

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE

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NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE

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THE JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

SYLLABUS AND STUDY GUIDE

FOR

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS

2004

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FOREWORD

THIS SYLLABUS AND STUDY GUIDE provide a comprehensive overview of the Naval War College Joint Military Operations Department course on Joint Military Operations. Prepared for the College of Naval Warfare and the Naval Command College, they also provide session-by-session material to assist the student in daily seminar preparation. Administrative information is also included.

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**JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT
JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS COURSE**

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JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS COURSE DESCRIPTION

1. Mission.

In keeping with the Naval War College (NWC) Mission, the Joint Military Operations (JMO) curriculum is designed to “. . .prepare U.S. and international military officers and civilians to (1) meet national security challenges as senior leaders in naval, joint, interagency and multinational arenas, (2) enable students to . . . conduct maritime and joint operations applying sound operational art, (3) develop advanced . . . operational concepts for employment of naval, joint, and multinational forces.” Once grounded in operational art, JMO students learn to identify joint battlespace objectives to achieve national and theater strategic aims, as well as, develop joint operational design. In addition, students will become well versed in campaign planning based on U.S. Naval and joint doctrine.

2. Course Overview.

The Joint Military Operations (JMO) course is an in-depth study of the operational level of war throughout the spectrum of conflict. JMO builds on the learning objectives of the National Security and Decision Making (NSDM) and Strategy and Policy (S&P) curriculums. Where NSDM and S&P emphasizes our national military strategy development, as well as, a nation’s imperative for matching policy to its strategic goals, JMO prepares students for the operational arena and to excel through effective operational planning and joint force application to achieve appropriate military objectives. Although maritime operations and sea service contributions are emphasized, all Services’ capabilities are studied with ultimate focus on joint operations from the combatant to the joint task force commander levels. Via extensive study of numerous case studies, the JMO student is challenged with five enduring questions from the perspective of a joint force commander and his staff planners:

- What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)
- What sequence of actions is most likely to produce those conditions? (Ways)
- How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish the desired sequence of actions? (Means)
- What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?
- What resources must be committed or actions performed to successfully execute the JFC’s exit strategy?

The ability to answer these questions is the very essence of the Joint Military Operations course.

3. Course Objectives.

- Acquire the capacity to focus thought at the theater-strategic and operational levels of war.

- Improve the ability to assess the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) as they apply to joint and multinational military operations.
- Develop the expertise to select, allocate, and task military forces across the spectrum of conflict.
- Understand the relationships among national and multi-national military forces, non-DoD or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private volunteer organizations (PVOs).
- Improve upon the ability to understand, analyze, and communicate complex issues clearly and effectively, both orally and in writing.

4. Course Organization

The first eight sessions of JMO constitute its Course Foundations. In these seminar sessions and lectures the student is introduced to the fundamental themes, which are subsequently woven throughout the ensuing four blocks. The operational research paper is detailed in the course foundations session. This 14–17 page paper on a joint operational level subject requires in-depth research and analysis, as well as close faculty and student collaboration. Paragraph eight below provides more detail on the JMO research paper requirement.

Block Two, “Operational Art,” introduces operational art, thoroughly illustrating its enduring concepts using the Battle of Leyte Gulf historical case study. The opportunity to exercise operational art is then offered in a student-led, seminar-wide analysis of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. Following the case study-based Operational Art examination, international and operational law sessions occur. In addition, the Law of Armed Conflict, as well as rules of engagement (ROE), is addressed in-depth.

In Block Three, “Planning,” Service capabilities and armed force employment are considered. The Commander’s Estimate of the Situation planning process is introduced and exercised via case study application. To ensure Combatant and Joint Force Commanders’ needs are met, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is central to this block.

Exploring the entire spectrum of conflict, Block Four, “Campaigning,” examines a wide variety of topics necessary for success during the conduct of modern campaigns, including historical cases covering failed and failing states, the interagency process, insurgency/counterinsurgency, terrorism, homeland security, transition, conflict termination, and peace operations. This block concludes with a synthesis event during which the interagency process must prioritize and apply resources in order to transition from combat to post-conflict operations. In addition, students are expected to apply material covered thus far in JMO while analyzing and ultimately resolving challenging issues.

Block Five concludes the JMO course. During Block Five, students are introduced to the dynamics of an operational commander’s headquarters staff during a hypothetical scenario that requires decisions on the use of military force. Students are expected to apply operational art, the Commander’s Estimate of the Situation (CES) and other concepts studied throughout the course, to develop solutions.

The trimester ends with the Final Examination, which takes into account the entire trimester's readings, seminar work, and exercises.

In summary, JMO's design allows each student to benefit from the combined contributions of faculty, guest speakers, and—most importantly—the shared professional expertise and research achievements of the corporate student body.

5. Student Guidelines.

The syllabus establishes the basis for required course work. In each session, “Focus” specifies the general context of the topic. Next, the “Objectives” section cites the session goals, including objectives required for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase I certification. The “Background” section provides assistance in framing the individual session. Finally, the “Questions” and “Readings” sections serve to focus student preparation and enhance understanding of the topic.

The Joint Military Operations course fulfills approximately 80 percent of the Phase I, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) requirements established by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The objectives identified as “PJE” in each session reflect these requirements. The remaining 20 percent of the JPME requirements are fulfilled in the National Security Decision Making (NSDM) and Strategy and Policy (S&P) courses.

Students joining the class as March “phased inputs” should read *Clausewitz and Sun Tzu Compared*. This book, placed in the March students' mailboxes, will assist in discussing operational art and other topics with classmates who have already completed the Strategy and Policy course.

6. The Socratic Method for the Warrior.

The seminar is JMO's fundamental learning forum. Student expertise is a significant part of the learning process. For a seminar to succeed there must be open and candid sharing of ideas and experiences, tempered with decorum. You will find that even the most “off-the-wall” idea may have some merit. Successful seminars—that is, seminars whose members leave with the greatest knowledge—are those made up of members who come to each session “loaded” with questions based on thorough preparation. Most students leave the seminar with new insights, or even more thought-provoking questions. Student preparation, free and open discussion, and the open-minded consideration of other students' ideas, all contribute to a valuable seminar experience. The “one-third” rule is the keystone of the seminar approach. The first third is a well-constructed, relevant curriculum. The second third is a quality JMO faculty. Most important is the individual student. Only by thoroughly preparing for seminar sessions can you become that active catalyst that generates “positive and proactive” seminar intra-action.

7. Readings.

All JMO Course sessions are supported by readings, the purpose of which is to assist in understanding the many aspects of the topics being presented. For the most part, the readings are intended to convey to the student basic information, the mastery of which in study outside the class will facilitate the discussions to take place within the class. A thorough understanding of the following information will significantly assist the student in using the course readings to best advantage:

- (a) **Categories of Readings.** Each syllabus session lists categories of readings.
- (1) **Required Readings** are those that should be read prior to the session, usually in the sequence listed in order to best understand the session material. Often your moderators will offer additional guidance on the priority of the readings, based on the special needs of the individual seminar.
 - (2) **Supplementary Readings** are those relevant to a session topic that may be useful to a student seeking more information in order to gain insight beyond that provided by the Required Readings; this would include additional background material on case studies and exercises. On occasion, faculty moderators may assign Supplementary Readings to individual students to read and provide oral synopses to the seminar in support of topic discussion.
- (b) **Reading Identifiers.** Each reading that is not a complete book or publication has a cover page which provides the four-digit reading identifier (e.g., NWC 1002) in the upper right-hand corner, and the reading title found below the Naval War College crest.
- (c) **Finding Specific Readings.** Readings for any specific session may be located as follows:
- (1) Required Readings are annotated as (Issued) at the end of the reading entry. This means they may be found in the Banker's Box of Readings provided to each student at the beginning of the JMO trimester. The Banker's Box is internally divided into specific JMO sessions by marked tabs (e.g., OPS I-2, III-3, etc.). The Issued Readings for the session are directly behind the session tab. Bulky Issued Readings, such as books, publications, and large extracts are found either at the back of the Banker's Box or in a separate bag.
 - (2) Supplementary Readings are annotated as (Issued), (Seminar Reserve), or (Library Reserve) at the end of each Reading entry. If issued, the reading is in the Banker's Box. If Seminar Reserve, several copies of the reading will be located on the rolling book cart in the seminar classroom. If Library Reserve, the reading (usually three to five copies) is located in the JMO Library Reserve section for JMO student use. Websites or library call numbers may be indicated for some readings. If there is no cue listed, the student will need to research the item; these readings are, however, frequently available in the Henry E. Eccles Library. The POC for a given session will be able to guide the student experiencing difficulty in tracking down a particular reading. Additional assistance is available from the reference librarians.
 - (3) CNW/NCC 2004 Reading List. This extremely useful handout is located at the front of the Banker's Box and may be the critical key to finding a reading when all else fails. It lists all NWC-numbered readings (e.g., NWC 1002) in numerical order, identifies status (Issued, Seminar Reserve, or Library Reserve), and identifies the course session to which the reading pertains. Readings are also listed by session number. The same information is also provided for books and publications. The Reading List is particularly useful for linking NWC numbered readings to their

specific course sessions in situations where the readings are distributed after the Banker's Box or are otherwise separated from the Box.

(4) **Readings Relevant to More Than One Session.** Some NWC-numbered readings (Issued) may be listed as Required or Supplementary for more than one session. In such cases, the reading will be found with the session tab (in the Banker's Box) of the first session to which the reading has been assigned. Duplicate copies of the reading are not provided for later sessions in which the reading is listed. Therefore, if an Issued Reading is not found with a session tab in the Banker's Box, cross-reference it using the Reading List to determine if the reading has been utilized for a previous session. If that fails, check the back of the Banker's Box in case the reading is bulky. If the reading isn't there, advise your faculty moderator, who will determine if the reading was inadvertently not included in your Banker's Box or if there is a class-wide problem.

(5) **Classified Readings.** The few classified readings used in the JMO Course will not be issued until near the date required for a specific session. Sufficiently in advance of the session, students will be advised when and where to draw the classified readings. Normally arrangements are made for students to obtain the classified reading from PUBS (located in the basement of Conolly Hall).

<p>IMPORTANT NOTE: Students are cautioned that classified readings and documents must be read on the premises of the Naval War College. Ensure such materials are properly safeguarded at all times. Do not leave the materials unattended, even in your cubicle area. Students are not provided with classified material storage containers (safes); it is therefore necessary to check out and return classified material on a daily basis. Faculty moderators will provide additional information as required during the JMO trimester.</p>

Management of Reading Load. The amount of preparatory reading required for each session depends on a variety of factors, including topic complexity and session objectives. ***Recommend you review session reading requirements at least a week ahead of time in order to accurately plan preparation time and ensure that all necessary readings are in hand.***

8. Operations Research Paper.

The Operations Research Paper presents the opportunity to study a theater-strategic or operational-level issue, conduct research and analysis, and prepare a paper that advances the literature. It is a chance for students to address a topic that they personally feel is of value. It requires independent thought and graduate-level writing, since the final product must be a 14–17 page paper suitable for publication in a professional journal. The amount and depth of research should be adequate to support the student's approach, and sufficiently justify the conclusions and recommendations. Another use of the paper may be to provide a source of innovative thinking to the Service and joint staffs involved with the many issues bearing on employment of forces.

Numerous combatant and headquarters commands actively solicit papers and monographs on topics of current interest to them. The Naval War College is frequently canvassed for papers on particular subjects, and requested to generate interest in specific areas for research and writing to support requesting commands. Quality papers are provided to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) via the Naval War College's Eccles Library, where qualified users can access them for use in a variety of applications.

Students are encouraged to submit their research papers for the War College Prize Competition as described in the Naval War College Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM), NWC Instruction Annexes, which is included in the “Student Handbook.” Amplifying information and guidance on the selection and execution of a successful Operations Research Paper project is provided in NWC 2062L. Your moderators will answer questions and otherwise assist you in this most important intellectual undertaking during the Introductory Seminar (OPS I-2), the Operations Research Paper-Review session (OPS I-6), and student tutorials in December.

9. Plagiarism and Misrepresentation.

While occurrences of plagiarism and misrepresentation are exceedingly rare, the consequences of such acts are so serious as to warrant some specific mention here, and will also be reviewed in seminar by the moderator team at the beginning of the trimester. Your attention is directed to the Naval War College SORM, which discusses the academic honor code and specifically prohibits cheating, plagiarism, and misrepresentation. For the military officer accustomed to the legitimate staff practice of adopting verbatim the language of orders and directives produced by other commands, the academic prohibition of using the words of other writers without proper attribution must be reviewed and emphasized. The following definitions clarify this important issue:

Plagiarism is the duplication of an author’s words without both quotation marks and accurate references or footnotes. It is also the paraphrased use of an author’s ideas without accurate references or footnotes.

Misrepresentation is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgment. It may include the following:

- Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at the Naval War College without advance permission of the moderators.
- Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside the Naval War College without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

10. Cases.

Like games, case method discussions generate good student involvement and are designed to develop student abilities to solve problems using the knowledge, concepts, and skills honed during the JMO trimester. Some of our cases and problems stress individual effort and planning, while other cases will require a team or staff approach. Cases may consist of historical events, analyzed for operational and strategic lessons, or postulated crisis situations demonstrating the application of concepts such as presence, deterrence, international law, rules of engagement, and self-defense. Case problems sometimes will be narrowly focused to demonstrate a specific force and its capabilities and limitations or to highlight specific concepts involving an aspect of warfare. Seminars are often split into small groups or teams to prepare solutions and responses.

11. Lectures by Senior Military Leaders.

Enrichment lectures by senior military leaders occur periodically during the course. Most of these presentations feature the Chiefs of Service or regional and functional

combatant commanders. These speakers are invited to discuss views and ideas from their perspective as operational commanders, Service Chiefs, or as senior staff officers. The lectures are normally scheduled for Monday or Tuesday afternoons from 1330–1500. The busy schedules of senior officers, however, often make a departure from this schedule unavoidable. The weekly yellow schedule will specify the final date and time of each enrichment lecture. Last minute changes will be disseminated by seminar moderators. In order to gain the most benefit from these sessions, it is critical that students be prepared to ask penetrating questions of the guest lecturer.

Note: *The substance of the lectures and the ensuing question and answer period are “Not for Attribution” and must not be referenced or identified outside the War College confines, or in any written work, including the Operations Research Paper, without the express permission of the speaker. Care should be taken not to quote an earlier speaker when posing questions to a subsequent speaker.*

12. Requirements.

Students are expected to prepare fully for each seminar and to participate in classroom discussions and exercises. A tough-minded, questioning attitude and a willingness to enter into rigorous but disciplined discussion are central to the success of the course.

(a) **Workload.** Some peaks in the workload will occur. Advance planning and careful allocation of time will help mitigate these peaks. This is particularly true of the Operations Research Paper. Student experience indicates that the total course requirements will involve a weekly average workload of about 10–15 hours of in-class and 30–35 hours of out-of-class work.

(b) **Oral and Written Requirements.** Each section of the course has oral and written requirements that provide the opportunity for the student to demonstrate prowess and progress. In addition, these requirements serve as a means for feedback and interaction between the faculty and members of the class. Not all requirements are graded, but each provides the student some measure of how he or she is doing at that point in the course. The following is a composite listing of these course requirements, type of activity, relative weights and the key dates of graded events:

<i>Requirement</i>	<i>Type Effort</i>	<i>Weight</i>	<i>Date</i>
Operations Research Paper Proposal	Written/Individual meeting with moderators		30 March (Proposal due) 2-8 April (Tutorials)
Operational Art Exam	Written/Individual	15%	2–5 April
Operations Research Paper	Written/Individual	35%	17 May
Final Examination	Written/Individual	25%	10 June
Seminar Contribution	Assessment by moderators	25%	Daily

13. JMO Department Grading Criteria.

The overall guidance for grading students at the Naval War College is contained in Naval War College SORM. The most salient points in this instruction are:

- Based on the analysis of past grade achievements, a grade distribution of 35%–45% “A’s” and 55%–65% “B’s” and “C’s” combined can be expected. While variations from this norm might occur from seminar to seminar and subject to subject, it would

be unusual to reach an overall “A” to “B/C” ratio greater than an even 50/50 distribution.

- Numerical averages will not be rounded up (i.e., 89.95 is a B+ and will not be rounded up to an A-).
- Any assigned grade may be appealed in writing within seven calendar days after receiving the grade. Grades will be appealed first to the senior moderator and then to the Department Chairman, using forms available in Room C-203. If deemed necessary, the Chairman may assign an additional grader who will review the assignment and provide an independent grade. Note that the review ***may sustain, lower, or raise the grade.***

Grade appeals may ultimately be taken to the Dean of Academics, whose decision will be final. The academic coordinator, Ms. Carol Stewart, in Room C-203, can assist in preparing an appeal.

A course average grade of B- or higher is required for successful completion of master’s degree requirements. A minimum grade of C- is required for successful completion of the JMO course and receipt of JPME Phase I certification.

Three sets of general grading criteria help in the determination of the letter grades that will be assigned during the Joint Military Operations trimester. The inclusion of these criteria here in the syllabus offers the student a suggestion of the kinds of standards and requirements for which grading faculty look. The first set covers the Operations Research Paper, the second covers the examinations, and the third covers individual contribution grades.

Using the Naval War College Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM) as basic guidance, the procedures below amplify the criteria as established within the Joint Military Operations Department.

a. Grading criteria for the Operations Research Paper:

The Operations Research Paper must have a thesis; provide sufficient background research to analyze the thesis; consider arguments and counter-arguments for the thesis and compare conflicting points of view; present logical conclusions drawn from the material presented; and provide recommendations or lessons learned based on the conclusions. In addition to the examples of substantive criteria specified below, the paper must be editorially correct (spelling, punctuation, grammar, format, etc.).

- A+ (98) Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Especially deserving of distribution to appropriate authorities and submission for prize competition. Thesis is definitive, research is extensive, subject is treated completely, and the conclusions and recommendations are logical and justified.
- A (95) Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original thought. Suitable for distribution and submission for prize competition. Thesis is clearly articulated and focused, research is significant, arguments and counter-arguments are comprehensive, and conclusions and recommendations are supported.

- A- (92) Above the average expected of graduate work. Contains original thought. Should be retained in the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). Thesis is clearly defined, research is purposeful, arguments and counter-arguments are presented, conclusions and recommendations are valid.
- B+ (88) A solid paper. Above the average of graduate work. Thesis is articulated, research has strong points, subject is well-presented and constructed, and conclusions and recommendations are substantiated by the material.
- B (85) Average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, research is appropriate for the majority of the subject, analysis of the subject is valid with minor omissions, and conclusions and recommendations are presented with few inconsistencies.
- B- (82) Below the average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, but the research does not fully support it; the analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are not fully developed. The paper may not be balanced and the logic may be flawed.
- C+ (78) Below the standards required of graduate work. Portions of the criteria are lacking or missing, the thesis may be unclear, research may be inadequate, analysis may be incomplete, and the conclusions and recommendations may be lacking or not supported by the material.
- C (75) Fails to meet the standards of graduate work. Thesis is present, but support, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are either missing or illogically presented. Paper has significant flaws in construction and development.
- C- (72) Well below standards. Thesis poorly stated with minimal evidence of research and/or several missing requirements. Subject is presented in an incoherent manner that does not warrant serious consideration.
- F (65) Paper has no thesis, or does not support the thesis. Paper has significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, logic. An apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements for the paper.

b. Grading criteria for the exams:

- A+ (98) Organized, coherent and well-written response. Completely addresses the question. Covers all applicable major and key minor points. Demonstrates total grasp and comprehension of the topic.
- A (95) Demonstrates an excellent grasp of the topic, addressing all major issues and key minor points. Organized, coherent, and well-written.
- A- (92) Above the average expected of graduate work. Demonstrates a very good grasp of the topic. Addresses all major and at least some minor points in a clear, coherent manner.

- B+ (88) Well-crafted answer that discusses all relevant important concepts with supporting rationale for analysis.
- B (85) Average graduate performance. A successful consideration of the topic overall, but either lacking depth or containing statements for which the supporting rationale is not sufficiently argued.
- B- (82) Addresses the question and demonstrates a fair understanding of the topic, but does not address all key concepts and is weak in rationale and clarity.
- C+ (78) Demonstrates some grasp of topic, but provides insufficient rationale for response and misses major elements or concepts. Does not merit graduate credit.
- C (75) Demonstrates poor understanding of the topic. Provides marginal support for response. Misses major elements or concepts.
- C- (72) Addresses the question, but does not provide sufficient discussion to demonstrate adequate understanding of the topic.
- F (65) Fails to address the question.

c. Grading criteria for seminar contributions:

The seminar contribution grade is determined by moderator evaluation of the quality of a student's contributions to seminar discussions, projects, and exercises.

All students are expected to contribute to each seminar session, and to listen and respond respectfully when seminar-mates or moderators offer their ideas. This overall expectation underlies all criteria described below. Interruptive, discourteous, disrespectful, or unprofessional conduct or attitude detracts from the overall learning experience for the seminar and will negatively affect the contribution grade.

- A+ (98) Peerless demonstration of wholly thorough preparation for individual seminar sessions. Consistently contributes original and highly insightful thought. Exceptional team player and leader.
- A (95) Superior demonstration of complete preparation for individual sessions. Frequently offers original and well thought-out insights. Routinely takes the lead to accomplish team projects.
- A- (92) Excellent demonstration of preparation for individual sessions. Contributes original, well-developed insights in the majority of seminar sessions. Often takes the lead to accomplish team projects.
- B+ (88) Above-average graduate level preparation for seminar sessions. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights. Obvious team player who sometimes takes the lead for team projects.
- B (85) Average graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Occasionally contributes original and insightful thought. Acceptable team player; takes effective lead on team projects when assigned.

- B- (82) Minimally acceptable graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Infrequently contributes well-developed insights; may sometimes speak out without having thought through an issue. Requires prodding to take lead on team projects.
- C+ (78) Generally prepared, but not to minimum acceptable graduate level. Requires encouragement to contribute to discussions; contributions do not include original thinking or insights. Routinely allows others to take the lead in team projects.
- C (75) Preparation for individual sessions is only displayed when student is called upon to contribute. Elicited contributions reflect at best a basic understanding of session material. Consistently requires encouragement or prodding to take on fair share of team project workload. Only occasionally engages in seminar dialogue with peers and moderators.
- C- (72) Barely acceptable preparation. Contributions are extremely limited, rarely voluntary, and reflect minimal grasp of session material. Displays little interest in contributing to team projects.
- F (65) Unacceptable preparation. Contributions are rare and reflect below-minimum acceptable understanding of session material. Displays no interest in contributing to team projects; cannot be relied on to accomplish assigned project work.

14. Seminar Assignments.

The principal criterion in assigning students to a seminar is a balanced distribution among Services and agencies, as well as student and moderator specialties and operational expertise. Two faculty members are assigned to each seminar. Student seminar, classroom, and faculty assignments are published separately.

15. Schedule.

Seminars usually meet in the morning. Depending on the work assigned, you may all meet for scheduled periods in seminar as a group, in smaller teams depending on tasking, or to conduct individual study and research. Please pay close attention to the start times for each event since they vary throughout the trimester. Classes normally are scheduled for 0830–1145. Moderators may adjust these times to facilitate the learning objectives for each segment of instruction. A course-planning schedule containing meeting dates and times is provided in the Addenda to this syllabus. The weekly schedule (printed on blue paper) reflects revisions and supersedes the schedule contained in the syllabus. Late changes will be announced by memo delivered to student mailboxes or by the moderators in class.

16. Key Personnel.

If you require additional information on the course, or if problems develop that cannot be resolved with your moderators, you may contact the Chairman via his Executive Assistant. The key departmental personnel are:

Chairman of the Department	CAPT A. J. Ruoti, USN Room C-203, 841-3556
Executive Assistant	PROF J. C. Hodell Room C-203, 841-6458

Academic Coordinator	Ms. C. A. Stewart Room C-203, 841-4120
Head, Block One Course Foundations	CAPT S. D. Kornatz, USN Room C-420, 841-6460
Head, Block Two Operational Art	CDR J. L. Barker, USN Room C-420, 841-6457
Head, Block Three Planning	PROF P. C. Sweeney Room C-424, 841-6480
Head, Block Four Campaigning	PROF J. R. Ballard Room C-421, 841-6469
Head, Block Five JMO Exercise	CAPT M. D. Seaman, USN Room C-423, 841-6477
Acting Head, Intelligence (CI) Division	CDR A. R. Wall, USN Room SE-117, 841-6486
Head, International Law Division (IL)	CAPT B. J. Waltman, JAGC, USN Room C-424, 841-6473

17. Faculty Assistance.

Faculty members are available to assist students with course material, to review a student's progress, and to provide counseling as required. Students with individual concerns are encouraged to discuss them as early as possible so that moderators can render assistance in a timely manner. Students are urged to make use of this non-classroom time with the faculty. During Tutorials, scheduled in conjunction with Operations Research Paper, moderators may take the opportunity to discuss student progress as well as to solicit student input on the course to date. Faculty room numbers and telephone extensions are listed on pages 166–67 of this syllabus. The majority of the faculty are located on the fourth deck of Conolly Hall, except where noted. SP denotes Spruance Hall; SE denotes Sims Hall; M denotes Mahan Hall; and L denotes Luce Hall.

18. Student Critiques.

We strive continually to improve this course. To assist us in this goal students are provided an End-of-Course Questionnaire for completion. We have also provided "Course Session Critique Notes" to allow students to record information as they go along. Both the Critique and the note pages are provided in the Addendum, starting on page 152. The note pages will enable you to record your insights on matters you may otherwise forget by the time you fill out the End of Course Questionnaire (e.g., which readings were particularly helpful, and which ones missed the mark.) The End-of-Course Questionnaire is required and will be submitted electronically. ***The Questionnaire must be submitted and receipt acknowledged not later than 1200 on Thursday, 4 March.*** Your constructive comments will help ensure that the course remains relevant and vital in the years to come.

19. Faculty Biographies.

CAPTAIN ANTHONY J. RUOTI, JR., USN, reported to the Joint Military Operations Department as chairman in August 2002, following a tour as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (N3) for Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces Europe. Captain Ruoti graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1975 and the Naval War College in 1993, receiving a master's degree in National Security and Strategic Studies. His shore tours include Training Squadron THIRTY-ONE, NAS Corpus Christi, Texas, Commander Patrol Wing ELEVEN, Executive Officer of the West Coast's P-3 Fleet Replacement Squadron, Patrol Squadron THIRTY-ONE, The Joint Staff, Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Directorate (J6), Architecture and Integration Division. Following this Washington tour he reported to Commander Patrol Wings Atlantic/Commander Task Force EIGHTY-FOUR as operations officer and subsequently as Chief of Staff. Captain Ruoti's sea tours were Patrol Squadron FIVE (VP-5), NAS Jacksonville serving as Aircraft Division Officer, Training Officer, and Pilot NATOPS Officer holding P-3 "Orion" Patrol Plane Commander, Mission Commander, and Instructor Pilot designations, deploying to NAS Bermuda and NAS Sigonella, with detachments to Iceland, Crete, Spain, the Azores, Puerto Rico and Senegal, working closely with allied naval forces throughout the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean, USS FORRESTAL as Communications Officer, deploying to the Mediterranean, Patrol Squadron NINETEEN as Assistant Operations Officer and Maintenance Officer, deploying to Diego Garcia, BIOT detaching to Daharan, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Oman, Okinawa and Misawa, Japan. He commanded Patrol Squadron NINE, during this tour his squadron was awarded the Battle "E", deploying to Misawa, Japan and detaching to Adak, Alaska and Panama. Captain Ruoti assumed command of Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing FIVE, preparing, training and certifying Patrol and Special Project Squadrons for forward deployed operations.

PROFESSOR JOHN R. BALLARD joined the Naval War College faculty in August 2000, having taught for six years the National Defense University. He came to Newport directly from a tour as visiting Professor of Defence and Strategic Studies at Massey University, in Palmerston North, New Zealand. Previously his National Defense University duties were at the Joint Forces Staff College, where he served as Professor of Military History and Strategy and the Director of Curriculum. Professor Ballard's career has included broad experience in teaching operational planning, command and control, interagency coordination, and military history. His research has focused on Joint Task Forces and Peace Operations, and he is currently writing a book on Operation STABILISE, the multinational operation in East Timor. Professor Ballard's past writing efforts have included prize-winning articles in numerous military and professional publications; his first book, published in 1998, was *Upholding Democracy, the United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997*. His active duty in the U. S. Marine Corps included tours at 2nd, 3rd and 4th Marine Divisions, Headquarters Marine Corps and the staff of U.S. Atlantic Command. A Colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve, he was recently mobilized in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, serving as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G5 at Marine Forces Pacific. Professor Ballard's degrees include a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Naval Academy, a master of arts in history from California State University, and a doctorate from the Catholic University of America.

COMMANDER JEFFREY L. BARKER, USN, returned to the Naval War College faculty in August 1999, and is the current holder of the Matthew Fontaine Maury Military Chair of Oceanography. A 1976 graduate of the Georgia Institute of Technology, with a B.S. in Physics, he earned an M.S. in Oceanography and Meteorology from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in 1987, and also earned an M.A. from the Naval War College in 1994. In his initial sea tour in USS KALAMAZOO (AOR-6) Commander Barker was designated a Surface Warfare Officer. After assignment at the U.S. Naval Academy, he was redesignated as a Meteorology and Oceanography Officer and reported to Fleet Numerical Oceanography Center in Monterey, CA as the Fleet Applications Division Officer. In addition to his initial Naval War College faculty tour, Meteorology and Oceanography assignments have included: A sea tour in USS WISCONSIN (BB-64) and; overseas tours as the Executive Officer of the Naval Oceanography Command Facility in Yokosuka, Japan, and as the Staff METOC Officer in the London headquarters of Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Force Europe.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAUL G. BELL, USAF, will be joining the Joint Military Operations Department Faculty in January 2004 following the completion of Chilean Senior Service School in Santiago, Chile. Prior to reporting to Santiago, Lt Col Bell was the Commander of the 20th Bombardment Squadron at Barksdale AFB, LA. Other assignments include a tour at the Pentagon where he served as the USAF Chief of Long Range Power Projection and as a Legislative Fellow on Capital Hill. Additionally, he was a B-52 Weapons School Instructor, Chief of Standardization/Evaluation and a Training Flight Instructor Pilot. Lt Col Bell earned a Bachelor of Science Degree in Political Science from the USAF Academy and was awarded a Masters of Aerospace Science and Technology from Embry Riddle University in 1995.

PROFESSOR ALBION A. BERGSTROM rejoined the Joint Military Operations faculty in Autumn 2003. He retired from the Army with over thirty years active duty in December 1999, having completed his career on the JMO faculty as a Professor of Operations and Chief of Block IV, Regional Contingency Planning and Warfighting. Prior military assignments include duty as an Agency Deputy Commander, Division Chief in the Pentagon, Armor (M1A1) battalion command and various command and staff jobs. An Armor officer by trade he had Cavalry, Armor and Infantry experience in Southeast Asia, Europe and CONUS. He holds a B.A. in Political Science/International Relations from Colorado State University, an M.A. in Personnel Management from Central Michigan University and an M.A. from the Naval War College. He is a graduate of the Army's Command and General Staff College and the Army War College Strategist course. He is also a graduate of the Senior Officials in National Security Course at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and was a National Security Fellow at Harvard.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN E. BRENCHE, USAF, joined the Joint Military Operations Department Faculty in September 2001, following a two year assignment at Fort Hood, Texas where he served as the Director of Operations for the 9th Air Support Operations Squadron and Commander of the 712th Air Support Operations Squadron. Lt Col Brenche is a Senior Navigator with over 1300 flight hours in the T-43, T-37, T-38, and F-

111A/D/F. Other assignments include a tour with the 32nd Fighter Group (FG), Soesterberg Air Base, The Netherlands as Chief of Plans, Chief of Exercises and Evaluations, and Deputy Commander of the 32nd Logistics Squadron. He was then selected to attend Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, followed by an assignment to the College of Aerospace Doctrine and Education (CADRE), where he was the Chief of Education Products for CADRE's Airpower Research Institute. Finally, he was stationed at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, and assigned to Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe, as Chief of the Forces Requirements Branch. Lt Col Brence earned a Bachelor of Science Degree in Military History and his commission from the USAF Academy in 1981, and was awarded a Master's of Public Administration from Troy State University in 1988.

COMMANDER RICHARD J. F. BUCKLAND, ROYAL NAVY, joined the Joint Military Operations faculty in July 2002 following completion of the Naval Command Course at the U.S. Naval War College. He joined the Royal Navy in 1978 and after graduating from the Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, qualified as an Anti-Submarine Warfare Observer in 1979. His first operational tour was spent with 819 Naval Air Squadron, Prestwick, flying SH-3s on Anti-Submarine and Search and Rescue duties prior to joining HMS ENDURANCE Flight in 1981, this time flying in the Wasp helicopter in the attack and survey support roles. In this memorable appointment he took part in two fascinating deployments to the Antarctic and saw service during the Falklands Conflict in 1982. Returning ashore in 1983, conversion to the Airborne Early Warning(AEW) Sea King helicopter preceded a return to sea for bridge watchkeeping duties in HM Ships ARGONAUT and PENELOPE prior to joining the staff of 849 Naval Air Squadron. In 1986 he took up an exchange appointment with the United States Navy in San Diego, California, instructing on the E2C 'Hawkeye' carrier-borne Early Warning aircraft, returning to the UK in 1989 as the Senior Observer 849 'B' Flight attached to HMS ARK ROYAL's air group. Following the Initial Staff Course in 1991 he joined the staff of the Naval Air Warfare Development Group with responsibility for AEW Sea King tactics. From 1994 to 1997 he was Executive Officer first in HMS NEWCASTLE, and latterly in HMS MONMOUTH prior to joining the staff of the Flag Officer Surface Flotilla as the Staff Executive Officer with responsibility for management issues in RN warships. Promoted to commander in December 1999, he took command of the Type 23 frigate HMS LANCASTER where he enjoyed a busy and rewarding period in command, culminating in a deployment to the Arabian Gulf in support of UN sanctions and national tasking.

PROFESSOR JAMES P. BUTLER returned to the Naval War College in Autumn, 2003 after having served as the Northrop Grumman Reserve Component Joint Professional Military Education Project Manager, converting core curriculum lessons into a distance learning course for the Joint Forces Staff College. A retired naval aviator with thirty years of extensive search and rescue, flying, and command experience, he served as the Air Boss aboard USS GUADALCANAL during Desert Storm (1991 war in Iraq) and Provide Comfort (humanitarian relief for Kurdish refugees); commanded the Naval Air Technical Training Center; served as executive assistant and professor of Strategy and Policy at the Naval War College; and was Dean, Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College. Professor Butler graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy

with a B.S. in Analytical Management, has an M.S. in Material Management from the Naval Postgraduate School, an M.A. in Strategic Studies from the U. S. Naval War College, and an M.S. in National Resource Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

PROFESSOR DONALD W. CHISHOLM joined the Naval War College in 2000. Previously, he was a member of the graduate public administration faculty at the University of Illinois, Chicago (1996–2000). He has also taught political science and public policy at the University of California, Los Angeles (1989–1996), at Ohio State University (1987–1989), and the University of California, San Diego (1984–1986). Professor Chisholm earned his A.B., M.A., and Ph.D. in political science at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of *Coordination Without Hierarchy: Informal Structures in Multi-organizational Systems* (University of California Press, 1989) and *Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793–1941* (Stanford University Press, 2001), along with a number of journal articles on problems of organizations. He is presently at work on a book on the amphibious operations of the Korean War to be published by the U.S. Naval Institute Press.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SCOTT G. CILUFFO, USA joined the Naval War College, Joint Military Operations department faculty in July 2003. Originally commissioned as a Regular Army (RA) Signal Corps Officer in 1982, this Rochester, NY native began his career as a Special Staff officer for the Deputy and Commanding Generals of Fort Gordon, Georgia, until his branch transfer to Army Aviation in 1984. As a Senior Army Aviator rated in the UH-1H, OH-58A/C, AH-1F and UH-60A/L, Lieutenant Colonel Ciluffo has served in Command, Staff, and Instructor Pilot positions from Platoon through Division at a variety of locations including Korea (52nd Avn Bn), Alabama, Alaska (6th ID (L)), Colorado (4/3 ACR) and Honduras (CDR, 1-228th Avn Regt). He has also completed two separate tours in the Pentagon, serving on both the Army (DAMO-OD, AOC) and Joint Staffs (OJCS, J-34), assisting in the coordination of operations in Haiti, Somalia, Northern Iraq, Rwanda and Kosovo. His schools include the Signal Officer Basic Course (1982), Aviation Officer Advanced Course (1986), Command & General Staff College (1996) and the U.S. Army War College (2003). He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Mass Communications from St. Bonaventure University in Olean, New York, and a Masters in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

CAPTAIN MICHAEL R. CRITZ, USN, reported to the Naval War College, Joint Military Operations faculty in September, 2001 following a three year tour as the Professor of Naval Science at the Naval ROTC Unit, University of Arizona. An HC and HSL helicopter pilot, he has served aboard numerous carriers, destroyers, and auxiliaries, most recently completing a tour as Air Officer aboard the USS INCHON (then LPH-12, now MCS -12). He has also served as the LAMPS MK I helicopter Assistant Program Manager for Systems and Engineering at the Naval Air Systems Command, Commanding Officer of Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron (Light) Thirty-Three (HSL-33), and was previously a member of the JMO faculty. He holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, an M.S. in Electrical Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School, an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies

from the College of Naval Command and Staff and has completed the JPME Phase II course at the Armed Forces Staff College.

CAPTAIN DAVID A. DUFFIÉ, USN, reported to the Joint Military Operations Department in September 2003 following a tour as Chief of Staff for Commander Submarine Group Eight in Naples, Italy. Captain Duffié has spent his entire 28 years in the Navy as a Submariner. His first submarine assignment was USS Narwhal (SSN 671) from January 1977 to July 1980. He served as engineer officer on USS Henry Clay (SSBN 625B) from July 1980 to July 1983. He then served as Director, Officer Department at Nuclear Power School, Orlando, Florida until July 1985. Captain Duffié served as executive officer and was on the pre-commissioning unit USS Louisville (SSN 724) from August 1985 to November 1987. He was then assigned to the Bureau of Personnel in Washington, DC where he served as the submarine placement officer and executive officer detailer until November 1989. Captain Duffié's first command was USS Helena (SSN 725) from August 1990 to July 1992. During his command tour Helena received the CINCPACFLT Silver Anchor Award, the Engineering "E", and the ASW "T". Additionally, he personally received the 1992 Naval Submarine League Admiral Darby award for command excellence. Following command, he reported to the COMSUBPAC staff as the Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO) Instructor from July 1992 to July 1994. He served as Chief of Actions on the Joint Staff from July 1995 to June 1997. He assumed command of the Submarine Tender, USS SIMON LAKE (AS 33) in LaMaddalena, Italy. During his command tour the ship received the Battle Efficiency "E" for 1997 and 1998, two Navy Unit and two Meritorious Unit Commendations. In July 1999, he was assigned as the Navy Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He served at Pacific Command in Pearl Harbor, HI as the Chief of Requirements and Force Structure Division (J-55) from July 2000 to July 2001. Captain Duffié holds a Bachelor of Science in Systems Engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy, a MBA from Cameron University, and a Master of Science Degree in National Security Strategy from the National War College at the National Defense University.

COLONEL MARVIN A. ENGLERT, USA, joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 2001 following his completion of the Naval War College. He was commissioned in the Army as an Infantry Officer. His company grade assignments include platoon leader, company executive officer, company commander and assistant brigade operations officer in the 9th Infantry Division and staff officer Forces Command. His field grade assignments include battalion operations officer in the 199th Separate Infantry Brigade, staff officer on the Army Staff, executive officer for the 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, base support battalion commander, and professor of military science at Providence College. He holds a bachelor of science degree from the United States Military Academy, a master of science degree in operation research and systems analysis from the Air Force Institute of Technology, and a master of arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DOUGLAS O. FEGENBUSH JR., USMC joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in November 2002 following his completion of the Naval War College as the honor graduate. He was commissioned in the United States

Marine Corps in 1981. He completed Naval Flight Training in 1984. His flying tours include operations with VMO-1 (OV-10 Bronco), MAG-13 and VMA-211 (AV-8B Harrier) in the Mediterranean, Japan, and the Persian Gulf. He served as an adjutant, pilot training officer, ordnance officer, powerline officer, aircraft maintenance officer, squadron operations officer, group operations officer, squadron executive officer, and group executive officer. His qualifications include Night Systems Instructor, Training LSO, Aviation Safety Officer, and CMS Officer, Forward Air Controller (Airborne), and Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne). His staff tour was with COMNAVAIRPAC as the AV-8B Class Desk, USS Constellation ship daddy, and Aerial Refueling Stores Class Desk. He commanded VMA-211 at MCAS Yuma, Arizona. LtCol Fegenbush is an honor graduate of Amphibious Warfare School, and a graduate of the USMC Command and Staff College. He holds a bachelor of science degree in Accounting from Southwestern Oklahoma State University and a master of arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.

COLONEL RICHARD FINDLAY, USMC, reported to the Joint Military Operations Department in August 2002, following an eleven month assignment as a Fellow on CNO's Strategic Studies Group XXI. He received his commission in June 1978 from the US Naval Academy and designated as a Naval Flight Officer in 1979. After completing VMA (AW)-202 he served as Maintenance Materiel Control Officer, Flight Line Officer and Avionics Officer in VMA (AW)-533 with deployments to MCAS Iwakuni and to the Mediterranean on board USS SARATOGA. From 1985–1986 he served as an instructor at the Staff Non-Commissioned Officer Academy. In 1987 he returned to VMA (AW)-533 and served as Quality Assurance Officer, Assistant and Aviation Maintenance Officer and completed deployments to the Mediterranean on board USS J. F. KENNEDY, to Iwakuni Japan and to Desert Storm. Upon return he transitioned to the F/A-18 and during the stand-ups of VMFA(AW)-225 and VMFA(AW)-533 served as the Intelligence Officer, Administration and Operations Officer between 1993 and 1995 and deployed to Aviano Italy in support of Operations PROVIDE PROMISE and DENY FLIGHT. He served as Commanding Officer VMFA (AW)-332 between 1996 and 1998; as Section Head Aviation Officer Assignments between 1999 and 2001. He holds a B.S. degree in Oceanography from USNA (1978), and a M.A. degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He is a 1987 graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School, a 1996 graduate of Air Command and Staff College and a 1999 graduate of the Naval War College.

PROFESSOR THEODORE L. GATCHEL rejoined the Joint Military Operations faculty in July 1998, having taught in the department twice while on active duty. He retired from the Marine Corps in 1991 as a colonel after a thirty-year career that included a wide variety of both staff and command assignments and two combat tours in Vietnam. He holds a B.S. in Geological Engineering from the University of Oklahoma and an M.S. in Management from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is also a graduate of the Naval War College, the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the U.S. Army's Infantry Officers Advanced Course. He is the author of *At the Water's Edge: Defending Against the Modern Amphibious Assault* (Naval Institute Press, 1996) and *Eagles and Alligators: An Examination of the Command Relationships That Have Existed Between Aircraft Carrier and Amphibious Forces During Amphibious Operations* (Naval War

College Press, 1997), in addition to numerous magazine and journal articles and a monthly newspaper column on military affairs.

COLONEL THOMAS J. GIBBONS, USA, reported to the US Naval War College as the Army Advisor in July 2003, following a tour as the Director of Manpower, Personnel and Administration (J1) for the U.S. Pacific Command at Camp Smith, Hawaii. Colonel Gibbons graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1979. He was commissioned as a Field Artillery Officer and served in field artillery batteries in the 2d Infantry Division in Korea and the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, NC. COL Gibbons attended flight training at Fort Rucker, AL in 1982 and was assigned to the 101st Airborne Division (AASLT) at Fort Campbell, KY. He flew with the 229th Attack Helicopter Battalion and commanded the Division Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC). He reported to the U.S. Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) in 1986 and worked as an Aviation Assignment Officer. COL Gibbons transitioned to the OH58D (Kiowa Warrior) helicopter and was subsequently assigned to Task Force 118 at Fort Bragg as the Operations Officer (S3). He worked as the U.S. Army Liaison to the NAVCENT Commander during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm flying from US Navy ships in the Persian Gulf region. COL Gibbons was assigned to the Army Staff at the Pentagon in 1993 and worked as the White House Liaison Officer for the Director of the Army Staff. In 1995, COL Gibbons was assigned to the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, NY as the 10th Aviation Brigade Executive Officer. He commanded of the 1st Battalion, 10th Aviation Regiment (ATTACK) at Fort Drum and deployed to support Joint Task Force 6 along the southern borders of the United States. COL Gibbons has had a variety of command and staff assignments in cavalry and attack helicopter battalions. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. COL Gibbons holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Economics from the US Military Academy, a Master's degree in Engineering Administration from The George Washington University, and a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DERRILL T. GOLDIZEN, USAF, joined the Naval War College faculty in the fall of 2002 following an assignment as Director of Weather Operations, 18th Air Support Operations Group, Pope AFB, North Carolina. He completed Air Force Officer Training School as First Honor Graduate and was commissioned in 1984. His operational assignments include tours as Staff Weather Officer to the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Ft Carson, Colorado and the Combined Field Army (ROK/US), Camp Red Cloud, Republic of Korea. He has also served as an intelligence analyst at the National Air Intelligence Center and taught graduate space physics at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. In his most recent assignment, he deployed to Southwest Asia to provide airpower expertise to the Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Coalition/Joint Forces Land Component Commander. His degrees include Bachelor of Arts in Natural Sciences from the University of South Florida (1984), Master of Science in Meteorology from the Pennsylvania State University (1991), and Doctor of Science in Meteorology from the Pennsylvania State University (1995).

CAPTAIN CHESTER E. HELMS, USN, enlisted in the Navy in 1969 and received his commission via the Navy Enlisted Scientific Education Program (NESEP). He graduated with honors from North Carolina State University in 1974 with a B.S. in Nuclear Engineering and holds an M.A. from the Naval War College. Captain Helms served sea tours aboard USS OMAHA (SSN 692), USS BOSTON (SSN 703), USS PHILADELPHIA (SSN 690), and as Commanding Officer of USS GEORGE C. MARSHALL (SSBN 654). His shore tours include the staff of Admiral McKee at Naval Reactors, Department of Energy; Tactical Development Staff of Submarine Development Squadron Twelve; and Executive Assistant to the Director for Operations and Logistics and Senior Controller in the Command Center at U.S. Strategic Command. Captain Helms reported to the Naval War College in August 1995.

PROFESSOR DOUGLAS N. HIME first served on the Naval War College faculty from 1992 to 1996, after having served as Chief, International Negotiations, U.S. Delegation to the NATO Military Committee. Following a tour as a member of the faculty at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, Professor Hime retired from the Air Force in September 1998 and rejoined the Naval War College faculty in October 1998. His previous assignments include several operational flying tours in B-52s and a staff assignment as Deputy Director of Bomber Operations at Headquarters, Strategic Air Command. He has commanded avionics and field maintenance squadrons in addition to a B-52 squadron. His military schooling includes Air Command and Staff College, Air War College and the NATO Defense College. He holds a B.S.E. from Emporia State University, an M.S. from the University of Southern California, and a Ph.D. from Salve Regina University.

PROFESSOR JOHN C. HODELL is a 1963 graduate of Villanova University, Villanova, PA. He holds master's degrees from the Naval War College and Salve Regina University. He has begun working on his dissertation toward a doctorate in Humanities from Salve Regina University. He had tours in several Electronic Warfare Squadrons including Commanding Officer of VAQ-130, an EA-6B Squadron. He was a Naval War College faculty member in the Operations Department from November 1981 to September 1984 followed by a tour in the Research, Development and Acquisition Directorate of the OPNAV staff before returning to the War College in 1987. He retired in August 1991, as a Captain, and remained on the faculty.

CAPTAIN FRED B. HORNE, USN, joined the Joint Military Operations faculty in August 2003 after serving two years as the Director of the Naval Staff College. He was graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1976 with a B.S. degree in Oceanography and designated a Naval Flight Officer in January 1978. He has served in a variety of operational and staff positions in the Maritime Patrol Aviation community including commanding officer Patrol Squadron FIFTY and Chief of Staff, Fleet Air Keflavik in Iceland. He is a 1988 graduate of the Naval War College (CNC&S), a 1999 graduate of the Air War College and holds a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies.

CAPTAIN STEVEN D. KORNTZ, USN, reported to the Joint Military Operations Department in January 2002 following assignment as Air Boss in USS ESSEX (LHD2) homeported in Sasebo, Japan. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1980 with

a BS in Mathematics and was designated a Naval Aviator in 1981. An HSL pilot, his sea duty assignments entailed flying SH-2F and SH-60B aircraft with both East and West Coast squadrons. Additionally, he commanded VC-8, a composite squadron of SH-3H and A-4 aircraft based at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. Ashore, he was assigned to VX-1 at NAS Patuxent River, MD as SH-60B Operational Test Director from 1986–1989; was a contingency planning officer and Director, President’s Emergency Operations Center with the White House Military Office from 1992–1994; attended the Naval War College, graduating in 1995; and was an Anti-Submarine Warfare planning officer on CINCPACFLT staff from 1995–1997. He holds a MS degree in Systems Management from the University of Southern California and a MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.

COLONEL DYER T. LENNOX, USMC, joined the JMO faculty in July 2000 after a tour as the Chief of Staff at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, CA. He was commissioned through the NROTC program at the University of Michigan in 1973. An Artillery officer, he has served in a wide variety of leadership and staff billets in CONUS, Hawaii, Okinawa and Italy. Commands include an artillery battery at Camp Lejeune, NC, the security company at Camp David, MD and Second Battalion, Twelfth Marines on Okinawa. Besides staff assignments at the artillery battalion and regimental level, he has served in the NMCC, OJCS and as the amphibious plans and operations officer on the COMSTRIKFORSOUTH staff in Naples, Italy. Here he was involved in the planning, preparation and employment of IFOR. His military schooling includes Amphibious Warfare School, the Armed Forces Staff College and the Naval War College. He holds an undergraduate degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Michigan and a MA from the Naval War College.

CAPTAIN IVAN LUKE, USCG, joined the JMO faculty in 2003 following four years in command of the U.S. Coast Guard Barque EAGLE (WIX-327), the Service’s seagoing sail training vessel, also known as “America’s Tall Ship.” Captain Luke is a 1976 graduate of the United States Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut. His initial assignment was Deck Watch Officer aboard the Medium Endurance Cutter USCGC DEPENDABLE homeported in Panama City, Florida. Subsequent afloat assignments were Operations Officer of the High Endurance Cutter USCGC TANEY in Portsmouth, Virginia as an O-3; Commanding Officer of the Medium Endurance Cutter USCGC EVERGREEN in New London, Connecticut as an O-4 and Executive Officer of the Medium Endurance Cutter USCGC SENECA in Boston, Massachusetts also as an O-4. Captain Luke’s O-5 command was the Medium Endurance Cutter USCGC VALIANT in Miami, Florida. In addition to these PCS assignments, Captain Luke served in a temporary capacity aboard a number of Coast Guard and Navy vessels including participation in Operation **Able Manner** (Haiti-1993), **Uphold Democracy** (Haiti-1994) and **Able Vigil** (Cuba 1994). Captain Luke’s assignments ashore included: Instructor of Nautical Science at the Coast Guard Academy; School Chief of the Coast Guard’s Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO) School; Assistant Law Enforcement Branch Chief at the Seventh Coast Guard District in Miami, Florida, and service as a fellow in the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and a Master of

Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. Captain Luke holds a merchant mariner's license in the grade of Unlimited Ocean Master, Steam, Motor or Sail.

PROFESSOR HUGH F. LYNCH rejoined the Joint Military Operations faculty in February 2001, having taught in the department twice before. He served on active duty in the Navy for 26 years, commanded an attack squadron, a carrier air wing and an amphibious ship. Ashore he had two tours in Washington: the first at the Bureau of Naval Personnel and later as Director, Air Weapons Systems Analysis Staff, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. During the Vietnam War, he made three combat deployments while flying A-4 and A-7 aircraft on over 300 missions. In the course of 22 years in the cockpit, he flew from the decks of 18 carriers and piloted 18 types of aircraft, from A-1s to F-14s. He holds an M.S. degree in International Affairs from George Washington University and a B.S. in Economics from Holy Cross College. He is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College. Professor Lynch has written many studies on naval matters, several of which centered on the Greater Middle East, including a book-length classified study, ***Iran, The United States, and The Employment of Navies.***

PROFESSOR RICHARD J. MARTIN JR., a 1972 graduate of the University of Maine, joined the Naval War College faculty in August 1994 as an active duty Marine Lieutenant Colonel until his retirement from active duty in 1998. His Marine Corps career included assignments in various operational air command and control billets in all three Marine aircraft wings as well as various staff assignments. He also served as Executive Officer and ultimately Commanding Officer of Marine Air Support Squadron-1 in the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, he was the air support detachment commander for Marine Forces Afloat aboard the USS NASSAU (LHA-4). He graduated from the USMC Command and Staff College in 1987 and the Air War College in 1994. He holds a Master of Arts degree in International Relations from Salve Regina University. After his retirement in September 1998, Professor Martin joined the civilian faculty of the Joint Military Operations Department in the College of Distance Education.

PROFESSOR ELIZABETH A. MCINTYRE, CIA FACULTY REPRESENTATIVE of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), returned to the Naval War College in October 2000 from CIA HQS where she had served in a senior position in the Latin America Division of the CIA Directorate of Operations (DO). She holds the George Herbert Walker Bush Chair of National Intelligence. During her career, Dr. McIntyre has served four tours overseas, first as an operations officer and later as Chief of Station in Western Europe. She has completed several Washington assignments, serving as chief of units focusing on operations in Russia and Central Asia, and spent 1994-95 on the DCI's staff where the majority of her work related to Interagency issues. Dr. McIntyre holds an M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University of Oxford (England) and a B.A. from Emmanuel College in Boston. She previously served on the JMO faculty at the Naval War College from 1995-99.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARK J. MCKEARN, USA, joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 2002 following his completion of the Naval War College.

Lieutenant Colonel McKearn is a native of Beloit, Wisconsin. He graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1981 and was commissioned as an Infantry Second Lieutenant. Following the Infantry Officer basic course he attended flight school and has served in Aviation Branch his entire career. Highlights of LTC McKearn's career include assignments as section leader, 128th Assault Helicopter Company, Camp Page, Korea; Headquarters Company Executive Officer, Assistant S-4, and Attack Platoon Leader, 7th Combat Aviation Battalion, 7th Infantry Division; Platoon Leader, Assistant S-3 and Attack Company Commander, 307th Attack Helicopter Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, Fort Ord, California; G-3 Plans Officer and Commander Delta Troop 2/1 Cavalry, 2nd Armored Division (Forward), Garlstedt, Germany, Assistant Brigade S-3, 1st Armored Division, Ansbach, Germany; Test Officer, TEXCOM Experimentation Center, Fort Hunter Liggett, California; Battalion S-3, 1-4 Attack Helicopter Battalion, Brigade S-3 and Brigade Executive Officer, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, Battalion Commander, 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment, Garlstedt, Germany, and G-3 Operations Officer, V Corps, Heidelberg, Germany. His military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic Course, Aviation Officer Advance Course, Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS3), the Command And General Staff College, and the Naval War College. He holds a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies. LTC McKearn is also a graduate of the Rotary Wing Aviator Course, AH-1 (Cobra) Qualification Course, AH-64 (Apache) Qualification Course and UH-60 (Blackhawk) Qualification Course.

CAPTAIN WILLIAM C. REED, USN, joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 2003 following completion of the Naval War College. He has served in the Navy for 38 years, all but two as a Navy SEAL and holds the William J. Donovan Military Chair of Special Operations. He enlisted in the Navy in 1964 and served his first tour of duty as an Electronics Technician aboard USS Waddell (DDG-24). In 1967, Captain Reed completed Underwater Demolition Team Training and deployed to Vietnam with UDT TWELVE followed by two more combat tours to Vietnam as a member of SEAL Team ONE. Captain Reed was commissioned as a Limited Duty Officer in 1977 and assigned as the Naval Tactical Data Systems Officer on board USS WILLIAM V. PRATT (DDG-44). He qualified as a Surface Warfare Officer during UNITAS-19 deployment to the South Atlantic, and was redesignated a Naval Special Warfare Unrestricted Line Officer in 1980. In 1985, he graduated from San Diego State University with a BA in psychology. Captain Reed has served in numerous command and staff assignments from 1980 to 2003: UDT ELEVEN – Platoon Commander of an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) that deployed to the Western Pacific in support of SEVENTH Fleet; Naval Special Warfare Group ONE – Project Officer of a Marine Mammal system; SEAL Team TWO – NSWTU Commander of the first-ever Marine Expeditionary Unit/Special Operations Capable MARG, which deployed in support of SIXTH Fleet; SEAL Team TWO – Operations Officer; Mission Commander, Special Development Unit, Washington, DC; Commanding Officer, Naval Special Warfare Unit FOUR; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Special Warfare Action Officer; Operations Officer, Naval Special Warfare Group ONE; Commanding Officer, SEAL Team FIVE; Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, Special Operations Command, Central Command; and Commodore, Special Boat Squadron ONE

PROFESSOR ROBERT K. REILLY, MARAD REPRESENTATIVE, returned to the Naval War College and the JMO Department in September 1995. He was an Operations Professor and the Emory S. Land Chair of Merchant Marine Affairs from 1983–86 and assumed the chair again. Professor Reilly holds two B.S. degrees from the Massachusetts Maritime Academy (Marine Transportation), a B. A. degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in Government and International Affairs, and a J.D. from Fordham School of Law. He has extensive experience in the commercial shipping industry and several assignments in the Military Sealift Command. He served in the Naval Control of Shipping Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-06N). After retiring from the Navy as a Commander, he practiced Admiralty Law for two civilian law offices. Most recently, he has been a member of the Board for Development of the Marine Transportation Curriculum, Massachusetts Maritime Academy; member of a Massachusetts state panel concerning Maritime Affairs and shipyard purchase and lease; and, most recently, a Principal Analyst for Sonalysts, Inc., in support of transportation issues in the CNWS Global War Game Series.

CAPTAIN WALTER J. RICHARDSON, JR., USN, joined the Joint Military Operations faculty in August 2002 following completion of the Air War College course at Maxwell AFB. He graduated from Louisiana Tech University with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering in May 1979 and was commissioned via the AVROC Program in November 1979. He subsequently earned his wings as a Naval Aviator in May 1981. Five squadron tours ensued from August 1981 to January 1994, including VC-1, NAS Barbers Point, Hawaii where he served as Assistant Operations Officer and Material Control Officer; VT-21, NAS Kingsville as an Instructor Pilot, A-4 Model Manager and Safety Officer; VF-24, NAS Miramar deploying with CVW-9 in USS NIMITZ as Maintenance Training Officer and Pilot Training Officer; VF-124, NAS Miramar as Instructor Pilot, Safety Officer and Tactics Phase Leader; and VF-21, NAF Atsugi, Japan, forward-deployed with CVW-5 in USS INDEPENDENCE as Operations, Safety and Maintenance Officers. In March 1994, he attended Naval War College, graduating in March 1995 with a Master of Arts Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies. From April 1995 to March 1996, he served in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N889) as Requirements Officer for Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN), Strike U and TACTS Ranges. He reported to NAS Meridian, MS in April 1996 where he served as Executive Officer and Commanding Officer of VT-7 and as Air Wing Standardization Officer of CTW-1. Following his Command tour, he reported to USS ENTERPRISE in August 1999, assuming duties as Air Boss in March 2000. He departed ENTERPRISE in July 2001 and reported to the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, graduating with a Masters of International Strategic Studies in June 2002. CAPT Richardson has accumulated over 4950 flight hours and over 500 carrier arrested landings.

PROFESSOR JOHN D. ROBERTS, rejoined the Joint Military Operations faculty in May 2002, having taught in the department for two years while on active duty. He retired from the Navy in 2001 following a 30 year career centered around maritime patrol aviation and technology development. He had five tours flying the P-3 Orion, including command of Patrol Squadron TEN and Patrol Wing FIVE. His shore assignments included duty on the Joint Staff as Chief of Detection and Monitoring for

Counternarcotics, and Special Assistant to the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Professor Roberts holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the State University of New York at Oswego, a Master of Science from Salve Regina University, and a Master of Arts from the Naval War College.

PROFESSOR PAUL A. ROMANSKI, a 1968 graduate of the NROTC Program at the University of Notre Dame, joined the Naval War College faculty in August 1994 as an active duty Navy captain and held the Arleigh Burke Chair of Surface Warfare until his retirement from active duty in 1998. His Navy career included destroyer escort and Combat Logistics Force duty, junk force riverine operations in Vietnam, and shore assignments on the CNO's staff, at the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and Military Sealift Command. Professor Romanski's career included tours in command of USS PYRO (AE-24), USS WICHITA (AOR 1), and the composite Task Force 63—Naval Surface Group Mediterranean—Task Force 505 (NATO). He holds Master of Arts degrees from the University of Illinois and the Naval War College, and is pursuing a Ph.D. at Salve Regina University. After his retirement in July 1998, Professor Romanski joined the civilian faculty of the Joint Military Operations Department.

PROFESSOR ANGUS K. ROSS, a 1975 graduate from Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, joined the Naval War College Faculty in September 1996, as an active duty Commander in the Royal Navy, teaching on the Joint Military Operations Faculty until his retirement in February 2000, after 25 years service. A Seaman Officer and ASW Specialist, his naval career included worldwide service in all types of RN surface vessels, from minesweepers to aircraft carriers, staff tours with Squadron and Admiral's staffs (afloat) and a number of seagoing tours with NATO, including COMSTRKFLTLANT. Professor Ross holds a BS degree (Honors) in Marine Zoology and Oceanography from Exeter University in the UK, a Master of Arts (highest distinction) from the Naval War College (CNW 98), and is pursuing a further M.A. degree in European History at Providence College, as well as an eventual Ph.D. in History. After his retirement from active duty, Professor Ross joined the civilian faculty of the College of Distance Education where he continues to teach Joint Military Operations.

CAPTAIN MARK SEAMAN, USN, joined the Joint Military Operations faculty in September 2001 following an assignment as Chief, Naval Plans and Exercises for Joint Headquarters North, Stavanger, Norway. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in May 1979 and was designated a Naval Aviator in August 1981. His sea tours include Fighter Squadron 32 (1984–1987), deploying aboard both the USS INDEPENDENCE (CV-62) and USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67); and Fighter Squadron 143 (1989–1992) deploying aboard the USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN-69). His major shore tours include Fighter Squadron 101 (1987–1989); a joint tour with Headquarters North, Kolsas, Norway (1992–1995); and Navy Recruiting District, Portland, Oregon as Commanding Officer (1996–1998). Captain Seaman holds a B.S. in Naval Science from the U.S. Naval Academy and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. He is also a graduate of the Navy Fighter Weapons School.

CAPT JOE STAFFORD, USN, joined the Joint Military Operations faculty in July 2003 following an assignment as Professor of Naval Science, Tulane University. He graduated from North Carolina 1974 and received his commission from OCS. His sea tours include assignments onboard USS FRANCIS MARION (LPA-249) where he was a Division Officer and made deployments to the Mediterranean. He completed department head tours as Chief Engineer onboard USS COMTE DE GRASSE (DD-974) and Operations Officer onboard USS MILWAUKEE (AOE-2). During his department head tours, he made deployments to the North Atlantic and Mediterranean in support of the multi-national peace keeping force in Lebanon. In August of 1986 he reported as Executive Officer onboard USS FLINT (AE-32) where he deployed to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf. Captain Stafford commanded USS SHASTA (AE-33) from October 1992 to October 1994 and USS SUPPLY (AOE-6) from March 1998 until April 2000. During his command tours he made deployments to the Mediterranean, Adriatic and Arabian Gulf in support of Kosovo and Desert Storm. Captain Stafford served ashore as an instructor at Surface Warfare School Command (Basic), CINCLANTFLT PEB engineering inspector (Gas turbine and steam ships), Joint Staff duty at USCINCSOC Macdill AFB in J-5 as Southwest Asia Planner and the Chief of Naval Operations staff as Maintenance and Modernization Division (N432) branch head and director of the navy equal opportunity program (Pers 61). He holds Masters of Arts degrees from the Naval War College in National Security and Strategic Studies and in Public Administration from Golden Gate University with Academic honors.

PROFESSOR PAUL J. ST. LAURENT joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 1988 where he held the Frederick J. Horne Chair of Military Logistics. After retiring from the Army in 1991 he joined the JMO faculty in the College of Distance Education. While on active duty Professor St. Laurent served in the Army Corps of Engineers and in the Quartermaster Corps. He has held various command and staff positions in units in Germany, Vietnam, Turkey and Iceland. He served on the staff of the Army Quartermaster School; as Logistics Support Manager, U.S. Army Troop Support Agency; as Chief, Supply and Services Branch on the Army Staff; and as Assistant Chief of Staff J-4, Iceland Defense Force. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Naval War College. He holds a B.S. from the University of Massachusetts and Masters in European History from Providence College and in Education from Boston University.

PROFESSOR PATRICK C. SWEENEY joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 1999 as a colonel in the U.S. Army, having completed a tour in NATO as the Chief of Contingency Plans for Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). He was commissioned in the Army as a Field Artillery Officer through the ROTC program at The Citadel in 1973. His tours of duty include a variety of artillery assignments in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Division G3 Ops with the 2d Infantry Division in Korea, a Fire Support Instructor at the U.S. Army Infantry School, command of a Pershing 2 Battery in Germany, Corps Plans Officer and artillery battalion executive officer in XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, NC, followed by an assignment as the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery G3 during DESERT SHIELD / STORM. He commanded an artillery battalion at the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum NY, and participated

in Hurricane Andrew relief operations as well as operations in Somalia and Haiti. His most recent assignment at AFSOUTH focused primarily as the Deputy CJ5 for the IFOR mission in Bosnia and as a NATO planner for Kosovo operations. Professor Sweeney is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advance Military Studies, and the Army War College. He holds a bachelor of science degree in Business Administration from The Citadel and master's degrees in Public Administration from Western Kentucky University and Military Arts and Science from the School of Advance Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth. Professor Sweeney retired from active duty in June 2002, as a colonel, and remained on the faculty.

PROFESSOR MILAN N. VEGO was an instructor at the Defense Intelligence College (1985–91) and an adjunct instructor at the War Gaming and Simulations Center, National Defense University (1989–91) before joining the Naval War College faculty in August 1991. He was a Senior Fellow at the Center for Naval Analyses (1985–87) and in the Foreign Military Studies Office (formerly Soviet Army Studies Office), Ft. Leavenworth, KS (1987–89). Professor Vego is a native of Capljina, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Professor Vego holds a B.A. in Modern History and an M.A. in U.S. History, Belgrade University, and a Ph.D. in European History from George Washington University. He also holds a Master Mariner's license since 1973. Professor Vego's book, "*Soviet Navy Today*," was published by Arms and Armour Press (London) in 1986; "*Soviet Naval Tactics*" was published by the Naval Institute Press in 1992; and "*The Austro-Hungarian Naval Policy 1904–1914*" was published by Frank Cass Publishers (London) in September 1996. Professor Vego's most recent book, "Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas," was published by Frank Cass Publishers in 1999. He is also a frequent contributor to many professional journals and magazines.

COMMANDER ALAN R. WALL, USN, joined the Naval War College faculty in July 2002 following a three-year assignment at the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) in Pearl Harbor where he served as a Senior Watch Officer, USCINCPAC J2 Liaison Officer, and the South Asia Department Head. He earned his commission through the Navy ROTC program at Ohio State University in 1985. His sea duty assignments include tours on USS BLAKELY (FF-1072) as Gunnery Officer and Electrical Officer, where he qualified as a Surface Warfare Officer, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67) as Assistant Deck Officer, and USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN-72) as Strike Intelligence and Intelligence Systems Officer. Ashore he served at the Navy & Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) as an intelligence instructor, and as the Intelligence Assistant to the Director of Surface Warfare (OPNAV N86) on the Chief of Naval Operations staff. He graduated with distinction from the Naval War College's College of Naval Command and Staff in 1999, earning an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies. He also holds a B.S. in Aerospace Engineering from Ohio State University and an M.S. in Engineering Management (Information Systems) from George Washington University.

COMMANDER BURTON J. WALTMAN, JAGC, USN, holds the Howard S. Levie Military Chair of Operational Law. Commander Waltman was called to active duty in 1983. His operational law experience includes tours as the fleet judge advocate on the staff of the

U.S. SECOND Fleet / NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic embarked in USS MOUNT WHITNEY (LCC-20), the staff of Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group TWO where he deployed on the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67), and the USS IOWA (BB-61), and as the legal officer for USS HOLLAND (AS-32) and the staff of Commander, Submarine Squadron 18. Commander Waltman joined the faculty in 2001, following his tour as the Director, Defense Institute of International Legal Studies. He also holds a LL.M. in International Law from the University of San Diego School of Law (1994), a J.D. degree from Western New England College School of Law (1983), and a B.S. from Bryant College (1976).

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGETTE P. WILSON, USA, joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in July 2002 following her graduation from the Army War College, in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Lieutenant Colonel Wilson is a native of Ghent, New York. She enlisted in the United States Army as a Computer Programmer in 1974. She is a graduate of the United States Military Academy Preparatory School and a 1981 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point. LTC Wilson was commissioned a Quartermaster officer and has served in Quartermaster and Systems Automation positions throughout her military career. Highlights of LTC Wilson's career include assignments as platoon leader, executive officer and operations officer, 26th Supply and Service Company, Hanau, Germany; Battalion S-1, Special Troops Battalion, 3rd Support Command, Frankfurt, Germany; Battalion S-4, 4th Support Battalion, and A Company Commander, 3/9 Aviation Regiment, 9th Infantry Division, and Assistant 9th Division Support Command S3 Plans Officer, Fort Lewis, Washington; Chief, Computer Support Center, Headquarters CINCPAC, Hawaii; Chief, Service Support Center and Battalion Executive Officer, 4th Corps Materiel Management Center, and Battalion Support Operations Officer 553 Corps Support Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas; NATO C3 Staff Officer, Brussels, Belgium; Battalion Commander 19th Corps Materiel Management Center, Wiesbaden, Germany; and V Corps Secretary of the General Staff, Heidelberg, Germany. Her military education includes the Quartermaster Officer Basic and Advance Courses, Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS3), The Support Operations Course, the Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Army War College. She has a master's degree in Strategic Studies from the Army War College and a Master of Science in Computer Science from the Naval Postgraduate School.

BLOCK ONE
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INTRODUCTION TO COURSE FOUNDATIONS

A. Focus:

JMO's course foundations (CF) sessions prepare students by introducing main themes and concepts that permeate the entire course. It is recognized that students entering the JMO course of instruction come from various Service/Agency backgrounds, possess different experience levels, and may be embarking on their first trimester at the Naval War College. Therefore, CF are designed to provide a common intellectual framework for all students by addressing four main areas of focus:

1. OPS I-1, I-2, and I-6 explain the intellectual linkage between the JMO trimester and the Strategy and Policy and National Security Decision Making educational disciplines; provide the student with an overview of what the JMO syllabus will entail as it proceeds through the main educational building blocks; and explain in detail what is required of the student to complete the course successfully. Specifically, OPS I-6 fully describes the requirement for the Operations Research Paper and its purpose in partially fulfilling the requirements for completion of the NWC master's degree, as well as its utility in furthering the critical intellectual literature on current and future operational warfare issues.
2. OPS I-3 and I-5 are designed to start the student thinking about the differences among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare—first in OPS I-3, by describing historically why the American military approaches warfare the way it does, and then in OPS I-5 by focusing the discussion more precisely on the naval officer's perspective.
3. OPS I-4, I-7, and I-8 complete the preliminary structure for the JMO course by examining the necessary and continuing relationship among political, diplomatic, economic, informational and military actions. This is accomplished in OPS I-4 by directing student attention firmly to the strategic objective as the centerpiece of all military planning and execution; in OPS I-7 by discussing the issues that arise in warfare caused by the civil/military tensions inherent in our national military organization; and in OPS I-8 by discussing the relationship between diplomacy and military force for the complex world in which the President, SECDEF, CJCS, and the combatant commanders must operate.

COURSE OVERVIEW (Lecture)

Extraordinary as it may appear, the naval officer whose principal business is to fight is not taught the higher branches of his profession. The U.S. is not singular in this respect. The defect is common to nearly all navies and is an inheritance of a past and less enlightened age. But with the recent revolution in naval warfare comes a demand for a higher order of talent in the conduct of naval operations.

—Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, 8 August 1877
 Founder and First President of the Naval War College

A. Focus:

The Chairman of the Joint Military Operations Department will overview the Joint Military Operations course.

B. Objectives:

Understand the objectives of the Joint Military Operations Course.

C. Background:

For the century ahead, the use of military and naval power and their interrelationships with the political, diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power will remain a key challenge. During this course, we will study how to wield the military instrument of power, in peace and war, to achieve the national policy goals. We will examine the power relationships at two levels, strategic and operational, which incorporate the varying perspectives of the Congress and the Executive Branch (President, Cabinet members, Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, joint task force commanders and their naval component commanders). Our focus remains joint operations at the theater and task force level; however, national level strategy formulation, implementation and campaigning are discussed. This course is designed to develop students' abilities to craft regional strategies and translate them into naval, joint, interagency, and multinational operations.

We will review current theory of operational art, compare it to the doctrinal basis for contemporary application of military power, and begin to distill the next generation of doctrine for our armed forces. Today's operational art theory and the doctrinal basis for the U.S. armed forces reflect the zenith of our wisdom and knowledge of Industrial Age warfare and nation-state relationships. The advent of the Information Age creates an additional challenge in the creation of the next generation of doctrine because some of our theoretical fundamentals may change. The joint community and each of the military Services are exploring this issue. The U.S. Navy advocates Sea Power 21 as its conceptual basis for 21st century war fighting. Through this prism, we will examine our nation's near term challenges and the tenets of 21st century warfare.

The point of contact for this session is Captain A. J. Ruoti, U.S. Navy, C-203.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Required Reading:

U.S. Naval War College, *Joint Military Operations Syllabus and Study Guide for Joint Military Operations 2004*, Course Description. Read pp. vi–xvii, 24, 78, 120, 162–168.

F. Supplementary Readings:

Hattendorf, John B., B. Mitchell Simpson, III, and John R. Wadleigh. *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U. S. Naval War College*. Naval War College Press, Newport, RI, 1984.

The Constitution of the United States. Article 1, Sections 8 & 9; Article 2, Section 2; Article 3, Sections 2 & 3. (Issued).

INTRODUCTORY SEMINAR

A. Focus:

This session is devoted to the introduction of seminar faculty and student members, a review of the administrative requirements and procedures for the trimester, an introductory discussion of the Operations Research Paper and the general “ground rules” of seminar conduct.

B. Objectives:

- Identify the background and expertise of the faculty and student members of the seminar.
- Establish seminar guidelines for conduct and evaluations.
- Identify linkage of JMO to National Security & Decision Making and Strategy & Policy.
- Explain course requirements, including exams and the Operations Research Paper.
- Discuss social and administrative matters.

C. Guidance:

The introductory seminar provides the opportunity for the moderators to identify faculty and student background and expertise, and for moderators and students to discuss relevant social and administrative matters pertaining to the conduct of the seminar. The Operations Research Paper, discussed in more detail in a later session, is introduced.

In preparation for the seminar, students are asked to complete a short, one-page questionnaire, which was distributed to student mail boxes and will be collected at the beginning of the session.

The point of contact for this session is CAPT S. D. Kornatz, C-420.

D. Required Reading:

“Operations Paper: Guidance for Students,” Newport, RI, February 2004. (*NWC 2062M*), (Issued).

E. Supplementary Readings:

None.

THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR (Lecture)

A. Focus:

The JMO course addresses the theater-strategic and operational levels of war across the spectrum of conflict, including conventional military operations and operations other than war (MOOTW). Throughout this course of study, it is important to understand the historical context and resulting American mindset for the use of military force. This lecture traces American approaches to war and examines the relationships among conventional and unconventional warfare; professional versus citizen soldiers; and preparedness versus unpreparedness that have characterized our American way of war.

B. Objectives:

- Analyze American perceptions about war.
- *PJE*—Analyze how the constituent elements of government and American society exert influence on the national strategy process.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. force structure affect the development of joint military strategy.

C. Background:

As we look at the spectrum of conflict, from total war to military operations other than war, it is important to understand the historical context and resulting American mindset for the use of military force. Every nation has a predisposition for how it fights wars, as the result of its own culture and experience. For the United States, many would say there is a strong dependence on mobilization, a penchant for technology, a tendency toward rapid action once engaged, a willingness to use a high level of violence, and an acceptance of precipitous demobilization and rapid return to “normal” peacetime activities.

Ours is a uniquely American approach to national defense, based in part upon a pioneer spirit, aggressive action, and a prejudice against standing armies and long-term conflicts. From the early years of the republic to the mid-20th century, there was a disconnect between U.S. military doctrine and education and the missions our armed forces were actually called upon to accomplish—a gap that often led to problems in the conduct of military operations, particularly when dealing with “small wars.” We have also oscillated between splendid isolation and pernicious engagement around the globe. Americans say they fight as a team, yet all too often we have intervened unilaterally as well.

These military characteristics have helped to foster a distinctly American cultural heritage. Examining our historic approach to war helps us understand our political, social and cultural evolution, and the way we may fight in the future.

The point of contact for this session is Professor J. R. Ballard, C-421.

D. Questions:

1. What are the key characteristics of the “American way of war?”
2. How does our heritage affect the conduct of campaigns and military operations?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine For Joint Operations*, 10 Sep 2001 (Issued). Read Preface, Chapters 1 and 5.

Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War*, 16 June 1995 (Issued). Read Glossary definitions.

F. Supplementary Readings:

Cunliffe, Marcus. *Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America 1775-1865*. Boston & New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1968.

Millett, Alan R. and Peter Maslowski. *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*. New York: The Free Press, 1994.

Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. The Macmillan Wars of the United States, ed. Louis Morton. New York: the Macmillan Company, 1973.

THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session will focus on the **strategic objective** and how it must drive military thinking and actions throughout the entire range of military operations. We will discuss the direct relationship between national strategic objectives and operational objectives and the concept of “regressive planning” to maintain focus on the goal. We will look at the interrelationship among the four elements of national power (political, military, economic, and “informational”) and how the **strategic objective** relates to the **Desired End State** (the strategic vision of how things should look at the conclusion of the operation). Our discussion will include a brief look at the policy documents which provide strategic direction to the military, such as, the **National Security Strategy**, and the **National Military Strategy**.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend how the elements of the **National Security Strategy** and **National Military Strategy** relate to the operational level.
- Introduce the concept of regressive planning which is key to grasping the perspective and operational-level planning that is the focus of the course.
- Introduce the “Five Questions” and analyze how they can help the operational commander apply assets in the pursuit of strategic objectives.
- Examine the interrelationship among the four elements of national power (political, military, economic, and “informational”) and how the **strategic objective** relates to the **Desired End State**.
- **PJE**—Analyze the strategic art; i.e., developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to secure national security objectives
- **PJE**—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- **PJE**—Analyze how the constituent elements of government and American society exert influence on the national strategy process.

C. Background:

The **National Military Strategy** (NMS) establishes key principles for the employment of U.S. military forces across the spectrum of conflict. Its purpose is to implement the agenda of the President’s **National Security Strategy** (NSS). The most recent versions of these two documents reflect core national goals long pursued by the United States, yet also reflect a continued movement toward more regional approaches. In particular, this construct envisions the regional Combatant Commanders “shaping” the situation in order to minimize the chances for conflict while maximizing U.S. advantages should conflict occur.

In response to a developing crisis, commanders at all levels must assess the strategic goal (in keeping with the NMS and NSS) in terms of five questions:

1. What **military** (or related political and social) **conditions** must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)

2. What **sequence of actions** is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)
3. How should the **resources** of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
4. What is the likely **cost or risk** to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?
5. What resources must be committed or actions performed to successfully execute the JFC's **exit strategy**?

The operational commander must ensure his response to the “five questions” (the essence of his plan) remains in line with strategic guidance. While some situations allow for clear military answers to these questions, in other cases there may be no “military condition” which will contribute to the stated or implied strategic objective. Often, the appropriate action may be diplomatic or economic, with the military in a supporting role. When military conflict appears necessary, the operational commander must also anticipate and plan for war termination and post-conflict activities (which will include both military and civilian elements). Without considering these aspects from the outset of planning, there is little chance that even the best planned military operation can achieve the Desired End State.

The point of contact for this session is Professor J. R. Ballard, C-411, 1-6415.

D. Questions:

How does the NMS help operational commanders translate strategy into operational plans?

How can the “Five Questions” help an operational commander respond to strategic guidance?

What is the connection between planning for conflict and planning for post-conflict operations? Why does it matter when you do this planning?

Who determines the term and conditions for conflict termination?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0, **Doctrine for Joint Operations**. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 10 September 2001, pp. I-1 to I-12, II-1 to II-3. (Issued).

JMO, “Putting First Things First,” Newport, 1999. (**NWC 3012**), (Issued).

National Military Strategy of the United States, Washington, 1997. (Issued). [Scan]

The White House, **The National Security Strategy of the United States of America**, September 2002. (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

“Flexible Deterrent Options,” Extracts from **Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan**. (**NWC 3081**), (Issued).

Iklé, Fred C. **Every War Must End**, pp. 1–16 (Seminar Reserve).

Reed, James W. “Should Deterrence Fail: War termination . . . ,” **Parameters** XXIII, No. 2, Summer 1993, 41–51. (**NWC 2171**), (Issued).

THE NAVAL WAY OF WAR (Lecture)

Do not refer to the captain by name. He is The Captain.

Recruit's Handbook, USS *West Virginia* (1935)

A. Focus:

This lecture explains how and why the present-day U.S. Navy acts as it does. It examines the historical context within which the Navy has developed its way of “doing business” and illustrates how and why Naval warfare is uniquely different from other types of warfare. The objective is to enhance student understanding of the naval culture and, specifically, naval traditions of planning and conducting operations, especially as they affect joint operations. This lecture also provides a foundation for understanding Navy capabilities and limitations addressed in Session III-3 and develops themes in common with those found in the Strategy and Policy sessions devoted to “The Institutional Dimension of Strategy.”

B. Objectives:

- Examine the spectrum of conflict as it involves naval forces.
- Understand the historical relationship between senior Navy and Marine Corps officers and their Army and Air Force counterparts.
- Understand the historical basis of the current U.S. defense establishment; its structure, policies, and strategies; understand how the functions, capabilities, and limitations of U.S. military forces affect the development of joint military strategy and military operations.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the Department of Defense systems and processes by which national ends, ways, and means are reconciled, integrated, and applied.

C. Background:

In its two centuries of existence, the Navy has developed unique ways of defining, planning, and conducting its operations, distinct from those of the other military services. These experiences are codified in its organization, doctrine, and operating procedures, as well as in less obvious informal usages and patterns of assumptions and beliefs. These include deeply held beliefs about: (1) how decisions should be made; (2) the place of the naval services in the implementation of national policy; (3) command relations and the importance of discretion for subordinates; (4) the relationship of plans to operations; (5) the relationship of technology to naval warfare; and (6) the appropriate relationship of the naval services to the other military services in the conduct of joint operations. These patterns are reinforced by professional training programs, career patterns, and day-to-day operations; and, although subject to change, they tend to lag changes in immediate circumstances.

The peculiarly American naval way of war has been and continues to be conditioned by: (1) the fundamental characteristics of naval warfare; (2) the historical era during which the Navy was created and formed; (3) U.S. national policy; (4) the technologies of naval warfare; (5) developments in thinking about naval warfare; (6) operational experience,

especially pivotal points of success and failure; and (7) relations with the other military services.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-412.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Required Readings:

None.

F. Supplementary Readings:

Baer, George. *One Hundred Years of Seapower: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Barlow, Jeffrey. *The Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945-1950*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995.

Chisholm, Donald. *Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793-1941*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.

Clark, Vern. "Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 128 (October 2002): 32-41.

Coletta, Paolo E. *The United States Navy and Defense Unification, 1947-1953*. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1981.

Davis, Vincent A. *Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1966.

Herrick, Walter R., Jr. *The American Naval Revolution*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1966.

Huntington, Samuel P. "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy." *Naval War College Review*, May 1954: 483-493.

Karsten, Peter. *The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism*. New York: The Free Press, 1972.

McKee, Christopher. *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Navy Officer Corps, 1795-1815*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Spector, Ronald. *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977.

Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout. *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1946.

Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout. *Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943.

Uhlig, Frank, Jr. *How Navies Fight: The U.S. Navy and Its Allies*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1994.

U.S. Navy. *Forward...From the Sea: the Navy Operational Concept*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997.

Vlahos, Michael. *The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919-1941*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1980.

Wylie, Joseph C., Jr. "Why a Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 83 (1957): 811-817.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH PAPER—REVIEW (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This seminar amplifies Operations Research Paper requirements addressed briefly during the Introductory Seminar, detailing requirements, guidance, deadlines, grading criteria, and suggested topics. The Paper constitutes an appropriate, objective method for students to demonstrate competence at the Master's degree level. Further, it is ecumenical in regard to the JMO curriculum, affording an opportunity to address a topic relevant to any of the syllabus sessions. Thus, the Paper is consistent with the mission specified for U.S. Senior Level Colleges, reflected as the Paper PJE Objective in the paragraph below.

B. Objectives:

The Operations Research Paper achieves the following purposes:

- Production of formal, written work dealing with the theater-strategic or operational level of war, operational art, or a topic of current interest to a theater-strategic or operational level commander.
- Development and refinement of original ideas in military strategy and operations through research and analysis.
- Advanced operational thinking.
- Timely address of topics that reflect current and future operational issues of interest to Service and joint staffs, and operational level commanders.
- Candidate work for publication in professional journals and military periodicals.
- Competition for prizes and awards offered by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Naval War College, and other sources.
- **PJE**—Comprehend and demonstrate the art and science of deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.

C. Guidance:

The Operations Research Paper provides the opportunity to study a theater-strategic or operational-level issue, conduct research and analysis, and prepare a paper that advances the literature in the selected area. It is a chance for students to address topics that they feel are of significant professional value. It requires independent thought and competent writing because the final product should be suitable for publication in a professional journal. The amount and depth of research should be adequate to support the student's approach and sufficiently justify the conclusions and recommendations or lessons learned. Another use of the paper may be to contribute innovative thinking to Service component and joint force staffs involved with the many complex issues associated with military force employment.

Combatant commander, operating force, and headquarter staffs solicit papers and monographs on topics of current interest to support initiatives, develop concepts, and provide fresh looks at the methods of accomplishing missions. The Naval War College is

canvassed frequently for papers on particular subjects, and requested to stimulate interest in specific areas for research and writing to support requesting commands. A recent example is a project dealing with innovation in the application of naval force—how to accomplish the goal of fighting *smarter* rather than fighting with *more*. While some aspects of this project fall outside the parameters of the Operations Research Paper requirement, many of the issues therein are JMO-applicable. These especially include doing the right things and doing them “right”—the synergistic effect of combining effectiveness and efficiency. Quality papers are provided to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), where qualified users can access them to meet a variety of needs.

(1) **Requirements.** The Operations Research Paper comprises the following:

- (a) A thesis—a well-defined position that the paper will aim to defend, support, or justify.
- (b) Sufficient research to analyze the thesis properly.
- (c) Arguments and counter-arguments that allow thorough contrast of conflicting points of view.
- (d) Logical conclusions drawn from the material presented within the paper.
- (e) Recommendations or lessons learned, as appropriate, demonstrating the paper’s relevance to the modern operational commander.

(2) **Topics.** Topics should be taken from one of the following areas:

- (a) A current issue at the operational or theater-strategic level of war.
- (b) A topic on operational art, or the use of operational art to examine or analyze historical cases.
- (c) An option in support of a military strategy or a new doctrinal concept.
- (d) An issue dealing with planning, execution, tasks, or functions at the operational level of war.
- (e) Innovative topics such as the application of naval force at the operational level of war.
- (f) A topic that applies to current, near-term, or future major operations or campaigns.
- (g) A topic of value to an operational level commander.

NOTE: The Operations Research Paper should not be an examination of tactics, technology, force structure, or future force planning concepts. Also, it should not be a library search and recitation of published material. The paper should not contain proposals or recommendations regarding numbers and types of weapon platforms, nor modifications to platforms, weapons, sensors, or force structure (i.e., it must not be an NSDM-type force planning paper). Moderators will answer any questions on specific issues relating to topic selection.

Required reading *NWC 2062M* contains the JMO Chairman’s guidance for selecting a suitable topic and crafting a research question. It also contains candidate topical areas from requesting commands, a list of topics dealing with the operational level of war, extracts on the awards program, and instructions for submission of papers to

professional journals. This is an excellent resource for developing ideas and selecting a topic.

(3) **Paper Proposal.** In the format of enclosure (1) to NWC 2062M, a paper proposal must be provided to the moderators. The proposal will state the student's thesis, approach, relevance, and methodology, so that the moderators may determine if the paper will satisfy the requirements of the course. Once the moderator team accepts a proposal, this constitutes an understanding between the student and the moderator grading team. An accepted proposal means that both the student and the moderator team have a good appreciation of the depth of research, extent of analysis, and quality of writing that are expected of the student, in addition to the requirements that are discussed in paragraph 1 of this section.

(4) **Research and Writing.** Research and writing shall meet graduate-level standards. *The Naval War College Writing Guide* offers suggestions and additional references on writing skills.

(5) **Format.** Turabian's *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations* (6th ed.) is the standard for unclassified written work. Format and style for classified papers are contained in the *Naval War College Style Manual and Classification Guide*.

(6) **Report Document Page.** In final version, as submitted to the moderators, the paper requires a Standard Form (SF) 298 as the Report Document Page. The SF-298 format is available either from the seminar academic representative (floppy disk) or on the student computers.

(7) **Length.** The text of the Operations Research Paper should be 14 to 17 double-spaced pages of text in *Times New Roman* font size 12 to conform to commonly accepted limits for publication and award submissions. Your moderators may accept longer papers depending on the paper purpose and topic, but this acceptance must be obtained prior to paper submission.

(8) **Faculty Advisor.** An advisor can help a student define the scope of the research effort; keep research, analysis, and writing on track; and review outlines and drafts. While there is no requirement for a student to have a faculty advisor, one is strongly recommended. Faculty and staff members are quite willing to act as advisors. Your moderators may choose to serve as your paper advisor, and can also suggest appropriate advisors, depending on topic. **Please do not ask your advisor to evaluate your paper in terms of a grade;** grading is a moderator function.

(9) **Grading.** The Operations Research Paper represents a substantial portion of the JMO Course grade. The paper will be evaluated for both substance and writing quality. Grades will be based on the criteria specified in the Course Description section of the JMO Syllabus.

(10) **Prizes and Awards.** Operations Research Papers may be submitted in competition for the prizes and awards bestowed annually during the June graduation ceremony. Students are encouraged to prepare their Operations Papers with the additional purpose of competing for one or more of these honors. In a few cases, this will require modifying the Operations Paper to meet the length specification for the prize. Details are included in Required Reading, NWC 2062M.

(11) **Schedule:**

- 30 March:** submit paper proposal to seminar moderators.
- 2-8 April:** conduct individual tutorials per schedule arranged with moderators; moderators and student agree on research topic and course of action.
- 19 April:** suggested date to terminate research, commence analysis and writing.
- 7 May:** suggested latest date for submission of **final** draft to faculty advisor.
- 17 May:** CNW deliver papers to seminar moderators.
- 24 May:** NCC deliver papers to seminar moderators.

The point of contact for this session is Professor P. A. Romanski, C-217.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Required Readings:

Operations Paper: Guidance for Students. Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 2004. (*NWC 2062M*), (Issued. Also available online at [http://www.nwc.navy.mil/jmo/research/.](http://www.nwc.navy.mil/jmo/research/))

Naval War College Writing Guide. Newport, RI, August 2000. (Issued. Also available online at [http://www.nwc.navy.mil/jmo/research/.](http://www.nwc.navy.mil/jmo/research/))

Naval War College Style and Classification Guide. Newport, RI, August 2000. (Issued. Also available online at [http://www.nwc.navy.mil/jmo/research/.](http://www.nwc.navy.mil/jmo/research/))

F. Supplementary Readings:

Research in the Library, Autumn 2003. Newport, RI: Naval War College Library, 2003. (Issued).

Strunk, William, Jr. **The Elements of Style**, 4th ed. With revisions, an introduction, and a chapter on writing by E.B. White. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1999.

Turabian, Kate L. **A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations**. 6th ed., revised by John Grossman and Alice Bennett. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996. (Issued).

U.S. NATIONAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Seminar)

... Our National Security. This is the most basic commitment of America's government, and the greatest responsibility of an American President. Our nation's ideals inspire the world, but our nation's ships and planes and armies must defend these ideals and sustain our allies and friends.

President George W. Bush, February 2001

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the organization and roles of the Department of Defense (DoD) and its components, and the methods and doctrine employed to achieve unity of effort, if not unity of command. To begin this seminar, we will analyze the role of DoD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—with particular emphasis on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, the Services, and the Reserve components. We will also examine the current plan for the organization of U.S. military forces throughout the world, and the authority that a commander can exercise over joint forces.

B. Objectives:

- *PJE*—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- *PJE*—Analyze how the constituent elements of government and American society exert influence on the national strategy process.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the role of joint doctrine with respect to unified command.
- *PJE*—Analyze the roles, relationships, and functions of the President, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, JCS, Combatant Commanders, Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Service Chiefs.

C. Background:

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed in January of 2002 that the use of the term “National Command Authorities” be discontinued when referring to the President and the Secretary of Defense. A few months later, he directed that the terms “Commander in Chief” and “CINC” be discontinued when referring to combatant commanders. The goal of this session is to expose the student to the history behind the military as it is structured today, and to comprehend and understand how joint doctrine factors shape the structure. Furthermore, it is our goal that students be conversant with the National Military Organization; especially with respect to recent term changes and the Unified Command Plan (UCP) restructuring.

The National Security Act of 1947 was the first legislative attempt to achieve unity of military effort in U.S. history. This Act provided for a Secretary of National Defense and established the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as a permanent agency. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 had extensive impact on DOD. Two of the principal aims of this legislation were to reduce the effects of service parochialism on defense policy and to improve unity of effort by increasing the authority of the Unified Combatant Commanders. The UCP provides guidance to the DOD to carry out the provisions of legislative action. Just as the National Security Act of 1947 has been

amended several times, the UCP is reviewed and amended as the political/military climate change in an effort to optimize the warfighting and support command structure.

Direction of U.S. military forces is currently accomplished through a single chain of command with two distinct branches. The operational (and strategic) direction of combatant forces is accomplished through the operational chain of command, which runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders, with communications running through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For matters not involving strategic and operational direction of combatant forces, guidance is issued through the administrative branch of the chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to Service secretaries and Service chiefs to commanders of Service forces. The preparation and provision of forces to the combatant commands are accomplished through this “administrative” branch of the chain of command, separate and distinct from the operational branch.

Various command relationships may exist among active duty and reserve component organizations involved in joint operations. How much authority a commander can exercise over a supporting or subordinate organization depends upon the specifically delineated command relationship that exists with that organization. A thorough understanding of command relationship alternatives is, therefore, essential in joint operations. Some important command relationship alternatives to be cognizant of are:

- Combatant Command (COCOM)
- Operational Control (OPCON)
- Tactical Control (TACON)
- Administrative Control (ADCON)
- Coordinating Authority (COORDAUTH)

Point of contact for this session is CAPT S. D. Kornatz, U.S. Navy, C-420.

D. Questions:

On 1 October 2002, the newly published 2002 UCP assigned USJFCOM’S entire AOR to USEUCOM and USNORTHCOM. USJFCOM’s functional responsibility is now joint tactics, techniques and procedures and doctrine publications, joint force training and being the force provider to the other geographic combatant commanders. Do you agree with this decision, or do you think USJFCOM must control an AOR to provide credibility to publish joint doctrine? Additionally, will this shift in responsibility better help the Services abide by the Goldwater-Nichols Act by allowing a Combatant Command to focus on penning Joint Doctrine?

In addition to USNORTHCOM’s AOR responsibilities, as specified by the 30 April 2002 UCP, it assumes the following tasks: providing military assistance and/or technical assistance to U.S. civilian authorities in consequence management operations in response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) incidents; providing military assistance to civil disturbances; and overseeing planning of bi-national land and maritime defense of Canada-U.S. region and Deputy Commander NORAD. For a new Command, is its plate too full?

U.S. Northern Command plans, organizes, and executes homeland defense and civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces. The command will be

assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions as ordered by the President. With the sole responsibility of homeland defense, do you think it is prudent for this command not to have permanently assigned forces? What would work better in your view?

The 17 April 2002 decision by Defense officials to establish USNORTHCOM has been called the most sweeping change of the UCP since the system was set-up in 1946. In your opinion, are we shaping our combatant commands in the right direction for future threats to America, or are we focusing too much military attention on internal defense?

As highlighted in the readings, the CJCS exercises control over no forces, nor can he deploy forces. What are the pluses and minuses of that arrangement for the U.S. military in its relationship with its civilian overseers and with allied/coalition partners?

In almost any envisioned conflict, the combatant commander with primary responsibility for employment of forces will require support from other combatant commanders. Does the “in support of” relationship between supporting and supported commanders provide sufficient authority to the supported combatant commander to ensure unity of effort?

The National Guard, though its units are designed for federal missions overseas, has a long established state and federal dual role and will have the closest troops to any incident within our borders. (There are more Guard bases than active duty bases in CONUS.) Should the new Deputy Commander of NORTHCOM be an Air or Army Guard Officer?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Forces Staff College. *Joint Staff Officers’ Guide*, JFSC PUB 1, 2000, pp. 1-2 to 1-57. (Issued).

Scan the next two required readings

Unified Command Plan, 30 April 2002. (*NWC 2021B*), (Issued).

Joint Pub 0-2: *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF), 10 July 2001, Focus on the following areas: pp. vii-xviii, Chapter I (I-1 to I-12), Chapter III (III-1 to III-13), and Chapter V (V-5 to V-11), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Grossman, Larry. “A Joint Venture,” *Government Executive*, July 1991, 14–18. (*NWC 4101*), (Seminar Reserve).

Chiarelli, Peter W. “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 2, Autumn 1993, 71–81. (*NWC 4055*), (Seminar Reserve).

White, John P. “Meeting the Needs of the Secretary of Defense.” *The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Perspective*, November 1999, 51–63. (*NWC 2112*), (Seminar Reserve).

Shalikashvili, John M. “Goldwater-Nichols Ten Years From Now.” *The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Perspective*, November 1999, 65–75. (*NWC 2113*), (Seminar Reserve).

“Summary of Major Provisions of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986” (*NWC 4022*), (Seminar Reserve).

DIPLOMACY AND MILITARY FORCE (Seminar)

The military are . . . most comfortable when the objectives are clear and precise. Institutionally, the military are solution oriented. . . . On the other hand . . . diplomacy is often the art of managing the insoluble.

—General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, 16 November 1994

A. Focus:

A common American view of foreign policy holds that power politics and old-fashioned diplomacy are bad, powerful standing militaries are to be mistrusted, peacetime international commitments are dangerous entanglements to be avoided, and military force should only be employed when vital national interests are at stake and objectives are clearly defined. Nonetheless, the United States regularly employs military assets in support of political objectives across the entire spectrum of conflict—from deterrence through war.

This session examines the particular ways that leaders, civilian (diplomatic) and military, orchestrate military actions in the pursuit of national objectives. In so doing, it builds on themes considered in Strategy and Policy curriculum sessions: “The Napoleonic Era: Europe 1792–1815” and “The Second World War: The United States, The Grand Alliance, And Global War.” Military forces, used in various ways under various circumstances, can influence the actions of other governments or non-state actors. Successful conflict termination and transition to post-hostilities require diplomacy. This session provides a foundation for Session III-9, “Operational Command and Control” and Session IV-2, “The Interagency Process.”

B. Objectives:

- Explain the link between national objectives and supporting military objectives, and the importance of conflict termination.
- Comprehend the link between diplomacy and military force in pursuing the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the derivative National Military Strategy (NMS).
- Understand the resources that diplomacy can provide the operational commander for achieving his objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.

C. Background:

Diplomacy among nations largely entails negotiation and bargaining, which may be polite or rude; and involve threats as well as offers. Military force can be used effectively in concert with the other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) to deter, compel, support, or coerce other actors. Military actions can be designed primarily to support political or diplomatic goals to achieve national objectives, without going to war, whenever possible.

“Flexible Deterrent Options” (FDOs) illustrate how these instruments of national power can be mutually supporting. What military force the combatant commander selects and how it is used must be matched to the stated national objective, in concert with political, diplomatic, informational, and economic actions, and appropriate to the level of national commitment. Overseas presence is customarily a factor in the selection of military force in a crisis; however, developing technologies and increasing international economic ties suggest the potential for reduction in our dependence on traditional presence missions. At the same time, military leaders cannot accomplish their objectives absent the expertise and assistance provided by the diplomatic community.

Since the Vietnam War, military and civilian leaders have struggled to establish appropriate criteria to govern when to employ military force—the military has sought clarity and certainty while its civilian masters have sought flexibility. Initial efforts by Caspar Weinberger and Colin Powell to devise such criteria were modified in light of U.S. experience in the Balkans and again by the George W. Bush administration. It is unlikely that a permanent set of criteria will be agreed upon, especially in light of continuing demands for the United States to conduct a wide range of military operations other than war.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-412.

D. Questions:

How does General Shelton’s position on the use of military force differ from the positions of Secretary Weinberger and General Powell?

General Anthony Zinni has argued that “If you read the Weinberger Doctrine and adhere to every one of its tenets, you will be able to fight no war other than World War II.” Is the Weinberger Doctrine a realistic guide to the employment of military force in a world characterized primarily by military operations other than war?

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has recently set new rules for entering conflicts. How do these rules differ from those embodied in the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine? What are the implications of these differences for the use of military force?

General Shalkashvili asserts that the imperatives of diplomacy and of military force are very different. Is he correct? If so, how does this affect the practical coordination of diplomacy and military force?

Diplomacy is based upon state-to-state relations; is it still useful when confronting a non-state foe, such as Al-Qaeda? If so, how?

E. Required Readings:

Weinberger, Caspar W. “The Uses of Military Power,” Remarks prepared for delivery to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 28 November 1984. (*NWC 1013*), (Issued).

Powell, Colin L. “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1992–1993, 32–45 (excerpts). (*NWC 1015*), (Issued). Oct. 17, 2002

Shalikashvili, John M. “Force and Diplomacy in the 21st Century.” Oscar Iden Lecture, Georgetown University, 16 November 1994. (*NWC 1016*), (Issued).

Shelton, Henry H. “From the Chairman: The U.S. Military and Foreign Policy.” (*NWC 3002*), (Issued).

Rumsfeld, Donald. "Guidelines to Be Considered When Committing U.S. Forces." Department of Defense, 14 October 2002 (as published by the *New York Times*). (*NWC 1000*), (Issued).

"Flexible Deterrent Options," Extracts from Armed Forces Staff College *Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*. (*NWC 3081*), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Joint Forces Staff College. *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JFSC Pub 5) (Seminar Reserve).

Arnold, Edwin J., Jr. "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Objectives." *Parameters* (1994): 4–12.

Craig, Gordon A. and Alexander L. George. "Coercive Diplomacy," in *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990 (2nd edition), 189–204.

Cable, James. *Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1979: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. (Seminar Reserve).

Iklé, Fred Charles. *Every War Must End*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. (Seminar Reserve).

Owens, William A. "Naval Voyage to an Uncharted World," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings* 120 (1994): 30–34.

Tangredi, Sam. "Are We Firing Tomahawks Too Easily?" United States Naval Institute *Proceedings* 122 (1996): 8–9.

White, Donald. "Mutable Destiny: The End of the American Century?" *Harvard International Security Review* (Winter 1997–1998): 42–47.

BLOCK TWO OPERATIONAL ART

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INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONAL ART

A. Focus:

The operational art block of the Joint Military Operations Course is the framework for understanding operational concepts discussed throughout the course. The study of operational art, fundamental elements of warfare and basic operational/campaign planning is essential to the understanding and comprehension of the operation level of war. Most important is a thorough understanding of the terms related to operational art. After a graded examination, this block of instruction concludes with a survey of operational law and rules of engagement considerations.

B. Guidance:

The course material offered in the operational art block may be more familiar to some students than to others, depending upon a student's branch of service, operational experience, and education. No matter what a student's background, there is a wealth of invaluable material to be gained from the assigned readings. Preparation and participation is key; students need to come to class prepared to participate in lively discussions with colleagues from other services and other agencies. By the end of the operational art block of study, every student should be comfortable with the terminology and concepts of operational art.

The first two weeks of the operational art block are designed to introduce the student to some of the terminology, elements, principles and concepts of operational art. During this time, The Leyte Gulf case study will be used as an illustrative example. During the third week, students will analyze the Falklands/Malvinas case study, using those same terms, elements, principles and concepts discussed during the first two weeks. The graded examination will test each student's understanding of the subject.

This block addresses the most important components of operational art; it is not intended to be a comprehensive manual. Every Naval War College graduate should understand the basic concepts of operational art and also understand the importance of operational art. In the profession of arms, the study of operational art will likely never stop; this block is designed to be just a beginning.

INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONAL ART (Seminar)

The truth is that the mistrust of theory arises from a misconception of what it is that theory claims to do. It does not pretend to give the power of conduct in the field; it claims no more than to increase the effective power of conduct.

—Sir Julian Corbett

A. Focus:

This session will introduce operational art. As an introduction, this session is designed to discuss the historical roots of operational art; the linkage between **operational art** and **strategy** and **tactics**; and the relationship between **operational art** and the **operational level** of warfare.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Analyze the strategic art; i.e., developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to secure national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how technological change affects the art and science of war and evaluate key ongoing and anticipated technological developments pertinent to the military instrument.
- Understand the importance of applying sound **operational art** concepts to military planning and force employment.

C. Background:

Operational art, in its essence, deals with the study, theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns designed to accomplish operational or strategic objectives in a given theater. Operational art is one of the three components of military art, along with strategy and tactics. All of the components of military art are inextricably linked. Operational art is applied across the three **levels** of warfare, strategic, operational and tactical, and across the **range** of military **conflict**, that is, from military operations other than war (MOOTW) to war.

As will be seen during the discussion of this lesson, the **conduct** of warfare at the operational level preceded the emergence of formal operational art. The operational **level** of warfare emerged as a result of various deliberate national policy decisions and the explosion of military technology. The search by military professionals for effective methods of conducting war at the operational level led to the emergence and evolution of operational **art**. This interaction among study, theory and practice continues to this day.

Operational art is not doctrine. Effective doctrine is a derivative of sound operational art. In that regard, the combat employment of ground, naval, air and space forces manifests some functional commonalities, but there are also clear

differences in practice, due primarily to differences in the “medium” (land, sea, air, and space) in which these forces operate and the weapon systems each Service employs in these media. Therefore, as a result of these and other influences, each Service develops and practices its own adaptation of operational art and related doctrine, while the joint employment of forces is guided by joint operational art and derivative joint doctrine. It is relevant to note that, in a modern context, no employment of combat forces at the operational or theater-strategic level has taken place without some involvement of two or more Services.

Operational art is also *not* strategy. Strategy is normally developed and implemented at the national level, while operational art is applied across the spectrum of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare, in order to develop the operational level concepts and plans which will integrate national strategic objectives with battlefield tactical actions, defined by tactics, through effective theater and joint task force level operations. Operational art is thus the enabling function for theater/task force operations. In addition, operational art and the operational level of warfare are *not* synonymous. Operational art is a cognitive, analytical *process*, while the operational level of war is a doctrinal perspective.

The point of contact for this session is Commander J. L. Barker, U.S. Navy, C-420.

D. Questions:

What is the operational level of warfare? How/why did it develop? When?

What is operational art? How/why did it emerge? When?

Was operational art discovered or was it created?

What is the relationship of operational art to the operational level of warfare?

Briefly, how would you define strategy and tactics?

What is the relationship of operational art to strategy and tactics?

Since the operational *level* of warfare emerged as a result of various deliberate national policy decisions and the explosion of military technology; what then will be the impact of new and emerging technology on the operational level of war?

Will new technology change the importance of operational art? If so, how?

Why study and learn operational art?

What is its utility for you as future joint operations and staff officers?

E. Required Readings:

Matheny, Michael R. “The Roots of Modern American Operational Art.” (*NWC 2031*), (Issued).

Schneider, James J. “The Loose Marble and the Origins of Operational Art.” (*NWC 4004*), (Issued).

Vego, Milan. “On Operational Art,” *Operational Warfare*, Part I: Fundamentals, 1–25. (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Vego, Milan. Glossary of Operational Terms, *Operational Warfare*. (Issued).

Goerlitz, Walter. *The German General Staff, 1657-1945*. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1961.

Stoecker, S.W. *Forging Stalin's Army—Marshal Tukachevsky and the Politics of Military Innovation*. Oxford, UK: Westview Press, 1998.

Orenstein, Harold S. (Trans.) *The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art—The Documentary Basis, 1927-1991* (Two Vols.). Portland OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1995.

Corum, James S. *The Roots of Blitzkrieg—Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform*. Lawrence, KS: Univ. of Kansas Press, 1992.

Corum, James S. *The Luftwaffe—Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940*. Lawrence, KS: Univ. of Kansas Press, 1997.

LEYTE OPERATION: STRATEGIC SETTING (Lecture)

A. Focus:

This session introduces the historical case study for Block II—Operational Art. It provides the strategic and operational background for the October 1944 Allied invasion of the Philippines and the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the concept and execution of operations associated with the invasion (and defense) of Leyte from both Allied and Japanese perspectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.

C. Background:

The Battle of Leyte Gulf was the largest and most complex sea-air battle (four separate battles over two days, actually) in history. As the final showdown between the U.S. and Japanese fleets, it involved enormous naval and air forces engaging in huge areas and over vast distances, all working in support of amphibious and land operations. As such, the battle provides superior illustrations of virtually all aspects of operational art covered in Block II and remains directly relevant to joint operations in the littorals today.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-412.

D. Required Readings:

Cannon, M. Hanlin. *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1954), Ch. 1, “The Strategic Plan,” pp. 1–9; Ch. 2, “The Nature of the Target,” pp. 10–14; Ch. 3, “Plans Are Made and Forces Are Readied,” pp. 21–32. (*NWC 2032*), Issued.

Field, James A. *The Japanese at Leyte Gulf*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1947, Ch. 1, “The October Situation,” 1–14. (*NWC 2033*), (Issued).

E. Supplementary Readings:

Cutler, Thomas J. *The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 23–26 October 1944*. New York: Harper Collins, 1994.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. “Leyte, June 1944–January 1945.” *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, Volume XII, Boston: Little, Brown, 1960.

Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, COMINCH P-008, Amphibious Operations: Invasion of the Philippines, October 1944 to January 1945 Washington, D.C.: Navy Department, 1945.

Barbey, Daniel E. *MacArthur’s Amphibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious Force Operations, 1943–1945*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1977.

OPERATIONAL ART AND DOCTRINE (Seminar)

I think it is fair to say that while good theory will not guarantee good generalship, bad theory will certainly guarantee the reverse. . . It seems to me there was a profound decline in the quality of strategic thought. The decline finally took the form of a search for axioms which were simple and easy to grasp, something Clausewitz had scrupulously avoided. . . . Clausewitz insists that there are no principles of war; that there is no system of rules which, if pursued, will guarantee success. . . . I consider it to his great credit rather than a ground for criticism. . . .

—Dr. Bernard Brodie

A. Focus:

This session will examine the relationship between operational art and current joint doctrine.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role of joint doctrine with respect to unified command.
- **PJE**—Analyze the roles, relationships, and functions of the NCA, CJCS, JCS, Combatant Commanders, Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Service Chiefs.
- Understand the relationship of **doctrine** to **operational art**.
- Understand how **operational art** developed in the United States.

C. Background:

In a perfect world, both Service doctrine and joint doctrine would evolve along with the factors that influence it. However, modern history is replete with failed rulers and defeated nations whose doctrine failed to change (**inflexibility**) or changed in the wrong direction (**lack of vision**). There are many reasons for inflexibility and lack of vision but generally, doctrinal failures can be attributed to some misinterpretation of influencing factors, ignorance of operational concepts, or even hubris. Doctrine involves the specific application of general insights regarding “how to fight” and is a function of relevant cultural, political, and military perspectives, economic considerations, geography, weapon systems, technology, etc. Ultimately, there is a strong argument that effective doctrine is a **derivative** of sound operational art.

The challenge for the United States, its allies, and its coalition partners is being able to discern what doctrine is worth keeping and what doctrine needs updating. Understanding the historical, theoretical and practical underpinnings of doctrine and operational art is vital for the development of sound future doctrine.

The point of contact for this session is Commander J. L. Barker, U.S. Navy, C-420.

D. Questions:

What is the relationship of **operational art** to **doctrine**?

Is Carl Builder still relevant in his assertions about *Service Culture*? How does culture affect *doctrine*?

Is the *joint* perspective on *operational art* comprehensive? Should it be? Are today's *Service* perspectives on *operational art* really distinct?

What precautions are appropriate when rewriting *doctrine*? Does our current *joint doctrinal development system* effectively account for significant influencing factors and safeguard against, for example, "change for its own sake"?

What are some *factors* that influence *doctrine*?

How does *Service* doctrine relate to *joint* doctrine?

E. Required Readings:

Builder, Carl H. *The Masks of War*, "Personalities," Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1991, 1–44. (Issued).

Joint Doctrine and Capstone and Keystone Primer. "The Joint Doctrine Story," 91–93. Issued.

Joint Pub 3-0. *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, pp. III-9 to III-24. (Issued).

Anderson, Charles R. "Leyte: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II," 1–35. (*NWC 2036*), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Hughes, Wayne P. Jr. Capt, USN (Ret). "The Power in Doctrine." *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1995. (*NWC 1018*), (Issued).

Meilinger, Phillip S. Col, USAF. "Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power." *Airpower Journal*, Spring 1996. (*NWC 1011*), (Issued).

Toffler, Alvin, and Heidi Toffler. "AirLand Battle," Chapter 7, pp. 44–56; *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*. (*NWC 1019*), (Issued).

Tritten, James J. "Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine." *Naval War College Review*, Spring 1995. (*NWC 1064*), (Issued).

Matheny, Michael R. "The Development of the Theory and Doctrine of Operational Art in the American Army, 1920–1940." School of Advanced Military Studies, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 22 March 1988.

Waghelstein, John D. "Preparing the U.S. Army for the Wrong War, Educational and Doctrinal Failure, 1865–91." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 10, No. 1 (Spring 1999).

OPERATIONAL FACTORS (Seminar)

It is only when we have reached agreement on the names and concepts that we can hope to progress with clearness and ease in the examination of the topic, and be assured of finding ourselves on the same platform with our readers. . . .

—Carl von Clausewitz

Those who do not know the conditions of mountains and forests, hazardous defiles, marshes, and swamps, cannot conduct the march of an army. . . .

—Sun Tzu

A. Focus:

This session addresses the operational factors of space, time, and force. Examples from the Battle of Leyte Gulf are used throughout the session to illustrate the application of operational art to the maritime theater. This session provides a foundation for the sessions on “Levels of Command (War) and the Theater” that will follow.

B. Objectives:

- *PJE*—Analyze the strategic art; i.e. developing, applying, and coordinating the four instruments of national power (D.I.M.E.) to achieve national security objectives.
- *PJE*—Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine and the application of national power affect the planning process.
- *PJE*—Analyze joint operational art with special emphasis on its application within the Joint Task Force.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing and sustaining our national military resources, while maintaining a perspective on how the military element of national power interacts with the other factors of “D.I.M.E.” to achieve our national security objectives.
- Understand the operational factors of *space*, *time*, and *force*, their interrelationships; and the need for the operational commander to balance these factors against one another in order to gain and maintain freedom of action.

C. Background:

Webster’s Dictionary defines *war* as a “period of open or armed conflict between opposing forces to achieve a particular end.” When viewed through the lexicon of factors *space*, *time* and *force*, warfare conducted at any level, but primarily strategic, is a monumental undertaking. It is essential to first understand the interrelationships among these factors, and subsequently, to recognize the dynamics of how slight adjustments in one factor can result in sometimes less than desirable changes in the others. Understanding how to balance the factors of *space*, *time*, and *force* are a commander’s primary concern and critical to achieve success.

Unfortunately, Commanders may or may not be able to choose the *space* in which they will be forced to wage war, but their ability to shape the battlespace is essential. The gain or loss of *space* in itself is not inherently an advantage or disadvantage; what matters most is the relationship between *space* and military *forces* available to influence

the enemy's ability react. The size, shape, and nature of a **space** will affect the quantity and type of **forces** employed, as well as the **time** required to conduct a successful military operation. While **space** or geography alone cannot determine the success of a military effort, the relationship between **space** and **forces** can be decisive.

Time and **space** have distinct reciprocal effects upon one another. For an attacker, the goal, historically, is to gain the most space in the least amount of **time**. The rationale being, the less **time** it takes the attacker to mobilize, deploy, and concentrate forces, the less prepared the defender will be. Rapidly seizing the initiative in order to gain control of the objective area further places the defender at a disadvantage, by reducing his area of operations, subsequently limiting his freedom of maneuver. Ideally, the defender wants to increase **time** expended by the attacker in order to better control **space**. Therefore, delay generally gives the defender the advantage, primarily because the attacker is forced to increase his efforts, thus depleting his combat power over **time**.

The third factor in this trilogy, is **force**. **Time** and **space** are relatively insignificant terms if the commander lacks the **forces** to exploit enemy weaknesses. The quantities and types of **forces** a Commander is able, or willing, to commit, directly affects the **time** required for a military operation, and the size of the **space** in which to use them. Counterintuitively, however, smaller **forces** can require more **time** and dictate a smaller **space** for achievement of objectives, while larger **forces** may allow faster action in a larger **space**.

Note: Recently, some theorists have argued that **information** and **law** are also key operational factors; however, until consensus is reached, it is reasonable to consider them as supporting elements of **space**, **time** and **force**.

Point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel (P) S. G. Ciluffo, U.S. Army, C-411.

D. Questions:

How did the Allies view the operational factors of **space**, **time** and **force** at the Battle of Leyte Gulf? How did the Japanese?

How did **forces** available affect Japanese plans for Leyte Gulf? Were these plans executable?

Which side used **time** and **space** most effectively at Leyte Gulf?

Are these operational factors still useful in planning and executing our present war on terrorism? Why or why not?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan. **Operational Warfare**, "Operational Factors," "The Factor of Space," "The Factor of Time," "The Factor of Force," "The Factors of Space, Time, and Force," "Information and Operational Factors."(Issued).

"The Battle for Leyte Gulf." Naval War College Interactive CD-ROM, (**NWC 2040**), (Issued).

Review previous required reading (**NWC 2032**) from Session OPS II-2. Focus on Chapter 2, "The Nature of the Target," pp. 10–14.

F. Supplementary Readings:

None.

LEVELS OF COMMAND (WAR) AND THE THEATER (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session will explain the concept of the levels of war and its relationship to the respective levels of command. It will also explain the natural and artificial features of the theater. Examples from the Battle of Leyte Gulf are used to illustrate the importance of understanding the levels of command (war) and the key elements of a theater.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the distinctions between the **strategic**, **operational**, and **tactical** levels of war, and how operational art is applied at the different levels.
- Comprehend how peacetime and wartime “theaters” are designed, including the key elements of a maritime theater.
- Understand the meaning and importance of the key elements of a theater (interior vs. exterior positions, base of operations, physical objectives, decisive points, lines of operations, and lines of communications).
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the Combatant Commanders.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.

C. Background:

There are three principal levels of command (war): strategic, operational, and tactical. In U.S. terms, the national-strategic and theater-strategic sub-levels are differentiated. In addition, the operational-tactical level serves as a link between the tactical and operational level of command (war).

Generally, each level of war corresponds to a specific command echelon. In practice, command echelons are established based on the objectives to be attained, whereas levels of war are based on the methods of combat force employment aimed at accomplishing tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. Levels of war cannot be easily delineated, because actions at any level often considerably affect the outcome at other levels of war. Knowledge and understanding of the levels of war is critical for one’s understanding of the elements of operational art.

After the military objectives and methods of combat forces employment are determined, the next step is determining the size of the physical space required for basing, deployment, combat employment, and logistical support and sustainment of the forces assigned to accomplish respective military objectives. This is one of the first and most important organizational decisions to be made by the higher commander. In generic terms, the size of physical space ranges from combat zones/sectors, areas of operations, to theaters of operations and theaters of war.

In U.S. terms, the geographic combatant commander's area of responsibility (AOR) encompasses a theater. In the case of two or more regional conflicts, the commander's AOR might be declared a theater of war. In the case of a major regional conflict (e.g., the Gulf War of 1990–1991 or Operation Iraqi Freedom of 2003), a part of the combatant commander's AOR can be delineated and formally (or informally) declared a theater of operations. It is there where the operational level of command is established and the operational level of war is conducted. A single campaign is conducted in a respective theater of operations. A major operation is normally conducted in an area of operations, while tactical actions take place in a given combat sector/zone. The new term, "battlespace" (or battle space) is used in referring to the rational combat sector/zone or an area of operations plus corresponding cyberspace.

Any theater contains a large number of seemingly random natural and artificial features that significantly affect the planning and execution of military action at any level of war. They are arbitrarily called "theater elements" or "theater geometry." The main elements of any theater are positions, distances, bases of operations, physical objectives, decisive points, lines of operations, lines of retreat, and lines of communications—any of which may have tactical, operational, or strategic significance. A key to evaluating the military importance of these features is not only their number and characteristics, but also their relative position and distance from each other—the geometry of the situation. Therefore, it is critically important that the operational commanders and their staffs know and understand the advantages and disadvantages of these elements to ensure the most effective employment of their own and the enemy forces.

The point of contact for this session is Professor M. N. Vego, C-412.

D. Questions:

How might a geographic Combatant Commander serve as either a strategic-level commander or an operational-level commander?

Was General MacArthur a strategic or operational-level commander during Operation King II? How about Admirals Nimitz and Halsey?

What is the usual relationship between command echelon and theater?

Why was the Allied Pacific Theater during World War II divided into several areas? Why was it divided up the way it was? What effect did these divisions have on the planning and execution of the Leyte Gulf operation?

What were advantages and disadvantages of the geostrategic position for the Japanese forces on land, at sea, and in the air in their defense of the Philippines in October 1944?

Identify and discuss tactical and operational objectives on land in the Allied Operation King II. What were Allied operational objectives at sea in that operation?

What were tactical and operational "decisive points" for the respective Allied and Japanese naval commanders in the Leyte Operation?

Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the lines of operations used by the Japanese naval forces and land-based air in their defense of the Philippines in October 1944.

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan. *Operational Warfare*, "Levels of Command and Levels of War," pp. 17–25. (Issued).

Ibid., “Theater Organization and Structure,” and “Theater Geometry,” pp. 109–122 and 151–182. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-0. *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, pp. II-1 to II-3 and II-19 to II-22. (Issued).

CJCSM 3500.04C, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)*, pp. B-A-4 to B-A-6. (JEL), (Library Reserve).

F. **Supplementary Readings:**

Vego, Milan. *Operational Warfare*, “Theater Physical Features,” pp. 123–149. (Issued).

MCDP 1, *Warfighting*. “Levels of War,” pp. 28–32. (*NWC 2006*), (Issued).

OPERATIONAL WARFARE AT SEA (Seminar)

Knowledge of naval matters is an art as well as any other and not to be attended to at idle times. . . .

Pericles, 460 B.C.

In giving up the offensive, the Navy gives up its proper sphere. . . . In war, the proper objective of the Navy is the enemy's navy.

Mahan, *Naval Strategy*, 1911

A. Focus:

This session will examine operational and strategic objectives of warfare at sea, including a discussion of the influence of physical factors upon objectives in the littorals.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the operational characteristics of the littorals and their influence on the combat employment of major naval forces and aviation.
- Comprehend and analyze the meaning and complexities of the terms “sea control,” “sea denial,” “choke point control,” and “basing/deployment area control.”
- Know and analyze the theoretical and practical implications of sea control in terms of scope (extent), duration, and degree.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how technological change affects the art and science of war and evaluate key ongoing and anticipated technological developments pertinent to the military instrument.

C. Background:

Warfare in a littoral sea differs considerably from warfare in an open ocean. This difference is primarily due to the proximity of continental landmasses and the relatively small size of an area in which to conduct warfare. No part of the ocean is more directly affected by the geomorphologic and hydrographic/oceanographic features of the physical environment than is the littoral. With its highly indented coasts, numerous islands, shoals, reefs, tides, currents, channels, straits and other features, the littoral greatly restricts the maneuverability and speed of ships, especially deep-draft combatants and submarines. In short, the littoral sea can be a difficult place to operate.

War at sea is almost never conducted in isolation; war at sea is an integral part of a country's strategic objectives in war as a whole. Therefore, war at sea is intrinsically related to war on land and in the air. Logically then, all services must cooperate in

conducting war in the littorals. In other words, there is no place where jointness is more important than in warfare in the littorals.

The point of contact for this session is Captain J. N. Stafford, U.S. Navy, C-412.

D. Questions:

Leyte Case Study:

- What were the effects of the archipelago features of the Philippines on the employment of the Allied and Japanese air and surface forces?
- Explain how the littoral nature of terrain, oceanography, and climate/weather affected the Allied amphibious landing at Leyte and subsequent battle ashore.
- What were the Allied operational objectives at sea prior to the landing at Leyte on 20 October 1944? Did the Allies aim to obtain general or local sea control in the Philippine waters?
- What were the Japanese objectives at sea in defense of the Philippines? Was their objective to obtain local sea control or sea denial?
- Did the Japanese possess control of the principal straits and their approaches? What were the consequences for the Allies?
- How would you characterize the situation that prevailed in the waters adjacent to the Island of Leyte in October-December 1944? Which side possessed local and temporary sea control there?
- Did the Japanese plan for and obtain control of their basing/deployment areas?

General Questions:

What are the principal differences between war at sea and war on land or war in the air?

Mahan's 1911 quote at the top of this session says "***In war, the proper objective of the Navy is the enemy's navy.***" Is this still true?

Given Professor Chisholm's earlier lecture on "The Naval Way of War," has the U.S. Navy demonstrated the ability or willingness to operate in the littoral?

Professor Vego's reading claims that no war at sea has ever been won without going on a strategic offensive. Is this true? If so, why?

Discuss the operational impact of geography, oceanography, and weather/climate on the employment of major combat forces in the littorals. In which ways do the influence of these factors differ from those on the open ocean?

How are tasks determined in war at sea?

What does it mean to have command of the sea? Is that the same as sea control?

Why do we care about choke points? What does choke point control mean?

What is the meaning of the term "basing/deployment area control?" Is it an important concept and why?

What are your thoughts on the future of war at sea?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan. Chapters: "Influence of the Physical Environment," "Objectives of Naval Warfare," *Operational Warfare Addendum* September 2002. (*NWC 1001A*), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.

Castex, Raoul. *Strategic Theories*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

Rosinski, Herbert. *The Development of Naval Thought*, edited by B. Mitchell Simpson, III. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977.

METHODS OF COMBAT FORCE EMPLOYMENT (Seminar)

The beginnings of wisdom is to call things their right name.

—Confucius

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is to explain and analyze the principal methods of combat force employment to accomplish operational or strategic objectives in a theater.

B. Objectives:

- Know and understand the principal methods of combat force employment in general.
- Understand the proper definition and meaning of the term “major operation” and its importance in planning as a part of a campaign.
- Describe the differences between tactical actions, major operations, and campaigns, and how they relate to the levels of war.
- Understand theater command and control relationships, with special emphasis on the functions and employment of a JTF.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the Department of Defense systems and processes by which national ends, ways, and means are reconciled, integrated, and applied.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the role of joint doctrine with respect to unified command.

C. Background:

Methods of combat force employment are an important component of operational art. While battles and campaigns have received inordinately greater attention in U.S. doctrinal publications, the same cannot be said about *major operations*. This lack of interest has been compounded by differences in terminology. Each Service, although using the same or similar terms, defines methods of combat force employment differently (even differently than joint doctrine). The full extent of Service differences is such that some of the terms used are not recognized by other Services, while other terms have no generally accepted definition or are not defined at all. More often than not, terms are used loosely and without regard to their real meaning or commonly accepted definitions.

Modern methods of combat force employment are the result of a long evolution of warfare. In the nineteenth century, “decisive” battles were the area of study and the practice of *tactics*, while *strategy* was concerned with the conduct of campaigns. While a single Service primarily conducted campaigns, there are examples nevertheless where the navies took part as well (the American War of Independence, the Peninsular War, the Crimean War, the American Civil War, etc.).

The principal methods of combat force employment today are *tactical actions*, *major operations*, and *campaigns*. These terms are differentiated by the *military objectives* they

are intended to accomplish and the corresponding command echelon responsible for their planning, preparation, and execution.

Tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes, attacks, etc.) are aimed at accomplishing major or minor tactical objectives in a given combat zone or sectors and, in some cases, can encompass an area of operations. They are usually an integral part of major operations. When conducted over time and in a certain sea or ocean area or airspace, tactical actions can cumulatively accomplish operational objective(s). Tactical actions can be either defensive or offensive in nature and are differentiated by the physical environment (land, sea, or airspace) in which they occur.

In the U.S. military, “major operation” is not a widely understood or accepted term. The more generic “operation” is used so often and interchangeably that it has lost its true meaning. However, Joint Pub 3-0, **Doctrine for Joint Operations**, defines a major operation as “a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by various combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to accomplish operational and, sometimes, strategic objectives in an operational area.”

In generic terms, a **major operation** consists of series of related battles, engagements, and strikes and other tactical actions sequenced and synchronized in terms of time and space to accomplish an operational objective. Major operations are normally an integral part of a campaign. Sometimes, a major operation may be planned to accomplish a strategic objective in a situation short of war, and usually in an undeveloped theater. Examples of such major operations are the U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983 (Operation **Urgent Fury**), the U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989 (Operation **Just Cause**), and NATO’s actions in the Kosovo Conflict of 1999 (Operation **Allied Force**).

In contrast to tactical actions, major operations are invariably planned. With respect to their purpose, they can be offensive or defensive. Ground (or land), naval (or maritime), air (space), and special forces major operations are differentiated with regard to the physical environment in which the preponderance of the major operation is conducted. With respect to the degree of Service participation, **independent**, **joint** (multi-Service), and **combined** (multi-national) major operations are differentiated.

Independent major operations are conducted **predominantly** by the combat arms of a single Service. A joint **major operation** is conducted by forces of two or more services, while a **combined major operation** is conducted with two or more services of allied countries or coalition member states. A major operation can be both joint and combined (as was the case during the Coalition’s air offensive against Iraq in the Gulf War of 1990–1991, and NATO’s action against Serbia in 1999). When only a single-type force is used, a major operation can be combined without necessarily being joint (e.g., the combat employment of multi-national naval forces or air forces).

The term **campaign** is used interchangeably by the U.S. military for describing a wide range of military actions. The Department of Defense and the Services differ in their understanding of what constitutes a campaign. Joint Pub 3-0, however, defines a campaign as a “series of related major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives.”

In generic terms, a **campaign** consists of a series of related major operations (land, air/space, naval, special forces) sequenced and synchronized in terms of time and space

and aimed to accomplish a **military strategic** or **theater-strategic objective** in a given (declared or undeclared) theater of operations. These operations are executed simultaneously or sequentially and are conducted according to a common plan, controlled by a theater commander. The main purpose of a campaign may be either offensive or defensive. **Land campaigns** and **maritime campaigns** are differentiated according to the physical environment in which major operations predominantly take place. Because airspace is an inseparable part of a maritime or land theater, air forces are almost always employed jointly with other Services.

In contrast, a campaign in “military operations other than war” (MOOTW), such as counterinsurgency or counter-terrorism, consists of a series of related minor or sometimes major tactical actions rather than major operations. These actions are coordinated in time and place to accomplish strategic objectives within a given part of the theater commander’s area of responsibility. Some campaigns in MOOTW, specifically, counter-drug or counter-terrorism campaigns, are not limited to a specific theater, but are conducted in several theaters that might or might not be adjacent to each other.

As in the past, the new technological advances will considerably affect the methods of combat force employment in the future. Battles and engagements will probably be less important than strikes. Major joint/combined operations will most likely emerge as the principal method of accomplishing strategic objectives in a theater, while campaigns could become rare, except in the case of war between two major powers.

The point of contact for this session is Professor M. N. Vego, C-414.

D. Questions:

Why is it important to know and understand the true meanings of the key terms dealing with the methods of combat force employment?

Explain the principal methods for accomplishing major and minor tactical objectives. What are the differences between a battle and an engagement, and between a strike and an attack?

What is the true meaning of the term “major operation?”

Explain what constitutes a “campaign.” Is there such a thing as an “air campaign?” Why or why not?

How has modern technology blurred the differences between tactical actions and major operations? Why?

Will the planning of tactical actions in the future become the purview of the operational commander? Why or why not? What problems might that pose?

Leyte Case Study:

1. Was the Allied amphibious landing at Leyte aimed to accomplish an operational or strategic objective?
2. Identify the types of major naval, ground, and air operations in terms of their main purpose (offensive vs. defensive, fleet vs. fleet, fleet vs. shore, air vs. ground, etc.) and sequence (main, supporting, preliminary, initial, etc.) conducted by the Allied and Japanese forces in the Philippines and the adjacent sea/airspace between 17 and 26 October 1944.

3. What naval battles and engagements constitute what is popularly known as the “Battle of Leyte Gulf?” Were all battles or engagements planned, or are they seen in retrospect as being planned?
4. Identify the key elements of the major naval and air operations conducted by the Japanese forces in defense of the Philippines in October 1944.

E. **Required Readings:**

Joint Pub 3-0. *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, pp. III-4 to III-9, GL-12 to GL-13, “major operation.” (Issued).

Vego, Milan. *Operational Warfare*, “Methods of Combat Force Employment,” “Major Naval Operations,” Part VI: Methods of Combat Force Employment, pp. 373–409. (Issued).

Wouk, Herman. *War and Remembrance*, Chapters 86–88, 90–91. (Issued).

F. **Supplementary Readings:**

None.

ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session continues to examine the theoretical framework and fundamental concepts of operational art. It focuses on the elements of operational warfare, specifically: deployment/redeployment, critical factors, the center of gravity, concentration, operational maneuver, and the concept of the culminating point.

B. Objectives:

- Identify and examine the principal elements of warfare as applied to the operational level of war.
- Know and understand the meaning and concept of the terms “critical factors,” “culminating point,” and “center of gravity.”
- *PJE*—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- *PJE*—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.

C. Background:

The essence of operational art is applying decisive force against the enemy’s main source of strength. This session will examine several key concepts that are essential to effectively plan and employ military forces to achieve desired military objectives.

Initial planning must include identifying critical factors that pertain to both enemy and friendly forces. The term “critical factors” is used to describe the critical strengths and critical weaknesses of both sides in a conflict. Critical strengths are those capabilities considered vital to achieve a given military objective. Critical weaknesses are those elements that, while essential, are grossly inadequate by themselves to perform their intended function or task. Critical strengths and weaknesses may become critical vulnerabilities if they are directly related to the center of gravity and are vulnerable to attack.

Successful planning and employment of combat forces hinge on the proper identification of a center of gravity (COG) for both the enemy and friendly forces. In generic terms, a center of gravity is defined as a source of massed strength—physical or moral, or, a source of leverage—whose serious degradation, neutralization, or destruction will have a decisive impact on a military force’s ability to accomplish a given military objective. The enemy’s COG must be neutralized or destroyed, while one’s own COG must be protected in order to accomplish the assigned military objective.

Success in combat is largely dependent on rapidly massed, superior combat power at a decisive time and place on the battlefield. A series of specific actions is required to successfully concentrate forces at a desired time and location. This series of actions includes deployment, employment, and sustainment.

Deployment is the process of moving one's own forces and assets to their planned starting positions or designated lines and areas for the commencement of actions. Time phasing of forces into the area of operations is critical for success at the higher levels of war (operational and strategic). Errors in deployment at the operational or theater-strategic levels cannot be easily corrected, if at all, once hostilities start. Deployment precedes employment and maneuver.

Employment of military forces frequently involves maneuver. The principal aim of maneuver is to obtain a position that offers a force an advantage relative to the enemy. Forces can employ maneuver in both the offense and defense. Maneuver facilitates direct or indirect attack on the enemy's COG or strikes at the enemy's critical capabilities, such as logistical support. Maneuver is categorized as tactical, operational, or strategic, based on the nature of the desired objective (tactical, operational, strategic).

An important element of warfare, especially at the operational and strategic levels, is the concept of a culminating point (or culmination). Culmination applies to both offensive and defensive actions. It is a "point" in terms of time and space reached by the attacker or the defender, after which their stated objectives cannot be accomplished, and continued effort to reach them would significantly heighten the chances of failure or defeat. It is reached when the relative combat power begins to decrease rapidly for one side in combat. The ability to prevent one's own culmination while causing the enemy to reach his is one of the prerequisites to operational success. In general, the point of culmination occurs in time and space, when and where the attacker must stop and defend his gains if he wishes to avoid losing them. It is the combat power that culminates, and the operational commander must determine his combat power relative to that of the opponent.

Point of contact for this session is Professor T. L. Gatchel, C-413.

D. Questions:

What is the purpose of strategic and operational deployment? Explain and analyze operational deployment. Did the Japanese and the Allies correctly assess the challenge of deployment in building their plans for the Philippines?

What is the relevance of the concept of critical factors? Explain the relationship between critical strengths, critical weaknesses, and critical vulnerabilities.

What is your understanding of the concept of the center of gravity? What is the relationship between the objective and the enemy center of gravity (COG)?

To what extent did the plans of the Allies and the Japanese clearly address the operational concept of the center of gravity (or recognition of appropriate critical factors)? What critical factors did each side identify? Do you agree with them?

Explain and analyze the concept of culmination. What key factors cause culmination? Did the Japanese or Allies reach a culminating point in the Leyte operation?

E. Required Readings:

JMO Department. "Elements of Operational Warfare." (*NWC 4096A*), (Issued).

Fowler, Christopher W. "Center of Gravity—Still Relevant After All These Years." (*NWC 2023*), (Issued).

Izzo, Lawrence L. “The Center of Gravity is not an Achilles Heel.” (*NWC 1026*), (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-0. “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” pp. III-22 through III-24. (Issued).

Webb, George S. “The Razor’s Edge: Identifying the Operational Culminating Point of Victory.” (*NWC 1027*), (Issued).

F. **Supplementary Readings:**

Vego, Milan. “Stages and Elements of Operational Warfare,” “Force Deployment,” and “Concept of Culminating Point,” Part V: Stages and Elements of Operational Warfare, *Operational Warfare*, (Issued).

Mendel, William W., and Lamar Tooke. “Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity.” *Military Review* 73, no. 6 (June 1993): 2–11.

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session is intended to further define the framework within which operational art is practiced. It deals in some detail with theater-wide or operational functions intended primarily to support the planning, preparation, conduct, and sustainment of major operations and campaigns. Operational functions are sequenced and synchronized in the employment of one's own and friendly forces across the range of military operations—from military operations other than war (MOOTW) to war.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the meaning and purpose of ***operational command and control***.
- Understand the meaning and purpose of ***operational movement and maneuver***.
- Understand the meaning and purpose of ***operational intelligence***.
- Understand the meaning and purpose of ***operational fires***.
- Understand the meaning and purpose of ***operational logistics***.
- Understand the meaning and purpose of ***operational protection***.
- Understand the meaning and purpose of ***synchronization*** of the key operational functions.
- ***PJE***—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- ***PJE***—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application within the joint task force.
- ***PJE***—Understand IO and C4 concepts and how they relate.
- ***PJE***—Demonstrate how IO and C4 are integrated into the theater and strategic campaign development process.

C. Background:

The existence of an operational level of war suggests the concurrent existence of operational level functions. The synchronization of these operational functions ensures and enhances the ability of operational commanders and their subordinate elements to carry out their missions in both peace and war. In a ***mature theater***, operational functions will normally be established nearly in their entirety. However, in an ***immature theater***, they may exist in a rudimentary form, or not at all. Understanding the impact and interaction of these functions at the operational level of war is critically important for proper planning, preparation, employment, and support of one's own forces in attainment of their assigned objectives.

The key operational functions are: ***Operational command and control, operational movement and maneuver, operational intelligence, operational fires, operational logistics, and operational protection***. The required readings provide a brief overview of each of these functions and associated activities. During your reading, you will probably find that you are already familiar with these functions at the tactical level.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel D. T. Lennox, U.S. Marine Corps, SP-215.

D. Questions:

What are the advantages or disadvantages of having operational functions in place during peace and war? Discuss and explain the purpose of each operational function.

What impact did the following operational functions have on the Leyte Gulf operation from the perspective of both belligerents?

Command and Control—What are some of the factors that influenced the composition of specific command structures? This particular area is cited for many of the difficulties and poor decisions that occurred throughout the operation. Identify the flaws and their associated consequences with specific command structures and guidance/orders issued to subordinates. Can you find elements of Information Operations in the Leyte Gulf operation? If so, discuss them.

Movement and Maneuver—How did the opposing forces plan and employ movement and maneuver at Leyte?

Operational Intelligence—To what extent did the Allies operate on a basis of Japanese intentions rather than capabilities? What result did this have on the eventual outcome of the battle?

Operational Fires—Were operational fires used during the Leyte Operation? If so, where and how? To what extent were they effective? Why?

Operational Protection—Did either of the opposing forces at Leyte consider and plan adequately for operational protection? Discuss examples of where and how operational protection was provided. What is the relationship of operational protection to the more commonly used term—force protection?

Operational Logistics—How did the Allies address this area? What was the operational impact for the Allies? What impact did operational logistics have on the Japanese?

Did the Allies synchronize their operational functions? If so, what functions did they synchronize and what effect did it have on the operation?

As our armed forces become ever more information based, what are the impacts on the operational functions?

E. Required Readings:

JMO Department. "Operational Functions." (*NWC 4103A*), (Issued).

Goodrich, David M. "Forgotten Mission: Land Based Air Operational Fires in Support of the Leyte Gulf Invasion." pp.124–138. (*NWC 2037*), (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-0. *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, pg. III-17, (Forces and Functions), (Issued).

Joint Pub 2-0. *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations*. (Scan) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-13.1. *Joint Doctrine for Command & Control Warfare* (C2W). (Scan) (Issued).

Joint Pub 4-0. *Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations*. (Scan) (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Vego, Milan. "Operational Command and Control Warfare (C2W)," and "Operational Protection," Part IV: Operational Functions, ***Operational Warfare***. (Issued).

Bolick, Joseph A. ***The Influence and Reasons for Acceptance or Rejection of Operational Intelligence during the 1914 and 1943 Kursk Campaigns***, Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 26 April 1988.

Handel, Michael I. "Intelligence and Military Operations," ***Intelligence and Military Operations***, London: Frank Cass, 1990.

Hutcherson, Norman B. "Command and Control Warfare: Putting Another Tool in the War-Fighter's Data Base," Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1994.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. ***Universal Joint Task List*** (CJCSM 3500.04C) Washington: 1 July 2002. Enclosure D. (Library Reserve).

Porter, Laning M. ***Preconceptions, Predilections, and Experiences: Problems for Operational Level Intelligence and Decisionmaking***, Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 12 May 1986.

Rockwell, Christopher A. "Operational Sustainment: Lines of Communication and the Conduct of Operations." Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 3 May 1987.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING (Seminar)

No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength. Only the layman sees in the course of a campaign a consistent execution of a preconceived and highly detailed original concept pursued consistently to the end.

—Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Sr., 1871.

A. Focus:

This session will focus on the fundamentals of operational planning, and selected elements of operational design in planning campaigns.

B. Objectives:

- Know and understand the fundamentals of operational planning.
- Understand the meaning and the practical application of the selected elements of design for a campaign.
- Know and understand the importance and key elements of an operational idea (scheme).
- Know and understand the purpose and difference between operational sequencing, synchronization, and phasing, and the important contribution these elements of operational scheme play in the formulation and plan development of a campaign.
- Understand and appreciate the use of operational/strategic deception in the planning and the execution of campaigns.
- Translate national security and military direction into development of theater strategies, and strategies of supporting combatant commanders for use in the geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) identified in the Unified Command Plan.
- Translate national military objectives, guidance, and theater strategies into theater strategic guidance, objectives, and operational focus in theater campaign plans.
- Understand the fundamentals, considerations, and design elements of campaign planning including integration of unified, joint multinational forces into theater and subordinate campaign plans.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the Department of Defense systems and processes by which national ends, ways, and means are reconciled, integrated, and applied.
- **PJE**—Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role of joint doctrine with respect to unified command.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the Combatant Commanders.

- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the value of integrating IO into theater strategies and campaigns.

C. Background:

Military planning is a continuous process in preparation for assigned or future objectives/tasks. It involves a detailed and methodical evaluation of all aspects of contemplated military action. Planning makes future actions easier by allowing for quick, subsequent and coordinated actions by the staff and other elements of the command. Proper planning allows for detailed and systematic examination of all factors involved in a forthcoming military action.

A major operation or campaign contains a number of elements that collectively ensure the accomplishment of the selected or assigned military objective(s). Thus, an overall **operational design** should exist to ensure that one's forces are employed in a coherent manner, and focused on the assigned operational or strategic objectives in the theater. The principal elements of operational design for a major operation are: **desired end state**, (in case a major operation is intended to end the hostilities), **ultimate operational** (and sometimes **strategic**) **objective, interior vs. exterior lines, identification of the enemy's critical factors and center of gravity, direction/axis**, and **operational idea (scheme)**.

The basic operation plan (OPLAN) normally contains only the most important elements of operational design in a rudimentary form. Many aspects of the design are elaborated in detail in the annexes to the OPLAN, and plans of subordinate component commanders. An operational idea (or scheme) represents the very heart of the design for a major operation or campaign. In its essence, it is very similar to what is commonly known today as concept of operations (CONOPS) or "scheme of maneuver" (used in the past). An operational idea should describe in broad terms the intended sequence for the employment of service or functionally based forces (in a campaign) or combat arms (in a major operation) necessary to accomplish the assigned strategic or operational objectives. Optimally, an operational idea should be novel, avoid stereotyped employment of one's forces, present the enemy with a multi-dimensional threat, provide surprise and deception, and ensure the speed of execution. It should clearly focus on the destruction or neutralization of the enemy's strategic (in a campaign) or operational (in a major operation) center of gravity.

Operational sequencing is one of the key elements of any operational idea. A sound sequencing is also the prime prerequisite for effective synchronization. Sequencing is the arrangement of events aimed to create overwhelming combat power in the order most likely to accomplish a given objective. Normally, these events are arranged by deriving a series of tasks/objectives carried out simultaneously and/or sequentially.

Operational synchronization is the coordination of actions by diverse combat arms and/or service forces in terms of objective and time aimed to generate a synergistic effect. The effect of all the elements of force combined should exceed the sum of their individual capabilities. Among other things, synchronization is ensured by proper command

relationships and by assigning missions based on common operational concepts. Clarity of the commander's intent is the critical factor in ensuring synchronization of efforts, especially in the employment of multi-service or multi-national forces.

Operational/strategic deception is one of the principal force multipliers in a given major operation or campaign. The **operational/strategic** level of command allows the commander to employ multi-service and often multi-national forces and assets in planning and executing **operational/strategic** deception. When properly conceived and executed, **operational/strategic** deception can significantly enhance the effectiveness of one's forces, prevent surprise, and reduce the effectiveness of the enemy forces. To realize possible benefits, operational commanders must not only understand the concept, but also must be willing to dedicate the time and forces required for operational deception to be successful.

The point of contact for this session is Professor M. N. Vego, C-414.

D. Questions:

Discuss and analyze the fundamentals of operational planning.

How are the elements of operational design integrated in planning a campaign?

What is "strategic guidance" and why is it important?

Explain the process of identifying "critical factors" and "center of gravity" in designing a campaign.

Explain the concept of operational sequencing. What is the linkage between operational objective, tasks and the factor of time?

Explain the concept of operational synchronization. What is its main purpose?

What is the purpose of **operational/strategic** deception? Explain the relationship between tactical and **operational/strategic** deception.

Applying the principal elements of operational design, analyze the naval aspects of the Leyte Operation:

1. How would you assess the operational objectives determined by Admiral Toyoda? To what extent did the operational idea (scheme) employed by the Japanese provide an opportunity for success? How could they have made it more effective?

2. Explain and analyze the Japanese plan for operational deception. To what extent was the plan successful and why? To what extent did the Allies apply operational deception in executing the Leyte Operation? Provide examples to support your arguments.

3. How are sequencing and synchronization different? Give examples of each from the Japanese plans. Did Admiral Toyoda have a better option to apply operational sequencing in his plans for naval defense of the Philippines?

4. How did the Japanese plan envisage operational synchronization?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan. **Operational Warfare**, "Operational Planning," "Campaign Design," "Operational Sequencing," and "Operational Synchronization," pp. 409–468, and 531–558.

Vego, Milan. “Operational Deception,” Operational Warfare Addendum (*NWC 1001A*), (Issued).

Critz, Mike. “Operational Deception.” (*NWC 4083*), (Issued).

Review previous required reading (*NWC 2032*) from Session OPS II-2. Focus on Chapter 3, “Plans Are Made and Forces Are Readied.”

Potter, E.B. *Nimitz*, “Return to the Philippines,” pp. 321–345. (*NWC-2039*), (Issued).

F. **Supplementary Readings:**

Joint Pub 3-0. *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (10 September 2001), pp. III-1 through III-20. (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-00.1. *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning* (25 January 2002), pp. I-1 through I-6; II-1 through II-11. (Issued).

PRINCIPLES OF WAR (Seminar)

Under the glass top of Nimitz' desk were several cards bearing military slogans, and in a central position one small card with a list: "Objective, Offensive, Surprise, Superiority of Force at Point of Contact, Simplicity, Security, Movement, Economy of Force, Cooperation." Some people call such lists "principles of war," but Nimitz thought of his merely as reminders, a check-off list of things to be considered before launching an operation. . . .

E.B. Potter, *Nimitz*

A. Focus:

This session deals with the ***principles of war*** as listed in current joint doctrine, their applicability to operational art, and the question of whether they are true principles, as opposed to guidelines, that are subject to change as the nature of warfare changes.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend current joint doctrine regarding the ***principles of war***.
- Explain how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war.
- Analyze historical case studies using the ***principles of war***.
- ***PJE***—Comprehend current role of joint doctrine with regard to the Unified Combatant Commander.

C. Background:

Historians and military leaders have always studied past wars in an effort to discover the underlying ***principles*** or elements that would help explain the victories of successful commanders, and, at the same time, would serve as guides for the conduct of future operations. These studies have consistently identified several "***principles***" as being worthy of consideration.

The armed forces of most nations accept the general validity of certain fundamental ***principles of war*** and teach them to each new generation of officers. Although the ***principles*** vary in name, number, and definition from nation to nation, it is important for military officers to know that such ***principles*** exist, and to decide for themselves how, and to what extent, to apply them when making operational decisions.

Admiral Mahan wrote that ***principles*** are, "***Fundamental truths correctly formulated. They are nothing more than the proper conclusions from the observation of a large number of naval campaigns in the past.***" He also said, "***historical examples are more valuable than principles, because by being narrative of the past events they are a story of practical experience.***"

Errors and failures are generally more illustrative of ***principles*** than are successes. Our ***principles of war*** must be continuously reexamined over time, with regard to changes in doctrine and technology, and the fundamental synergy that exists between the two. They are not intended to be recipes, but rather guides, that when appropriately applied can enhance the probability of success. However, adherence to any one ***principle*** may frequently require violation of another.

The point of contact for this topic is Lieutenant Colonel (P) S. G. Ciluffo, U.S. Army, C-411.

D. Questions:

1. **Principles of war** are fundamental truths governing the prosecution of war, and their application is essential to strategic, operational, and tactical success. Do you agree or disagree? Support your position.
2. There has been a great deal of debate whether Clausewitz aspired to this notion of **principles of war**. What is your opinion and why?
3. Some historians have criticized Admiral Halsey's actions as the Third Fleet Commander during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Yet, Halsey, until his death, believed that his actions were correct in view of the information he had and his interpretation of his mission. Do you think Admiral Halsey acted properly in carrying out the tasks of operational protection and support of the Leyte operation (**King II**)? Defend your position in terms of the **principles of war**.
4. Can the failure of the Japanese plan at Leyte Gulf be explained in terms of violations of the **principles of war**? If so, how?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0: **Doctrine for Joint Operations**, II-1 and Appendix A, "Principles of War." (Issued).

Field Manual 3-0: **Operations**, pp. 4-11-4-15 "Principles of War." (Issued).

Brodie, Bernard. "The Worth of Principles of War." (**NWC 1057**), (Issued).

An Evolving Joint Perspective: U.S. Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century. pp. 1-15 & Encl 2, pp. 45-58. (**NWC 2029**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Alger, John I. **The Quest for Victory: The History of the Principles of War**. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982.

Bennett, William C. "Just Cause and the Principles of War." **Military Review** 71 (March 1991): 2-13.

Brown, C. R. "The Principles of War." (**NWC 1025**), (Seminar Reserve).

Fishel, John T. "Operation Uphold Democracy: Old Principles, New Realities." **Military Review** 77 (July-August 1997): 22-30.

Glenn, Russell W. "No More Principles of War?" **Parameters** 28 (Spring 1998): 48-66.

Murdock, Paul. "Principles of War on the Network-Centric Battlefield: Mass and Economy of Force." **Parameters** 32 (Spring 2002): 86-95.

Nelson, Bradford K. "Applying the Principles of War in Information Operations." **Military Review** 78 (September-October-November 1998): 31-35.

OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP (Seminar)

During an operation decisions have usually to be made at once: there may be no time to review the situation or even to think it through. . . . If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.

—Clausewitz, *On War*

A. Focus:

This session addresses the fundamental components of operational leadership. It contrasts the responsibilities of operational commanders, operational thinking, and operational decisions with analogous endeavors at the tactical and strategic levels. It addresses at the **operational** level issues of leadership similar to those considered in the Strategy and Policy course at the strategic level (in the analysis of Athens and Sparta), and in the National Security Decision Making course (studies of leadership).

B. Objectives:

- Understand the major responsibilities and tasks of operational commanders.
- Understand why operational commanders and their staffs need an operational perspective.
- Develop a framework of thought through which the distinction between decisions made at the operational and tactical levels of war can be examined and understood.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the combatant commanders.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role of joint doctrine with respect to unified command.

C. Background:

In contrast with their tactical counterparts, operational commanders must focus on broad military objectives that lie beyond immediate tactical actions—ranging from destruction of enemy forces in the field to undermining the enemy’s will to fight. Effective operational commanders need what is known as an **operational perspective** on all the aspects of the situation in a given area of operations or theater. Because the operational level of war ties together the strategic and tactical levels, operational commanders need to understand how actions at each level of war affect actions at the other levels. Such broad objectives also require the ability to look beyond current operations, visualizing trends in the military, political, economic, and other elements of the strategic or operational situation into the future—days, weeks, and months. Operational commanders also must understand joint operations and interagency coordination issues.

The broader operational level perspective also renders decision-making processes more complex and challenging than those at the tactical level. While the tactical commander focuses on fighting battles and engagements, the operational commander is most

appropriately concerned with setting the stage for conducting a major operation or campaign. The operational commander must resist the strong temptation to narrow his focus to the immediate tactical level and to micro-manage his subordinate commanders.

Operational courses of action must be evaluated and decided upon, based on key assumptions and information actually available, usually in a short time and in the face of considerable uncertainty about future events. Careful analysis of the situation that weighs all advantages and disadvantages of each possible course of action is often impossible, and operational commanders must decide on the basis of instinctive judgment.

Unfortunately, little opportunity exists for most future operational commanders to develop broad vision through practice; hence, it is typically acquired through professional education and/or systematic self-study of military history. Study of past wars, and their major operations and campaigns in particular, has proven to be the most effective method for acquiring an operational perspective.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-412.

D. Questions:

Explain and analyze the main responsibilities of an operational commander. What personal traits do you think an operational commander should have to be successful?

What are the differences between tactical and operational perspectives? Explain and analyze the principal types of decisions made by operational commanders.

How did General Eisenhower, who had never commanded troops in combat prior to World War II, become an effective operational commander?

What did General Ridgway believe to be his principal responsibilities upon taking command of U.S. Eighth Army in December 1950?

What were the main organizational and operational decisions made by the operational commanders, Allied and Japanese, during planning, preparation, and execution of the Leyte operations?

Compare General Ridgway's approach to his command with Admiral Halsey's approach to his.

E. Required Readings:

Wouk, Herman. *War and Remembrance*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1978, Ch. 92 (Issued).

Field, James A. *The Japanese at Leyte Gulf*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947, Ch. 6, "The End of a Navy." (*NWC 2034*), (Issued).

Ballard, John, R. "Learning in Combat: Eisenhower and Operational Art, 1942–1944," December 2001. (*NWC 1020*), (Issued).

Ridgway, Matthew B., and Harold H. Martin. *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956) 191–220. (*NWC 1002*), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Vego, Milan, *Operational Warfare*, "Exercising Operational Leadership," pp. 577–602, "The Decisions," 603-616 (Issued).

Buell, Thomas B. *The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988. (Seminar Reserve).

Buell, Thomas B. *Master of Seapower: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995.

JOINT OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (Lecture and Panel Discussion)

Operation Iraqi Freedom was carried out with a combination of precision and speed and boldness the enemy did not expect, and the world had not seen before. From distant bases or ships at sea, we sent planes and missiles that could destroy an enemy division, or strike a single bunker. Marines and soldiers charged to Baghdad across 350 miles of hostile ground, in one of the swiftest advances of heavy arms in history. You have shown the world the skill and the might of the American Armed Forces.

—President George W. Bush addressing the crew of USS *Abraham Lincoln*

A. Focus:

This session will examine Operation Iraqi Freedom from the perspective of operational art and current joint doctrine.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role of joint doctrine with respect to unified command.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.

C. Background:

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was one of the most decisive U.S. victories. A dictatorial regime ruling a population of 25 million was defeated in only 21 days of fighting instead of the planned campaign of 125 days. U.S. forces showed remarkable improvement in their conduct of joint/combined warfare since the Gulf War in 1990-1991. New technological advances were integrated successfully with sound tactical and operational concepts.

OIF showed that the U.S. military has flexible, agile commanders who can make proper decisions and take appropriate actions in accordance with changes in the situation. They also are superbly trained. All these advantages could be degraded if the trend toward excessive centralization and micromanagement from the top is not reversed.

The process of learning sound lessons should not be politicized or personalized. Programmatic decisions that are going to determine the long-term direction of our military must be made with the greatest care. A single-minded focus on technological lessons, to the exclusion of operational and strategic concerns, will do much harm.

A wide, vigorous, and open debate is needed to arrive at any definitive lessons learned. Our potential opponents also are studying the Iraqi and Coalition performances in OIF. If we are not diligent and objective, they might derive more sound lessons than the victors.

The lecture and panel discussion will examine how operational art was employed in Operation Iraqi Freedom, how current doctrine affected planning and execution, and what the future portends.

The point of contact for this session is Commander J. L. Barker, U.S. Navy, C-420.

D. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0. ***Doctrine for Joint Operations***, Chapter IV, “Joint Operations in War,” pp. IV-1 to IV-20. (Issued).

THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS CONFLICT: A CASE STUDY (Seminar)

A senior officer said after the war that it had proved that ‘the things we did on the basis of well-tried and proven formations worked, and the ad hoc arrangements turned out much less happily.’ Joint-service liaison and staff work left much to be desired.

—Hastings and Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*

A. Focus:

This session serves as the synthesis event for the components of operational art explained and discussed in preceding Block II sessions. Emphasis is on the decisions and actions of operational-level commanders on both sides.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Analyze the strategic art; i.e., developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to secure national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- **PJE**—Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- Analyze how commanders and staffs applied operational art in a historical case study.
- Comprehend the key factors that affect the development of joint plans and assess the relative influence of these factors.
- Analyze the operational lessons valid for the employment of modern, multinational and joint forces.

C. Background:

This case study is presented in three consecutive sessions. Tuesday, 30 March, will start in Spruance Auditorium with a faculty presentation on the historical/strategic background of the war. This will be followed by a 60-minute video on the background and highlights of the conflict. Students will have the remainder of Tuesday and Wednesday morning to study the case materials and prepare student-led discussions based on the questions listed below. The morning of Thursday, 1 April, is devoted to student-led discussions of the case study.

This session is designed to reinforce the aspects of operational art studied and discussed in preceding sessions. Historical examples provide an excellent opportunity for

illustrating the complexities of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns and the reasons why certain military actions either succeeded or failed. This particular case is used because it is rich with examples of the application, lack of application, misapplication, or inability to apply the concepts associated with operational art.

The goal of this session is to provide in-depth discussion and analysis of major aspects of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982 from an operational perspective. As the major synthesis event for the operational art portion of the syllabus, the motivations, planning, and actions of both sides in the conflict will be examined in some detail. Seminar moderators will assign specific responsibilities for student discussion of the case.

Point of contact for this session is Professor T. L. Gatchel, C-413.

D. Questions

Analyze and critique the following strategic and theater-level decisions made during the conflict:

British decision to withdraw HMS *Endurance* from the South Atlantic in 1982.

Argentine decision to solve the issue by force.

Argentine decision to advance D-day for Operation Rosario from sometime in July or August to 1 (later 2) April.

Argentine decision to plan initially for a garrison force only on the Malvinas and not to plan for a defense.

British decision to send submarines to the South Atlantic immediately followed by other naval forces without first making basic decisions about what course of action to follow.

British decision to plan for military action while still attempting to resolve the issue through diplomacy.

British decision to appoint Admiral Fieldhouse as the operational commander and have him remain at his headquarters at Northwood in the UK with no single, overall commander on the scene in the South Atlantic.

Argentine failure to appoint a single commander for the entire operation.

Argentine decision to keep the most combat-ready forces on the border with Chile and to garrison the Malvinas with draftees from many of the regions of Argentina as opposed to a more cohesive group.

Argentine decision not to lengthen the runway at Stanley to accept fighters.

British decision to have the TF depart the UK before it was completely ready knowing that it would have to be reloaded at Ascension Island.

British decision to use force to retake the Falklands and South Georgia.

British decision to establish a 200-mile MEZ/TEZ and later to extend it to within 12 miles of Argentina.

British decision to retake South Georgia before landing in the Falklands.

Argentine decisions or lack of same that resulted in no comprehensive defensive strategy or operational plans.

British decision to use Vulcan bombers from Ascension Island to attack the runway at Stanley.

British decision to order HMS *Conqueror* to sink the *Belgrano* even though she was outside of the MEZ.

Argentine decision to keep the remainder of the Argentine fleet in port after the sinking of the *Belgrano*.

British decision not to attack targets on the Argentine mainland.

Argentine decision not to attack the British base of operations at Ascension Island or the British SLOCs.

British decision to land at San Carlos.

Argentine decision to give targeting priority to British carriers rather than to the amphibious ships.

British decision to order 3Cdo Bde to attack Goose Green before the remainder of the ground forces arrived at the beachhead.

Argentine decision to surrender Port Stanley without further attempts to delay the British advance.

Decisions made by both sides regarding freedom of the press and the impact those decisions had on aiding enemy intelligence collection.

Having considered the various strategic and operational decisions made, or not made, by the British and Argentine leaders during the conflict, what lessons stand out for U.S. leaders?

E. Required Readings:

Gatchel, Theodore L. "Operational Art and Theater-Level Decisions During the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict." (*NWC 1087*), (Issued).

Thompson, Julian. Extract from *The Lifblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflicts*, Chapter 8, "Amphibious Logistics-Falklands 1982." (*NWC 1086*), (Issued).

Scheina, Robert L. *Latin America: A Naval History 1810-1987*, Chapter 14, "The Malvinas Crisis, March-April 1982" and Chapter 15, "The Malvinas War, May-June 1982." (*NWC 1138*), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Clapp, Michael. *Amphibious Assault Falkland Islands: The Battle of San Carlos Water*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1996.

Freedman, Lawrence, and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse. *Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991. (Library Reserve).

Hastings, Max, and Simon Jenkins. *The Battle for the Falklands*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1983. (Seminar Reserve).

Middlebrook, Martin. *Task Force: The Falklands War, 1982*. Rev. Ed. London: Penguin Books, 1987. (Seminar Reserve).

Selected extracts from *Conflicto Malvinas, Official Report of the Argentine Army*, Vol. II, (*NWC 1038*), (Seminar Reserve).

Selected extracts from *Falklands Islands Campaign: Understanding the Issues*, Vol. 1. (*NWC 1115*), (Seminar Reserve).

Summers, Harry G., Jr. "Strategic Lessons Learned: The Falkland Islands Campaign." (*NWC 1111*), (Seminar Reserve).

Thompson, Julian. *No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic: 1982* New York: Hippocrene Books, 1985.

U.K., The Defence Council. "The Falklands War 1982 from the Viewpoint of Doctrine." (*NWC 4060*), (Seminar Reserve).

Woodward, Sandy. *One Hundred Days—The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992. (Seminar Reserve).

OPERATIONAL ART EXAMINATION

A. Focus:

This written requirement will measure a student's knowledge and understanding of operational art.

B. Objectives:

- For students: Demonstrate an understanding of operational concepts.
- For students: Demonstrate the ability to deduce operational lessons valid for the employment of modern military forces.
- For faculty: Evaluate student understanding of the operational employment of military force in joint and combined operations.
- For faculty: Provide feedback on student understanding of operational concepts as they translate into naval, joint, and multi-national operations.

C. Background:

The examination will be the synthesis event for the Operational Art block of instruction. Students will be expected to prepare complete responses to questions and problems presented by the faculty. The examination will not require students to recall specific facts, but rather to integrate and apply major principles, ideas, and concepts that will have been addressed during the operational art sessions.

Procedurally, the examination will be administered as follows: The faculty will distribute a case study for the students to read and review prior to the exam date. Students may hold review sessions or discuss the case study with classmates prior to the examination question distribution at **0800 of the exam date**. Once the examination has been distributed, each student will then work alone and will develop a response to the questions that will be due to the moderators no later than **0800 on Monday, 5 April, 2004**.

The basis for evaluation of the examination will be:

1. Complete, logical, and well-supported solutions to each question or problem presented.
2. Application of appropriate course concepts to the specific question chosen.
3. Clear and concise articulation of ideas.

Point of contact for this session is Commander J. L. Barker, U.S. Navy, C-420.

USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Seminar)

At all times, commanders shall observe, and require their commands to observe, the principles of international law. Where necessary to fulfill this responsibility, a departure from other provisions of Navy Regulations is authorized.

Article 0705, U.S. Navy Regulations (Rev. 1999)

A. Focus:

This seminar introduces the operational law portion of the operations curriculum. International law affects the planning and conduct of military operations in a number of critical ways. This session will address sources of international law and the international legal basis for the use of force by one nation against another.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the development of international law in its historical context.
- Identify the primary sources of international law, compare the sources of international law with the sources of domestic U.S. law, and understand important provisions of the UN Charter.
- Discuss the impact of the UN Charter on the development of international law, particularly with respect to the concept of individual and collective self-defense.
- Understand how international law definitions and concepts affect the combatant and operational commander in planning and executing military operations.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies consistent with U.S. and international law regarding the use of force.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with alliance and coalition forces consistent with often divergent views of international law.
- *PJE*—Analyze how international law regarding the use of force impacts the planning process.

C. Background:

Relations among nations necessarily involve the application of international law. International practice and agreements regulate such diverse activities as aviation safety, communications, financial transactions, nautical rules of the road, environmental protection and the use of force. While the international legal system, like its domestic counterpart, is not perfect, nations nevertheless comply with most international law most of the time.

Nations create international law by long-standing practice and by agreement—as a result, they usually regard it as fair and find it in their best interest to comply with its provisions. As an example, to ensure its military personnel are treated in accordance with international law, a nation will seek to comply (the concept of “reciprocity”). Compliance is also a function of reciprocity by which nations follow the law out of concern for adverse responses by other nations against unlawful conduct. Moreover,

nations usually desire the reputation of reliably keeping promises. They want to foster respect for the “rule of law,” while being sensitive to the pressures of domestic and world public opinion and valuing the need for order and predictability.

For many, international law appears to lack the precision and predictability that is more evident in domestic law. One of the reasons for the apparent uncertainty in international law is that it lacks an “international” parliament with the authority to dictate enforceable laws. Nevertheless, there are principles of international law. These principles are, by and large, the “standards of conduct” by which nation-states or countries seek to characterize their actions as compliant with international law.

So, “what is the law” in the international context? The commonly accepted sources of international law are:

1. “Customary law,” formed from the widespread practice of nations out of the belief that such a practice is legally required;
2. International agreements (treaties or conventions) between and among nations; and
3. General principles of law, usually employed in areas not already settled by customary practice or agreements.

Secondary factors include the general principles of law reflected in the domestic legal systems of nearly all nations, court decisions, and the publications of recognized scholars. Resolutions of international organizations may also be a factor; by virtue of the UN Charter, one type of binding, law-declaring resolution is a “decision” by the UN Security Council.

The early development of international law involved exclusively rules of conduct between and among nations. More recently, international law has focused increasingly on the rights and responsibilities of individuals. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which the United States and nearly all nations are parties, are examples of humanitarian law applicable during armed conflict. Human rights law, written in treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified by the U.S. in 1992) is another example. Many international human rights principles are similar to U.S. constitutional guarantees.

Defining the authority of a nation to use force against another nation is the primary purpose of the UN Charter. The Charter specifies that a nation may use force either pursuant to an authorization from the Security Council (or in limited circumstances a regional arrangement under the Charter), or in individual or collective self-defense. However, recent events, such as the NATO intervention in Kosovo, highlight that customary international law may provide additional authority for a nation to use force (e.g., on the basis of humanitarian intervention). The reading by Professor Lillich (*NWC 1063*) suggests that this is the case.

The United States regards itself as a country which abides by international law, and it is increasingly looked to as a chief proponent (and sometimes enforcer) of the rule of law in the international community. Violations of international law by the U.S. military commander can be detrimental to U.S. national interests and the military mission. However, international law can have a “force-multiplying” effect, such as the coalition operations in the Terror War being justified under the UN Charter (Article 51

guaranteeing the rights of individual and collective self-defense) and UN Security Council resolutions. The relevant UN Security Council resolutions pertaining to Iraq (1441 and 1472) should be reviewed for our seminar.

A note about the law-related sessions: Sessions I-16 through I-19 are intended to provide an overview of international law influences on the conduct of military operations. The purpose is to instill awareness of how law can affect the planning and execution of operations and to convey that operational commanders should seek advice from qualified legal advisors.

Some of the issues addressed in these sessions will be illustrated in the case study during Session I-20 and in the seminars and exercises during the Blocks that follow. We will discuss how legal considerations are factored into the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) process, and consider legal issues in the context of the JFC/JTF HQ exercise at the end of course.

The point of contact for this session is Commander B. J. Waltman, JAGC, U.S. Navy, C-424.

D. Questions:

What are the sources of international law? Why do nations care about international law? What motivates them to comply with its provisions?

What role does international law play in the President/SECDEF's policy-making process?

What role does international law play in the military decision-making process in general? At the strategic level? At the operational level?

How can the commander ensure planning and execution of operations are accomplished consistent with international law?

What are the legal bases for coalition operations in the Terror War? For the operations in Iraq?

E. Required Readings:

Robertson, H. B., Jr. "Contemporary International Law: Relevant to Today's World?" (*NWC 5002*), (Issued).

Lillich, Richard B. "Forcible Self-Help Under International Law." (*NWC 1063*), (Issued).

The Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945. (*NWC 5003*) (Relevant articles: 1, 2, 23 [1963 text], 24, 25, 27 [1963 text], 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53) (*Scan Only*) (Issued).

UN Security Council Resolution 1441 of 8 November 2002. (*NWC 5001*), (Issued).

UN Security Council Resolution 1472 of 28 March 2003. (*NWC 5004*), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Bunn, George. "International Law and the Use of Force in Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships Have to Take the First Hit?" (*NWC 1074*), (Seminar Reserve).

Zinni, A. C. "The SJA in Future Operations." (*NWC 1048*), (Seminar Reserve).

OPERATIONAL LAW AND FACTOR SPACE (Seminar)

The Department of Defense strongly supports U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. A universally respected ocean regime, with strong, unambiguous guarantees of fundamental operational rights, such as passage through foreign territorial seas, through international straits, and through the world's archipelagoes, preserves the ability of the U.S. to deter and respond to threats whenever and wherever required.

—Secretary of Defense, 2001 Annual Report to the President and the Congress

A. Focus:

This seminar focuses on a basic understanding operational law affecting the operational factor of space. The right of all nations to complete control of their land and air boundaries, and the right of all nations to navigation and over flight within international waters and airspace are essential considerations in planning military operations.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the operational considerations resulting from the sovereign right of all nations to limit the entry and movement of foreign forces within their land territory and national airspace.
- Consider the impact of operational law and factor space issues at the strategic and operational levels of war.
- Understand the traditional international legal rights of belligerent nations and neutral nations and how these rights impact military operations during armed conflict.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies consistent with the principles of operational law and factor space.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with alliance and coalition forces consistent with often divergent views of operational law and factor space.
- **PJE**—Analyze how operational law and factor space considerations impact the planning process.

C. Background:

Among the operational art tools used by the operational planner are the three key operational factors of time, force and space. Factor space is heavily influenced by widely accepted international law rules governing the establishment and meaning of land, sea and air boundaries (a key characteristic of factor space). These boundaries directly impact the freedom of movement of the operational commander. During the deterrent (or pre-hostilities) phase of a military operation, military forces must respect the sovereign rights of all nations within the boundaries of their land territory, national waters and national airspace. This means that with a few limited exceptions, military forces may not operate within another nation's boundaries without its permission.

During the hostilities phase of an operation, our movement will be conducted without regard to the sovereign rights of the enemy belligerent nation. However, the traditional

sovereign rights of neutral states will likely continue to be respected and, hence, limitations on the freedom of movement of our forces within the land, sea and air boundaries of neutral states must be factored into our operational planning. When limited navigation and over flight rights within neutral air and sea space prove insufficient, operational planners must notify the State Department of the need to obtain access and transit agreements in order to facilitate a planned operation.

Freedom of navigation and over flight over and through *international* waters and airspace (as well as the limited right of navigation and over flight in *national* waters and airspace) are fundamental requirements in implementing U.S. military strategy. These freedoms allow support and reinforcement of forward-deployed forces, enable U.S. and coalition forces to operate worldwide, and ensure uninterrupted world commerce. This session will include a study of the freedoms of all nations to navigation and over flight, as well as the rights of coastal nations to exercise jurisdiction over some portions of the sea and airspace for certain purposes.

Customary international law, as reflected in the UN Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention, provides widely accepted rules for global navigation and over flight. These rules have as their basis internationally agreed upon air and sea boundaries, as defined in the LOS Convention and depicted in NWC 1049. These boundaries, and the navigation and over flight rights associated with them, strongly impact the planning and conduct of military operations.

Since 1983, U.S. policy has recognized the non-deep seabed mining provisions of the LOS Convention to be customary international law. Since that time, it has been Presidential policy for U.S. forces to “exercise and assert [United States’] navigation and over flight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the Convention.” Moreover, Presidential policy has been that the U.S. would not “acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and over flight and other related high seas uses.”

In July 1994, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution containing an agreement to modify the LOS Convention’s deep seabed mining provisions. The United States signed the agreement on 29 July 1994. As a result, the basic LOS Convention, along with this supplemental agreement, was submitted to the Senate in October 1994 for its advice and consent. The Senate has not ratified the Convention. The United States is still not a party to it. The U.S. Navy has published guidance on the LOS regimes in Part I of *The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*, NWP 1-14M. This handbook is a great resource for the operational commander and his/her staff.

The point of contact for this session is Commander B. J. Waltman, JAGC, U.S. Navy, C-424.

D. Questions:

What sovereign rights does a nation have within its land territory and national airspace, and how does this affect the movement or operation of foreign military forces therein?

What are the distinctions between innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea-lane passage, and high seas freedoms of navigation?

What are the rights and responsibilities of maritime and coastal nations with respect to each of these concepts?

To what extent may military operations of a belligerent nation be conducted within the land territory, national airspace and national waters of a neutral nation?

E. **Required Readings:**

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M. ***The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations***. Chapters 1 and 2, and pages 7-1 through 7-4. (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College. "Legal Regimes of Oceans and Airspace Areas." (***NWC 1049***), (Issued).

Lee, Jong-Heon. "North Korea: Ship Interception 'piracy.'" (***NWC 5005***), (Issued).

Wedgwood, Ruth. "A Pirate Is a Pirate." (***NWC 5006***), (Issued).

F. **Supplementary Readings:**

U.S. Naval War College. "Warning Zones" (***NWC 1046***), (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of Defense. ***National Security and the Convention on the Law of the Sea*** (***NWC 1017***), (Seminar Reserve).

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (***NWC 1003***), (Seminar Reserve).

Maritime Claims Reference Manual. DoD 2005.1-M. Located at:
<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/20051m.htm>

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (Seminar)

Those skilled in war cultivate the Tao (the way of humanity and justice) and preserve the laws and are therefore able to formulate victorious policies.

—Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

A. Focus:

When planning and conducting military operations, commanders and their subordinates must comply with the international law that governs the conduct of hostilities. This session is devoted to discussing the law of armed conflict for land, air, and naval warfare.

B. Objectives:

- Examine the origins of and the purposes served by the law of armed conflict and comprehend the reasons that nations comply or attempt to comply with it.
- Know the basic principles of the law of armed conflict.
- Apply the concepts of the law of armed conflict to the strategic and operational levels of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies consistent with the principles of the law of armed conflict.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with alliance and coalition forces consistent with often divergent views of the law of armed conflict
- **PJE**—Analyze how the law of armed conflict considerations impact the planning process.

C. Background:

The law of armed conflict (LOAC) was historically referred to as the law of war. It is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is based on international custom and practice and on international agreements or conventions.

There are three general principles of the law of armed conflict: military necessity, proportionality, and humanity. The principle of **military necessity** allows a belligerent to apply force to achieve legitimate military objectives, while the principle of **proportionality** means that the degree of force used must be no greater than what is necessary and proportionate to the prompt realization of those legitimate military objectives. The principle of **humanity** forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes. These principles require, for example, that belligerents distinguish as much as is reasonably possible between combatants and noncombatants when targeting.

The law of armed conflict is also consistent with certain principles of war, such as objective, mass, and economy of force. Both the law of armed conflict and the principles of war stress the importance of directing force against critical military targets, while avoiding the waste of resources against objectives that are militarily unimportant.

Part II of *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations* presents an overview of the rights and duties of military personnel under the law of armed conflict.

In DoD Directive 5100.77, the Secretary of Defense directed that the U.S. Armed Forces comply with the law of armed conflict during all armed conflicts and to apply the principles and spirit of the law of armed conflict during all other military operations.

The point of contact for this session is Commander B. J. Waltman, JAGC, U.S. Navy, C-424.

D. Questions:

Why is it in a nation's interest to comply with the law of armed conflict? Why is it in the interest of the military commander?

To what extent does the law of armed conflict apply to non-international armed conflict and to Military Operations Other Than War?

What are the major protections afforded by the law of armed conflict to the wounded and sick, prisoners of war and civilians in occupied areas?

What are the principal international law considerations with respect to selection of targets and selection of weapons?

What are the requirements to be a lawful combatant or noncombatant? What is an illegal combatant?

What is the legal basis to hold detainees in GTMO?

How has the law of armed conflict changed, if at all, during the ongoing Terror War?

What are the legal bases for Occupation Law? What are the requirements for the Occupying Power?

E. Required Readings:

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M. *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*. Chapters 5 through 12. (Issued).

Iraq – Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1 of 16 May 2003. (*NWC 5007*), (Issued). Also found at: <http://cpa-iraq.org/regulations/REG1.pdf>

Iraq – Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1 of 16 May 2003. (*NWC 5008*), (Issued). Also found at: <http://cpa-iraq.org/regulations/CPAORD1.pdf>

Friend, Jim. "Military Occupation and the Law of Armed Conflict: Discouraging Resistance." (*NWC 5009*), (Issued).

Selected Sections from Geneva Conventions and Hague Regulations. (*NWC 5010*), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Capece, Christian M. "The Ottawa Treaty and Its Impact on U.S. Military Policy and Planning." (*NWC 1075*), (Seminar Reserve).

Shotwell, C. B. "A Look at the Aerial Rules of Engagement in the 1991 Gulf War." (*NWC 1076*), (Seminar Reserve).

Rodriguez, Cara L. "Slaying the Monster: Why the United States Should Not Support the Rome Treaty." (*NWC 1077*), (Seminar Reserve).

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (Seminar)

The determination of hostile intent is the single most difficult decision that a commander has to make in peacetime.

Admiral Frank Kelso

A. Focus:

This session concerns rules of engagement (ROE), which define for operational forces the circumstances and extent to which they may use force. The session highlights the U.S. Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) and then reviews the foundation for and process involved in developing ROE and how they are employed in military missions (whether we are dealing with conventional warfare or military operations other than war).

B. Objectives:

- Gain an understanding of ROE and the process by which modifications to ROE are obtained from higher authority.
- Understand the need for clear and comprehensive ROE, the principles underlying them, and their role in the civilian control of the military.
- Examine ROE development in the planning process.
- ***PJE***—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies consistent with the rules of engagement as authorized by civilian leaders of the U.S. military.
- ***PJE***—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with alliance and coalition forces consistent with often divergent views of the rules of engagement.
- ***PJE***—Analyze how the rules of engagement considerations impact the planning process.

C. Background:

ROE are the primary means by which the President/Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commanders guide U.S. military forces in the use of force. U.S. forces operate under the SROE contained in a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 3121.01A). The SROE provide direction and guidance regarding the inherent right of ***self-defense***, which applies at all times (from peace to war). The SROE also provide a list of supplemental measures from which appropriate ROE can be requested for a given operation to provide additional ROE for ***mission*** accomplishment.

Both the inherent right of self-defense and mission accomplishment ROE have as their legal basis the inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Depending upon the circumstances surrounding a given operation, mission accomplishment ROE may also be justified on a specific UN Security Council Resolution.

When mission accomplishment ROE are issued for international armed conflict, the law of armed conflict applies and will shape the ROE selected. Although international law

relating to the use of force is an important consideration in drafting ROE, political guidance and operational requirements are the most significant factors which shape ROE.

All ROE should be consistent with national policy, military strategy, and the missions assigned by higher authority. ROE must be framed and interpreted in conjunction with the mission and should support, not inhibit, mission accomplishment.

In operational planning, the adequacy of ROE is assessed during the mission analysis in the Commander's Estimate of the Situation. In all subsequent phases of the military decision-making process, it is vitally important that commanders and their planning staffs continue to be alert to the effect that ROE have on mission accomplishment, and to seek changes to the ROE when appropriate. The J-3 is normally responsible to the Commander for ROE development, with the assistance of other staff officers, including the staff judge advocate.

The point of contact for this session is Commander B. J. Waltman, JAGC, U.S. Navy, C-424.

D. Questions:

What factors lead to the need for unit or individual self-defense?

What are the limits of actions that may be taken in self-defense?

Is preemptive action consistent with the SROE?

How can a combatant commander ensure that subordinate commanders do not misinterpret the ROE or put an undesired "spin" on the approved ROE?

What measures have to be incorporated into the SROE to transition from MOOTW to war?

What additional ROE considerations are involved in coalition warfare? In UN operations?

What is the appropriate role of the legal advisor in developing and implementing ROE?

In the Terror War and in Homeland Security, are there new considerations regarding rules of engagement?

Are the rules of engagement and use of force rules the same for all military and civilian forces participating in Homeland Security?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Chapter III, paragraph 6.n. (Page III-35). (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, Chapter IV, paragraph 9. (Page IV-6 to IV-8). (Issued).

Duncan, James C. "The Commander's Role in Developing the Rules of Engagement." (*NWC 1066*), (Issued).

Rose, S. "Crafting the Rules of Engagement for Haiti." (*NWC 1051*), (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College. Extracts from CJCS Instruction 3121.01A, "JCS Standing Rules of Engagement." (*NWC 1062*), (Scan), (Issued).

Operation ***IRAQI FREEDOM***, CFLCC ROE Card (unclassified) of 31 Jan 03. (***NWC 5011***), (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College. "Blue Force Standing Rules of Engagement." (***NWC 2012***), (Issued), (Scan).

OPERATIONAL LAW CASE STUDY (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This seminar provides the opportunity to apply operational law and to discuss the effective application of ROE to specific military operations.

B. Objectives:

- Demonstrate knowledge of the elements of the law of the sea and airspace and the law of armed conflict by applying them in a factual context involving the employment of military forces.
- Demonstrate an understanding of the various political, military, and legal considerations involved in crafting rules of engagement for a specific military operation.
- Apply the CJCS SROE in a factual context involving the employment of military forces.
- Practice using a set of supplemental ROE in a specific military operation.

C. Background:

See OPS Sessions I-16 through I-19.

The point of contact for this session is Commander B. J. Waltman, JAGC, U.S. Navy, C-424.

D. Required Readings:

U.S. Naval War College. "Case Study for Operational Law, Operation **UPHOLD PAPUA**." (*NWC 1070*), (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College. "Blue Force Standing Rules of Engagement." (*NWC 2012*), (Issued).

E. Supplementary Readings:

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M. *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*. Chapters 1-2 and 5-12. (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College. "Extracts from CJCS 3121.01A, "JCS Standing Rules of Engagement." (*NWC 1062*), (Issued).

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INTRODUCTION TO PLANNING

A. Focus:

Block III sessions build upon the framework and components of the previous blocks by relating them to current U.S. military organization and planning concepts. Block III sessions afford a comprehensive view of: Service cultures, doctrine, and capabilities; essential supporting systems; and the foundations of formal planning. Each student brings to the seminar unique expertise and experience in one or more of the Block III topics. The overall educational objective is to weave faculty seminar presentations, student contributions, readings, lectures, and assigned case studies into a seamless fabric of baseline, joint and operational competence. It is expected that this competence will be reflected in student understanding and application of formal planning and decision-making principles to the proper employment (selection, assignment and tasking) of forces in joint and combined environments to accomplish assigned missions.

B. Background:

Sessions III-1 through III-9 comprise a logical sequence of essential warfare supporting systems, Service doctrine and capabilities, and joint and multinational warfare considerations, which enable the student to consider how best to deploy and employ forces and functional support systems to accomplish assigned missions.

Sessions III-10 and III-11 develop knowledge and skills for planning and directing force employment and introduce the processes of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) that deal with the development of plans and issuing orders.

Sessions III-12 and III-13 provide insight into the capabilities and limitations of C4ISR and Information Operations as well as the role of the J2 (Intelligence Officer) during planning situations.

Block III concludes with Session III-14, a Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) case study exercise. With operational art principles as the foundation, students will apply planning process and force employment knowledge to the development of a plan appropriate to accomplishing the mission and solving the problem.

By the end of Block III, students should be able to use logic and common sense in a joint planning framework to develop the correct sequence of actions that properly employ available resources to accomplish a mission.

C. Questions:

None.

D. Readings:

None.

OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS (Seminar)

... A sound logistics plan is the foundation upon which a war operation should be based. If the necessary minimum of logistics support cannot be given to the combatant forces involved, the operation may fail, or at best be only partially successful.

—Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN, Commander Fifth Fleet, 1946

A. Focus:

This session provides an overview of logistics at the operational level of war. It addresses the principles of logistics, joint boards and cells, and the geographic combatant commander's logistics responsibilities. Finally, it examines operational logistics planning considerations.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the Principles of Logistics.
- Identify and describe the joint boards and offices that directive authority for logistics allows a combatant commander to routinely use or establish.
- Comprehend logistics planning considerations.
- Understand the challenges of logistics transformation.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role of joint doctrine with respect to unified command.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the unified combatant commanders.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- **PJE**—Analyze JV2020 and the nature of warfare in the information age, to include key current developments.

C. Background:

The operational commander, and members of the commander's staff, must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of operational logistics if he or she is going to successfully execute daily peacetime operations and, certainly, operations across the full spectrum of conflict. Providing logistics to our forces throughout the world is a very complicated process and requires a great deal of coordination and synchronization by both supported and supporting commands and organizations. Even though logistics is normally a Service responsibility, the combatant commander retains directive authority for logistics and must decide if and when it is appropriate to exercise that authority.

This lesson includes an overview of the principles of logistics, the geographic combatant commander's responsibilities for supply, and directive authority for logistics. Also included in the session are logistics joint boards and offices, joint and coalition logistics considerations, and the classes of supply. Additionally, considerations for logistics planning and types of servicing are also key areas for the combatant commander to understand, and are discussed during this session.

Point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel (P) G. P. Wilson, U.S. Army, C-415.

D. Questions:

How can operational logistics extend operational reach for the combatant commander?

What are the key elements of a logistics system that must be taken into account when developing a concept of logistics support?

Why should a combatant commander be concerned about exercising Directive Authority for logistics, if logistics are an individual Service responsibility?

What logistics planning considerations should be taken into account when conducting joint operations?

In a multinational operation, what logistics issues should the combatant commander consider?

What is the difference between a “push” and “pull” logistics system?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 4-0, ***Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations***, 6 April 2000. Executive Summary (pp. v through ix); Chapter I, para 1, 2, and 3 (pp. I-1 through I-14); Chapter II; Chapter III; Chapter IV, para 1, 2, and 3 (pp. IV-1 through IV-6); Appendix B and Appendix C. (Issued).

Joint Vision 2020, Focused Logistics, pp. 24–25. (Issued).

Brown, Susan Declereq, and Phyllis Rhodes. “DLA: Logistics Backbone of Iraqi Freedom.” ***Army Logistician*** (July–August 2003): 6–7. (***NWC 3049***), (Issued).

Wood, David. “Some of Army’s Civilian Contractors Are No-Shows In Iraq,” Newhouse News Service, www.newhouse.com/archive/wood080103.html, July 31, 2003. (***NWC 3051***), (Issued).

Schrady, David. “Combatant Logistics Command and Control for the Joint Force Commander.” ***Naval War College Review*** (Summer 1999): 49–75 (Scan). (***NWC 3048***), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Department of the Navy and Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. ***NDP 4, Naval Logistics***, 20 February 2001. <http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/Library/Documents/NDPs/NDP4/NDP4.pdf>

Director of Logistics, The Joint Staff. ***Focused Logistics Campaign Plan***. <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/j4/projects/foclog/foclog.htm>

STRATEGIC MOBILITY (Seminar)

Victory is the beautiful, bright-colored flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.

Winston Churchill, *The River War* (1899)

USTRANSCOM . . . their motto should be “try fighting without us.”

General Henry Shelton, CJCS

A. Focus:

This session emphasizes how the national strategic mobility system works. It addresses the organization and mission of U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and its component commands. Finally, it examines the United States’ ability to deploy in support of global contingencies.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the elements of the strategic mobility triad, which focuses on transportation and sustainment by land, sea and air assets.
- Know the role of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in working with the regional combatant commanders on strategic mobility and sustainability.
- Understand the complexities involved in planning for the deployment of joint forces at the operational level of war.
- Explain how the defense planning systems affect joint operational planning.
- Comprehend the considerations for employing joint forces at the operational level of war.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- *PJE*—Analyze the relationships and functions of the NCA, CJCS, Combatant Commanders, and the Chiefs of the Services from a transportation supportability standpoint.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. force structure affect the development of joint military strategy.
- *PJE*—Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process from a transportation standpoint.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the combatant commanders.

C. Background:

The ability of the U.S. military to successfully carry out its assigned tasks per our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy depends greatly on its capability to deploy forces, equipment, and sustainment to a theater of operations within a given period of time. While logistics includes all those supporting activities required to sustain a deployed force, strategic mobility defines that part of the logistics process which transports people, equipment, supplies, and other commodities by land, sea, and air, to enable military force projection. In fact, the operational commander must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the strategic mobility process if he or she is going to successfully execute a major operation or campaign. Force selection, phasing of operations, and risk assessment are directly tied to the ability to project forces and support from the United States to the area of responsibility, area of operation, or theater of war.

USTRANSCOM oversees the strategic mobility process. USTRANSCOM's charter is to maintain and operate a deployment system for orchestrating the transportation aspects of worldwide mobility planning, integrate deployment-related information management systems, and provide centralized wartime traffic management. Actual movement is executed by USTRANSCOM component commands: Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC-Army), Military Sealift Command (MSC-Navy), and Air Mobility Command (AMC-Air Force). The Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration (MARAD) bridges MSC, U.S. flag commercial companies, and U.S. unions for sealift procurement and operations.

The Strategic Mobility triad consists of prepositioned material, sealift, and airlift. Each triad component has distinct advantages and disadvantages in terms of response time, expense, availability of carrying assets, and carrying capacity. Sealift and airlift have access to only limited U.S. Government-owned assets, and thus are highly reliant on commercial industry under a variety of programs, including the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and Voluntary Intermodel Sealift Agreement (VISA).

Point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel J. E. Brence, U.S. Air Force, C-410.

D. Questions:

What are the major advantages and disadvantages of each leg of the strategic mobility triad?

How does the combatant commander or the CJTF interface with USTRANSCOM? What is the supported/supporting commander relationship?

What are the critical shortages in sealift and airlift and their root causes?

What are the major planning considerations facing operational planners in deploying a force to the theater of operations?

E. Required Readings:

"Forces/Capabilities Handbook." Read Strategic Lift Chapter, pp. 112–123. (*NWC 3153H*), (Issued).

Joint Deployment Process Course (CD ROM) August 2002. Accomplish modules on Introduction to JDP and Phases I-IV (*NWC 2018*) (Issued). Note: The References that

this CD ROM draws upon are Joint Pub 3-35, ***Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operation***, Washington, DC: 7 September 1999; Joint Pub 4-01, ***Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System***, Washington DC: 17 June 1997; and the ***Joint Task Force (JTF) Deployment and Redeployment Handbook***, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, Suffolk, VA: 24 April 2000.

“Service Capabilities Vignette: Scenario and Background Information.” 1 August 2003. Read 2–5. (***NWC 2001A***), (Issued).

F. **Supplementary Readings:**

Snyder, Thomas J., and Stella T. Smith. “The War in the Persian Gulf.” ***Air Force Journal of Logistics*** (Summer 1998): 16–28. (***NWC 4010***), (Seminar Reserve).

USTRANSCOM Handbook 24-2, ***Understanding the Defense Transportation System***, 3rd Edition, Scott AFB, IL: 1 September 2000, 1–17. (***NWC 4006***), (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Pub 4-01, ***Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System***. Washington DC: 19 March 2003. (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-17, ***Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Air Mobility Operations***, 14 August 2002. Chapter VII. (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. NAVY CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

He who commands the sea has command of everything.

Themistocles (528–462 B.C.)

The seas are no longer a self contained battlefield. Today they are a medium from which warfare is conducted. The oceans of the world are the base of operations from which navies project power onto land areas and targets. . . . The mission of protecting sea-lanes continues in being, but the Navy's central missions have become to maximize its ability to project power from the sea over the land and to prevent the enemy from doing the same.

Timothy Shea, *Project Poseidon*, February 1961

A. Focus:

Our three maritime Services—Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—conduct operations in the world's oceans and littoral regions. With such capable naval forces, we view the oceans not as an obstacle, but as our base of operations and our maneuver space, which we either can control or deny to an opponent. Whenever we face an adversary without a blue-water fleet, the oceans serve as barriers for our defense. The oceans provide the United States avenues of world trade and military lines of communication with allies and friends—when they are protected by our strong naval forces. To appreciate operations in the maritime environment, it is necessary to understand the distinctive character of naval forces.

—Naval Doctrinal Publication 1, *Naval Warfare*

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the considerations for employing U.S. Navy forces as a part of a joint force at the operational and theater-strategic levels of war.
- Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Navy forces and how other services can capitalize upon the capabilities and offset the limitations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role of U.S. Navy doctrine with respect to joint doctrine and to unified command.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining U.S. Navy forces, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Navy forces affect the development of joint military strategy.

C. Background:

The United States depends upon transoceanic links, commercial and military, to allies, friends, and its strategic interests. The nation's maritime strength has enabled us to endure more than two centuries of global crisis and confrontation that have reflected the world's unending religious, ethnic, economic, political, and ideological strife. Whenever these crises have threatened our national interests, our leaders traditionally have responded with naval forces. Naval forces alone, however, were never intended to have every military capability needed to handle every threat or crisis that the nation may face.

Just as using complementary capabilities within the naval forces compounds overall strength, combining the capabilities and resources of the other Services and other nations in joint and multinational operations can produce overwhelming military power. In future conflicts, the nation will answer with joint forces in most cases.

The U.S. Navy's approach to war fighting and military operations short of war is guided by the roles specified in law by Congress and by specific service functions prescribed by the President and Secretary of Defense, as codified in DoD Directive 5100.1. Specifically these functions are “. . . conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft and land-based naval air components—specifically, forces to seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea commerce, to gain and maintain general naval supremacy, to control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea lines of communication, to establish and maintain local superiority (including air) in an area of naval operations, to seize and defend advanced naval bases, and to conduct such land, air, and space operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.”

Navy roles and functions remained relatively stable from post-World War II through the 1980s; however, the capability to perform functions varied depending on national security strategy and resource decisions of the time. Disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War led to the articulation of a new national security strategy in August 1990 that shifted focus from a global foe to regional contingencies. The Navy developed and articulated its vision of the part it would play in this new strategy in a September 1992 White Paper . . . ***From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century***. This was followed in September 1994 by an additional White Paper, ***Forward . . . From The Sea***, which reflected two years' hard operational experience with forward presence and contingency response. In March 1997 ***Forward . . . From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept*** was released, promulgating guidance on operational primacy—the ability to carry out swiftly and effectively any naval, joint, or multinational mission and to prevail decisively over any foe across the spectrum of conflict. In October 2002 the Chief of Naval Operations promulgated the concept of ***Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities***, where “. . . we will continue the evolution of U.S. naval power from the blue-water, war-at-sea focus of the 'Maritime Strategy' (1986), through the littoral emphasis of ' . . . From the Sea' (1992) and 'Forward . . . from the Sea' (1994), to a broadened strategy in which naval forces are fully integrated into global joint operations against regional and transnational dangers.”

As one of the major initiatives precipitated by . . . ***From The Sea***, the U.S. Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) was established in February 1993 in Norfolk, VA. The first major NDC task was to synthesize and promulgate naval doctrine in six major parts: Warfare, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Planning, and Command and Control. The first of these capstone documents is Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (NDP-1), ***Naval Warfare***, published in 1994. In July 1998, the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) was established at Newport, R.I. Its responsibilities include the formulation and personalization of naval doctrine.

The Navy is in a period of transition. Hence, there are elements of both the old and the new in current Naval operations. This session looks at both old and new with an emphasis on the new. The key capabilities for the Navy are discussed in Admiral Clark's article in ***Sea Power 21: A Collection of Readings, (NWC 3040)***. While all Navy ships are designed and organized to operate independently to various degrees, their individual capabilities are complementary, leading to the formation of composite groups/forces to

accomplish core Naval Service tasks. Vice Admiral Mullen's article in *Sea Power 21: A Collection of Readings*, (NWC 3040) discusses the employment of Naval assets.

A brief description of organization, capabilities, and operational concepts is contained in the *Forces/Capabilities Handbook*, (NWC 3153H), while *Sea Power 21: A Collection of Readings*, (NWC 3040) provides a more detailed discussion of the Navy's transitional goals. Individual ship descriptions are available in the Almanac of Sea Power.

The point of contact for this session is Captain C. E. Helms, U. S. Navy, C-422.

D. Questions:

What capabilities and options do U.S. Navy forces bring to a joint force commander, and how can these be integrated into joint operations? What are the strengths and weaknesses?

What are the implications and operational challenges of expeditionary and littoral warfare concepts for the U.S. maritime component commander and the joint force commander?

What are the issues associated with integration into the joint force?

Using the "Service Capabilities Vignette: Scenario and Background Information" (NWC 2001A), consider the range of employment options that Navy forces could offer.

E. Required Readings:

Sea Power 21: A Collection of Readings. (NWC 3040), (Issued).

"Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations," U.S. Navy Briefing, CD-ROM. (NWC 2002A), (Issued).

"Forces/Capabilities Handbook." Newport, RI: Naval War College, Review U.S. Navy section, 2-8, Appendix C and Appendix E. (NWC 3153H), (Issued).

"Service Capabilities Vignette: Scenario and Background Information," 1 August 2003. (NWC 2001A), (Issued).

Navy League of the United States. *The Almanac of Sea Power 2003*. Arlington, VA: January 2003. (Scan) (Seminar Reserve).

F. Supplementary Readings:

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington DC: Naval Doctrine Publication 1, NDP-1, *Naval Warfare*. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, March 1994. (Scan) (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: Naval Doctrine Publication 2, NDP-2, *Naval Intelligence*. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, September 1994 (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: Naval Doctrine Publication 4, NDP-4, *Naval Logistics*. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, 20 February 2001 (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: Naval Doctrine Publication 5, NDP-5, *Naval Planning*. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, January 1996 (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: Naval Doctrine Publication 6, NDP-6, ***Naval Command and Control***. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, May 1996 (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. COAST GUARD CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

The Coast Guard provides . . . a unique instrument in the nation's national security tool bag.

General Colin Powell

The Coast Guard has a 200-plus-year history of both maritime and military service and I think they would be difficult to replace. If you didn't have a Coast Guard, you'd probably look to create one. . . . I'm very proud to be their Secretary. . . . When the need arises, they can surge to fill that need and then go back to their more traditional missions.

Secretary Tom Ridge

A. Focus:

The multi-mission Coast Guard is the country's fifth and smallest Armed Service with non-redundant, complementary capabilities that can serve as a force multiplier in joint operations. Since 9/11 the Coast Guard has also seen greatly increased emphasis on the mission of maritime HLS/HLD and is in the process of recapitalizing its entire fleet. This session examines Coast Guard's capabilities to support joint operations, diverse mission areas, equipment, challenges and limitations.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the considerations for employing U.S. Coast Guard forces as a part of a joint force at the operational and theater-strategic levels of war.
- Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Coast Guard forces and how other services can capitalize upon the capabilities and offset the limitations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role of U.S. Coast Guard doctrine with respect to joint doctrine and to unified command.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining U.S. Coast Guard forces, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Coast Guard forces affect the development of joint military strategy.

C. Background:

Founded in 1790, and having participated in every American war since, the Coast Guard is an armed service in all respects. Although multi-mission in nature, and charged with significant responsibilities in such diverse areas as pollution response and aids to navigation, Coast Guard forces provide non-redundant complementary capabilities in support of the national military strategy. In recent combat operations, Coast Guard forces have provided a valuable capability to the joint force commanders in maritime interception operations, port operations and security, coastal sea control and other areas where the smallest service's expertise can add value.

Transferred intact to the new Department of Homeland Security on 1 March 2003, the Coast Guard functions as the lead federal agency for maritime homeland security, greatly increasing the demands on the already spread-thin service. Benefiting from

additional funding in the wake of 9/11, the Coast Guard is growing by 25 percent and re-capitalizing its entire fleet by the largest acquisition program in the Service's history, the "Deepwater" project.

Point of contact for this session is Captain I. T. Luke, U.S. Coast Guard, SP-214.

D. Questions:

What Coast Guard capabilities can be useful to the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander? What are the Service's strengths and weaknesses in the joint operations arena? How does a JTF commander or combatant commander request and receive USCG support, and what are the issues associated with integration into the joint force?

Should the coast Guard continue to have a role in expeditionary warfare? What is the right balance between the Coast Guard's responsibilities in Maritime Homeland Security and its contributions to OCONUS joint operations?

Is the Coast Guard accepting too much risk by re-capitalizing its entire surface and air fleets at once via the unprecedented "deepwater" acquisition project?

Using the "Service Capabilities Vignette: Scenario and Background Information" (*NWC 2001A*), consider the range of employment options that Coast Guard forces could offer.

E. Required Readings:

Hull, James D. VADM, USCG, and Cari B. Thomas, CDR, USCG, and Joe DiRenzo, LCDR, USCG. "What Was the Coast Guard Doing in Iraq?" *Proceedings* (August 2003): 38–40. (*NWC 3052*), (Issued).

Gerber, Michael S. "Nation's Smallest Armed Service Is Adjusting to Its New Role in Security." *The Hill*, May 21, 2003. (*NWC 3045*), (Issued).

Mintz, John, and Vernon Loeb. "Coast Guard Fights to Retain War Role." *The Washington Post*, 31 August 2003. (*NWC 3043*) (Issued).

"Forces/Capabilities Handbook." 98–103. (*NWC 3153H*), (Issued).

"Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations." U.S. Coast Guard Briefing, CD-ROM August 2003. (*NWC 2002A*), (Issued).

"Service Capabilities Vignette: Scenario and Background Information," 1 August 2003 (*NWC 2001A*), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Stubbs, Bruce B., and Scott C. Truver. "America's Coast Guard: Safeguarding U.S. Maritime Safety and Security in the 21st Century," pp. i–iii, 53–81, 131–132, 139–140, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters (G-O), January 2000. (*NWC 2134*), (Issued).

Commandant Instruction M3000.3A (COMDTINST M3000.3A) *Coast Guard Capabilities Manual* (CAPMAN), (Library Reserve).

Coast Guard Publication 1, U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian, January 2002. (*NWC 2015*), (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. MARINE CORPS CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

A military, naval, littoral war, when wisely prepared and discreetly conducted, is a terrible sort of war. Happy for that people who are sovereigns enough of the sea to put it into execution! For it comes like thunder and lightning to some unprepared part of the world.

Thomas More Molyneux, 1759

A. Focus:

During this session you will examine the role of the Marine Corps in national defense and how it functions to fulfill its role, current Marine Corps organization, capabilities and limitations, doctrine for warfighting, and the utility of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) to an operational commander.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the command structure, organizational concepts, and command relationships applicable to the U.S. Marine Corps in joint and combined commands.
- Comprehend how current U.S. Marine Corps doctrine affects joint and combined operations at both the tactical and operational levels of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Forces affect the development of joint military strategy.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing and sustaining U.S. Marine Corps forces, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role of U.S. Marine Corps doctrine with respect to joint doctrine and to unified command.

C. Background:

The Marine Corps is an expeditionary force-in-readiness that is manned, trained, and equipped specifically to respond quickly to a broad variety of crises and conflicts across the full range of military operations anywhere in the world. The Marine Corps' philosophy of warfighting is based on the tenets of maneuver warfare and is in consonance with joint doctrine. Marines provide a unique combat capability that combines air, land, and naval forces from the sea—the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The key characteristic of these forces is their expeditionary mindset. Marines possess the ability to adapt and engage upon arrival, and then sustain operational momentum. They are logistically expeditionary. Marine aviation is another element that characterizes the unique concept of MAGTFs. The primary function of Marine aviation is, and always has been, support of ground troops—focused, versatile, flexible, and responsive to needs on the ground.

It is the Marine Corps' ability to deliver a unique blend of ground, air, and service support elements in a responsive and adaptive manner that makes it the nation's most effective land combat, forcible entry option.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel D. T. Lennox, U.S. Marine Corps, S-215.

D. Questions:

What is the Marine Corps warfighting doctrine for winning in the uncertain, chaotic and fluid environment expected on the battlefields of the future?

How do the Marine Corps warfighting concepts for the 21st Century fit into the network centric environment expected on future battlefields?

How are MAGTFs structured to perform missions across the range of military operations?

What are the Marine Corps' four fundamental operating concepts for the conduct of expeditionary operations?

Why are Marine Corps forces assigned to Joint Task Forces typically organized under two separate component commands—the Marine Corps component and the Navy component?

Using the “Service Capabilities Vignette: Scenario and Background Information” (*NWC 2001A*), consider the range of employment options that Marine Corps forces could offer.

E. Required Readings:

“Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations,” U. S. Marine Corps Briefing, CD-ROM, August 2003. (*NWC 2002A*), (Issued).

MCDP 1, *Warfighting*, Chapter 4, pp 69–96. (*NWC 2006*), (Issued).

MCDP 3, *Expeditionary Operations*, Chapters 3 and 4, pp 61–94. (*NWC 2008*), (Issued).

U.S. Marine Corps. *Concepts and Issues 2001*, Scan pp. 1–27. (*NWC 2158*), (Issued).

“U.S. Marines At The Time of Desert Shield and Desert Storm.” (*NWC 3070*), (Scan). (Issued).

“Forces/Capabilities Handbook,” Read pp. 31–40. (*NWC 3153H*), (Issued).

“Service Capabilities Vignette: Scenario and Background Information,” 1 August 2003. (*NWC 2001A*), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

FMFMRP 2-12, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A Global Capability*. (*NWC 3057*), (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Marine Corps, Krulak, Charles C. *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, 4 January 1996. (*NWC 3022*), (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Marine Corps, Rhodes, J. E. and G. S. Holder. “Seabased Logistics: A 21st Century Warfighting Concept,” 12 May 1998. (*NWC 2009*), (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Marine Corps, Van Riper, Paul K. “Ship-To-Objective Maneuver,” 25 July 1997. (*NWC 2011*), (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Marine Corps, Krulak, Charles C. “MPF 2010 and Beyond,” 30 December 1997. (*NWC 2013*), (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. ARMY CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

The real object of having an Army is to provide for war.

Elihu Root, 1899

A. Focus:

This session examines the doctrine, capabilities, limitations, and organization of the Army's forces. The primary emphasis is on the contribution those forces make to joint operations.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the considerations for employing U.S. Army forces as part of a joint force at the operational and theater-strategic levels of war.
- Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Army forces and how other Services can capitalize upon the capabilities and offset the limitations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role of U.S. Army doctrine with respect to joint doctrine and to unified command.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining U.S. Army forces, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objective.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Army force structure affect the development of joint military strategy.

C. Background:

America's Army is the most potent land combat force in the world. The Army is indispensable to the protection and advancement of our national interests because of its utility across the full range of contingencies. This utility comes from the Army capability for executing a range of operations from nation building and disaster relief to defeating enemies on the battlefield. The Army's most fundamental capability is the exercise of sustained, comprehensive control over people, land and natural resources. Putting American soldiers on the ground is a most effective method to shape the international environment in ways favorable to our interests.

The U.S. Army is a doctrinally-based Service capable of handling large campaigns as well as combat in a variety of scenarios. The 2001 edition of Field Manual 3-0, **Operations**, is the Army's keystone warfighting doctrine that describes how the Army thinks about the conduct of operations.

The Army recently implemented a transformation campaign designed to match its capabilities with the Nation's strategic requirements. Advances in information, materials, and weapons systems technologies will enable new organizational concepts that optimize the employment of Army and joint capabilities across the full spectrum of operations.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel M. J. McKearn, C-408.

D. Questions:

How does the Army view the battlefield framework at the operational level?

How does the Army envision the use of airpower on the battlefield?

Beyond airpower, how else can the operational commander conduct deep operations as envisioned in Army doctrine?

What are the differences in combat capability between light and heavy forces?

What is the utility of airborne and air assault forces?

Using the “Service Capabilities Vignette: Scenario and Background Information” (*NWC 2001A*), consider the range of employment options that Army forces could offer.

E. Required Readings:

“Forces/Capabilities Handbook.” Review pp. 19–52. (*NWC 3153H*) (Issued).

“Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations,” U.S. Army Briefing, CD-ROM, 2003. (*NWC 2002A*), (Issued).

“Service Capabilities Vignette: Scenario and Background Information,” 01 August 2003. (*NWC 2001A*), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Reading:

HQ Dept. of the Army. FM 3-0, *Operations*. June 2001.

U.S. AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

... a buzzword for the rest of this decade is going to be integration—the horizontal integration of manned, unmanned, and space—the integration of stealth, standoff precision, space and information . . . and my mission is to close the seams that divide our capabilities today.

—General John P. Jumper, Air Force Chief of Staff

A. Focus:

This session takes a brief look at the doctrine, capabilities and employment of air and space power. It introduces how the Air Force is organized, highlights the core competencies, capabilities, limitations, and transformation philosophy of the Air Force, and discusses considerations for properly employing air and space power effectively in a joint environment.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the considerations for employing U.S. Air Forces as part of a joint force at the operational and theater-strategic levels of war.
- Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Air Forces and how the other Services can capitalize on the capabilities or offset the limitations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role of U.S. Air Force doctrine with respect to joint doctrine and to unified command.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining U.S. air forces, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Air Force structure affect the development of joint military strategy.

C. Background:

The Air Force is an integrated air and space force with a domain that stretches from the earth's surface to the outer reaches of space in a seamless operational medium. Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 states that the Air Force is the only U.S. Service specifically directed to “organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained offensive and defensive combat operations in the air and space” and for strategic air and missile warfare. The Air Force will employ its air and space assets globally and jointly to achieve strategic, operational and/or tactical objectives. Most air and space assets can perform multiple functions to achieve the desired level objective; some even perform these functions in a unique way. This strength is what the USAF brings to the operational planning table for the joint force commander to dominate his adversaries. By learning to appreciate this inherent Air Force versatility that also includes speed, flexibility and global reach, Naval War College students will develop into future joint force commanders who know how to fully exploit the air and space continuum to achieve victory within the three dimensional battlespace.

The point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel D. T. Goldizen, U.S. Air Force, C-407.

D. Questions:

Why does the Air Force believe that the JFACC, Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) and the Airspace Control Authority (ACA) should be the same person?

Why is air and space superiority important for the joint force?

Why is centralized control and decentralized execution of air and space power important?

What is an Air and Space Expeditionary Task force?

What is the Air Force role in homeland defense?

Using the “Service Capabilities Vignette: Scenario and Background Information” (*NWC 2001A*), consider the range of employment options that U.S. Air Forces could offer.

E. Required Readings:

“Services Capabilities and Employment Considerations,” U.S. Air Force Briefing, CD-ROM, August 2003. (*NWC 2002A*), (Issued).

“Forces/Capabilities Handbook.” Review pp. 63–97. (*NWC 3153H*), (Issued).

“Service Capabilities Vignette: Scenario and Background Information,” 1 August 2003. (*NWC 2001A*), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Lambeth, Benjamin S. *The Transformation of American Air Power*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000, 260–296. (Issued).

AFDD1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, 17 November 2003. (Seminar Reserve).

AFDD2, *Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power*, 17 Feb 2000. (Seminar Reserve).

AFDD2-1, *Air Warfare*, 22 Jan 2000. (Seminar Reserve).

AFDD2-2, *Space Operations*, 27 Nov 2001. (Seminar Reserve).

ACH-JFACC, *Aerospace Commander’s Handbook for the JFACC* (AFDCH 10-01), 27 Jun 2001. (Seminar Reserve).

Horner, Charles A. “The Air Campaign.” (*NWC 3094*), (Library Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-09, *Fire Support*, 12 May 1998. (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*, 5 Jun 2003. (Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM, Jun 2003).

Meilenger, Philip S. “The Future of Airpower—Observations of the Past Decade.” (*NWC 2144*), (Issued).

U.S. Department of the Air Force, *America’s Air Force Vision 2020*. (*NWC 2140*), (Issued).

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change and USSOCOM is no exception. Guided by a comprehensive enduring vision and supporting goals, we must constantly reshape ourselves to remain relevant and useful members of the joint team.

—General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA

A. Focus:

This session provides an understanding of the organization, capabilities, and missions of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and their support to the regional combatant commanders. It will briefly introduce the roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD-SO/LIC), theater Special Operations Commands, and Command and Control of SOF. The session addresses the integration of joint SOF capabilities with conventional forces and takes a brief look at SOF equipment, training, and support. Also highlighted will be considerations for interagency operations, mission employment and insights into civil affairs and psychological operations.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the considerations for employing U.S. Special Operations Forces as part of a joint force at the operational and theater-strategic levels of war.
- Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Special Operations Forces and how other Services can capitalize upon the capabilities and offset the limitations.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the role of U.S. Special Operations Forces doctrine as related to joint doctrine and to unified command.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the art and science of deploying, employing and sustaining U.S. Special Operations Forces, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of U.S. Special Operations Forces affect the development of joint military strategy.

C. Background:

In every conflict since the Revolutionary War, the U.S. has employed special operations tactics and strategies to exploit an enemy's vulnerabilities. Specially designated groups with a broad inventory of unusual skills carried out unique operations at the tactical level, but often with strategic effect. Since the establishment of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 1987, SOF have been trained, equipped, and prepared by one commander to conduct unilateral, joint, and combined special operations in peace, conflict and war. Today, special operations are integral to supporting the regional combatant commanders, U.S. ambassadors and their country teams, and other government agencies. Each military department has established a major command to serve as the Service component of USSOCOM.

The point of contact for this session is Captain W. C. Reed, U.S. Navy, C-407.

D. Questions:

Why do the characteristics of SOF and their principal mission areas result in an operational capacity-based vice an operational capabilities-based force?

How should SOF be integrated into theater peacetime activities? Contingencies? What unique command and control considerations apply?

How and why do SOF emphasize the indirect application of military power? Does this require SOF to be more sensitive than general purpose forces to cultural and political considerations?

Why, how, when, and under what conditions should SOF be employed as a force multiplier?

What unique roles can SOF perform in coalition warfare?

What unique roles can SOF perform in support of the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT)?

Using the “Service Capabilities Vignette: Scenario and Background Information” (*NWC 2001A*), consider the range of employment options that U.S. Special Forces could offer.

E. Required Readings:

“Forces/Capabilities Handbook,” Review pp. 104–111. (*NWC 3153H*), (Issued).

“Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations,” SOF Briefing, CD-ROM, August 2003. (*NWC 2002A*), (Issued).

“Service Capabilities Vignette: Scenario and Background Information,” 1 August 2003. (*NWC 2001A*), (Issued).

U.S. Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, 2003–2004. Review pp. 3–72. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*. (Joint Electronic Library, CD-ROM). (Issued), (Scan).

F. Supplementary Readings:

None.

OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL (Seminar)

As we consider the nature of warfare in the modern era, we find that it is synonymous with joint warfare.

Joint Pub 1

The teams and staffs through which the modern commander absorbs information and exercises his authority must be a beautifully interlocked, smooth-working mechanism. Ideally, the whole should be practically a single mind.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

The only thing worse than fighting with allies is fighting without them.

Winston Churchill

A. Focus:

This session addresses the organization and employment of joint and multinational forces. It examines and analyzes a Joint Force Commander's organizational options and considerations when standing up a joint force and then extends this to considerations (tangible and intangible), of which he should remain mindful when extending his command to the multinational arena.

B. Objectives:

- From an operational commander's viewpoint, understand the practical differences between an alliance and coalition along with the associated advantages and disadvantages such relationships bring.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role of joint doctrine with respect to unified command.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. force structure affects the development of joint military strategy.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how technological change affects the art and science of war and evaluate key ongoing and anticipated technological developments pertinent to the military instrument.

C. Background:

Combatant commanders face the possibility of executing missions across the full range of military operations. They must plan for Major Wars (MWs) at the high end of the conflict spectrum as well as a variety of military operations at the lower end of the spectrum (MOOTW). Whatever the scope or intensity of any particular action, the joint

force commander must consider how best to organize a force in order to achieve the following goals:

- Clarity of Objective
- Unity of Effort
- Centralized Direction
- Decentralized Execution

To address both the mission to be accomplished and the objective to be attained, a wise commander will account for operational functions when structuring a force. To bring the seminar discussion into focus within the framework of joint doctrine, the required readings include sections of Joint Pub 5-00.2, ***Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures***. This reading discusses the authorized command relationships and authority military commanders can use; provides doctrine, principles, and policy for the exercise of that authority; provides doctrine, principles, and policy for organizing joint forces; and prescribes policy for selected joint activities. Additionally, this session draws on the earlier Service session discussions and the relevance of component command organization to the overall joint command picture. However, the common thread throughout is that of command relationships, an area that was first introduced during the NMO session, and one that requires a thorough appreciation to effect a sound command organization.

The “Service Capabilities Vignette: Scenario and Background Information” (***NWC 2001A***) should prompt the seminar to examine the various options for constructing a joint task force, debating the benefits and liabilities of each organizational option. Once U.S. organizational considerations are understood, the more thorny issue of multinational warfare can be examined.

A variety of key planning documents, including the U.S. ***National Security Strategy*** and ***National Military Strategy***, highlight the U.S. preference for operating with alliance and coalition partners to achieve U.S. national objectives. In fact, key tenets of U.S. military strategy (e.g., forward presence and engagement) depend heavily upon other nations to realize success. Current basic joint doctrine for the conduct of multinational operations is contained in the readings from Joint Pubs 3-0 and 3-16; a reading concerning Command and Control of maritime operations during Operation ***ENDURING FREEDOM (NWC 3042)*** illuminates some of these issues.

Multinational operations present a variety of unique operational considerations for the military commander, not the least of which is the thorny issue of establishing unity of effort/command. It has become fashionable to take the “Unity of Effort/Parallel Command” architecture, as demonstrated by Operation ***DESERT STORM***, as the norm and to assume that unity of command, in its purest sense, will be unattainable. Alliances, which offer more formal and enduring command relationships, provide a range of capabilities from which the commander may draw. Organizing an allied force, however, can still present significant headaches given potential diplomatic and political sensitivities (the issue of Macedonia during the Kosovo crisis for example). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the best-known of the formal alliances in which the United States participates. NATO has recently adopted the CJTF concept, and intends to stand-up a NATO Reaction Force to take this transformation forward (***NWC***

3042). However, it may be worth noting that NATO's most recent military actions in the Balkans (air strikes over Kosovo) were not conducted with a CJTF and, in fact, greatly resembled a "lead nation" operation.

Background information concerning NATO structure, initiatives, and issues is contained in the Supplementary Readings (*NWC 2097*). Today, the U.S. is a member of five multinational alliances and three bilateral Alliances; her obligations to each can and do vary.

Coalitions, which are normally formed in an ad hoc manner, often represent a disparate group of nation-states responding to a common specific threat at a particular time, thus posing even more demanding challenges to the commander than the more stable alliance. Designing a workable command relationship for coalition forces during Operations *DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM* was one example of such challenges. However, some of the British experiences during Operation *IRAQI FREEDOM* are highlighted in a Jane's Intelligence Review article (*NWC 3042*), and show what can be achieved in a demanding, modern Command and Control environment.

Maintaining the integrity of a coalition may become a critical factor/objective in the successful execution of a combined operation. Consequently, any planning must cater to an astute adversary who, recognizing the strategic importance of coalition cohesion, seeks to exploit any perceived weaknesses.

As a practical matter, coalitions are most often composed of United Nations member states from a specific region or localized area. Legitimacy is claimed by invocation of the UN Charter, specifically Chapter 1, Article I: "The Purposes of the United Nations are: . . . To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace . . ."

Much has been written about the advent of the information age causing a technology "gap" between the globally-focused United States and the more regionally-focused allied nations. Whatever your feelings to future allied operations, a degree of multi-national interoperability remains a demanding pre-requisite for success at the operational level of war.

The point of contact for this session is Commander R. J. Buckland, Royal Navy, C-409.

D. Questions:

In addition to mission and objective, what other factors might influence the selection of an organizational structure?

Some might argue that the underlying rationale for a JTF is to ensure each Service will be represented. Is this true?

Is the premise for a JTF budgetary in nature or does the JTF reflect a flexible/useful option?

How will the SJFHQ improve future JTFs?

What are some of the critical issues an operational commander must consider when planning and executing a multinational operation?

Given the long term obligations of an alliance and the turbulent, changeable world we find ourselves in, has the alliance, as a method of binding force effort together, lost out to the seemingly more flexible coalition, or are there enduring qualities that can provide operational military benefits?

What factors are relevant in establishing an effective C2 organization within a coalition? Should we still strive for true unity of command? Include consideration of the situation wherein the overall commander may not be a U.S. military officer.

How can we reconcile the United States' steadfast pursuit of advanced (and expensive) technology with the strategic directive to embrace multinational operations as the expected norm and to seek interoperability with our allies? How does this translate down to the operational commander in the field? Will a dependence on superior technology be the final straw that breaks the allies' backs?

What are the advantages and disadvantages of a standing joint headquarters? Could we do the same in the multinational arena?

How can a commander ensure that necessary intelligence, some of which may be the product of very sensitive sources, is disseminated and understood by coalition partners, some of whom may be future adversaries?

What can the commander do during peacetime, given a particular area of responsibility (AOR) and range of potential contingencies, to improve the effectiveness of coalition operations in a future crisis?

Using the "Service Capabilities Vignette: Scenario and Background Information" (*NWC 2001A*), consider the range of joint/ multinational organizational options that the Joint Force Commander might consider.

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, pp. VI-1 to VI-13. (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, pp. II-1 through II-10 and III-1 through III-13. (Issued).

"Operational Command and Control—A Compendium," July 2003. (*NWC 3042*), Issued.

"Service Capabilities Vignette: Scenario and Background Information," 1 August 2003. (*NWC 2001A*), (Issued).

"Forces/Capabilities Handbook." (*NWC 3153H*), pp. 124 through 134.

Myers, Gene. *A Common Perspective*, "Concepts to Future Doctrine," pp 6–9, April 2002. (*NWC 2003*), (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, (Ed. 1 issued 5 April 2000), pp. vii-x and II-1 to II-15. (JEL) (June 2003). (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Cooke, Thomas. "NATO CJTF Doctrine: The Naked Emperor." *Parameters* (Winter 1998–99). (*NWC 2052*), (Seminar Reserve).

Extracts from the *NATO Handbook*. "What Is NATO? Fundamental Security Tasks." Ch. 1, 21 May 2001. (*NWC 2097*), (Seminar Reserve).

Rice, Antony, J. "Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare." *Parameters* (Spring 1997).

JFSC PUB 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide*, pp. 1-45 through 1-53 (Issued).

Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF), pp. V-1 through V-19 (Issued).

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) PART 1 (Seminar)

During the fall of 1989, during DoD's regular planning process, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) recommended and the Secretary approved a shift in the principal U.S. focus in the Persian Gulf. . . . Accordingly, the Secretary directed DoD to sharpen its ability to counter such a regional conflict on the Arabian Peninsula. In turn, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directed CINCCENT to develop war plans consistent with this shift in emphasis.

DoD, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress*

Turbulence is a constant: it is what happens when you have to balance the management requirements to plan an operation with the flexibility needed by those who will soon be carrying it out. While it may have certain flaws, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the baseline system for all U.S. deployments, including those supporting peace operations.

Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*

A. Focus:

This session introduces the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). It begins with an overview of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the roles of the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, the Joint Staff, and the Service chiefs and their staffs in translating national policy objectives into definitive planning guidance for the combatant commanders and their Service component commanders. Attention will also be directed toward the guidance contained in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), a CJCS instruction which initiates the deliberate planning cycle conducted by the combatant commanders. The session then describes the deliberate planning process, compares and contrasts it with the time-sensitive crisis action planning process. Emphasis will be on an overview of the five phases of the deliberate planning process and the six phases of the crisis action process. We will also examine the tasking and coordination methodologies, and the relationships between the key elements and products of both processes as well as the content and organization of the various plans and directives associated with the joint military planning process.

B. Objectives:

- Know the purpose, roles, functions, and responsibilities and relationships within the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC).
- Comprehend the role of the JSCP in the Defense Planning System with emphasis on the deliberate and crisis action planning processes.
- Know the five phases of the deliberate planning process and the six phases of the crisis action planning process used within JOPES and the products and their functions derived from these processes.
- Understand how to prepare plans and orders using Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) processes and products.
- Demonstrate the ability to analyze military directives for their correct format and content.

- *PJE*—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. force structure affect the development of joint military strategy.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- *PJE*—Analyze how time coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.
- *PJE*—Analyze and apply the principal joint strategy development and operational planning process.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the combatant commanders.

C. Background:

As mandated by Title 10 USC, the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS are pivotal in translating national security objectives into definitive planning guidance for the combatant commanders. The Service chiefs and their staffs are also involved in the process, both as contributors to the joint planning guidance and in deriving Service plans that provide trained and equipped forces to support that process. The combatant commanders are responsible for the actual development and production of the operation plans (OPLANs), but are dependent on support from the Services, other combatant commanders, and the combat support agencies during the planning and execution process.

JOPES provides the overall framework for the military planning process—both the five-phase deliberate planning process (DPP) and the six-phase crisis action planning (CAP) process. Prior to JOPES, there existed the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) and the Joint Deployment System (JDS). The need for JOPES stemmed from the recognition, based on actual crisis situations, that JOPS and JDS focused primarily on deployment and did not adequately support employment activities. JOPES was therefore developed to give senior level decision-makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and control events during both planning and execution of joint operations.

The JSCP is the vehicle by which the CJCS initiates the deliberate planning cycle. It includes regional objectives and planning assumptions; it specifies the type of plan for each task; and it apportions major combat and strategic lift forces to the combatant commanders for their planning. The JSCP also provides the combatant commanders with a framework for the scope of their plans, plan formats, and the amount of detailed planning that is required. Deliberate planning is a complex and lengthy process, particularly when the combatant commanders are required to develop Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD).

The six phases of CAP may have to be executed almost instantaneously, and plans may have to be altered substantially once forces are ashore in the crisis area or when strategic objectives change. In certain crises, the phases may be compressed, entirely eliminated, or conducted concurrently. Moreover, the process could terminate during any of the phases should the crisis subside before the execution phase is reached. The

1983 Grenada operation, **URGENT FURY**, the 1989 Panama operation, **JUST CAUSE**, and the 1990 Southwest Asia crisis, **DESERT SHIELD** and **DESERT STORM**, stand as examples of such dynamic situations, as well as the latest operations in Kosovo, **ALLIED FORCE**, Afghanistan, **ENDURING FREEDOM**, and Iraq, **IRAQI FREEDOM**.

The current SecDef Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) and the JSCP are both based on the assumption that there is utility in developing deliberate plans that may guide the President's response to a crises. If that assumption is true, we must understand how deliberate plans can be used to guide or expedite crisis action planning and execution, and which agencies are responsible for specific portions of the planning process.

Point of contact for this session is Professor P. C. Sweeney, C-424.

D. Questions:

What is the basis for the planning tasks assigned in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan?

Why has the CJCS developed the concept of adaptive planning and how does a combatant commander incorporate that concept into deliberate plans? How does a combatant commander address the issue of deterrence?

How are limited resources and forces matched to planning requirements necessary to support the national security strategy and objectives?

Does the JSCP address only combat forces?

How is strategic lift considered during deliberate planning?

Does the combatant commander need a tasking from the CJCS to initiate deliberate planning?

How does the combatant commander provide guidance to his staff and component commanders?

What types of plans are developed during the deliberate planning process? During CAP?

To what extent are deliberate plans really only deployment plans?

How does the combatant commander express how forces are to be employed?

To what extent is CAP sufficiently flexible for "evolving" crises? What happens when major changes occur?

How effective do you think CAP will be in meeting the challenges of the future?

Have recent U.S. military operations validated the hoped-for correlation between deliberate and crisis action planning? If so, what portions of the deliberate plan will normally need to be modified in times of crisis?

What is the "standard five-paragraph format" for plans and orders? What are the key items in each paragraph, and what are some of the "optional" parts of the directive not contained in the five paragraphs?

What is the purpose of annexes, and how are they used in directives?

What are the intended actions of, approval level requirement for, and releasing activity for: Warning, Planning, Alert, Deployment, and Execute Orders?

How are synchronization matrices used in the operation planning process?

E. Required Readings:

“Instructional JSCP, FY 02,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 December 2002. (**NWC 2-03**) (**SECRET/NOFORN**) (Classified Issued) (This will be issued in class).

Joint Pub 5-00.1, **Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning**, Washington, DC: 25 January, 2002. Read pp. III-1 through IV-24 on Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning. Review Appendix C on the Theater Campaign Plan Format. (Issued).

“Plans and Orders,” Sept. 02. (**NWC 2159A**), (Issued), (Review).

“Sample Planning Documents,” August 2001. (**NWC 2110A**), (Issued), (Scan).

F. Supplementary Readings:

User’s Guide for JOPES (Joint Operation Planning and Execution System), Washington, D.C.: 1 May 1995. pp. 1–20 (JEL. CD-ROM, June 2003.) (**NWC 2089**), (Issued).

CJCSM 3122.01 **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)**, Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures, 14 July 2000, w/CH-1, May 2001. (Seminar Reserve).

CJCSM 3122.03A, **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance**, 31 December 1999, CH-1, 6 September 2000. (Seminar Reserve).

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPEs) PART 2 (Seminar)

A robust plan flows best from plurality of perspective and the resulting competition of ideas. . . . The process may be somewhat untidy, but it is distinctly American. It works.

Admiral J. D. Watkins, *The Maritime Strategy*

A. Focus:

This lesson focuses on the implementation of national strategy at the theater combatant commander level. The first step of the process comes to the combatant commander as guidance from the *National Security Strategy* (NSS), the *National Military Strategy* (NMS), and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Based on this guidance, the combatant commander develops his theater strategy by means of a strategic estimate. The combatant commander's theater strategy produces concepts to both shape the theater and respond to challenges. The final steps are constructing the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) to shape the theater in peacetime and developing campaign plans to respond to regional threats. The JMO course has previously addressed the basic concepts associated with national strategy, campaigns, the TSCP, and operational art. This session will more closely examine the interrelationship between those concepts and their effect on the geographic combatant commander's theater planning.

B. Objectives:

- Understand how a combatant commander uses the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) to synchronize and unify employment of the military, diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power to assist in formulating national security direction and a strategic end state.
- Analyze fundamental challenges, considerations, and design elements of Theater Security Cooperation Planning, including integration of unified, joint, and multinational forces, and non-DoD agencies, into the Theater Security Cooperation Plan.
- Translate national military objectives, guidance, and theater strategies into theater strategic guidance, objectives, and operational focus in theater campaign plans.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- **PJE**—Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the combatant commanders.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries.

- *PJE*—Comprehend the value of integrating IO into theater strategies and campaigning.

C. **Background:**

Theater strategy is the development of integrated strategic concepts and courses of action to accomplish national and multinational objectives within a theater across a wide range of military operations. The key process in developing a theater strategy and the subsequent campaign plan is the theater commander's estimate of the situation. The guidance provided in the NSS, NMS, and JSCP form the basis for the theater commander's strategy.

Today's regional combatant commander has a unique perspective on the current and projected security environment within his theater. His charge is to identify U.S. political and economic, as well as military interests in the theater. He must focus on identifying opportunities for shaping the environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests. The TSCP can be described as the "peacetime campaign plan," by which combatant commanders translate national strategy into strategic and operational concepts for their individual AORs.

Campaign planning bridges both the deliberate and crisis action planning process. Traditionally, campaign plans establish objectives and seek to synchronize operations within a theater of war. Campaign plans become the basis for subordinate campaign plans by joint forces and supporting plans for component forces. There is a definite art and professional skill in writing a supporting campaign plan that translates the theater commander's strategic vision into a concept of operation and necessary tasks for subordinate forces. Campaign planning is a logical result of the theater commander's estimate process. This session provides the seminar with an opportunity to analyze a selected World War II operation (*HUSKY*) with an eye towards its linkage to a strategy and the effectiveness of its construct.

The point of contact for this session is Professor P. C. Sweeney, C-424.

D. **Questions:**

What are the fundamental responsibilities of the theater commander to provide for strategic direction, unified action, and operational focus?

What is theater strategy, and how is it related to campaign planning?

What is the campaign planning process, and how is it related to JOPES?

What are the concepts and fundamentals applied by the theater commander in developing a strategic concept for a campaign?

Will the TSCP gain and maintain viability as a useful planning document?

How does the combatant commander ensure non-DoD agencies comply with CJCS's direction to integrate all theater activities into a single TSCP?

Using Joint Pub 5-00.1 as a guide, analyze Operation *HUSKY*. In your analysis, consider the following additional questions:

How did the multi-national aspect of each campaign influence the strategy?

How well did the campaign apply the tenets of operational art and the fundamentals of campaign planning as found in Joint Pub 5-00.1?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, Washington, DC: 25 January, 2002. Read pp. I-1 through II-20 on campaign planning and design. (Issued).

Dougherty, Kevin. "Invading Sicily: A Tale of Branches and Sequels." *Joint Force Quarterly*. Summer 2002. (*NWC 2026*), (Issued).

"Security Cooperation Guidance," April 2003. (*SECRET/NOFORN*), (*NWC 4-03*).

Note: This will be distributed and reviewed in the seminar room.
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"USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation Strategic Concept." (*SECRET/NOFORN*), (*NWC 5-03*).

Note: This will be distributed and reviewed in the seminar room.
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F. Supplementary Reading:

None.

C4ISR (Lecture/Seminar)

Joint warfighting is the key to greater things on the battlefield. I think that's been clearly proven here. We have very good integration. The thing that enables that and eliminates gaps and seams is the C4ISR.

—General Richard Meyers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, during Operation ***IRAQI FREEDOM***

A. Focus:

This session focuses on C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) support to the joint force commander at the operational level of war. The 2003 U.S./coalition military operation in Iraq is used as the principal case study to elicit current C4ISR capabilities and limitations in support of a major multinational military operation. The primary goal is to derive insights and lessons learned with respect to C4ISR systems, operational concepts, and organizations. The seminar will be preceded by the lecture “C4ISR & The Operational Commander (or . . . The Top Ten Things a Good Operator Knows He Should Hear from His J2 about C4ISR).” In addition, because C4ISR and Information Operations (IO) are inextricably linked, the student must remain mindful of C4ISR issues during the follow-on IO session (OPS III-13).

B. Objectives:

- ***PJE***—Understand IO and C4 concepts and how they relate.
- ***PJE***—Demonstrate a thorough understanding of how IO and C4 are integrated to support the National Military and National Security Strategies and interagency process.
- ***PJE***—Demonstrate how IO and C4 are integrated into the theater and strategic campaign development process.
- Understand the capabilities and limitations of national and theater-level intelligence assets available to the joint operational commander.

C. Background:

Information superiority (the ability to collect, process, and disseminate information while denying an adversary's ability to do the same) has become recognized as a key enabler in 21st century military operations. It facilitates Decision Superiority and Full Spectrum Dominance, which are central to the DoD's ***Joint Vision 2020*** and the ***Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations***. Essential elements of information superiority include robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and command, control, communications and computers (C4) systems.

The 2003 U.S./coalition operation in Iraq (Operation ***IRAQI FREEDOM***) provides an excellent case study that highlights the capabilities and limitations of our current C4ISR systems, concepts, and organizations. Within the context of this case study, this lesson explores two different, but integrally related areas of information:

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR): Under the organizational responsibility of the staff J2 (Intelligence), the central focus of ISR is to establish and

maintain an accurate picture of the environment and enemy activity in the area of operations. The particular challenges to maintaining ISR effectiveness in a highly dynamic battlespace will be explored.

Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4): Under the organizational responsibility of the staff J6 (C4), the primary focus of C4 is the maintenance of robust information networks to link operational forces for all activities from planning through execution. The particular problems of maintaining adequate information throughput capacity and operational security in the distant battlespace will be explored.

The principal focus of this lesson is to develop an understanding of existing capabilities and limitations of C4ISR at the operational level of war, and to explore how our information challenges might better be met in future operations.

The point of contact for this session is Commander A. R. Wall, U.S. Navy, Sims Hall, SE-117.

D. Questions:

What were the intelligence requirements to support the operations in Iraq?

What national and theater intelligence resources were available to the joint force commanders in the region?

What were the JFCs' principal capabilities and limitations in supporting U.S./coalition operations?

How were national and theater intelligence assets organized? Did these organizations meet U.S. and coalition requirements?

What were the principal command and control requirements to support operations in Iraq?

What national and theater C4 assets were available?

What were the principal capabilities and limitations of these assets? How effectively did they support the operational commander?

What overall lessons for future operations can be drawn from C4ISR experiences in this case?

What do our experiences from this operation imply for our efforts to achieve Network Centric Warfare?

E. Required Reading:

JMO Department. ***CAISR and Information Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom***, 2003. (***NWC 3-03***), (***SECRET/NOFORN***). (Obtain from one of three sites: Pubs, Conolly Hall basement; classified library; or the Intelligence Division, Sims Hall E-120).

Jones, Garrett. "Working with the CIA," ***Parameters*** (Winter 2001-02): 120, 228-39. (***NWC 2005***), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Joint Pub 2-0, ***Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations***, 9 March 2000. (Joint Electronic Library), (Issued).

Joint Pub 2-01, ***Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operation***, 20 November 1996. (Joint Electronic Library), (Issued).

Joint Pub 6-0, ***Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations***, 30 May 1995. (Joint Electronic Library), (Issued).

INFORMATION OPERATIONS (Seminar)

A front from the south, one from the north, one from the west, one directly in the environment of Baghdad proper, and the fifth one was information operations.

—General Tommy Franks, on the OIF Battle Plan

A. Focus:

This session focuses on IO (Information Operations) support to the Joint Force Commander at the operational and theater-strategic levels of war. The 2003 Operation **IRAQI FREEDOM** (OIF) is used as the principal case study to elicit current capabilities and limitations of IO in support of a major U.S./coalition military operation. The primary goal is to derive insights and lessons learned with respect to IO systems, operational concepts, and organizations. IO and C4ISR are inextricably linked, and so the student must keep the previous C4ISR session (OPS III-12) in mind as well.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the capabilities and limitations of national and theater-level IO assets available to the joint force commander.
- **PJE**—Understand IO and C4 concepts and how they relate.
- **PJE**—Demonstrate a thorough understanding of how IO and C4 are integrated to support the National Military and National Security Strategies and interagency process.
- **PJE**—Demonstrate how IO and C4 are integrated into the theater and strategic campaign development process.
- **PJE**—Understand how the joint operational planning and execution system is integrated in theater and operational IO campaign planning and execution to support theater and national strategic sustainment and warfighting efforts.

C. Background:

Information Operations is emerging as the primary organizational entity for the attainment of information superiority across the spectrum of conflict and at all levels of war. Information superiority, in turn, is absolutely essential to military success in both the physical and psychological domains. The doctrinal concept of IO encompasses a broad set of information-related functions ranging from electronic warfare to psychological operations; consequently, IO touches upon and is influenced by many elements of the military planning process.

The 2003 U.S./Coalition operation in Iraq (Operation **IRAQI FREEDOM**) provides an excellent case study to highlight the capabilities and limitations of our current IO systems, concepts, and organizations. In particular, OIF saw the explicit use of embedded media as just one component of a far-reaching information operations “perception management” campaign.

The principal focus of this lesson is to explore the theoretical basis of IO, to comprehend IO capabilities and limitations, and to understand how IO is integrated into military

planning at the operational level of war. The development of specific IO goals and operational concepts to accomplish the IO mission will also be explored.

The point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel D. T. Goldizen, U.S. Air Force, C-407.

D. Questions:

What were the operational and strategic goals for IO in Operation ***IRAQI FREEDOM?***

What were the measures of effectiveness for IO?

What principal IO assets were available to the operational commanders and national decision makers?

What overall lessons for future operations can be drawn from IO experiences in this case?

What do our experiences from this operation imply for our efforts to achieve Information Superiority?

E. Required Reading:

Berkowitz, Bruce. "An Afghan Hard Drive," in ***The New Face of War***, 2003. (***NWC 3056***), (Issued).

Information Operations: The Hard Reality of Soft Power (Joint Command Control & Information Warfare Staff at the Joint Forces Staff College), Extracts: Chapters 1 & 2 and Appendix C. (***NWC 3055***), (Issued).

Joint Vision 2020, Information Superiority, pp. 8–10; Information Operations, pp. 28–30. (Issued).

JMO Department, ***CAISR and Information Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom***, 2003. (***NWC 3-03***), (***SECRET/NOFORN***). NOTE: No additional reading required; this reference was used in OPS III-12 and will be referred to during this seminar.

F. Supplementary Readings:

Joint Pub 3-13, ***Joint Doctrine for Information Operations***, 9 Oct 1998. (Joint Electronic Library), (Issued).

Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook, July 2002 (Joint Command Control & Information Warfare Staff at the Joint Forces Staff College), Chapters I–IV. (Seminar Reserve).

The White House, ***National Security Strategy of the U.S.A.***, September 2002. (Issued).

THE COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION (CES) (Exercise)

The one who is to draw up a plan of operations must possess a minute knowledge of the power of his adversary and of the help the latter may expect from his allies. He must compare the forces of the enemy with his own numbers and those of his allies so that he can judge which kind of war he is able to lead or to undertake.

Frederick the Great, Letter 1748

A. Focus:

The weeklong sessions will introduce you to one of the most critical aspects of the planning process and the framework and steps involved in making a decision by selecting a Course of Action (COA). We will use the Navy's Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) as a model for military decision making. The CES Workbook (*NWC 4111F*) will be used as an instructional tool and a guide as we apply these concepts to a scenario based on warfare in a littoral region. The exercise will use a scenario in Borneo to develop a CES, and then deliver a COA decision brief. Following this, the seminar will use the selected COA to further develop a synchronization matrix and discuss its utility in developing an OPORD. While this exercise will highlight activities at all three levels of war, it will focus on the operational planning aspects and is not intended to progress into the execution phase. Additionally, we will review several other planning frameworks to provide insight and exposure to other systems in the art of decision-making.

B. Objectives:

- Apply Operational Law in operational planning.
- Synthesize operational art at the joint task force level.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the Department of Defense systems and processes by which national ends, ways, and means are reconciled, integrated, and applied.
- *PJE*—Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.
- *PJE*—Analyze and apply the principal joint strategy development and operational planning processes.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. force structure affect the development of joint military strategy.
- *PJE*—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.

- **PJE**—Demonstrate how IO and C4 are integrated into the theater and strategic campaign development process.
- **PJE**—Understand how the joint operational planning and execution system is integrated in theater and operational IO campaign planning and execution to support theater and national strategic sustainment and warfighting efforts.

C. Background:

Block III began by introducing the capabilities and limitations of the various Services and several key operational issues critical to the planning process. The Commander's Estimate of the Situation applies and synthesizes these, along with doctrine and theory from Block II, for making a sound military decision.

For most of the twentieth century, and during all of its major wars, the United States military used the CES to think through real and potential military situations and the myriad of influencing factors in order to arrive at decisions. In 1909, the U.S. Army adopted the Estimate of the Situation from the German General Staff; the U.S. Navy followed a year later.

As you will find out, there is a wide range of CES experience in your seminar, ranging from none to sophisticated use on joint staffs. There are also differences in Service perspectives in the planning framework as well as ideas from outside the military. The **main purpose** of the CES, and any planning framework, is to provide a logical sequence of actions in analyzing a military problem and reaching a decision.

Military commanders must continually make decisions, often under unfavorable conditions. The opponent's independent will and actions can considerably affect the execution of one's own plans and actions. Moreover, the physical environment, climate, and weather can significantly interfere with the commander's accomplishment of the assigned mission. The CES is designed to ensure that no matter of importance is omitted by the commander.

These sessions focus on describing the CES planning process using the workbook and readings, and then synthesizing the knowledge through the Borneo (PACIFIC TEAK) Crisis Planning Exercise. The seminar will act as members of a Joint Task Force (JTF). This exercise focuses on the planning aspects of how to use forces during a crisis that develops in a littoral region. The group will develop a CES based on the intelligence assessment and information provided in the readings.

JTF organization will be introduced as a precursor to the Block V JFC/JTF HQ Exercise, when the entire class will form a JTF. Previous sessions have touched on the Information Operations Cell and the Rules of Engagement Cell. JTFs use permanent or ad hoc organizations called groups, boards, centers and cells to facilitate the Crisis Action Planning (CAP) process by promoting cross-staff integration. These include the Joint Planning Group (JPG), Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB), Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) and Joint Fires Element (JFE). Also discussed is the concept of Battle Rhythm—the way a JTF manages time.

An operational planner will be more effective if he or she has a good understanding of the different capabilities, limitations, and doctrines that each Service brings to the joint force. This effectiveness will be increased if the planner has a comprehensive understanding of the critical factors that affect the use of these forces at the operational

and tactical levels. The seminar will discuss operational law issues relevant to the situation. The seminar will also have an opportunity to discuss other planning frameworks. By now you should recognize Operational Art and the Five Questions as a foundation to military success.

The first step in the CES is the ***Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) and Mission Analysis (MA)***. The JIPB will be used to define the battlespace's environment; describe the battlespace's effects in terms of time, space and force; evaluate the threat; and determine enemy COAs. The MA is the single most important element of the CES. It results in a proposed, restated mission statement and the commander's issuance of his planning guidance. The mission should be constantly reviewed throughout the entire estimate process. The mission is contained in paragraph 1 of the CES and comprises paragraph 2 of the basic plan or OPORD.

The second step is to ***develop friendly COAs*** with respect to the enemy COAs developed in Step 1. These COAs will be developed through an analysis of relative combat power, the task organization of forces, and the development of a scheme of operation. A prepared statement and sketch will be used to analyze and compare the COAs. The scheme of the operation will be expanded into the concept of the operation (CONOPS) if/when the COA is selected (during the Decision) and comprises paragraph 3 of the basic plan or OPORD.

The third step is to ***analyze the courses of action***. The staff will select a war game method and technique to record and display the results. The staff will list all available forces, assumptions, known critical events and decision points, and significant factors and then war game the COA to assess the results.

The fourth step is to ***compare the courses of action*** with each other to help form the basis for the decision. The staff will consider advantages and disadvantages, identify actions to overcome disadvantages, make final tests for feasibility and acceptability, weigh relative merits of the COAs, and select one COA that offers the greatest chance of accomplishing the mission. To facilitate comparison between the retained COAs, the staff considers each COA in terms of the governing factors selected by the commander in his guidance.

The fifth and final step is the ***decision***. The decision is based on both an objective review of the results of the tabulations and calculations of the outcome of each step in the process, as well as upon subjective analysis. The commander must rely heavily on his professional judgment in making a sound decision.

Based on the commander's decision and final guidance, the CES process is completed, and the staff now refines the COA and completes the plan and prepares to issue the order. The staff turns the selected COA into a clear, concise concept of operations and often completes a ***joint synchronization matrix***. The joint synchronization matrix is a staff decision and planning aid that graphically reflects the joint execution of an operation over a specific time period.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel R. J. Findlay, U. S. Marine Corps, C-415.

D. Questions:

What is the common thread seen throughout the CES?

How does operational art theory get translated into real-world practical application?

What are some influences on the superior's mission that you will have to judge?

What are the shortcuts and pitfalls in planning and decision-making?

What are the strengths and weaknesses of the various planning frameworks?

Consider the following questions as you proceed through the CES process:

How does Step 1 (Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and Mission Analysis) provide the Joint Force Commander (JFC) an understanding of the overall situation that he is facing?

What are the enemy capabilities and courses of action that the JFC might confront?

What are the considerations for command and control of assigned forces? Location of the CJTF? Organization of the JTF?

What are the potential courses of action that the JCF can select?

Is the recommended course of action adequate (accomplishes the mission), feasible (accomplishes the mission with the assets available), and acceptable (accomplishes the mission with the estimated cost)?

What details must be provided in an OPORD in order for the forces to accomplish their mission?

Are actions of all participants synchronized towards this end? Will the proposed military condition lead to achievement of the political objective?

E. Required Readings:

U.S. Naval War College, "A Borneo Case Study for Expeditionary Warfare," August 2002. (**NWC 2095B**), (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, "Commander's Estimate of the Situation: Worksheet for In-Class Work and War Gaming," 19 Aug 2002. (**NWC 4111F**), (Issued).

Joint Pub 2-01.3, **Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace**, 24 May 2000, Chapters I through III and Appendix A. (Issued).

Joint Forces Command, **JTF Chief of Staff Handbook**, 6 August 2002, pp 33–36. (**NWC 3041**), (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-00.2, **Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures**, 13 January 1999, pp. IX-6 – IX-14, VII-4 – VII-8, and VIII-15 – VIII-16. (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, "Plans and Orders," September 2002. (**NWC 2159A**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Naval Warfare Publication 5-01, Rev. A, **Naval Operational Planning**, May 1998. (Seminar Reserve).

"Forces/Capabilities Handbook." (**NWC 3153H**), (Issued).

CJCSM 3122.01, **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, VOL I (Planning Policies and Procedures)**, CH-1, 25 May 2001. (Seminar Reserve).

CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, VOL II (Planning Formats and Guidance), CH-1, 6 September 2000. (Seminar Reserve).

CJCSM 3500.05A, Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide, 1 June 2003 (*NWC 4027*), (Issued).

BLOCK FOUR CAMPAIGNING

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INTRODUCTION TO CAMPAIGNING

A. Focus:

Successful prosecution of modern campaigns requires more than just superb operational concepts and planning skills. Today, military leaders must be familiar with a broad range of issues that encompass more than the military aspects of national power. Exploring the entire spectrum of conflict, Block IV examines the variety of topics necessary for meeting today's national security challenges, including historical cases covering failed and failing states, and seminars concerning the interagency process, insurgency, terrorism, homeland security, and transition, conflict termination, and peace operations. This block concludes with a synthesis event during which the interagency process will be used by students to coordinate and apply resources in order to transition from combat to post-hostilities operations. Upon completion of these lessons, students should be comfortable in translating strategic goals into feasible military objectives for operations across the spectrum of conflict.

B. Guidance:

Officers traditionally focus on mastering the application of combat power. The Military Services also focus on training and education at the high end of the operational continuum or range of military operations. This block of sessions allows students to sharpen different skill sets, develop a broader understanding of the complexity of military operations and delve more deeply into some of the critical issues of today's operating environment, including interagency coordination, homeland security and the political-military perspectives needed to achieve national objectives. Block IV is designed to provide students with the emerging tools, concepts, principles and doctrine required for accomplishing modern military tasks. Students should focus their thoughts during these lessons on understanding the critical linkages and important cultural and environmental factors that add complexity to modern operations so that they can construct a strategic campaign plan to synchronize component execution and achieve the military conditions necessary for achieving desired endstate.

INTRODUCTION TO CAMPAIGNING (Lecture)

Campaign planners must plan for conflict termination from the outset of the planning process and update these plans as the campaign evolves . . . campaign planners must consider a wide variety of operational issues, to include disengagement, force protection, transition to post-conflict operations, and reconstitution and redeployment. Planners must also anticipate the nature of post-conflict operations, where the focus will likely shift to MOOTW; for example, peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, or enforcement of exclusion zones.

 Joint Pub 5-00.1

A. Focus:

This session will introduce Block IV and explain the relationships between combat and post-hostilities operations. Taken as a whole, this block addresses the full range of operations that will confront the future leaders of our military, from domestic to foreign, and high to low intensity. Therefore, this introductory session is designed to frame the lessons of the block into a broad issue-based approach to modern operational campaigning. This lesson will also introduce the principles of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Upon completion of this block, students should be comfortable translating strategic goals into feasible military objectives either separate from, preceding, or subsequent to traditional military activities.

B. Objectives:

- Apply joint doctrine across the spectrum of conflict.
- Analyze the reasons for the success or failure of selected operational cases.
- Understand peace, transition and post-conflict operations.
- Understand the principles of MOOTW and how they relate to the classic principles of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the combatant commanders.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.

C. Background:

Military officers focus their careers on mastering the application of combat power. Not surprisingly, the Services focus on training and education at the high end of the operational continuum or range of military operations. This block of instruction provides students an opportunity to sharpen skills in generally less familiar environments. In this series of lessons, students will expand their focus to include the full range of operations

in order to develop an understanding of military operations other than war (MOOTW) and to delve into the interagency, diplomatic and other important applications of military power used to achieve national objectives in combat and during post-conflict operations. Operations **ENDURING FREEDOM-AFGHANISTAN** and **IRAQI FREEDOM** both demonstrated the complexity of modern operations and the importance of sound transitions from combat to post-hostilities operations. The evolving joint doctrine has addressed this critical seam more and more over the past decade. Lessons from operations in Panama, Somalia, Haiti and Kosovo have shown a variety of ways to terminate hostilities with leverage and transition smoothly towards the desired end state. The lessons in Block IV are designed to better prepare today's officers for the rigors of operational warfighting across the spectrum of operations. Block IV is designed to provide students with the tools, concepts, principles and doctrine (including interagency issues) required for the tasks of the future. During these lessons, students will be required to translate the strategic national guidance of the President and the Secretary of Defense into a theater commander's strategic plan to terminate combat, transition to post-conflict operations and set desired endstate conditions.

The point of contact for this session is Professor J. R. Ballard, C-421.

D. Questions:

What is the connection between planning for conflict and planning for post-conflict operations? Why does it matter when you do this planning?

Who determines the terms and conditions for conflict termination?

What types of military capability are normally appropriate for post-conflict operations?

What military activities are necessary for stability operations and what activities broach into nation building?

How are the principles of MOOTW applicable to current operations of the war on terror?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 5-00.1, **Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning**. Chapters 1 and 2. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-07, **Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War**. Chapters 1 through 4. (Scan), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Butler, Glen. "Noble Eagle Is Not Your Average Operation," **U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings** (August, 2003): 48-51. (**NWC 4013**), (Issued).

THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS (Lecture and Seminar)

Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political and/ or diplomatic, and informational entities of the U.S. Government (USG) as well as nongovernmental agencies. The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint planners consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective. Success in operations will depend, to a large extent, on the ability to blend and engage all elements of national power effectively.

Joint Pub 3-08

A. Focus:

Modern military operations require the proper application of all elements of national power, yet commanders frequently state that interagency coordination is one of their biggest challenges. With this thought in mind, students must understand the key principles associated with the interagency process (both in Washington and abroad) in order to enhance the prospects for success during joint operations. This session will address: joint doctrine for interagency coordination; the national, theater and operational interagency coordination processes; the basic roles and authorities vested in a U.S. Ambassador and country team; and, the concepts associated with Security Assistance.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the impact of interagency coordination on strategic, operational, and tactical military activities.
- Understand the role of the U.S. Ambassador and the organization and functions of a Country Team in U.S. embassies abroad as they may impact on military planning.
- **PJE**—Analyze the development, application, and coordination of the instruments of national power to secure national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with interagency and non-governmental organizations. Analyze the kinds of resources available for military organizations from other governmental agencies, from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and from private volunteer organizations (PVOs).

C. Background:

Military commanders need to understand how military advice is formulated at the strategic level through the Washington interagency process and how government agencies contribute to the successful prosecution of the modern joint campaign. Key to success at the operational level is the relationship between and among affected U.S. ambassadors, the theater commander and their staffs. Modern operations also require a practical understanding of methods for developing unity of effort among the large number of supra-national organizations (the United Nations and regional bodies, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization of American States), government agencies and even non-governmental agencies (including PVOs) who may be

operating within the battlespace. Understanding these relationships will assist the students in coordinating across the full spectrum of military operations.

A key to this session is knowledge of the range of resources available to military commanders and recent lessons learned in developing successful coordination. NGOs often have links with local populations unreachable in any other way. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) acts as the lead federal agency for foreign disaster assistance. There are many circumstances when the Department of State, in the person of the in-country ambassador (the President's direct representative), is the lead agency for dealing with a situation. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) can provide a range of information relevant to both military and political success, either via the in-country Chief of Station, or the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) representative to the combatant commander, or (along with other members of the intelligence community) as part of a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST).

Apart from civilian resources, the commander has military assets particularly well suited to accomplishing tasks across the spectrum of operations. For example, civil affairs units and SOF are useful both in their "traditional" roles and as liaison officers between the military and external agencies or other military forces. In the latter case, liaison officers have been effective in establishing and maintaining unity of effort in a multilateral environment. The civil-military operations center (CMOC) is a proven method of improving coordination during operations.

Security Assistance (SA) applies across the conflict continuum. SA programs often attempt to address the root-causes of the problems facing a nation by helping in the development of host nation internal defense and development plans. Although SA is the responsibility of the State Department, DoD is the executive agent for a number of SA programs. DoD executes its SA mission through an array of organizations operating in CONUS. Within a host nation, the responsibilities of SA are carried out by organizations within the local U.S. mission which go by a variety of titles, such as Military Assistance and Advisory Groups (MAAGs) and Military Groups (MilGps). At the Unified Command level, the combatant commanders provide the means for SA organizations to render that support and provide regional coordination.

The point of contact for this session is Professor J. R. Ballard, C-421.

D. Questions:

What do we mean by "interagency coordination," and why is it important?

Describe the characteristics of the interagency working environment, per National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD-1).

How does the interagency process function in Washington? What do we mean by the term "lead agency"?

How does the NSC system work; what are the roles played by National Security Council and Presidential Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs)?

What is the mechanism for interagency management of complex contingency operations?

What is the responsibility of the U.S. Ambassador in terms of interagency coordination?

Why might the operational commander be concerned with the interagency process and non-DoD resources?

Provide examples of non-governmental agencies (NGOs), private volunteer organizations (PVOs), and regional and international organizations that may play roles within the modern battlespace.

How may we organize best for success for interagency operations at the operational level?

What are some organizational tools Joint Force Commanders may employ to enhance prospects for success in interagency operations?

E. Required Readings:

“Organization of the National Security Council System.” (*NWC 3089*), (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Cooperation during Joint Operations*, Vol. I, Chapters I-III. (Issued), (Scan).

Raach, George T., and Ilana Kass. “National Power and the Interagency Process.” *Joint Force Quarterly*. (*NWC 2044*), (Issued), (Note: read only the first article in *NWC 2044*.)

Clinton, William J. “President’s Letter to Ambassadors.” (*NWC 2106*), (Issued), (Scan).

Simmons, Barry K. “Executing Foreign Policy Through the Country Team Concept.” *The Air Force Law Review* 37 (1994): 121–36. (*NWC 2010*), (Issued), (Scan).

Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Cooperation during Joint Operations*, Vol. II. (Issued), (Scan).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Dearfield, Mark. “The CJTF and NGOs—One Team, One Mission?” (*NWC 3006*), (Issued).

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). *The Management of Security Assistance*, Chapter Two. (*NWC 2016*), (Issued).

PDD-56, *National Security Council White Paper on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*. (*NWC 3072*), (Issued).

COMBATING TERRORISM (Seminar)

We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.

—President George W. Bush, June, 2002

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the nature of global terrorism, the applicability of all the instruments of national power in dealing with it, and the role of the operational commander with respect to the challenges and complexities of combating terrorism.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the nature of terrorism and how that may have changed.
- Understand U.S. national policy and general objectives with regard to combating terrorism.
- Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces in combating terrorism.
- Understand the role of lead agencies in combating terrorism and how that may change.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art in regard to combating terrorism and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- **PJE**—Analyze the strategic art in terms of combating terrorism, i.e., developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to secure national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations in combating terrorism.

C. Background:

Combating terrorism encompasses two activities: counter-terrorism (CT) and anti-terrorism (AT). While the State Department maintains overall responsibility for U.S. CT activities outside the United States, USSOCOM has the lead for planning and executing the DoD's contributions. With the "War on Terrorism" declared after September 11, 2001, all combatant commanders have found themselves directly involved in plans for combating terrorist groups. Further complicating the situation, if the President has previously authorized a covert action program to combat terrorism in a particular area, and later calls on the military to become involved, the CIA may already be on the ground with significant programs and local ties that will need to be considered in any military plan. DoD AT activities are integrated within regional combatant commands and the Services to counter terrorist threats to military installations, bases, facilities, equipment, and personnel (to include dependents).

The trend in terrorism over a period of years has been a movement from state-sponsored terrorist organizations to loose networks of international terrorists without state sponsorship. Extremist groups claiming legitimacy based on their versions of religious teachings have demonstrated the ability to mount sophisticated attacks against the United States and its allies. The long term goal of at least one of these groups, al-Qaeda, is the overthrow of a number of regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere, and the creation of religious-based states; they see U.S. power and influence as the main obstacles to achieving this goal.

Al-Qaeda appears to be adept at finding ways to provoke U.S. responses which are likely to alienate international public opinion. The challenge for the operational commander is to figure out how to avoid that trap. Meeting this challenge may translate into determining how best to use military forces in dealing with particular terrorist groups, or it may mean providing military support to other instruments of power, if those other instruments are likely to be more effective in helping create the desired end state. The principal purpose of this session is to increase student awareness of the problems facing the joint force commander in combating terrorism and to think through how and when to use various types of military forces in dealing with this type of problem.

Points of contact for this session are Professor E. A. McIntyre, CIA, C-425 and Captain W. C. Reed, U.S. Navy, C-407.

D. Questions:

What distinguishes terrorism from the legitimate use of force by nations or groups?

Is the U.S. national objective to defeat “terrorism” or to defeat the groups that choose to use it as a tactic? Why?

If one accepts the notion of a “new” type of terrorism, how would defining al-Qaeda as having a “catalytic” strategy influence how one might best take offensive action to defeat it? How might such a definition assist in determining how best to protect our own center of gravity from attacks by al-Qaeda?

What are the regional combatant commanders’ responsibilities for combating terrorism?

What are some strengths and weaknesses of the use of military force in combating terrorism in general, and al-Qaeda (or any other global terrorist group) in particular?

How might one take advantage of the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses of using military force to combat terrorism? Provide examples to illustrate your points.

What other “instruments of power” are important in any campaign to combat terrorism? What are the strengths and weaknesses of each? Why do these other “instruments” matter in practical terms to a combatant commander constructing a plan to combat terrorism in his theater?

E. Required Readings:

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Washington, D.C., Feb. 2003. (Issued). Scan pp. 1–10, Read pp. 11–28 (Issued).

Pillar, Paul R., *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Read pp. 123–129, Scan pp. 29–40, pp. 57–69, pp. 73–123, and pp. 217–228. (Issued).

Conetta, Carl. "Dislocating Alcyoneus: How to Combat al-Qaeda and the New Terrorism," *Commonwealth Institute Project on Defense Alternatives*, Briefing Memo #23, 17 June 2002. (*NWC 3011*), (Issued).

Andrew Koch. "U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Forces: Covert Warriors," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 19 March 2003, pp. 1–6. (*NWC 4018*), (Issued).

Biddle, Stephen. "War Aims and War Termination," The U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, *Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analysis*. (*NWC 3030*), (Issued).

STRATFOR.COM. "The War from Al Qaeda's Standpoint," 17 June 2002. (*NWC 3032*), (Issued).

Bertrand, Serge C. "Fighting Islamist Terrorism—An Indirect Strategic Approach," 1 August 2002, unpublished paper submitted to Salve Regina University. (*NWC 3036*), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Conetta, Carl. "A Strange Victory: A Critical Appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan War, Executive Summary," *Project on Defense Alternatives*, 13 February 2002. (*NWC 3035*), (Issued).

Juergensmeyer, Mark. "Understanding the New Terrorism," and John Arquilla, et al, "Terrorism in the Information Age," *Current History* 99, No. 636, (April 2000). (*NWC 3075*), (Seminar Reserve).

Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001. Department of State. May 2002, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/>, sections A, B, I, J, K, O.

Katzman, Kenneth. *Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001*, CRS Report for Congress, 10 September 2001, Summary and pp. 1–3, 25–37. (*NWC 3091*), (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-07.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism*, Chapter I-III. (Joint Electronic Library), (Seminar Reserve).

HOMELAND SECURITY (Seminar)

On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars—but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war—but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks—but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day—and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.

President George W. Bush

A. Focus:

This session examines the complex topic of homeland security and the military's role in protecting the American homeland. Seminar discussions are designed to develop an understanding of the various responsibilities and issues involved in this rapidly evolving area. Students should draw on previous sessions covering national security direction, organizational and political influences, U.S. interagency cooperation, the relationships and functions of the President, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, the combatant commanders, and the individual Service capabilities in order to discuss military options for responding to homeland security scenarios. The session should help students appreciate the benefits of military and interagency cooperation, the tremendous complexity of defending the world's largest democracy—with its open borders, and the synergy possible with a unified response.

B. Objectives:

- Understand U.S. national policy and general objectives with regard to homeland security.
- Comprehend the responsibilities of the DoD, other government agencies and the combatant commanders in protecting the United States, its possessions, and bases against attack, threat of attack, or hostile incursion.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the Department of Defense systems and processes by which national ends, ways, and means are reconciled, integrated, and applied.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with the other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role of joint doctrine with respect to unified command.

C. Background:

The attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon that occurred on 11 September 2001 awakened many in the United States to the reality that their homeland was no longer as safe as they once had assumed it was. In the aftermath of these

tragedies, the U.S. government began to reevaluate its homeland security posture, and while changes are still occurring, the complexity of responsibilities is overwhelming. On 8 October 2001, the President signed Executive Order 13228, which established the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council. Twenty-one days later, the first Homeland Security Presidential Directive was issued, defining the composition of the Homeland Security Council Principals Committee and the Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee, while also establishing eleven Homeland Security Council Policy Coordination Committees. On that same date, President Bush appointed then-Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge as the nation's first Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. On 6 June 2002, President Bush made a 13 minute speech proposing a change to the Executive Branch not seen since the National Security Act of 1947, the creation of a new Cabinet level Department of Homeland Security.

While the Secretary of Defense's current Unified Command Plan (UCP) outlines general responsibilities for homeland defense, it also acknowledges that this is a very broad concept. DoD roles require greater definition. "Protecting the United States, its possessions, and bases against attack, threat of attack, or hostile incursion . . ." is a responsibility shared by all combatant commanders.

The creation of NORTHCOM was intended to address the overlap and the seams in geographic responsibilities, as well as clearly assign duties to a unified combatant commander for providing unity of command as well as command and control over military efforts related to Homeland Security within the NORTHCOM AOR. However, many unique and challenging issues remain: the relationship between NORTHCOM and PACOM with respect to Alaska; the specific relationship between NORTHCOM and the Coast Guard, as lead federal agency for maritime security; the role/relationship of NORTHCOM with standing Joint Interagency Task Forces, particularly in regard to military support for any consequence management scenario, as well as the relationship with the new Department of Homeland Security.

The point of contact for this session is Captain I. T. Luke, U.S. Coast Guard, SP-214.

D. Questions:

What other agencies have responsibilities for homeland security and who is/should be in charge overall? How will coordination occur? What are the command and control arrangements?

What role should DoD play in homeland security?

To what extent are there overlapping jurisdictional responsibilities, and how will these be deconflicted?

How can we ensure that homeland defense is cohesive and that seams won't be exploited by potential enemies?

Does the newest UCP adequately address homeland security responsibilities? Are any changes needed?

What is the difference between Homeland Security and Homeland Defense?

E. Required Readings:

Unified Command Plan, Read page 3, para. 11.a., pp. 7–11. 30 April 2002. (***NWC 2021B***), (Issued).

U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, Read pp. 4–25. January 2001. (***NWC 3007***), (Issued).

F. **Supplementary Readings:**

FM 3-0, ***Operations***. Read pp. 2-14 through 2-25. (JEL) (CD-ROM, June 2003), (Issued).

NWP 3-10 (Rev. A), Chapter 1, “Naval Coastal Warfare Overview,” pp. 1-1 through 1-9. (***NWC 4026***), (Issued).

U.S. President. “Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council,” Executive Order 13228, 8 October 2001. (***NWC 4023***), (Issued).

U.S. President. “Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council,” Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1, 29 October 2001. (***NWC 4024***), (Issued).

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session focuses on critical issues for the operational commander with respect to the use, or potential use, of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Primary emphasis is placed on the possible introduction of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive (CBRNE) weapons in a theater conflict. It is likely that such weapons will be seen by prospective adversaries as a means to counter the significant technological superiority of U.S. conventional forces. This session will provide an understanding of the nature of the threat, and primary considerations for deterrence, defense, and response. Different cases will be examined to explore the principal issues surrounding the use, or threatened use of WMD in possible future contingencies.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the unique threat posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and the primary considerations for the potential use of such weapons by an adversary.
- Comprehend the basic elements of deterrence theory and how they might be applied in the case of weapons of mass destruction at the operational level of war.
- Comprehend the current and near-term capabilities of U.S. forces to defend against weapons of mass destruction.
- Comprehend the considerations for response to enemy use of WMD against U.S. military forces, civilians, or allies.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development of joint military strategy.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies and strategies, including current issues of interest to the combatant commanders.

C. Background:

More than two dozen nations worldwide possess, or are actively working to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive (CBRNE) weapons and the ability to deliver them against military or civilian targets. Although such weapons have seen little battlefield use, they appear to be increasingly viewed by many nations and non-government groups as a potential means to counter the military superiority of the United States or another adversary. The significant technological lead that the U.S. enjoys in conventional military forces may increase the prospect that a future adversary will view WMD as a credible response to U.S. presence and power projection in his region. The possible employment of CBRNE weapons is of particular concern to the U.S. operational commander given the potential consequences of use and the problematic nature of defense. The problem has recently grown given the potential for radiological dispersal device employment by terrorists. The wide range of prospective foes that may

threaten the use of WMD equates to an equally wide range of deterrence, defense, and response considerations for the operational commander.

Point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel D. O. Fegenbush, U.S. Marine Corps, M-13.

D. Questions:

What are the critical differences in the utility and potential uses of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive weapons?

What are the basic elements of deterrence? How does one establish the credibility and will to employ both defensive and retaliatory capabilities?

What are current and near-term U.S. capabilities (in particular, Theater Ballistic Missile Defense) to defend against WMD?

What are the primary considerations for military response following the use of WMD?

Are deterrence and response options case specific? What are the primary considerations of the operational commander in applying those options against specific adversaries?

E. Required Reading:

JMO Department, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Considerations for the Operational Commander." (*NWC 2115B*), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Payne, Keith B. "Deterring the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Lessons from History." *Comparative Strategy* 14, No. 4 (1995): 347–359. (*NWC 3028*), (Library Reserve).

Schneider, Barry R. "Strategies for Coping with Enemy Weapons of Mass Destruction." *Airpower Journal* (Special Edition, 1996): 36–47. (*NWC 2068*), (Library Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense* (11 July 2000) (Joint Electronic Library), (CD-ROM, June 2003).

Swicker, Charles C. *Theater Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea*, Newport Paper Number Fourteen. Newport, RI: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, August 1998). (*NWC 2070*), (Library Reserve).

FAILED STATES (Seminar)

The fundamental problem of failed states is that they do not simply go away, they linger; the longer they persist, the greater the potential challenges to neighboring states, regional stability, and international peace.

—Robert H. Dorff, *Parameters*, Summer 1996

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the failed state phenomenon and examines the degree to which the U.S. military may effectively address the problem.

B. Objectives:

- Introduce the concept of failed (or failing) states.
- Analyze the pathology of the degeneration of states.
- Examine the impact of failed states upon U.S. national interests.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- *PJE*—Analyze the development, application, and coordination of the instruments of national power to secure national security objectives

C. Background:

Although throughout the recorded history of man there are dramatic accounts of the rise and fall of states, the more recent phenomenon of the “failed” or “failing state” was born of the post-World War II process of great power decolonization. Former colonies, often lacking the political maturity and economic wherewithal to prosper on their own as independent nation states, were kept viable by either the East or the West, with Washington and Moscow eagerly competing for their loyalty in the bipolar struggle of the Cold War. With the passing of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, more new sovereign states arose, often driven by previously latent ethnic and religious tensions, thus adding to the number of governments whose future stability was in some doubt.

The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed a growing number of states unable to survive as stable, viable entities. The resulting deterioration of governance in these states seems to be characterized by serious problems, all of which bear the seeds of crisis. These range from economic collapse to widespread hunger, population dislocation and migration, insurgencies, international terrorist activity, human rights abuses, and internal instability affecting neighboring states and the region in general. The situation in Afghanistan during the autumn of 2001 presents a dramatic illustration of the risks presented to the global community by failed states.

In Block IV we focus on the failed state phenomenon because it so often commands the willing or unwilling involvement of outside powers, including the United States, in what

have become known as “complex contingency operations.” Our national leadership has recently been confronted by difficult policy decisions concerning the U.S. ability to intervene, the appropriateness of intervention, and the options available for the application of military resources. Assessment of those options and seminar discussions of the military role in dealing with complex contingency operations are the goal of the session.

The point of contact for this session is Captain W. C. Reed, U.S. Navy, C-407.

D. Questions:

What are the characteristics of a state described as “failed” or “failing”?

What are the causes?

Are there common problems or is each unique?

If the states are outside its region, should the U.S. care?

What are the “danger signs” that should forewarn of failure?

Should United Nations-led intervention be the preferred option of choice?

What are the risks of acting unilaterally?

How can military resources be applied most effectively, or *can* they be?

E. Required Readings:

Dearth, Douglas H. “Failed State: An International Conundrum.” (*NWC 3029*), (Issued).

Ballard, John R. *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994–1997*, (excerpt). (*NWC 3084*), (Issued).

Metz, Helen C., ed. “Somalia: A Country Study” (Extract from Introduction). (*NWC 3076*), (Issued).

Helman, Gerald B., and Steven R. Ratner. “Saving Failed States.” (*NWC 3026*), (Issued).

Katzman, Kenneth. “Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns.” (*NWC 4020*), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

The White House. *National Security Strategy of the U.S.A.*, September 2002. (Issued).

Woodward, Susan L. “Failed States: Warlordism and ‘Tribal’ Warfare.” (*NWC 3033*), (Seminar Reserve).

Manwaring, Max G., ed. *Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder*. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1993.

PEACE OPERATIONS—CASE STUDIES (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session introduces another specific type of MOOTW: peace operations. It will cover joint and multinational structure, the peacekeeping process in accordance with the principles of MOOTW, civil affairs, information operations, and force protection issues. It will also highlight those aspects which would be important to a U.S. military commander or staff officer operating with the UN or in UN-sanctioned operations. This session uses two historical examples to illustrate the use of military force and emerging doctrine (to include conflict termination) in peace operations. The seminar will conduct a critical analysis of U.S. peace operations in Somalia and Haiti. It will then compare and contrast the two operations and discuss the operational lessons learned from them. Specific briefing requirements will be discussed in seminar.

B. Objectives:

- *PJE*—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- *PJE*—Analyze how the constituent elements of government and American society exert influence on the national strategy process.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with the other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- *PJE*—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the value of integrating Information Operations (IO) into theater strategies and campaigning.

C. Background:

U.S. military involvement in peace operations has increased dramatically. Current world events point to continued involvement in the foreseeable future. Participation in peace operations may involve peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or other military operations in support of diplomatic actions to establish and maintain peace. Such operations present a challenge to those who may have spent years preparing to fight conventional wars. Peace operations may take place in environments far less defined than combat and in situations where combat power may be less important than non-combat power. The political and cultural dimensions may become central to the conflict and force may be needed to compel, not destroy. There are even discrete principles (the Principles of MOOTW) that supplement the Principles of War and guide our planning and mission execution.

Peace operations terminology can be confusing. The subtle differences that characterize almost every mission have created a broad range of definitions that describe them. Joint doctrine correctly defines the terms associated with peace operations. The student must be comfortable with these definitions, able to analyze, discuss, and—most importantly—conduct peace operations in concert with other military leaders, interagency officials, the media, and non-governmental and private voluntary organization (NGO and PVO) representatives.

Although the United States may participate in peace operations unilaterally, in ad hoc cooperation with other countries, or with regional organizations (e.g., the Organization of American States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or the Organization of African Unity), in the past it has usually operated under some type of UN umbrella.

The founders of the UN did not specifically address peace operations. However, Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter describe procedures for addressing threats to peace and for reversing acts of aggression. Chapter VI discusses peaceful solutions to international problems; Chapter VII discusses the use of UN military force. These two chapters of the UN Charter form the basis for modern peace operations within the UN framework.

The two case studies in this session provide the student with a wide variety of political, economic, cultural, legal, and military challenges that faced both the United States and the United Nations in Somalia and Haiti. Students should be prepared to discuss the major lessons learned from each of these cases, analyze their possible impact on current and future peace operations, and recommend viable courses of action.

The point of contact for this session is Professor H. F. Lynch, C-421.

D. Questions:

What are the distinctive characteristics of the following terms: Peace Operations, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Peace Building, and Peace Enforcement?

Which governmental agency will likely take the lead in each specific type of peace operation?

How effectively were the Principles of MOOTW applied in Somalia and Haiti?

What lessons from Somalia and Haiti might we apply to future peace operations?

What role might Information Warfare play in peace operations?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations. Read: Executive Summary, pp. xiii-xxiv. (Scan Chapters 1-12) (Issued).

Hayes, Daly, and Gary Wheatley. ***Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study.*** Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996. Read: Chapters 2, 3. (Issued).

Allard, Kenneth. ***Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned.*** Read: Chapters I & III. Scan Chapter II. (Issued).

Bentley, David, and Robert Oakley. ***“Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti.” (NWC 3083),*** (Issued).

Brennan, Rick, and R. Evan Ellis. “*Information Warfare in Multinational Peace Operations.*” (*NWC 2038*), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, Chapter II. (JEL), CD-ROM, June 2003), (Issued).

PDD-25: “Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multinational Peace Operations.” (*NWC 2187*), (Issued).

Anderson, Joseph. “*Military Operational Measures of Effectiveness for Peacekeeping Operations.*” (*NWC 3090*), (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations.* (Issued).

CONFLICT TERMINATION (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session addresses the challenge of conflict termination at the interface between the diplomatic and military elements of power. Although few officers will be in a position to set the terms for termination of hostilities, history shows that the specific timing and the conditions established during planning for the termination of hostilities has had a major impact on the ability to accomplish the desired endstate effectively in many past campaigns and major operations. Therefore, it is important for students to develop an understanding of the complexity of conflict termination, to develop an appreciation of the meaning of terminating conflict with leverage, and to understand the impact of termination on all subsequent activities. Students should be comfortable translating strategic goals into feasible military objectives preceding and subsequent to traditional military activities.

B. Objectives:

- Apply joint doctrine across the spectrum of conflict.
- Analyze the reasons for the success or failure of selected operational cases.
- Understand conflict termination and its role in the operational campaign.
- *PJE*—Analyze the strategic art; i.e., developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to secure national objectives.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.

C. Background:

Past operations have clearly demonstrated the complexity of modern conflict termination and the importance of transitioning from combat to post-hostilities operations. The evolving joint doctrine has addressed this critical seam more often over the past decade. Lessons from historical operations have shown a variety of ways to terminate hostilities with leverage, transitioning smoothly toward the desired end state. During this session, students will examine a number of operational situations in order to better understand the issues of conflict termination. Students will then apply the lessons learned from past operations to current challenges. At the end of this session, students should be able to translate national strategic guidance (from the President and the Secretary of Defense) into a plan to terminate combat, conduct post-conflict operations and transition to desired endstate conditions.

The point of contact for this session is Professor J. R. Ballard, C-421.

D. Questions:

Who determines the terms and conditions for conflict termination?

What is the relationship between the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commander during conflict termination?

What does terminating conflict with leverage mean in modern operations?

E. Required Readings:

Ballard, John R. "Finishing the Job: A Historical Appreciation for Conflict Termination." (*NWC 4012*), (Issued).

Fondaw, Jeffrey E. "Conflict Termination – Considerations for the Operational Commander," U.S. Naval War College, 16 May 2001. (*NWC 4017*), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Grey, Colin S. "Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory," U.S. Army Institute for Strategic Studies, April, 2002. (*NWC 4014*), (Issued).

Rotermund, Manfred K. "The Fog of Peace: Finding the End-State of Hostilities," U.S. Army Institute for Strategic Studies, November, 1999. (*NWC 4015*), (Issued).

Boulé, John R. "Operational Planning and Conflict Termination," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn/Winter 2001-2002. (*NWC 4016*), (Issued).

TRANSITION OPERATIONS—CASE STUDIES (Seminar)

When addressing conflict termination, campaign planners must consider a wide variety of operational issues, to include disengagement, force protection, transition to post-conflict operations, and reconstitution and redeployment. Interagency coordination plays a major role in the termination phase. View conflict termination not just as the end of hostilities, but as the transition to a new post-hostilities phase characterized by both civil and military problems.

 Joint Pub 5-00.1

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) transition to a new CJTF or transition of lead authority to a civilian organization/agency because changes require significant adjustments in the composition of the current CJTF.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with interagency and non-governmental organizations. Analyze the kinds of resources available for military operations from other government agencies, from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and from private volunteer organizations (PVOs).
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.

C. Background:

This is a new session for the 2003/04 academic year. It is designed to highlight the importance of CJTF transition operations by deriving lessons learned from the Somalia and Haiti case studies and current transition operations ongoing in Operation **IRAQI FREEDOM** (OIF). Regardless of the CJTF, its staff will plan for and execute transition operations either as a task, as a phase of a major operation, or as a major operation in and of itself. Failure to properly plan, prepare for, and execute the transition to another CJTF or failure to transition to the lead authority of a civilian organization/agency may well result in the failure to attain national Strategic Objectives, even though the CJTF may have accomplished its military operational objectives.

Although this session uses the same case studies as session IV-7, Peace Operations, all of the readings are different, with one exception, because of the shift in focus. Specifically, this session will focus on the transitions from the U.S. lead Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), and from the U.S.-led Multinational Force (MNF) to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), as well as current transition operations underway in Operation **IRAQI FREEDOM**.

This session reinforces the importance of joint planning as learned earlier during the Joint Military Operations (JMO) Joint Planning and Organization sessions (Block III), and the Interagency Process that was covered recently in the campaigning session (Block IV).

Finally, this session helps serve as preparation for the upcoming campaigning sessions: Planning for Post-conflict Operations and Operation **COOPERATIVE GUARDIAN**.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel M. A. Englert, U.S. Army, M-13.

D. Questions:

What is/should be the role of the military commander in planning transition operations?

What is/are the mechanism(s) for interagency management during transition operations? Why does the military commander care?

What are some organizational tools that Joint Force Commanders may employ to enhance prospects for success during transition operations?

How effective were transition operations conducted during Somalia? Haiti?

What lessons from Somalia and Haiti might we apply during transition operations in Iraq?

How effective are on-going transition operations being conducted in Iraq?

What are the costs associated with failed or less than effective planning and execution of transition operations?

E. Required Readings:

CJCSM 3500.05A, **Joint Task force Headquarters Master Training Guide**, pages 3–56 to 3–57 and 3-V-1 to top of 3-V-6. Scan 3-V-6 to 3-V-32. (**NWC 4027**), (Issued).

Strednansky, Susan. “Balancing The Trinity” pages 21–45. (**NWC 3013**), (Issued).

Bentley, David, and Robert Oakley. “Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti.” (**NWC 3083**), (Issued).

Ballard, John R. “Stabilization and Transition in Haiti: JTF190 to the MNF.” (**NWC 4011**), (Issued).

Slavin and Moniz. “How Peace in Iraq Became So Elusive.” (**NWC 4007**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Reading:

Hayes and Wheatley. **“Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study,”** Chapter 1, 4 and 5. (Issued).

PLANNING FOR POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS (Seminar)

A. Focus:

In this session we focus on the planning for the post-conflict (or post-hostilities) operations which follow the use of military force. Having briefly examined the difficulties of the interagency process and the combating of terrorism, we now examine the special challenges to the military commander of planning for what comes “after the shooting stops.”

B. Objectives:

- Assess the price paid for the failure of military planners to practice regressive planning and to deal with the challenges of what happens after the cessation of conflict.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- *PJE*—Analyze the development, application, and coordination of the instruments of national power to secure national security objectives.

C. Background:

Although we have witnessed many examples of MOOTW which are of a supportive nature (disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, etc.), others may be coercive in nature (raids, NEOs, etc.), involving the use of force. The problem of how to achieve U.S. objectives in an unclear and often undefined situation affects the response of the regional combatant commander and the JTF commander. This is especially so when the U.S. must “go it alone.” Further, it is a reality that the President, SECDEF and JCS are often more than passive observers in these types of operations, and may, on occasion, be dominant players. The prudent course, therefore, is for the joint staff officer to have an awareness of the dynamics at the national level that may have an impact on the operational commander.

Although one might wish that another agency (like State) would assume the role of “campaign planner” for the period *following* hostilities, the lead role has in the past—more often than not—initially fallen to the military. Joint doctrine, therefore, includes the basic elements of “post-conflict activities” and the essential planning involved for them. Not surprisingly, however, the combatant commanders’ planners are often inclined to emphasize the planning for hostilities over the need to look at how stability is restored “when the shooting stops.” Such was the case in Panama in 1989 and 1990. Much can be gained by examining what went right *and* what went wrong in this first post-Goldwater-Nichols use of military force.

In early 1989 President George H. W. Bush was facing a dilemma in Panama. He had, during his victorious campaign for president, argued for a tough stand against General Manuel Noriega. Despite economic, political and diplomatic efforts, Noriega not only remained in control, but increasingly challenged U.S. policy in the region. By the fall of 1989, as General Colin Powell assumed the position of CJCS and a new commander took

over U.S. Southern Command, with its headquarters still at Quarry Heights in Panama, the situation had reached the crisis stage. American lives and interests, the integrity of the Panama Canal, the quest of the Panamanian people for democracy, and the U.S. fight against illegal drug trafficking all were being threatened by the Noriega regime.

During this session, we will look briefly at the nature of the crisis and the planning that was done to resolve it. Attention will focus, however, on the way the United States dealt with the post-conflict challenges in Panama. The time devoted to analysis of these two phases, JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY, will offer opportunities to see historic “illustrations” of the “theory and doctrine” we have studied throughout the trimester: the Principles of War, the Principles of MOOTW, the challenges of interagency planning, and the selection of DoD assets during operational planning. Few examples of military planning in recent history better illustrate the crucial need for timely, thorough planning for what comes after the cessation of hostilities.

The point of contact for this session is Professor J. R. Ballard, C-421.

D. Questions:

In defining the breadth of operational options at the regional combatant commander’s disposal in MOOTW, which specific actions would best complement the economic and diplomatic FDOs being employed?

As a theater commander witnesses the progressive failure of economic and political measures being taken by the President to deter military conflict, to what extent can he and should he proceed with plans for dealing with the ultimate failure of deterrence?

In planning for post-conflict operations, what agencies are available to assist? To which can you turn for optimizing planning? From the vantage point of the operational commander, what are the “pros and cons” of interagency involvement?

When the “helm” is finally turned over to a non-DoD agency, how can *military* assets best be used to support interagency efforts in assisting a democratic government?

E. Required Reading:

Shultz, Richard H. Jr. “In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause,” Air University Press, 1993, pp. 1–65. (*NWC 2175A*), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Donnelly, Thomas, Margaret Roth and Caleb Baker. *“Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama.”* New York: Lexington Books, 1991, 20–35; 57–69; 70–87. (Seminar Reserve).

Woodward, Bob. *The Commanders.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, 82–196. (*NWC 3058*), (Seminar Reserve).

Joint History Office (Cole, Ronald H.). *Operation Just Cause—The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama—February 1988–January 1990.* Washington D.C.: November 1995. (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-07, *MOOTW*, Chapter IV. (Issued).

Terry, James P. “The Panama Intervention: Law in Support of Policy,” *Naval Law Review* 39, 1990.

POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS—CASE STUDIES (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session examines Counterinsurgency (CI), a specific type of MOOTW. It focuses on the U.S. supporting role in El Salvador. The seminar will examine the case using elements of operational art and the Principles of MOOTW.

B. Objectives:

- Apply campaign-planning techniques to a situation involving political and economic issues as well as military issues.
- Demonstrate an understanding of how CI doctrine and practice operated in El Salvador and the soundness of projecting that experience into future insurgency situations.
- Assess the price paid for the failure of military planners to practice regressive planning and to deal with the challenges of what happens after the cessation of conflict.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- *PJE*—Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.

C. Background:

In many ways it is easier for the American military to conduct conventional war than conflict at the lower end of the spectrum. The applicability of conventional force in the counterinsurgency (CI) arena is relatively rare, and sometimes less than fully effective. Of the various types of military operations other than war (MOOTW), counterinsurgency is likely to be among the most challenging, the most often misunderstood, and the least likely to respond to the application of conventional military force. Assuming insurgencies will continue, students need an appreciation of such a murky warfighting environment, where there is often no single solution, but only a few examples of previously successful counter-insurgency campaigns to serve as a guide.

Remember, however, that despite their similarities to other crises, ***all insurgencies are unique***. In conducting their analyses, students should keep in mind that the military should never design counterinsurgency campaigns in a vacuum. All nations are unique, especially those of the “Third World,” and each requires unique application of military power. More often than not, the Department of Defense will not be the leading player in MOOTW. Consequently, any advice from a military officer on the role that the United States may play in such an operation must be compatible with U.S. policy objectives. This assumes that the applicable national strategy is clearly defined, which, in such low intensity conflicts, may not always be the case.

The point of contact for this session is Professor J. R. Ballard, C-421.

D. Questions:

What were the U.S. national interests involved in El Salvador?

How do the FMLN’s organization, objectives and strategy compare with other models?

How did the Principles of MOOTW apply to the El Salvador case?

What made the campaign in El Salvador successful?

What lessons can be learned from El Salvador that might assist U.S. efforts in current operations?

E. Required Readings:

Waghelstein, John. "El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in Counterinsurgency." Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1985. (*NWC 3014*), (Issued).

CIA. "Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency." (*NWC 2228*), (Issued).

Evans, Ernest. "El Salvador Lessons for Future U.S. Interventions." *World Affairs* (Summer 1997): 43–48. (*NWC 3004*), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Waghelstein, John. "El Salvador and the Press," *Parameters*, Fall 1985. (Complete Article in Library.)

Waghelstein, John. "Ruminations of a Pachyderm or What I Learned in the Counter-Insurgency Business." *Small Wars and Contingencies* 5, No. 3 (Winter 1994): 360–78. (*NWC 2090*), (Issued).

Abrams, Eliot. "American Victory." *National Review*, February 3, 1992, 39–40. (*NWC 2076*), (Seminar Reserve).

Karl, Terry L. "El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution." *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 2 (Spring, 1992): 147–64. (*NWC 2098*), (Seminar Reserve).

White, Jeffrey B. "Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare." *Studies in Intelligence* 39, No. 5 (1996): 51–57. (*NWC 3060*), (Seminar Reserve).

OPERATION COOPERATIVE GUARDIAN (Exercise)

Joint force commanders frequently state that interagency coordination is one of their biggest challenges.

Joint Pub 3-08

A. Focus:

This exercise is intended to synthesize and reinforce the instruction in Block IV by challenging the student to analyze the national response to a terrorist incident and to apply military planning logic in the preparation of an interagency Political-Military Implementation Plan (Pol-Mil Plan), in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56). In the years ahead, officers will be called upon ever more frequently to demonstrate their familiarity with the interagency process in preparing for or managing contingency situations. Students need to understand both the military requirements of other national organizations and the support the Department of Defense may need to provide as a part of a broader government response.

B. Objectives:

- Apply national strategic guidance in the process of planning for operations in an interagency environment.
- Demonstrate the ability to develop input to an interagency Pol-Mil Plan.
- Analyze the multinational and interagency challenges inherent in post-conflict operations.
- Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- *PJE*—Comprehend the art and science of developing, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- *PJE*—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.

C. Background:

In this exercise, as a part of the ongoing global war against terrorism, the United States has developed a campaign designed to restore stability in Southeast Asia. The first major operation in that campaign (known as *KEEN DAGGER*) is nearing completion; a subsequent operation (*COOPERATIVE GUARDIAN*), now in development, is designed to resolve the multinational and interagency challenges remaining following the completion of the initial major military operation and to reach the U.S. desired end state.

This exercise is the synthesis event for Block IV. It will encompass a brief introduction session (15 minutes) and two three-hour morning sessions, capped by presentation of student inputs to the Pol-Mil planning effort.

Following the brief introduction session, students should come to the first session prepared to conduct an analysis of the current situation in the affected region and to prepare a draft DoD input to the PDD-56 Pol-Mil Plan, in accordance with the required readings. In the second session, students will role play as PACOM planners tasked to prepare a draft input to the interagency planning process. Students may discuss how their plan may interface with other agencies' planning and how other agencies may impact on DoD's role in dealing with the crisis. Clearly, the National Security Council, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and several other agencies will be involved. The main objective of this exercise is not to produce a finished Pol-Mil Plan, but to improve students' abilities to analyze such situations and to familiarize them with the PDD-56 interagency planning process. Students will not be required to play interagency roles *per se*, but a thorough review of Joint Pub 3-08, Volume II, will acquaint students with the functions of the various agency roles in such situations. Students should come to class prepared to discuss interagency functions and points of view.

In Washington, the National Security Council (NSC) will have the lead in the interagency process on such matters. The NSC will work through the standing interagency structure within the National Security Council system. Such interagency coordination should be reflected at the theater-strategic and operational levels as well, including theater staff coordination with affected embassies in the region.

The point of contact for this session is Professor J. R. Ballard, C-421.

D. Required Readings:

Operation *COOPERATIVE GUARDIAN* Readings. (*NWC 3047*), (Issued).

"White Paper on Presidential Decision Directive 56: Managing Complex Contingency Operations," 1998. (*NWC 3072*), (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-08 Volumes I and II, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations*. (Issued).

BLOCK FIVE
JFC/JTF HQ EXERCISE

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JFC/JTF HQ EXERCISE

The war with Japan had been re-enacted in the game rooms at the War College by so many people and in so many ways, that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise—absolutely nothing except the kamikaze tactics towards the end of the war...

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, 1960

A. Focus:

Block V of the Joint Military Operations curriculum consists of the JMO Exercise. The purpose of the exercise is to synthesize and reinforce the JMO course material through practical application in a realistic staff environment. This is an educational, planning exercise, designed to provide students with an opportunity to apply the principles and concepts studied throughout the trimester. While the issues students confront in this exercise are real, the situations used to highlight these issues and the solutions students select are only hypothetical.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Analyze the strategic art; i.e., developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to secure national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- **PJE**—Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.
- **PJE**—Analyze and apply the principal joint operational planning processes.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role of joint doctrine with respect to unified command.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze the roles, relationships and functions of the President of the United States, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, Combatant Commanders, Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs, and component commanders.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. force structure affect the development of joint military strategy.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the Combatant Commander.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and its application via the joint task force.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.

- **PJE**—Comprehend the value of integrating IO into theater strategies and campaigning.
- **PJE**—Understand IO and C4 concepts and how they relate.
- **PJE**—Demonstrate how IO and C4 are integrated into the theater and strategic campaign development process.
- **PJE**—Understand how the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is integrated in theater and operational IO campaign planning and execution to support theater and national strategic sustainment and warfighting efforts.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how technological change affects the art and science of war and evaluate key ongoing and anticipated technological developments pertinent to the military instrument.
- Introduce collaborative-distributive planning tools to support the military planning process at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

The JFC/JTF HQ Exercise will be conducted over two weeks, scheduled generally from 0830-1630 each day. Students must read the short article, *It's Time to Train for War (NWC 4000)*, the *JFC/JTF HQ Exercise Book (NWC 5000)* and the “Blue Force Standing Rules of Engagement” (*NWC 2012*) prior to the start of the exercise. Some additional research will be required by students to enhance their exercise roles once assignments have been made.

Students will be assigned roles on staffs at the theater-strategic, operational and operational-tactical levels of war. Assignments to specific billets will be made prior to the exercise. Certain billet holders will be scheduled to receive orientation on specific tools and/or procedures unique to their assigned billets; however, all students will receive a general introduction to the exercise, public affairs orientation and McCarty-Little information technology and network training.

The exercise will be conducted in three phases: crisis development and deployment, decisive operations, and post-hostilities.

In the crisis development phase, staffs will organize and familiarize themselves with the communications system and read information concerning the developing crisis.

As the crisis unfolds, staffs will begin the process of crisis action planning. The exercise is designed to highlight the realities of distributive, collaborative, concurrent, and parallel planning in a networked environment, including the interaction of boards, cells and centers. All staffs will conduct their own estimates, make recommendations up the chain-of-command, and respond to tasking from their superiors. Similarly, the flow of information and events will challenge staffs to deal with immediate events while planning for future operations.

The decisive operations phase presents the staffs with the opportunity to respond to new and unexpected situations that will require new planning or execution of various branches or sequels to their original plans.

Issues of how to terminate hostilities and how to deal with post--conflict issues comprise the post-hostilities phase of the exercise and relate to the Desired End State, as defined by the political objective(s).

The Control Team for the exercise will be comprised of faculty moderators, War Gaming Department representatives, and representatives from the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) Detachment. Within each board, staff section, center and cell there will be a faculty moderator to assist you with organization, exercise mechanics, intelligence/information, and assessment. The Control Teams will provide feedback to student staffs in the form of event injects or intelligence assessments, enabling the control group to adjust the scenario and tempo to meet exercise objectives.

Throughout the exercise, several activities will recur with which the students will have to deal, such as: staff processes that integrate political, military, informational and diplomatic factors; information operations; mine warfare; strategic mobility; conflict termination and post conflict operations.

The point of contact for this session is Captain M. D. Seaman, U.S. Navy, C-423.

D. Required Readings:

U.S. Naval War College. *JFC/JTF HQ Exercise Book*, Newport, RI. (*NWC 5000*), (Issued separately).

U.S. Naval War College. "Blue Force Standing Rules of Engagement." (*NWC 2012*), (Issued).

Morgan, Thomas D. "It's Time to Train for War." *Proceedings* (December 1997). (*NWC 4000*), (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College. "Commander's Estimate of the Situation Worksheet." (*NWC 4111F*), (Issued).

E. Supplementary Readings:

Since the exercise involves application of material covered throughout the JMO curriculum, students can decide which references will be needed based on the role assigned and individual knowledge and experience. In addition to the Joint Publication set, the documents listed below may be helpful.

CJCSM 3122.01, (JOPES Vol.1), *Planning Policies and Procedures*, 14 July 2000, CH-1, 25 May 2001 (JEL) and (Seminar Reserve).

CJCSM 3122.03A, (JOPES Vol. II), *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance*, 31 December 1999, CH-1, 6 September 2000 (JEL) and (Seminar Reserve).

"Forces/Capabilities Handbook," Newport, RI: Naval War College. (*NWC 3153H*). (Issued).

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*, Chapters 5-10 (Issued).

COURSE SESSION CRITIQUE NOTES
BLOCK ONE. COURSE FOUNDATIONS

OPS I-1 Course Overview (Lecture)
Comments:

OPS I-2 Introductory Seminar (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-3 The American Way of War (Lecture)
Comments:

OPS I-4 The Strategic Objective (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-5 The Naval Way of War (Lecture)
Comments:

OPS I-6 Operations Research Paper—Review (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-7 U.S. National Military Organization (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS I-8 Diplomacy and Military Force (Seminar)
Comments:

BLOCK TWO. OPERATIONAL ART

General Comments:

OPS II-1 Introduction to Operational Art (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS II-2 Leyte Operation: Strategic Setting (Lecture)
Comments:

OPS II-3 Operational Art and Doctrine (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS II-4 Operational Factors (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS II-5 Levels of Command (War) and the Theater (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS II-6 Operational Warfare at Sea (Seminar)

OPS II-7 Methods of Combat Force Employment (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS II-8 Elements of Operational Warfare (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS II-9 Operational Functions (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS II-10 Operational Planning (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS II-11 Principles of War (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS II-12 Operational Leadership (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS II-13 Joint Operational Lessons Learned: Operation ***IRAQI FREEDOM***
(Lecture and Panel)
Comments:

OPS II-14 The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict: A Case Study (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS II-15 Operational Art Examination
Comments:

OPS II-16 Use of Force Under International Law (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS II-17 Operational Law and Factor Space (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS II-18 Law of Armed Conflict (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS II-19 Rules of Engagement (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS II-20 Operational Law Case Study (Seminar)
Comments:

BLOCK THREE. PLANNING

OPS-III-1 Operational Logistics (Seminar)

Comments:

OPS III-2 Strategic Mobility (Seminar)

Comments:

OPS-III-3 U.S. Navy Capabilities and Employment Considerations (Seminar)

Comments:

OPS-III-4 U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Employment Considerations (Seminar)

Comments:

OPS-III-5 U.S. Marine Corps Capabilities and Employment Considerations (Seminar)

Comments:

OPS-III-6 U.S. Army Capabilities and Employment Considerations (Seminar)

Comments:

OPS-III-7 U.S. Air Force Capabilities and Employment Considerations (Seminar)

Comments:

OPS-III-8 Special Operations Forces Capabilities and Employment Considerations
(Seminar)

Comments:

OPS-III-9 Operational Command and Control (Seminar)

Comments:

OPS-III-10 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Part 1 (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-III-11 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Part 2 (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-III-12 C4ISR (Lecture/Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-III-13 Information Operations (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-III-14 Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) (Exercise)
Comments:

BLOCK FOUR. CAMPAIGNING

General Comments:

OPS-IV-1 Introduction to Campaigning (Lecture)
Comments:

OPS-IV-2 The Interagency Process (Lecture and Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-IV-3 Combating Terrorism (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-IV-4 Homeland Security (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-IV-5 Weapons of Mass Destruction Considerations (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-IV-6 Failed States (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-IV-7 Peace Operations—Case Studies (Seminar)

OPS-IV-8 Conflict Termination (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-IV-9 Transition Operations—Case Studies (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-IV-10 Planning for Post-conflict Operations (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS-IV-11 Post-Conflict Operations—Case Studies
Comments:

OPS-IV-12 Operation *COOPERATIVE GUARDIAN* (Exercise)
Comments:

BLOCK FIVE. JFC/JTF HQ

General Comments:

OPS-V-1 JFC/JTF HQ Exercise
Comments:

END OF COURSE QUESTIONNAIRE

The paper form on the pages which follow is provided to assist you in preparing your electronic response to our end of course questions.

We solicit your honest and thoughtful responses to this questionnaire in order to help us make the JMO course better. Please take the time to read the questions closely. Answer each question with the most objective response you can based on your experience in the course. Each section of this questionnaire has somewhat different rating parameters, so please pay close attention so that you do not inadvertently provide misleading data.

Please work through the form sequentially. Your comments will be collated in order to provide key insights to accurate data interpretation; please take the time to write comments. It is important to get 100 percent participation so that the department gets a clear picture of the student body course assessment.

Please submit the questionnaire electronically no later than 1630 on Thursday, 3 June 2004*. Responses to the questionnaire will not be released to the faculty until grades are posted.

Thank you for your help,

CAPTAIN A. J. RUOTI, U.S. Navy
Chairman,
Joint Military Operations Department

* Electronic input is anonymous and no faculty/staff member knows who submitted ratings/comments; additional information will be provided later in the trimester.

END OF COURSE QUESTIONNAIRE

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA will be used for analysis purposes only.

Seminar Number: _____

Service/Organization: USN/USCG 1
 USMC 2
 USA 3
 USAF 4
 Civilian 5

Component: Regular Reserve Civilian
 1 2 3

Previous PME: Resident Non-Resident Both None
 1 2 3 4

Mark the boxes for your previous duty experience:

Joint Duty Yes No
 Fleet/Corps/Air Force staff: Yes No
 Service staff: Yes No
 Multi-national Operations: Yes No

1. The knowledge I gained from the Joint Military Operations Course should be valuable to me in future joint assignments.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
 Comments: _____

2. Overall, I learned and benefited from this course.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
 Comments: _____

3. I feel prepared to apply what I learned in this course in my future work assignments.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
 Comments: _____

4. This course was well-planned and organized.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
 Comments: _____

5. The pace of this course was appropriate.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

Comments: _____

6. Course difficulty was appropriate for my background.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

Comments: _____

7. This course was an appropriate mix of lecture and discussion.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

Comments: _____

8. The moderator team created an environment where all seminar members were encouraged to participate in discussions and ask questions.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

Comments: _____

9. The moderator team respected my opinions.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

Comments: _____

10. The moderators were fair and unbiased in the treatment of all students in this course.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

Comments: _____

11. Course assignments and readings helped me to learn on my own.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

Comments: _____

For questions 12-22, grade the JMO Course in terms of the degree to which the course enhanced your understanding of the following subject areas:

	Very Little					Very Much	
12. Forces Capabilities and Employment Considerations:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. Operational Art Concepts:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. National Military Strategy:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. Joint Doctrine:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. Multinational Operations:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. Military Planning Process:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

18. Military Operations Other Than War:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19. Information Operations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20. The Interagency Process:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
21. Post-conflict Operations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
22. International Law/ROE:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Comments: _____

For questions 23-34, grade the value of each of the following in helping you to learn in this course.

23. Seminar discussion:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
24. JFC/JTF HQ Exercise:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
25. Class-wide lectures:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
26. Operational Art Exam:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
27. Research Paper:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
28. Discussions outside of class:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
29. Student presentations:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
30. Case Studies:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
31. Moderator team:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
32. Law Moderator:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
33. Required readings:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
34. Supplementary readings:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Comments: _____

Rate the JMO Course in the following areas:

	Not Enough				Too Much		
35. Amount of reading:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
36. Amount of writing:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
37. Amount of class time/week:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
38. Number of tests:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Comments: _____

Rate the overall atmosphere in your seminar:

39. Boring	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stimulating
40. Threatening	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Supportive
41. Few dominate	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	All contribute

42. Divisive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Teamwork

Comments: _____

43. Considering study, research and reading outside of the classroom, I devoted about _____ hours per week to the course.

Comments: _____

44. Are there any additions to the JMO course that you can suggest?

45. Are there any deletions from the JMO course that you can suggest?

46. Which topics were most beneficial?

47. What did you like most about the JMO course?

48. What did you like least about the JMO course?

49. Do you have any other comments or suggestions that can help make the course more relevant and timely?

50. Do you have any recommendations regarding the readings for Block I, Block II, Block III, Block IV or Block V?

51. Do you have any recommendations regarding the content of Block I, Block II, Block III, Block IV or Block V?

JMO—Faculty and Staff Directory

NAME/RANK/SERVICE	PHONE	ROOM	STATUS
Ballard, John R.	16415	C-421	Faculty/Block IV DIV HD
Barker, Jeffrey L. (“Jeff”), CDR, USN	16457	C-420	Faculty/Block II DIV HD
Bell, Paul G., Lt Col, USAF.....	16465	C-414	Faculty
Bergstrom, Albion A. (“Al”)	16484	C-409	Faculty/Block V
Brence, John E. (“Mongo”), Lt Col, USAF.....	16476	C-410	Faculty/Block III
Buckland, Richard J. F., CDR, Royal Navy	13209	C-409	Faculty/Block III
Butler, James P. (“Jim”).....	14146	C-415	Faculty/Block III
Chisholm, Donald W.....	12328	C-412	Faculty/Block II
Ciluffo, Scott G., LTC (P), USA	12598	C-411	Faculty/Block II
Critz, Michael R., CAPT, USN.....	12532	C-217	Faculty/NOPC DIR
Duffié, David A., CAPT, USN	16474	C-410	Faculty/Block I
Englert, Marvin A., COL, USA	17378	M-13	Faculty/Block IV
Fegenbush, Douglas O., LTCOL, USMC.	17379	M-13	Faculty/Block III
Findlay, Richard, J. COL, USMC.....	16478	C-425	Faculty/Block III
Gatchel, Theodore (“Ted”).....	13467	C-413	Faculty/Block II
Gibbons, Thomas J., COL, USA.....	12134	SP-212	Faculty/Block I USA ADV
Goldizen, Derrill T., Lt Col, USAF	16482	C-407	Faculty/Block III
Helms, Chester E. (“Chet”), CAPT, USN	16471	C-422	Faculty/Block III
Hime, Douglas N. (“Doug”).....	16463	C-423	Faculty/Block V
Hodell, John C. (“Chuck”)	16458	C-203	Executive Assistant
Horne, Fred B., CAPT, USN	16230	C-422	Faculty/Block V
Kornatz, Steven D. (“Steve”), CAPT, USN	16460	C-420	Faculty/Block I DIV HD
Lennox, Dyer T., COL, USMC	16230	SP-215	Faculty/Block II USMC ADV
Litman, Mark.....	14709	SE-117	Support Staff
Logan, Susan (“Sue”)	12519	C-217	Support Staff
Luke, Ivan T., CAPT, USCG	12397	SP-214	Faculty/Block IV USCG ADV
Lynch, Hugh F.....	16564	C-421	Faculty/Block IV
Manning, Marie L.....	12596	C-417	Support Staff
McIntyre, Elizabeth A., CIA.....	13394	C-425	Faculty/Block IV
McKearn, Mark J., COL, USA	16570	C-408	Faculty/Block III
Neville, Santiago R., CAPT, USN	16485	SE-117	Faculty/Block III
Reed, William C., CAPT, USN	16468	C-407	Faculty/Block IV
Reilly, Robert R. (“Bob”).....	16475	C-408	Faculty/Block V

Richardson, Walter J. Jr. (“Jody”), CAPT, USN	16466	C-413	Faculty/Block V
Roberts, John D.	13277	L-116	Faculty
Romanski, Paul A.	12534	C-217	Faculty/NOPC
Ruoti, Anthony J. (“Tony”), CAPT, USN.....	13556	C-203	JMO Chairman
Seaman, Mark D., CAPT, USN	16477	C-423	Faculty/Block V DIV HD
Seerden, Christie, CTA1, USN.....	16488	SE-117	Support Staff
Stafford, Joe N., CAPT, USN.....	16477	C-412	Faculty/Block II
Stewart, Carol.....	14120	C-203	Support Staff
Sweeney, Patrick C. (“Pat”).....	16480	C-424	Faculty/Block III DIV HD
Vego, Milan N.	16483	C-414	Faculty/Block II
Wall, Alan R., CDR, USN	16486	SE-117	Faculty/Block V
Waltman, Burton J. (“Buzz”), CDR, JAGC, USN.....	16473	C-424	Faculty/LAW DIV HD/Block V
Wieland, Linda A.	13414	C-203	Support Staff
Wilson, Georgette, LTC (P), USA	16462	C-415	Faculty/Block III

May 2004

CNW/NCC

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
3 0830-1630 * OPS-III-14 CES	4 0830-1630 * OPS-III-14 CES (Cont.)	5 0830-1145 * OPS-III-14 CES (Cont.) NCC-IPV 4-11 May	6 0830-1145 * OPS-III-14 CES (Cont.)	7 0830-0915 † OPS-IV-1 Introduction to Campaigning
10 0830-1145 * OPS-IV-3 Combating Terrorism	11 0830-1145 * OPS-IV-4 Homeland Security 1200-1300 [working lunch] OPS V-1 JMO Exercise Orientation - Students meet with assigned boards and cells (Rooms TBD)	12 0830-1145 * OPS-IV-5 Weapons of Mass Destruction	13 0800-1000 * OPS-IV-6 Failed States	14 0915-1130 † OPS-IV-2 The Interagency Process
NCC-IPV 4-11 Apr		ELECTIVES	ELECTIVES	
17 0830-1145 * OPS-IV-7 Peace Operations OPS Paper Due (1630)	18 0830-0930 * OPS-IV-8 Conflict Termination 0945-1115 * OPS-IV-9 Transition Operations	19 0830-1145 * OPS-IV-10 Planning for Post-conflict Operations	20 0830-1145 * OPS-IV-11 Post-conflict Operations - Case Studies Presentation	21 0830-1145 * OPS-IV-12 Introduction to Operation COOPERATIVE GUARDIAN
24 0830-1630 * OPS-IV-12 Operation COOPERATIVE GUARDIAN NCC OPS Paper Due	25 0830-1630 * OPS-IV-12 Operation COOPERATIVE GUARDIAN (Cont.)	26 0830-1000 † OPS V-1 JMO Exercise - Intro 1015-1145 † OPS V-1 JMO Exercise Training	27 0830-1145 # OPS V-1 JFC/JTF HQ Exercise Training	28 0830-1630 # OPS V-1 JFC/JTF HQ Exercise
31 Holiday		ELECTIVES END	ELECTIVES END	

June 2004

CNW/NCC

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
	0830-1630 # OPS V-1 JFC/JTF HQ Exercise	0830-1630 # OPS V-1 JFC/JTF HQ Exercise	0830-1630 # OPS V-1 JFC/JTF HQ Exercise	0830-1630 # OPS V-1 JFC/JTF HQ Exercise
7	0830-1630 # OPS V-1 JFC/JTF HQ Exercise Distribute Exam Read-ahead	8	9	10
0830-1630 # OPS V-1 JFC/JTF HQ Exercise Ops Papers Returned	Student Admin	Student Admin	0800-1200 * Joint Maritime Operations Final Examination	Student Admin
14	15	16	17	18
Student Admin	Current Strategy Forum ←.....→ (Uniform: Summer White or Service Equivalent)			Graduation (Uniform: Service Dress White or Service Equivalent)
21	22	23	24	25

