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COLLEGE OF NAVAL COMMAND AND STAFF

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THE JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

SYLLABUS AND STUDY GUIDE

FOR

JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS COURSE

2009

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FOREWORD

THIS SYLLABUS AND STUDY GUIDE provides a comprehensive overview of the Naval War College Joint Military Operations Department course on Joint Maritime Operations. Prepared for the College of Naval Command and Staff and the Naval Staff College, it also provides session-by-session material to assist the student in daily seminar preparation. Administrative information is also included.

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JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT
JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS COURSE

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JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS COURSE DESCRIPTION

1. Mission.

In keeping with the Naval War College (NWC) Mission, the Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) Course intermediate – level curriculum with Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase I curriculum is designed to prepare mid-career U.S. and international military officers and civilians to (1) effectively apply the Joint/Navy Planning Process to meet national security challenges, (2) creatively apply Operational Art in maritime, Joint, interagency, and multinational environments, (3) exercise critical thought, particularly as it pertains to operational level decision making and leadership, (4) efficiently conduct Staff Officer duties on major operational staffs and (5) understand the maritime dimensions of operational warfare. Once grounded in operational art, JMO students learn to identify Joint operating area objectives and means to achieve national, theater-strategic, and operational objectives, as well as develop operational designs, using U.S. Service and Joint doctrine.

2. Course Overview.

The Joint Maritime Operations intermediate - level course is an in-depth study of the operational level of war throughout the range of military operations. This course meets the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) requirements and complements the learning objectives of the National Security Decision Making (NSDM) and Strategy and War (S&W) curricula. Where NSDM and S&W emphasize our national military strategy development as well as the nation's imperative for matching strategic goals to policy, using historical and current case studies, JMOC is a practitioners course which prepares students for the operational arena and to excel through effective operational planning and application of Joint forces to achieve appropriate military objectives in coalition/multinational and interagency environments. Although maritime operations and sea service contributions are emphasized, the capabilities of all services are studied with ultimate focus on planning and execution of Joint operations at the Joint/combined task force and functional /service component levels. Via extensive study of numerous case studies, the JMOC student is challenged with four enduring questions from the perspective of a Joint force commander and his staff planners:

- **What conditions are required to achieve the objectives? (Ends)**
- **What sequence of actions is most likely to create those conditions? (Ways)**
- **What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)**
- **What is the likely cost or risk in performing that sequence of actions?**

The ability to answer these questions is the very essence of the Joint Maritime Operations course.

3. Course Objectives.

These broad course objectives along with the Student Outcomes listed below in paragraph 4, detail the NWC expectations for those who successfully complete the Joint Maritime Operations course. They are not to be confused with the Educational Outcomes listed in paragraph 4 below. The Educational Outcomes are those outcomes intended to be achieved at the completion of the Academic Year after students have had

the opportunity to synthesize the education provided by all three academic departments. The Educational Outcomes may be viewed as the strategic objectives for the course. Immediately below are the operational objectives we seek to achieve. Each session has tailored objectives that support these points:

Acquire the capacity to apply critical thought at the operational level of war.

Improve the ability to assess the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) as they apply to Joint, interagency and multinational military operations at the Joint Task Force and Functional/Service Component operational level or war.

Skillfully apply Operational Art and the Joint/Navy Planning Processes.

Develop the expertise to select, allocate, and task military forces across the range of military operations.

Understand the relationships among national and multinational military forces, non-DoD, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).

Improve upon the ability to understand, analyze, and communicate complex issues clearly and effectively, both orally and in writing in support of Joint Force and Component Commander's decision making processes.

Enhance the skill sets necessary to properly execute significant leadership responsibilities on Joint and component operational level staffs.

4. Student Outcomes.

The Officer Intermediate Professional Military Education Outcomes applicable to this course are listed below. These outcomes in synchronization with the JPME Objectives represent the Naval War College's expectations for those who successfully complete the Joint Maritime Operations course.

Skilled in Applying OPART to Maritime, Joint, Interagency, & Multinational Warfighting

- Confident with the concepts, doctrine, systems, languages, and processes required to employ naval forces effectively in the Joint, interagency, and multinational environments
- Skilled in applying Sea Power to achieve strategic effects across the range of military operations
- Capable of integrating naval/military power with other national instruments of power
- Informed of challenges in accomplishing interagency/multinational coordination

Skilled in Joint/Navy Planning Process

- Fluent with the Joint warfighting planning processes—contingency and crisis action
- Skilled in applying naval perspective throughout planning analytical frameworks
- Competent in Planning/Order writing with real-world scenarios at JFMCC/JTF level
- Prepared for the challenge of applying regional knowledge and cultural awareness to planning and **execution of naval and Joint operations**

Capable of Critical Thought with Operational Perspectives

- Empowered with analytical frameworks to support the decision making process
- Aware of critical thinking and decision making by real world, operational level leaders
- Imbued with a comprehensive operational-level perspective

Prepared for Operational Level Leadership Challenges

- Skilled in persuasive leadership: fostering collaborative relationships, building teams and trust, conflict management, negotiation, and effective communications
- Competent in operational-level problem solving, creative thinking, and change management
- Confident with the full range of action officer responsibilities

Effective Maritime Spokespersons

- Steeped in maritime dimensions of warfare
- Understanding of operational warfare at sea—past, present, and future
- Conversant in full range of naval capabilities
- Informed in operational C2 issues, especially JFMCC

Additional Qualification Designation (AQD) Code Qualification. As of 16 May 2007, the U.S. Navy approved the award of an AQD code as Joint Operational Planner (JPN) for all U.S. Navy (11XX, 12XX, 13XX, 16XX and 31XX designators) who graduate from the resident College of Naval Command and Staff, Intermediate Level Course (ILC)/Joint Professional Military Education (JPME I) from the U.S. Naval War College.

5. Course Organization.

The course is divided into eight Modules and sequenced to build upon previous sessions, culminating in a complex collaborative planning Capstone Planning Exercise using a real world scenario.

Module One—"Course Foundation" lays the foundation of the Joint Maritime Operations Course (JMOC). It introduces, through lectures and seminars, the basis of the "American Way of War", the "Naval Way of War", and begins to explore the theory and tenets of naval/maritime warfare across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO). It will also provide an introduction to operational level planning processes. The requirement for the operational research paper is detailed in this Module. This 14–17 page original research paper on a Joint operational subject requires in-depth research and analysis, as well as close faculty and student collaboration.

Module Two—"Operational Art" encompasses the theory and application of Operational Art. In these seminar sessions and lectures students are introduced to the fundamental themes of operational art, which are subsequently woven throughout the ensuing modules. It introduces operational art, thoroughly illustrating its enduring concepts using the Battle of Leyte Gulf and the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict historical case studies. A case study–based Operational Art examination concludes Module TWO.

Module Three—"Operational & Maritime Law" encompasses international, operational and maritime law, law of armed conflict, and rules of engagement. In addition, an Operational Law case study is used to enable students to analyze and apply the

operational law principles in greater depth.

Module Four—"Operational Warfare at Sea" introduces operational art in a maritime domain. It is designed to explore in some detail the unique nature of the maritime environment and investigate how this environment affects both the planning and employment of naval forces. In contrast to Module Two, this module explains and analyzes naval or maritime aspects of operational warfare. The first three sessions explain the key components of the maritime domain, influence of the physical environment, and the employment of naval forces across the spectrum of conflict at sea. All the subsequent sessions in this module are focused on the practice of operational warfare at sea, and freely use historical examples to illustrate various theoretical aspects of this topic. The sessions on the objectives of naval warfare and major naval operations are scene setters for successive sessions that explain the role and importance of naval combat arms in obtaining, maintaining and exercising sea control, or contesting that control. Sessions on antisubmarine warfare, attack on and defense/protection of maritime trade, amphibious warfare, and mine warfare explain and analyze the employment of multi-naval combat arms (surface, subsurface, and air) and combat arms/branches of other services at the operational level of war. The final session in this module will investigate and analyze the main elements of design for a major naval operation. The Battle for Midway is used as a historical case study for this session. This module is focused exclusively on the theory and practice of operational warfare at sea. Accordingly, none of the sessions include any reference to the U.S. Navy's current capabilities and doctrine. These issues properly belong to and are discussed in Module Five.

Module Five—"Joint/Combined Warfare" explores the operational and planning considerations in employing the service capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces (U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S Air Force). All Service Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities and employment considerations are discussed in one session. Follow–on sessions cover Joint and combined warfare at the theater level, coalition/multinational operations, operational logistics, strategic deployment, intelligence support to operational decision-making and planning, information operations, and Joint/multinational command and control, including case study-based practical application opportunities. Students will have the opportunity to apply this knowledge in detail during the Module Six and Module Eight comprehensive planning exercises.

Module Six—"Military Decision Making and Planning" utilizes the knowledge gained in previous modules and provides students with the tools, concepts, principles, doctrine and practical planning skills required to accomplish modern military tasks. The module begins with a class on the history of planning. Next, a Joint Staff J-7 representative will discuss the current Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and its replacement, the Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX). After a seminar on the joint staff and how one can organize personnel to plan effectively, students will have the opportunity to apply both the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) and the Navy Planning Process (NPP) to a fictional military scenario in the Southwest Pacific area. The sessions are intended as both an introduction to joint planning as well as an opportunity for students to appreciate the integral role of Operational Art,

joint/combined operations, service capabilities, and joint/service doctrine in a realistic, complex practical planning exercise.

Module Seven—"Contemporary Operations and Environments" examines a variety of activities and mission sets which may be executed or supported by the military throughout the Range of Military Operations. Topics include failed and failing states, the interagency process, insurgency/counterinsurgency, terrorism, homeland defense, NGOs/IGOs and contractors in the operating environment, Security, Stability, Transition & Reconstruction (SSTR) operations, including a discussion of peace, post conflict, foreign humanitarian/disaster relief and civil-military operations. A series of case studies will be used to enable students to fully comprehend military and interagency operations in support of strategies designed to address these very complex types of operations. Students are expected to apply knowledge gained in previous Modules, while analyzing and planning for a variety of challenging issues in contemporary environments. A mid-term examination concludes Module Seven.

Module Eight – "Capstone Exercise" is the culminating exercise and enables student synthesis of most learning objectives achieved throughout the Joint Maritime Operations course. This module is a Combined and Joint Task Force (CJTF) staff-level planning exercise that challenges students to use collaborative tools during Crisis Action Planning (CAP) to solve a complex humanitarian assistance problem within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) theater of operations. Students are assigned to positions across the CTF "Morning Calm" staff, as liaison officers and into component headquarters working collectively to conduct Joint Operational-level problem solving using the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP). The established strategic objectives allow students to integrate all instruments of national power and capabilities of non governmental agencies to achieve operational objectives during the process. Students execute a rigorous 18-day planning timeline that includes execution of daily update briefings to the command group and execution of a realistic battle rhythm that includes participation and interaction in scheduled Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells and Working Groups (B2C2WG). Students are exposed to the challenges and realism of maintaining situational awareness within a combined, Joint and multinational environment, while also realizing the importance of decisions made within a time- and-resource constrained environment. Additionally, the scenario provides all students the opportunity to interact with the media and to present mission analysis and COA decision briefings to faculty serving as command and staff principals. A control cell provides information to the staff as the situation in the DPRK evolves during the course of the planning exercise. The exercise culminates in two internal transition briefings to the entire staff and components (entire class).

In summary, the Joint Maritime Operations Course design allows each student to understand and then employ the Joint/Navy Planning Process multiple times as a means to reinforce knowledge of the planning process but also to reinforce complex decision making and leadership at the operational level of war. While the individual sessions and modules are sequentially organized in the Syllabus, they are not necessarily executed in sequence. The course flow is designed to provide a sound foundation of theory, an understanding of current Joint/service doctrine and capabilities, the planning processes and the challenges of the current operating environment. The Planning and Capstone Exercises are integrating events designed to

provide students the supervised opportunity to apply their knowledge of OPART, doctrine and collaborative planning processes in realistic, complex scenarios. Students will benefit from the combined contributions of faculty, guest speakers, and—most importantly—the shared professional expertise and research achievements of the corporate student body.

6. Student Guidelines.

The syllabus establishes the basis for required course work. In each session, "Focus" specifies the general context of the topic. Next, the "Objectives" section cites the specific session goals. The "Background" section provides assistance in framing the individual session. Finally, the "Questions" and "Readings" sections serve to focus student preparation and enhance understanding of the topic.

The Joint Maritime Operations Course fulfills the majority of the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase I requirements established by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in the OPMEP guidance. The objectives identified in each session reflect these requirements. The remaining JPME Phase I requirements are fulfilled in the National Security Decision Making (NSDM) and Strategy and War (S&W) courses or provide additional emphasis through an alternate viewpoint.

7. The Socratic Method for the Warrior.

The seminar is JMO's fundamental learning forum. Student expertise is a significant part of the learning process. For a seminar to succeed there must be open and candid sharing of ideas and experiences, tempered with decorum. You will find that even the most "off-the-wall" idea may have some merit. Successful seminars—that is, seminars whose members leave with the greatest knowledge—are those made up of members who come to each session "loaded" with questions based on thorough preparation. Most students leave the seminar with new insights, or even more thought-provoking questions. Student preparation, free and open discussion, and the open-minded consideration of other students' ideas all contribute to a valuable seminar experience. The "one-third" rule is the keystone of the seminar approach. The first third is a well-constructed, relevant curriculum. The second third is a quality Joint Military Operations Department Faculty. But most important is the individual student. Only by thoroughly preparing for seminar sessions can you become an active catalyst that generates positive and proactive seminar intra-action.

8. Readings.

All JMO sessions are supported by readings, the purpose of which is to assist in understanding the many aspects of the topics being presented. For the most part, the readings are intended to convey to the student basic information, the mastery of which in study outside the class will facilitate the discussions that take place within the class. A thorough understanding of the following information will significantly assist the student in using the course readings to best advantage:

(a) Categories of Readings. Each syllabus session lists categories of readings.

(1) *Required Readings* are those that must be read prior to the session. Often your moderators will offer additional guidance on the priority of the readings, based on

the special needs of the individual seminar or recommend you scan a particular reading for broad content or as a refresher.

(2) *Supplementary Readings* are those relevant to a session topic that may be useful to a student seeking more information in order to gain insight beyond that provided by the Required Readings; this includes additional background material on case studies and exercises. On occasion, faculty moderators may assign Supplementary Readings to individual students to read and provide oral synopses to the seminar in support of topic discussion. Supplemental readings also provide additional sources for student research in support of the Ops Research paper requirement.

(b) Reading Identifiers. Each reading that is not a complete book or publication has a cover page which provides the four-digit reading identifier (e.g., **NWC 1002**) in the upper right-hand corner, and the reading title found below the Naval War College crest. Often, this number is used instead of the title, but in either event, the readings are almost universally located on the JMO Web site under the specific session.

(c) Finding Specific Readings. Readings for any specific session may be located as follows:

(1) Unless otherwise annotated as (Issued), (Seminar Reserve), or CD-ROM, Required Readings and other course material is available on the Computer Access Card (CAC) enabled NWC web portal and Required Readings are on a mirror Blackboard web site that is accessible without a CAC. Further, readings that are not copyrighted or for which the NWC was able to negotiate copyright permissions are also available on a computer diskette issued to students. Most of the Joint Publications are not printed separately. They are in the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) available online at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis. Some hard copies of JOPES Manuals are available in Seminar. Students should not print copies of Joint Pubs due to the size of the publications and the cost of duplication. Joint Pubs are constantly under revision. The JDEIS website has the most current revisions and this is also a good opportunity for students to gain familiarity with the JDEIS web site for future use as operational planners following their NWC assignment.

(2) Supplementary Readings, Seminar Reserve Readings, and Library Reserve Readings, are not issued. These readings are, however, frequently available in the Henry E. Eccles Library or on a cart in each seminar room. Faculty moderators or the POC for a given session will be able to guide the student experiencing difficulty in tracking down a particular supplementary reading. Additional assistance is available from the reference librarians.

(3) Classified Readings. The few classified readings used in the JMOC will not be issued until near the date required for a specific session. Sufficiently in advance of the session, students will be advised when and where to draw the classified readings. Normally, arrangements are made for students to obtain the classified reading from PUBS (located in the basement of Conolly Hall).

IMPORTANT NOTE: Students are cautioned that classified readings and documents must be read on the premises of the

Naval War College. Ensure such materials are properly safeguarded at all times. Do not leave the materials unattended, even in your cubicle area. Students are not provided with classified material storage containers (safes); it is therefore necessary to check out and return classified material on a daily basis. Faculty moderators will provide additional information as required during the JMOC trimester.

Management of Reading Load. The amount of preparatory reading required for each session depends on a variety of factors, including topic complexity, session objectives, and the course schedule. *Recommend you review session reading requirements at least a week ahead of time in order to regressively and accurately plan preparation time and ensure that all necessary readings are in hand.*

9. Operations Research Paper.

The Operations Research Paper presents the opportunity to study an operational or theater-strategic level issue, conduct research and analysis, and prepare a paper that advances the literature. Purely strategic or tactical level research papers are not appropriate for this research requirement. It is a chance for students to address a topic that they personally feel is of value. It requires independent thought and graduate-level writing, since the final product must be a 14–17 page paper suitable for publication in a professional journal. The amount and depth of research should be adequate to support the student's approach, and sufficiently justify the conclusions and recommendations. Another use of the paper may be to provide a source of innovative thinking to the service and Joint staffs involved with the many issues bearing on employment of forces.

Numerous combatant and headquarters commands actively solicit papers and monographs on topics of current interest to them. The Naval War College is frequently canvassed for papers on particular subjects, and requested to generate interest in specific areas for research and writing to support requesting commands.

Students are encouraged to submit their research papers for the War College Prize Competition as described in the Naval War College Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM), NWC Instruction Annexes, which is included in the "Student Handbook." Amplifying information and guidance on the selection and execution of a successful Operations Research Paper project is provided in **NWC 2062T**. Your moderators will answer questions and otherwise assist you in this most important intellectual undertaking during the introductory seminars and student tutorials in February.

10. Late or Incomplete Work

Per Naval War College Instruction 1520.2 Examination and Grading Policy; student work that is not completed will receive a numeric grade of zero (0). Unexcused tardy student work, that is work turned in past the deadline without previous permission by the moderator, will receive a grade not greater than C+ (78). Student work determined to be in violation of the honor code will receive a grade of F. The College's Academic Integrity Board will assign an accompanying numeric grade to the F. Though it may not be applicable to all cases, a grade of zero (0) will be assigned as a matter of practice.

11. Plagiarism and Misrepresentation.

While occurrences of plagiarism and misrepresentation are exceedingly rare, the consequences of such acts are so serious as to warrant some specific mention here, and will also be reviewed in seminar by the moderator team at the beginning of the trimester. Your attention is directed to the Naval War College SORM, which discusses the academic honor code and specifically prohibits cheating, plagiarism, and misrepresentation. For the military officer accustomed to the legitimate staff practice of adopting verbatim the language of orders and directives produced by other commands, the academic prohibition of using the words of other writers without proper attribution must be reviewed and emphasized. The following definitions clarify this important issue:

Plagiarism is the duplication of an author's words without both quotation marks and accurate references or footnotes. It is also the paraphrased use of an author's ideas without accurate references or footnotes.

Misrepresentation is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgment. It may include the following:

Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at the Naval War College without advance permission of the moderators.

Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside the Naval War College without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

12. Cases.

Like games, case method discussions generate good student involvement and are designed to develop student abilities to solve problems using the knowledge, concepts, and skills honed during the JMOC trimester. Some of our cases and problems stress individual effort and planning, while other cases will require a team or staff approach. Cases may consist of historical events, analyzed for operational and strategic lessons, or postulated crisis situations demonstrating the application of concepts such as presence, deterrence, international law, rules of engagement, and self-defense. Case problems sometimes will be narrowly focused to demonstrate a specific force and its capabilities and limitations or to highlight specific concepts involving an aspect of warfare. Seminars are often split into small groups or teams to prepare solutions and responses.

13. Lectures by Senior Military Leaders.

Enrichment lectures by senior military leaders occur periodically during the course. Most of these presentations feature the chiefs of service or regional and functional combatant commanders. These speakers are invited to discuss views and ideas from their perspective as operational commanders, service chiefs, or as senior staff officers. The lectures are normally scheduled for Monday or Tuesday afternoons from 1330–1500. The busy schedules of senior officers, however, often make a departure from this schedule unavoidable. The weekly salmon/green colored schedule (CNC&S or NSC, as applicable) will specify the final date and time of each enrichment lecture. Last minute changes will be disseminated by seminar moderators. In order to gain the most benefit from these sessions, it is critical that students be prepared to ask penetrating questions

of the guest lecturer.

Note: *The substance of the lectures and the ensuing question and answer period are **"Not for Attribution"** and must not be referenced or identified outside the War College confines, or in any written work, including the Operations Research Paper, without the express permission of the speaker. Care should be taken not to quote an earlier speaker when posing questions to a subsequent speaker.*

14. Requirements.

Students are expected to fully prepare for each seminar and to participate in classroom discussions and exercises. A tough-minded, questioning attitude and a willingness to enter into rigorous but disciplined discussion are central to the success of the course. An officer's ability to positively and productively engage in deliberations and formulate advice is integral to sound operational decision making. We evaluate seminar contributions with regard to one's skills in persuading peers and seniors because that persuasive leadership is critical to an officer's continued success. We evaluate written products because they represent one's ability to synthesize and organize information in a coherent manner, applying analytical frameworks and critical thinking. We also use seminar work and written products to demonstrate the level of subject mastery achieved by individual students and indirectly the effectiveness of the faculty and course material. We expect that students will improve both their written and verbal skills throughout their NWC experience.

(a) Workload. Some peaks in the workload will occur. Advance planning and careful allocation of time will help mitigate these peaks. This is particularly true of the Operations Research Paper. Student experience indicates that the total course requirements will involve a weekly average workload of about 12–18 hours of in–class and 25–30 hours of out-of-class work. The rhythm during the Planning and Capstone Exercises changes and both involve numerous full day group planning efforts.

(b) Oral and Written Requirements. There are eight modules in the course. Two written exams and the research paper requirements provide the opportunity for the student to demonstrate prowess and progress. In addition to these written requirements, student participation in seminar serves as a means for feedback and interaction between the faculty and students. The following is a composite listing of these course requirements, relative weights, and the key dates of graded events:

Requirement	*Type Effort*	*Weight*	*Date*
Operations Research Paper Proposal	Written/Individual meeting with moderators		27 February (Proposal due) 3–6 March (Tutorials)
Operational Art Exam	Written/Individual	15%	Exam Handed Out 11 March, Exam Due to Moderators 12 March
Operations Research Paper	Written/Individual	35%	4 May Due to Moderators
Mid-Term Exam	Written/Individual	10%	Exam Handed Out 18 May, Exam Due to Moderators 19 May
Seminar Contribution	Assessment by moderators	25%	Daily 11 February–19 May
Capstone Exercise Contribution	Assessment by Capstone cell moderators	15%	Daily 20 May–12 June

15. JMO Department Grading Criteria.

The overall guidance for grading students at the Naval War College is contained in Naval War College SORM. The most salient points in this instruction are:

Numerical averages will not be rounded up (i.e., 89.95 is a B+ and will not be rounded up to an A-).

Any assigned grade may be appealed in writing within seven calendar days after receiving the grade. Grades will be appealed first to the senior moderator and then to the department chairman, using forms available in Room C-203. If deemed necessary, the chairman may assign an additional grader who will review the assignment and provide an independent grade. Note that the review may sustain, lower, or raise the grade.

Grade appeals may ultimately be taken to the Dean of Academics, whose decision will be final. The academic coordinator, Ms. Carol Stewart, in Room C-203, can assist in preparing an appeal.

A course average grade of B- or higher is required for successful completion of master's degree requirements. A minimum grade of C- is required for successful completion of the Military Operations Course and receipt of JPME Phase I certification.

Three sets of general grading criteria help in the determination of the letter grades that will be assigned during the Joint Maritime Operations Course trimester. The inclusion of these criteria here in the syllabus offers the student a suggestion of the kinds of standards and requirements for which grading faculty look. The first set covers the Operations Research Paper, the second covers the examinations, and the third covers individual contribution grades.

Using the Naval War College Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM) as basic guidance, the procedures below amplify the criteria as established within the Joint Military Operations Department.

a. Grading criteria for the Operations Research Paper:

The Operations Research Paper must have a thesis; provide sufficient background research to analyze the thesis; consider arguments and counter-arguments for the thesis and compare conflicting points of view; present logical conclusions drawn from the material presented; and provide recommendations or lessons learned based on the conclusions. In addition to the examples of substantive criteria specified below, the paper must be editorially correct (spelling, punctuation, grammar, format, etc.).

A+ (97-100): Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Especially deserving of distribution to appropriate authorities and submission for prize competition. Thesis is definitive, research is extensive, subject is treated completely, and the conclusions and recommendations are logical and justified.

A (94-96): Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original thought. Suitable for distribution and submission for prize competition. Thesis is clearly articulated and focused, research is significant, arguments and counter-arguments are comprehensive, and conclusions and recommendations are supported.

A- (90-93): Above the average expected of graduate work. Contains original thought. Should be retained in the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC).

Thesis is clearly defined, research is purposeful, arguments and counter-arguments are presented, conclusions and recommendations are valid.

B+ (87-89): A solid paper. Above the average of graduate work. Thesis is articulated, research has strong points, subject is well-presented and constructed, and conclusions and recommendations are substantiated by the material.

B (84-86): Average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, research is appropriate for the majority of the subject, analysis of the subject is valid with minor omissions, and conclusions and recommendations are presented with few inconsistencies.

B- (80-83): Below the average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, but the research does not fully support it; the analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are not fully developed. The paper may not be balanced and the logic may be flawed.

C+ (77-79): Below the standards required of graduate work. Portions of the criteria are lacking or missing, the thesis may be unclear, research may be inadequate, analysis may be incomplete, and the conclusions and recommendations may be lacking or not supported by the material.

C (74-76): Fails to meet the standards of graduate work. Thesis is present, but support, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are either missing or illogically presented. Paper has significant flaws in construction and development.

C- (70-73): Well below standards. Thesis poorly stated with minimal evidence of research and/or several missing requirements. Subject is presented in an incoherent manner that does not warrant serious consideration.

D (56-69): Fails to meet graduate-level standards. Paper attempts to present a thesis. Paper lacks evidence of graduate-level research and critical thinking. Significant errors in construction and development detract from the readability of the paper.

F (0–55): Fails to meet graduate-level standards. Unsatisfactory work. Paper has no thesis. Paper has significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, and logic. Paper displays an apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements. Gross errors in construction and development detract from readability of the paper. Paper displays evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.

b. Grading criteria for the exams:

A+ (97-100): Organized, coherent and well-written response. Completely addresses the question. Covers all applicable major and key minor points. Demonstrates total grasp and comprehension of the topic.

A (94-96): Demonstrates an excellent grasp of the topic, addressing all major issues and key minor points. Organized, coherent, and well-written.

A- (90-93): Above the average expected of graduate work. Demonstrates a very good grasp of the topic. Addresses all major and at least some minor points in a clear, coherent manner.

B+ (87-89): Well-crafted answer that discusses all relevant important concepts with

supporting rationale for analysis.

B (84-86): Average graduate performance. A successful consideration of the topic overall, but either lacking depth or containing statements for which the supporting rationale is not sufficiently argued.

B- (80-83): Addresses the question and demonstrates a fair understanding of the topic, but does not address all key concepts and is weak in rationale and clarity.

C+ (77-79): Demonstrates some grasp of topic, but provides insufficient rationale for response and misses major elements or concepts. Does not merit graduate credit.

C (74-76): Demonstrates poor understanding of the topic. Provides marginal support for response. Misses major elements or concepts.

C- (70-73): Addresses the question, but does not provide sufficient discussion to demonstrate adequate understanding of the topic.

D (56-69): Considerably below graduate-level performance and lacking any evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter. In some measures, fails to address the entire question.

F (0–55): Unsatisfactory work. Fails to address the questions or paper displays evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.

c. Grading criteria for seminar contributions:

The seminar contribution grade is determined by moderator evaluation of the quality of a student's contributions to seminar discussions, projects, and exercises.

All students are expected to contribute to each seminar session, and to listen and respond respectfully when seminar-mates or moderators offer their ideas. This overall expectation underlies all criteria described below. Interruptive, discourteous, disrespectful, or unprofessional conduct or attitude detracts from the overall learning experience for the seminar and will negatively affect the contribution grade.

A+ (97-100): Peerless demonstration of wholly thorough preparation for individual seminar sessions. Consistently contributes original and highly insightful thought. Exceptional team player and leader.

A (94-96): Superior demonstration of complete preparation for individual sessions. Frequently offers original and well thought-out insights. Routinely takes the lead to accomplish team projects.

A- (90-93): Excellent demonstration of preparation for individual sessions. Contributes original, well-developed insights in the majority of seminar sessions. Often takes the lead to accomplish team projects.

B+ (87-89): Above-average graduate level preparation for seminar sessions. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights. Obvious team player who sometimes takes the lead for team projects.

B (84-86): Average graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Occasionally contributes original and insightful thought. Acceptable team player; takes effective lead on team projects when assigned.

B- (80-83): Minimally acceptable graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Infrequently contributes well-developed insights; may sometimes speak out without having thought through an issue. Requires prodding to take lead on team projects.

C+ (77-79): Generally prepared, but not to minimum acceptable graduate level. Requires encouragement to contribute to discussions; contributions do not include original thinking or insights. Routinely allows others to take the lead in team projects.

C (74-76): Preparation for individual sessions is only displayed when student is called upon to contribute. Elicited contributions reflect at best a basic understanding of session material. Consistently requires encouragement or prodding to take on fair share of team project workload. Only occasionally engages in seminar dialogue with peers and moderators.

C- (70-73): Barely acceptable preparation. Contributions are extremely limited, rarely voluntary, and reflect minimal grasp of session material. Displays little interest in contributing to team projects.

D (56-69): Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are uncommon and reflect below-minimum acceptable understanding of lesson material. Engages in frequent fact-free conversation.

F (0–55): Unacceptable preparation. Displays no interest in contributing to team projects; cannot be relied on to accomplish assigned project work. At times may be seen by peers as disruptive.

d. Grading criteria for CAPSTONE Exercise contributions:

The CAPSTONE Exercise contribution grade is determined by the cell moderator's evaluation of the student's contributions to exercise preparation, planning, and execution play. It is recognized that many students will role play in areas which they have no prior expertise. Additionally, some billets have greater visibility. Consequently, each student will be evaluated on his/her preparation and contribution in each given role, taking into consideration the above factors.

All students are expected to contribute during the exercise, and to listen and respond respectfully when exercise role players or moderators offer their ideas. Interruptive, discourteous, disrespectful, lackadaisical, or unprofessional conduct or attitude detracts from the overall learning experience for all students during the exercise and will negatively affect the contribution grade.

A+ (97-100): Peerless demonstration of wholly thorough preparation for exercise role. Consistently contributes original and highly insightful thought. Exceptional team player and leader.

A (94-96): Superior demonstration of complete preparation for exercise role. Frequently offers original and well-thought-out insights. Routinely takes the lead to accomplish team projects.

A- (90-93): Excellent demonstration of preparation for exercise role. Contributes original, well-developed insights in the majority of exercise sessions. Often takes the lead to accomplish team projects.

B+ (87-89): Above-average graduate level preparation for exercise role. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights. Obvious team player who sometimes takes the lead for team projects.

B (84-86): Average graduate level preparation for exercise role. Occasionally contributes original and insightful thought. Acceptable team player; takes effective lead on team projects when assigned.

B- (80-83): Minimally acceptable graduate level preparation for exercise role. Infrequently contributes well-developed insights; may sometimes speak out without having thought through an issue. Requires prodding to take lead on team projects.

C+ (77-79): Generally prepared, but not to minimum acceptable graduate level. Requires encouragement to contribute to discussions; contributions do not include original thinking or insights. Routinely allows others to take the lead in team projects.

C (75) Preparation for exercise role is only displayed when student is called upon to contribute. Elicited contributions reflect at best a basic understanding of session material. Consistently requires encouragement or prodding to take on fair share of team project workload. Only occasionally engages in seminar dialogue with peers and moderators.

C- (70-73): Barely acceptable preparation. Contributions are extremely limited, rarely voluntary, and reflect minimal grasp of session material. Displays little interest in contributing to team projects.

D (56-69): Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are uncommon and reflect below-minimum acceptable understanding of lesson material. Engages in frequent fact-free conversation.

F (0–55): Unacceptable preparation. Displays no interest in contributing to team projects; cannot be relied on to accomplish assigned project work. At times may be seen by peers as disruptive.

16. Seminar Assignments.

The principal criterion in assigning students to a seminar is a balanced distribution among services and agencies, as well as student and moderator specialties and operational expertise. Typically, two faculty members are assigned to each seminar. Student seminar, classroom, and faculty assignments are published separately.

17. Schedule.

Seminars usually meet in the morning. Depending on the work assigned, you may meet for scheduled periods in seminar as a group, in smaller teams depending on tasking, or individually to conduct study and research. Please pay close attention to the start times for each event since they vary throughout the trimester. Classes normally are scheduled for 0830–1145. If class is scheduled in the afternoon the normal timeframe is 1300–1615. Moderators may adjust these times to facilitate the learning objectives for each segment of instruction. A course-planning schedule containing meeting dates and times is

provided in the Addenda to this syllabus. The weekly schedule (printed on salmon-colored paper for CNC&S students or green for NSC students) reflects revisions and supersedes the schedule contained in the syllabus. Late changes will be announced by memo delivered to student mailboxes or by the moderators in class.

18. Key Personnel.

If you require additional information on the course, or if problems develop that cannot be resolved with your moderators, you may contact the Departmental Chairman via his executive assistant. The key departmental personnel are:

Chairman of the Department..... CAPT J. K. Cook, USN
..... Room C-213, 841-3556

Executive Assistant..... PROF F. B. Horne
..... Room C-211, 841-6458

Academic Coordinator..... Ms. C. A. Stewart
..... Room C-214, 841-4120

Coordinator, Joint Maritime Operations Course..... PROF. E. J. Shaw
..... Room C-420, 841-6467

Module Lead, Modules One & Two..... PROF J. L. Barker
Course Foundation, Operational Art..... Room C-431, 841-6457

Module Lead, Module Three ..... CDR S.P. Henseler, JAGC, USN
Operational & Maritime Law ..... Room C-431, 841-6468

Module Lead, Module Four..... PROF T.A. Parker
Naval / Maritime Warfare..... Room C-424, 841-6473

Module Lead, Module Five..... CAPT M. E. Donahue, USN
Joint/Combined Operations ..... Room C-409, 841-6474

Module Lead, Module Six ..... COL M. McGauvran, USAF
Military Decision-making & Planning..... Room C-422, 841-6564

Module Lead, Module Seven..... PROF T.C. Hone
Contemporary Operations..... Room C-406, 841-1385

Module Lead, Module Eight..... COL G. D. Reilly, USA
JTF/JFMCC Capstone Exercise..... Room C-421, 841-6466

19. Faculty Assistance.

Faculty members are available to assist students with course material, to review a student's progress, and to provide counseling as required. Students with individual concerns are encouraged to discuss them as early as possible so that moderators can render assistance in a timely manner. Students are urged to make use of this non-classroom time with the faculty. During tutorials, scheduled in conjunction with Operations Research Paper proposal review, moderators may take the opportunity to discuss student progress as well as to solicit student input on the course to date. Faculty room numbers and telephone extensions are listed on pages 287–88 of this syllabus. The majority of the faculties are located on the fourth deck of Conolly Hall, except where noted. SP denotes Spruance Hall; SE denotes Sims Hall; M denotes Mahan Hall; and L

denotes Luce Hall.

20. Student Critiques.

We strive continually to improve this course. To assist us in this goal students are provided an End-of-Course Questionnaire for completion on the CAC-enabled web portal. We have also provided "Course Session Critique Notes" to allow students to record information as they go along. Critique note pages are provided in the Addendum, starting on page 275. The note pages will enable you to record your insights on matters you may otherwise forget by the time you fill out the End of Course Questionnaire (e.g., which readings were particularly helpful, and which ones missed the mark.) Constructive critiques and comments help ensure that the course remains relevant and vital for future students. Completing the Questionnaire is required and will be submitted electronically. Failure to complete the Questionnaire will result in the final grade being withheld (along with course credit) until the requirement is met. The Questionnaire must be submitted and receipt acknowledged not later than 1630 on Friday, 12 June.

21. Faculty Biographies.

PROFESSOR JEFFREY L. BARKER returned to the Naval War College faculty in August 1999, serving as the Matthew Fontaine Maury Military Chair of Oceanography until his retirement in November 2004, at which time he joined the faculty as an Associate Professor. A 1976 graduate of the Georgia Institute of Technology, with a B.S. in Physics, he earned an M.S. in Oceanography and Meteorology from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in 1987, and also earned an M.A. from the Naval War College in 1994. In his initial sea tour in USS Kalamazoo (AOR-6) Professor Barker was designated a Surface Warfare Officer. After assignment at the U.S. Naval Academy, he was redesignated as Meteorology and Oceanography Officer and reported to Fleet Numerical Oceanography Center in Monterey, California. In addition to his initial Naval War College faculty tour, Meteorology and Oceanography assignments have included: A sea tour in USS Wisconsin (BB-64), and overseas tours as the Executive Officer of the Naval Oceanography Command Facility in Yokosuka, Japan, and as the Staff METOC Officer in the London headquarters of Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Force Europe.
jeffrey.barker@nwc.navy.mil

PROFESSOR MICHAEL J. BARKER joined the Naval War College faculty in 1999 as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Marine Corps and served as Deputy Director of the Naval Staff College. He was a CH-46 pilot in the Marine Corps and served operational tours in Hawaii, California, and Okinawa, making several MEU deployments, and served a Department head tour in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM as a member of HMM-268. He was Commanding Officer of HMM-262 and Executive Officer of Marine Aircraft Group 36 in Okinawa, Japan. Shore assignments included a tour at Naval Air Systems Command in Washington. He is a graduate of Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School and the College of Naval Command & Staff at the Naval War College, earning a Master of Arts degree. Upon retirement in 2005, he joined the civilian JMO faculty in the College of Distance Education.
michael.barker@nwc.navy.mil

PROFESSOR ALBION A. BERGSTROM rejoined the Joint Military Operations faculty in autumn 2003. He retired from the Army with over thirty years active duty in December 1999, having completed his career on the JMO faculty as a Professor of Operations and Chief of Block IV, Regional Contingency Planning and Warfighting. Prior military assignments include duty as an Agency Deputy Commander, Division Chief in the Pentagon, Armor (M1A1) battalion command, and various command and staff jobs. An Armor officer by trade, he had cavalry, armor, and infantry experience in Southeast Asia, Europe, and CONUS. He holds a B.A. in Political Science/International Relations from Colorado State University, an M.A. in Personnel Management from Central Michigan University, and an M.A. from the Naval War College. He is a graduate of the Army's Command and General Staff College and the Army War College Strategist course. He is also a graduate of the Senior Officials in National Security Course at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and was a National Security Fellow at Harvard.
albion.bergstrom@nwc.navy.mil

LIEUTENANT COLONEL TIMOTHY D. BROWN, USA, reported to the Naval War College faculty in January 2007 following completion of a battalion command tour with the 101st Airborne Division (AASLT). LTC Brown served in both OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM I and IV. A 1987 graduate of James Madison University, he earned a master's degree in Logistics Management from the Florida Institute of Technology. As a Quartermaster Officer (Logistician), LTC Brown has served as platoon leader, company executive officer and battalion S4 during his tour with the 25th Infantry Division and the 45th Support Group. After company command and an assignment as a plans officer in the 101st Airborne Division (AASLT), LTC Brown went on to be the aide-de-camp to the 44th Quartermaster General at Fort Lee, Virginia. Major level staff assignments include COSCOM, Plans Officer, Corps Support Battalion Support Operations Officer, Corps Support Battalion Executive Officer and Corps Support Group Support Operations Officer. Following OIF I, he served a tour as the Quartermaster Lieutenant Colonel's Assignment Officer at Human Resources Command. His military schools include the Quartermaster Officer Basic and Advance Course, Command and General Staff College, Logistics Executive Development Course and the Petroleum Officer Course.
timothy.brown@nwc.navy.mil

CDR ROBERT E. BURKE, USN, joined the Naval War College faculty in June 2008 after completing a one year tour in support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM as the OIC of the Counter Radio-Controlled IED Electronic Warfare (CREW) Detachment, Afghanistan attached to JTF Paladin. He is qualified as a Special Operations, Diving and Salvage officer. Previous tours include Naval Sea Systems Command where he worked Mine Warfare Mission Package integration for LCS, Executive Decision Management Office within the Director of Navy Staff office, Conventional Ordnance Explosives Safety and Nuclear Weapons System Safety, OPNAV N41, and OIC of Atlantic Ordnance Command, Detachment Charleston. He has served onboard *USS Edenton* and *USS Grasp,* participating in numerous diving and salvage operations. He has Navy Reserve experience in Naval Coastal Warfare and Harbor Defense, Military Sealift Command, and Mobile Diving and Salvage Units. CDR Burke was enrolled in the National Defense University, School for National Security Executive Education prior to

being deployed. He earned a Master of Science degree in Ocean Systems Management from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1994, and holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the Massachusetts Maritime Academy.
robert.burke@nwc.navy.mil

PROFESSOR JAMES P. BUTLER returned to the Naval War College in November 2003 after having served as the Northrop Grumman Reserve Component Joint Professional Military Education Project Manager, converting the JPME Phase II core curriculum into a distance learning course for the Joint Forces Staff College. A retired naval aviator with thirty years of extensive operational flying, and command experience, he has commanded two aviation squadrons (HC-8 and HC-3) and a major shore command (the Naval Air Technical Training Center). Operational assignments include two pentagon tours, six flying tours, and two ship's company tours (Second Division Officer onboard USS Kansas City in Vietnam and as Air Boss onboard USS Guadalcanal (LPH-7) during Operation DESERT STORM). Captain Butler's last active duty assignment was as Dean of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JPME Phase II) at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. Professor Butler graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy with a B.S. in Analytical Management, has an M.S. in Material Management from the Naval Postgraduate School, an M.A. in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College, and an M.S. in National Resource Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Leadership and Management from Capella University.
james.butler@nwc.navy.mil

PROFESSOR DAVID R. CARRINGTON rejoined the Naval War College faculty in September 2004 after completing thirty-one years of commissioned service with the U.S. Navy. Among his tours of duty, he served as special assistant to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, as the N2 aboard the USS Forrestal, as the N2 with COMSECONDFLT, as the N2 with CINCUSNAVEUR, as the J2 for Joint Task Force PROVIDE PROMISE in Bosnia, as the Director of Intelligence for SACLANT, and as the Director of Intelligence for JIATF East. A former member of the Naval War College Faculty, Professor Carrington was also the Edwin T. Layton Chair of Military Intelligence from May 1994 to October 1997. Professor Carrington has a Bachelor of Science from Western Washington State University and a Master of Arts in Business Management from Central Michigan University.
david.carrington@nwc.navy.mil

PROFESSOR DONALD W. CHISHOLM joined the Naval War College in 2000. Before coming to the Naval War College, he taught at several universities, including the University of Illinois at Chicago and the University of California, Los Angeles, where he was a founding member of the School of Public Policy and Social Research. Professor Chisholm earned his A.B., M.A., and Ph.D. in political science at the University of California. His chief fields of interest include military history, organization theory, administrative behavior, policy analysis, and American political institutions. His research has examined the planning and execution of Joint military operations; cognitive and organizational limits on rationality; organizational adaptation and innovation; organizational failure and reliability, particularly in high-risk technologies; and privatization of public activities. He is the author of *Coordination Without Hierarchy: Informal Structures in Multi-organizational Systems* (University of

California Press, 1989) and *Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793–1941* (Stanford University Press, 2001), for which he received the 2001 RADM Samuel Eliot Morison Award for Distinguished Contribution to Naval Literature. He has also published a number of articles in professional journals, including *Joint Force Quarterly*, *Parameters*, and the *Naval War College Review*.

donald.chisholm@nwc.navy.mil

CAPTAIN JAMES K. COOK, USN, joined the Naval War College faculty in April 2007 after completing a tour as Commander, Carrier Air Wing Three, embarked in USS *Harry S. Truman* flying combat sorties in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Previous operational aviation tours include: Commander of Strike Fighter Squadron One Thirty One embarked in USS *John C. Stennis* and USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* supporting Operation Southern Watch; Maintenance Officer of Fighter Squadron Eighty Four executing combat sorties in support of Operations DESERT STORM and PROVIDE COMFORT; and Quality Assurance officer in Fighter Squadron Thirty Three embarked in USS *America* participating in Operation EL DORADO CANYON. His shore tours include: Navy TACAIR analyst supporting the Program Analysis and Evaluation Director in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Deputy J3 for JTFSWA Saudi Arabia; Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN) Operations Officer and Instructor; Assistant Chief Operational Test Director for Air Test and Evaluation Squadron Four. Captain Cook earned a Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College in 1995, participated as an Associate Fellow in CNO's Strategy Study Group, and holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Bennington College.

james.cook@nwc.navy.mil

PROFESSOR MICHAEL R. CROSKREY, USN, joined the Joint Military Operations (NOPC) faculty in November 2004 following an assignment as Future Operations and Air Warfare Officer for Commander SEVENTH Fleet. He earned a commission in 1986 and was designated a Naval Flight Officer in 1988. He was assigned to VS-33 flying S-3s, and deployed onboard USS *Constellation* in 1989 and with CVW-9 onboard USS Nimitz in 1991. In 1992, he was assigned instructor duty with VS-41. He then conducted a disassociated sea tour with CVW-14 staff deploying onboard USS Carl Vinson in 1996 and went on to a department head tour with VS-35 as maintenance officer, deploying in 1998 with CVW-14 onboard USS Abraham Lincoln. He transferred to the Naval Postgraduate School in 2000 where he completed his JPME Phase I curriculum through a Naval War College satellite program. While at SEVENTH Fleet he served on the staffs of three Joint Task Force commands and on JFMCC and JFACC functional commands. Commander Croskrey holds a B.S. in Computer Science from Iowa State University and an M.S. in Aeronautical Engineering (Avionics) from the Naval Postgraduate School.

michael.croskrey@nwc.navy.mil

PROFESSOR RICHARD M. CROWELL joined the Naval War College civilian faculty in January 2008. Prior to that he was a military professor in the Joint Military Operations Department from July 2005 to December 2007. While on active duty, Professor Crowell was a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO). He served at the Joint Forces Staff College as Military Faculty in the Joint and Combined Warfighting School and the Joint Command, Control & Information Operations School. Additionally, he served as the

Chief Operations Branch, NATO Multi-Service EW Support Group, RNAS Yeovilton, UK; Operations Officer, Helicopter Combat Support Squadron SIX; and Assistant Air Officer, USS Guadalcanal, (LPH-7). His shore tours include the Assistant Air Operations Officer for the Commander Naval Air Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet and the Program Manager for the Aviation Officer Candidate and Aviation Intelligence Officer programs for the Commander Navy Recruiting Command. He has earned a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College and a Bachelor of Science from Massachusetts Maritime Academy.
richard.crowell@nwc.navy.mil

COMMANDER JAMES DALTON, USN, joined the Naval War College faculty in August 2008 after completing a tour at Carrier Air Wing SEVENTEEN, NAS Oceana, Virginia. After graduating from the University of Missouri he attended Aviation Officer Candidate School in Pensacola, Florida, receiving his commission in 1988. Upon completing A-6E Intruder Naval Flight Officer (NFO) training, he reported to VA-36 onboard the USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71) in support of Operation DESERT STORM. In 1993, he reported to the F-14 Training Squadron (VF-124) at NAS Miramar, California, for duty as a Flight Instructor. In 1995, he returned to sea duty with VF-11 aboard USS CARL VINSON (CVN 70) completing a deployment in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. In 1996, he reported to VX-9 at NAF Point Mugu, California, where he served as the Operational Test Director of the LANTIRN Targeting System and several other developmental weapon systems. In 1999, he joined VF-31 where he completed an additional deployment to the Middle East. Following his department head tour, Command Dalton reported to the staff of the Commander United States Special Operations Command at MacDill AFB, Florida where he served as an action officer in the Joint experimentation department. Following his Joint tour, Commander Dalton reported to the Naval Personnel Command in Millington, TN where he served as Major Staff Placement. His NPC responsibilities included the placement of all "Joint billets" worldwide outside the Pentagon. In August 2005, Commander Dalton reported to the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, as a student, where he received a Master's Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies. james.dalton@nwc.navy.mil

CAPTAIN MARK E. DONAHUE, USN, reported to the Joint Military Operations Department as a faculty member in September 2008 following his tour as Chief Current Operations (J33) at US Pacific Command. Prior to his assignment at PACOM, he served as Commander, Amphibious Squadron ELEVEN forward deployed in Sasebo Japan where he conducted operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Unified Assistance. In 2004 he served on the CJTF-7/MNF-I staff at Camp Victory, Iraq. He had command of USS GUNSTON HALL (LSD 44) from 2000 to 2002. A 1981 graduate of the US Naval Academy, he is a Surface Warfare Officer who has served afloat in USS ESTEEM (MSO 438), USS FOX (CG 33), USS SAMUEL B ROBERTS (FFG 58), USS JOHN A MOORE (FFG 19), USS ESSEX (LHD 2) and as an Engineering Inspector for the CINCLANTFLT Propulsion Examining Board. Shore duty assignments have included Surface Warfare Officers School, Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Center Roanoke, Virginia, Commander Naval Surface Force US Atlantic Fleet and Commander Fleet Forces Command. He is a 2000 graduate of the Naval War College where he received a Master's Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies.
mark.donahue@nwc.navy.mil

PROFESSOR JERRY DUFFY holds a Masters Degree from the Naval War College and is an intelligence sub-specialist He joined the faculty of the Naval War College in September 2006 upon retiring from the Navy. Tours of duty included; Search and Rescue pilot, NAS Jacksonville, Florida, VERTREP pilot HC-11, San Diego, CA, Instructor Pilot, HC-16, Pensacola, Fl, Mini-Boss USS New Orleans, San Diego, CA, DET OIC HC-5 Guam, Joint Forces Intelligence Command, Norfolk Va, NATO Staff Officer, London, England, and Staff Officer, Naval Staff College.
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LIEUTENANT COLONEL SCOTT EFFLANDT received a commission in 1985 from Marion Military Institute as a Distinguished Military Graduate. For the next two years, as he completed his degree, he served as an Infantry Platoon Leader with the 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry in the Illinois Army National Guard. Upon receipt of a Regular Army commission in 1987 he was assessed onto Active Duty as an Armor Officer. As a new Armor lieutenant, 2dLt Efflandt was assigned to the 5th Battalion, 77th Armor (Steel Tigers) of the 8th Infantry Division in Mannheim, Germany. During this tour his duties included tank platoon leader, support platoon leader, company executive officer and battalion maintenance officer. Captain Efflandt's next operational assignment was in 1992with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Brave Rifles) initially at Fort Bliss, Texas. During this tour, he served in three squadrons as either an assistant S3, the S3 and finally as the commander of B Troop (Bandit) 1st Squadron until he relinquished command at Fort Carson, Colorado in 1996. Upon completion of civil schooling, Major Efflandt was assigned as a faculty member in the Behavioral Sciences and Leadership Department at the United States Military Academy. In 2001, he returned to troop service with the 1st Cavalry Division. In the subsequent seven years he served as the Executive Officer of the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry (Thunderhorse), as the 2nd Brigade (Black Jack) S3, XO followed by duty as the Deputy Brigade Commander. Most recently LTC Efflandt commanded 2nd Battalion, 8th (US) Cavalry (Stallions), relinquishing duties in April 2008 for posting to the faculty of the Naval War College in Newport, RI. LTC Efflandt's education includes AA from Marion Military Institute; BS in Administration of Justice from Southern Illinois University; MS in Sociology from Texas A&M University; Armor Officer Basic Course, Infantry Officer Advance Course, Maintenance Officer Course, Bradley Commander's Course, and the Command and General Staff Course. His membership and affiliations are: American Sociological Association, Fellow--Inter University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Association of the United States Army, Military Officers Association of America.
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CAPTAIN MICHAEL J. FITZPATRICK, USN joined the Naval War College faculty in August 2008 following a four year tour at the NATO Joint Force Command Brunssum in The Netherlands where he served as a Branch Head in the J5 Division. He is an unrestricted Naval Aviator and qualified Surface Warfare Officer. As an H-46D pilot based in San Diego, California, his operational flying tours included deployments throughout the western Pacific and Indian Oceans as well as service in the Persian Gulf. While based in Sicily, he commanded an MH-53E squadron which supported both Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM with detachments based throughout the Mediterranean and in several Middle Eastern states. He is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and is a Joint Qualified Officer (JQO). Captain

Fitzpatrick holds a B.S. from the United States Naval Academy, a M.S. from the University of Maryland and a M.A. from the United States Naval War College.
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LTC BRUCE FLOERSHEIM was commissioned from the United States Military Academy in the Corps of Engineers in 1989. His assignments include platoon leader, executive officer, and company commander in combat engineering and assault float bridge engineering units in the United States, Germany and Bosnia (IFOR). He was a construction officer for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Turkey in charge of military construction on Pirinclik Air Station and responsible for inspecting NATO construction sites throughout the country. Later he was assistant product manager for infantry and tank munitions and a project manager for reconstruction in Iraq working with the Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources and the Iraqi Ministry of Public Works. He has taught mechanical engineering design at the United States Military Academy and has been selected to return permanently as the Engineering Design Group Leader in the Department of Civil and Mechanical Engineering after this assignment. He holds a M.S. in Mechanical Engineering from Stanford University and a Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering from Old Dominion Univ. His military awards include the Bronze Star, three Meritorious Service Medals and four Army Commendation Medals.
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PROFESSOR STEPHEN FORAND joined the Joint Military Operations Department in October 2007 following retirement from the U.S. Marine Corps. He holds a B.S. from the University of Massachusetts and an M.A. in National Security Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. A naval aviator with over thirty years of operational experience he has served in all Marine Aircraft Wings. His last posting was the Chief of Staff of Marine Corps Installations East and the Commanding Officer of MCAS New River. His Marine Career encompasses a variety of assignments including the Naval War College Strategy and Policy Faculty, USCENTCOM J3 Current Operations, Commanding Officer Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363, Headquarters Marine Corps and as an exchange pilot with the U.S. Navy at HM-14 an Airborne Mine Countermeasures Squadron.
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PROFESSOR ROGER S. FOUNTAIN II joined the College of Distance Education in 2006 after working as a CDE/JMO adjunct professor since 2003. During twenty-eight years of active duty with the USAF, his assignments included: EC-121 navigator/RF-4C Weapons System Officer operational tours; initial cadre U.S. Central Command as an action officer; three years of faculty experience at Army Command and General Staff College (Department of Joint and Combined Operations) developing/teaching JPME; two USAF major command headquarters tours (battle staff operations and war plans); an assignment with the NATO Reaction Force Air Staff (plans division); and an Air Liaison Officer tour of duty with the U.S. Army. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from the University of Denver, a Master of Science in Systems Management from the University of Southern California, and a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He completed Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and the Air War College. He also attended the Naval War College (College of Naval Command and Staff) and the

Armed Forces Staff College (JPME Phase II). He is currently managing the CDE/JMO Web-Enabled Course.
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PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER J. GREGOR joined the College of Distance Education in 2006. He retired from the U.S. Marines after 22 years of active service in a variety of command and staff assignments in artillery, research and development, and intelligence billets. He served as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the Second Marine Division during DESERT STORM and retired as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of II Marine Expeditionary Force. He earned an M.A. in International Affairs from Florida State University and an M.S. in Defense Systems Analysis from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. He has taught the Naval War College Non-resident Strategy and Policy course and the Joint Maritime Operations course at NAS Jacksonville. He is currently managing the College of Distance Education JMO CD course. He has had articles on leadership, institutional change, and career development published in the Marine Corps Gazette.
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CAPTAIN BRENT J. GRIFFIN, USN, joined the JMO faculty in July 2005 and currently holds the RADM Edwin T. Layton Chair of Military Intelligence. A career Intelligence Officer, his operational tours include: N2 for the John F. Kennedy Carrier Strike Group (2002–2004); N2 for Naval Special Warfare Group One (1994–1996); Intel Officer for USS New Orleans (LPH-11) (1992–1994); and Intel Officer for Fighter Squadron Fifty-One (1986–1989) onboard USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70). He also deployed onboard USS Mount Whitney (LCC-20) as a Special Assistant to the Deputy Commander, CJTF-HOA in 2003. Staff tours include: Intelligence Representative for the Navy's Assist and Assess Team; EA positions for the Deputy Commander, EUCOM (2000–2002) and the PACOM J2 (1990–1991); Head of the EUCOM Intel Briefing Team (1999–2000); Director of Training at the Fleet Intelligence Training Center, Pacific (1996–1999); and Intel analyst at the Intelligence Center Pacific (1989–1990). CAPT Griffin holds a B.A. in Political Science from SUNY Potsdam (1985), an M.A. (w/distinction) in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School (1992), and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College (2005).
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PROFESSOR BILL HARTIG initially reported to the Joint Military Operations Department as an active duty Marine infantry officer in July 2004, following a tour as Assistant Chief of Staff, for the I Marine Expeditionary Force. He served in all three Marine Expeditionary Forces and commanded at each grade. He retired as a Marine Colonel on 1 October 2007 after 30 years of service and joined the faculty as Professor and as the JMO JPME Phase 2 Coordinator.
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LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARK C. HARYSCH, USAF, joined the Naval War College faculty in the summer of 2006 following an Air Force Fellowship in the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois. He was commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Corps and completed pilot training at Williams AFB in 1989. His previous assignments include operational flying tours in B-52s at Loring AFB, Maine, K. I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan, and Minot AFB, North Dakota. He deployed for Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM in 1990 and is a

graduate of the USAF Weapons School. He also served an instructor tour in the T-3A at the Air Force Academy. Most recently, he served as Presidential Strike Advisor and Command Center Operations Chief on the E-4B, National Airborne Operations Center, at Offutt AFB, Nebraska. He holds an S.B. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Astronautical Engineering and an M.A. in International Relations from Auburn University–Montgomery.

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COLONEL THOMAS A. HEANEY, JR., INFANTRY, USA, joined the Joint Military Operations Department in August of 2008 after having completed a tour in the US Army Recruiting Command as the Deputy Commander-West for Army Recruiting. Prior to serving in Army recruiting COL Heaney was the Deputy Commander – Operations for US Army South at Ft Sam Houston, Texas. Tom is a Distinguished Military Graduate from The University of Rhode Island ROTC program, where he was commissioned in the Army as an Infantryman. His assignments include various tours with light infantry, airborne and Ranger units in the United States and in Panama, serving as Platoon Leader, Scout Platoon Leader, Combat Support Company Executive Officer, Battalion Air Operations Officer, Light Infantry Company Commander, Battalion Operations Officer, Battalion Executive Officer, Brigade Operations Officer, Division Current Operations Officer, Battalion Commander, JRTC Senior O/C, Corps G3 (Exercise) and Brigade Commander. He is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic Course, the U.S. Army Ranger School, Airborne School, Jumpmaster School, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Naval War College. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in History from The University of Rhode Island and Master's degrees in Business Administration from Central Michigan University and National Security Strategy from the Naval War College.

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CAPTAIN STEPHANIE A. HELM, USN, reported to the Joint Military Operations Department as a faculty member for Information Operations in July 2006. A 1980 graduate of the University of California, she was commissioned as a Restricted Line (Special Duty Cryptology) naval officer. She graduated from the Naval War College in 1993. Her shore duty assignments include the National Security Agency, U.S. Central Command and OPNAV staff. She commanded the Naval Security Group Activity, Norfolk, Virginia, from 1999 to 2001. She was assigned to Commander, Second Fleet/Commander, Striking Fleet Atlantic for duty as the Deputy, J2 and as the Information Operations Branch Chief. During her assignment to OPNAV, she worked Navy Strategy and Policy for Information Operations.

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PROFESSOR CHESTER E. HELMS, rejoined the Naval War College faculty in January 2007. He retired from the Navy with thirty-five years active duty in September 2004, having completed his career on the JMO faculty as a Professor of Operations and Chief of Block I, Operational Concepts and Operational Law. He also held the Charles A. Lockwood Military Chair of Undersea Warfare. His prior military duty includes service on four submarines, both SSNs and SSBNs. While he was in command, his ship received the Battle Efficiency "E" and the Navy League SSBN of the Year Awards. Shore assignments included: Naval Reactors, Department of Energy; Submarine Development

Squadron 12 Tactical Development Staff; and duty at U.S. Strategic Command as the Executive Assistant to the J3/J4 and J36, and as Senior Controller in the Command Center. Professor Helms was Joint Specialty Officer Certified. He was commissioned through the Naval Enlisted Scientific Education Program (NESEP) and holds a B.S. in Nuclear Engineering (with Honors) from North Carolina State University and a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies (with Distinction) from the Naval War College.
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COMMANDER SEAN HENSELER was commissioned in 1989 as a Distinguished Naval Graduate from Aviation Officer's Candidate School in Pensacola, FL then matriculated to the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) in Dam Neck, Virginia. While awaiting training CDR Henseler supported the counter-narcotic operations of Commander, Joint Task Force FOUR (CJTF-4) in Key West, Florida. Upon graduating from NMITC as an Aviation Intelligence Officer in 1990, CDR Henseler was assigned to Attack Squadron ONE FOUR FIVE (VA-145) based out of Whidbey Island, Washington (1990-1992). Henseler made two WESTPAC deployments with VA-145 aboard the USS RANGER (CV-61) homeported in San Diego, California. CDR Henseler participated in both *Operation Southern Watch* and *Operation Desert Storm* as a squadron intelligence officer and as the Carrier Air Wing TWO (CVW-2) assistant intelligence officer. CDR Henseler earned COMATVAQWINGPAC Intelligence Officer of the Year honors in 1990, 1991, and 1992 and contributed to VA-145's winning the Rear Adm. Wade C. McCluskey Award as the Navy's best attack squadron. CDR Henseler was next assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in Suitland, Maryland (1992-1994) and spent the majority of his tour as the Navy representative to the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) at the Pentagon. After CDR Henseler was designated as intelligence briefer for the Chief of Naval Operations he was selected to enter the Navy's Law Education Program. While at The Catholic University of America's Columbus School of Law (1994-1997), CDR Henseler interned at Navy Legal Service Office (NLSO), Washington DC, the Navy and Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Chief of Naval Operations Legal Office. CDR Henseler, the founder and first president of the Irish American Law Student's Association at CUA, graduated *cum laude* in 1997 and was selected by faculty and students to be the Commencement Speaker. After completing the Naval Justice School in Newport, RI, CDR Henseler was stationed at Trial Service Office East (TSO EAST) in Norfolk, Virginia (1997-2000). While at TSO EAST CDR Henseler served as a Special Assistant United States Attorney prosecuting felonies for the Eastern District of Virginia. After graduating from the Naval War College in Newport, RI in March 2001 as the President's Honor Graduate, CDR Henseler was assigned as the Staff Judge Advocate for Commander Carrier Group SIX (COMCARGRU SIX) homeported in Mayport, Florida. As the SJA for the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67) battle group (2001-2003) CDR Henseler deployed in support of *Operation Enduring Freedom*, acted as the legal advisor to Commander Task Force 50 (CTF-50), and was selected as the "2001-2002 Outstanding Young Military Lawyer for the US Navy." CDR Henseler then immediately redeployed aboard the USS MT. WHITNEY to Djibouti as deputy SJA for Commander, Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) from January-March 2003. CDR Henseler was next assigned to the Naval Justice School (NJS) in Newport, RI where, he helped establish the Operational Law Department. As the Civil Law Department Head, he was responsible for Operational Law, Administrative Law, and Legal Assistance Training for Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard accession judge advocates. Additionally, CDR

Henseler provided Operational and Administrative Law training to senior line and staff officers at Surface Warfare Officer's School, the Naval War College, Command Leadership School, Submarine School, Naval Aviation School's Command, Navy Chaplain School, the Senior Enlisted Academy, and Officer Indoctrination School. CDR Henseler then took part in *Operation Iraqi Freedom* as the Chief of Detention, Judicial, and Legal operations on the legal staff of Commander, Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I) in Baghdad from March-September 2006. CDR Henseler, the primary legal advisor to the Commanding General, Task Force 134 who was responsible for over 14,000 Iraqi detainees, also acted as the Officer in Charge of the US-Iraq Bi-lateral Inspection team which uncovered significant abuse within the Iraqi detention system. In March 2008, CDR Henseler was hand picked to serve as the legal advisor to the Iraqi Governance Assessment Team chartered by Commander MNF-I, General Petraeus, and the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Ambassador Crocker. Specifically, CDR Henseler focused on how MNF-I and U.S. Mission Iraq can assist the GoI to expand the Rule of Law and reduce corruption. CDR Henseler is currently holds the Howard S. Levie Military **Chair of Operational Law** at the Naval War College in Newport, RI and has twice coached the Roger Williams University Law School Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court team. A member of the New Jersey state bar, CDR Henseler holds degrees from the Catholic University of America's Columbus School of Law (J.D), Georgetown University (M.A. National Security Studies), the Naval War College (M.A. National Security Studies), and Babson College (B.S. Business Management). His personal awards include the Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal (2), Navy Commendation Medal (3), Joint Service Achievement Medal, and the Navy Achievement Medal.

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PROFESSOR DOUGLAS N. HIME first joined the Naval War College faculty in 1992, after having served as Chief, International Negotiations, and U.S. Delegation to the NATO Military Committee. Following a tour as a member of the faculty at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, from 1996–1998, Professor Hime retired from the Air Force in September 1998 as a colonel, and rejoined the Naval War College faculty in October 1998. His previous assignments include several operational flying tours in B-52s and staff assignments as Chief of Crisis Action Planning and Deputy Director of Bomber Operations at Headquarters, Strategic Air Command. He has commanded avionics and field maintenance squadrons in addition to a B-52 squadron. His military schooling includes Air Command and Staff College, Air War College, and the NATO Defense College. He holds a B.S.E. from Emporia State University, an M.S. from the University of Southern California, and a Ph.D. from Salve Regina University.

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PROFESSOR THOMAS C. HONE joined the faculty of the Naval War College in August 2006. He was an Assistant Director of the Office of Force Transformation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) from the summer of 2003 to the summer of 2006. In 2001-2002, he was Principal Deputy Director of the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation in OSD. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin–Madison, and is a graduate of the Program Managers Course of the Defense Acquisition University. He has taught at the Naval War College (1985–86) and at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (1999–2001). He also served in the Partnership for Peace Program with the European Command in Germany, and was a special assistant to the Commander of the Naval Air Systems Command. He is the author or co-author of the following books:

(a) *Battle Line, The United States Navy, 1919–1939*, (b) *American & British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919–1941*, (c) *Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume I, Part 2 (Command and Control),* and (d) *Power and Change: The Administrative History of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations*, *1946–1986*. His awards include the Air Force Exceptional Civilian Service Award, the Navy Meritorious Civilian Service Medal, and the Department of Defense Exceptional Civilian Service Award.
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PROFESSOR FRED B. HORNE joined the Joint Military Operations faculty in August 2003 after serving two years as the Director of the Naval Staff College. Professor Horne retired from the Navy in July 2006, and is currently assigned as the Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Military Operations Department. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1976 with a B.S. degree in Oceanography and designated a Naval Flight Officer in January 1978. He has served in a variety of operational and staff positions in the Maritime Patrol Aviation community including commanding officer Patrol Squadron FIFTY and Chief of Staff, Fleet Air Keflavik in Iceland. He is a 1988 graduate of the Naval War College (CNC&S), a 1999 graduate of the Air War College, and holds a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies.
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COMMANDER D. MARK HOUFF, USN, joined the Naval War College Faculty in November 2007 after completing a tour as the Assistant U.S. Naval Attaché in Moscow, Russia, where he represented Senior USN and DOD officials to their counterparts in the Russian Federation and executed both USN and Joint security cooperation activities with Russia. As a Junior Officer, he served in USS UNDERWOOD (FFG-36). In 1995, CDR Houff transitioned from Surface Warfare to Naval Intelligence and was assigned to the Chief of Naval Operations Intelligence Plot (CNO-IP) at the Pentagon as a watch officer. Following the Pentagon assignment, he served as Naval Intelligence Watch Officer and Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) briefer at the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Suitland, Maryland. CDR Houff then was the Senior Intelligence Analyst at U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and U.S. FIFTH FLEET Headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, supporting Maritime Interception Operations and OPERATIONS SOUTHERN WATCH and DETERMINED RESPONSE. Upon returning from Bahrain, he was the Assistant Flag Intelligence Officer for Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Group TWO/Commander GEORGE WASHINGTON Battle Group, where he completed a combat deployment including missions in support of OPERATIONS NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and SOUTHERN WATCH. CDR Houff earned a B.S. degree in History, with distinction and honors, from the U.S. Naval Academy and a M.A. degree in History from the University of Maryland, College Park. He is a graduate (with highest distinction) from the Naval War College's College of Naval Command and Staff and from the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC). While at the JFSC, CDR Houff received the MacArthur Award for excellence in critical campaign analysis. He is also a graduate of the Defense Language Institute-Washington, D.C. in the Russian language. He is a Joint Qualified Officer.
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CAPTAIN MICHAEL C. HUSAK, USCG, was commissioned in 1984 through the United States Coast Guard Academy. His career includes 11 duty stations, including three

afloat commands and a Joint tour. Most recently, Captain Husak served as Deputy Director of Operations for Joint Interagency Task Force South. In that capacity he was responsible for command and control of a Joint, combined, interagency, and coalition force executing a counter narco-terrorist campaign spanning three distinct operational theaters. Prior to JIATF-South, Captain Husak was Commanding Officer of the CGC Vigorous. The cutter executed the full range of Coast Guard missions across the expanse of the Atlantic. Over the course of a career, mission experiences include: defense, security, enforcement, search and rescue, ice breaking, aids to navigation, pollution response, nation building, natural resource protection, and facilitation of commerce. Captain Husak holds an undergraduate degree in Marine Science and a masters degree in Organizational Management. Personal awards include the Joint Meritorious Service medal, Coast Guard Meritorious Service Medal (two awards), Silver Life Saving Medal, Coast Guard Commendation Medal (three Awards), and the Coast Guard Achievement Medal. Captain Husak is also authorized the permanent cutterman's pin. He also serves as the Coast Guard Advisor to the President, U. S. Naval War College.

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PROFESSOR IVAN LUKE joined the JMO faculty in 2003 as a USCG Captain, following four years in command of the U.S. Coast Guard Barque Eagle (WIX-327), the service's seagoing sail training vessel, also known as "America's Tall Ship." Professor Luke is a 1976 graduate of the United States Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut. His initial assignment was Deck Watch Officer aboard the Medium Endurance Cutter USCGC Dependable homeported in Panama City, Florida. Subsequent afloat assignments were Operations Officer of the High Endurance Cutter USCGC Taney in Portsmouth, Virginia as an O-3; Commanding Officer of the Medium Endurance Cutter USCGC Evergreen in New London, Connecticut as an O-4; and Executive Officer of the Medium Endurance Cutter USCGC Seneca in Boston, Massachusetts also as an O-4. Professor Luke's O-5 command was the Medium Endurance Cutter USCGC Valiant in Miami, Florida. In addition to these PCS assignments, Professor Luke served in a temporary capacity aboard a number of Coast Guard and Navy vessels including participation in Operation ABLE MANNER (Haiti–1993), UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti–1994), and ABLE VIGIL (Cuba–1994). His assignments ashore included: Instructor of Nautical Science at the Coast Guard Academy; School Chief of the Coast Guard's Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO) School; Assistant Law Enforcement Branch Chief at the Seventh Coast Guard District in Miami, Florida; and service as a fellow in the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and a Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He also holds a merchant mariner's license in the grade of Unlimited Ocean Master, Steam, Motor, or Sail. Professor Luke retired from the USCG in September 2005 and rejoined the JMO faculty in October 2005 as civilian professor.

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CAPTAIN JOHN R. "J.R." MATHIS, USN, joined the Naval War College faculty in August 2003 after completing an instructor tour at the Navy's Command Leadership Course, Newport, Rhode Island. From August 2003 to June 2006 he served as the Deputy Chairman of the Strategic Research Department (SRD) prior to transferring to JMO. As Deputy, SRD, he led ten professors in conducting focused research on matters of naval

warfare, maritime strategy, national military strategy, and national security strategy as it affects military operations. After graduating from Marquette University he attended Aviation Officer Candidate School in Pensacola, Florida, receiving his commission in 1981. Upon completing the EA-6B Prowler Naval Flight Officer (NFO) training, he reported to VAQ-136 onboard the USS Midway (CV 41) homeported in Yokosuka, Japan, for his junior officer tour. In 1986, he reported to the EA-6B Training Squadron (VAQ-129) at NAS Whidbey Island, Washington, for duty as a Flight Instructor. In 1989, he returned to sea duty with VAQ-139 aboard USS Constellation (CV 64) for his department head tour, completing two Indian Ocean deployments, including this country's first DESERT SHIELD response aboard the USS Independence (CV 62). In 1992, he reported to the JCS National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) at Offutt AFB, Nebraska, where he served as a Chief of Emergency Actions, responding to National Command Authorities and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) tasking. While assigned to NAOC, he earned a Master of Aeronautical Science Degree from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Captain Mathis rejoined VAQ-136, stationed at NAF Atsugi, Japan, and deploying aboard USS Independence (CV 62) as the Executive officer in July 1996. He commanded the Gauntlets from October 1997 until January 1999, during which, as part of Carrier Air Wing 5, he permanently cross-decked his squadron to the USS Kitty Hawk (CV 64). In March 1999, Captain Mathis reported to the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, as a student, where he received a Master's Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies. Upon completion, he reported for instructor duty at the Command Leadership School in April 2000, where he taught combat leadership and ethics along with providing one-on-one mentorship to over 1,200 prospective commanding officers. In the fall of 2002, he was selected for the U.S. Navy's Permanent Military Professor (PMP) Program and is currently completing his doctoral at Salve Regina University. Captain Mathis has over 3,100 flight hours and more than 880 arrested landings.

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PROFESSOR RICHARD J. MARTIN, JR., a 1972 graduate of the University of Maine, joined the Naval War College faculty in August 1994 as an active duty Marine lieutenant colonel until his retirement from active duty in 1998. His Marine Corps career included assignments in various operational air command and control billets in all three Marine aircraft wings as well as various staff assignments. He also served as Executive Officer and ultimately Commanding Officer of Marine Air Support Squadron-1 in the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing. During DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, he was the air support detachment commander for Marine Forces Afloat aboard the USS Nassau (LHA-4). He graduated from the USMC Command and Staff College in 1987 and the Air War College in 1994. He holds a Master of Arts degree in International Relations from Salve Regina University. After his retirement in September 1998, Professor Martin joined the civilian faculty of the Joint Military Operations Department in the College of Distance Education.

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL KEVIN MASTERSON, USAF, joined the Naval War College faculty in the summer of 2008 following command of the Operational Support Squadron at Moody Air Force Base, Valdosta GA. He was commissioned through the ROTC and completed navigator training at Mather AFB in 1989. He flew B-52s at Barksdale AFB,

Louisiana where he deployed in support of Operation DESERT STORM. Lt Col Masterson has extensive experience in Special Operations flying the HC/MC-130P with assignments to Okinawa Japan, Hurlburt Field Florida and RAF Mildenhall UK. His staff tours include the Air Force Doctrine Center where served in the Doctrine Development Directorate. He deployed twice in recent years both as the Commander of an Expeditionary Rescue Squadron in support of CJTF-Horn of Africa, Djibouti Africa. His degrees include a B.S. from the University of Lowell (now U-Mass at Lowell), an M.A. in Military Arts and Sciences from American Military University, and an M.A. (Distinguished Graduate) in Military Operations Arts and Sciences from Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL.

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COMMANDER TIMOTHY J. MAYNARD, USN joined the faculty of the Naval War College in July 2007 after serving three years as Command Center Director and Assistant Operations Officer at Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe-U.S. SIXTH Fleet in Naples, Italy. As a Navy Surface Warfare Officer his sea tours include USS MCINERNEY (FFG-8), USS PEGASUS (PHM-1), USS BELKNAP (CG-26), USS JOHN L HALL (FFG-32), and Battle Force SEVENTH Fleet embarked in USS KITTY HAWK (CV-63). Shore tours include Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force, Navy Warfare Development Command, and as an Individual Augment to Central Command immediately following 9/11/2001. He served on the faculty of the U.S. Naval Academy as Planetarium Director as well as Strategy and Tactics Instructor in the Department of Professional Development. His academic degrees include a BS from the U.S. Naval Academy, an MS from Johns Hopkins University and an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. He was an Associate Fellow on the CNO's Strategic Studies Group XV. He is currently pursuing a doctorate in Educational Leadership at Johnson & Wales University.

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COLONEL MICHAEL McGAUVRAN, USAF, reported to the Naval War College in July 2006 following a tour as the Chief of Plans at U.S. Strategic Command. Colonel McGauvran is a command pilot with 4,100 hours in B-1, T-38, and B-52 aircraft. The colonel has extensive experience in the T-38 as a flight training instructor and in the B-1 as an instructor, evaluator, Operations Officer, Squadron and Deputy Group Commander. As a staff Officer in Headquarters Air Combat Command, Colonel McGauvran oversaw the F-22, F-15, B-1, B-2 and B-52 programs and assisted COMACC in Congressional testimony. Operationally, Colonel McGauvran deployed twice for combat operations; he was the Expeditionary Operations Support Squadron Commander for Operation DESERT FOX and flew combat sorties in support of Operation ALLIED FORCE. His degrees include a B.S. from the University of StonyBrook, NY, an M.A. in Public Administration from Midwestern State University, TX, an M.A. (w/highest distinction) in National Security and Strategic Studies from Naval Command and Staff College, RI, and an M.S. in National Resource Strategy from the National Defense University, Washington D.C.

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES MCGRATH, USMC entered military service in the U.S. Navy in August 1982 serving as a Machinist Mate aboard submarines before accepting an appointment to the United States Naval Academy in July 1984. He was

commissioned a Second Lieutenant in May 1988 after graduation with a BS in Mathematics. After completing The Basic School and Infantry Officers Course, he was assigned to 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines serving as a Rifle Platoon Commander, Weapons Platoon Commander, and Company Executive Officer. He conducted two deployments to the Mediterranean with BLT 3/8 of the 26th MEU(SOC). Following this tour, he was transferred to 2d Force Reconnaissance Company in 1991 serving as Assistant Operations Officer, was promoted to Captain, and completed his tour of duty as the Operations Officer. Reassigned to COMMARFORLANT in Norfolk, VA in May 1994, he served in the G-3 as an Assistant Operations Officer. Returning to Quantico in 1996, he attended the Amphibious Warfare School, graduating with honors. In the summer of 1997, he reported to Camp Lejeune, NC serving as a Rifle Company Commander in 3rd Battalion, 2d Marines deploying with 26th MEU(SOC) to the Mediterranean. Upon return, he was promoted to Major and reassigned as the Battalion Operations Officer prior to reassignment as the Regimental Operations Officer for 2d Marines where he served for fifteen months, deploying to Norway. In the summer of 2000, he entered the USA Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS graduating in June 2001 with a follow on assignment to the School of Advanced Warfighting in Quantico graduating in May 2002. He returned to Camp Lejeune for duty with the G-3 Future Operations section of II Marine Expeditionary Force prior to being assigned to the G-3 of 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (TF Tarawa) as an Operational Planner for Operation Iraqi Freedom until his return from Iraq. In January 2004, he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and deployed to Djibouti serving as the Joint Planning Group Director for CJTF-Horn of Africa through July 2004. Upon return, he was reassigned to the 26th MEU(SOC) as the Operations Officer deploying to the CENTCOM AOR conducting operations in Iraq and surrounding countries. Upon return to Camp Lejeune in the fall of 2005, he was assigned to the 2d Marine Division G-3 Plans section prior to assuming command of 3d Battalion, 6th Marines in May 2006. The battalion deployed to Iraq for OIF 06-08 in Al Anbar returning in August 2007. He served briefly in the S-3 of 8th Marines prior to attending the Naval War College, graduating with distinction in November 2008. His personal decorations include the Joint Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with three Gold Stars, the, Marine Corps Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal, and the Combat Action Ribbon.

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COMMANDER PATRICK T. MOYNIHAN joined the Joint Military Operations faculty (NOPC) in August 2007 following an assignment at USPACOM as Current Operations Directorate (J3) Special Operations Forces Branch Head and Program and Assessment Directorate (J8) Program and Budget Division Head. He earned a commission in 1989 and was designated a Naval Aviator in 1990. He was assigned to HSL-46 to fly the SH-60B and deployed onboard USS DEWERT (FFG 45) in 1992 and USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CG 58) in 1993. In 1994, he was assigned as a Combat Systems instructor at Surface Warfare Officer School. He then conducted a disassociated sea tour with USS BELLEAU WOOD (LHA-3) as Air Operations Officer. Following that tour, he went on to his department head tour with HSL-48 where he served as a Detachment Officer In Charge deploying in 2002 with USS ROOSEVELT (DDG-80) and subsequently as Squadron Operations officer, He transferred to the Air Command and Staff College in 2003 where he completed the JPME Phase I curriculum. Commander Moynihan holds a

B.S. in Economics from the United States Naval Academy, a Masters in Business Administration from the University of Rhode Island and a Masters in Military Studies from the Air Command and Staff College.

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PROFESSOR GEORGE F. OLIVER III joined the Naval War College in November 2005. Prior to joining the NWC faculty, he served 31 years in the U.S. Army. His last military assignment was with the U.S. Army Center of Military History where he was writing the official history of the U.S. Army in peace operations. Before this position, he spent six months in Iraq as the Deputy Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance for the Coalition Provisional Authority. From 1999–2003, Colonel Oliver served as the Director of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and from 1996–1999, the Military Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. George Oliver earned a Bachelor's degree in Engineering from the United States Military Academy in 1974, a Master of Science degree in Business Administration from the University of South Carolina (1983) and a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College (1996). He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. While on active duty, Oliver served in a variety of light infantry, ranger, Special Forces, and airborne units across the globe including service during the 1990–1991 Gulf War. His interest in peace operations began in 1993, while the Operations Officer for the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Since then he has been involved in several peacekeeping missions, developed U.S. national policy, and analyzed these roles for U.S. forces. Additionally he has taught, written and lectured around the world on the role of the military in peace operations. Professor Oliver is also one of the authors on the United States Army's book on the Gulf War, Certain Victory, and has published many articles.

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PROFESSOR TOM PARKER came to the Naval War College in the fall of 2007 from Raytheon, where he was a Program Manager for the Raytheon Athena Maritime Domain C2 Program. A 1974 graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, with a BA in History, he earned a M.A. in International Studies from Old Dominion University. Commissioned into the Navy in 1976, he was designated a Naval Flight Officer and flew the E-2C Hawkeye, eventually commanding VAW-124 in USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71). He held numerous staff billets included TACAIR analyst in the Secretary of the Navy's Office of Program Appraisal (OPA) and Vice Director of Plans (J5V) at U. S. Space Command. He also established the Maritime Domain Awareness Program Office (J52) at U. S. Northern Command. While at U. S. Space Command, Professor Parker commanded the Delta (Navy) Crew at the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, and the Mobile Command and Control Center (MCCC). Operational tours include various sea going assignments, including Force Tactical Action Officer on the Staff of Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Eight; Operations Officer, USS American (CV-66); and Executive Officer, USS Belleau Wood (LHA-3). He commanded USS Belleau Wood (LHA-3), USS Essex (LHD-2), and USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63). Professor Parker was a Federal Executive Fellow at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California.

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COMMANDER JOSEPH PELLISSIER, USN joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 2007. He holds a B. Arch. (with honors) from the University of Notre Dame and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies (with highest distinction) from the U.S. Naval War College. His previous sea tours included duty on four submarines: USS Ulysses S. Grant (SSBN-631) (Blue), USS Kentucky (SSBN-737) (Blue), USS Springfield (SSN-761), and USS Toledo (SSN-769). His previous shore assignments included PXO lead instructor at the Command Leadership School and Deputy Director of the Naval Command College.
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PROFESSOR JAMES B. PERKINS holds the Emory S. Land Chair of Merchant Marine Affairs. He was a surface warfare officer and commanded six times over a 35-year career. Commands and significant operational assignments include: CO USS Scholfield (FFG 3); COMDESRON Nine (SAG Commander, Operation PRAYING MANTIS); COMNAVMARIANAS (Commander JTF FIERY VIGIL); COMPHIBGRU Three (COMPF, NCC Operation RESTORE HOPE); DCINC, U.S. Southern Command (Acting CINC); and Commander, Military Sealift Command. A 1964 graduate of the Naval Academy, Admiral Perkins also graduated from and holds Master's degrees from the Naval War College (with distinction) and the Naval Post Graduate School (Sigma Xi). Prior to joining the faculty, he was president of L3 Communications/TMA Corporation, a Washington, D.C.-based professional services company.
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COMMANDER PAUL A. POVLOCK, USN, joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 2004 following command of USS San Francisco (SSN-711). He was graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1984 with a B.S. degree in Marine Engineering. His sea tours include duty on USS Lafayette (SSBN-616) (GOLD), USS Richard B. Russell (SSN-687), USS Albuquerque (SSN-706), and USS Philadelphia (SSN-690). Significant shore tours include duty on the Joint Staff as the Navy Branch Chief of the Reconnaissance Operations Division (J38), duty at Central Command Headquarters as the Chief of Effects Synchronization & Plans of the Strategic Effects Division (J5), and as an Instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy. Commander Povlock also holds an M.S. in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Maryland and an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College.
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LIEUTENTANT COLONEL MICHAEL W. RAUHUT reported to the Naval War College faculty in August 2008 following command of 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division. LTC Rauhut's operational experience includes Operations Iraqi Freedom and Provide Comfort. His educational experience includes a Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York and a Master's of Science in Operations Research from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He is a graduate of various Army Infantry courses and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He is joined by his wife Sandy and two children, Hannah and Jacob.
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COLONEL MICHAEL RAMOS, USMC was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in December 1985 after graduating from the University of Virginia with a Bachelor of Science degree

in Electrical Engineering. After completing The Basic School and the Infantry Officers Course, he was assigned to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines where he served as a Rifle Platoon Commander, Heavy Machine-gun Platoon Commander, 81mm Mortar Platoon Commander and Company Executive Officer. He conducted 2 deployments to the Western Pacific while with 1/5. Following this tour, he was transferred to Marine Corps Security Force Company, Panama where he served as Executive Officer. During his tour in Panama, he participated in OPERATIONS JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY. Returning to Quantico in 1992, he attended the Amphibious Warfare School where he graduated with honors. In the summer of 1993, he reported to 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit as the Assistant Operations Officer. He deployed with the 11th MEU (SOC) to Somalia and participated in UN peace enforcement operations, the amphibious withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Somalia (OPERATION QUICKDRAW), and the Noncombatant Evacuation Operation of Americans and Westerners from Burundi (OPERATION DISTANT RUNNER). Upon return to CONUS, he was transferred to 2d Battalion, 5th Marines for duty as Commanding Officer, Company E. While serving with 2/5, he deployed to the Western Pacific with 31st MEU (SOC) as the Heliborne Company Commander. During the summer of 1996, he participated in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the Western Sahara as Operations Officer. He was promoted to Major on 1 September 1996. Upon return to CONUS, he was assigned as the Executive Officer of 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, I Marine Expeditionary Force. In 1999 he attended the Argentine Naval Command and Staff Course. Upon graduation, he was assigned to the Argentine Marine Corps General Staff. In October 2001, he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. Lieutenant Colonel Ramos transferred to HQMC for duty with Plans, Policies, and Operations in April of 2002. In January of 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Ramos assumed command of 1st Battalion, 3d Marines. The battalion deployed to Iraq in August of 2004 as a battalion landing team under 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, and fought initially under the colors of Regimental Combat Team 7. Lieutenant Colonel Ramos led Battalion Landing Team 1/3 as it participated in OPERATION PHANTOM FURY, the assault on the city of al Fallujah, and in OPERATION CITADEL II in support of Iraqi National elections. Following the return to the United States, LtCol Ramos assumed duties as Current Operations Officer, Marine Forces Pacific. Colonel Ramos assumed his present rank on 1 June 2006. From August 2006 through June 2008, Colonel Ramos served as Chief of Training for NATO's Joint Force Training Centre. His personal decorations include the Bronze Star with "V," Meritorious Service Medal with three Gold Stars, the Joint Service Commendation Medal, Marine Corps Commendation Medal with two Gold Stars, Navy Achievement Medal, Combat Action Ribbon with Gold Star, Argentine Naval Cross, and Canadian Land Force Commander's Commendation.

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COLONEL GREG REILLY, ARMOR, USA, joined the Joint Military Operations Department in July of 2007 after graduating with distinction from the College of Naval Warfare. Prior to attending the Naval War College, he commanded the 1st Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, which included two tours in command supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Greg is a Distinguished Military ROTC Graduate from California State University, Sacramento, where he earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics. His assignments include various tours with armored and cavalry units in the United States and in Europe, serving as Platoon Leader, Cavalry Troop Executive Officer, Squadron Logistics Officer, Tank Company Commander, Headquarters Company Commander,

Battalion Operations Officer, Brigade Operations Officer, and Brigade Executive Officer. He also served as the G3 Plans and Chief of Operations in 1st Armored Division. In addition to OIF, his major deployments include serving as the 1st Cavalry Division Battle Captain during Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, tours to Bosnia and Kosovo and recently served on the Strategic Action Group in support of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), Kabul, Afghanistan. He is a graduate of the Field Artillery Officer Basic Course, the U.S. Army Ranger School, Airborne School, Armor Officer Advanced Course, the Army's Command and General Staff College, the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and the College of Naval Warfare.

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CAPTAIN W. J. "JODY" RICHARDSON, JR., USN, was named as the Director, Naval Operational Planner Course (NOPC) in May 2005, following three years of service on the Joint Military Operations faculty as a faculty moderator and JLASS Course Director. He graduated from Louisiana Tech University with a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering in May 1979, was commissioned via the AVROC Program in November 1979, and subsequently earned his wings as a Naval Aviator in May 1981. Five squadron tours ensued from August 1981 to January 1994, including VC-1, NAS Barbers Point, Hawaii, where he served as Assistant Operations Officer and Material Control Officer; VT-21, NAS Kingsville as an Instructor Pilot, A-4 Model Manager and Safety Officer; VF-24, NAS Miramar deploying with CVW-9 in USS Nimitz as Maintenance Training Officer and Pilot Training Officer; VF-124, NAS Miramar as Instructor Pilot, Safety Officer and Tactics Phase Leader; and VF-21, NAF Atsugi, Japan, forward-deployed with CVW-5 in USS Independence as Operations, Safety and Maintenance Officers. In March 1994, he attended the Naval War College, graduating in March 1995 with a Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies. From April 1995 to March 1996, he served in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N889) as Requirements Officer for Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN), Strike U and TACTS Ranges. He reported to NAS Meridian, Mississippi, in April 1996 where he served as Executive Officer and Commanding Officer of VT-7 and as Air Wing Standardization Officer of CTW-1. Following his Command tour, he reported to USS Enterprise in August 1999, assuming duties as Air Boss in March 2000. He departed Enterprise in July 2001 and reported to the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, graduating with a Master of International Strategic Studies in June 2002. CAPT Richardson is a graduate of the Navy Fighter Weapons School and has accumulated over 4,950 flight hours and over 500 carrier-arrested landings.

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PROFESSOR JOHN D. ROBERTS rejoined the Joint Military Operations faculty in May 2002, having taught in the department for two years while on active duty. He retired from the Navy in 2001 following a 30-year career centered around maritime patrol aviation and technology development. He had five tours flying the P-3 Orion, including command of Patrol Squadron TEN and Patrol Wing FIVE. His shore assignments included duty on the Joint Staff as Chief of Detection and Monitoring for Counternarcotics, and Special Assistant to the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Professor Roberts holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the State University of New York at Oswego, a Master of Science from Salve Regina University, and a Master of Arts from the Naval War College.

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LIEUTENTANT COLONEL BRIAN L. ROGERS reported to the Naval War College faculty in June 2008 following completion of a command tour in the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). LTC Rogers' major deployments include Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Operation Uphold Democracy and Operation Iraqi Freedom I and 06-08. His education includes a Bachelor of Science degree from Baptist Bible College in Springfield, Missouri, a Bachelor of Science degree from the Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., and a Master of Arts degree in Adult and Continuing Education from the Kansas State University. He is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic Course, the Quartermaster Officer Advanced Course, the Combined Arms and Service Staff School and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. brian.rogers@nwc.navy.mil

PROFESSOR PAUL A. ROMANSKI reported to the Naval War College in August 1994 as a Navy captain, held the Arleigh Burke Chair of Surface Warfare, and joined the civilian faculty in August 1998. His Navy career included destroyer escort and Combat Logistics Force duty, junk force riverine operations in Vietnam, and shore assignments on the CNO staff, Bureau of Naval Personnel, and Military Sealift Command. He commanded USS Pyro (AE-24), USS Wichita (AOR-1), and composite Task Force 63—Naval Surface Group Mediterranean—Task Force 505 (NATO). He holds Master of Arts degrees from the University of Illinois and the Naval War College, and is pursuing a Ph.D. at Salve Regina University.
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PROFESSOR ANGUS K. ROSS, a 1975 graduate from Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, joined the Naval War College Faculty in September 1996, as an active duty Commander in the Royal Navy, teaching on the Joint Military Operations Faculty until his retirement in February 2000, after 25 years service. A Seaman Officer and ASW Specialist, his naval career included worldwide service in all types of RN surface vessels, from minesweepers to aircraft carriers, staff tours with Squadron and Admiral's staffs (afloat), and a number of seagoing tours with NATO, including COMSTRKFLTLANT. Professor Ross holds a B.S. degree (Honors) in Marine Zoology and Oceanography from Exeter University in the U.K., a Master of Arts (highest distinction) from the Naval War College (CNW 98), and is pursuing a further M.A. degree in European History at Providence College, as well as an eventual Ph.D. in History. After his retirement from active duty, Professor Ross joined the civilian faculty of the College of Distance Education where he continues to teach Joint Military Operations.
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COMMANDER THOMAS C. SASS, USN reported to the Naval War College as the Special Operations Forces Chair in September 2007 after completing a tour as Commanding Officer SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team ONE in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. He completed Basic Underwater SEAL Training in June 1988 with Class 151. He was subsequently assigned to SEAL Team THREE from 1988 to 1992 where he served as a SEAL Platoon Commander. Upon completion of the Basic Italian Language Course at the Defense Language Institute in 1993, he was assigned as an Exchange Officer with the Italian Naval Commando Unit in La Spezia, Italy. He returned to the Naval Special Warfare

Center in 1995 for SEAL Delivery Vehicle School and follow-on assignment to SEAL Delivery Vehicle Task Unit Commander and Department Head on board the USS JAMES K. POLK (SSN 645). From August 1998 to December 2000, he served as an operations and plans officer on the Joint Staff in the Operations Directorate, Special Operations Division. In January 2001, he reported on board Naval Special Warfare Unit TWO, the maritime component command of Special Operations Command Europe, as the Executive Officer. From January 2002 to June 2003, he served as the Flag Aide to the Commander, United States Naval Forces Europe and Commander in Chief, Allied Forces South. Commander Sass earned a Masters of Public Administration degree from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 1998. He completed his duties as the U. S. Navy Admiral Arthur S. Moreau Scholar while assigned to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University from June 2003 to July 2005 where he earned a Masters of Law and Diplomacy and completed requirements for a PhD (ABD).

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PROFESSOR MARK SEAMAN retired as a Captain from the U. S. Navy in June 2008. He graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in May 1979 and was designated a naval aviator in August 1981. His sea tours include Fighter Squadron 32 (1984–1987), deploying aboard both the USS INDEPENDENCE (CV-62) and USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67); and Fighter Squadron 143 (1989–1992) deploying aboard the USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN-69). His major shore tours include Fighter Squadron 101 (1987–1989); a Joint tour with Headquarters North, Kolsas, Norway (1992–1995); Navy Recruiting District, Portland, Oregon as Commanding Officer (1996–1998) and then following a second tour in Norway as the Chief, Naval Plans and Exercises, Joint Headquarters North, Stavanger, Norway, he reported to the U. S. Naval War College in September of 2001, where he served in both the Joint Military Operations Department and the War Gaming Department. He holds a B.S. degree in Naval Science from the U. S. Naval Academy and a M.A. degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U. S. Naval War College.

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PROFESSOR ERIC J. SHAW first joined the faculty of the Naval War College in 1995, serving as the Coast Guard Liaison to the Naval Staff College. He returned upon his retirement from the U.S. Coast Guard at the rank of Captain as commanding officer of Coast Guard Barque Eagle (WIX 327), "America's Tall Ship." His operational career also included assignments as commanding officer of Coast Guard Cutter Legare (WMEC 912), Portsmouth, Virginia; executive officer of the CGC Northland (WMEC 904), Portsmouth, VA; operations officer of CGC Seneca (WMEC 906), Boston, Massachusetts; and combat information center officer and anti-submarine warfare officer of CGC Jarvis (WHEC 725), Honolulu, Hawaii. His afloat service also included navigator of Barque Eagle and deck watch officer aboard CGC Courageous (WMEC 622). Professor Shaw served at the Coast Guard Academy on the faculty, as school chief of the Command and Operations School, and as deputy director of the Coast Guard Leadership Development Center. He inaugurated the Coast Guard liaison position at the Navy Warfare Development Command. His first ashore assignment was as public affairs officer and flag lieutenant to the First Coast Guard District Commander, Boston, Massachusetts. Professor Shaw earned his Bachelor of Science degree in Psychology from Virginia Tech. He holds a Master of Science in Operations Research from the University of New Haven,

a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College, and a Ph.D. in Humanities from Salve Regina University.
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PROFESSOR PAUL J. ST. LAURENT joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 1988 where he held the Frederick J. Horne Chair of Military Logistics. After retiring from the Army in 1991 he joined the JMO faculty in the College of Distance Education. While on active duty Professor St. Laurent served in the Army Corps of Engineers and in the Quartermaster Corps. He has held various command and staff positions in units in Germany, Vietnam, Turkey, and Iceland. He served on the staff of the Army Quartermaster School; as Logistics Support Manager, U.S. Army Troop Support Agency; as Chief, Supply and Services Branch on the Army Staff; and as Assistant Chief of Staff J-4, Iceland Defense Force. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Naval War College. He holds a B.S. from the University of Massachusetts and Masters in European History from Providence College and in Education from Boston University.
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PROFESSOR PATRICK C. SWEENEY joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 1999 as a colonel in the U.S. Army, having completed a tour in NATO as the Chief of Contingency Plans for Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). He was commissioned in the Army as a Field Artillery Officer through the ROTC program at The Citadel in 1973. His tours of duty include a variety of artillery assignments in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Division G3 Ops with the 2d Infantry Division in Korea, a Fire Support Instructor at the U.S. Army Infantry School, command of a Pershing 2 Battery in Germany, Corps Plans Officer and artillery battalion executive officer in XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, followed by an assignment as the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery G3 during DESERT SHIELD/STORM. He commanded an artillery battalion at the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York, and supported the ARFOR HQ during Hurricane Andrew relief operations as well as operations in Somalia and as JTF Chief JOC Chief in Haiti. His most recent assignment at AFSOUTH focused primarily as the Deputy CJ5 for the IFOR mission in Bosnia and as a NATO planner for Kosovo operations. Professor Sweeney is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advance Military Studies, and the Army War College. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration from The Citadel and Master's degrees in Public Administration from Western Kentucky University and Military Arts and Science from the School of Advance Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, and a Ph.D. from Salve Regina University. Professor Sweeney retired from active duty in June 2002 and remained on the faculty.
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COMMANDER N. J. THOMPSON OBE ROYAL NAVY Educated at King's College, Taunton, Neil Thompson joined the Royal Navy in 1981. After flying training, he served in 845 NAS at RNAS Yeovilton as a Wessex HU5 pilot, flying in Ascension Island and Europe before re-training on the Wasp HAS1 in 829 NAS at RNAS Portland. Flight Commander of the Leander-class frigate HMS DIOMEDE, he was the last operational Wasp pilot trained. 1986-88, HMS DIOMEDE saw service in the North Atlantic, South Atlantic (FIs), and Arctic Oceans and the West Indies, Baltic and Mediterranean. He

then converted to the Sea King HC4 before returning to 845 NAS as a Flight Commander and Instrument Rating Instructor in the Commando role, before completing the Qualified Helicopter Instructor course in 1990. He then assumed the role of Commando Operational Flying Training Officer in 707 NAS and achieved his A2 QHI category. As Training Officer 845 NAS, he deployed to Op GRAPPLE in the FRY, where he was awarded the Queen's Commendation for Bravery in the Air (QCBA) for 2 NVG CASEVACs from Srebrenica in 1993. As a Lieutenant Commander, Neil Thompson has served as the Senior Training Officer and Maritime Counter-Terrorism Flight Commander at 848 NAS, where he was involved in UK counter-narcotics and CT ops. As the Senior Pilot (XO) of 845 NAS, he conducted the initial work up and deployments of HMS OCEAN (LPH) as Air Group XO and carried out disaster relief operations in Honduras and Nicaragua in the wake of Hurricane MITCH. Appointed to the newly-formed Joint Helicopter Command HQ at Wilton in 2000, he was the CHF and Littoral Manoeuvre desk officer in J3 before taking up the appointment as CO 846 NAS in January 2003. Taking his squadron into southern Iraq in the wake of the invasion, his squadron saw 7 months of active duty in Basrah. He also commanded the Air Group of HMS OCEAN in 2004 for her exercises off North Carolina. Having handed over his squadron, he took command of the UK's Joint Helicopter Force (Iraq) in 2005. In the last 3 years, he has served as CHF Chief Of Staff (Support), before joining the NWC as an NCC student in 2007. He was invested as an 'Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire' (OBE) for his contribution to the nation's defense by HM the Queen in 2008.

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COMMANDER MARC TRANCHEMONTAGNE, USN, joined the JMO faculty in February 2008. He graduated with BA in Political Science from Norwich University, the Military College of Vermont, in 1989 and was commissioned through NROTC. He attended pipeline training at the Navy Diving and Salvage Training Center, Panama City, Florida and the Surface Warfare Officer School in Newport, Rhode Island. Upon completion of SWOS, he served in USS Brunswick (ATS 3), home ported in Sasebo, Japan, as the Damage Control Assistant, Operations Officer, and Executive Officer. After his initial sea tour, he attended the Naval School of Explosive Ordnance Disposal and reported for duty as OIC of a mobile EOD detachment at EODMU Five in Guam. He served subsequent EOD tours as OIC of a shore detachment at EODMU Three Detachment China Lake, California and Operations Officer at EODMU Eight in Sigonella, Sicily. After graduating from the Naval War College CNC&S course, CDR Tranchemontagne served as Executive Officer at the Navy Experimental Diving Unit in Panama City, Florida. Following his XO tour, CDR Tranchemontagne was selected for a Legislative Fellowship and served for one year on the personal staff of Sen. John Warner of Virginia, then Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. After a year in the Pentagon in the SECNAV Office of Program Appraisal and OPNAV N76, CDR Tranchemontagne reported to the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from which he deployed to Iraq twice as a liaison officer to Multi-National Forces Iraq. CDR Tranchemontagne is a qualified Special Operations and Surface Warfare Officer, Master EOD Technician, Mixed Gas Diver, and Naval Parachutist.

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PROFESSOR MARK VAUGHN joined the JMO staff in September 2004. He holds a B.S. in Business Administration from the Citadel (1986), an M.A. in History from Providence College (1993) and a Ph.D. from the University of Reading, United Kingdom (1999). Previously he has taught graduate and undergraduate courses in Political Science and History at the University of Rhode Island, Roger Williams University, and Providence College. Originally commissioned as an infantry platoon leader, he has also served in logistics and civil affairs positions. As a U.S. Army Reservist he has been activated and deployed to Bosnia for Operation Joint Endeavor (1995-96), Kosovo for Operation JOINT GUARDIAN (1999, 2002) and Iraq for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (2003-04). As a Navy civilian he recently completed a deployment to Iraq (2007-08) where he served as a Government Advisor and Senior Planner for Provincial Reconstruction Team-Baghdad (PRT-B).

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PROFESSOR MILAN VEGO has a B.A. in Naval Science from the former Yugoslav Academy. He also has a Master Mariner's license (1973). Professor Vego served for 12 years as an officer in the former Yugoslav Navy and for four years as 2nd officer (Deck) in the West German merchant marine before obtaining political asylum in the United States in February 1976. He held a variety of menial and clerical jobs (1976–1979) before becoming a freelance writer (1979–1991). He became a naturalized citizen in 1984. Professor Vego was an adjunct professor at George Washington University (1983), the former Defense Intelligence College (1985–1991), and at the War Gaming and Simulations Center, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. (1989–1991) before joining the Naval War College faculty in August 1991. He was a Senior Fellow at the Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia (1985–1987), and the former Soviet Army Studies Office (SASO), U.S. Army Combined Center, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas (1987–1989). Professor Vego is a Croatian native of Capljina, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Professor Vego holds a B.A. in Modern History (1970) and an M.A. in U.S./Latin American History (1973), Belgrade University, and a Ph.D. in Modern European History from George Washington University (1981). Professor Vego's book, *Soviet Navy Today*, was published by Arms and Armour Press (London) in 1986; *Soviet Naval Tactics* was published by the Naval Institute Press in 1992; and *The Austro-Hungarian Naval Policy 1904–1914* was published by Frank Cass Publishers (London) in September 1996. He is the author of *Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas*, published by Franks Cass in 1999 (2nd ed., 2003; Spanish edition, 2003), and the textbook *Operational Warfare*, published by the Naval War College in 2001. His book, *The Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and Execution*, was published by the Naval Institute Press in March 2006. His latest book, *Joint Operational Warfare* was published in February 2008. Professor Vego is a frequent contributor to many professional journals and magazines.

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL TIMOTHY "TIM" WHITE, USAF, reported to the Naval War College in July 2008 following a tour as the Commander, HQ Air Mobility Command Test and Evaluation Squadron where he directed a total force, multi-service team of over 100 personnel testing new and modified aircraft, support equipment, procedures and subsystems supporting major Mobility Air Force acquisition and tactics programs, each coordinated through USAF Major Commands, Joint and Allied test agencies, non-DOD government

agencies and civilian industry. Of note, where the tests of the C-5M "Super Galaxy", C-130J, C-130 AMP, Joint Precision Air Drop System, Joint Cargo Aircraft, DV Airlift Capsule "Steel Eagle", KC-X (now KC-45) test program stand up, C-17 All-weather Formation Flight System, KC-135 Block 45, and the NASA Air Launch Rocket System and new tactical maneuvers for every mobility airframe. Colonel White earned his wings from Vance AFB and is a command pilot with over 3100 hours in the T-38, KC-135A, KC-135Q, KC-135R, KC-135T, Special Operations' RT KC-135R, KC-10A, C-130H, C-5A, C-17A, and E-3 aircraft. He has extensive experience in the KC-135 as a flight training instructor, instructor school trainer, operational instructor/evaluator, and Operations Officer of an Air Refueling Squadron and Operations Support Squadron. Educationally speaking, Colonel White has an MS degree in Adult Education from Troy State University and served as a Squadron Officer School Instructor, teaching USAF and Allied O-3s and equivalents leadership fundamentals. He holds an MA degree in Military Art and Science from Air University, a BA degree in Criminology (specializing in Interrogation Techniques) from the University of South Florida and an AA degree in Criminal Justice. Operationally, he has deployed as a commander of a Special Operations KC-135 Air Refueling Squadron, a combined Special Operations KC-135 & KC-10 Air Refueling Squadron, and a KC-10 Air Refueling Squadron and has deployed 13 times in support of operations NORTHERN WATCH, SOUTHERN WATCH, JOINT ENDEAVOR, DENY FLIGHT, VIGILANT WARRIOR, ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM.

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COURSE FOUNDATIONS

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COURSE FOUNDATIONS

A. Focus:

This module will establish the conditions for the trimester; it will focus upon the challenges ahead, introduce the students to general requirements of the course, and address foundational concepts of the Joint Maritime Operations Course and how it fits into the overall officer development plan of the Naval War College.

B. Description:

The introductory module is aimed at a broad discussion of the themes and concepts of the course. The first module is foundational to follow-on course modules that will span the range of topics from theory to application.

The JMO student body is diverse. Each student's path to the Naval War College has been unique; the foundational sessions are intended to provide each student with a common intellectual framework and a clear indication of the demanding requirements of the course prior to beginning the study of operational art.

To begin the module, the chairman of the Joint Military Operations Department will greet the incoming class and will provide an overview of the Joint Maritime Operations course. A foundational series of lectures begins with an examination of what is unique about the United States and the U.S. Navy and how each distinct culture views warfare. In the same vein, a lecture on the range of military operations will demonstrate the many options open to contemporary military staff officers when planning to achieve a given objective or series of objectives. Next, students will return to the seminar to discuss how the national military organization is constructed to address those given objectives using a joint fighting force. Finally, a lecture will compare and contrast the planning processes of each military service and will provide insight into each service's decision-making characteristics when incorporated into a joint fighting force.

To help each student prepare for a trimester-long research and writing assignment, a session dedicated to the operations research paper will be conducted to discuss the associated requirements and methodologies for success.

No matter what path a student has taken to the Naval War College, there is much to be gained from the reading assignments, lecturers, moderators, and fellow students. Each student needs to be prepared for class and ready to participate in classroom discussions and to learn from colleagues with diverse backgrounds from other services, other countries, and other agencies. It is a time to learn and reflect.

JMO CHAIRMAN'S WELCOME AND COURSE OVERVIEW (Lecture)

Extraordinary as it may appear, the naval officer whose principal business is to fight is not taught the higher branches of his profession. The U.S. is not singular in this respect. The defect is common to nearly all navies and is an inheritance of a past and less enlightened age. But with the recent revolution in naval warfare comes a demand for a higher order of talent in the conduct of naval operations.

—Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, 8 August 1877
Founder and First President of the Naval War College

A. Focus:

The chairman of the Joint Military Operations Department (JMO) will greet the incoming class and will present an overview of the Joint Maritime Operations Course.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the mission of the Naval War College.
- Understand the objectives of the Joint Maritime Operations Course.

C. Background:

During this course, we will study how to effectively wield the military instrument of power, in peace and war, in order to achieve national policy goals. We will examine the power relationships at two levels, strategic and operational, which incorporate the varying perspectives of the Legislative and the Executive branches of government. Our focus will be upon joint operations at the theater- and task-force level; however, national-level strategy formulation, implementation, and campaigning will also be discussed. This course is designed to prepare U.S. and international military officers and civilians to (1) effectively apply the joint/navy planning process to meet national security challenges; (2) creatively apply operational art in maritime, joint, interagency, and multinational environments; (3) exercise critical thought, particularly as it pertains to operational level decision making and leadership; (4) efficiently conduct staff officer duties on major operational staffs; and (5) understand the maritime dimensions of operational warfare. Once grounded in operational art, JMO students learn to identify joint operating area objectives to achieve national, theater-strategic, and operational objectives, as well as to develop operational designs, using naval and joint doctrine.

We will review current theory of operational art, compare it to the doctrinal basis for contemporary application of military power, and begin to distill the next generation of doctrine for our armed forces. We will examine how current operational art theory and the doctrinal basis for the U.S. Armed Forces, while based upon our understanding of Industrial Age warfare and nation-state relationships, will continue to evolve in the Information Age. This course will challenge students to comprehend how joint warfare and crisis resolution in the 21st Century are evolving and the role of a joint maritime force in that evolution.

The point of contact for this session is Captain James Cook, USN, C-205.

D. Required Reading:

U.S. Naval War College. *Joint Maritime Operations Syllabus and Study Guide for Joint Maritime Operations 2009*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2009. Read: Course Description.

THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR (Lecture)

Nothing is more annoying in the ordinary intercourse of life than this irritable patriotism of the Americans.

—Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*

A. Focus:

This lecture traces American approaches to war and examines the relationships among conventional and unconventional warfare, professional versus citizen soldiers, and preparedness versus naiveté and a lack of preparedness—issues that have characterized the American way of war. Throughout this course of study, it is important to understand the historical context and resulting American mindset for the use of military force.

B. Objective:

- Understand American perceptions of war.

C. Background:

Every nation has a predisposition for how it fights wars as the result of its own culture and experience. For the United States, history has shown that there is a strong dependence on mobilization, a penchant for technology, a tendency toward rapid action once engaged with an enemy, a willingness to use a high level of violence, and an acceptance of precipitous demobilization and rapid return to "normal" peacetime activities.

The American way of war is a unique approach to national defense, based in part upon a pioneer spirit, aggressive action, and a prejudice against standing armies and long-term conflicts. From the early years of the Republic to the mid-20th century, there was a disconnect between U.S. military doctrine and education and the missions our armed forces were actually called upon to accomplish—a gap that often led to problems in the conduct of military operations, particularly when dealing with "small wars." The United States has also oscillated between splendid isolation and pernicious engagement around the globe. Furthermore, American doctrine and policy may say the country fights as part of a team, yet all too often it has taken a unilateral approach.

These inherent military characteristics have helped to foster a distinct American cultural heritage. An examination of America's historic approach to war is designed to help each Naval War College student understand the country's political, social, and cultural evolution and how that history may affect the way it will fight in the future.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Jeff Barker, C-431.

D. Questions:

What are the key characteristics of the "American way of war?"

Do current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan fit into the American way of war?

How does American heritage affect the planning and conduct of campaigns and military operations?

How long will the current emphasis on counterinsurgency operations last?

Is the American way of war changing?

What is the impact of the new administration upon the American way of war?

E. Required Reading:

Meilinger, Phillip S. "American Military Culture and Strategy," *Joint Force Quarterly*. 46 (3rd Quarter 2007): 80-86. (**NWC 1028**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Cunliffe, Marcus. *Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America 1775–1865*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968.

Millett, Alan R., and Peter Maslowski. *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*. New York: Free Press, 1994.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations,* Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1.

Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. The Macmillan Wars of the United States, ed. Louis Morton. New York: Macmillan, 1973.

INTRODUCTORY SEMINAR

I was rather excited at the prospect of meeting Kurtz very soon.

—Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*

A. Focus:

This session is devoted to the introduction of seminar faculty and student members, a review of the administrative requirements and procedures for the trimester, an introductory discussion of the operations research paper, and the general ground rules of seminar conduct.

B. Objectives:

- Discover the rich and diverse backgrounds and areas of expertise gathered together in the seminar.
- Comprehend seminar guidelines for conduct and evaluations.
- Discuss the interconnections and linkages of JMO to National Security Decision Making and Strategy & Policy curricula.
- Highlight important information found in the syllabus, specifically: reading, writing, research, and examination requirements; the schedule; grading criteria; and faculty expectations.
- Discuss other social and administrative matters.

C. Background:

The introductory session provides the opportunity to recognize faculty and student background and expertise, and for moderators and students to discuss relevant social and administrative matters pertaining to the conduct of the seminar.

In preparation for the seminar, students are asked to complete a short, one-page questionnaire, which was distributed to student mailboxes and will be collected at the beginning of the session.

The operations research paper, discussed in more detail in a later session, is also introduced.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Jeff Barker, C-431.

D. Required Reading:

U.S. Naval War College. *Operations Paper: Guidance for Students.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 2009. (**NWC 2062U**).

E. Supplementary Readings:

None.

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS (Lecture/Seminar)

The conduct of small wars is in certain respects an art by itself, diverging widely from what is adapted to the conditions of regular warfare, but not so widely that there are not in all its branches points which permit comparisons to be established.

—Colonel C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice,* 1906

Like it or not, most of you will find yourselves in a place you never heard of, doing things you never wanted to do.

—General John Shalikashvili, CJCS (1993–1997), Addressing U.S. Troops, Spring 1994

A. Focus:

This session takes a descriptive term—the range of military operations, or ROMO—and uses it to pose a problem to the military professional: How can a military force designed to conduct certain kinds of campaigns perform other tasks without losing its ability to gain victory in the campaigns for which it was designed? After all, we don't ask police departments to put out fires, and we don't ask the fire department to fight crime. We want fire and police personnel to be professionals—specialists at solving certain kinds of dangerous problems. So how can we expect a military force designed mainly for one set of tasks to perform a whole range of tasks successfully? How can professionals be anything other than amateurs when they act outside their primary field of expertise?

B. Objectives:

- Understand what "ROMO" means. Grasp the total range of military operations.
- Understand the implications of the ROMO for military operations and military planning.
- Understand the implications of the ROMO for the military profession.
- Comprehend means for solving planning problems across the ROMO.

C. Background:

The current concept of ROMO found in Joint Publication 3-0 (*Joint Operations*) is defined as: (a) peacetime military engagement, (b) security cooperation, (c) deterrence, (d) crisis response, and (e) major conventional military operations and campaigns. This doctrinal concept of ROMO eliminates the traditional boundary between conventional and other military operations, such as stability and reconstruction.

As noted already in this course, the U.S. military has historically preferred to focus on large-scale conventional warfare against similar opponents where the objectives were relatively clear and where the war itself was relatively short. Despite this preference, U.S. military forces have found themselves throughout their history conducting operations falling short of conventional war, and U.S. forces will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, for example, has to date comprised several weeks of conventional combat operations followed by more than five years of belligerent occupation, stability, and counterinsurgency operations. Nearly seven years

after quickly routing the Taliban in Afghanistan, the United States and its allies are still conducting significant operations (of several kinds) there.

The history of thinking about unconventional conflicts within the U.S. military is interesting. In 1940, the U.S. Marine Corps published its *Small Wars Manual* that codified the experience gained by Marines in conflicts in places like Central America. In the 1960s, the term "small wars" was replaced by "counterinsurgency" as U.S. forces became heavily engaged in Vietnam. In the 1970s, "counterinsurgency" was replaced by "low intensity conflict" (LIC). In the 1980s, "low intensity conflict" was dropped in favor of "military operations other than war" (MOOTW).

Critics of "military operations other than war" argued that there was no hard and fast line between conventional military operations and MOOTW. At the tactical level, according to the critics, ambushes, patrols, and gunfights were what they had always been, even if the enemy was not wearing a regulation uniform or serving as part of a conventional military force. The critics—who were mostly military or retired military officers—eventually got their way, and MOOTW was replaced by "operations other than war" (OOTW). But OOTW never became the dominant term. It coexisted with other terms, including "complex contingency operations," "peace operations," and "stability and support operations." The existence of these different but related terms is a sign of the complexity of the missions included in the ROMO, and it is also a sign that many of these missions will have to be dealt with by a combination of agencies and organizations.

The challenges confronting the U.S. military today are as dramatic as any challenges the military services have confronted during the last century. The concept designed to enable military professionals to comprehend these challenges is the "range of military operations." The ROMO concept assumes that conventional military forces can at any time successfully conduct operations across a spectrum of operations so wide that there may be little in common between operations at one end of the spectrum and those at the other. But how can you apply the operational factors of time, space, and force across the ROMO? What are the essential operational functions that must be fulfilled at any given point along the range of military operations? These are just some of the difficult questions addressed by the lecture and seminar.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Tom Hone, C-406.

D. Questions:

How should you think about operational functions once you get away from conventional war and consider operations such as peace-keeping and reconstruction?

Is there a generic operations planning model that can be effective across the entire ROMO?

What parts of the ROMO present tame problems? What parts present wicked problems?

How do political objectives vary across the ROMO? What effect do different political objectives have on the selection of operational objectives?

How can you—as a professional—prepare yourself to think and act effectively through the range of military operations?

E. Required Readings:

Fishel, John T. "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night." *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* 4 (Winter 1995): 372–398. (**NWC 3077**).

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations,* Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1. Read: Chapter 1, "Strategic Context." (Issued).

Waghelstein, John D. "Preparing the U.S. Army for the Wrong War: Educational and Doctrinal Failure 1865–1891." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 10 (1999): 1–33. (**NWC 3113**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Boot, Max. *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*. New York: Basic Books, 2003.

Callwell, C. E. *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice.* 3rd ed. London: General Staff, 1906.

Mason, Philip. *A Matter of Honour, An Account of the Indian Army, Its Officers and Men*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974. (Especially Chapter 1)

Porch, Douglas. *Wars of Empire*. London: Cassell, 2000.

U.S. Marine Corps. *Small Wars Manual.* With an Introduction by Ronald Schaffer. Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press. [Originally published 1940].

White, Jeffrey B. "Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare." *Studies in Intelligence* 39, no. 5 (1996): 51–57.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH PAPER (Seminar)

Although one can think without writing (and) one can write without thinking, these are not, ultimately, separate activities. I am not much impressed when a student tells me that he has thought A-Plus thoughts but has written them in C-Minus language. We do not think wordlessly and later put our thoughts into words. Language is a medium of thought as well as of expression; we think in and with words, just as we speak and write with words. In short, I believe that muddy writing is, more often than not, a symptom of muddy thinking. If I cannot say clearly what I want to say, I probably haven't thought it out clearly. Taking the time to think can do wonders for our writing.

—Inis L. Claude, Jr.

A. Focus:

This seminar amplifies operations research paper requirements addressed in the Introductory Seminar. The operations research paper provides an objective way for students to demonstrate competence at the Master's degree level. Further, it is an essential part of the curriculum, affording the opportunity to address a topic relevant to any of the syllabus lessons. This seminar addresses specific paper requirements, including guidance on research and writing, due dates, grading criteria, and appropriate research topics.

B. Objectives:

- Discuss the production of formal written work addressing contemporary issues in one of the following joint professional learning areas: joint warfare; the theater or operational level of war; operational art; joint operational planning processes; integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities and force employment; information operations, command, control, or domain awareness; and joint force leadership development; or a topic of current interest to a theater or operational level commander.
- Develop and refine original ideas in military operations through research and analysis to advance operational and joint critical thinking. Address topics that reflect current and future operational issues of interest to Service and joint staffs, and operational level commanders.
- Discuss producing papers worthy of publication in professional journals and military periodicals.
- Describe the process for competitive prizes and awards offered by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Naval War College, and other sources.

C. Background:

The operations research paper provides the opportunity to study a theater or operational level issue, conduct research and analysis, and prepare a paper that advances the literature in the selected area. It enables students to address topics that they believe are of significant value. It requires independent thought and competent writing because the final product should be suitable for publication in a professional journal. The range and depth of research should be adequate to support the student's approach and justify sufficiently the conclusions and recommendations or lessons learned. Another use of the

paper is to contribute innovative thinking to Service component and joint force staffs involved with the many complex issues of military force employment.

Combatant commanders, operating forces, and headquarters staffs solicit papers and monographs on topics of current interest to support initiatives, develop concepts, and provide fresh looks at the methods of accomplishing missions. The Naval War College is canvassed frequently for papers on particular subjects and is requested to stimulate interest in specific areas for research and writing to support requesting commands. A recent example is innovation in the application of naval force—how to accomplish the goal of fighting *smarter* rather than fighting with *more*. While some aspects of this project fall outside the parameters of the operations research paper requirement, many of the issues therein are JMO applicable. These especially include doing the right things and doing them right—the result of integrating effectiveness and efficiency.

1. ***Requirements.*** The operations research paper requires the following:
   a. A thesis: A definitive position that the paper will aim to defend, support, or justify.
   b. Sufficient research to analyze the thesis properly.
   c. Arguments and counterarguments that allow thorough contrast of conflicting points of view.
   d. Logical conclusions drawn from the material presented within the paper.
   e. Recommendations or lessons learned, as appropriate, demonstrating the paper's relevance to the modern operational commander.
2. ***Topics.*** Topics should be taken from one of the following areas:
   a. A current issue at the operational level of war.
   b. Operational art or the use of operational art to analyze a case.
   c. An option in support of a military strategy, operational concept, or a new doctrinal concept.
   d. An issue dealing with joint, interagency, multinational planning, execution, tasks, or functions at the operational level of war.
   e. Force employment innovation, such as the application of naval force at the operational level of war.
   f. A topic that applies to current, near-term, or future major operations or campaigns.
   g. A topic of value to an operational level commander.

NOTE: The operations research paper should not be an examination of tactics, technology, force structure, or future force planning concepts. Also, it should not be a library search and recitation of published material. The paper should not contain proposals or recommendations regarding numbers and types of weapon platforms, nor modifications to platforms, weapons, sensors, or force structure (i.e., it must not be an NSDM-type force planning paper). Moderators will answer any questions on specific issues relating to topic selection.

Required reading **NWC 2062U** contains the JMO chairman's guidance for selecting a

suitable topic and crafting a research question. It also contains candidate topical areas from requesting commands, a list of topics dealing with the operational level of war, extracts on the awards program, and instructions for submission of papers to professional journals. **NWC 2062U** is an excellent resource for developing ideas and selecting a topic.

3. ***Paper Proposal.*** In the format of enclosure (1) to **NWC 2062U**, students shall submit paper proposals to their moderators. The proposal will state the student's thesis, approach, relevance, and methodology so that the moderators may determine if the paper will satisfy JMO course requirements. The acceptance of proposal by a moderator constitutes an understanding between the student and the moderator grading team. An accepted proposal means that the student and the moderators understand in common the depth of research, extent of analysis, and quality of writing expected of the student, in addition to the requirements that are discussed in paragraph 1 of this section.

4. ***Research and Writing.*** Research and writing shall meet graduate-level standards. Student attention is directed to the *Naval War College Student Handbook*, and the *Naval War College Writing and Style Guide,* which discuss the academic honor code and specifically prohibit cheating, plagiarism, and misrepresentation.

5. ***Format.*** *The Naval War College Writing and Style Guide* is the standard for unclassified written work. Guidance for classified papers is available from the moderators.

6. ***Report Document Page.*** The final version of the paper submitted to the faculty requires a Standard Form (SF) 298 as the Report Document Page. A blank SF-298 template is posted on the JMO CNC&S/NSC web portal in the JMO Templates folder. Double click on CNCS-NSC 2009 – JMO Paper Template.

7. ***Length.*** The text of the operations research paper should be 14 to 17 double-spaced pages in Times New Roman font size 12 to meet standard format parameters for publication and award submissions. Your moderators may accept longer papers depending on paper purpose and topic, but this acceptance must be obtained prior to paper submission.

8. ***Faculty Advisor.*** A paper advisor may help a student define the scope of the research effort; keep research, analysis, and writing on track; and review outlines and drafts. While students are not required to have an advisor, one is strongly recommended. Your seminar moderators can suggest appropriate advisors depending on paper topic.

9. ***Grading.*** The operations research paper represents a substantial portion of the JMO Course grade. The paper will be evaluated for both substance and writing quality. Grades will be based on the criteria specified in the JMO syllabus.

10. ***Prizes and Awards.*** Operations research papers may compete for the prizes and awards bestowed annually during the June graduation ceremony. Students are encouraged to prepare their papers with the additional purpose of competing for one or more of these honors. Details are included in reading **NWC 2062U**.

11. ***Schedule:***

27 February 2009: Submit paper proposal to seminar moderators.

3-6 March 2009:	Conduct individual tutorials per schedule arranged with moderators; moderators and student agree on research topic and course of action.
10 April 2009:	Suggested date to terminate research, commence analysis and writing.
23 April 2009:	Suggested latest date for submission of final draft to faculty advisor.
4 May 2009:	Operations research paper due to moderators.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Paul Romanski, MLH-136.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Required Readings:

U.S. Naval War College. *Operations Paper: Guidance for Students.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 2009. (**NWC 2062U**).

U.S. Naval War College. *Naval War College Writing and Style Guide.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, August 2007. (Posted on the JMO website and at http://nwcintranet/library/).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Booth, Wayne C., Gregory G. Colomb, and Joseph M. Williams. *The Craft of Research.* 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.

Strunk, William, Jr. *The Elements of Style.* 4th ed. With revisions, an introduction, and a chapter on writing by E.B. White. New York: Macmillan, 1999.

U.S. Naval War College, Naval War College Library. *Research in the Library.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, published annually.

U.S. Naval War College. *Student Handbook, 2008–2009.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2008.

THE NAVAL WAY OF WAR (Lecture)

Do not refer to the captain by name. He is The Captain.

—Recruit's Handbook, *U.S.S. West Virginia* (1935)

A. Focus:

This lecture addresses how and why the present-day U.S. Navy acts as it does. The lecture examines the historical context within which the Navy has developed its way of doing business and illustrates how and why naval warfare is uniquely different from other types of warfare. This lecture will enhance students' understanding of the naval culture, specifically the naval traditions of planning and conducting operations, especially as they affect joint operations.

B. Objective:

Enhance student comprehension of the naval culture, specifically the naval traditions of planning and conducting operations, especially as they affect joint operations.

C. Background:

In its two centuries of existence, the Navy has developed unique ways of defining, planning, and conducting its operations, distinct from those of the other military services. These experiences are codified in its organization, doctrine, and operating procedures, as well as in less obvious informal usages and patterns of assumptions and beliefs. These include deeply held beliefs about how decisions should be made, the place of the naval services in the implementation of national policy, command relations and the importance of discretion for subordinates, the relationship of plans to operations, the relationship of technology to naval warfare, and the appropriate relationship of the naval services to the other military services in the conduct of joint operations. These patterns are reinforced by professional training programs, career patterns, and day-to-day operations and, although subject to change, they tend to lag changes in immediate circumstances.

The peculiar American way of naval war has been and continues to be conditioned by the fundamental characteristics of naval warfare; the historical era during which the Navy was created and formed; U.S. national policy; the technologies of naval warfare, developments in thinking about naval warfare; operational experience, especially pivotal points of success and failure; and relations with the other military services.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D.W. Chisholm, C-422.

D. Questions:

What are the main challenges of naval warfare that distinguish it from land warfare?

What are the similarities between naval warfare and land warfare?

Why is naval culture considered unique?

What has the information age done to change the character of naval warfare?

Does the U.S. Navy have coherent doctrine?

E. Required Reading:

Note: This reading will also be used for Session OPS 2-1 (Classical Military Thinkers and Operational Art).

Vego, Milan, *Naval Classical Thinkers,* Naval War College, Newport, 2008. (**NWC 1005**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Baer, George. *One Hundred Years of Seapower: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1994.

Barlow, Jeffrey. *The Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995.

Chisholm, Donald. *Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793–1941*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2001.

Clark, Vern. "Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities." U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 128 (October 2002): 32–41.

Coletta, Paolo E. *The United States Navy and Defense Unification, 1947–1953*. Newark: Univ. of Delaware Press, 1981.

Davis, Vincent A. *Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943–1946*. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1966.

Herrick, Walter R., Jr. *The American Naval Revolution*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1966.

Huntington, Samuel P. "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy." *Naval War College Review* (May 1954): 483–493.

Karsten, Peter. *The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism*. New York: Free Press, 1972.

McKee, Christopher. *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Navy Officer Corps, 1795–1815*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Spector, Ronald. *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977.

Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout. *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776–1918*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1946.

Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout. *Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918–1922*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1943.

Uhlig, Frank, Jr. *How Navies Fight: The U.S. Navy and Its Allies*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

U.S. Navy. *Forward . . . From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997.

Vlahos, Michael. *The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919–1941*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1980.

Wylie, Joseph C., Jr. "Why a Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor." U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 83 (1957): 811–817.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR (Seminar)

Under the glass top of Nimitz' desk were several cards bearing military slogans, and in a central position one small card with a list: "Objective, Offensive, Surprise, Superiority of Force at Point of Contact, Simplicity, Security, Movement, Economy of Force, Cooperation." Some people call such lists "principles of war," but Nimitz thought of his merely as reminders, a check-off list of things to be considered before launching an operation . . .

—*E.B. Potter*, Nimitz

A. Focus:

This session will examine the principles of war as listed in current joint doctrine.

B. Objectives:

- Understand current joint doctrine regarding the principles of war and how that perspective may continue to evolve.
- Understand how to apply the theory of the principles of war in planning.

C. Background:

Historians and military leaders have studied past wars in hope of uncovering the underlying principles that might explain the foundation of victory or the root cause of defeat. Once discovered, those underlying principles then serve as a framework for conducting future operations. However, blind adherence to such principles when developing doctrine can be problematic. The principles of war should be reexamined after the introduction of new technology or new cultural influences; in other words, they should evolve. Therefore, the list of principles of war is not intended to be a recipe but rather a guide that, when appropriately applied in time and space, can enhance the probability of success.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Jeff Barker, C-431.

D. Questions:

Admiral Mahan wrote that principles are "fundamental truths correctly formulated. They are nothing more than the proper conclusions from the observation of a large number of naval campaigns in the past." He also said "historical examples are more valuable than principles, because by being narrative of the past events they are a story of practical experience." What do you think he meant? Are his suggestions still valid?

Although the principles vary in name, number, and definition from nation to nation, each country finds that it is important for military officers to know that certain principles exist. Why do the armed forces of most nations accept the general validity of certain fundamental principles of war and teach them to each new generation of officers?

What can you learn about a nation's culture from its principles of war?

What risks are introduced by strict adherence to principles of war?

What are the risks of not understanding principles of war?

E. Required Readings:

Brodie, Bernard. "The Worth of the Principles of War," lecture delivered 7 March 1957 to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. (**NWC 1057**).

Brown, C.R. "The Principles of War." *US Naval Institute Proceedings* 75, (June 1949): 621-633. (**NWC 1025**) (Scan).

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations,* Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1. Read: II-1to II-4 and Appendix A. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "Operational Maneuver," *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: VII-53-VII-72. (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Glenn, Russell W. "No More Principles of War?" *Parameters* 28 (Spring 1998): 48–66.

Morgan, John G., Rear Admiral, USN, and McIvor, Anthony D. "Rethinking the Principles of War." *US Naval Institute Proceedings* 129, (October 2003): 34–38.

Murdock, Paul. "Principles of War on the Network-Centric Battlefield: Mass and Economy of Force." *Parameter*s 32 (Spring 2002): 86–95.

Nelson, Bradford K. "Applying the Principles of War in Information Operations." *Military Review* 78 (September–November 1998): 31–35.

U.S. NATIONAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Seminar)

. . . Our National Security. This is the most basic commitment of America's government, and the greatest responsibility of an American President. Our nation's ideals inspire the world, but our nation's ships and planes and armies must defend these ideals and sustain our allies and friends.

—President George W. Bush, February 2001

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the organization and roles of the Department of Defense (DOD) and its components, and on the methods and doctrine employed to achieve unity of effort, if not unity of command. The seminar will begin with an analysis of the role of the DOD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—with particular emphasis on the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders, the services, and the reserve components. The seminar discussion will also examine the current plan for the organization of U.S. military forces throughout the world and the authority granted to a joint commander.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the purpose, roles, functions, and relationships of the President and the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council (NSC), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), combatant commanders, joint force commanders (JFCs), service component commanders, and combat support organizations.
- Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
- Comprehend the relationships among all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements, including homeland security and defense.

C. Background:

The National Security Act of 1947 was the first legislative attempt to achieve unity of military effort in U.S. history. The Act merged the functions of the War Department and Navy Department into the Department of Defense under a single cabinet-level post and also established the JCS as a permanent organization. After nearly 40 years of legislative tweaking, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 brought sweeping changes to the Department. Two of the principal aims of this legislation were to reduce the effects of service parochialism on defense policy and to improve unity of effort with the armed services by increasing the authority of the unified combatant commanders.

The Unified Command Plan (UCP) is a document that is approved and signed by the President. The UCP establishes combatant commands and assigns them missions and responsibilities (including geographic boundaries). Since its inception under President Truman, the UCP has been updated to reflect the national security requirements of the United States and the Department of Defense.

The most current UCP established USAFRICOM as a geographic combatant command (command authority) and updated the responsibilities of each combatant commander. Other recent changes have reflected the need the need for interagency cooperation and coordination.

Today, U.S. military forces are directed through a chain of command with two distinct branches. The operational direction of combatant forces is accomplished through a chain of command, which runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, directly to the combatant commanders, with communications running through the chairman of the JCS. For matters not involving operational direction of combatant forces, guidance is issued through the administrative branch of the chain of command from the President, through the Secretary of Defense to secretaries of the military departments. The administrative branch prepares military forces for the operational branch to employ in accordance with the orders of the President.

The type of authority any commander will exercise depends upon the specifically delineated command relationship that exists. A thorough understanding of command relationships is essential in joint operations. Some important command relationships that will be discussed during the seminar are:

Combatant command (command authority) (COCOM)

Operational control (OPCON)

Tactical control (TACON)

Support

Administrative control (ADCON)

Coordinating authority (COORDAUTH)

The point of contact for this session is Professor Jeff Barker, C-431.

D. Questions:

What changes would you recommend to improve the current Unified Command Plan?

How do regional combatant commanders address issues at the seams of their geographic areas of responsibility?

What are some of the issues that cause friction between the operational chain of command and the administrative chain of command?

Is the UCP more important during times of crisis, war, or stability?

What are some of the challenges for an officer on the joint staff when dealing with the staffs of combatant commanders?

What are some of the attributes and challenges of the supported and supporting command relationships?

How does a functional combatant commander with a global mission accomplish that mission in a geographic region that is the assigned to another combatant commander?

What can be done to minimize friction when dealing with other agencies?

What are the unique challenges one could expect from an assignment at USAFRICOM?

E. Required Readings:

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Washington, DC: CJCS, 14 May 2007. Scan chapters I and II, read chapters III and IV (Section A).

U.S. Government Accountability Office. *Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on the Progress and Challenges Associated with Establishing the U.S. Africa Command,* GAO-08-947T. Washington, DC: GAO,15 July 2008. (**NWC 1016**).

Jablonski, David. "Eisenhower and the Origins of Unified Command." *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 1999–2000): 24–31. (**NWC 1052**).

F. Supplementary Reading:

Gates, Robert. *Unified Command Plan 2008*. (In the Naval War College Classified Library, call no. UA 23.3 U6 2008)

U.S. Government Accountability Office. *Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues,* GAO-08-251. April 2008.

Chiarelli, Peter W. "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols." *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 2 (Autumn 1993): 71–81.

INTRODUCTION TO PLANNING (Lecture)

Plans are useless, but planning is everything.

—General Dwight D. Eisenhower

A. Focus:

This lecture will focus on military planning in general and will identify various processes used within the Department of Defense.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend broad insights into the variety of service and joint planning processes; discuss why we plan, how we plan and for whom we plan; and how planning supports the Commander's decision process in the modern joint force at the operational level of war.
- Discuss the concept of regressive planning and operational-level planning that is the focus of the course.

C. Background:

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 5, *Planning,* presents an excellent synopsis of what plans and planning are. Generally, "planning" is the art and science of envisioning a desired future and laying out effective ways of bringing it about. It is a preparation process. In planning, we draw a significant distinction between a process (a dynamic system of related activities) and a procedure (a prescribed sequence of steps for accomplishing some specified task). The planning process may often involve the use of procedures to perform certain tasks, but planning overall is too complex and situation-dependent to be treated as a routine procedure.

Planning is also a process rather than merely an act because it involves a number of ongoing, iterative, and interdependent activities. Since situations (or the information available about them) continuously change and the problems we are asked to resolve are ill-structured, we must adapt our plans as time allows. Planning is a process that should build upon itself—each step should create a new understanding of the situation that becomes the point of departure for new plans. Planning for a particular action only stops with execution and even then through a process of continuous assessment; adaptation continues during execution.

Planning encompasses two basic functions: envisioning a desired future and arranging a configuration of potential actions in time and space that will allow us to realize that future. Planning is thus a way of determining how to move from a current state to a more desirable future state, even if it does not allow us to control the transition precisely.

We should consider planning a learning process, as mental preparation that improves our understanding of a given situation. In its simplest terms, planning is thinking before doing. Even if the plan is not executed precisely as envisioned—and few ever are—the process should result in a deeper situational awareness that improves future decision making. We should thus think of planning as a learning activity that facilitates the exercise of judgment and not as merely a mechanical, algorithmic procedure.

What then, is a plan? Generically, a plan may be any product of planning. It may be a formal, articulated document with all associated annexes and appendices or an informal scheme orally presented. Since planning is an ongoing process, it may be well considered to think of a plan as an interim product based on the information and understanding known at the moment and always subject to revision as new information and understanding emerge. A plan is thus a structured configuration of actions in time and space envisioned for the future. A plan is the basis for action, cooperation, and adaptation. Most military plans are arranged hierarchically, as plans for one echelon are nested within the plans of higher echelons.

This lecture will address why we plan, how we plan, and for whom we plan. It is intended to set the stage for the upcoming trimester and provide an overarching introduction to military planning.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Bill Hartig, Room C-428.

D. Questions:

Do the current planning models (JOPP, JOPES, MDMP, NPP, etc.) provide sufficient rigor to analyze ill-structured problems and develop solutions to them? If not, then what method(s) is (are) better?

How is planning related to command and control?

What is the relationship in planning between time and certainty?

How are plans and planning related to orders?

E. Required Readings:

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations,* Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1. Read: IV-1–IV-6. (Issued.)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning,* Washington, DC: CJCS, 26 December 2006. Read: ix–xviii. (Issued.)

Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5-500, *Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design Version 1.0.* (28 January 2008). Read: 4–12.

https://ca.dtic.mil/doctrine/interactive/courses/planning/course.htm. This link directs the student to a DOCNET website and opens an online course to Planning Joint Operations. DOCNET courses are a series of online multimedia presentations of key joint doctrine information. Also located on the JMO web portal.

F. Supplemental Readings:

None.

MODULE TWO
OPERATIONAL ART: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS

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INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONAL ART: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS

A. Focus:

Joint Maritime Operations Course Module Two sessions will prepare students by introducing foundational themes and concepts that permeate the entire course. The study of operational art in planning for war is emphasized during this module. Operational art prepares students for the entire range of military operations by introducing and developing theoretical constructs and then applying those fundamentals at the operational level of war.

B. Description:

The operational art sessions of this module are the framework for understanding operational concepts discussed throughout the course. The study of operational art, fundamental elements of warfare, and basic operational/campaign planning is essential to the understanding and comprehension of the operational level of war. The most important aspect is a thorough understanding of the terms related to operational art.

Since each student's path to the Naval War College is unique, the operational art portion of this module may be completely new to some and more familiar to others. No matter what a student's background, there is a wealth of invaluable material to be gained from each assigned reading. Preparation and participation are essential; students are expected to be prepared to participate in classroom discussions with colleagues from a variety of backgrounds and experience.

The operational art module will include the following:

- Discussion of the theoretical components of operational art
- Moderator-led application of the concepts using the Leyte Gulf case study
- Student application of the concepts using the Falklands/Malvinas case study
- A written examination that will gauge each student's understanding of the concepts of operational art.

In the profession of arms, the study of operational art will be perpetual. Although introductory in nature, this module is a prerequisite to operational planning and Joint warfare. Naval War College graduates will be expected to understand the basic concepts of operational art and its importance across the range of military operations.

CLASSICAL MILITARY THINKERS and OPERATIONAL ART (Lecture/Seminar)

Theory exists so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield.

—Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (1832)

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is upon the key ideas of the leading classical thinkers of land, naval, and air warfare, respectively, and the influence of those thinkers upon modern warfare and the impact upon current thinking regarding future warfare.

B. Objectives/Outcomes:

- Comprehend the influence of the classical thinkers who had a major impact on the development of operational art.
- Know and understand the thinking of the leading theoreticians of land, naval, and air warfare.
- Understand the key ideas of the classical thinkers of naval and air warfare and their influence on the respective service way of warfare.
- Know and understand the influence of classical military thinkers of the development of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force doctrine.

C. Background:

The complexity and trends in modern warfare cannot be fully understood without comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the theories espoused by corresponding thinkers of warfare at sea, on land, and in the air in the modern era. The classical military thinkers influenced not only professional military education but also the development of service and joint doctrine. Their influence is also felt in many ways on the military policies and strategies of many nations, sometimes in the most insidious ways.

The ideas of some classical military thinkers were not widely accepted in their own time. They were either too far ahead of their time, or their ideas were too controversial; however, each of them contributed to our knowledge and understanding of both theory and practice of modern warfare.

The main purpose of this session is not to be an advocate for any of the classical military thinkers but rather to present to the student a collection of ideas based on the writings of the classical thinkers. It would be a serious mistake for a student to dismiss entirely the works of any particular classical military thinker simply because those ideas do not correspond to one's views or might be unacceptable for a given service. Each of the classical military thinkers has something to offer; no classical military thinker espoused ideas that might be considered as either totally one-sided or altogether wrong. Students who leave behind their preconceptions and then critically study a variety and number of classical military thinkers will benefit the most.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Milan Vego, C-427.

D. Questions:

Explain and analyze Clausewitz's understanding of the operational level of war.

Is Clausewitz's concept of weight of the main effort (*Schwerpunkt)* identical to what modern theoreticians and practitioners refer as center of gravity?

What were Jomini's basic theories and his approach to warfighting? Are they valid today?

What were Jomini's main theoretical contributions to the emergence of the operational level of war?

What were the general principles of war that became a central theme of Jomini's writings? Do Jomini's principles of war have a place in modern war?

What was Mahan's view on the command of the sea and the methods of obtaining it?

What was the influence of Jomini on Mahan's theories of naval warfare?

What was Clausewitz's influence on Corbett's writing?

What were Corbett's ideas on sea control? How do his ideas differ from those of Mahan?

Explain the influence of the early airpower proponents on the development of U.S. and British doctrine of strategic bombing. Are these influences still felt and, if so, in what way?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan, *Naval Classical Thinkers,* Naval War College, Newport, 2008. (**NWC 1005).**

Paret, Peter. "Clausewitz." In *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret, et al. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986. Read: 186–213. (**NWC 2007**).

Shy, John. "Jomini." In *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret, et al. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986. Read: 143–185. (**NWC 2014**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Castex, Raoul. *Strategic Theories*. Selections, translated and edited, with an introduction by Eugenia C. Kiesling. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

Colomb, Phillip H. *Naval Warfare. Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated.* Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990.

Corbett, Julian S., *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988, reprint of 1911 edition.

Douhet, Giulio. *The Command of the Air*. Translated by Dino Ferrari. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983.

Jomini, Antoine Henri de. *The Art of War*. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1992.

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783*. New York: Dover, 1987.

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1919.

Mahan, Alfred T. *Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1975.

Meilinger, Phillip, ed. *The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory*. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Univ. Press, 1997.

Paret, Peter, et al., eds. *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986.

Robertson, Scot. *The Development of RAF Strategic Bombing Doctrine, 1919–1939*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995.

Schurman, D. M. *Julian S. Corbett, 1854–1922: Historian of British Maritime Policy from Drake to Jellicoe*. London: Royal Historical Society, 1981.

Wegener, Wolfgang. *The Naval Strategy of the World War*. Translated with an introduction and notes by Holger H. Herwig. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989.

INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONAL ART (Seminar)

Spruance, you did a damn fine job there . . . no matter what people tell you, your decision was correct.

—Admiral King to Admiral Spruance after the Battle of the Philippine Sea

In war there is no second prize; there is seldom a second chance.

—Naval Manual of Operational Planning, 1948

A. Focus:

This session defines and explains what operational art is. It examines the emergence of the operational level of war, the relationship between theory and the practice of operational warfare, the main features of operational art, and the mutual relationship between operational art and strategy.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the meaning of the term "operational art."
- Know and understand the relationship between theory and practice of operational art.
- Know selected definitions and basic concepts used in studying operational art.
- Appreciate why it is important to understand and apply operational art.
- Know the main factors that led to the emergence of operational art in military thought and operational planning.
- Understand the linkage between operational art and strategy and tactics and doctrine.
- Understand how operational art developed in the U.S. military.

C. Background:

Operational art, one of the three components of military art, is inextricably linked with the strategy and tactics components. Operational art is applied across the entire range of military operations. In its essence, operational art deals with both the theory and the practice of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns aimed to accomplish operational or strategic objectives in a given theater. Proper application of the tenets of operational warfare allows a smaller but better trained and skillfully led force guided by a sound strategy to defeat a much stronger opponent relatively quickly and decisively. The proper application of operational art helps the commander to avoid attrition warfare.

Operational art is not a new area of study and practice. Its roots can be traced to wars fought in ancient times. It emerged as the result of the cumulative influences of military technological advances, societal changes coupled with changes in the character and practice of war, and the writings of the leading military theoreticians on the campaigns of the great military leaders. The first elements of modern operational warfare emerged during the wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815) when

the advent of mass armies allowed commanders to conduct wide-ranging movements aimed at accomplishing operational and strategic objectives in a theater. The operational level of war emerged in the latter part of the 19th century due to the cumulative effects of new technological developments (e.g., steam engine, railroads, internal combustion engine, undersea cable, longer-range and more lethal field guns and infantry weapons, telegraph, radio, etc.), industrialization, and changes in society (e.g., rise of nationalism, increasing role of public opinion, etc.). Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Sr. (1800–1891) was the first who fully integrated the new technological advances and changes in military organization in planning and execution of highly successful campaigns in the Wars of German Unification (1864, 1866, and 1870–1871).

Many elements of modern operational warfare were practiced in the American Civil War (1861–1865) and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. A large number of campaigns and the first major joint operations were conducted on land and at sea during World War I. The lessons of World War I, combined with new technological advances, led to new operational concepts in the inter-war years. Likewise, the theoretical foundations of operational art at sea and in the air were developed in the 1920s and 1930s. The Soviets were in the forefront in developing the theory of planning and conducting major operations on land, at sea, and in the air.

World War II represented a culmination in the practice of operational art. Numerous major operations on land, at sea, and in the air, along with multiple land and maritime campaigns, were conducted by all of the major belligerents. Allied victories in the Pacific were due largely to a combination of realistic strategy and sound operational thinking. In Europe, operational brilliance on the part of Germany was the principal factor in her early victories of World War II. As the war dragged on, that operational thinking enabled Germany to avoid defeat longer than its flawed strategy should have allowed.

In the aftermath of World War II, interest in the theoretical study and practical application of operational art steadily declined in the West. The decline in operational thinking in the West was due to several factors; probably most important was the belief that because of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles there would be no need for large-scale conventional operations. Also, the fixation on insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare led many western theoreticians and practitioners to believe that the time of major operations and campaigns was a thing of the past. In contrast, the Soviets and other communist-controlled armies continued to pay attention to the theoretical study of operational art in the postwar years.

A renewal of interest in operational art in the West started in the late 1970s. The U.S. Army took the early lead and remains the principal champion of operational art among the U.S. services. The Army's influence is strongly felt in all U.S. joint doctrinal documents. The British Army embraced operational art starting in the 1980s (as shown by its manual *Operations* in 1994) as has, more recently, the Royal Navy (*The Fundamentals of British Naval Doctrine*, 1995). The German Bundeswehr doctrine (H. Dv. 100/100 *Truppenfuehrung*) had always incorporated many elements of operational art. The French Army adopted operational art as the core of its doctrine in July 1993. The Swiss Army published its operational doctrine (OF 95 *Operative Fuehrung*) in 1994. More recently, NATO published AJP-1(A) *Allied Joint Operations Doctrine* that

encompasses many tenets of operational art. The Russians and all the armies of the communist and former communist-ruled countries retained essentially the former Soviet views and teachings on operational art.

The theory and practice of operational art continuously affect each other. Practice preceded theory, and then theory paved the way for the practical application of new operational concepts. Practice always should be followed by extensive and vigorous debate among theoreticians regarding operational decisions made, actions taken, and lessons learned. Obviously, only the practical application of a new operational concept can prove its soundness or show that it needs to be modified or even discarded.

The combat employment of ground, naval, or air/space forces has many commonalties, but there are also many variations. This is due mainly to vast differences in the "medium" (land, sea/ocean, air, and space) where they operate and the types of weapon platforms each service possesses. Therefore, it can be argued that each service develops and practices its own operational art, while the joint employment of forces is guided by "joint" operational art. Regardless of whether we accept the existence of operational art within an individual service, it is clear that the joint force commander must fully know and understand the distinctions in the employment of all forces under his command.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Dave Carrington, C-414.

D. Questions:

Why do we need to know and understand the key aspects of operational art?

What were the main factors that led to the emergence of operational warfare in the nineteenth century?

What is the relationship of operational art to strategy and tactics?

To what extent will new technology change the importance of operational art?

What is the future of operational art?

Can operational art be applied across the range of military operations?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan. "On Operational Art." Part I: Fundamentals. In *Joint Operational Warfare*, Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007.
Read: I-3—I-13 and I-15—I-34. (Issued.)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations,* Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1.
Read: IV-2—IV-3. (Issued.)

F. Supplementary Readings:

Adams, Dwight L., and Clayton R. Newell. "Operational Art in the Joint and Combined Arenas." (Parameters. June 1988).

Allen, Ralph L. "Piercing the Veil of Operational Art." Parameters. (Winter 1986).

Hattendorf, John B. *Naval History and Maritime Strategy: Collected Essays*. Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing, 2000.

Krause, Michael, D., and Cody R. Phillips, eds. *Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art.* Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, Department of the Army, 2006.

Matheny, Michael R. "The Roots of Modern American Operational Art." Carlisle, PA, Army War College.

Naveh, Shimon. *In Pursuit of Excellence: Evolution of Operational Theory*. London: Frank Cass, 1997.

Newell, Clayton R. "Exploring the Operational Perspective." Parameters. (Autumn 1986).

Record, Jeffrey. "Operational Brilliance, Strategic Incompetence: The Military Reformers and the German Model." Parameters. (Autumn 1986).

Schneider, James J. "Theoretical Implications of Operational Art." *Military Review* (September 1990).

Vego, Milan. "Glossary of Operational Terms." In *Joint Operational Warfare.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007.

Vego, Milan. *The Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and Execution*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2006.

OPERATIONAL ART & DOCTRINE; SERVICE CULTURE (Seminar)

Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.

—General George H. Decker, USA
(quoted in Joint Publication 1)

Operational art provides a framework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations.

—Milan Vego

A. Focus:

This lesson will begin by examining the respective cultures of the various U.S. services and how those cultures affect the services' differing views of doctrine. Next we'll look at how service doctrine and joint doctrine are related. Finally we'll develop the relationship between operational art and doctrine and see how a thorough understanding of operational art provides the foundation for the development of robust doctrine.

B. Objectives:

- Contrast the different perspectives (cultures) of the U.S. military services.
- Examine the relationship and fundamental differences between doctrine and operational art.
- Examine the varying roles and importance of written doctrine for each of the U.S. military services.
- Understand the relationship between U.S. joint doctrine and service doctrine.

C. Background:

1. Operational Art

In modern war, a sound strategy alone is insufficient to ensure victory. Likewise, a combat force trained in tactics and capable of winning battles against the strongest foe is inadequate by itself to ensure overall victory. An effective combination of strategy and tactics must exist in order to achieve victory. That need for the integration of tactics and strategy is the reason for the emergence of the intermediate area of theoretical study and practice called operational art.

Operational art provides the fundamental structure necessary to successfully link military and tactical actions to national security and military strategies. Joint operational art allows commanders to efficiently arrange and synchronize joint forces in time, space, and purpose.

Operational theory and practice should always be consistent with operational realities; otherwise, the operational concepts, no matter how well conceived, are almost certain to fail. For example, history shows that a focus on technology at the expense of operational thinking can preclude success against an opponent who, though not having the most advanced weapons and equipment, has developed superior operational concepts. In a war between two strong opponents, victory will go to the side that thinks more clearly and acts faster and with greater determination. This of course does not deny the need for more advanced weapons and equipment than one's opponent; however, superior

thought processes, complemented by a historical awareness, is far more critical than technology.

The American study and practice of operational art began after the War of 1812 and recurred intermittently over the next century. During the period between the twentieth century's two world wars, operational art (under the label of "strategy" and influenced chiefly by the operational concepts of Clausewitz), permeated the conceptual innovations of this extraordinarily productive period. The success of joint and combined campaigns in World War II reflected a sophisticated underpinning of operational art in U.S. military campaign planning and execution. The war's immediate aftermath saw a major revision of the military's publications; these new editions were enriched with a deft blend of superb, operational thinking and the practical wisdom of experienced campaigners.

Then, with nuclear weapons proliferation and the belief that the next war would be nuclear and short, such thinking receded, this time for nearly three decades. The trauma of the Vietnam experience compelled a reassessment. With the leadership of William DePuy, Donn Starry, and others in the U.S. Army, operational art reemerged. This time the term, "operational art" entered the American lexicon, and the 1982 Army doctrine clearly identified it. During the subsequent years, this thinking about operational art has extended throughout the U.S. military's training and educational institutions as a foundation upon which doctrine is built. Today's military publications library reflects a significant and growing influence of operational art concepts.

2. Doctrine

Every military service operates in a unique environment, employing forces (ground, air, space or naval) in accordance with war fighting methods developed over many years and optimized for each service-unique environment. These methods constitute each service's doctrine. Relatively recently, joint doctrine has been established to prescribe the methodology that will facilitate integrated, multi-service operations to achieve national and theater-level objectives. An extensive joint publications system, with a topical hierarchy and a prescribed development process, exists to ensure that sufficient authoritative joint operations guidance exists to "fundamentally shape the way we think about and train for war."

Doctrine, both service and joint, must evolve as influencing factors change. Modern history is replete with failed rulers and defeated nations whose doctrine failed to change or changed incorrectly because of a fatal misinterpretation of influencing factors and/or an ignorance of the operational concepts upon which predecessor doctrine was founded. Doctrine, by its nature, involves specific application of general insights regarding "how to fight," as influenced by relevant political and military perspectives, economic factors, geography, weapon systems, etc. Thus, effective doctrine is clearly a derivative of sound operational art.

Because the forces and assets of each service must train and fight synergistically with those of the other services as elements of joint or coalition forces, our study of operational art begins with a review of the services' doctrinal perspectives and then proceeds to a consideration of operational art as applied to joint operations.

A key point to remember as we start into the analysis of operational art and its many components is that military "truths" established and verified through history have

evolved from experience and lessons learned, for the most part, in combat. Many of these truths will remain valid and vital to future joint military planning and operations, even as technology and concepts such as "network centric warfare" and the "system of systems" approach evolve. However, some of our doctrinal thinking may no longer be relevant in that context. The challenge ahead is to discern what to keep and what to discard. Understanding the historical, theoretical, and practical underpinnings of doctrine, that is, operational art, is vital for the development of sound future doctrine.

The point of contact for this lesson is Professor Chet Helms, C-404.

D. Questions:

To what extent do contemporary assertions about service culture capture the essence of our military services?

What is doctrine?

Paul Johnston claims that culture is more important than doctrine in determining how a service fights. To what extent is he right?

To what extent are current service perspectives on doctrine distinct? Why might each service have a different view of doctrine?

How does specific service doctrine relate to joint doctrine?

What factors influence doctrine (both service and joint)?

Why is published joint doctrine almost always out-of-date and compromised?

What is operational art?

Consistent and correct terminology application is vital to clear communications. Vego claims that the usage of terminology in our joint doctrine is frequently incorrect. What fundamental issue do you think creates this problem?

What is the difference(s) between operational art and doctrine? How are they related? Which is more dynamic? Why?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Military Operations Department. "Perspectives on Service Culture: Developing an Awareness of the Impact of Culture in the Planning Group," ILC version. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2008. (**NWC 2070**).

Johnston, Paul, "Doctrine Is Not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behavior of Armies." *Parameters* (Autumn 2000), 30–39. Read: All pages. (**NWC 1013**).

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "The Joint Doctrine Story," In *Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer*, 10 September 2001. Read: 91–93. Note: This reading has been extracted from historical doctrine. (**NWC 2059**).

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,* Joint Pub 1, 14 May 2007. Read: Appendix A.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning,* Washington, DC: CJCS, 26 December 2006. Read: IV-1–IV-2. (Issued.)

Vego, Milan, "On Operational Art," Part I: Fundamentals, in *Joint Operational Warfare,* Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2007. Read: I-3–I-11. (Issued).

Vego, Milan, "The Problem of Common Terminology." *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 43, (4th Quarter 2006). Read: 44–49. (**NWC 1019**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Builder, Carl H., *Masks of War*. Baltimore: The Rand Corporation/Johns Hopkins Press, 1991. (Seminar Reserve).

Hughes, Wayne P., Jr., Capt, USN (Ret). "The Power in Doctrine." *Naval War College Review,* (Summer 1995).

Meilinger, Phillip S. "American Military Culture and Strategy." *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 46, (3rd Quarter, 2007).

Meilinger, Phillip S., Col, USAF. "Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power." *Airpower Journal* (Spring 1996).

Toffler, Alvin, and Heidi Toffler. "Air Land Battle." Chapter 7 in *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century,* Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1993.

Tritten, James J. "Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine." *Naval War College Review* (Spring 1995).

Waghelstein, John D. "Preparing the U.S. Army for the Wrong War, Educational and Doctrinal Failure, 1865–91." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 10, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 1–33.

LEYTE OPERATION: STRATEGIC SETTING (Lecture)

I shall return.

—General Douglas MacArthur, March 30, 1942

I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God, our forces stand again on Philippine soil.

—General Douglas MacArthur, October 17, 1944

A. Focus:

This lesson introduces the historical case study for operational art. It provides the strategic and operational background for the October 1944 Allied invasion of the Philippines and the Leyte Gulf operation.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the concept and execution of operations associated with the invasion (and defense) of Leyte from both Allied and Japanese perspectives.
- Understand how this major operation supported the Central Pacific Campaign in World War II.

Understand the impact of strategy and policy upon operations.

C. Background:

One of the best descriptions of the thinking behind whether or not to bypass the Philippines is given in Robert Ross Smith's essay, "Luzon Versus Formosa," in *Command Decisions* published by the Office of the Chief of Military History. He states eloquently:

> One of the thorniest problems of strategic planning for the war against Japan was to decide whether the principal objective of drives that had brought the Allies into the western Pacific should be Luzon or Formosa. The decision was made by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, since the Pacific was an American area of strategic responsibility. They made it after long debate and careful study of the views of the commanders in the Central and Southwest Pacific theaters. Among the considerations that determined their choice when they finally made it, logistical factors played the major role, but here, as in other connections, they had to take into account the commitments and progress of the Allies in other theaters, and particularly in Europe. It was in this sense a decision in global strategy.[1]

The Leyte Gulf operation was the largest and most complex sea-air conflict (four separate battles over two days) in history. As the final showdown between the United States and Japanese fleets, this one major joint/combined operation involved enormous naval (282 American, Japanese, and Australian ships) and air forces in huge areas and over vast distances (the operation spanned over 100,000 square miles). As such, the operation provides superior illustrations of virtually all aspects of operational art and remains directly relevant to joint operations in the littorals today.

[1] Robert Ross Smith's essay is a supplementary reading for this session. It is available online, and there are several copies of *Command Decisions* in the Naval War College library.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Jeff Barker, C-431.

D. Question:

Based on the information available at the time, which course of action would you have recommended?

E. Required Readings: Even though this session is a lecture, we will be referring to the information in these readings throughout this module of instruction.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. *Leyte,* vol. 12 of *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II.* Chicago: Univ. of Illinois Press. (Issued). Read: Chapter I (pp. 1–18); Scan: Chapters II and III (pp. 19-54).

Cannon, M. Hanlin. "The Strategic Plan," "The Nature of the Target," "Plans Are Made and Forces Are Readied," and Appendix A. In *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific*. Washington, DC: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1954. Read: 1–32. (**NWC 2032**).

Field, James A. "The October Situation." Chapter 1 in *The Japanese at Leyte Gulf*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1947. Read: 1–14. (**NWC 2033**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Barbey, Daniel E. *MacArthur's Amphibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious Force Operations, 1943–1945*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1977.

Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. COMINCH P-008, *Amphibious Operations: Invasion of the Philippines, October 1944 to January 1945*. Washington, DC: Navy Department, 1945.

Cutler, Thomas J. *The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 23–26 October 1944*. New York: HarperCollins, 1994.

Potter, E.B. "The Battle of Leyte Gulf." Chapter 41 in *Sea Power*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1960.

Smith, Robert Ross. "Luzon Versus Formosa" in *Command Decisions* by the Office of the Chief of Military History. Washington, DC: United States Army, 1960. (also available online at http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_0.htm or in the NWC library under call no.: D743 .U44 1960.)

MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND THE LEVELS OF WAR (Seminar)

Pursue one great decisive aim with force and determination—a maxim which should take first place among all causes of victory.

—Carl von Clausewitz, *Principles of War* 1812

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is on the discussion and analysis of desired strategic end state; political and military strategic objective; scale of the military objectives and the process of determining and articulating the military objectives; and the relationships between the military objectives and corresponding levels of war.

B. Objectives:

- Know and understand the linkage of policy, strategy, and operational art in terms of the political and military strategic objectives to be accomplished.
- Examine the interrelationship among the four elements of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) and how *objectives* relate to the *desired strategic end state*.
- Comprehend the meaning of the military objective and differences among strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.
- Know and understand the process of determining and articulating a military objective.
- Understand the relationship between the military objectives and desired effects to be achieved.
- Comprehend how the elements of the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy relate to the theater and operational levels of war.
- Examine the relationship between the levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) and the objectives.

C. Background:

The objective to be accomplished comprises the very heart of both the theory and the practice of war. Without a clearly stated and attainable objective, the entire military effort becomes essentially pointless. This is particularly true at the operational and strategic levels of war because the stakes are so much higher than at the tactical level. Almost all aspects of operational warfare are related, either directly or indirectly, to the objective to be accomplished. Among other things, the objective determines the method of one's combat force employment, the size of the physical space for accomplishing it, the level of war, and also the level of command, type of planning, and major phases and elements of one's combat force employment.

In generic terms, the objective can also be understood as the "purpose" of the actions one carries out within a specific space and time. Military objectives are those that, by their nature, location, purpose, or potential use, would make an effective contribution to

military action, or whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would offer a definitive military advantage.

Tactical, operational, and strategic objectives are differentiated according to their scale. In generic terms, a strategic objective can be described as the one whose destruction, annihilation, neutralization, or control will have a drastic (or radical) effect on the course and outcome of a war as a whole. Correspondingly, the accomplishment of a strategic objective should have a drastic or radical effect on the situation in a part of or the entire theater (of war).

A distinction is made between the national (or alliance/coalition) strategic objective and the military strategic objective. In the case of a country potentially waging war in two or more theaters, there will also be a need to accomplish the theater-strategic objective in each theater. In war, the accomplishment of a national or alliance/coalition strategic objective should end the enemy's organized resistance and the hostilities in a given theater of war.

Normally, a national or alliance/coalition strategic objective cannot be accomplished with a single step but requires the achievement of two or more intermediate steps or military strategic or theater-strategic objectives. The accomplishment of each of these subordinate strategic objectives should lead to a drastic change in the military situation in a given theater of war and would also represent a distinctive phase in a war as a whole.

Because of its scale and complexity, a military strategic or theater-strategic objective cannot be accomplished by a single act; several intermediate steps—or operational objectives—have to be accomplished to achieve the entire military or theater-strategic objective. Depending on the respective strength of the friendly and enemy forces, the characteristics of the physical environment, and other aspects of the situation, the intermediate objectives can be accomplished in succession and/or simultaneously. The accomplishment of each operational objective should lead to drastic or radical change in the situation in a given declared (or undeclared) theater of operations.

An operational objective also has to be divided into several intermediate—or tactical—objectives. These, in turn, can be major or minor in scale. The accomplishment of a major tactical objective should represent a major step toward accomplishing the respective operational objective and should also lead to a drastic change in the situation in a given area of operations. The accomplishment of a minor tactical objective should directly contribute to achieving the respective major tactical objective and also result in a drastic change in the situation in a given combat zone or sector.

A military objective is normally divided into a number of constituent parts—called tasks—that, when carried out, will collectively lead to the objective's accomplishment. Tasks are those measurable entities that allow the commander to properly determine the rate of progress toward the accomplishment of a given military objective.

The operational commander and the planners must also give a great deal of thought to anticipating the possible effects (also called consequences or results) of the accomplishment of the military objective. This is not a science, but rather an art. Much

depends on the commander's knowledge and understanding of the enemy and all aspects of both the military and nonmilitary situation. There are also many pitfalls in the process which, in turn, make any prediction on the possible effects tenuous at best.

The scale and complexity of the military objective to be accomplished determine the level of war to be conducted. The larger the military objective, the higher the level of war. Thus, three basic levels of war exist: strategic, operational, and tactical. The strategic level of war can be divided into two sublevels: national-strategic and theater-strategic.

The theater-strategic level of war is conducted in a specific theater (of war). In the case of a global conflict such as World War II, several campaigns were conducted sequentially and/or simultaneously in a given theater of war. The operational level of war takes place in a formally (or informally) declared theater of operations. Then a single campaign is normally conducted to accomplish a single theater or military strategic objective. The tactical level of war is conducted in a small part of the theater, ranging from a combat zone or sector to an area of operations. This is the level of war at which one's own and enemy forces are engaged to accomplish their respective major or minor tactical objectives through the conduct of battles, engagements, strikes, attacks, and other tactical actions. These actions take place in all three physical mediums.

Although related, levels of war and levels of command are not identical. The first nominally exist only in time of war and deal exclusively with the employment of one's sources of military and nonmilitary power to accomplish specific military objectives. Normally, levels of command exist in time of peace and in war. They are only prerequisites for conducting war at a given level in the course of accomplishing assigned military objectives. Yet if the respective theater commander does not apply the tenets of operational art in the employment of his sources of power and instead focuses on tactics or, even worse, pure targeteering, he does not conduct war at the operational or theater-strategic level.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Milan Vego, C-427

D. Questions:

What is the desired strategic end state and what are its main elements?

Discuss the relationship between the desired strategic end state and political strategic objective.

Discuss the importance of the military objectives in theory and practice of operational warfare.

What is the relationship between the military objective and its constituent tasks?

Discuss the process of determining the military objective.

What are the distinctions among tactical, operational, and strategic physical objectives? Why it is important to properly understand these distinctions?

What is the relationship between the military objective and the corresponding level of war?

Why it is important to know and understand the differences among respective levels of

war?

Some theorists claim that technology has compressed the levels of war to the point that the differences are no longer significant. Do you agree?

What are the distinctions between levels of command and levels of war? How important are they, and why?

Leyte Case Study

Discuss the ultimate strategic objective in the Philippine Campaign and its intermediate objectives. Did General MacArthur properly determine intermediate operational objectives for that campaign?

Identify and discuss Allied tactical and operational objectives on land in the Leyte operation (Operation King II).

What were Allied operational objectives at sea and in the air in the Leyte operation?

Were the allied operational objectives on land properly determined?

Discuss the Allied tactical objectives at sea during the battle of Leyte on 24–27 October 1944.

What were the Japanese theater-strategic and operational objectives in defense of the Philippines?

What were the theater-strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war in the Leyte Operation?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan, "Policy-Strategy-Operational Art Nexus," In *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2007. Read: I-44–I-49 (section on desired strategic end state and strategic objective). (Issued.)

Vego, Milan, "Military Objectives and the Levels of War." In *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2007. Read: II-3–II-23. (Issued.)

Morison, Samuel Eliot. *Leyte,* Volume 12 of *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II.* Chicago: Univ. of Illinois Press. Read Chapter IV. Read: 55 to73. (Issued.)

B. H. Liddell Hart, "The Objective in War: National Object and Military Aim," A Lecture Delivered at the Naval War College on 24 September 1952," *Naval War College Review* V no. 4, December 1952. (**NWC 2044**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

MacGregor, Douglas A. "Future Battle: The Merging Levels of War." *Parameters* (Winter 1992–93): 33–47.

Vego, Milan, "Objectives of Land Warfare," In *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2007. II-25–II-43.

Vego, Milan, "Objectives of Air Warfare," In *Joint Operational* . Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2007. II-63–II-93.

U.S. Office of the President. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, DC: March 2006.

U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense. *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: March 2005.

OPERATIONAL FACTORS (Seminar)

It is only when we have reached agreement on the names and concepts that we can hope to progress with clearness and ease in the examination of the topic, and be assured of finding ourselves on the same platform with our readers.

—Carl von Clausewitz

Those who do not know the conditions of mountains and forests, hazardous defiles, marshes, and swamps, cannot conduct the march of an army.

—Sun Tzu

A. Focus:

This lesson addresses the most basic foundational aspect of operational art—the operation factors of space, time, and force and the interrelationship of those factors in working to achieve operational objectives.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the operational factors of space, time, and force.
- Understand the interrelationship between the operational factors.
- Comprehend the process by which the operational commander balances operational factors against each other in order to achieve operational objectives.

C. Background:

At the most basic level, operational factors are simply the factors of space, time, and force in relation to a given objective. War is a monumental undertaking; understanding the operational factors of space, time, and force helps a commander and staff to organize complex planning and preparation for war into a calculated and logical process. Operational factors provide a link between the science and art of operational planning.

1. Processes:

a. Consider and evaluate the enemy's factors of space, time, and force in determining one's own military objective.

b. Evaluate one's own factors of space, time, and force.

c. Analyze interrelationships between friendly and enemy factors.

d. Balance or harmonize friendly factors with the assigned operational or strategic objective. The key for obtaining larger freedom to act is to balance disadvantages in one factor with the surplus or advantage in another.

The first two steps can be viewed as the scientific portion of the analysis. The last two steps can be a difficult, complicated, and time-consuming process. They are also more art than science. Most of the past's successful military leaders possessed an uncanny ability to assess and then balance the factors of space, time, and force versus the assigned operational or strategic objectives.

2. General Considerations:

a. Operational commanders and their staffs may or may not be able to choose the space in which they will be forced to wage war, but their ability to shape the

operational environment is essential.

b. The gain or loss of space in itself is not inherently an advantage or disadvantage; what matters most is the relationship between space and military forces available to influence the enemy's ability to react.

c. Of the factors, only time cannot be regained.

d. The size, shape, and nature of a space will affect the quantity and type of force employed as well as the time required to conduct a successful military operation. While space or geography alone cannot determine the success of a military effort, the relationship between space and force can be decisive.

e. Without credible force, time and space lose much of their significance.

f. Special distances and force size and type have a relationship with time.

g. Information and law are increasing in importance. Currently, they are considered within other factors in our analysis. In the future, these may become factors themselves.

h. A smaller force can require more time and dictate a smaller space for achievement of objectives, while a larger force may allow faster action in a larger space.

Operational factors must be considered early in the development of campaigns or major operations. For an experienced practitioner of operational art, they are often an intuitive consideration. During the rest of the semester, operational factors will be considered explicitly to ensure thorough analysis.

The point of contact for this session is Commander Neil J. Thompson OBE, Royal Navy, C-426.

D. Questions:

What are the relationships between the operational factors space/time, space/force, and time/force?

How does a staff balance the operational factors space/time, space/force, and time/force?

Have technology and information reduced the importance of factor space?

Is information a new operational factor?

What is the difference between combat potential and combat power? Is it possible to assess the tangible factor of force precisely? Are smaller forces the trend in the future? Why or why not?

To what extent are the operational factors still critical for success in planning and executing major operations and campaigns in the information age?

Leyte Case Study:

How did the force available affect Japanese plans for Leyte Gulf? To what extent were these plans executable?

How did the Allies balance the operational factors of space, time, and force at the Battle of Leyte Gulf? How did the Japanese?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan. *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2007. Read: III-3–III-74. (Issued.)

Cannon, M. Hanlin. "The Strategic Plan," "The Nature of the Target," "Plans Are Made and Forces Are Readied," and Appendix A. In *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific*. Washington, DC: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1954. Read: 10–14. (**NWC 2032**). Note: These pages were also assigned for session OPS 2-4.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations,* Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1. Read: IV-3. (Issued.)

"The Battle for Leyte Gulf." Naval War College Interactive CD-ROM. (**NWC 2040**). (Issued.)

F. Supplementary Readings:

Anderson, Charles Robert. "Leyte" in *U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II,* Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1994. www.history.army.mil/brochures/leyte/leyte.htm

Cannon, M. Hamlin. *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific*. Washington, DC: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1954.

THE THEATER: ITS STRUCTURE AND GEOMETRY (Seminar)

Tactics make the steps from which operational leaps are assembled; strategy points out the path.

—Faculty member, Frunze Academy, USSR, 1927

A. Focus:

This lesson will examine the natural and artificial features of the theater. Examples from the Battle of Leyte Gulf are used to illustrate the influence of geography and strategic objectives on the formation of a theater.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend how national policy can impact the creation of a theater structure.
- Comprehend how peacetime and wartime theaters can be designed.
- Understand the distinct elements of a maritime theater.
- Analyze a current or historical case with respect to the key elements of theater geometry including interior vs. exterior positions, base of operations, physical objectives, decisive points, lines of operations, and lines of communications.

C. Background:

After the military objectives and methods of combat forces employment are determined, the next step is to determine the size of the physical space required for basing, deployment, combat employment, and logistical support and sustainment of the forces assigned to accomplish respective military objectives. This is one of the first and most important organizational decisions made by the higher commander. In generic terms, the size of physical space ranges from combat zones/sectors and areas of operations to theaters of operations and theaters of war.

In U.S. terms, the geographic combatant commander's area of responsibility (AOR) encompasses a theater. In the case of two or more regional conflicts, the commander's AOR might be declared a theater of war. In the case of a major regional conflict (e.g., the Gulf War of 1990–1991 or Operation IRAQI FREEDOM of 2003), a part of the combatant commander's AOR can be delineated and formally (or informally) declared a theater of operations. It is there where the operational level of command is established, and the operational level of war is conducted. A single campaign is conducted in a respective theater of operations. A major operation is normally conducted in an area of operations, while tactical actions take place in a given combat sector/zone.

Any theater contains natural and artificial features called "theater elements" or "theater geometry" that significantly affect the planning and execution of military action at any level of war. The main elements of any theater are positions, distances, bases of operations, physical objectives, decisive points, lines of operations, lines of retreat, and lines of communications—any of which may have tactical, operational, or even strategic significance. A key to evaluating the military importance of these features is not only their number and characteristics but also their relative position and distance from each other—the geometry of the situation. Therefore, it is critically important that operational commanders and their staffs know and understand the advantages and disadvantages of these elements to ensure the most effective employment of friendly forces.

The point of contact for this session is Professor David Carrington, C-414.

D. Questions:

What are the distinctions between levels of command and levels of war? How important are they, and why?

Why it is important to know and understand the differences among respective levels of war?

Some theorists claim that technology has compressed the levels of war to the point that the differences are no longer significant. Do you agree?

What is the basis for establishing the theater structure?

To what extent is the concept of the theater of operations outdated in the information age? Should a commander and staff focus exclusively on the concept of operational environment vs. traditional concepts of the theater of operations and areas of operations?

What are the distinctions among tactical, operational, and strategic physical objectives?

Explain the concept of "decisive point." Are "decisive points" synonymous or identical with the concept of "decision point"?

Discuss the concept of "line of operations." Is this concept still valid in the information age?

Leyte Case Study:

Was General MacArthur a strategic or operational level commander during Operation King II? What were Admirals Nimitz and Halsey?

Explain the key features of the Japanese command organization. Was Admiral Soemu Toyoda an operational or theater-strategic commander? Why?

What were the theater-strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war in the Leyte Operation?

Why was the Pacific Theater during World War II divided into several subordinate "ocean areas"? What effect did these divisions have on the planning and execution of the Leyte Gulf Operation?

What were the advantages and disadvantages of the geostrategic position for the Japanese forces on land, at sea, and in the air in their defense of the Philippines in October 1944?

Identify and discuss Allied tactical and operational objectives on land in the Operation King II. What were Allied operational objectives at sea and in the air in that operation?

What were tactical and operational decisive points for the respective Allied and Japanese naval commanders in the Leyte Operation?

Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the lines of operations used by the Japanese naval forces and land-based air in their defense of the Philippines in October 1944.

E. Required Readings:

Morison, Samuel Eliot. *Leyte,* Volume 12 of *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II.* Chicago: Univ. of Illinois Press. Review: Chapter IV, pages 55–73; Scan: Chapter VII, pages 113–129. (Issued.)

Vego, Milan. "Levels of Command" *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2007. Read: Appendix A, pages APP-5–APP-10. (Issued.)

Vego, Milan. "The Theater and Its Structure" *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2007. Read: IV-3–IV-12. (Issued.)

Vego, Milan. "Theater Geometry." *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2007. Read: IV-49–IV-78. (Issued.)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1. Read: xiii, xv–xviii, II-1–II-3, II-16–II-20, IV-12–IV-14. (Issued.)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operation Planning* , Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Washington, DC: CJCS, 26 December 2006. Read: IV-16–IV-24. (Issued.)

F. Supplementary Readings:

Collins, John M. *Military Geography for Professionals and the Public*. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1988.

MacGregor, Douglas A. "Future Battle: The Merging Levels of War." *Parameters* (Winter 1992–93): 33–47.

U.S. Marine Corps. "Levels of War." In *Warfighting,* MCDP 1. Washington, DC: c1997. (pp. 28–32). Library call no. VE153 .M32 no. 1.

Vego, Milan. "Land Theater Physical Features." *Joint Operational Warfare.* Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2007. IV-13–IV-34.

METHODS OF COMBAT FORCE EMPLOYMENT (Seminar)

The beginning of wisdom is to call things their right name.

—Confucius

A. Focus:

The focus of this lesson is how principal methods of combat force employment accomplish operational or strategic objectives in a theater.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the principal methods of combat force employment (tactical actions, major operations, and campaigns) and how they are linked and related to operational objectives.
- Comprehend how operational and strategic objectives are achieved.
- Apply solutions to operational problems using concepts found in joint doctrine.
- Comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- Analyze a current or historical case with respect to the principal methods of combat force employment.

C. Background:

One of the main responsibilities of commanders at any level is to properly determine the way or method of employing combat forces to accomplish the assigned military objective with the least losses for the friendly side and in the quickest possible time. Depending on the scope of the military objective, a distinction is made today among tactical actions, major operations, and campaigns.

Modern methods of combat force employment are the result of a long evolution of warfare. In the 19th century, most campaigns were conducted primarily by a ground force; however, there are many instances where navies took part in a supporting role. Cogent exemplars are the American War of Independence, the Peninsular War, the Crimean War, and the American Civil War.

Today, the principal methods of combat force employment are tactical actions, major operations, and campaigns. These terms are differentiated by the military objectives they are intended to accomplish and the corresponding command echelon responsible for their planning, preparation, and execution. The reason for studying this subject is that all too often, commanders have been unsuccessful because they did not understand the link between the objective and how to employ the force.

Tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes, attacks, etc.) are aimed at accomplishing major or minor tactical objectives in a given combat zone or sector and, in some cases, can encompass an area of operations. They are usually an integral part of major operations. When conducted over time and in a certain sea or ocean area or airspace or on land, tactical actions can cumulatively accomplish operational objective(s). Tactical actions can be either defensive or offensive in nature and are differentiated by the

physical environment (land, sea, or airspace) in which they occur.

As a result of efforts at all of the war colleges and the joint staff, the term "major operation" has become more important in joint doctrinal publications. Through most of the last half of the 20th century, the word "operation" had been used so often and interchangeably that it had become watered down and meaningless. Drawing from the definition the Naval War College has used since 1994, current joint doctrine defines a major operation as "a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and controlled by a single commander."

In generic terms, a major operation consists of a series of related battles, engagements, and strikes and other tactical actions sequenced and synchronized in terms of time and space to accomplish an operational objective. Major operations are normally an integral part of a campaign. Examples of major operations are the U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983 (Operation URGENT FURY), the U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989 (Operation JUST CAUSE), and NATO's actions in the Kosovo Conflict of 1999 (Operation ALLIED FORCE).

The term "campaign" has been used in the past by different components of the U.S. military to describe a wide range of military actions. This has lead to confusion. In an effort to reduce confusion, JP 3-0 and JP 5-0 both define a campaign as "a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space."

In terms of being able to study and understand the essence of a campaign, the joint definition is merely a starting point. In generic terms, a campaign consists of a series of related major operations (land, air/space, naval, special forces) sequenced and synchronized in terms of time and space and aimed to accomplish a military strategic or theater-strategic objective in a given (declared or undeclared) theater of operations. These operations are executed simultaneously or sequentially and are conducted according to a common plan, controlled by a theater commander. The main purpose of a campaign may be either offensive or defensive. Land campaigns and maritime campaigns are differentiated according to the physical environment in which major operations predominantly take place. Because airspace is an inseparable part of a maritime or land theater, air forces are almost always employed jointly with others.

By contrast, a campaign that involves counterinsurgency or counterterrorism may consist of a series of related minor or sometimes major tactical actions rather than major operations. It may still be considered a campaign because actions are coordinated in time and place to accomplish strategic objectives within a given part of the theater commander's area of responsibility. Furthermore, counterdrug or counterterrorism campaigns may not be limited to a specific theater, but may be conducted in more than one theater under a functional combatant commander with global responsibility.

As in the past, technological advances will affect the methods of combat force employment in the future and will lead to a continuous evolution in tactical actions.

Some types of tactical actions may become more effective with the passage of time and ingenuity. For example, major joint/combined operations may emerge as the principal method of accomplishing strategic objectives in a theater. While campaigns within a single theater may become rare events, today's armed forces must still be prepared to plan and conduct successful campaigns.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Jeff Barker, C-431.

D. Questions:

Why does an operational commander need to know the principal methods of combat force employment for accomplishing major and minor tactical objectives?

Why are the meanings of the key terms dealing with the methods of combat force employment of concern to the operational commander and to operational staffs? For example, why is it important to know the differences between a battle and an engagement, between a strike and an attack, between a skirmish and a raid, etc.?

Why is it important to have inter-service agreement on the meaning of the term "major operation"?

The Air Force uses the term "air campaign." Does this lead to confusion in the joint fighting environment?

What distinguishes a land campaign from a maritime campaign?

Has modern technology blurred the differences between tactical actions and major operations?

Will the planning of tactical actions in the future become the purview of the operational commander? Why or why not? What problems might that planning pose?

Leyte Case Study:

What methods of combat force employment did Japanese forces plan to use in the defense of the Philippines prior to any U.S. landing?

After the Allied landings, did the Japanese Navy commanders at Leyte understand the methods of combat force employment needed to achieve their objectives?

What methods of combat force employment did U.S. forces plan to use prior, during, and following the invasion at Leyte?

When met with surprise by Japanese action what methods of combat force employment did U.S. forces employ?

In language offered by the required reading, can you identify the types of major naval, ground, and air operations in terms of their main purpose (offensive vs. defensive, fleet vs. fleet, fleet vs. shore, air vs. ground, etc.) and sequence (main, supporting, preliminary, initial, etc.) conducted by the Allied and Japanese forces in the Philippines and the adjacent sea/airspace between 17 and 26 October 1944?

E. Required Reading:

Vego, Milan. "Campaigns," *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: V-5–V-10. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "Major Operations," *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: V-33–V-37. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "Major Joint/Combined Operations." *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: V-97–V-129. (Issued).

Morison, Samuel Eliot. *Leyte,* vol. 12 of *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II.* Chicago: University of Illinois Press. (Issued). Read: Chapter VIII (pp. 130–156). (Issued).

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations,* Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1. Read: xxi, I-9–I-10; Scan: Chapter V and Glossary GL-5–GL-29.

F. Supplementary Reading:

Vego, Milan. "On Operations," "Major Land Operations", Major Naval Operations," and "Major Air Operations." *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Part V (Issued).

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS (Seminar)

A skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and doesn't demand it of his subordinates.

—Sun Tzu

A. Focus:

This session details the theater-wide or operational functions used to support the planning, conducting, and sustaining of major operations and campaigns.

B. Objectives:

- Analyze each of the operational functions and their roles in campaign and major operations planning.
- Understand the relationship between operational factors and operational functions.
- Understand how and why operational functions are synchronized in time, space, and force at the operational level of war.
- Understand how information operations may impact each of the operational functions.
- Comprehend how and why the joint staff took the theoretical construct of operational functions and created a tool like the Universal Joint Task Manual (UJTM).

C. Background:

Operational art translates the Joint Force Commander's strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating key activities at all levels of war. The key activities at the operational level of war consist of processes, systems, or functions that must be manipulated in order to achieve desired objectives.

The Naval War College refers to these activities as operational functions. The key operational functions are: operational command organization, operational movement and maneuver, operational intelligence, operational fires, operational logistics, and operational protection. The synchronization of these operational functions ensures and enhances the ability of operational commanders and their subordinate elements to carry out their missions in both peace and war. Basically, these functions shape actions prior to and throughout a campaign or major operation.

In a mature theater, operational functions will normally be established in full measure. However, in an immature theater, they may exist in a rudimentary form or not at all. Understanding the impact and interaction of these functions at the operational level of war is critically important for proper planning, preparation, employment, and support of one's own forces in attainment of the assigned objectives.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Jeff Barker, C-431.

D. Questions:

What are the advantages or disadvantages of having operational functions in place during peace and war? Discuss and explain the purpose of each operational function.

As our armed forces become ever more information-based, what are the impacts on the operational functions? Does one of the function's significance increase in relation to the

others?

How long have operational planners been using operational functions to plan major operations and campaigns? How have they changed over the years?

Does following the UJTM as a guide alleviate the need for operational thinking or operational vision?

What is the nexus of operational functions and information operations?

Leyte Case Study:

What impact did the following operational functions have on the Leyte Gulf Operation from the perspective of both belligerents?

Operational Command Organization—What are some of the factors that influenced the composition of specific command structures? This particular area is cited for many of the difficulties and poor decisions that occurred throughout the operation. Identify the flaws and their associated consequences with specific command structures and guidance/orders issued to subordinates. Can you find elements of information operations in the Leyte Gulf Operation? If so, discuss them.

Operational Movement and Maneuver—How did the opposing forces plan and employ movement and maneuver at Leyte?

Operational Intelligence—To what extent did the Allies operate on a basis of Japanese intentions rather than capabilities? What result did this have on the eventual outcome of the battle?

Operational Fires—How were operational fires used during the Leyte Operation? To what extent were they effective? Why?

Operational Protection—To what extent did either of the opposing forces at Leyte consider and plan adequately for operational protection? Discuss examples of where and how operational protection was provided. What is the relationship of operational protection to the more commonly used term "force protection"?

Operational Logistics—How did the Allies address this area? What was the operational impact for the Allies? What impact did operational logistics have on the Japanese?

Did the Allies synchronize their operational functions? If so, what functions did they synchronize and what effect did it have on the operation?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan. "Operational Functions", *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: VIII-3–VIII-94. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "Operational Command and Control", *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: X-19–X-31. (Issued).

Morison, Samuel Eliot. *Leyte,* vol. 12 of *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II.* Chicago: Univ. of Illinois Press. Read: Chapter VI (pp. 86–109). (Issued).

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations,* Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1. Read: xvi–xviii; Scan: Chapter III. (Issued).

CJCS, Universal Joint Task Manual" CJCSM 3500.04E, 25 August 2008, (**NWC 1061**). Read: Enclosure A. Scan: Remainder of manual.

F. Supplementary Readings:

Bolick, Joseph A. *The Influence and Reasons for Acceptance or Rejection of Operational Intelligence during the 1914 and 1943 Kursk Campaigns,* Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 26 April 1988.

Goodrich, David M. "Forgotten Mission: Land Based Air Operational Fires in Support of the Leyte Gulf Invasion." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000.

Handel, Michael I. "Intelligence and Military Operations." In *Intelligence and Military Operations*. London: Frank Cass, 1990.

Porter, Laning M. *Preconceptions, Predilections, and Experiences: Problems for Operational Level Intelligence and Decisionmaking*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 12 May 1986.

Rockwell, Christopher A. "Operational Sustainment: Lines of Communication and the Conduct of Operations." Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 3 May 1987.

ELEMENTS OF COMBAT FORCE EMPLOYMENT (Seminar)

The capital was the center of gravity for the Baathist regime; as long as his troops still controlled the city, Saddam Hussein would never relinquish power.

—General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*

A. Focus:

This session further examines the theoretical framework and fundamental concepts of operational art. It focuses on the stages and elements of operational warfare: deployment/redeployment, critical factors, center of gravity (COG), operational maneuver, and the culminating point.

B. Objectives:

- Understand and apply the terms "deployment," "critical factors," "center of gravity," "critical capabilities," "critical requirements," and "culminating point."
- Apply the terms above to an analysis of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Evaluate the performance of the opposing commanders with respect to these concepts.

C. Background:

This session examines several key concepts that are essential to planning for and employing military forces to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

Initial planning must include identifying critical factors that pertain to both enemy and friendly forces. The term "critical factors" is changing somewhat in current usage. Traditionally, critical factors have been called critical strengths, critical weaknesses, and critical vulnerabilities. Recent joint doctrine, however, has begun to classify critical factors as critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities. The readings discuss the differences between these two approaches. In this session we will use the traditional approach and discuss critical capabilities and requirements separately. The purpose of identifying these critical factors and the related centers of gravity is not to conduct an academic exercise but rather to learn how to use them in the planning of operations and campaigns.

Successful planning and employment of combat forces hinge on the proper identification of both the enemy forces' and the friendly forces' COG. The enemy's COG must be defeated, while one's own COG must be protected in order to accomplish the assigned military objective.

Success in combat is largely dependent on rapidly massing superior combat power effects at a decisive time and place on the battlefield. A series of specific actions including deployment, employment, and sustainment is required to achieve that aim. Deployment is the process of moving one's own forces and assets to their planned starting positions for the commencement of action. Time phasing of forces into the theater of operations is critical for success at the higher levels of war (operational and strategic). Errors in deployment at the operational or theater-strategic levels cannot be easily corrected, if at all, once hostilities start. Deployment precedes employment and maneuver.

An important element of warfare, especially at the operational and strategic levels, is the concept of a culminating point (or culmination). Culmination applies to both offensive and defensive actions. In the offense, the culminating point is the point when the attacker no longer has sufficient combat power to successfully continue the attack. The attacker seeks to secure his objective before reaching his culmination point. In the defense, the culminating point is the point where the defender has inadequate combat power to defend successfully.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Chet Helms, M-15.

D. Questions:

What is the purpose of strategic deployment; operational deployment? Discuss the Japanese and the Allied deployment schemes in building their plans for the Philippines.

How do critical factors—strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities—relate to the objective? How do critical factors relate to the center of gravity?

In the opening quote for this syllabus page, is General Franks' assessment of the COG for the Baathist regime correct?

What is the relationship between Vego's discussion of the COG and joint doctrine's discussion of the COG?

How do critical capabilities and critical requirements relate to the center of gravity?

Discuss the Allied and Japanese objectives, critical factors, COGs, critical requirements, and critical capabilities as they apply to the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Did the Allied and the Japanese planners make the proper determinations?

Explain the concept of culmination. What factors can bring on culmination? How do you avoid culmination? Did either the Japanese or Allies reach a culminating point in the Leyte operation?

E. Required Readings:

Morison, Samuel Eliot. *Leyte,* vol. 12 of *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II.* Chicago: University of Illinois Press. Read: Chapter XII, "The Battle off Samar—The Main Action." (pp. 242–288). (Issued).

Strange, Joseph L., and Richard Iron. "Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant." *Joint Force Quarterly* (October 2004): Read 20–27. **(NWC 1060)**.

U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, *Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES),* Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2008. *(***NWC 4111H**). Read Annex C. (Issued).

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning,* Washington, DC: CJCS, 26 December 2006. Read: IV-8–IV-19. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "Operational/Strategic Deployment", *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2007. Read: VI-5–V-15. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "Concept of Critical Factors and Center of Gravity," *Joint Operational*

Warfare. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2007. Read: VII-13–VII-35. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "Concept of Culminating Point," *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2007. Read: VII-73–VII-96. (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Echevarria, Antulio, II. "Center of Gravity: Recommendations for Joint Doctrine." *Joint Force Quarterly* (October 2004).

Izzo, Lawrence L. "The Center of Gravity Is Not an Achilles Heel." *Military Review* (January 1988).

Mendel, William W., and Lamar Tooke. "Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity." *Military Review* (June 1993).

Strange, Joseph L. *Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language. Perspectives on Warfighting*, no. 4, Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps University Foundation, 1996.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations,* Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1.

Webb, George S. "The Razor's Edge: Identifying the Operational Culminating Point of Victory." Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Student Paper, 16 May 1995.

OPERATIONAL DESIGN (Seminar)

No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength. Only the layman sees in the course of a campaign a consistent execution of a preconceived and highly detailed original concept pursued consistently to the end.

—Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Sr., 1871

A. Focus:

This session explains in some detail operational design for a major operation as part of a campaign. The focus is on the selected elements of the operational idea (scheme).

B. Objectives:

- Examine and comprehend the framework for planning campaigns and major operations.
- Understand the meaning and the practical application of the selected elements of design for a major operation.
- Know and understand the importance and key elements of an operational idea (scheme) for a major operation.
- Know and understand the use of operational deception in the planning and execution of major operations.
- Comprehend the fundamentals, considerations, and design elements of campaign planning, including integration of unified, joint, and multinational forces into theater operation plans.

C. Background:

Military planning is a continuous process in preparation for the accomplishment of current or future objectives/tasks. It involves a detailed and methodical evaluation of all aspects of contemplated military action. Planning makes future actions easier by allowing for quick, subsequent, and coordinated actions by the staff and other elements of the command. Proper planning allows for detailed and systematic examination of all factors involved in a forthcoming military action.

A major operation contains a number of elements that collectively should ensure the accomplishment of the selected or assigned military objective(s). Thus, an overall operational design should exist to ensure that one's forces are employed in a coherent manner and focused on the assigned operational or strategic objectives in the theater. The principal elements of operational design for a major operation are: desired end state (in case a major operation is intended to end the hostilities); ultimate operational (and sometimes strategic) objective; interior vs. exterior lines; identification of the enemy and friendly critical factors and center of gravity; direction/axis; and operational idea (scheme).

An operational idea (sometimes referred to as an operational scheme) represents the very heart of the design for a major operation or campaign. In its essence, it is very similar to what is commonly known today as a concept of operations (CONOPS) or in the

past as a scheme of maneuver. An operational idea should describe in broad terms the intended sequence for the employment of service or functional component forces (in a campaign) or combat arms (in a major operation) necessary to accomplish the assigned strategic or operational objectives. Optimally, an operational idea should be novel, avoid stereotyped employment of one's forces, present the enemy with a multidimensional threat, provide for surprise and deception, and ensure the speed of execution. It should clearly focus on the destruction or neutralization of the enemy's strategic (in a campaign) or operational (in a major operation) center of gravity.

The elements of an operational idea for a major operation are as follows: selected principles of war, operational maneuver and fires, methods of defeating the enemy's center of gravity, application of one's military sources of power, sectors of main and secondary effort, point of main attack (defense), deception, sequencing, synchronization, branches, sequels, phasing, pause, anticipation of the friendly operational point of culmination, protection of friendly operational center of gravity, momentum, reserves, regeneration of combat potential, and sustainment.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Milan Vego, C-427.

D. Questions:

What is the strategic and operational framework for planning a major operation?

Discuss the main elements of design for a major operation. How are these elements integrated into a campaign plan?

Explain the process of identifying critical factors and center of gravity in designing a major operation.

Explain why a plan for a major operation must be based on a common operational idea (scheme). What are the key elements of a sound operational idea in generic terms?

Explain the concept of operational sequencing. What is the purpose of operational sequencing?

Discuss the concept of operational synchronization.

What is the purpose of operational/strategic deception? Explain the relationship between tactical, operational, and strategic deception.

Leyte Case Study:

Applying the principal elements of operational design, analyze the naval aspects of the Leyte Operation:

1. How would you assess the operational objectives determined by Admiral Toyoda? To what extent did the operational idea (scheme) employed by the Japanese provide an opportunity for success? How could they have made it more effective?
2. Explain and analyze the Japanese plan for operational deception. To what extent was the plan successful and why? To what extent did the Allies apply operational deception in executing the Leyte Operation? Provide examples to support your arguments.

3. How are sequencing and synchronization different? Give examples of each from the Japanese plans. Did Admiral Toyoda have a better option to apply operational sequencing in his plans for naval defense of the Philippines?

4. How did the Japanese plan envisage operational synchronization?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan. "Designing a Conventional Campaign/Major Operation: Combat Phase", *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: IX-83–IX-102. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "The Operational Idea", *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: IX-103–IX-133. (Issued).

Morison, Samuel Eliot. *Leyte,* vol. 12 of *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II.* Chicago: University of Illinois Press. Read Chapter IX (pp. 159–176). (Issued).

Hamlin, Cannon M. "Plans Are Made and Forces Are Readied." Chapter III in *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific*. (**NWC 2032**). (Review applicable portions as needed, particularly pp.21–39).

Potter, E.B. "Return to the Philippines." In *Nimitz.* Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976. pp. 321–345. (**NWC 2039**).

F. Supplemental Readings:

Cannon, M. Hamlin. *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific*. Washington, DC: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1954.

Critz, Michael. "Operational Deception." Newport, RI: Naval War College.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations,* Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning,* Washington, DC: CJCS, 26 December 2006.

Vego, Milan. "Operational Deception in the Information Age," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Spring 2002): 60–66.

OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP (Seminar)

During an operation, decisions usually have to be made at once: there may be no time to review the situation or even to think it through . . . if the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.

—Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*(1832)

A. Focus:

This session addresses the personality traits for success at the operational level of command, the requirements for acquiring operational thinking, and the tenets of operational leadership.

B. Objectives:

- Know and understand personal and professional requirements for successful performance at the operational level of command.
- Understand the meaning of the terms "operational thinking" and "operational vision."
- Understand why operational commanders and their staffs need an operational perspective.
- Know and understand the tenets of operational leadership.
- Develop a framework of thought through which the distinction between decisions made at the operational level of war and those made at the tactical level of war can be examined and understood.

C. Background:

In contrast with their tactical counterparts, operational commanders should focus on broad military objectives that lie beyond immediate tactical actions, ranging from destruction of enemy forces in the field, in the air, and at sea, to undermining the enemy's will to fight. Effective operational commanders need what is known as an operational perspective on all the aspects of the situation in a given area of operations or theater. Because the operational level of war ties together the strategic and tactical levels, operational commanders need to understand how actions at each level of war affect actions at the other levels. Operational commanders also must understand joint operations and interagency coordination issues.

The broader operational level perspective also renders decision-making processes more complex and challenging than those at the tactical level. While the tactical commander focuses on fighting battles and engagements, the operational commander is most appropriately concerned with setting the stage for conducting a major operation or campaign. The operational commander must resist the strong temptation to narrow his focus to the immediate tactical level and to micromanage his subordinate commanders.

Operational leadership requires a leader with broad vision who can focus on broad

military objectives that lie beyond the realm of tactics. With objectives ranging from the destruction of the enemy forces in the field to undermining the enemy's public support for war or the enemy's will to fight, operational commanders must be able to comprehend even the most complex situation in a given theater. Moreover, they need to fully understand how actions at each level of war impact actions that may be taking place at each of the other levels.

To move beyond the narrow focus of a tactical commander, operational commanders must be capable of visualizing trends in the military, political, diplomatic, economic, and other elements of the situation for weeks and months ahead of time. In short, they must think operationally. This also means that they must stop thinking tactically, which is unintuitive, because in most cases tactical expertise is what enabled that person to be promoted to the position of an operational leader.

Operational thinking is not something that comes naturally to a future commander, but must be acquired by conscious efforts and hard work. It can be obtained through practical experience in war, large-scale exercises and maneuvers in peacetime, and operational and strategic wargaming. However, there is little or no opportunity for most future operational commanders to obtain the necessary broad vision in the practical execution of their responsibilities. Hence such a perspective is acquired through both professional education (e.g., attending a war college) and systematic self-study of military history, geography, international relations, economics, ethnicity and nationalism, society, religions, etc. The study of past wars, and major operations and campaigns in particular, is the best method for acquiring an operational perspective.

Operational thinking is the key prerequisite for what is called operational vision. The latter is in fact the practical application of operational thinking in planning, preparation, and execution of a campaign or major operation. In contrast to operational thinking, which is broader and also a permanent condition of a commander, operational vision pertains to a specific mission and the situation. However, operational thinking and operational vision are interrelated; the commander cannot have sound operational vision if he does not think operationally.

Success in combat is considerably enhanced by applying certain selected aspects of operational art, here arbitrarily called "tenets" by operational and theater strategic commanders. Like the principles of war, there is no common agreement either in regard to what the tenets are or to their number. They also are not universal but are primarily based on one's way of war. Yet regardless of national differences in the conduct of operational warfare, experience has shown that not observing or violating the selected tenets of theater strategic leadership will greatly complicate and can result in failure of a major operation or campaign.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Dave Carrington, C-414.

D. Questions:

What personal traits do you think an operational commander should have to be successful?

How does a nation find and develop the best operational commanders? Is there a template for creating an operational commander?

If the responsibilities of an operational commander are different from that of a tactical commander, why do we promote tactical commanders to become operational commanders?

What is the real meaning of the term "operational thinking?" What are the principal sources of operational thinking?

Explain the differences between "operational thinking" and "operational vision."

Has technology taken away the need for operational leadership?

What are the qualities of those leaders who have demonstrated theater strategic leadership successfully?

Leyte Case Study:

What were some of the most important operational and theater strategic decisions made by Allied and Japanese commanders during planning, preparation, and execution of the Leyte Operation?

Analyze the elements of the decision made by Admiral William F. Halsey in the evening on 24 October 1944 to turn north. Did Halsey display proper perspective on the situation?

Did Admiral Toyoda perform well as the operational commander after the Allies landed on Leyte?

E. Required Readings:

Morison, Samuel Eliot. *Leyte,* vol. 12 of *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II.* Chicago: Univ. of Illinois Press. Read Chapter XIV, pp. 317–332. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "Operational Leadership", *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: X-5–X-17. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "Operational Thinking", *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: XI-3–XI-17. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "Operational Thinkers and Practioners", *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: XI-19–XI-34. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "Operational Vision", *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: XI-35–X-41. (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Blumenson, Martin, and James L. Stokesbury. *Masters of the Art of Command*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975.

Bradley, Omar N. "On Leadership." *Parameters* XI (Sep 1981): 2-7. Reprinted from Winter 1972 issue.

Buell, Thomas B. *The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance.*

Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988.

Collins, J. Lawton. "Leadership at Higher Echelons." *Military Review* (May 1990): 33–45. Reprint of his speech at CGSC, 15 Apr 1949.

De Czege, Huba Wass. "A Comprehensive View of Leadership." *Military Review* (August 1992): 21–29.

Gardner, Gregory C. *Generalship in War: The Principles of Operational Command*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 4 May 1987.

Gerner, Mark, H. "Leadership at the Operational Level." *Military Review* (June 1987): 26–35.

Halsey, William F. *Admiral Halsey's Story*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947.

Slim, Sir William. "Higher Command in War." U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1970, 1–10.

Summers, Harry G., Jr. "Leadership in Adversity: From Vietnam to Victory in the Gulf." *Military Review* (May 1991): 2–9.

OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED (Seminar)

It is now accepted with naval and military men who study their profession, that history supplies the raw material from which they are to draw their lessons, and reach their working conclusions. Its teachings are not, indeed, pedantic precedents; but they are the illustrations of living principles.

—Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, *From Sail to Steam*, 1907

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is on the purpose and importance of deriving proper operational lessons learned for future operations; sources and methods of operational lessons learned will be discussed in some detail.

B. Objectives/:

- Know and understand the differences among the technological, tactical, operational, and strategic lessons learned.
- Understand the purpose and importance of operational lessons learned for the future employment of one's combat forces in campaigns and major operations.
- Know the methods used for deriving operational lessons learned
- Comprehend the pitfalls in deriving operational lessons learned.
- Understand the linkage between operational lessons learned and the development of sound service/joint doctrine.

C. Background:

Famous German military theoretician General Baron Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven (1855–1924) said that many mistakes in war would have been avoided if the commanders and subordinates on both sides had better used the experiences of past wars. Lessons derived by military institutions have a proven and inestimable value for modifying or improving existing doctrine or creating new doctrine. They are especially important in creating new tactical and operational concepts. These, in turn, are the very heart of any sound doctrine. The new doctrine then serves as a broad guidance for combat training. Another purpose of deriving lessons is to provide input for designing new weapons/sensors and equipment, principles of command organization, command and control, and training. The process of learning lessons also has considerable value for enhancing the professional knowledge of the officer corps as a whole and of individual officers.

In terms of their scale and importance, lessons learned can be technological, tactical, operational, and strategic. Technological lessons are derived from the use of weapons and sensors and their platforms and equipment. They have great value in improving existing or designing new weapons, sensors, and equipment. Tactical lessons are deduced from the study of planning, preparing, and executing battles, engagements, strikes, and other tactical actions. In contrast, operational lessons are derived from a thorough study of all aspects of major operations and campaigns in peacetime exercises, war games, and combat. Strategic lessons are learned from the comprehensive study

and analysis of a conflict or war as a whole and its political, diplomatic, military, economic, informational, and other aspects.

The higher the level of war, the greater the importance of the lessons learned or mislearned. Also, the higher the level, the longer the durability of the lessons. Hence, operational lessons are by their nature more durable than tactical lessons. Likewise, strategic lessons last longer than operational or tactical lessons. Lessons on intangible aspects are generally more durable than lessons derived from the physical aspects of a given situation. War is a clash of human wills; hence, the human element is a critical part of it and will remain so in the future. Therefore, lessons pertaining to leadership, unit cohesion, morale and discipline, and training are essentially timeless. In contrast, technological lessons are by their very nature short-term.

Lessons learned are interrelated and can have a considerable effect on the employment of one's forces, both in peacetime and in time of war. Tactical lessons learned greatly influence the theory and practice of operational art, while operational lessons affect the theory and practice of strategy and even policy. Likewise, strategic lessons learned considerably affect the theory and practice of operational art and tactics.

Optimally, one's lessons should be derived by evaluating all possible sources of lessons, ranging from peacetime exercises, wargaming, and the study of military history, to war experiences. Nothing should be thought unimportant and thus either neglected or willfully ignored. Not only military but also political, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other aspects of the situation must be taken fully into account in order to reach proper conclusions and lessons learned. Optimally, politics—domestic or foreign—and service parochialism should play no role in deriving operational lessons.

The process of evaluating the experiences of major forces in peacetime and in time of conflict or war is complex and full of potential missteps that collectively can lead to serious problems in writing a service and joint doctrine and then applying it. Lessons can be learned, but they can also be mislearned. Those mislearned might not be obvious until some grave event occurs that results in high losses. Nevertheless, despite potential problems, one should make all efforts to derive proper lessons from as many sources as possible; otherwise, it is not possible to refine or modify existing doctrine or write new doctrine, develop new operational concepts, transform forces, educate and train officers for high positions, and prepare for war in general. Lessons should be learned from one's own performances in both peacetime and combat. They should be learned from friends and foes alike. The study of military history is perhaps the most beneficial of all in deriving operational lessons because it offers the most complete range of human experience in wartime. In contrast, lessons learned from major exercises or war games are limited in terms of both their physical scope and their timeframe. Though they are a major source of technology-based lessons that are key for successful innovation and development of new tactical and operational concepts, major exercises and war games do not provide the opportunity to derive lessons for intangible factors that are present in combat. War experiences are the best source for lessons for both tangible and intangible factors in combat. They are limited, however, only to the last conflict or war.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Milan Vego, C-427.

D. Questions:

What is the purpose and importance of lessons learned?

Why is it important to know and understand the distinctions among technological, tactical, operational, and strategic lessons learned?

What are the sources of operational lessons learned?

Is it possible to derive proper lessons from the experiences of others?

What are the pitfalls in deriving operational lessons learned?

Leyte Case Study:

What operational lessons (from both the Allied and the Japanese perspective) can be derived from the Leyte Operation? Specifically address the following issues:

Operational command organization

- Operational functions
- Operational planning
- Operational decision-making
- Operational leadership.

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan. "Operational Lessons Learned," *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: XI-43– XI-79. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "Deriving Operational Lessons," *Joint Operational Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: Appendix G, pp. APP-91– APP-100. (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). *Operation OUTREACH* Newsletter, no. 03-27, October 2003.

CG, 1st Marine Division. *Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Lessons Learned*, 29 May 2003 (UNCLAS).

Cordesman, Anthony H. *The "Instant Lessons" of the Iraq War. Main Report* (3rd working draft, 14 April 2003). Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003.

Cordesman, Anthony H. *Preliminary "Lessons" of the Israeli-Hezbollah War* (working draft, 2nd ed. Rev, 11 September 2006). Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006.

Ministry of Defence. *Iraq First Reflections Report*. London: Ministry of Defence, July 2003.

Tripp, Robert S., et al. *Lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2004.

Vego, Milan. "Learning From Victory." U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 129 (August

2003): 32–36.

Vego, Milan. “Wake-Up Call in Kosovo.” U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 126 (October 2000): 66–70.

FALKLANDS/MALVINAS CASE STUDY (Lecture/Seminar)

A senior officer said after the war that it had proved that "the things we did on the basis of well-tried and proven formations worked, and the ad hoc arrangements turned out much less happily." Joint-service liaison and staff work left much to be desired.

—Hastings and Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*

A. Focus:

This lesson serves as the synthesis event for the components of operational art explained and discussed in preceding Module II lessons. Emphasis is on the decisions and actions of operational-level commanders on both sides.

B. Objectives:

- Analyze and apply the components of operational art through the Falklands historical case study.
- Apply the concepts from operational law in order to evaluate the legal issues in the Falklands historical case study.
- Analyze the operational issues valid for employment of modern, multinational and joint forces.

C. Background:

This case study is presented in three consecutive lessons starting with a faculty presentation of the historical/strategic background to the conflict. This will be followed by a 60-minute film that draw out elements from both sides involved. Students will have the remainder of that day, as well as the next morning, to study the case materials and develop student-led discussions of the assigned questions. The final morning is devoted to student-led discussions of the case study.

This lesson is designed to reinforce the aspects of operational art studied and discussed in preceding lessons. Historical examples provide an excellent opportunity for illustrating the complexities of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns and the reasons why certain military actions either succeeded or failed. This particular case is used because it is rich with examples of the application, lack of application, misapplication, or inability to apply the concepts associated with operational art.

The goal of this lesson is to provide in-depth discussion and analysis of major aspects of the Falklands conflict of 1982 from an operational perspective. As the major synthesis event for the operational art portion of the syllabus, the motivations, planning, and actions of both sides in the conflict will be examined in some detail. Seminar moderators will assign specific responsibilities for student discussion of the case.

The point of contact for this session is Commander Neil J. Thompson OBE, Royal Navy, C-426.

D. Questions:

Analyze and critique the following strategic and theater-level decisions made during the conflict:

The British decision to withdraw HMS *Endurance* from the South Atlantic in 1982.

The Argentine decision to solve the issue by force.

The Argentine decision to advance D-day for Operation ROSARIO from sometime in July or August to 1 (later 2) April.

The Argentine decision to plan initially for a garrison force only on the Malvinas and not to plan for a defense.

The British decision to send submarines to the South Atlantic immediately followed by other naval forces without first making basic decisions about what course of action to follow.

The British decision to plan for military action while still attempting to resolve the issue through diplomacy.

The British decision to appoint Admiral Fieldhouse, as the operational commander and have him remain at his headquarters at Northwood in the UK with no single, overall commander on the scene in the South Atlantic.

The Argentine decision not to appoint a sole commander for the entire operation.

The Argentine decision to keep the most combat-ready forces on the border with Chile and to garrison the Malvinas with a mainly conscripted force.

The Argentine decision not to lengthen the runway at Stanley.

The British decision to have the task force depart the UK without being properly combat loaded, thereby forcing supplies to be reloaded at Ascension Island.

The British decision to use force to retake the Falklands and South Georgia.

The British decision to establish a 200-mile MEZ/TEZ and later to extend it to within 12 miles of Argentina.

The British decision to retake South Georgia before landing in the Falklands.

The Argentine defensive strategy or operational plans for the defense of the islands.

The British decision to use Vulcan bombers from Ascension Island to attack the runway at Stanley.

The British decision to order HMS *Conqueror* to sink the *Belgrano*.

The Argentine decision to keep the remainder of the Argentine fleet in port after the sinking of the *Belgrano*.

The British decision not to attack targets on the Argentine mainland.

The Argentine decision not to attack the British base of operations at Ascension Island or the British SLOCs.

The British decision to land at San Carlos.

The Argentine decision to give targeting priority to British carriers rather than to the amphibious ships.

The British decision to order 3 Commando Brigade to attack Goose Green before the remainder of the ground forces arrived at the beachhead.

The Argentine decision to surrender Port Stanley when they did.

Decisions made by both sides regarding freedom of the press and the impact those decisions had on aiding enemy intelligence collection.

Having considered the various strategic and operational decisions made or not made by the British and Argentine leaders during the conflict, what lessons stand out for U.S. leaders?

E. Required Readings:

Thompson, Julian. "Amphibious Logistics—Falklands 1982." Extract from Chapter 8 in *The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflicts*. (**NWC 1086**).

Scheina, Robert L. "The Malvinas Crisis, March–April 1982" and "The Malvinas War, May–June 1982." Chapters 14 and 15 in *Latin America: A Naval History 1810–1987*. (**NWC 1138**).

Gatchel, Theodore L. "Operational Art and Joint Task Force Operations During the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict." Newport, RI: Naval War College. (**NWC 1044**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Clapp, Michael. *Amphibious Assault Falkland Islands: The Battle of San Carlos Water*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996.

Freedman, Lawrence. *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign—Vol 2*. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2005. (Seminar Reserve).

Freedman, Lawrence, and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse. *Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1991.

Hastings, Max, and Simon Jenkins. *The Battle for the Falklands*. New York: Norton, 1983. (Seminar Reserve).

Middlebrook, Martin. *Task Force: The Falklands War, 1982*. Rev. ed. London: Penguin, 1987. (Seminar Reserve).

Selected extracts from *Conflicto Malvinas, Official Report of the Argentine Army, Vol. II*. (**NWC 1038**), (Seminar Reserve).

Selected extracts from *Falkland Islands Campaign: Understanding the Issues, Vol. 1*. (**NWC 1115**), (Seminar Reserve).

Summers, Harry G., Jr. "Strategic Lessons Learned: The Falkland Islands Campaign." (**NWC 1111**), (Seminar Reserve).

Thompson, Julian. *No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic: 1982*. New York: Hippocrene, 1985.

United Kingdom Defence Council. "The Falklands War 1982 from the Viewpoint of

Doctrine."

Van der Bijl, Nick, and David Aldea. *5th Infantry Brigade in the Falklands 1982*. Barnsley, West Yorkshire, UK: Leo Cooper, 2003.

Woodward, Sandy. *One Hundred Days—The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992. (Seminar Reserve).

MODULE THREE
OPERATIONAL & MARITIME LAW

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OPERATIONAL LAW

A. Focus:

Joint Maritime Operations Course Module Three sessions prepare students by introducing operational law concepts that will apply to operational planning for the employment and command and control of sea, land and air functional components across the range of military operations. The emphasis of the module is the comprehension of the nature of international operational law and familiarity with specific aspects of that law so that it may be effectively used by operational planners to achieve operational and strategic objectives and the desired end state.

Combined with Operational Art, Module Three provides the necessary foundation for many of the blocks which follow. Additionally, the OPLAW module reinforces concepts initially presented in the Strategy and Theater Security module of NSDM.

B. Description:

Operational law is the collection of international and domestic law that governs the conduct of military operations world-wide. It is a critical aspect of effective planning across the range of military operations and all operational planners must have at least general familiarity with the key operational law concepts. Maritime operations present particular operational law challenges for planners, who must accomplish military objectives while respecting the sovereignty and sovereign rights of other maritime nations. In particular, each zone in the ocean's littorals possesses a unique blend of sovereign and international rights. These rights must be thoroughly understood in order to conduct operations in a manner that achieves maximum legitimacy, minimum unintended friction, and thereby sets the conditions to achieve the desired end state that the military objective supports.

Comprehending and applying operational law concepts requires planners to understand that international law, which reflects norms of expected behavior among sovereign states and on which operational law is primarily founded, is fundamentally different from a country's laws governing the activities of citizens. International law grows and changes based on sovereign consent, either through behavior (custom) or by agreement (treaties and conventions). Accordingly, operational law sessions will focus on U.S. treaty obligations, such as those incurred under the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and collected customary international law, such as is reflected in the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWP 1-14M).

The objective of Module Three is to ensure that students are prepared to be effective planners in the maritime environment because they have some familiarity with the legal bases for a nation to employ force, can identify operational law-related constraints and restraints on potential courses of action, can design courses of action that meet fundamental requirements of international law, and can shape the use of force by subordinates in accordance with those requirements.

LEGAL BASES FOR THE USE OF FORCE (Seminar)

"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any state…"

- U.N. Charter Article 2(4)

"Nothing in the present Chapter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security…"

- U.N. Charter Article 51

A. Focus:

This seminar introduces the "operational law" portion of the JMO curriculum. Operational law is a broad term which encompasses those facets of international law, U.S. domestic law, and the domestic law of other nations that impact military planning and operations. This seminar will explore what is known as *jus ad bellum* (the law of resorting to war). Specifically, this seminar will examine the question, "When can a nation legally use force under international law?" After discussing the U.N. Charter and the role of the U.N. Security Council the seminar will examine developments in this area of the law post-9/11 to include the "Bush Doctrine of Preemption" as well as the use of force against non-state actors.

B. Objectives:

- Identify the primary sources of international law related to *jus ad bellum* and understand those provisions of the U.N. Charter related to a nation's use of force.
- Discuss the impact of the U.N. Charter and the role of the U.N. Security Council as they relate to the development of international law, particularly with respect to the concept of national and collective self-defense.
- Discuss developments in international legal norms post-9/11 related to a nation's use of force against non-state actors.
- Discuss how international law affects the combatant and operational commander in planning and executing military operations.

C. Background:

Relations among nations necessarily involve the application of international law. For example, international law regulates such diverse activities as aviation safety, communications, financial transactions, nautical rules of the road, and environmental protection. International law also directly impacts the legality of a nation's use of force.

There are two primary sources of international law; state practice and international agreements. Only when state practice attains a degree of regularity and is accompanied by the general conviction among nations that behavior in conformity with that practice is obligatory can it be said to have become a rule of customary law binding upon all nations. Bilateral or multilateral formal agreements between and among nations are also primary sources of international law. Such agreements are often styled as *treaties* or *conventions*. Significant conventions and treaties related to the conduct of hostilities

include the Hague Conventions of 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the U.N. Charter, the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. Secondary sources of international law include general principles of law, judicial decisions, and the writings of publicists are applied.

Historically, international law focused on the conduct between and among sovereign nations. In the last half century, however, international law has focused increasingly on the rights and responsibilities of individuals, e.g. the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). This trend has had a significant impact on both the conduct and public perception of war. Finally, state practice since 9/11, combined with U.N. Security Council actions and decisions of the International Court of Justice ICJ), indicate that perhaps new norms are evolving regarding the legal basis for nation states to use force against non-state actors.

The point of contact for this lesson is Commander Sean Henseler, JAGC, USN, C-431.

D. Questions:

What are the sources of international law? Why do nations care about international law when deciding whether or not to use force? What motivates them to comply with its provisions?

What are the two commonly accepted legal bases for the employment of armed force by a nation state?

Describe the role of the U.N. Security Council regarding the use of force against a nation or non-state actors.

What role, if any, should international law play in U.S. national security decisions regarding the use of force?

What are the legal bases for coalition military operations in Iraq? Afghanistan? Elsewhere in the so-called "terror war"?

E. Products:

None

F. Required Readings:

Schmitt, Michael. "Preemptive Strategies in International Law." *Michigan Journal of International Law* (Winter 2003), 513-548. (**NWC 1033**).

United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations. 26 June 1945. (Relevant articles: 1–2, 23 [1963 text], 24–25, 27 [1963 text], 33–34, 36–43, 45–46, 48–49, 51–53). (Contained within the *Law of War Documentary Supplement*, pages 160-167).

International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, U.S. Army. *Operational Law Handbook*. Read: Chapter 1 (pp 1-8).

United Nations Security Council. *Security Council Resolution 1269*. 1999. (**NWC 1031**), (Scan).

United Nations Security Council. *Security Council Resolution 1368*. 2001. (**NWC 1031**), (Scan).

United Nations Security Council. *Security Council Resolution 1373*. 2001. (**NWC 1031**), (Scan).

G. Supplementary Readings:

None

MARITIME OPERATIONAL LAW (Seminar)

"Our new maritime strategy emphasizes the importance of leveraging other nation's capabilities. The growing interdependency of the community of nations will continue to offer similar opportunities. I support the United States' accession to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, and I believe that joining the Convention will strengthen our military's ability to conduct operations."

--Michael G. Mullen Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, February, 2008

The Department of Defense strongly supports U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. A universally respected ocean regime, with strong, unambiguous guarantees of fundamental operational rights, such as passage through foreign territorial seas, through international straits, and through the world's archipelagoes, preserves the ability of the U.S. to deter and respond to threats whenever and wherever required.

—Secretary of Defense, 2001 Annual Report to the President and the Congress

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A. Focus:

This seminar focuses on the law that affects military operations in the maritime environment. Legal classifications or regimes of ocean and airspace directly affect maritime operations by determining the degree of control that a coastal nation may exercise over the conduct of foreign merchant ships, warships, and aircraft operating in those areas. This seminar will discuss not only constraints maritime operational law might have on military operations but also how the operational commander can utilize the law to achieve mission success.

B. Objectives:

- Discuss operational considerations resulting from the sovereign right of nations to limit the entry and movement of foreign forces within their land territory, territorial seas, and national airspace.
- Understand the navigational rights of innocent, transit, and archipelagic sea lanes passage.
- Understand how operational commanders can use the right of belligerent control of the immediate area of operations, maritime warning zones, and blockade to contribute to mission success.
- Understand traditional legal rights of belligerent and neutral nations and how these rights might impact military operations.
- Become familiar with the various legal bases for maritime interception operations (MIO).
- Become familiar with the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) concept.

C. Background:

Among the operational art tools used by the operational planner are the factors of time, force, and space. "Factor Space" is heavily influenced by international law governing the establishment of land, sea and air "boundaries." These boundaries directly impact the freedom of movement of military forces. For example, during the deterrent or pre-hostilities phase of an operation, military forces typically respect the sovereign rights of nations regarding their land territory, national waters, and national airspace.

During the hostilities phase of an operation, when the Law of Armed Conflict becomes the *lex specialis* or law that governs the situation, the movement of military forces may be conducted without regard to the sovereign territorial rights of the enemy belligerent nation. However, the traditional sovereign rights of other states (e.g. neighboring states) as a matter of law must continue to be respected. As such, limitations on the freedom of movement of forces within the land, sea, and air boundaries of such states must be factored into operational planning. When limited navigation and over flight rights within other nation's air and sea space prove insufficient, operational planners might consider either notifying the State Department of the need to obtain access and transit agreements in order to facilitate planned operations or necessary Rules of Engagement.

Possessing the freedom to utilize international waters and airspace is fundamental to implementing U.S. national and military strategies. This freedom allows access to strategic areas of the world, facilitates support and reinforcement of forward-deployed forces, enables U.S. and coalition forces to operate worldwide, and ensures uninterrupted world commerce. During this lesson we will discuss the rights of all nations in international waters and airspace, as well as the limited rights of coastal nations to exercise jurisdiction over some portions of the sea and airspace adjacent to their coastline.

Since 1983, the United States has recognized the LOS Convention's description of the various maritime zones and boundaries and the rights and responsibilities associated with them to be accepted customary international law. Since that time, it has been presidential policy for U.S. forces to actively "exercise and assert [U.S.] navigation and over flight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the Convention." Moreover, presidential policy has been that the United States shall not "acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and over flight and other related high seas uses."

Although the Senate has yet to ratify U.S. participation in the Law of the Sea Convention, by an Executive Order signed by President Reagan in 1983 it is official government policy that all military operations will be conducted in accordance with the Convention's delineation of rights and responsibilities. The U.S. Navy publishes detailed guidance on the LOS regimes in Part I of The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M. This handbook is a great resource for the operational commander and his/her staff.

The point of contact for this lesson is Commander Sean Henseler, JAGC, USN, C-431.

D. Questions:

What sovereign rights does a nation have regarding its land territory, territorial sea and national airspace, and how does this affect the movement or operation of foreign military forces in these zones?

What are the distinctions between innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea-lane passage, and high seas freedoms of navigation?

How, if at all, is military planning and operations affected by the various legal regimes of oceans and airspace?

How can operational planners use the concepts of belligerent control of the immediate area of operations, maritime warning zones, and blockade to assist mission accomplishment?

To what extent may the military operations of a belligerent nation be conducted within the land territory, national airspace and national waters of a neutral or non-belligerent?

When, where, and how may coastal nations lawfully employ naval mines?

What legal issues are associated with MIO, PSI, and MOTR?

E. Products:

None

F. Required Readings:

United Nations. *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. 1983. Articles 1-25, 29-54, 86-111 and 121. (**NWC 1003**), (Scan).

U.S. Department of Defense. *National Security and the Convention on the Law of the Sea*. 1996. (**NWC 1017**), (Scan).

U.S. Department of the Navy. Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*. Norfolk, VA: Department of the Navy, 2007. Chapters 1, 2, 4, and 7. (Issued). Scan 1 and 2, Read 4 and 7..

Stephens, Dale, CMDR, CSM, RAN. "The Law of Naval Warfare and Zones." In *Maritime Operational Zones*, Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006. Read: 4-1 to 4-30. (**NWC 1069**).

G. Supplementary Reading:

Winner, Andrew C. "The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdictions." *Washington Quarterly* (Spring 2005), 129-143.

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (Seminar)

Those skilled in war cultivate the Tao (the way of humanity and justice) and preserve the laws and are therefore able to formulate victorious policies.

—Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

A. Focus:

When planning and conducting military operations, commanders and their subordinates must comply with the international law that governs the conduct of hostilities. This lesson is devoted to discussing the law of armed conflict for land, air, and naval warfare. Additionally, this lesson will touch upon some of the post-combat legal issues which arise with detainees, internees, and prisoners of war.

B. Objectives:

- Examine the origins of and the purposes served by the law of armed conflict and comprehend the reasons that nations comply or attempt to comply with it.
- Know the basic principles of the law of armed conflict for land, air, and naval warfare.
- Consider the legal issues surrounding detainees, internees, and prisoners of war.
- Apply the concepts of the law of armed conflict to the strategic and operational levels of war.

C. Background:

The law of armed conflict (LOAC) was historically referred to as the law of war. It is that part of international and domestic law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is based on international custom and practice, on international agreements or conventions, and on American values and policies.

There are three general principles of the law of armed conflict: military necessity, proportionality, and humanity. The principle of **military necessity** allows a belligerent to apply force to achieve legitimate military objectives, while the principle of **proportionality** means that the degree of force used must be no greater than what is necessary and proportional to the prompt realization of those legitimate military objectives. The principle of **humanity** forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes. These principles require, for example, that belligerents distinguish as much as reasonably possible between combatants and noncombatants when targeting. This is known as the principle of **distinction**, which is an aspect of military necessity.

The law of armed conflict is consistent with certain principles of war, such as objective, mass, and economy of force. Both the law of armed conflict and the principles of war stress the importance of directing force against critical military targets, while avoiding the waste of resources against objectives that are militarily unimportant.

The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations and the Army's Operational Law Handbook present an overview of the rights and duties of military

personnel under the law of armed conflict. In DOD Directive 5100.77, the Secretary of Defense directed U.S. Armed Forces to comply with the law of armed conflict during all armed conflicts, however characterized, and to apply the principles and spirit of the law of armed conflict during all other military operations.

The point of contact for this session is CDR Sean Henseler, JAGC, USN, C-431.

D. Questions:

Is it in a nation's interest to comply with the law of armed conflict? Is it in the interest of the military commander?

To what extent does the law of armed conflict apply across the range of military operations?

What are the major protections afforded by the law of armed conflict to the wounded and sick, prisoners of war, and civilians in occupied areas?

What are the principal international law considerations with respect to selection of targets and selection of weapons?

What are the requirements to be a lawful combatant? To be a noncombatant? What is an unlawful (or unprivileged) combatant?

How has the law of armed conflict changed, if at all, during the ongoing Terror War?

E. Required Readings:

Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War. *Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,* August 12, 1949, Articles 13-26 and 47-88. (Contained within the *Law of War Documentary Supplement* 238-240 and 244-251), (Scan).

Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War. *Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,* August 12, 1949, Articles 1-42. (Contained within the *Law of War Documentary Supplement* 199-208), (Scan).

International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, U.S. Army. *Operational Law Handbook*. Read: Chapters 2–4, (Scan).

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*. Read: Chapters 8–12. (Issued) (Scan).

F. Supplementary Readings:

None

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (Seminar)

The determination of hostile intent is the single most difficult decision that a commander has to make in peacetime.

—Admiral Frank Kelso

A. Focus:

This lesson concerns rules of engagement (ROE), which define for operating forces the circumstances and extent to which they may use force. The lesson reviews the U.S. Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) and Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) and then discusses the foundations for and process involved in developing ROE. Finally, this lesson discusses how ROE are employed across the range of military operations.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the basic principles underling the use of force in self defense.
- Comprehend how the SROE/SRUF is constructed and know when and where SROE and SRUF apply.
- Understand the principles behind the SROE and the distinction between conduct-based ROE and status-based ROE.
- Understand the different considerations involved in the issuance of permissive versus restrictive ROE.
- Examine ROE development in the planning process and understand the process by which modifications to ROE are obtained from higher authority.

C. Background:

Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the primary means by which the President, through the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders, exercises his Constitutional responsibility as commander-in-chief to guide U.S. military forces in the use of force to obtain national objectives. U.S. forces operate under the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) and Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) contained in chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B. The SROE/SRUF provide direction and guidance regarding the right of self-defense, which is based fundamentally on the conduct of others and which applies at all times from peace to war. The SROE/SRUF also provide a list of supplemental measures designed to be tailored to ensure accomplishment of a particular mission. The article by Stephen Rose, set in the context of operations in Haiti, helps commanders and planning staffs whose forces must work within an overall posture of reactive, self-defense rules of engagement to develop means to take back some of the tactical initiative through rules of engagement that blend status and conduct.

The right to use force, including deadly force, in self-defense has as its legal basis the right of military self-defense recognized under customary international law and the right of national self-defense recognized under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Mission accomplishment ROE are issued by senior civilian and military commanders as a means of shaping a military operation to best achieve political and military goals, and to ensure

that forces comply with the law of armed conflict at all times. All ROE should be consistent with national policy, military strategy, and the missions assigned by higher authority. ROE must be framed and interpreted in conjunction with the mission and should support, not inhibit, mission accomplishment. Thus, although international law relating to the use of force is an important consideration in drafting ROE, political guidance and operational requirements are perhaps the most significant factors that shape mission accomplishment ROE.

In operational planning, the adequacy of existing ROE is assessed during the mission analysis in the Commander's Estimate of the Situation. Operational planners should be prepared to brief the commander on the specific ROE required to ensure mission accomplishment which may include tailored supplemental measures that supplement existing ROE. In all subsequent phases of the military decision-making process, it is vitally important that commanders and their planning staffs continue to be alert to the effect that existing ROE have on mission accomplishment, and to seek or order changes to the ROE when appropriate. The J-3 is primarily responsible to the Commander for ROE development, with the assistance of other staff officers, including the staff judge advocate.

The point of contact for this session is CDR Sean Henseler, JAGC, USN, C-431.

D. Questions:

When may US forces employ force in self defense? Define hostile act and hostile intent. May a commander place limits on the ability of subordinate forces to employ force in self defense? Define unit and collective self defense?

Who has a role in crafting ROE for a particular mission and why?

Describe methods a planning staff can employ to obtain mission specific ROE.

How can a combatant commander ensure that subordinate commanders do not misinterpret the ROE or put an undesired "spin" on the approved ROE?

In asymmetric warfare what, if any, proactive measures can forces take to assist in determining hostile intent at sea and on the ground?

What additional ROE considerations are involved in coalition warfare? In UN operations?

In the Terror War and in Homeland Defense/Security, are there new considerations regarding rules of engagement? How can commanders blend conduct and status based ROE to assist with mission accomplishment?

E. Required Readings:

Henseler, Sean P. "Self-Defense in the Maritime Environment Under the New Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SROE/SRUF)." *Naval Law Review* 53 (2006): 211-228. (**NWC 4042**).

Rose, S. "Crafting the Rules of Engagement for Haiti." (**NWC 1051**).

U.S. Naval War College. "JCS Standing Rules of Engagement and Rules for the Use of Force." Extracts from CJCS Instruction 3121.01B. (**NWC 1062A**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

None.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CASE STUDIES (Seminar)

When the Alpha Company's position here in (Afghanistan) came under RPG (rocket propelled grenade) and small arms fire, the effect was like thwacking a beehive with a baseball bat. Angry Marines boiled up in a swarm, weapons up, ready for revenge. I mean, one Marine wondered, who'd be dumb enough to fire at a bunch of Marines … and MISS???

The attackers appeared to be two young men on a motor bike. A couple of Marines who'd been on watch, on the roof of a mud-walled farmer's compound, had seen them a quarter mile away, riding back and forth, eyeing the Marines. One Marine said he thought one had something on his back that looked like an RPG but he couldn't be sure.

Over the next few hours, the two men were seen several more times, but at no time could the Marines be certain these two men were the attackers.

The incident could be emblematic of this kind of war. There is likely to be very little of the video-game business of emptying an M-4 magazine into a bunch of sneering, evil terrorists. There is likely to be much of what Alpha and Bravo Companies of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines are doing: patiently working through this Taliban stronghold, weeding out bad guys, making contact with neutral locals, ready to kill but being judicious about it.

There are two good reasons for this approach. One is that even under provocative attack, Marines are bound by the Rules of Engagement. The ROE differ by region, command and mission, but they all spring from the international laws of war. The ROE say when you can and when you cannot use deadly force.

The other reason is that the counterinsurgency campaign depends on winning the cooperation of local Afghans. Indiscriminate fire, the mistaken killing of civilians, set back this goal significantly.

So it was that Alpha did not return fire and the two young men – probably insurgents – got away.

—David Wood, Baltimore Sun

A. Focus:

This lesson provides the students with multiple real world ROE scenarios in video and slide form to include a VBIED in Iraq, an insurgent attack in Fallujah, a sniper attack in Iraq, Straits of Hormuz Transit engagements, Haditha, Tarnak Farms, Peruvian counter narcotic operations, and several more historical events. This lesson seeks to apply the fundamental concepts introduced in OPS 3-4 to these real world scenarios. This lesson is designed to enhance the student's understanding of how legal, political, and military considerations factor into ROE development as well as the ROE related issues that might arise during coalition operations. Finally, this lesson is focused on the role of military commanders in promulgating and reviewing ROE as well as responding to apparent ROE/LOAC violations.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the basic principles underlying the use of force in self defense.

- Understand the principles behind the SROE and the distinction between conduct-based ROE and status-based ROE.
- Understand the different considerations involved in the issuance of permissive versus restrictive ROE.
- Examine ROE development in the planning process and understand the process by which modifications to ROE are obtained from higher authority.
- Understand the evolution of the SROE and their applicability to evolving tactics, techniques, and procedures in an asymmetric environment.
- Understand the role of political, legal, and military personnel in the formulation of ROE.
- Discuss the role of the commander upon learning of an apparent ROE violation.
- Understand the implications of working with coalition forces and their likely different ROE.

C. Background:

Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the primary means by which the President, through the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders, exercises his Constitutional responsibility as commander-in-chief to guide U.S. military forces in the use of force to obtain national objectives. U.S. forces operate under the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) and Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) contained in chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B. The SROE/SRUF provide direction and guidance regarding the right of self-defense, which is based fundamentally on the conduct of others and which applies at all times from peace to war. The SROE/SRUF also provide a list of supplemental measures designed to be tailored to ensure accomplishment of a particular mission.

The right to use force, including deadly force, in self-defense has as its legal basis the right of military self-defense recognized under customary international law and the right of national self-defense recognized under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Mission accomplishment ROE are issued by senior civilian and military commanders as a means of shaping a military operation to best achieve political and military goals, and to ensure that forces comply with the law of armed conflict at all times. All ROE should be consistent with national policy, military strategy, and the missions assigned by higher authority. ROE must be framed and interpreted in conjunction with the mission and should support, not inhibit, mission accomplishment. Thus, although international law relating to the use of force is an important consideration in drafting ROE, political guidance and operational requirements are perhaps the most significant factors that shape mission accomplishment ROE.

Students will be shown videos and other media depicting real world scenarios during which mission specific ROE and the SROE have been applied. Students will be asked to critique the efficacy of the ROE as well how the military forces involved interpreted and applied the ROE/SROE.

The point of contact for this session is CDR Sean Henseler, JAGC, USN, C-431.

D. Questions:

When may US forces employ force in self defense? Define hostile act and hostile intent. May a commander place limits on the ability of subordinate forces to employ force in self defense? Define unit and collective self defense?

Who has a role in crafting ROE for a particular mission and why?

What is Positive Identification (PID) and what ramification does the requirement for PID have on US forces?

What considerations impact a commander's actions when he/she becomes aware of potential violations of the ROE and/or the Law of Armed Conflict?

Who in the chain of command should have/does have the authority to determine hostile intent? Who has the authority to take lethal measures when faced with hostile intent?

How can commanders use C2 to ensure ROE are adhered to?

Describe methods a planning staff can employ to obtain mission specific ROE.

How can a combatant commander ensure that subordinate commanders do not misinterpret the ROE or put an undesired "spin" on the approved ROE?

In asymmetric warfare what, if any, proactive measures can forces take to assist in determining hostile intent at sea and on the ground?

What additional ROE considerations are involved in coalition warfare? In UN operations?

In the Terror War and in Homeland Defense/Security, are there new considerations regarding rules of engagement? How can commanders blend conduct and status based ROE to assist with mission accomplishment?

E. Required Readings:

CFLCC Operation Iraqi Freedom ROE Card, 31 Jan 03. (N**WC 5011**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

None.

OPERATIONAL LAW CASE STUDY (Seminar)

You will usually find that the enemy has three courses open to him, and of these he will adopt the fourth.

—Helmuth von Moltke ("The Elder")

A. Focus:

This seminar provides the opportunity to apply operational law to a real world maritime conflict scenario (the Iran/Iraq Tanker War) and to discuss ROE within the context of specific military operations.

B. Objectives:

- Demonstrate knowledge of the elements of the law of the sea and airspace, the law of naval warfare, and the law of armed conflict by applying them in a factual context involving the employment of military forces.
- Demonstrate an understanding of the various political, military, and legal considerations involved in crafting rules of engagement for a specific military operation.
- Apply the CJCS SROE in a factual context involving the employment of military forces.
- Demonstrate an understanding of supplemental ROE through developing supplemental measures for a series of military missions.
- Demonstrate an understanding of the UN Charter Chapter VII and the legal bases to use force.

C. Background:

See OPS Lessons 3-1 through 3-5.

The point of contact for this session is CDR Sean Henseler, C-431.

D. Questions:

Students work individually to prepare short answers to assigned scenario questions, and to present those answers to the seminar for discussion.

E. Required Readings:

Walker, George K. Selected Readings from *The Tanker War, 1980–88, Law and Policy*. U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies, Volume 74 (2000). (**NWC 3004A**).

U.S. Naval War College. "Blue Force Standing Rules of Engagement." (**NWC 2012A**).

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*. (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College. "JCS Standing Rules of Engagement and Rules for the Use of Force." Extracts from CJCS 3121.01B. (**NWC 1062A**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

None.

MODULE FOUR
OPERATIONAL WARFARE AT SEA

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OPERATIONAL WARFARE AT SEA

A. Focus:

Module Four introduces operational art in the context of the maritime domain, and is focused exclusively on the theory and practice of operational warfare at sea. Module Four sessions build upon the framework and components of previous modules, but is dedicated to explaining and analyzing operational art in a maritime/naval operational context. The sessions provide a comprehensive view of the theoretical underpinnings of the importance of the oceans and how command of the seas (sea control) contributes to a nation's power and influence. It also examines in detail the functional elements required to gain and maintain maritime power, and provides analysis of historic examples so as to better understand the optimum employment considerations for these functions in a theater of operations. The overall educational objective is to combine faculty seminar presentations, student contributions, readings, and a Battle of Midway analysis into creating a knowledge foundation for the application of operational art in a maritime environment. It is expected that this competence will be reflected in student understanding of the importance of the maritime environment, and the essential role of operational art in accomplishing maritime objectives.

B. Description:

Sessions 4-1 through 4-3 explain the key components of the maritime domain, influence of the physical environment, and the employment of naval forces across the spectrum of conflict at sea. All the subsequent sessions in this module are focused on the practice of operational warfare at sea, and freely use historical examples to illustrate various theoretical aspects of this topic. The sessions on the objectives of naval warfare (Ops 4-4) and major naval operations (OPS 4-5) are scene setters for successive sessions that explain the role and importance of naval combat arms in obtaining, maintaining and exercising sea control, or contesting that control. Sessions on antisubmarine warfare (Ops 4-9), attack on and defense/protection of maritime trade (4-12), amphibious warfare (4-13), and mine warfare (4-10) explain and analyze the employment of multi-naval combat arms (surface, subsurface, and air: Ops 4-6, 7, and 8) and combat arms/branches of other services at the operational level of war. The final session (Ops 4-14) in this module will investigate and analyze the main elements of design for a major naval operation. The Battle for Midway is used as a historical case study for both this session and session Ops 4-5. The emphasis throughout this module is on the theoretical foundations of maritime operational art and their employment in maritime warfare, which will assist the student in considering how best to deploy and employ forces and functional support systems to accomplish assigned objectives.

THE MARITIME DOMAIN (Seminar)

There is a tradition in the sea-going profession, a tradition of the sea that is older than the traditions of our great country. . . . This is the philosophy of the Navy. It is the time-honored tradition of men who must meet the challenge of the sea. It is the philosophy inherited by the United States from those who have braved the seas to find freedom and fulfillment, and it must be your philosophy as Americans if you are to serve the large purposes of free men on earth.

—Admiral Arleigh Burke, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, 1959

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is to describe the role and importance of maritime domain and the description and analysis of its main components. This session will provide the broader framework within which one's maritime forces are employed across the spectrum of conflict at sea.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the components of the maritime domain and where those components are operationally significant.
- Comprehend the theoretical elements of "seapower" as they pertain to any country's overall national power.
- Understand the current and projected threats resident in the maritime domain.
- Comprehend the theoretical reasons for the existence of navies and "navy-like" forces.

C. Background:

About 70 percent of the world's surface is covered by the oceans and seas. The 2005 U.S. National Strategy for Maritime Security notes that "these waters are a single, great ocean, and immense maritime domain that affects life everywhere." Although there is no completely agreed-upon definition of the "maritime domain," it arguably encompasses several components with physical, social, economic, political, military, and legal aspects. The domain also contains not only the surface of the world's waterways, but also potentially the airspace above, undersea areas below, and land/sea interfaces (ports, straits, etc.) near the water. The components of the domain interact with each other in ways that require a unique understanding by the maritime operational planner. For the joint planner, the awareness of: the depth of international dependence on unimpeded/secure use of the oceans; the extent to which this access is assumed; and an understanding of the consequences for global security should secure use of the oceans be challenged in any significant way, provides a critical underpinning for the development of maritime operational plans.

Some leading past and present maritime theoreticians provide an overarching context for a discussion of "seapower" and maritime influence. Seapower may be understood as a subset, or application of, national power that takes place in the maritime domain. This

can include employment of both civil and military elements of national power. RADM Alfred T. Mahan, for example, never completely defines seapower, but demonstrates that it is connected to the political, social, and military importance of the sea. Geoffrey Till also illustrates that very "attributes of the sea itself" provide the basis for the concept of seapower.

This session will explore the multiple aspects and elements of the maritime domain to provide the planner with a theoretical, historical, and statistical framework for understanding seapower and maritime influence. This framework will include an analysis of why, and where, the maritime domain is important, particularly relating to transportation, commerce, population, and resources. Also included in this exploration will be readings on the threats and challenges to the maritime domain as well as fundamental reasons that nation states create and maintain maritime forces. Finally, we will also review briefly the relationships between these nation states, their legal zones and the implications of international law as they impact the domain. These analyses serve to pinpoint likely areas of conflict between military elements of the domain (and between states and non-state actors), which will be of importance to the maritime operational planner.

The point of contact for this session is CDR Mark Houff, SE-118.

D. Questions:

How is the maritime domain characterized? How does it different from land and air domains?

Why and where are the oceans important? Explain, identify, and discuss in general terms the critical elements of the domain (e.g., the location of key interfaces between land and sea, ocean transit routes, etc.).

What are the key components of the maritime domain (political/legal, military, social, economic, environmental, etc.)?

How do the critical elements of maritime domain interact? How do these interactions change (or become more important) between "peacetime" and then across the spectrum of conflict?

Which of these components have the most influence on the military element?

Why do countries have a navy and/or coast guard?

E. Required Readings:

Isenberg, Michael T. *Shield of the Republic: The United States Navy in an Era of Cold War and Violent Peace, 1945-1962,* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. Read Chapter 1 pp. 23-29; 39-42. (**NWC 4049**).

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783.* Project Gutenberg E-book, posted on http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13529/13529-h/13529-h.htm#Page_25 (accessed 30 October 2008) Read Chapter 1, pp. 25-28. (**NWC 4064**).

National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration. *Project Oceanography Data Sheet: "Why the Oceans are Important."* Washington, D.C.: National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, 1998. Read pp. 1-2. (**NWC 4065**).

Office of Naval Intelligence. *Worldwide Maritime Challenges*, Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2004. Scan pages 5-40. (**NWC 4015**).

Till, Geoffrey. *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century,* London: Frank Cass, 2006. Read Chapter 1. Issued.

U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. "World Oil Transit Chokepoints," January 2008, posted on http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World.oil.Transit.chokepoints/pdf.pdf (accessed 13 Sep 08). Scan pp. 1-11. (**NWC 4066**).

The White House. *The National Strategy for Maritime Security,* Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2005. Read Sections I and II Read pp. 1-6. (**NWC 4067**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Carafano, James J. and Alane Kochems. *Heritage Special Report: Making the Sea Safer, a National Agenda for Maritime Security and Counterterrorism*, Washington, D.C: The Heritage Foundation, February 2005.

United Nations. *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: Review of Maritime Transport 2007.* New York: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2007. Chapter 1. Available on the web at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2007_en.pdf

United Nations. *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.* Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. 2007. Review previously read portions from Operational Law sessions.

U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center. *National Maritime Terrorism Threat Assessment*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard, January 2008. (UNCLAS FOUO version).

U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center. *Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship: Predicting the Impact of a Tumultuous Future 2030*, Washington, D.C.:U.S. Coast Guard, June 2008. Scan pp. 1-17.

U.S. Department of Transportation, *U.S. Water Transportation Statistical Snapshot*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, May 2008. U.S. Department of the Navy. Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*. Norfolk, VA: Department of the Navy, 2007. Chapters 1 and 2, and pp. 7-1 through 7-5, Review previously read portions from Operational Law sessions.

INFLUENCE OF THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT ON NAVAL WARFARE (Seminar)

War is a matter of vital importance to the state . . . . Therefore, appraise it in terms of the five fundamental factors . . . . The first of these factors is moral influence; the second, weather, the third, terrain; the fourth command; and the fifth, doctrine.

—Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

The Allies . . . prevailed because of superior meteorologists.

—Dwight D. Eisenhower

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is how the maritime operational commander evaluates the operational features in the complex and unforgiving nature of the maritime environment in order to achieve operational objectives without taking undue risks. This session will also address how the physical environment impacts planning and conducting maritime operations.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the role of the physical environment on planning and conducting maritime operations.
- Understand the impact of deploying and moving forces (people, ships, aircraft, and vehicles) from one environment to another.
- Understand the time required to attain theater-specific or area-specific knowledge of the physical environment and how a maritime force is impacted by that environment.
- Comprehend the risks posed by the physical environment on operational success.
- Comprehend the reliance upon supporting commanders.

C. Background:

The physical environment is a component of factor space that affects how the operational commander must balance the other two factors (time and forces) in order to achieve operational objectives. What a maritime staff must know about the physical environment includes all aspects of weather, oceanography, and the burgeoning field of geospatial information that includes bathymetry, hydrography, and terrain. There is a vast amount of information; nevertheless, this mountain of details regarding the physical environment needs to be taken into account during the planning process or the degree of risk upon execution will be increased significantly.

At the operational level of war, weather considerations are based on a climatic scale that are often outside of the timeframe of the ability of science to accurately forecast the impacts of weather on the tactical battlefield; therefore, seasonal data and climatological trends are more important in the operational planning process than real-time data. Furthermore the operational planner has to determine in the planning

process how to set up a tactical weather data network that will not overload nor overwhelm subordinate commanders with data they do not need.

The maritime environment is more than just weather; it is also the sea, the ocean bottom, and the shore. It is the constantly changing terrain familiar to mariners. Every platform, every sensor, and every weapon operates in the environment, and the performance of each is, to some degree, impacted by the environment. While these impacts are often most apparent at the tactical level of war, the role of the environment must be accounted for at the operational, and sometimes strategic, levels of war.

For example, the sequencing for operation OVERLORD was dependent on the timing of the tides on the beaches of Normandy. The Allies wanted a period of quiet weather that would coincide with low tide (to expose obstacles). These conditions were difficult to define because, as a joint operation, each part of the staff had a different idea about what "quiet weather" meant. A few days of stormy weather and high seas around D-Day would have caused a delay of at least a month, not days, in the cross-channel operation. After much haggling, the staff agreed on the parameters. That agreement along with a hemispheric view on data collection and weather forecasting allowed Eisenhower's staff meteorologist to predict a very fleeting window of opportunity.

The astute planner should strive to understand the environment and use it for military advantage. That understanding must go beyond the concept of "good" or "bad" weather to a comprehension of how the environment relates to achieving objectives. For example, low clouds and fog, resulting in reduced visibility and typically regarded as "bad" weather, may be the ideal environment for employing naval Special Forces, who could leverage reduced visibility to aid in concealment.

Planning staffs should include officers competent in meteorology, oceanography, and hydrography. These officers with specialized competencies should participate in boards, centers, and cells that ensure operational-level planning accounts for the impact of the physical environment.

The knowledge of the maritime physical environment needed for operational-level planning is expansive and complicated. As a consequence, it is easy to overlook or underestimate the impact of some aspect of the physical environment during the planning phase, a result which normally leads to a lesson learned being issued (or issued once more) as part of the after-action report.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Jeff Barker, C-431.

D. Questions:

How does the maritime operational commander take advantage of the physical environment?

In operational-level planning, is the physical environment neutral? Is there an advantage to the aggressor or the defender?

How does a less-sophisticated enemy take advantage of the physical environment to defeat, deter, or delay a high-tech maritime force?

How does a high-tech force take advantage of the physical environment to defeat, deter,

or delay a less-sophisticated maritime force?

What are some of the major considerations when considering how to balance the physical environment against factor time?

Which of the maritime operational functions are influenced or impacted by the physical environment? How does the operational commander mitigate that influence or impact?

What are the critical requirements associated with supporting the maritime operational commander's critical capabilities with respect to the collection and distribution of environmental data?

What tools does the operational planning staff need in order to support the commander in planning for the impact of the physical environment? Where do they go to get that support?

When should a maritime operational commander dedicate assets for environmental reconnaissance?

What weather or climate factors caused the British to react quickly to the invasion of the Falklands? What might have been the outcome had they waited?

E. Required Reading:

Barker, Jeffrey. "The Environmental Influences upon Naval Warfare." Newport, RI: Naval War College, Nov 2008. (**NWC 4029**).

Barker, Jeffrey. "Meteorological Factors at the Operational Level of War." Newport, RI: Naval War College, Nov 2008. (**NWC 4044A**).

Nimitz, Chester. CINCPACFLT letter to Pacific Fleet and Naval Shore Activities, Pacific Ocean Areas, 13 February 1945. (**NWC 4025**).

Shaw, Ronald R., Jr. "Reinventing Amphibious Hydrography: The Inchon Assault and Hydrographic Support for Amphibious Operations." Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Student Paper, 31 October 2008. (**NWC 4024**).

F. Supplementary Reading:

Calhoun, C. Raymond. *Typhoon: The Other Enemy*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981.

Collins, John. *Military Geography for Professionals and the Public*. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1998.

Winters, Harold A. *Battling the Elements, Weather and Terrain in the Conduct of War*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1998.

EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Sea power in the broad sense… includes not only the military strength afloat that rules the sea or any part of it by force of arms, but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests.

—Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* (1890)

Man-of-war is the best ambassador.

—Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658)

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is on providing a broad overview of the employment of naval forces across the spectrum of conflict, from the activities in peacetime, operations in support of the nation's foreign policy and military (theater) strategy and peace operations to the employment of naval forces in low intensity conflict and high intensity conventional war.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the role and importance of naval power in peacetime, operations short of war, and in war.
- Understand the importance and diversity of the missions by naval forces conducted in peacetime.
- Comprehend the role and importance of naval power in support of the country's foreign policy.
- Understand the importance of the use of naval forces in support of the country's military and theater strategy.
- Comprehend the role of naval forces in support of peace operations.
- Understand the role of naval forces in low-intensity conflict.
- Comprehend the range of objectives to be accomplished by naval forces in case of a regional or global high-intensity conventional war.

C. Background:

Navies can be employed in routine activities in peacetime, operations short of war, low-intensity conflict, and high-intensity conventional war. Today and for the immediate future, naval forces will be predominantly employed in conducting diverse missions in

what are arbitrarily called "operations short of war." However, a navy, no matter how strong, cannot carry out all the tasks alone but needs to proceed in combination with other elements of naval power, such as a coast guard. In some cases, the coast guard is an integral part of the navy; in other cases, the two are separate. Optimally, a coast guard should be employed predominantly for maritime policing (or constabulary) duties in peacetime and for conducting some combat missions in operations short of war and in a high-intensity conventional conflict. In the littorals, the air force and the army might be employed jointly with naval forces. A navy also has to interact and closely work with other elements of the country's sea power—specifically, the merchant marine, shipbuilding industries, ocean technology enterprises, and deep-sea mining agencies. Additionally, navies need to cooperate closely with many government agencies. This, in turn, requires smooth and effective interagency cooperation. To achieve success, naval forces (including the coast guard) must work with a large number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private volunteer organizations (PVOs) ashore.

Maritime forces are employed in peacetime for conducting a large number of diverse missions ranging from routine activities, homeland security, and protection of the country's economic interests at sea; to enforcement of maritime treaties and humanitarian assistance (HA) and disaster relief (DR). In general, routine duties include enforcing maritime border laws/customs, hydrographic surveys, oceanographic research, salvage, search and rescue, ordnance disposal, and marine pollution control. Usually, these tasks are the responsibility of the coast guard, with naval forces employed in a supporting role.

Maritime forces also play a major role in the maritime aspects of homeland security. Specifically, they can be employed for sea-based ballistic missiles defense (BMD), protection of critical installations/facilities ashore, port security, and for countering environmental pollution, smuggling narcotics (drugs) and weapons, and illegal immigration.

The navies and coast guard are also primarily responsible for protection of the country's economic interests at sea, specifically commercial shipping, fisheries, offshore oil/gas installations and seabed mineral deposits. The main tasks of maritime forces in the enforcement of international treaties are combating transnational terrorism, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, and countering slavery, piracy, illicit arms trade, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), respectively.

Maritime forces are routinely employed in peacetime for providing Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief such as assistance in the aftermath of natural disasters (earthquakes, flooding, fires), providing emergency medical assistance, refugee assistance, and evacuation of civilians.

Navies are an ideal tool for providing support of foreign policy. Their main advantages are flexibility, mobility, and political symbolism. Naval forces have diverse capabilities that can be quickly tailored to the situation at hand. They are also largely self-sufficient and do not require extensive support from the land. Naval forces can be employed in support of the country's diplomatic initiatives in peacetime and time of crisis, or for naval diplomacy—actions aimed to create a favorable general and military image abroad,

establish rights in areas of interest, provide reassurance to allies and other friendly countries, influence the behavior of other governments, threaten seaborne interdiction, and, finally, threaten the use of lethal force.

Blue-water navies such as the U.S. Navy play a critical role in providing support to national and military (or theater) strategy as a part of nuclear and/or conventional deterrence. The use or threatened use of conventional forces is a critical element in conventional deterrence. Naval forces are highly suitable for conventional deterrence because of their high mobility and high combat power. For a blue-water navy the main method of exercising conventional deterrence is the forward deployment of its striking forces. ability to deploy sea-based air and missile defenses forward contributes to force self-protection, assured access, and the defense of other forward-deployed forces. Navies are also extensively used in carrying out diverse tasks as part of security cooperation in a given maritime theater.

Naval forces are most extensively used in support of peace operations—military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. These actions are conducted in conjunction with diplomacy as necessary to negotiate a truce and resolve a conflict. They may be initiated in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after the conflict. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are the principal types of peace operations.

Navies can be employed to carry out diverse tasks in support of an insurgency or counterinsurgency (COIN). In COIN, these tasks include blockading the coast, aimed at preventing an influx of fighters and material to the insurgents; attacking insurgent concentrations in their operating areas and/or sanctuaries by using surface combatants and carrier-based aircraft; providing gunfire support to friendly troops ashore; and providing close air support, transport of friendly troops and material, and reconnaissance/surveillance.

Navies will play a major role in providing direct and/or indirect support to ground forces in the case of a regional or global conflict. War at sea has almost never taken place alone but has been conducted in conjunction with war on land and, in the modern era, war in the air. The objectives of naval warfare have been and continue to be an integral part of war's objectives. These, in turn, are accomplished by the employment of all the services of a country's armed forces. The main strategic or operational objective for a stronger side is to obtain sea control in the whole theater or a major part of it, while the weaker side tries to obtain sea denial. A relatively strong but initially weaker side at sea aims to ultimately obtain sea control for itself. When operating in an enclosed sea theater, a blue-water navy would aim to obtain choke-point control, while the weaker side would conduct counter-choke-point control. Another operational objective for both the stronger and weaker sides at sea is to establish, maintain, and, if possible, expand control of their respective basing and deployment areas for their naval forces and aircraft, thereby creating prerequisites for planning, preparing, and executing major operations.

The point of contact for this session is Prof. M. Vego, C-427.

D. Questions:

What is in broad terms the role and importance of naval forces across the spectrum of conflict at sea?

Discuss the type and range of missions conducted by maritime forces conducted in time of peace?

Are the navies best suited for providing support to the country's foreign policy in a maritime theater and why?

What is the role of naval forces in support of the country's military and theater strategy.

Discuss the possible role of naval forces in providing support in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations? What are the differences between the two?

What are the possible missions of naval forces in providing support to insurgency, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaigns, respectively? Explain broad terms the main objective to be accomplished by naval forces in case of a regional and/or global high-intensity conventional war?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan. "On Naval Power," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 50, 3rd quarter 2008, pp. 8-17 (**NWC 4072**).

Mobley, Richard. "Pueblo: A Retrospective," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 54, 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 98-117 (**NWC 1067**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Burnett, John S., *Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas* (New York, NY: Penguin Putnam Inc., 2002).

Cable, Sir James. *Diplomacy at Sea* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985).

Cable, Sir James. *Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force* (London: Macmillan; New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2nd ed., 1981).

Christol, C.Q., and C.R. Davis, "Maritime quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of Offensive Weapons and Associated Materiel to Cuba, 1962," *American Journal of International Law* 57 (1963), pp. 525-45.

Cutler, Thomas J. *Brown Water, Black Berets: Coastal and Riverine Warfare in Vietnam*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988).

Davidonis, Anthony C., *The American Naval Mission in the Adriatic, 1918-1921* (Washington, DC: Administrative Reference Service Report No. 4., Administrative Office, U.S. Navy Department, 1943).

Dismukes, Bradford and McConnell, James M. eds., *Soviet Naval Diplomacy* (New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1979).

Divine, Robert A. *The Cuban Missile Crisis* (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1971).

Elliot, Robert, "Piracy on the High Seas," *Security Management*, Vol. 51, No 6, 2007, pp. 40-42.

Goscha, Christopher E. "The Maritime Nature of the Wars for Vietnam (1945-1975): A Geo-Historical Reflection." *War & Society*, November 2005, pp. 53-92.

Hagan, Kenneth J., *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishers, 1993).

Lehr, Peter, ed., *Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism* (New York, NY: Taylor & Francis Group, 2007).

Richardson, Michael, A. *A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-related Terrorism in the Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004).

Rodgers, William L., "The Navy as an Aid in Carrying Out Diplomatic Policies," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 55 (February 1929), pp. 99-104.

Sheehy, Edward J. *The U.S. Navy, the Mediterranean and the Cold War, 1945-47* (New York, NY: Greenwood, 1992).

Schreadley, R. L. *From the Rivers to the Sea: The United States Navy in Vietnam*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992).

Utz, Curtis. *Cordon of Steel: The U.S. Navy and the Cuban Crisis* (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1993).

Von Doenhoff, Richard A. "Biddle, Perry, and Japan," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings,* 92 (November 1966), pp. 78-87.

Walters, Stephen, "Contemporary Maritime Piracy," *Crime & Justice International*, Vol. 23. No. 96 (January/February 2007), pp. 10-16

OBJECTIVES OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (Seminar)

Knowledge of naval matters is an art as well as any other and not to be attended to at idle times . . .

—Pericles, 460 B.C.

In giving up the offensive, the Navy gives up its proper sphere.
In war, the proper objective of the Navy is the enemy's navy.

—RADM Alfred T. Mahan, *Naval Strategy*, 1911

A. Focus:

This session considers the objectives of naval warfare both on the open ocean and in the littorals at the operational level of war. The meanings of the terms sea control and sea denial, as well as their more specialized variants will be discussed in some detail in terms of the factors of space, time and force. Additionally, the implications and employment considerations associated with gaining, maintaining and exercising sea control and with conducting sea denial will be explained and discussed in some detail.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend and analyze the meaning and complexities of the terms "sea control," "sea denial," "choke point control," and "basing/deployment area control."
- Comprehend the theoretical and practical implications of sea control in terms of the factors of space (general vs. local control; control of the surface, subsurface, and the air); time (permanent vs. temporary) and force (maritime superiority vs. maritime supremacy).
- Identify the principal methods of obtaining, maintaining and exercising sea control.
- Identify the principal methods of conducting sea denial.

C. Background:

Political strategic objectives determine the part to be played by each service in a war, but achievement of strategic objectives normally requires employment of all of the components of a country's armed forces. Therefore, war at sea should be considered not in isolation from but as intrinsically related to war on land and in the air. Since wars can no longer be won by the efforts of a single service, all services must cooperate closely. In particular, the highest degree of jointness is absolutely necessary in conducting war in the littorals.

Depending on the military objectives to be accomplished, war at sea is fought at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. For each of these objectives, a number of tasks must be determined that should cumulatively lead to the accomplishment of a given objective. In general, a strategic objective in a maritime theater could be offensive, defensive, or a combination of these two and will usually enable operations ashore.

Whether a war at sea would be conducted primarily offensively or defensively would depend, among other things, on a country's geostrategic position, the initial balance of strength between contending forces, and the overall war objectives. A stronger fleet normally goes on the strategic offensive; a weaker fleet is usually forced to stay on a strategic defensive until the balance of forces shifts to its favor. No war at sea has ever been won without going on the strategic offensive.

Historically, the principal objective of a fleet was to obtain and maintain what was called *command of the sea* (or *maritime supremacy* in modern joint terms). The meaning of this term has undergone significant changes owing to the advent of the submarine, aircraft, and guided missiles. The term used today, *sea control*, more accurately conveys the true state of affairs in a war at sea. It is extremely difficult to command the seas – to assure one's own unfettered use or to completely deny such use to a strong and resourceful opponent. Sea control essentially means the ability of one's fleet to operate with a high degree of freedom in a sea or ocean area for a limited period of time. The objective for a weaker opponent at sea would normally be that of *sea denial*.

The term *sea control* should be applied only when referring to the *strategic* or *operational* levels of war at sea. It is a stretch to label control of the waters in a maritime defense zone or approaches to one's base/port as *sea control*. Likewise, use of the term *battlespace dominance* pertains to a fluid zone of control in a given naval combat zone or, at most, a maritime area of operations. In its very essence, this term refers to a tactical, not operational, level of war. Therefore, it should not be confused with the term "sea control" in its proper definition.

A unique feature of enclosed and semi enclosed seas (popularly called "narrow seas") is the extraordinary influence that straits and narrows—commonly called *choke points*—play in naval strategy. Control of a sea's exit by itself, however, does not normally guarantee absolute control within an enclosed or semi enclosed sea. To obtain such control, it may be necessary to seize or neutralize some *operationally* significant positions (a strait/narrows, an island or stretch of the mainland coast) within the confines of a given narrow sea.

One of a navy's most important *operational tasks*, accomplished over time through a series of diverse tactical actions and measures, is the establishment and maintenance of control of its own basing and deployment areas; otherwise it cannot accomplish its assigned strategic and operational objectives. Once the hostilities at sea begin, control of one's basing/deployment areas must be maintained and possibly expanded. This is meant to provide for the safety of one's forces, at their bases and deployment areas, from enemy sea, air and ground attacks. Control of one's basing/deployment area, in a given maritime theater, is an integral part of a much broader function, *operational protection*.

The point of contact for this session is Captain Mike Fitzpatrick, USN, C-425.

D. Questions:

Explain and discuss in general terms the principal differences between wars at sea and wars on land or in airspace.

Explain the meaning of the terms "command of the sea", "sea control", "sea denial."

Discuss the degree of one's sea control in terms of the risks for friendly forces, i.e. maritime superiority vs. maritime supremacy?

Discuss and explain sea control at the operational level in terms of its scope, duration, and degree. Why does "battlespace dominance" not pertain to the operational level of war at sea?

Discuss and explain the meaning of the term "choke point control?"

What is the meaning of the term "basing/deployment area control?" Is it an important concept and why?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Till, Geoffrey. "Navies and the New World Order." U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (March 2005): 60–63. (**NWC 4033**).

_____. *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*. London: Frank Cass, 2006. Read pp. 157-159. (Issued)

Uhlig, Frank, Jr. "Fighting at and from the sea - A Second Opinion." *Naval War College Review* (Spring 2003): 39-52. (**NWC 4071**).

Vego, Milan. "Objectives of Naval Warfare" and "Obtaining, Maintaining, and Exercising Sea Control" in *On Naval Warfare,* September 2008, Read pages 7-25, 29-32, 37-54 and 65-66 (**NWC 4020A**).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Brodie, Bernard. *A Guide to Naval Strategy*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 5th edn, 1965.

Castex, Raoul. *Strategic Theories*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1992.

Cowie, J.S. *Mines, Minelayers and Minelaying*. London/New York: Oxford University Press,
1949.

Hill, J.R. *Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers*. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1986.

Moineville, Hubert. *Naval Warfare Today and Tomorrow*. Oxford, England: basil Blackwell,
1983.

Rosinski, Herbert. *The Development of Naval Thought*. Edited by B. Mitchell Simpson III.
Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1977.

MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS (Seminar)

A man's judgment is best when he can forget himself and any reputation he may have acquired and can concentrate wholly on making the right decisions.

—Admiral Raymond Spruance

A. Focus:

This session focuses on explaining the theory and practice of major naval operations, their main purpose, types, characteristics, content, and prerequisites.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the historical evolution of major naval operations.
- Understand the main purpose and characteristics of modern major naval operations.
- Understand the structure of a modern major naval operation.
- Understand in generic terms the principal types of modern major naval operations.
- Analyze major naval operation(s) of a case study.

C. Background:

In generic terms, a major naval operation consists of a series of related, in terms of time and place, major and minor naval tactical actions conducted by diverse naval forces and combat arms of other services to accomplish an operational (and sometimes strategic) objective in a given maritime theater of operations. Major naval operations are planned and conducted in accordance with an operational idea (scheme) (see OPS IV-14) and a common plan. They are normally an integral part of a maritime or land campaign, but they can sometimes be conducted outside of the framework of a campaign.

Tactical actions in a major naval operation can be fought on the surface, beneath the surface, in the air, and in some cases on the coast. They are all related and conducted within a given operational framework. Naval tactical actions can range from actions in which weapons are not used, such as patrols and surveillance, to attacks, strikes, raids, engagements, and naval battles. They are aimed at accomplishing tactical objectives in a given part of a maritime theater. In some cases, a series of diverse tactical actions conducted over time can lead to the accomplishment of an operational objective.

In generic terms, in the case of a high-intensity conflict at sea the main purposes of a major naval operation today can be: fleet versus fleet (destroy the enemy fleet at sea or in its bases); fleet versus shore (conduct an amphibious landing on the opposed shore and destroy enemy coastal installations/facilities); attack against an enemy's maritime trade; defense and protection of friendly maritime trade; destruction of an enemy's (or

protection of friendly) sea-based strategic nuclear forces; and support of ground forces operating in the littoral.

The point of contact for this session is C. Helms, C-404.

D. Questions:

Discuss the purpose(s) of major naval operations.

Discuss the types of tactical actions (strikes, attacks, battles, etc.) that make up major naval operations and the major phasing of those actions.

Discuss the differences between major naval operations on the open ocean and in the littorals (enclosed/semi-enclosed seas in particular).

Midway Case Study:

Identify the operational objectives of the major naval operation(s) planned and conducted by the Japanese in Operation MI.

Identify and analyze how the various tactical actions contributed to the major naval operation(s) planned and conducted by the Japanese in Operation MI.

E. Required Readings:

Parshall, Jonathan, and Tully, Andrew**.** *Shattered Sword, The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway*. Potomac Books, Washington, D.C. 2005. (Issued). Read pp. 19-59.

Vego, Milan. "Major Naval Operations" and "Types of Major Naval Operations" in *Newport Papers 32: Major Naval Operations.* Read pp. 7-37. (**NWC 4070**). Posted on the JMO Website. *(Much of this reading is a review of concepts addressed in Operational Art. The student should scan and read as necessary to gain an understanding of the concepts as applied to major naval operations.)*

F. Supplementary Readings:

Bates, Richard W. *The Battle of Midway Including the Aleutian Phase, June 3 to June 14, 1942. Strategical and Tactical Analysis*. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. 1948.

Fuchida, Mitsuo and Okumiya, Masatake. Edited by Clarke Kawakami and Roger Pineau. *Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan*. Ballantine Books, New York, 1955. pp. 10-11, 73-199.

FUNDAMENTALS OF SURFACE WARFARE (Seminar)

There are eight sail of the line, Sir John.
Very well, sir.
There are twenty sail of the line, Sir John.
Very well, sir.
There are twenty-five sail of the line, Sir John.
Very well, sir.
There are twenty-seven sail of the line, Sir John – nearly double our own.
Enough, sir, no more of that! The die is cast, and if there are fifty sail I will go through them.

—Sir John Jervis, 1797, aboard HMS Victory, led the British Navy to confront a combined Dutch and Spanish fleet at the Brest blockade.

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is to describe and analyze the role and methods of combat employment of surface forces in major naval operations aimed to obtain/maintain and exercise or deny sea control.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the role and methods of combat employment of surface forces in obtaining and maintain control of the sea surface.
- Understand the role and methods of combat employment of surface forces in exercising control of the sea surface. Comprehend the role and methods of combat employment of surface forces to exercise control of the sea surface.
- Understand the role and methods of combat employment of surface in attack on and defense/protection of seaborne trade.

C. Background:

Major naval operations are an integral part of a maritime or land campaign. They are intended to obtain, maintain, exploit or deny sea control. The combat employment of surface forces is a central element to this effort, though land or air combat power also influences activities at sea. Both the weaker and stronger sides in a conflict employ surface forces for offensive and defensive purposes. Due to the proliferation of modern weapons, gaining sea control in the littorals is especially difficult, even for a superior naval force. Surface forces play a major role in major naval operations aimed to destroy the enemy's fleet at sea and its bases; support of amphibious landings on the opposed shore, anti-amphibious defense, seizing the enemy's or defense of major naval bases/ports, destroying enemy's installations/facilities on the coast and support of friendly troops on the coast. They also play a major role in attack on the enemy's and defense/protection of friendly maritime trade.

The point of contact for this session is CAPT Michael C. Husak, USCG.

D. Questions:

Explain the main methods of combat employment of surface forces in major naval operations aimed at destroying the enemy's fleet at sea or its bases.

How can the weaker side effectively employ its surface forces to prevent the stronger side for obtaining control of the sea surface?

Discuss the role and importance of one's surface forces in conducting naval/commercial blockade or counter-blockade.

What are the main methods of combat employment of surface forces in support of friendly ground forces on coastal areas?

Discuss the role of surface forces in attacking the enemy's maritime trade.

Discuss the role of surface forces in defense and protection of maritime trade.

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Reynolds, C. 1994. "The U.S. Fleet-in-Being Strategy of 1942." *Journal of Military History* 58, no. 1: 103. (JMO Web). (**NWC 4068**).

Till, G. *Sea Power: A Guide For The Twenty-First Century*. London: Frank Cass, 2004. Read: Chapters 6 "Securing Command of the Sea" and 7 "Exploiting Command of the Sea," 161-198, and 214-234. (Issued).

Vego, M. "Types of Major Naval Operations." *Naval War College Papers*. 32. Newport Rhode Island: Naval War College, 2008. Read: 23-39. (**NWC 4070**).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Baer, G. *The U. S. Navy, 1890-1990, One Hundred Years of Sea Power*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993.

Barnett, R. 2005. "Technology and Naval Blockade." *Naval War College Review* 58, no. 3: 87-98.

Black, J. 2008. "A British View of the Naval War of 1812." *Naval History* 22, no. 4: 16-25.

Brodie, B. *A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1942.

Caravaggio, A. 2006. "The Attack at Taranto." *Naval War College Review* 59, no. 3: 103-127.

Cable, J. *Gunboat Diplomacy 1919 - 1979*. London: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1981.

Corbett, J. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1988.

Cutler, T. *The Battle of Leyte Gulf: 23-26 October 1944*. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

Goldstein, L., and Zhukov, Y. 2004. "A Tale of Two Fleets." *Naval War College Review* 57, no. 2: 27-63.

Goldrick, J. “John R. Jellico: Technologies Victim (1859-1935).” *The Great Admirals*. Edited by Jack Sweetman. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1997.

Grubb, M. 2007. "Merchant Shipping in a Chinese Blockade of Taiwan." *Naval War College Review* 60, no. 1: 81-102.

Hallion, R. 2007. "Dress Rehearsal for Pearl Harbor?" *World War II* 22, no. 8: 54-61.

Hines, J. 2008. "Sins of Omission and Commission: A Reassessment of the Role of Intelligence in the Battle of Jutland." *Journal of Military History* 72, no. 4: 1117-1153.

Holmes, J., and Yoshihara, T. 2008. “China and the United States in the Indian Ocean: An Emerging Strategic Triangle?” *Naval War College Review* 61, no. 3 (July 1): 40-60.

Howarth, D., and Howarth, S. *Nelson: The Immortal Memory*. New York: The Lyons Press, 1988.

Keegan, J. *The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare*. New York: Penguin Group Inc., 1990.

Mahan, A. *Mahan on Naval Strategy*. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Moore, S. 2007. "Long Night of the Dreadnoughts." *Military History* 24, no. 2: 60-65.

Norman, J. 1957. “MacArthur’s Blockade Proposals Against Red China.” *The Pacific Historical Review* 26, no. 2: 161-174.

Rubin Jr. L. 2001. ”The Continuing Argument Over Jutland.”*The Virginia Quarterly Review* 77, no. 4 (October 1): 583-602.

Spector, R. *At War At Sea: Sailors and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Penguin Putnam Inc., 2001.

Trammell, J. 2007. "Blockade in Name Only." *America's Civil War* 20, no. 5: 44-51.

United States Army. *Command Decisions*. Edited by K. Greenfield. Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1960.

Vego, M. *Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas*. London: Frank Cass, 2nd ed., 2003.

Vego, M. *On Naval Warfare*. Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College, 2008.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

FUNDAMENTALS OF SUBMARINE WARFARE (Seminar)

"The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril."

—Winston S. Churchill

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is to explain and analyze the role and importance of the submarine force in obtaining/maintaining and exercising control of the subsurface and surface and denying that control by a weaker navy .

B. Objectives:

- Know and understand the advantages and disadvantages in the combat employment of one's submarine forces.
- Comprehend the influence of the physical environment on the employment of one's submarines on the open ocean and in the littorals.
- Understand the role and importance of submarine warfare in obtaining or denying sea control.
- Comprehend the main objectives and methods of combat employment of one's submarine forces in obtaining and maintaining or denying control of the subsurface.
- Understand the main objectives and methods of combat employment of one's submarine forces in exercising control of the subsurface.
- Comprehend the range of missions performed by one's submarine forces at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the technological development of the submarine had progressed to a point where its wartime employment could be considered. Their stealthy operating characteristics and torpedo armament allowed these early submersibles to gain tactical positions where they could sink any adversary's most powerful surface ship. The navies of that era investigated the employment of submarines, and while many had doubts on their combat capabilities, the vessels continued to gain in firepower, range and speed. Prior to World War One the navies of the Great Powers envisioned the submarine operating as part of the main battle fleet, scouting ahead for the main body and attriting the enemy before battleships settled the matter in a grand Mahanian battle. Problems with communications between the fleet and deployed submarines and submarine speed and endurance prevented this doctrinal scheme from being achieved during the war.

If the submarine's effectiveness as a tactical fleet asset was marginal, its employment as a commerce raider had significant strategic and operational effects. The German unrestricted submarine operation of 1917–1918 significantly affected the Allies war making capacity and appeared capable of causing the economic collapse of Great Britain. The U-boat operations also brought in the United States as a belligerent, frustrating the desired effects of the German undersea offensive. While the continued onslaught delayed the deployment of the U.S. Army to France, an effective antisubmarine warfare (ASW) effort by the Allies defeated the German threat.

Following the Great War, all navies attempted to digest the lessons learned from the conflict. Across the globe the technological development increased the firepower, endurance and stealth of the submarine, but the methodology for using this increasingly powerful naval weapon remained uncertain. Some navies continued to emphasize the importance of the classic Mahanian fleet engagement, where the role of the submarine would remain a supporting one. Others looked at the submarine's ability to choke off the seaborne commerce of an adversary, providing an easier and much less costly method to attack and destroy the enemy's critical capabilities. Other navies investigated the doctrine and technology required to defeat any enemy submarine offensive, ensuring the maintenance of vital sea lines of communications and guaranteeing one's own forces could use the oceans as unobstructed maneuver space. These doctrines would be tested in the iron crucible of the Second World War, where the combatants all operated submarine forces with varying degrees of efficiency and effectiveness. In the Atlantic Ocean, powerful German U-boat flotillas again came close to starving Great Britain into submission until the mass production and technological superiority of the Allies defeated the German threat. The German effort was hampered by lack of support from the German army and air forces, but still required the intervention of enormous Allied ASW forces to defeat them. In the Pacific, American submarines overwhelmed the anemic Japanese defenses, resulting in the economic strangulation of the Japanese Empire. Here, the synergistic effects of the American commerce destruction in concert with the marauding carrier task groups ground down the Japanese naval forces, and with the strategic bombing campaign caused the economic collapse of the empire. During the war, submarine forces performed a wide range of missions, from commerce raiding, missions in the landing and retrieval of agents and commandos, shore line bombardment, intelligence gathering on enemy coast lines, and delivery of supplies to isolated garrisons. Many issues that had distracted naval commanders in the First World War continued in the Second. Submarine forces were typically commanded and controlled at the theatre level, and were not always employed in concert with vital operations. Submarines did not always interact effectively with other naval or joint forces, and submarine force commanders often preferred to conduct their own operations without due regard to the assistance joint forces could provide.

Following the end of the Second World War submarine technology advanced dramatically with the introduction of nuclear power as a means of propulsion. The submerged submarine could now travel faster than most surface warships. With the advent of quiet nuclear submarines armed with advanced torpedoes, the job of ASW became significantly more difficult. During the Cold War, submarines reached into the ASW role as well. Nuclear powered fast attack submarines (SSN) attempted to locate and track an adversary's vital ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) in order to maintain the balance of power during the Cold War's nuclear standoff.

Presently the focus of submarine warfare has shifted from the blue water concept which prevailed during the Cold War to the littoral environment. The quiet conventionally powered submarine represents a significant asymmetrical counter to traditional maritime power via the practice of localized sea denial. With the advent of air independent propulsion systems, which allows for even greater stealth and endurance, combined with the difficulties inherent in the acoustic littoral environment, the modern conventional submarine represents another new and interesting chapter in the realm of maritime influence.

The point of contact for this session is CDR Joe Pellissier, USN, C-411.

D. Questions:

What are the unique advantages and disadvantages in the combat employment of one's submarine forces? How can these advantages and disadvantages be exploited by the operational commander?

What significant aspects of the physical environment produce the greatest effect on the employment of one's submarines on the open ocean? How do these aspects differ when operating in littoral waters? Why is this of utmost importance to the operational commander?

What are the main objectives and methods of combat employment of one's submarine forces in obtaining and maintaining control of the subsurface? In denying control of the subsurface? What direct or indirect influences can a submarine have in this regard?

What range of missions can be performed by one's submarine forces? Which of these are most pertinent to the operational level of war?

E. Required Readings:

Lautenschlager, Karl. "The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001." *International Security* 11, No. 3 (Winter 1986-1987): 94-140. (**NWC 4077**). Read pp. 94-111.

Papadopoulus, Randy. "Between Fleet Scouts & Commerce Raiders: Submarine Warfare Theories and Doctrine in the German and U.S. Navies, 1939–1945." *Undersea Warfare* (Summer 2005). Read pp. 28–33. (**NWC 4013**).

Gibson, Holbrook. *The Employment of Submarines.* U.S. Naval War College, Staff Presentation 8 December 1939. Scan. **(NWC 4083)**.

F. Supplementary Readings:

Doenitz, Karl. *Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1958, 127–163.

Loye, John F. *It's Operational Art: Employing Submarines in Third World Conflicts.* U.S. Naval War College, JMO Student Research Paper, 1998.

VanYe, Mark S. *Wishing Away the Problem: The Impact of Ignoring the Modern Diesel Submarine on the Operational Commander*. U.S. Naval War College, 2003 [Student Research Paper].

Poirer, Michel. "Results of the Pacific Submarine of World War II." http://www.chinfo .navy.mil/navpalib/cno/n87/history/pac-campaign.html.

FUNDAMENTALS OF AIR AND STRIKE WARFARE (Seminar)

The Navy is the first line of offense and naval aviation as an advance guard of this first line must deliver the brunt of the attack. Naval aviation cannot take the offensive from shore; it must go to sea on the back of the fleet. . . . The fleet and naval aviation are one and inseparable.

—William A. Moffett 1925

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is discussing the role and importance of naval air and strike warfare and methods of combat employment in obtaining, maintaining and exercising control of the air and surface as part of one's sea control. It will also address methods of combat employment of air and air defense forces in denying the enemy's control of the air and control of the surface.

B. Objectives/Outcomes:

- Comprehend the concept that sea control in modern era inherently encompasses control of the air.
- Comprehend the role and importance of naval air and air defense forces in obtaining control of the air and denying that control.
- Understand the main methods of combat employment of naval air forces in combination with surface forces, to obtain, maintain and exercise control of the surface.
- Understand the main methods of combat employment of naval air forces to deny control of the air in a maritime theater.
- Analyze the role and importance of naval air defense forces in providing protection to one's naval/maritime forces at sea and in their bases.

C. Background:

Navies have shown interest in aviation and the possibilities of its use since the introduction of Samuel P. Langley's flying machine in the late 1800s. It was not until the early 1900s that navies organized and funded aviation programs specifically intended to develop airplanes for use in the maritime domain. These early aircraft were initially used as naval gunfire spotters, intended to improve the accuracy of and extend the effective range of their main warship, the battleship. By 1914, testing of air delivered ordinance was accomplished and within a few short years, forward firing ordnance for the purpose of countering aircraft attack was introduced.

It was clear that integration of the capabilities of the airplane into naval operations improved the maritime commander's awareness of the battlespace. Concomitant benefits of this new technology included enhanced decision making through an ability to influence

a greater space and extended the depth that naval forces could strike. Yet it was land based aviation in the early 1900's that contested British ability to maintain sea control in the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, major naval operations, whether fleet on fleet, or fleet versus shore, had to attack and destroy the enemy air threat regardless of location. Naval vessels too small to actually launch aircraft, became surface to air platforms or operated under the cover and protection of other ships and were integrated into larger task formations.

Realizing the impact aviation had on fleet operations to both sides in a conflict by extending the space and depth naval forces employing air could strike, Admiral Moffett took the position that control of the sea necessitated control of the air and integrated sea based aviation with fleet operations.

Naval aircraft are not the only resources contributing to control of the air or denying the enemy control of the air; however, naval air provides the maritime operational commander flexibility, speed, and depth; with naval air contributing to an integrated layered air defense system that includes surface vessels, sea based and land based air. When operating beyond the reach of friendly land based air, or where persistent presence is critical, naval air contributes to gaining and maintaining air control prior to arrival of high value surface vessels.

Combat employment of naval air forces must be coordinated with air defense capabilities of surface vessels as well as land based air, to obtain, maintain and exercise control of the surface. The limitations associated with surface vessels, in terms of speed of advance and numbers of air defense capable surface shooters, can be mitigated with naval air capabilities by allocating appropriate strike or fighter aircraft to the sector of main effort.

In a maritime theater, sea based aviation has a marked advantage with the mobility of the carrier striking force. Sea based air can come from multiple axes over the horizon, contesting air control to the level of potentially denying the enemy use of the air.

The speed associated with air power challenges a maritime operational commander in the protection of maritime forces. The problem is amplified during protection of maritime force in port, in that the environmental factors of terrain and weather may reduce reaction or decision time and can degrade effectiveness of surface radar and air defense systems. Naval air can be leveraged by extending the detection and intercept of potential incoming threats.

The point of contact for this session is CAPT Mark Seaman, USN, (Ret).

D. Questions:

What are the objectives and main methods of employment of naval air in obtaining and maintaining control of the air and surface in conducting major naval operations fleet vs. fleet at sea or its bases? How does employment of naval air differ in a typical enclosed/semi-enclosed sea from the employment in the littorals bordering the open ocean?

In exercising control of the air and surface, what are the objectives and main methods of employing naval air during amphibious operations?

How is naval air employed against enemy coastal installations/facilities and naval bases/commercial ports during major naval operations?

What are the objectives and main methods of employment of naval air in defense of a maritime theater?

For the weaker navy, how might a maritime commander employ naval air to deny a stronger navy control of the air and surface? Does this differ for the stronger navy when denying the adversary use of the air in a theater of secondary effort?

How do maritime commanders employ naval air to attack enemy maritime trade? What are the challenges for defense/protection of friendly shipping with naval air? Does this differ significantly for the weaker navy?

How can other services (air forces and ground forces) be employed in support of naval air to obtain/maintain and exercise control of the air/surface or deny that control?

E. Required Readings:

Douglas, A. H., CAPT, USN. "Employment of Aviation in Naval Warfare." Newport, RI: U. S. Naval War College, 14 December 1939. Read Chapter II, pp. 15-32. (**NWC 4059**),

Knott, Richard S. *Attack From the Sky, Naval Air Operations in the Korean War*. Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 2004. Read pp. 11-17. (**NWC 4061**).

Moffett, William A., RADM, USN. "Some Aviation Fundamentals." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Oct. 1925. (**NWC 4058**).

Vego, Milan."Types of Naval Operations," *Naval War College Newport Papers* 32 (2008). Review pp. 23-39. (**NWC 4070**).

Willmott, H.P. "The Battle of the Philippine Sea." in *Great American Naval Battles*, edited by Jack Sweetman, 324-341. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998. (**NWC 4073**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Lambeth, Benjamin S. *American Carrier Air Power at the Dawn of a New Century*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2005.

_____. *The New Face of Naval Strike Warfare*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2005.

Trimble, William F. *Admiral William A. Moffett Architect of Naval Aviation*. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994.

FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (Seminar)

"My Navy has been definitely slack in preparing for this submarine war off our coast. As I need not tell you, most naval officers have declined in the past to think in terms of any vessel of less than two thousand tons. You learned the lesson two years ago. We still have to learn it."

—President Franklin Roosevelt in a letter to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill during the Battle of the Atlantic, 1942

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is to describe and analyze the objectives and methods of combat employment of Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) forces (surface, subsurface and air) in obtaining/maintaining and exercising control of the subsurface (by a stronger side) or denying that control (by a weaker side).

B. Objectives:

- Understand the role and importance of ASW in obtaining/maintaining and exercising or denying sea control.
- Comprehend the main objectives and methods of combat employment of one's ASW forces in obtaining and maintaining or denying control of the subsurface.
- Understand the main objectives and methods of combat employment of one's ASW forces in exercising control of the subsurface.
- Comprehend the range of missions performed by one's ASW forces at the operational level of war.
- Comprehend the capabilities of other services (air forces/ground forces) in obtaining or denying control of subsurface.

C. Background:

If the world's navies had difficulties comprehending how technological advances would affect the roles and missions of increasingly capable submarines, they were even more confused with how to resist this burgeoning undersea threat. At the start of the First World War, senior officers of all of the Great Powers were unsure as to what role the submarine could take in assisting their attempts to obtain or deny sea control in vital areas. Antisubmarine warfare requirements to assist friendly or counteract enemy subsurface threats were also obscure. One hundred years later, much of this uncertainty remains. Antisubmarine warfare will continue to be a vital component in any maritime force's attempts to gain or deny sea control.

The objectives of antisubmarine warfare have been remarkably consistent over time. Navies have attempted to destroy enemy submarines, limit their effectiveness or contain their deployment. By mitigating the offensive powers of the enemy, friendly forces were able to accomplish sea control in specific areas to gain sea control and achieve their objectives. Conversely, by using powerful ASW forces, navies could prevent enemy subsurface forces from operating in an area.

Many of the tactical methods of antisubmarine warfare have varied over the course of the last century as naval forces have attempted to use advanced technology to deal with the subsurface threat. Navies have employed hunter-killer groups to actively seek out submarines, have sent disguised merchant ships to attack unwary surface submarines, mined submarine harbors and operating areas to restrict access, used patrolling aircraft to search and attack patrolling submarines. Eventually, the use of the ancient technique of convoying vessels proved to be the most effective way to diminish the effectiveness of submarines and allow friendly forces to achieve their objectives.

Exercising control over the subsurface allowed the exploitation of the area by other forces to accomplish vital objectives. Essential maritime trade could be conducted, amphibious forces could travel to their landing sites, or nuclear missile launching submarines could be protected in bastions. Denying that same capability to the enemy allowed one to more rapidly prosecute the conflict, maintaining the initiative in the maritime and consequently terrestrial realm.

At the operational level of war, maritime commanders have undertaken various courses of action to degrade the adversary submarine threat. Attempting to defeat the submarine threat in either the submarine training areas or construction sites, the transit routes to their patrol areas, or while on station all require different methods and decisions for the joint commander. Commanders who concentrated on only one of these methods, or focus only on the use of maritime forces to degrade enemy capabilities, limit the effectiveness of the joint force. Land based air and ground forces can also play an important role in defeating the enemy, or at least mitigating the adversary's potential to allow friendly forces to obtain their objectives.

Concurrently, the use of other elements of national power, particularly in the security of friendly information sources or the exploitation of enemy ones, have been crucial in obtaining success. One should consider that Allied success in both World Wars in defeating German U-boat offensives in the Atlantic was due in no small part to the sheer size of available ASW forces and the massive numbers of merchant ships produced, as well as the exploitation of German signal traffic. There are no panaceas in antisubmarine warfare, but focusing on the required operational objectives and using all elements of the joint force provide a greater opportunity to achieve success.

The point of contact for this session is CDR Paul Povlock, USN, C-423.

D. Questions:

How does a successful antisubmarine warfare effort contribute to achieving and maintaining sea control? Sea denial?

How does a submarine's influence on the operational factors of time, space and force and the relationship between these factors affect the anti-submarine problem? How should a Joint Force Commander balance the interrelationship of these forces to provide the opportunity to successfully conduct ASW?

Historically, ASW have been force and time intensive. Can the improvements in information technology transform "Awfully Slow Warfare" into a faster method to defeat enemy underwater threats?

How do joint forces increase the effectiveness of ASW efforts? How can land forces be used to counter an undersea threat?

How do other elements of national power be used to increase the effectiveness of an ASW operation?

What operational functions can and should be utilized to counter the submarine threat? What are the best ways to synchronize and sequence these functions to produce a viable ASW scheme?

What options does the joint commander have to protect the sea lines of communications and support the theater lines of operations in the face of submarine warfare? What are the implications and challenges of countering submarine force operations in the littorals?

E. Required Readings:

Breemer, Jan S., *Anti-Submarine Warfare: A Strategy Primer*. Naval Post graduate School Paper. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, July 1988. (**NWC 4079**).

Breemer, Jan S. "Chasing U-Boats and Hunting Insurgents." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 40 (1st quarter 2006). Read pp. 60-66. (**NWC 4080**).

Lautenschlager, Karl. "The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001." *International Security* 11, No. 3 (Winter 1986-1987): Read pp. 94-140, 111-140. (**NWC 4077**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Burgess, Richard R. *Seapower*. "Awfully Slow Warfare." 48, No. 4 (April 2005): 12-14.

Doenitz, Karl. *Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1958. Read pp. 127–163.

Haydon, Peter. "Is Anti-Submarine Warfare Dead?" *Canadian Defence Quarterly* (May 1993). Read pp. 15-23

Oi, Atsushi. "Why Japan's Antisubmarine Warfare Failed." Chapter 12 in *The Japanese Navy in World War II.* Second ed. U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 78, no. 6 (June 1952): 587–601.

Polmar, Norman and Kenneth J. Moore. *Undersea Warfare*. "Cold War Strategic ASW." (Summer 2005): 20-24.

FUNDAMENTALS OF MINE WARFARE (Seminar)

"We have lost control of the seas to a nation without a Navy, using pre-World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ."

—Rear Admiral Allan Smith, in charge of the advance force at Wonsan, Korea (1950)

"Any ship can be a minesweeper…once"

—Anonymous

A. Focus:

This session will focus on the description and analysis of the fundamentals of both offensive and defensive mine warfare (MIW) at the operational level of war at sea. It will also explain and analyze the employment of combined naval arms (surface, subsurface and air) in conducting mine warfare to obtain one's control or deny the enemy's control of the seas.

B. Objectives/Outcomes:

- Understand the role and importance of mine warfare in obtaining/maintaining and exercising or denying sea control.
- Understand advantages and disadvantages in using sea mines.
- Understand the influence of the physical environment on the conduct of mine warfare.
- Understand the differences between tactical and operational employment of mines and mine counter-measures (MCM).
- Comprehend the purpose and the main methods of offensive mining.
- Understand the purpose and the main methods of defensive mining.

Comprehend offensive and defensive components of MCM. The three stages of mining operations and be prepared to discuss the elements within each phase.

C. Background:

The history of use of sea mines goes all the way back to David Bushnell's attempt to deny the British access to the coast of Connecticut in 1777 utilizing a double line of crude contact mines. Although inspiring from a fundamentals of war standpoint his efforts were not a success. A second attempt on 7 January, 1778 using single powder kegs, rigged with a contact mechanism, which he floated down the Delaware River, did not fare much better.

The Russians used extensively the 35-kilogram (77 pounds) lead contact mines during the Crimean War (1853-1856) to block approaches to their main naval bases Kronstadt and St. Petersburg in the Baltic and Sevastopol in the Black Sea. In the Austro-French War of 1859, the Austrians used mines off approaches to their naval base at Venice in the Adriatic Sea. The American Civil War (1861-1865) saw the employment of mines

and mine counter-measures by both Union and Confederate forces. The most notable experience being Admiral Farragut's dramatic entrance into Mobile Bay on the morning of August 5th, 1864 where he uttered the words "Damn the torpedoes!, Full speed ahead, Drayton." A total of 30 to 35 ships with 10,000 tons were lost from mines by both sides in that conflict.
In the Austro-Prussian-Italian War of 1866, the Austrians defended Venice and Pola with controlled mines fitted with an electric exploder. This was the reason that the Italians did not attack these two ports. In the war of the Triple Alliance (Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay) vs. Paraguay (1865-1870) the Paraguayans used mines for defensive purposes on the rivers. One Brazilian ironclad was sunk from mines. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 the Russians neutralized a major part of the Turkish fleet by mining selected parts of the Danube Estuary. Although, only one Turkish ship (an ironclad) was sunk, the Russians obtained the initiative in the war. Mines were also used the war of Chile and Peru in 1879-1881, the Sino-French War in 1884-1885, the Chilean Civil War of 1891, the Brazilian Civil War of 1894, and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.
In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 mines proved to be formidable weapon. Both sides lost three battleships, five cruisers, four destroyers, two torpedo boats, one minelayer and one gunboat were sunk. The Japanese lost two battleships, four cruisers, two destroyers, one torpedo boat and one minelayer. The Russian losses were one battleship, one cruiser, two destroyers, one torpedo boat, and one gunboat. No warship on either side was sunk form the torpedoes. The Russians sunk more ships by mines than by any other form of attack. The Russo-Japanese War was the last conflict where mines were used exclusively against warships.

Mines were used on a massive scale by all combatants during World War I. Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey) laid about 52,000 mines while the Entente and Associated Powers laid some 256,000 mines. Neutral powers laid 1,600 mines. Some 180 out of 600 merchant ships sunk during that war were lost form mines. Mines sank 89 submarines, 17 large surface combatants and 110 destroyers/torpedo boats. Out of 132 submarines sunk, 89 were lost from mines.

In World War II, an estimated 650,000 mines were laid by all belligerents. Some 357,000 mines were laid by the Allies while the Axis powers laid about 341,500 mines. Some 3,200 allied and Axis merchant ships, surface combatants and submarines were sunk from mines. Out of the total Allied losses of merchant shipping (21,194.000 BRT) about 6,660.000 BRT were lost due to mines. The British alone lost 296 commercial vessels and 281 warships from mines. In the Pacific, the Japanese laid 51,400 and the Allies about 44,000 mines. During the last five months of the war, the Japanese lost 1.25 million tons of shipping due to the Allied mines.

During the Korean War (1950-1953) the North Koreans used some 3,000 old Russian-designed mines. After the successful landing at Inchon in September 1950, General Douglas MacArthur planned to prevent escape of the North Korean forces retreating from the Pusan perimeter by conducting an amphibious landing at Wonsan. However, the approaches to that port were blocked by the North Korean mines. Because of inadequate number of mine counter-measures (MCM), UN amphibious landing was delayed by eight days. This, in turn, allowed the North Korean forces withdrawing from the south to escape the trap laid by UN forces.

During the Vietnam War (1965-1975), the U.S. mining of the seven main North Vietnamese ports, including Haiphong started in early May 1972 (Operation Pocket Money). For the next eight months about 11,000 MK-36 Destructor mines and 108 MK 52-2 special mines were laid. The mining was highly successful because it significantly reduced North Vietnam' ability to receive war supplies. The port of Haiphong remained closed to merchant shipping for about 300 days. The mining also had a role in bringing about the eventual peace agreement.

Mines were used during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, the Iraq-Iran war of 1980-1988 and the Gulf War of 1990-1991. A U.S. frigate was almost sunk after encountering a drifting Iranian-laid mine in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf in 1988. Iraqi mines damaged the Aegis guided-missile cruiser *Princeton* and the assault amphibious ship *Tripoli* in 1991.

The threat of mines to both blue-water navies and coastal navies has significantly increased since the early 1990s, in terms of both the number of mines and their sophistication. Mines have a great value and special attraction for small navies guarding straits or operating in shallow coastal waters. Today, more than 50 countries currently possess mine inventories and 30 countries are capable of producing sea mines. Some 20 countries are actual mine producers. Russia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Italy, Sweden, and Chile are among the most important exporters of sea mines in the world market today. There are today an estimated 275,000 mines in inventories worldwide. Mine inventories worldwide consist of both old and new types of mines. Moored contact mines are still extensively used, because they are relatively inexpensive and simple to manufacture, acquire, and maintain. The new mine technologies include pressure mines, mines fitted with multiple sensors, computer-controlled target devices for upgrading obsolescent firing mechanisms, and mines with irregular shapes made from nonmagnetic materials and with anechoic coatings to reduce their physical signature.

Nontraditional and asymmetric threats to the maritime environment are now emerging. These threats are in the form of waterborne IEDs and explosives laden craft that target ports, harbors, and river ways. Driven by criminal activities such as piracy, drug smuggling, and illegal immigration these non-state or rouge-state players threaten both freedom of movement and freedom of use.

Mine warfare is an important tool for the operational commander. The physical and psychological impact it can have on enemy naval and commercial shipping should not be underestimated. Properly deployed and maintained, mines can establish and maintain sea control, deny the enemy free and open access to the high seas, and protect critical lines of operation and communication.

The use of sea mines has many advantages and disadvantages. Among the advantages is that you do not need sophisticated boats or aircraft to place a mine field. Any work-boat, skiff, dhow, or sampan can transport and then be used as a platform to lay mines. Although technological advances in mines have increased over the years, there are still fifty, sixty year old chemical contact mines out there that can be acquired cheaply and

laid with ease. Sea mines present the enemy with a silent and hard to detect hazard. The disadvantages include lack of control once laid, and the loss of that part of the operating area which you have just mined to friendly forces as well as the opposition.

Influences of the physical environment must be considered for mining operations. Water depths, wave heights, bottom types and slopes, as well as currents all must be factored in when choosing which type of mine you want to use; anchored, floating, acoustic, or pressure-activated.

Mines are tactically employed in order to damage, delay, or hamper enemy naval and commercial shipping thus limiting their tactical maneuver space. Operational employment seeks to impact the outcome of a major campaign or operation. The objective is denial of larger sea areas, or the closure of straits, narrows, and major ports.

Offensive mining typically takes place within an enemy's controlled waters. Its main purpose is to deny, delay, and disrupt the movement of enemy naval forces and commercial shipping. It puts stress on their mine counter-measure efforts and can psychologically defeat freedom of movement and action. The main method of employment is a blockade where enemy shipping, both military and commercial, can be prevented from departing bases or deployment areas. Several mines barriers laid across a gulf, bay, or narrow inlet can block an enemy's transit route to open waters.

Defensive mining is used in waters controlled by friendly forces or in areas where sea control is disputed. Its purpose is to deny the enemy access to your naval bases and ports, landing beaches, and straits, narrows, or channels of importance. Defensive mine barriers are typically larger than those used for offensive mining operations. These barriers require the establishment, and maintenance, of mine-free lanes that can be used for naval and commercial shipping. Defensive barriers must be protected in order to prevent enemy forces from sweeping these areas and thus gaining access.

Mine counter-measures are equally important as mining; there application can be both offensive and defensive. Defensive mining consists of both active and passive measures. Active measures include minesweeping, minehunting, and clearance diving. Passive measures include avoidance of mined areas, de-gaussing of platforms, shock hardening, and acoustic signature reduction. Mine counter-measure tactics, techniques, and procedures are disproportionate to those of minelaying in terms of forces required and time to conduct. Water depth, sea-state, and weather will cause additional restrictions. Offensive mine counter-measure aims at preventing or neutralizing the enemy's minelaying capability. This effort will require intelligence in order to find, fix, and track the location of these assets.

The point of contact for this session is CDR Robert Burke, USN, C-406.

D. Questions:

Explain the main advantages and disadvantages in using sea mines.

What is to effect of physical environment on using mines and conducting mine counter-measures?

Explain the role and importance of mine warfare in obtaining and maintaining control of the subsurface or denying that control.

Explain the purpose and methods of conducting offensive mining.

What are the purpose and methods of conducting defensive mining?

Discuss the main methods of passive and active mine counter-measures.

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan. "Mine Warfare" 2008. **(NWC 1009).**

Luckow, Ulrich. "Victory over ignorance and fear: the U.S. mine laying attack on North Vietnam" *Naval War College Review,* (Jan-Feb 1982) Vol. 35: 17-27. **(NWC 4075).**

Meacham, James A. "Four Mining Campaigns: An Historical Analysis of the Decisions of the Commanders." *Naval War College Review*, Volume 19 (June 1 967). Read pp. 75- 129. **(NWC 4087).**

F. Supplementary Readings:

Till, Geoffrey. *Seapower, a Guide for the Twenty-First Century.* London: Frank Cass, 2006: Read pp. 219, 256-257, 289, 297.

Bernitt, Thomas R. and Sam J. Tangredi. "Mine Warfare and Globalization: Low-Tech Warfare in a High-Tech World." In Tangredi, ed. *Globalization and Maritime Power*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2002. Read pp. 389-403.

Goulda, Michael E. "The Dardanelles Campaign: A Historical Analogy for Littoral Mine Warfare." *Naval War College Review*, Volume 51, Issue 3 (Summer 1998). Read pp. 82-96.

Chilstrom, John S. "Mines Away! The Significance of U.S. Army Air Forces Minelaying in World War II." A thesis presented to The School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. May 1992

Truver, Scott C. " Mines and underwater IEDs in U.S. ports and waterways: context, threats, challenges, and solutions" *Naval War College Review*, (Winter 2008), Vol. 61, No. 1. Read pp. 106-127.

FUNDAMENTALS OF AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE (Seminar)

Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea-based power possesses.

—B.H. Liddell Hart, 1960

A. Focus:

This session examines the capability of maritime nations to project power overseas through the employment of amphibious warfare. The session explores the fundamental concepts of amphibious warfare and the contributions provided by amphibious forces during maritime specific missions.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the fundamental concepts of amphibious warfare.
- Comprehend the potential effects that amphibious forces can generate on an adversary
- Comprehend the maritime domain requirements necessary to conduct and support amphibious operations and follow-on land operations.
- Understand the vulnerabilities that amphibious forces, and other elements of the amphibious task force, are exposed to during landing operations.
- Understand the operational capabilities that amphibious forces, as an element of an amphibious task force, provide to the Joint Force Commander.
- Comprehend the unique considerations for employing amphibious forces, in support of operational objectives.

F. Background:

The theoretical underpinnings of amphibious warfare were worked out by trial and error over the past 250 years. The inherent flexibility and mobility of naval forces clearly recommend and support these types of operations, which provide significant advantages to the attacking force as compared to more conventional land forces. The concept is simple, but like many simple military concepts it frequently has proven difficult to realize in actual practice. At its foundation, command of the sea (sea control) allows the use of the sea as a means of transportation, in this case for military purposes. Certain prerequisites are necessary before even attempting amphibious operations and a very high level of at least localized sea control is an absolute necessity before even attempting an amphibious operation. The failure of Napoleon's and Hitler's intended invasions of England are examples of the inability of obtaining localized sea control for amphibious operations. Even with sea control, the difficulties in creating a successful operation are significant, but the potential payoff is enormous: Till mentions the capture of Havana in

1762, Wolfe's Canadian operation in the Seven Years' War, Wellington's Peninsular Campaign, and the operations in the Crimean War as proof that amphibious operations can have a very strong--even decisive--impact on the success of land campaigns.

In more modern times, the allied amphibious operations at Gallipoli in Turkey in WWI provide an excellent example of the complexity of amphibious operations, even when sea control allows the flexibility for attempting such efforts. Vego relates that the objectives of the campaign were far-reaching and potentially war winning: removal of Turkey from the war, opening a link with the Allies' embattled ally in Russia, and forcing the Germans to weaken their eastern front and shift troops to support Turkey. Unfortunately, the Gallipoli campaign eventually failed, and the losses on both sides were heavy. But even the initial failures of the Gallipoli campaign bore the seeds of success later in that same campaign, when amphibious expertise finally began to match expectations. Over 120,000 allied soldiers were removed by ship from the battlefield in Turkey in December 1915, directly under the noses of the Turkish army. The "amphibious withdrawal" of the allied army was one of the few bright spots in this debacle, according to Corbett, and turned out to be the most successful allied amphibious operation of the war.

As shown in the Gallipoli campaign, amphibious operations are at the same time extremely complicated and fraught with dangers to the forces involved, both prior and subsequent to the landing of troops over the beach. Amphibious operations always require a very high level of expertise, combined arms coordination and cooperation to achieve success, as was discovered in the initial U.S. amphibious operations in the Pacific during WWII. The potential payback for successful amphibious operations-the ability to affect the entire course of a war--can be enormous, as evidenced by subsequent U.S. operations in the latter stages of the Pacific and European theaters, the Inchon operations during the Korean War, and the British amphibious landings during the Falkland war.

Sea control enables the use of the sea as a conduit for amphibious operations. Amphibious operations are always extremely complex and require careful planning and combined arms cooperation to ensure success. Based on the circumstances, risks to the amphibious forces can be high, but the potential payback for successful amphibious operations can be enormous and game changing.

Students should depart the seminar with a firm grasp of the inherent value of amphibious warfare and the utility that amphibious forces provide an operational commander.

The point of contact for this session is LtCol Jim McGrath, C-414.

D. Questions:

What types of operational effects can be generated by amphibious forces?

What are the factors that increase the complexity of amphibious warfare in comparison to other forms of warfare?

What conditions are necessary for conducting amphibious operations?

What operational utility do amphibious forces provide the joint force commander (JFC)?

What factors should be considered when assigning command responsibility for an amphibious operation? Should a naval officer always be in command?

Considering the substantial challenges faced by U.S. forces, what factors allowed for the successful landing of amphibious forces at Inchon during the Korean War?

G. Required Readings:

Blandy, W. H. P., ADM, USN (Ret). "Command Relations in Amphibious Warfare." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*. (June 1951). Read pp. 569-581. (**NWC 4055).**

Hart, B.H. Liddell and Batcheller, Gordon, LtCol, USMC. "Marines and strategy." *Marine Corps Gazette* (January 1980). Read pp. 23-31. (**NWC 4054).**

Heinl, Robert D., Col, USMCR. "The Inchon Landing: A Case Study in Amphibious Planning." *Naval War College Review* (March 2006). Read pp. 117-135. (**NWC 4053).**

Possony, Stefan T. "Amphibious Strategy." *Marine Corps Gazette* (June 1945). Read pp. 2-14. (**NWC 4052**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Friedman, Norman. *U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002.

Gatchel, Theodore L. *At the Water's Edge: Defending Against the Modern Amphibious Assault*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996.

JP 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, 2001, "Executive Summary," ix–xv; "Concept of Amphibious Operations," I-1–I-8. (JEL).

Joint Staff Washington, D. C. CJCSM 3500.04D, 1 August 2005, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL),* Review Annex C to Appendix C to Enclosure B, *Operational Tasks, Measures, and Criteria*. (JEL).

Kennedy, Michael R. "Expeditionary Strike Group Concepts and Recommendations." *Marine Corps Gazette* (March 2006): 16–25.

Kirkpatrick, Charles E. "Joint Planning for Operation Torch." *Parameters*. (Summer 1991): 73-83.

Lorelli, John A. *To Foreign Shores: U.S. Amphibious Operations in World War II*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995.

Lovering, T. T. A., ed. *Amphibious Assault: Manoeuvre from the Sea*. London: Crown, 2005.

Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment (MOC), Second Edition, June 2007, Annex B, "Operational Maneuver from the Sea (Extracts)"; Annex C, "Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept, Executive Summary"; and Annex D, "Distributed Operations for a Complex Environment, Executive Summary."

Naval War College. Joint Military Operations Department. *Forces/Capabilities Handbook*. U.S. Marine Corps, August 2006, 63–73.

Picotte, Leonard F. RADM, USN (Ret) and King, Kendal. "Amphibious Redux." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*. (June 1997): 62-65.

Pierce, Terry. "Obey the iron Law." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*. (November 1997): 28-31.

Stewart, Scott D. LCDR, USN. "Operation Watchtower: An Analysis in Operational Design." Paper submitted to the Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College. (9 March 1993): 1-36.

Willmott, H.P. "Guadalcanal: The Naval Campaign." *Joint Forces Quarterly*. (Autumn 1993): 98-106.

ATTACK ON AND DEFENSE/PROTECTION OF MARITIME TRADE (Seminar)

Whoever commands the sea, commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.

—Sir Walter Raleigh
(1554?-1618)

The battle of the Atlantic was the dominating factor all through the war. Never for one moment could we forget that everything happening elsewhere . . . depended ultimately on its outcome.

—Winston S. Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, 1951

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is discussion and analysis of elements of maritime trade in general, prerequisites for, tenets, and methods of combat employment of naval forces and aircraft in attacking an enemy's and defending/protecting friendly maritime trade, respectively.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the importance of and distinctions between maritime trade on the open ocean and in the littorals.
- Understand the prerequisites for success in attacking the enemy's maritime trade.
- Identify the tenets and the main methods of combat employment of naval forces and aviation in attacking an enemy's maritime trade.
- Understand the prerequisites for success in defense and protection of friendly maritime trade.
- Identify the tenets and the main methods of combat employment of naval and aviation forces in defending and protecting friendly maritime trade.

C. Background:

The world's increasingly globalized market economy is characterized by a historically high level of international trade that relies on the sea for the safe, efficient flow of goods around the globe. Given these circumstances, the protection of maritime trade has never been more critical. In particular, states bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea frequently depend, to a large extent, on the continuous flow of trade over coastal routes for the everyday functioning of their economies. This is especially the case for a country with underdeveloped land communications in the littoral area. The importance of maritime trade to a particular nation is determined, in part, by the nation's geographic location and the level of its economic self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, to varying degrees,

all maritime countries depend on seaborne commerce for their economic well being.

In past wars, two of the main tasks of navies were the attack on enemy shipping and the defense and protection of their nation's own and friendly shipping. Since the advent of aircraft and guided missiles, the scope of these tasks has progressively expanded to encompass the entire maritime transportation system. So, not only is shipping at sea of concern, but also ships in their ports, port facilities, shipyards and ship repair facilities, cargo storage areas, and road/railroad junctions have come to be included within the concept of maritime trade. Collectively, attack on enemy and defense and protection of friendly maritime trade may be referred to as "maritime trade warfare." Maritime trade warfare is an integral part of a much broader effort to weaken the enemy's or to protect one's own and friendly military-economic capacity.

One of the main purposes of sea control is to ensure the safety of friendly seaborne trade. A country that fails to safeguard its seaborne trade may find not only that it suffers significant economic harm but also that its entire war effort has been crippled. Additionally, adequate control of the seas enables a stronger navy to focus on attacking enemy maritime trade. In any case, attack on and defense/protection of maritime trade is one of a navy's operational tasks whether the navy is on the offensive or the defensive.

Attack on enemy maritime trade is achieved by "interfering" with or "interdicting" key nodes in or elements of the enemy maritime transportation system. The degree to which enemy maritime trade is reduced ranges from hampering to curtailing, interrupting, and cutting off the enemy maritime trade. Today, particularly during a limited war, attacking or inhibiting enemy trade may include maritime intercept operations, seizures and use of exclusion zones as opposed to the wholesale sinking of commercial shipping that was seen during both World Wars.

The success in the attack on enemy maritime trade depends on theory and doctrine developed and practiced in peacetime. The development of such doctrine requires robust debate among naval theoreticians meant to optimize how the attack on enemy maritime trade should be planned, prepared, and conducted. Additional requirements for success include the availability of adequate forces and weapons, a high degree of training, appropriate intelligence, sufficient air support, access to suitable bases, and reliable logistical support.

Defense of maritime trade is not a secondary or 'lesser included' task but, rather, one of the most important responsibilities of the armed forces. It should encompass defense of all of the elements of trade, specifically port terminals, storage depots, shipbuilding and ship repair facilities, and railway and road communications in the coastal area. This means that navies, other military services and certain sectors of the civilian economy must be integrated into the overall concept. Perhaps one of the key prerequisites for success during times of conflict is to have a sound and tested doctrine for naval control of shipping. Methods and procedures for defense of shipping should be fully practiced in peacetime through war games and exercises.

The point of contact for this session is Captain Mike Fitzpatrick, USN, C-425.

D. Questions:

What are the elements of maritime trade? What are the main differences between maritime trade conducted on the open ocean and in enclosed/semi-enclosed seas?

Explain the key prerequisites for success in attacking an enemy's maritime trade?

What are the tenets and main methods of combat employment of naval forces and aviation in attacking an enemy's maritime trade?

Explain the key prerequisites for success in defending and protecting friendly maritime trade?

What are differences between convoying on the open ocean and in the littorals?

Is convoying a viable method today for the defense and protection of maritime trade?

What are the tenets and main methods of combat employment of naval forces and aviation in defense and protection of friendly maritime trade?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Grubb, Michael C. *Protection of Shipping: A Forgotten Mission with Many New Challenges.* Naval War College JMO Student Research Paper, October 2006, (**NWC 4038**), pages 1-11.

Vego, Milan. "Attack on Maritime Trade" and "Defense and Protection of Maritime Trade." In *On Naval Warfare.* (**NWC 4020A**), pages 93-99, 111, and 117-125.

G. Supplementary Readings:

Goulter, Christina, J. M. *A Forgotten Offensive. Royal Air Force Coastal Command's Antishipping Campaign, 1940–1945*. London: Frank Cass, 1995.

Grove, Eric, J. *The Defeat Of The Enemy Attack On Shipping 1939–1945.* A revised edition of
the Naval Staff History Volumes 1A (Text and Appendices) and 1B (Plans and Tables). Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, The Navy Records Society, 1997.

James, Jonathan T. *Countering Naval Guerrilla Warfare: Are Convoys Obsolete?* Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 1991.

Kemp, Paul. *The Russian Convoys, 1941–1945.* Poole, Dorset, U.K.: Arms and Armour Press, 1987.

Lewis, Archibald. R. The Northern Seas: Shipping and Commerce in Northern Europe A.D. 300–1100. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1958.

Navias, Martin S., and E. R. Hooton. *Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping during the Iran-Iraq Conflict, 1980–1988.* London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1996.

Schoefield, B. B. *The Russian Convoys.* Philadelphia, Pa: Dufour Editions, 1964.

Tracy, Nicholas. *Attack on Maritime Trade.* Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1991.

Tracy, Nicholas. *Sea Power and the Control of Trade: Belligerent Rights from the Russian War to the Beira Patrol, 1854–1970.* Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate for the Navy Records Society, 2005.

Uhlig, Frank, Jr. *How Navies Fight: The U.S. Navy and Its Allies.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994.

Woodman, Richard. *Malta Convoys, 1940–1943.* London: J. Murray, 2000.

MARITIME OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS (Seminar)

Because of my wartime experience, I am insistent on the point that logistics know-how must be maintained, that logistics is second to nothing in importance in warfare, that logistic training must be widespread and thorough ...

—VADM Robert B. Carney, USN
(1895-1990)

A. Focus:

This seminar with examine and explain the use of operational functions in a maritime theater. Specifically, the session will review and discuss operational functions from the theater commander's perspective, including: operational command structure, intelligence, command and control warfare (C2W), fires, logistics, and protection.

B. Objectives:

- Know and understand the importance of establishing and maintaining operational functions in a maritime theater.
- Comprehend the role, importance and tenets of sound maritime operational level command and its intermediate levels.
- Understand the purpose and importance of naval operational intelligence.
- Comprehend the purpose and the main components of naval command and control warfare (C2W).
- Understand the purpose and joint character of maritime operational fires.
- Comprehend the purpose, tenets, and main component of naval operational logistics.
- Understand the purpose and the main components of operational protection in a maritime theater.

C. Background:

For maximum effectiveness in the employment of maritime forces at the operational level of command/war, a number of supporting structures and activities, usually referred to as "operational functions," must be fully established in peacetime. In generic terms, the key functions in a maritime theater are operational command organization (or command structure), intelligence, command and control warfare (C2W), fires, logistics, and protection. For a successful outcome of a maritime campaign, all operational functions have to be properly sequenced and synchronized. Because of the much smaller scale of the objective, a major naval operation requires support of only selected elements, collectively called naval combat support. They are, in turn, an integral part of the respective operational function.

Command organization (or structure) is the principal means by which a maritime operational commander exercise command and control (C2) over subordinate forces. Its main purpose is to integrate maritime forces and forces of other services into effective teams. Normally, a sound command organization requires the existence of several intermediate levels of command to ensure a sufficient degree of freedom of action by subordinate tactical commanders. At each level of war at sea, a specific intelligence picture is needed to provide support in the employment of maritime forces. A corresponding intelligence organization should be established and fully developed at each level of command in peacetime. This is a crucial requirement: intelligence must be conducted continuously in both time of peace, conflict or war. It is also essential that naval operational commander integrate intelligence into the other operational functions. Yet intelligence is only one—and not necessarily the most important—factor in making a sound decision and then preparing and executing plans. Operational intelligence is aimed to support the planning, preparation, and execution of a major naval/joint forces operation or maritime campaign. Normally, operational intelligence has to anticipate events several weeks or even months ahead. In contrast, tactical intelligence is concerned with events that take place over a day, or several days at the most.

Naval operational C2W is a continuum, integrating operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction--all supported by intelligence--to influence, degrade, deny information to, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities. This must be performed while protecting C2 of friendly maritime forces against such enemy actions during planning and preparations for a maritime campaign or major naval operation. There is significant overlap in this area, and operations security (OPSEC), defensive elements of electronic warfare, psychological operations, and deception are at the same time integral parts of another function: operational protection. Each component of C2W can be used to supplement the effect achieved by other elements; often, however, the use of one component conflicts with the use of other components.

Operational fires in a maritime theater are designed to have a decisive impact on the course and outcome of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. In the post cold war environment this is an inherently joint function. Operational fires are not simply fire support; hence, the success of an operational maneuver is not necessarily dependent on these fires. However, they can affect an operational maneuver. They are conducted in the operational and strategic depths of the enemy's defenses.

Naval operational logistics encompasses logistical organization in a formally declared or undeclared maritime theater of operations. It links naval strategic logistics to naval tactical logistics. Its main purpose is to ensure that actions of one's maritime forces are uninterrupted through all phases of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. Logistical support and sustainment are perhaps two of the most critical factors for the success of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. Failure to establish sound logistical organization in the theater, a lack of readily available supplies of all kinds, and an inability to provide protection to both the elements of logistical organization and the sea lines of communications will lead to major setbacks and often to defeats.

Protecting maritime forces from a wide range of threats in peacetime, crisis, and war is

one of the most important responsibilities of a naval operational commander. While at the tactical level the naval commander focuses almost entirely on protection of ships at sea or in port, the operational commander's responsibility encompasses the major part or the entire maritime theater. It includes protection of maritime forces and shore installations/facilities, as well as many elements of civilian infrastructure and population in the littoral area. The range of possible threats in a maritime theater large, while one's ability to provide full defense and protection is usually limited. Hence, operational commanders must make hard choices in determining which forces and which part of the maritime theater infrastructure need more protection than others.

The point of contact for this session is M. Vego, C-427.

D. Questions:

Why is it critically important to establish and maintain operational functions in a maritime theater? Is there any significant difference between operational functions in support of a campaign and major naval operation?

What are the differences between operational level of command on land and in maritime theater? Explain the importance of having intermediate levels of command?

What is the purpose and importance of naval operational intelligence? Discuss the distinction between operational-level intelligence in a maritime theater and in land theater?

What are the purpose and the main components of naval operational C2W?

Explain and discuss the purpose and the joint character of maritime operational fires?

What are the purpose, tenets, and the main component naval operational logistics? Explain the relationship between shore-based and sea-based operational logistics?

What is the importance and the main components of protection in a maritime theater?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Hines, Jason. 2008. "Sins of Omission and Commission: A Reassessment of the Role of Intelligence in the Battle of Jutland." *Journal of Military History* 72, no. 4. Read pp. 1117-1153. (**NWC 4084**).

Vego, Milan. *Maritime Operational Functions* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, September 2008). (**NWC 1065**).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Ballantine; Duncan S. *U.S. Naval Logistics in the Second World War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947).

Carter, Worrall R. *Beans, Bullets and Black Oil: The Story of Fleet Logistics Afloat in the Pacific During World War II* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953).

Dyer, George C. *Naval Logistics* (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2d ed., 1962).

Ford, Christopher A. *The Admirals Advantage: U.S. Navy Operational Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005).

Gardner, J.W.C. Decoding History: ULTRA and the Battle of the Atlantic (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999).

Layton, Edwin T. with Roger Pineau and John Costello, *"And I Was There:" Pearl Harbor and Midway-Breaking the Secrets* (New York, NY: William Morrow, 1985).

Lewin, Ronald. *The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers, and the Defeat of Japan* (New York, NY: Farrar Strauss, and Giroux, 1982).

Rohwer, Juergen, "Signal Intelligence and World War II: The Unfolding Story," *Journal of Military History*, vol 63. no. 4, October 1999, pp. 939-951.

Sumida, Jon T. "British naval operational logistics, 1914-1918," *Journal of Military History*, 57 (1993), pp. 447-80.

Vego, Milan. "Harbour Protection," *Naval Forces*, No. III/2007, pp. 9-20.

DESIGN FOR A MAJOR NAVAL OPERATION (Seminar)

Is the proposed operation likely to succeed?
What might be the consequences of failure?
Is it in the realm of practicability in terms of materials and supplies?

—Posted on the bulkhead in Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz' office

A. Focus:

This session examines the concept of operational design, introduced generally in OPS II-12 *Operational Design,* as specifically applied to major naval operations—the focus is on selected elements of operational design and the operational idea (scheme).

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend operational design for major naval operations.
- Analyze selected elements of operational design for a major naval operation(s).
- Comprehend the key elements of operational idea (scheme) for major naval operations.
- Analyze selected elements of an operational idea for a major naval operation(s).
- Comprehend the role of operational deception in major naval operations.
- Analyze operational deception for a major naval operation(s).

C. Background:

A major naval operation is an integral part of a maritime or land campaign; therefore, its ultimate objective is normally operational and physical in its content. Sometimes the ultimate objective of a major naval operation comprises more than one operational objective and additional major tactical objectives. Normally, the ultimate objective of a major naval operation cannot be achieved with a single action. Hence, each objective may be divided into several tasks that collectively accomplish a given ultimate objective. These, in turn, are translated into the corresponding objectives to be accomplished by subordinate commanders. The process and considerations involved are operational design.

The operational idea (or scheme) is the core of a design for a major naval operation. The essence of the idea is, in U.S. terms, called a "concept of operations" (CONOPS). A naval component commander develops the operational idea pertaining to the employment of naval forces. The operational idea is developed in a rudimentary form during the naval operational commander's estimate of the situation and then expanded and refined during the planning phase of a major naval operation. (Normally, the operational idea for a maritime or land campaign should be developed first, to provide a framework for the operational idea of the naval commander. Otherwise, neither real synergy nor the most

effective employment of forces is possible.) In general, the operational idea should describe in broad terms what naval forces have to do, where, and when. It should express in broad and succinct terms the sequence and types of actions by subordinate forces for accomplishing operational objectives.

The point of contact for this session is C. Helms, C-404.

D. Questions:

Discuss the relationship(s) between intermediate and ultimate objectives.

How might enemy and friendly centers of gravity differ between major naval and land operations?

Identify and discuss the main elements that go into an operational idea (scheme)?

How might design for a major naval operation differ from a major land or air operation?

In general, how would the design for a naval major operation in the littorals differ from a major naval operation on the open ocean?

Midway Case Study:

Who was the operational commander for the Japanese? Critique the choice of operational objectives determined by the operational commander.

Analyze the main elements of the Japanese operational scheme for the Operation MI. Did the Japanese commander have a sound operational idea?

To what extent did the operational idea (scheme) employed by the Japanese provide an opportunity for success? How could they have made it more effective?

To what extent was the Japanese deception plan successful and why?

E. Required Readings:

Parshall, Jonathan, and Tully, Andrew**.** *Shattered Sword, The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway*. Potomac Books, Washington, D.C. 2005. (**Issued**). Read pp. 19-59.

Vego, Milan. "Operational Design" and "The Operational Idea" in *Newport Papers 32: Major Naval Operations*. Read pp. 63-101. (**NWC 4070**).

(Much of this reading is a review of concepts addressed in Operational Art. The student should scan and read as necessary to gain an understanding of the concepts as applied to major naval operations.)

F. Supplementary Readings:

Bates, Richard W. *The Battle of Midway Including the Aleutian Phase, June 3 to June 14, 1942. Strategical and Tactical Analysis*. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 1948.

Fuchida, Mitsuo and Okumiya, Masatake. Edited by Clarke Kawakami and Roger Pineau. *Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan*. Ballantine Books, New York, 1955. Read pp. 10-11, 73-199.

MODULE FIVE
JOINT/COMBINED WARFARE

Introduction to Joint/Combined Warfare 148

OPS 5-1 U.S. Navy Capabilities and Doctrine (Seminar) 149

OPS 5-2 U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Doctrine (Seminar) 152

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OPS 5-14 Department of State and the Country Team (Lecture) 186

INTRODUCTION TO JOINT/COMBINED WARFARE

A. Focus:

Module Five—"Joint/Combined Warfare" explores the operational doctrine and planning considerations in employing the service capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces (U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Coast Guard, all service Special Operations Forces (SOF)). Follow–on sessions cover Joint and combined warfare at the theater level, coalition/multinational operations, operational logistics, strategic deployment, intelligence support to operational decision-making and planning, information operations, and Joint/multinational command and control, including case study-based practical application opportunities. It is expected that this competence will be reflected in student understanding of the proper employment (selection, assignment, and tasking) of forces in joint and combined environments to accomplish assigned missions. Students will have the opportunity to apply this knowledge in detail during the Module SIX and Module EIGHT comprehensive planning exercises.

B. Description:

Sessions 5-1 through 5-3 and 5-5 through 5-7 comprise a review of individual service capabilities (U.S. Navy, U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF)), essential warfare supporting systems and employment considerations as well as their application and use in joint and coalition/multinational warfare. This background will enable the student to consider how best to deploy and employ forces and functional support systems to accomplish assigned missions. These sessions will emphasize the maritime aspects of joint and combined warfare.

Session 5-4 provides an insight into operational command and control for Joint operations. Session 5-8 looks at the command and control and planning considerations for multinational operations.

Session 5-9 addresses the importance of and planning considerations regarding Information Operations. An IO practical exercise is embedded in Module SIX Naval Planning Exercise and will provide an excellent opportunity for the students to apply the IO capabilities in a realistic planning practical scenario. Sessions 5-10 and 5-11 provide an insight into joint operational logistics and strategic deployment. Session 5-12 is a seminar/practical exercise which will provide a fictional future scenario as a backdrop for student application of their knowledge of Joint forces (particularly naval) employment considerations and operational command and control to a discussion of a major, joint maritime operation. Sessions 5-13 and 5-14 are lectures on intelligence support to operational decision-making and planning and Department of State and the Country Team. The Module 5 topics support further work in these areas in the subsequent Planning and Capstone Exercise in later Modules.

U.S. NAVY CAPABILITIES AND DOCTRINE (Seminar)

. . . A few fir-built frigates manned by a handful of bastards and outlaws.

—The London Times, 1812 (of the U.S. Navy)

A. Focus:

This session provides an overview of U.S. Navy capabilities and doctrine from the perspective of the operational level of war. In Block IV theory and practice of operational warfare at sea was explained and discussed in some detail. The focus of this session is to critically explain and discuss the U.S. Navy's capabilities and doctrine at the operational level of war at sea.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the strategic framework for the employment of U.S. Navy forces.
- Understand the key doctrinal documents guiding the organization and employment of U.S. Navy forces.
- Know and understand the U.S. Navy's capabilities and limitations pertaining to key naval warfare areas and their importance to joint and multi-national operations.
- Understand the doctrine and practice of the U.S. navy's theater/numbered fleet commanders' Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center (MHQ/MOC).

C. Background:

Per the maritime strategic concept outlined in *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, "United States seapower will be globally postured to secure our homeland and citizens from direct attack and to advance our interests around the world." *A Cooperative Strategy*, signed October 2007, is the latest U.S. Navy strategic document intended to guide the organization and employment of Navy forces. Throughout the Cold War era the U.S. Navy was guided by a Mahanian strategy focused on decisive war at sea. In the 1990's, with the break-up of the Soviet Union and the demise of a peer naval competitor, the U.S. Navy shifted its focus towards the littorals with the release of *… From the Sea* and *Forward … From the Sea.* In 2002 *Sea Power 21*, with its three primary pillars; Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea Basing, further refined the Navy's vision. Unlike the Army and Marine Corps, the U.S. Navy does not have a capstone doctrinal publication to tie together the many disparate pieces of naval warfare into a universal service doctrine. There are many Navy Warfare Publications (NWPs), but these are tactical level documents focused on individual missions, functions or tasks. NWP 3-32 (Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War) was published in October 2008 and Navy Doctrine Pub 1 (Naval Warfare) is being completely revised with a target release in FY 09. These developments indicate a U.S. Navy effort to strengthen their doctrinal foundation. The recurring strategies discussed above provide doctrinal

guidance in the absence of a service capstone publication.

U.S. Navy forces are organized, trained, equipped and employed to carry out naval missions under Navy command and control or as part of a joint force in either supported or supporting roles. These naval missions include (not all inclusive) forward presence, crisis response, power projection, maritime security, sea control, deterrence, security cooperation, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. Integral to all naval missions are key warfare areas -- strike warfare, anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, air and missile defense, amphibious warfare, mine warfare, etc. These warfare areas form the basis for the tactical level command and control organization used by the U.S. Navy – the composite warfare commander (CWC) system. The CWC is the senior afloat commander within a Task Force/Task Group and his subordinate commanders are the primary warfare commanders within each of the key warfare areas – air defense commander, sea combat commander (includes both anti-submarine warfare and surface warfare areas), amphibious warfare commander, etc. These warfare commanders exercise command and control within their respective areas with the CWC exercising "command by negation" over their decisions. All U.S. Navy ships, submarines and aircraft are "multi-mission" and as such are allocated among the various warfare commanders as the situation dictates. While the multi-mission nature of the units enhances interoperability between warfare commanders, it sub optimizes capabilities within individual warfare areas due to increased training requirements for crews and frequent multi-tasked mission assignments.

The U.S. Navy is operationally organized along geographic lines with a Navy component commander assigned to each Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC). Under the Navy component commander are numbered fleet commanders who are the primary operational level Navy commanders within their respective areas of responsibility (AOR). All Navy theater component and numbered fleet commanders are configured with a maritime headquarters with maritime operations center (MHQ/MOC) to provide command and control at the operational level – to include execution of Joint/Combined Force Maritime Component Commander (J/CFMCC) functions. The standup of MHQ/MOC is a recent advance in U.S. Navy command and control (C2) and represents a significant advancement for the Navy in regards to the operational level of war. Tactical level operations are conducted by Task Force (TF) and Task Group (TG) commanders under their respective numbered fleet commander. The U.S. Navy deploys forces organized as Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG). The CSG is centered on an aircraft carrier (CVN) and its embarked airwing (CVW) and typically includes one cruiser (CG), two destroyers (DDG), one submarine (SSN) and a logistics ship (AOE). The ESG is centered on an amphibious assault ship (LHD/LHA) and its embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and typically includes one amphibious transport dock (LPD), one dock landing ship (LSD), one cruiser (CG), two destroyers/frigates (DDG/FFG) and one submarine (SSN).

The point of contact for this session is Captain Mark Donahue, C-409.

D. Questions:

How do the recurring U.S. Navy strategic papers (*A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, Sea Power 21,* etc) guide U.S. Navy doctrine?

Discuss the assertion that the U.S. Navy is overly focused on tactics and technology while operational thinking is largely absent.

Discuss the relationship and potential seams between the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard in support of our nation's strategic objective to secure the U.S. from direct attack.

Describe how deployed Navy forces are used to support geographic combatant commander theater objectives? Discuss the command and control structure for these forces.

What are the primary deployment configurations of U.S. Navy forces? What unique capabilities does each of these configurations provide to the Joint Force Commander?

Discuss the Navy's capabilities and limitations with regard to Defense/Protection of Maritime Trade.

E. Required Readings:

Navy Office of Information. Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center (MHQ with MOC). *Rhumb Lines.* March 7, 2007. (**NWC 5023**).

U.S. Department of the Navy. *Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War*, Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-32, Washington, DC: CNO, October 2008, pp 1-1 – 1-7. .

U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. October 2007. .

U.S. Navy. Naval Operations Concept 2008 (NOC 08). (**NWC 5024**).

Vego, Milan. "Obsessed with Tactics." *Armed Forces Journal* (May 2008). (Available online at http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/05/3434637) (**NWC 5025**).

Vego, Milan. "The U.S. Navy and Defense/Protection of Maritime Trade." October 2008 (**NWC 5018**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Roughhead, Gary, CNO Guidance for 2009; Executing our Maritime Strategy. November 2008. (Available online at http://www.navy.mil/docs/cno_guidance.pdf)

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. *Forces/Capabilities Handbook.* Read: 1-19

Vego, Milan. "The U.S. Navy and Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)." October 2008

Vego, Milan. "The U.S. Navy and Mine Warfare." October 2008.

U.S. COAST GUARD CAPABILITIES AND DOCTRINE (Seminar)

The Coast Guard provides . . . a unique instrument in the nation's national security tool bag.

—General Colin Powell

A. Focus:

The multi-mission Coast Guard, the country's fifth and smallest Armed Service, has non-redundant, complementary capabilities that can serve as a force multiplier in joint operations. Since 9/11, the Coast Guard has placed greatly increased emphasis on the mission of maritime Homeland Security/Homeland Defense (HLS/HLD), sometimes at the expense of its other traditional mission areas. The challenges of mission growth have been exacerbated by aging cutters, boats, aircraft and communications systems, and the service has undertaken a major recapitalization effort to modernize its fleet. This session examines the Coast Guard's capabilities to support joint operations, and its diverse mission areas, equipment, challenges and limitations.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Coast Guard to conduct the full range of military operations against the capabilities of 21st century adversaries.
- Comprehend the organizational framework within which U.S. Coast Guard forces are employed and sustained.
- Comprehend how the U.S. Coast Guard is organized to plan, execute, sustain and train for joint, interagency and multinational operations.
- Comprehend the interrelationship between U.S. Coast Guard doctrine and joint doctrine.
- Comprehend the considerations for employing U.S. Coast Guard forces as part of a joint and multinational force at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

Founded in 1790, the Coast Guard is an armed service in all respects and has participated in every American war since its inception. Although multi-mission in nature and charged with significant responsibilities in such diverse areas as maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, pollution response and maintaining an aids to navigation system, Coast Guard forces provide non-redundant complementary capabilities in support of the national military strategy. In recent combat operations, Coast Guard forces have provided a valuable capability to Joint Force Commanders in maritime interception operations, port operations and security, coastal sea control and other areas where the smallest service's expertise can add value.

A part of the Department of Homeland Security since 1 March 2003, the Coast Guard functions as the lead federal agency for maritime homeland security and plays a supporting role for maritime homeland defense. While this new emphasis on homeland security has placed increasing demands on an already over-extended service, the Coast Guard has benefited from additional funding in the wake of 9/11 and modest (ten percent) growth in end-strength. In addition, the Coast Guard has garnered increasing

political support for its "Deepwater" project—a much-needed integrated initiative to recapitalize its fleet, air frames and communications systems.

Point of contact for this session is Captain M. Husak, USCG, SP-214.

D. Questions:

What Coast Guard capabilities can be useful to the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander? What are the Service's strengths and weaknesses in the joint operations arena? How does a JTF commander or combatant commander request and receive USCG support, and what are the issues associated with integration into the joint force?

What Coast Guard capabilities might be useful in support of NORTHCOM's maritime homeland defense (MHLD) mission? What DoD capabilities might the Coast Guard want in support if its maritime homeland security (MHLS) mission? What are the options and considerations for Command and Control (C2) for the MHLS and MHLD missions?

To what extent is the Coast Guard accepting too much risk by re-capitalizing its entire surface and air fleets at once via the unprecedented "Deepwater" acquisition project?

E. Required Readings:

DiRenzo, Joe, III, and Chris Doane. "Joint Coast Guard and Department of Defense Operations." *The United States Coast Guard, The Shield of Freedom 2006*, 126–133. (**NWC 4023**).

Hull, James D., VADM, USCG, Cari B. Thomas, CDR, USCG, and Joe DiRenzo, LCDR, USCG. "What Was the Coast Guard Doing in Iraq?" U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (August 2003): 38–40. (**NWC 3052**).

Robinson, Clarence A., Jr. "Supporting Combatant Commanders." *The United States Coast Guard, The Shield of Freedom 2004*, 22–29. (**NWC 2016**).

Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations. U.S. Coast Guard Briefing, CD-ROM, 2006. (**NWC 2002F**), (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. *Forces/Capabilities Handbook*. Read: 107 - 114. (**NWC 3153J**), (Issued and posted on the JMO website).

Wilson, J. R. "Coast Guard Expeditionary Forces." *The United States Coast Guard, The Shield of Freedom 2004*, 42–53. (**NWC 2010**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

U.S. Coast Guard. *U.S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian*, Coast Guard Publication 1, January 2002.

Commandant Instruction M3000.3A (COMDTINST M3000.3A), *Coast Guard Capabilities Manual* (CAPMAN).

U.S. MARINE CORPS CAPABILITIES AND DOCTRINE (Seminar)

General Bradley tells me that amphibious operations are a thing of the past. We'll never have any more amphibious operations. That does away with the Marine Corps. And the Air Force can do anything the Navy can do nowadays, so that does away with the Navy.

—Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, 1949

A. Focus:

This session provides an overview of U.S. Marine Corps capabilities and doctrine. While neither platform nor unit specific, the session explores U.S. Marine Corps contributions to meeting the Joint Force Commander's responsibilities for operational functions (C2, movement/maneuver, protection, fires, intelligence, and logistics) and maritime specific missions.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the planning considerations resulting from the necessity to prioritize tasking for multi-mission capable maritime forces in joint operations and recognize that naval forces are routinely multi-tasked to more than one component commander in a joint task force for the planning and execution of joint/multinational operations.
- Understand the considerations for employing U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps amphibious forces as part of a joint/multinational force at the operational level of war to accomplish proper synchronization of operational functions (C2, movement/maneuver, protection, fires, intelligence, and logistics).
- Understand the capabilities and employment considerations of the U.S. Marine Corps and amphibious forces in general that are required to gain and maintain maritime superiority and to conduct and support land operations.
- Comprehend the meaning of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS), Sea Basing, and Distributed Operations.

C. Background:

The Marine Corps remains the Nation's premier expeditionary combat force-in-readiness. Primarily a naval force whose strength is the ability to access denied areas from great distances; Marine forces are projected from land or sea bases for operations as part of a joint or combined force.

The Marine Corps provides defense of the homeland by operating from forward deployed locations throughout the world. Marine Forces fight across the spectrum of conflict. Though the immediate future will be characterized by irregular wars, the Marine Corps continues to retain the ability to fight and win on the conventional battlefield as well. A guiding principle of the Marine Corps is to fight as combined-arms teams, seamlessly integrating ground, aviation, and logistics forces. Speed, flexibility, and agility inherent in the combined-arms approach are keys to defeating traditional, terrorist, and emerging threats to our Nation's security.

The US Navy / Marine Corps combined amphibious capability represent the largest, best equipped, best trained, and most capable amphibious force in the world. Despite this fact, significant challenges are presented by the current operational environment. These challenges include, but are not limited to lack of sufficient amphibious lift, lack of sufficient naval fire support, and enemy anti-access capabilities enabled by advanced technology.

After discussing these and related issues, the student should have a basic understanding of US Marine Corps organization and capabilities, challenges presented by the current operational environment, and current and emerging doctrine for employment of Marine Forces.

The concepts discussed in this session will be applied to a practical case in session 4-13, PRC-Taiwan Scenario **(NWC 4027B).**

The point of contact for this session is COL Mike Ramos, SP-215.

D. Questions:

What capabilities and options do U.S. Navy-Marine Corps amphibious forces bring to a Joint Force Commander?

What are the current strengths and weaknesses of U.S. amphibious forces?

Can amphibious warfare commanders devise innovative ways to overcome the current shortages of amphibious lift, naval surface fire support, and mine countermeasures? If so, what might they be?

Is forcible entry from the sea still a viable operational option?

E. Required Readings:

Kennedy, Michael R. "Expeditionary Strike Group Concepts and Recommendations." *Marine Corps Gazette* (March 2006): 16–25 (**NWC 4037**).

Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment (MOC), Second Edition, June 2007; Annex B, "Operational Maneuver from the Sea (Extracts)"; Annex C, "Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept, Executive Summary"; and Annex D, "Distributed Operations for a Complex Environment, Executive Summary." **(NWC 4000A)**.

Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations. U.S. Marine Corps Briefing, CD-ROM, 2007. (**NWC 2002F**), (Issued).

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-02. Washington, DC: CJCS, 2001. Read: "Executive Summary," ix–xv; "Concept of Amphibious Operations, I-1–I-8. .

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Database." https://jdeis.js.mil/. Scan UJTL Database.

F. Supplementary Readings:

Friedman, Norman. *U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002.

Gatchel, Theodore L. At the Water's Edge: Defending Against the Modern Amphibious Assault. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996.

Lorelli, John A. *To Foreign Shores: U.S. Amphibious Operations in World War II*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995.

Lovering, T. T. A., ed. *Amphibious Assault: Manoeuvre from the Sea*. London: Crown, 2005)

Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. *PRC-TAIWAN Vignette*, 2006.

Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. *Forces/Capabilities Handbook* August 2006, 63–73, U.S. Marine Corps.

OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL (Seminar)

As we consider the nature of warfare in the modern era, we find that it is synonymous with joint warfare.

—Joint Pub 1

There is still a tendency in each separated unit …to be a one handed puncher. By that I mean that the rifleman wants to shoot, the tanker to charge, the artilleryman to fire. . . . To get harmony in battle, each weapon must support each other. Team play wins.

—Gen George S. Patton, Jr., USA

A. Focus:

This session addresses the organization and employment of joint forces. It examines and analyzes a Joint Force Commander's (JFC's) authorities, command relationships, organizational options and considerations when standing up a joint force. It will also look at the functions and responsibilities of the subordinate service and functional component commanders.

B. Objectives/Outcomes:

- Understand the range of considerations influencing the command and control (C2) frameworks for joint campaigns and operations.
- Understand the various command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON, support, ADCON, DIRLAUTH) within a joint force and the level of authority that goes with each. Discuss the considerations that go into selecting a specific command relationship for joint operations.
- Understand key HQ functions and the staff organization and processes that support these functions.
- Understand the functions and responsibilities of the service and functional component commanders and the various seams that exist between those components.

C. Background:

Combatant commanders face the possibility of executing missions across the full range of military operations. They must plan for Major Wars (MWs) at the high end of the conflict spectrum as well as a variety of military operations at the lower end of the spectrum. Whatever the scope or intensity of any particular action, the Joint Force Commander must consider how best to organize a force in order to achieve the following goals:

- Clarity of Objective
- Unity of Effort
- Centralized Direction
- Decentralized Execution

The reading from Joint Pub 1 *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* provides doctrine, principles, and policy for the exercise of authority over joint forces and discusses key considerations for organizing joint forces. Command relationships determine the level of authority exercised by the commander over subordinate or external forces. Selection of the proper command relationship depends on a variety of factors and can be a contentious decision as it determines how much authority the joint force commander will exercise over assigned forces.

A particular emphasis in this lesson is on the establishment of a Joint Task Force (JTF) and its associated components. The reading from JP 3-33 provides insights on the considerations involved in standing up a JTF and how it should be organized to support critical headquarters functions such as the Commander's decision cycle and a HQ battle rhythm.

The roles of the subordinate components, both service and functional, are very important to the achievement of the JFC objectives. A clear understanding of span of responsibility and level of authority within each component is very important to unify the effort. Some longstanding issues complicate operational clarity in the seams between components (control of aircraft over water, control of space/cyberspace assets, etc.). Awareness of these issues coupled with clearly established responsibilities for each component helps mitigate the effects of these issues.

The point of contact for this session is Captain Mark Donahue, Conolly 409.

D. Questions:

Some might argue that the underlying rationale for a JTF is to ensure each service will be represented. Is this true?

In addition to mission and objective, what other factors might influence the selection of an organizational structure for joint operations?

What are some of the considerations a JFC takes into account when deciding between conducting operations through service component commanders or through functional component commanders?

What are some resources available to a Joint Task Force Commander to ensure a well-balanced staff that is representative of the whole force?

What are some of the seams that exist between the various service and functional components and what mitigation measures can be used to minimize confusion along those seams?

How does the Maritime Headquarters/Maritime Operations Center (MHQ/MOC) enhance the Navy's ability to execute JFC and JFMCC functions?

E. Required Readings:

CPF Executive Leadership and Training Symposium. *Navy Joint Principles.* 19 – 20 September 2007. pp. 1 – 5. (**NWC 5021**).

Johns, Raymond and Hanessian, Bruce. "Domain Expertise and Command and

Control." *Joint Force Quarterly* (Issue 49, 2nd quarter 2008): 44 – 48. (**NWC 5022**).

U.S. Department of the Navy. *Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War*, Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-32, Washington, DC: CNO, October 2008, pp 7-1 – 7-17; 7-22 – 7-27.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. Joint Publication (JP) 1, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 14 May 2007. Read IV-1 – IV-20; V-1 – V-12; V-17 – V-20. .

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Task Force Headquarters*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-33, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 16 Feb 2007. Read I-1 – I-11; II-1 – II-19; III-1 – III-21; IV-1 – IV-18. .

F. Supplementary Readings:

Air Force Doctrine Center. *Air and Space Commander's Handbook for the JFACC.* AFDCH 10-01. 16 January 2003, pp. 17 – 47.

Forces/Capabilities Handbook, Operational Command and Control. Read pp.141-150**.**

"Standing Joint Force Headquarters-Core Element." *CHIPS*, Jan-Mar 2007.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-30, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 5 June 2003. Read I-1 – I-4; II-1 – II-11.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-31, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 23 March 2004. Read I-1 – I-8; II-1 – II-7; III-1 – III-9.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-32, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 8 Aug 2006 (w/CH1 27 May 2008). Read I-1 – I-5; II-1 – II-11.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 17 December 2003. Read III-1 – III-14.

U.S. ARMY CAPABILITIES AND DOCTRINE (Seminar)

…[Y]ou may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.

-----T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the U.S. Army and how it is organized, equipped, and postured to provide a range of capabilities to commanders in the execution of joint and combined operations. This lesson provides information regarding current Army structure, as well as transformation initiatives aimed at increasing depth of tactical forces, while also improving the Army's agility and adaptability to shape, deter, or win decisively across the spectrum of military operations. Additionally, this lesson focuses on the Army's core competencies, missions and limitations while executing operations.

B. Objectives:

- Analyze the core competencies and the primary missions, roles, and functions of Army formations, while comprehending the limitations associated with employing heavy and light forces across the range of military operations.
- Comprehend how the Army is organized, equipped, and postured to respond to the requirements of Combatant Commanders.
- Comprehend how the Army arrays and employs capabilities to accomplish shaping, sustaining, and decisive operations within the context of both contiguous and non contiguous areas of operation.
- Comprehend the changes underway in the Army to modify its structure and the associated changes aimed at expanding the depth of Army capabilities.
- Comprehend how the Army trains, deploys, sustains, and regenerates force capabilities while simultaneously transforming and conducting combat operations.
- Comprehend the challenges facing the Army with respect to current commitments and its ability to respond to unforeseen threats.

C. Background:

The Army's two capstone doctrinal publications are Field Manual 1 (The Army) and Field Manual 3.0 (Operations). Field Manual 1 states that "the Army is the primary land-power arm of our Nation's Armed Forces. It exists to serve the American people, protect enduring national interests, and fulfill the Nation's military responsibilities." The culture of the Army is formed by its rich history and timeless traditions, while the foundation of the soldier is comprised of enduring "Army Values," the "Soldier's Creed," and the "Warrior Ethos."

Since the end of the Cold War and particularly after 2001, the active Army, the Army National Guard, and Reserve forces have deployed repeatedly to numerous Joint Areas of Operation executing joint and combined operations in direct support of U.S. National security objectives and interests. As the uncertainty and unpredictability of global military operations have increased, so too has the requirement for the Army to be even more prepared, agile, flexible and capable to execute full-spectrum, joint and expeditionary operations abroad. To accomplish this, the Army has undergone a significant transformation to improve the balance of capabilities between its heavy, medium, and light forces. By improving the balance of Army capabilities, the Combatant Commander has more options available across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO). Under the current transformation plan, the number of Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) in the active component of the Army will increase from 33 to 43. Furthermore, as a result of recent decisions to increase Army force levels from 495,000 to 570,000 (approximately), the number of Brigade Combat Teams will increase beyond 43 over the next five years.

As a result of transformation, the Army has integrated a host of new technologies into weapons, communications, navigational, reconnaissance, and survivability systems, while also reconfiguring its fighting formations into modular components that are more responsive in achieving operational and strategic objectives. The Army employs ground forces to accomplish sustaining, shaping and decisive operations, while combining the effects of war-fighting functions to generate combat power. The Army's war-fighting functions mirror Joint Operational Functions, however, the Army subscribes to the "Battle-Command" concept in articulating the command aspect of "command and control." As defined in FM 3.0 (Operations) "Battle Command is the art and science of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing forces in operations against a hostile, thinking, and adaptive enemy."

Although the Army is undergoing transformation initiatives, it remains focused on fighting the Global War on Terror, improving Joint Force interoperability, and sustaining enduring institutional functions. To do this, the Army is executing a Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model that enables a cyclic rotation of personnel and equipment through a process that designates a pool of forces on the spectrum of readiness for any given time.

The point of contact for this session is COL Gregory Reilly, C-421.

D. Questions:

What are the characteristics of heavy, medium and light forces? What are their employment and deployment considerations, strengths and limitations?

What are the primary formations of the Army at the operational and tactical level of war?

How are joint forces capabilities integrated into and leveraged to support and sustain Army operations?

What is the concept supporting Army transformation, what does it mean in terms of changes to Army formations and capabilities?

What is the utility of airborne and air assault forces at the operational and strategic level?

Is Army transformation appropriate for the most likely conflicts of the future? Or should it instead emphasize the more demanding requirements of conventional scale conflict?

What are some the challenges facing the Army today?

E. Required Readings:

Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations, U.S. Army Briefing, CD-ROM, 2006. (**NWC 2002F**), (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. *Forces/Capabilities Handbook*. Read: 20 - 62. (**NWC 3153J**), (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Fontenot, Gregory, et al. *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*. Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: 2004.

U.S. Army. *The Army*. Field Manual (FM) 1. Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, June 2005.

U.S. Army. *Army and Marine Corps Integration in Joint Operations (AMCI)*. Field Manual (FM) 3-31.1. Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, November 2001.

U.S. Army. *Tactics*. Field Manual (FM) 3-90. Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, July 2001.

U.S. Army. *Division Operations*. Field Manual (FM) Interim 3-91. Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, Draft, February 2006.

U.S. Army. *The Army in Theater Operations*. Field Manual (FM) 3-93. Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, July 2005.

U.S. Army. *Theater Support Command*. Field Manual (FM) 4-93.4. Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, Draft, 15 April 2003.U.S. Army War College. *Guidebook for the Joint Force Land Component Commander*s, February 2006.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-31, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 23 March 2004.

U.S. Army War College. *Joint Forces Land Component (JFLCC) Primer*, February 2006.

U.S. AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES AND DOCTRINE (Seminar)

During [OIF] major combat operations, I had an excellent relationship with special operations, ground and sea based forces as the air component commander. I witnessed first hand how the services shared information and supported one another to create a whole that was greater than the sum of its parts. Almost everything the Air Force does is done in a joint manner now, and I believe we have effectively changed our culture to thinking in terms of the joint fight.

—General T. Michael Moseley, Air Force Chief of Staff

A. Focus:

This session introduces U.S. Air Force (USAF) organization and doctrine. The session highlights the core competencies, distinctive capabilities, concepts of operation, and transformation philosophy of the Air Force; and discusses considerations for employing air and space power effectively in a joint environment.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the capabilities, limitations, and employment considerations of USAF forces in a joint, multinational environment at the operational level.
- Understand how USAF forces are organized, deployed, supported, and employed at the operational level.
- Understand the broad doctrinal service concepts governing employment of USAF forces.
- Understand the unique nature, roles, missions, functions, and support requirements of USAF forces at the operational level in a joint, multinational environment.

C. Background:

The USAF is an integrated air and space force commanding a domain that stretches from the earth's surface to the outer reaches of space in a seamless operational continuum. Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 states that the USAF is the only U.S. Service specifically directed to "organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained offensive and defensive combat operations in the air and space," as well as, strategic air and missile warfare. The USAF will employ its air and space assets globally and jointly to achieve strategic, operational and/or tactical objectives. Most air and space assets can perform multiple functions to achieve the desired objectives. The inherent versatility of flexible assets is just one of the strengths the USAF brings to the operational planning table to ensure the Joint Force Commander dominates adversaries.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel Mike McGauvran, USAF, C-422.

D. Questions:

How does the USAF envision the use of air and space power at the operational level of war?

What tactical or operational missions might be assigned to air and space forces?

How does the USAF command and control air and space forces at the operational level of war?

What deployment construct does the USAF use to provide air and space forces to combatant commanders or subordinate Joint Force Commanders for employment?

What are the roles and responsibilities of a JFACC?

E. Required Readings:

Air Force Doctrine Center, *50 Questions Every Airman Can Answer*, March 2005. (**NWC 5010**).

Forces/Capabilities Handbook. Review 74–106. (**NWC 3153J**), (Issued).

Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations, U.S. Air Force Briefing, CD-ROM, 2006. (**NWC 2002F**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Air Force Doctrine Center. *Air and Space Commander's Handbook for the JFACC*. AFDCH 10-01. 27 June 2005.

Air Force Doctrine Center. *Air & Space Commander's Handbook for the COMAFFOR*. AFDCH 10-02. 4 November 2005.

U.S. Air Force. *Air Force Basic Doctrine*. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1. Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 17 November 2003.

U.S. Air Force. *Operations and Organization*. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2. Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 3 April 2007.

U.S. Air Force. *Air Warfare*. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1. Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 22 January 2000.

U.S. Air Force. *Space Operations*. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2, 27 November 2006.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Countering Air and Missile Threats*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-01, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 05 February 2007.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Interdiction*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-09, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 3 May 2007.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-09, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 13 November 2006.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Doctrine for Space Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 9 August 2002.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Command & Control for Joint Air Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-30, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 5 June 2003.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-52, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 30 August 2004.

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CAPABILITIES AND DOCTRINE (Seminar)

A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change and USSOCOM is no exception. Guided by comprehensive enduring vision and supporting goals, we must constantly reshape ourselves to remain relevant and useful members of the joint team.

—General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA

A. Focus

This session provides an understanding of the organization, capabilities and activities of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and their support to the combatant commanders. In the session, we will briefly introduce the unique responsibilities of the United States Special Operations Command, a Unified Combatant Command with service like responsibilities, and will examine its components and their capabilities. Additionally, we will address the integration of SOF capabilities with the Joint Force, discuss the Command and Control of SOF, and outline the roles of a Theater Special Operations Command and a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF).

B. Objectives/Outcomes:

- Understand the capabilities, limitations and employment considerations of U.S. Special Operations forces in a joint and multinational environment at the operational level of war.
- Understand the organization and command and control of SOF at the theater level, specifically the roles of the Theater Special Operations Commander (TSOC), the Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC) and the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF).
- Understand the broad joint and doctrinal service concepts governing employment of SOF.
- Understand the unique nature, roles, missions, functions and support requirements of U.S. Special Operations Forces at the operational level of war.

Background:

Special Operations Forces (SOF) are small, specially organized units manned by people carefully selected and trained to operate under physically demanding and psychologically stressful conditions to accomplish missions using modified equipment and unconventional applications of tactics against strategic and operational objectives in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational and or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is not broad conventional force requirement. Since the establishment of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 1987, SOF have been under the combatant command of one unified commander and have been trained and equipped to conduct unilateral, joint and combined special operations across the Range of Military Operations. SOF support the geographic combatant commanders, U.S. ambassadors and their country teams, and other government agencies. Additionally, USSOCOM is

designated as the lead agency to synchronize GWOT efforts across DoD. Each military service has established a major command to serve as the service component of USSOCOM.

The point of contact for this session is CDR Tom Sass, USN. C-408.

D. Questions:

What capabilities does SOF provide national decision makers?

What capabilities does SOF provide the Joint Force Commander?

What are the limitations of SOF?

What is a Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), a Joint Special Operations Component Command (JFSOCC), and a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)?

What are the command relationships that can best leverage SOF?

What unique roles do USSOCOM and SOF perform in supporting the Global War on Terror (GWOT), counter-proliferation of WMD, and Irregular Warfare?

What are some of the future challenges of SOF?

E. Required Readings:

Dailey, Dell L. LTG, USA and Webb, Jeffrey G. LtCol, USMC, "US Special Operations Command and the War on Terror," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 40, (1st Quarter 2006), pp. 44-47. (**NWC 4089**).

Mangum, Ronald S. USAR, "Linking Conventional and Special Operations Forces." *Joint Forces Quarterly* Issue 35, (Autum 2004), pp. 58-63. (**NWC 4091**).

Searle, Thomas R. LTC, USA, "Tribal Engagement in Anbar Provice: The Critical Role of Special Operations Forces." *Joint Forces Quarterly,* Issue 50, (3rd Quarter 2008), pp. 62-66. (**NWC 4088**).

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1. Washington, DC: CJCS, 26 April 2007. Scan Chapters I - IV

U.S. Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, 2008. Scan

F. Supplementary Readings:

Tucker, David and Lamb, J. Christopher, "Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats." *Strategic Forum*, No. 219, (January 2006), pp.1-6.

Gray, Colin S., "Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When do Special Operations Succeed?" *Parameters*, Vol 29, Issue 1, (Spring 1999), pp. 1-21.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS (Seminar)

Throughout our nation's history, our Armed Forces have participated in alliances and coalitions in support of freedom in all parts of the world.

---General Hugh Shelton

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, JP 3-16, April 2000

The bottom line is that JP 3-16 contains a wealth of information for our commanders about how US forces should interface with allied and coalition forces.

--LTC Malcom D. Grimes, USAF

Air and Space Power Journal, Winter 2004

A. Focus:

During this lesson, we will focus on multinational operations. The United States will most likely not undertake military operations alone. Therefore it behooves us to learn the lessons of operating within a coalition. Issues such as command and control, intelligence sharing, rules of engagement, capabilities gaps, and logistics will be discussed.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend how coalition's nations are formed for military operations - from the strategic level and how this might impact on the operational level.
- Synthesize the value of multinational operations since the United States will rarely undertake operations alone.
- Synthesize the Joint Doctrine on Multinational Operations with special emphasis on the nature of multinational operations.
- Comprehend the formation of command and control in multinational operations.
- Comprehend the other challenges of multinational operations and synthesize methods for mitigating those challenges.

- **Background:**

Military operations in the past and future operations will normally not be undertaken by the United States alone. Often we will work with other militaries from around the world. This is proven by the facts. Since the end of the Cold War in Operation Desert Storm (Persian Gulf War 1990-1991), Provide Promise (Northern Iraq), Provide Hope (Somalia), Uphold Democracy (Haiti), Joint Endeavor (Bosnia), Allied Force (Kosovo), Joint Guardian (Kosovo), Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq), the United States has engaged in operations with other nations. There is no reason to believe American military forces will ever undertake a major operation alone without some other nations participating. Multinational operations challenge operational commanders in many ways. Issues such as command and control, intelligence sharing, logistics, rules of engagement are difficult to work through, as are

capability gaps in equipment. This lesson will address these issues.

Moving beyond the command and control issues of coalitions, we will discuss the role of staff functions, including liaison officers. Then the discussion will turn to intelligence and logistics, key areas that Joint Task Force Commanders and staff must work through for coalition operations to be effective. There are some real legal issues associated with sharing of information and providing equipment and logistics. Mutual support arrangements are often required and often this is elevated to national level decisions.

Liaison officers are critical for multinational operations. Normally liaison officers are exchanged both ways to help in coordination. Selection of the right personnel for liaison duties is critical in multinational operations.

The point of contact for this session is Professor G. Oliver. C-408.

D. Questions:

How are coalitions formed? Is there a difference between an alliance that goes to war and a coalition of the willing? What are the advantages of alliances?

Will U.S. forces ever be placed under command of another nation's commander? How about operational control?

What are the options for establishing command and control arrangements in a multinational task force?

What are the challenges to logistics when working with military forces from other nations?

Can the U.S. share intelligence with other nations? What needs to be protected or what concerns are there?

How does the commander work out rules of engagement among coalitions?

What is the impact of the science and technology gap between United States forces and other nations' forces?

Is there a cost to the United States for entice other nations to join a coalition

How can multinational exercises, seminars and coordination affect the forming of a coalition of the willing?

E. Required Readings:

Howard, Bart COL, "Preparing Leaders for Multinational Operations." *Army,* March 2008, pages 21-24. (**NWC 5019**).

Multinational Planning and Augmentation Team, *Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures*, version 2.3, 4 January 2008. Also on website: http://www1.apan-info.net/Default.aspx?alias=www1.apan-info.net/mpat. Scan table of contents, pages A-1 to A-6, B-1, B1-1 through B1-2, B1 B-1 through B1 B-6, and B1 A-1 through B2 A-2. (**NWC 5020**).

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Multinational Operations.* Joint Publication (JP) 3-16. Washington, DC: CJCS, 7 March 2007. Read chapter I, pages I-1 through I-8, chapter 2, pages II-1 through II-14, and chapter III, pages III-1

through III-43. (Posted on JMO website).

Weitsman, Patricia, "The High Price of Friendship," *New York Times*, editorial, 31 August 2006. (**NWC 5015**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

American British, Canadian, and Australian, *Coalition Operations Handbook*, 14 April 2008.

American, British, Canadian, and Australian website: http://www.abca-armies.org/

Engler, Alan Lt Col, Lt Col Al Glodowski, and Cdr Rocky Lee, "Coalition Operations: Politically Necessary Yet Operationally Challenging," Armed Forces Staff College, 8 March 2004.

Forster, Larry M. "Coalition Leadership Imperatives," *Military Review,* Nov/Dec 2000.

Khan, Asad A. "Liaison Officer's Observations." *Marine Corps Gazette*. Quantico : September 2002, Vol. 86. Issue 9, page 58.

Lawlor, Maryann, Henry Kenyon, and Christian B.Sheehy. "Information Sharing Forums Shed Light on Coalition Issues." *Signal Magazine,* Aug 2000.

Mathis, Lieutenant Commander Darrell L. "Multinational Logistics : Can U.S. Commanders Continue to Function Efficiently Without It ?" DTIC, NWC Student paper.

Riscassi, Robert W. "Principals of Coalition Warfare, *Joint Forces Quarterly,* Summer 1993.

Rice, Anthony F. Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare." *Parameters,* Spring 1997: 152-167.

Stewart, Patrick, "Beyond Coalitions of the Willing: Assessing U.S. Multilateralism," *Ethics and International Affairs*, New York: 2003, Vol 17, Issues 1, pages 37-46.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "International Military Agreements for Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability between the United States, its Allies, and other Friendly Nations," CJCSI 27000.01B, Washington, DC: CJCS, 12 January 2006.

Womack, Stephen M. "Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations," *Marine Corps Gazette.* Quantico: Feb 1996, Vol. 80, Issue 2, page 22.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS (Seminar)

"The profoundest truth of war is that the issue of battle is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders, not the bodies of their men."

—Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, British Army

A. Focus:

This session focuses on IO (Information Operations) support to the Joint Force Commander at the operational and tactical levels of war. The 2003-2004 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) is used as the principal case study to elicit current capabilities and limitations of IO in support of a major U.S./coalition military operation. The primary goal is to derive insights and lessons learned with respect to IO capabilities, operational concepts, and organizations. The students should keep in mind that they will need to apply the IO capabilities learned in this lesson in Module 7, IO Practical Exercise within OPS 6-5.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the principles, capabilities and limitations of information operations across the range of military operations.
- Know how C2 and battlespace awareness apply at the operational level of war and how they support operations conducted by a networked force.
- Comprehend how increased reliance on information technology throughout the range of military operations creates opportunities and vulnerabilities.
- Apply the process of developing IO objectives and tasks that support the Joint Force Commander's mission and objectives.

C. Background:

Information Operations (IO) are key to the successful execution of military operations in the 21st Century. Understanding the Information Environment (IE) and the physical, cognitive and information dimensions that make up the IE are integral to successful IO. The Joint Pub definition of IO is, "The integrated employment of the core capabilities of EW, CNO, PSYOP, Military Deception and OPSEC, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making, while protecting our own. Consequently, IO touches upon and is influenced by many elements of the joint operation planning process; for an inexperienced staff, integrating IO into the overall plan can be especially challenging.

U.S./Coalition military operations in Afghanistan (OEF) and Iraq (OIF) provide excellent case studies to highlight the capabilities and limitations of our current IO systems, concepts, and organizations. In particular, OIF saw the explicit use of embedded media as just one component of a far-reaching information operations strategy to get the USG and DoD story out.

The purpose of this lesson is to explore the doctrinal basis of IO, to comprehend IO capabilities and limitations, and to understand how and why IO is integrated into

military planning at the operational and tactical levels of war.

The point of contact for this lesson is Prof Dick Crowell, C-421.

D. Questions:

What were the operational and tactical objectives, assets available, and measures of effectiveness (MOE) for IO in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM?

How did the coalition IO strategy employed during Major Combat Operations (MCO) influence (or shape) the subsequent military situation in Iraq?

What lessons for future operations can be drawn from IO outcomes in OEF and OIF?

Were the coalition and adversary IO strategies in Iraq since the end of major combat operations (May 2003) effective? If so, why? If not, why not?

E. Required Readings:

Armistead, Leigh, ed. *Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power*. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2004. Read: Chapter 4 (pp. 137–162). (Issued)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Information Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 February 2006. Read: Chapters 1, 2, and 4 .

Woods, Kevin M. *Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership*. Suffolk, VA: Joint Center for Operational Analysis. United States Joint Forces Command, 2006, Read: Chapter V, pages 89-114; Chapter VI pages 123-130; Scan pages 131-150. (**NWC 2034**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Army War College. *IO Primer,* Jan 2007.

Caddell, Joseph W. *Deception 101—Primer on Deception*. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December, 2004.

Chisholm, Donald. "The Risk of Optimism in the Conduct of War." *Parameters* 33, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 114–131.

Darley, William M. "Clausewitz's Theory of War and Information Operations." *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 40: 73–79.

Joint Information Operations Center. *IO Sphere: The Professional Journal of Information Operations* (Spring 2005–Spring 2006).

Lamb, Christopher J. "Information Operations as a Core Competency." *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 36: 88–96.

O'Connell, Ed, and Dr. Cheryl Benard. "A New IO Strategy: Prevention and Disengagement." *Strategic Insights* 5, no. 5.

Payne, Kenneth. "The Media as an Instrument of War." *Parameters* 35, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 81–93.

Putnam, Bill. "Information Wars: Are the Iraqis Getting the Message?" *Strategic Insights* 3, no. 12.

Peters, Ralph. "In Praise of Attrition." *Parameters* 34, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 24–32.

Steele, Robert D. *Information Operations: Putting the 'I' Back in DIME*. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2006.

JOINT OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS (Seminar)

. . . A sound logistics plan is the foundation upon which a war operation should be based. If the necessary minimum of logistics support cannot be given to the combatant forces involved, the operation may fail, or at best be only partially successful.

—Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN, Commander Fifth Fleet, 1946

- **Focus:**

This session provides an overview of logistics at the operational level of war. It addresses the principles of logistics, joint boards and cells, and the geographic combatant commander's logistics responsibilities. Finally, it examines joint operational logistics planning considerations.

B. Objectives:

- Understand logistics at the operational level.
- Identify and describe logistics tools that enable the Joint Force Commander to properly execute his logistics responsibility in the JOA
- Understand the importance of the Logistics Estimate. Identify and understand specific logistics issues that must be addressed when conducting a logistics estimate for a joint operation and how to apply them in the planning process at the operational level.
- Understand the doctrinal definition and application of Directive Authority for Logistics and the responsibilities, tasks, functions of the joint force and military services for logistics support to joint and multination forces.
- Understand the definitions, responsibilities for intra-theater and inter-theater logistics support and sustainment.

C. Background:

The joint operational commander, as well as members of the commander's staff, must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of operational logistics to successfully execute daily peacetime operations and, certainly, missions across the range of military operations. Providing logistics to our forces throughout the world is a very complicated process and requires a great deal of coordination and synchronization by both supported and supporting commands and organizations. Even though logistics is normally a service responsibility, the combatant commander retains directive authority for logistics and must decide if and when it is appropriate to exercise that authority.

This lesson provides an overview of the fundamentals of operational logistics to include the principles of logistics and the classes of supply. It identifies logistics tools that enable the geographic combatant commander to properly execute logistics responsibilities in the operational area. These tools include directive authority for logistics, common servicing, joint logistics boards and offices, Acquisition Cross Service Agreements (ACSA), and coalition/contract logistics. This session also emphasizes the importance of the Logistics Estimate and how it should be used as a tool to ensure that critical logistics issues are properly considered throughout the joint staff planning process.

The point of contact for this session is LTC Tim Brown, USA.

D. Questions:

How does operational logistics bridge the gap between tactical and strategic logistics?

What are critical logistics responsibilities of the Joint Force J-4 during the staff planning process?

How does the "logistics estimate" serve as a tool to facilitate critical logistics planning during the joint planning process?

How does the Joint Force Commander leverage host nation, coalition, and contract logistics capabilities to accomplish his mission?

What critical intra-theater distribution management issues must be properly addressed when planning joint operations? Why are these distribution management issues so critically important?

Why should a combatant commander be concerned about exercising Directive Authority for logistics, if logistics is an individual service responsibility?

E. Required Readings:

Christianson, Claude V. "Joint Logistics-Shaping Our Future: A Personal Perspective" *Army Logistician (July–August 2006).* (**NWC 2019**).

U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. *Instructions for the Logistics Estimate*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 2006. (**NWC 2066**).

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 4-0, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 18 July 2008. Read: Executive Summary (vii–xiv) and Chapter III; Chapter IV, paragraphs 1–3 (IV-1–IV-6); Appendix B and Appendix C. (Issued) .

_____. *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common-User Logistics during Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 4-07, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 11 June 2001. Read: Chapter I and Chapter IV. .

F. Supplementary Readings

U.S. Department of the Navy. Naval Doctrine Publication 4, *Naval Logistics*. Washington, D.C.: CNO, 10 January 1995. .

STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT (Seminar)

Victory is the beautiful, bright-colored flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.

—Winston Churchill, *The River War* (1899)

USTRANSCOM . . . their motto should be "try fighting without us."

—General Henry Shelton, CJCS

A. Focus:

This session emphasizes how the national strategic deployment system and processes work. It addresses the organization and mission of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and its component commands. Finally, it examines the United States' ability to deploy in support of global contingencies.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the elements of the strategic deployment triad, which focuses on transportation and sustainment by land, sea and air assets.
- Understand the role of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in working with the combatant commanders on strategic mobility and sustainability issues and the planning processes applied to accomplish strategic deployment of joint forces.
- Understand the importance of the Time Phased Force Deployment Data/List (TPFDD/L).
- Understand the definitions, responsibilities for intra-theater and inter-theater transportation.

C. Background:

The ability of the U.S. military to successfully carry out its assigned tasks per our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy depends greatly on its capability to deploy forces, equipment, and sustainment to a theater of operations in a timely manner. Logistics includes all those supporting activities required to sustain a deployed force, strategic mobility defines that part of the logistics process which transports people, equipment, supplies, and other commodities by land, sea, and air, to enable military force projection. The operational commander must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the strategic mobility process to successfully execute a major operation or campaign. Force selection, phasing of operations, and risk assessment are directly tied to the ability to project both forces and support from the United States to the area of responsibility, area of operation, or theater of war.

USTRANSCOM oversees the strategic deployment process. USTRANSCOM's charter is to maintain and operate a deployment system for orchestrating the transportation aspects of worldwide mobility planning, integrate deployment-related information management systems, and provide centralized wartime traffic management. Actual movement is executed by USTRANSCOM's component commands: Military Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC—Army), Military Sealift Command (MSC—Navy), and Air Mobility Command (AMC—Air Force). The Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration

(MARAD) bridges MSC, U.S.-flag commercial companies, and U.S. unions for sealift procurement and operations.

During the planning process, the CJTF staff must develop a prioritized movement plan that supports the commander's concept of operations. The CJTF's detailed movement plan is communicated in the Time Phased Force Deployment Data/List (TPFDD/L). The TPFDD/L serves as the commander's primary tool for managing the flow of forces/capability into the area of operations. The TPFDD/L uses each leg of the Strategic Mobility Triad to move forces. The Strategic Mobility Triad consists of pre-positioned material, sealift, and airlift. Each triad component has distinct advantages and disadvantages in terms of response time, expense, availability of assets, and carrying capacity. Sealift and airlift have access to only limited U.S. Government-owned assets, and thus are highly reliant on commercial industry under a variety of programs, including the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and the Voluntary Inter-modal Sealift Agreement (VISA).

The point of contact for this session is LTC Tim Brown, USA.

D. Questions:

What are the major advantages and disadvantages of each leg of the strategic deployment triad?

How does the combatant commander or the CJTF interface with USTRANSCOM? What is the supported/supporting commander relationship?

What are the major planning considerations facing operational planners in deploying a force to the theater of operations?

How is does the CJTF use the Time Phase Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) to manage the movement of forces into the area of operations?

E. Required Readings:

DPRA Incorporated. "Collaborative Force Analysis, Sustainment and Transportation", *Self Paced Instruction – CFAST V. 5.0.1,* July 2008. (**NWC 5026).**

U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. *Instructional Timed Phased Force Deployment List*, Newport, RI: Naval War College, June 2005. (**NWC 2072**).

_____. *Reference Guide, Forces/Capabilities Handbook*, Newport, RI: Naval War College, August 2006. Read 128-140 (**NWC 3153J**).

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Deployment and Redeployment Operations,* Joint Publication (JP) 3-35. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 7 May 2007. Read: Chapter I and III.

F. Supplementary Readings:

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System*. Joint Publication (JP) 4-01, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 19 March 2003. .

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Air Mobility Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-17, Washington, D.C.: CJCS. .

_____. *Sealift Support to Joint Operations,* Joint Publication (JP) 4-01.2. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 31 August 2005. Read: Chapter I. Scan Chapters III and IV. .

U.S. Transportation Command Handbook 24-2, *Understanding the Defense Transportation System*. 3d ed. Scott AFB, IL: 1 September 2000, 1–17. .

DESIGNING MAJOR NAVAL/JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS—PRC-TAIWAN CASE STUDY (Seminar)

The challenge for the Navy and Marine Corps today is to remain capable of traditional naval missions while simultaneously enhancing our ability to conduct non-traditional missions in order to ensure that naval power and influence can be applied at and from the sea, across the littorals, and ashore, as required.

—Naval Operations Concept, 2006

A. Focus:

This session is a seminar discussion and practical exercise designed to synthesize the Module 4 and 5 sessions, which explored the capabilities/limitations and employment considerations relevant to naval and Joint forces in a variety of warfare areas, under a Joint Task Force (JTF) in a major naval operation. Knowledge from Modules 2 (Operational Art) and 3 (Operational and Maritime Law) will also be tapped in this session. The PRC-TAIWAN Vignette (**NWC 4027B**) provides a fictional future scenario for the students to apply their knowledge and understanding of naval forces employment considerations and command & control to a discussion of operational design of a major, joint maritime operation. The focus in this session is operational design of a major, joint maritime operation and understanding capabilities, limitations and operational level considerations to effectively employ joint forces to meet the tasks and objectives assigned to the Joint Task Force commander. The capabilities and employment of JFMCC forces (the supported component), as well as those of the JFLCC, JFACC and JSOTF (supporting components), will be central to this session. This is not a full planning exercise (that comes in Module 6), but merely a vignette to provide a realistic backdrop for discussion.

B. Objectives:

- Apply knowledge of the service specific and joint capabilities, limitations and employment considerations to operations in a joint environment.
- Apply knowledge of maritime force capabilities, roles, functions, employment considerations, limitations and discuss the operational design of a major joint maritime operation using a fictitious but challenging scenario at the operational level.
- Apply knowledge of operational design for a major naval/joint operation including the following elements: ultimate operational (and sometimes limited strategic) and intermediate objectives; force requirements; balancing operational factors against the ultimate objective; identification of critical factors and centers of gravity; initial positions and lines of operations; directions/axes; the operational idea; and operational sustainment.

C. Background:

Design for a major naval/joint operation resembles in many ways design for major land or air operations. However, there are also considerable differences because of the characteristics of the physical environment in which maritime forces operate and other aspects of the factor of space. Clearly, maritime forces are employed very differently

than forces of other sister services. In general, any sound operation plan should be based on a large number of nonmilitary (political, diplomatic, economic, psychological, ethnic, etc) and military or operational considerations. These operational considerations are arbitrarily called "operational design". They are not a plan for a major naval/joint operation, but rather a loose collection of operational diverse elements that the joint force commander should consider before actually developing a plan.

In generic terms an operational design for a major naval/joint operation includes the following elements: ultimate operational (and sometimes limited strategic) and intermediate objectives; force requirements; balancing operational factors against the ultimate objective; identification of critical factors and centers of gravity; initial positions and lines of operations; directions/axes; the operational idea; and operational sustainment.

The operational idea (or scheme) is the very essence of a design for a major naval/joint operation. The operational idea for a campaign should be developed first, because the strategic objective always dominates the operational objectives. It provides a framework for the operational idea of each subordinate major operation. The operational commander should make sure the subordinate operational ideas in each phase of a maritime campaign are consonant with his own operational idea.

The operational idea for a major naval/joint operation is developed during the operational commander's estimate of the situation, and the decision should be further elaborated and refined during the planning process. A soundly conceived operational idea should include selected principles of war; a method for defeating the enemy; application of sources of power; the sectors of effort; main forces and supporting forces, the point of main attack (or defense); concentration in the sector of main effort; operational maneuver and fires; protection of the friendly center of gravity; anticipation of the point of culmination; deception; sequencing; synchronization; branches and sequels; phasing; tempo; momentum; and reserve.

It is critical to understand how maritime forces can be used to support and enable success of the other component commander's (land, air, SOF, etc) and ultimately the CJTF mission objectives. This fictitious vignette is intended for use as an instrument for discussing capabilities, limitations and operational design of major naval operations. It is not desired that students expend time discussing the viability of the scenario presented, or the probability of American intervention in the portrayed crisis. Students need to simply accept the task of discussing potential operational designs or schemes and how maritime forces could be effectively employed in this situation.

The seminar will have the opportunity to look at the U.S. viewpoint in discussing potential operational designs for employment of forces in this scenario.

The point of contact for this session is CAPT Mark Donahue, USN, C-409.

D. Questions:

Moderators will guide seminars through discussion. The seminar discussion will be from the point of view of the U.S. Joint Task Force staff with the following tasks:

<u>YOUR TASK (U.S. Staff):</u> You are a member of the COMJTF SEA TIGER staff tasked with planning for a major naval/joint operation as part of the CDRUSPACOM's campaign plan. Based on your understanding and knowledge of naval warfare at the operational level learned during your time in the CNC&S-NSC course at the Naval War College, N5 asked you to explain in some detail how US forces, in cooperation with naval

forces of the coalition partners, should be employed in support of the campaign plan SEA TIGER. Specifically, you are tasked to address the following:

- Operational Idea (Concept of Operations)
- Tentative phases of Operation *Sea Tiger*
- Deployment of U.S. naval forces to the JOA
- Free-form discussion explaining in some detail main and component tasks, and U.S./Coalition forces required for:
    - Obtaining and maintaining sea control in the Taiwan Strait and its approaches
    - Obtaining and maintaining sea control in the JOA, the vicinity of Taiwan, and the SLOCs necessary to sustain operations in the South China Sea & Western Pacific.
    - Exercising sea control in the Taiwan Strait and JOA.
    - Basing/Deployment area control in the Vicinity of Taiwan inside the JOA.

<u>Additional questions to support the session discussion/objectives broken down by elements of operational design:</u>

<u>Ultimate and Intermediate Objectives:</u>

- What is the ultimate operational objective of JTF Sea Tiger?
- What intermediate objectives are required to achieve this objective? Should they be sequential or simultaneous?
- Do you expect the objectives to change during Operation Sea Tiger?

<u>Force Requirements:</u>

- What broad capabilities and options do U.S. naval forces bring to the Joint Force Commander?
- What broad capabilities and options do U.S. ground, air and special operations forces bring to the Joint Force Commander?
- What broad capabilities and options do coalition/multinational assets bring to the Joint Force Commander?
- What types of amphibious operations is the JTF capable of executing?
- What friction points potentially exist in multi-tasking the Naval Forces assigned? How might the Joint Force Commander and C/JFMCC apportion his assets?
- What operational fires can naval assets and other components (JFACC, JFLCC, JSOTF) provide the CJTF?
- Are there unique HD/LD naval or other assets the CJTF might need?
- What theater ISR assets/capabilities and limitations does the operational commander have to support his efforts in the area of interest?

<u>Balancing Operational Factors against the objectives:</u>

- How do factors time and space favor the PRC in the current situation? What options does the Joint Force Commander have to mitigate this advantage?

- Describe in broad terms the advantages and disadvantages of the theatre geometry for both the U.S. and PRC commanders. How could the U.S. commander limit threats to his vital lines of communications from PRC submarine assets?
- With the PRC inherent capability to strike U.S. support bases with conventional missiles and unconventional warfare in response to any U.S. attacks on mainland China, how could the operational commander act to protect his vital in-theatre assets prior to any Chinese counterattacks? Does the CJTF need support from outside the JOA and who might provide that support?

Identification of the Enemy / Friendly Operational Centers of Gravity:

- What is the PRC operational center of gravity? What tactical centers of gravity need to be defeated to enable destruction/neutralization of the operational center of gravity? Identify the PRC critical factors.
- What is the JTF SEA TIGER operational center of gravity? What measures must be taken to protect the operational center of gravity? Do these protective measures constitute JTF SEA TIGER tactical centers of gravity?
- Do you anticipate a shift in the enemy center of gravity as the operation progresses?
- What vulnerabilities exist in US/Coalition forces that could be exploited by the adversary in exercising sea denial operations, such as mine warfare, blockade, land-based air and cruise missile threats, submarine threats? How could the C/JFMCC compensate for those vulnerabilities?

Initial Lines of Operation:

- Are JTF Sea Tiger forces operating along interior or exterior lines of operation? PRC forces? Discuss advantages and disadvantages of each.

Direction (Axis):

- What options are available with regard to the axis of advance to the physical objective?

Operational Idea:

- How could U.S. naval, air, land and special operations forces be integrated into joint operations as applied to the PRC-TAIWAN Vignette?
- Should the C/JFMCC request a Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) around Taiwan to limit neutral shipping interference in any conflict? Would an unrestricted submarine warfare operation against the PRC be effective (or legal) during the operation? Could a Total Exclusion Zone be feasible, desirable, effective?
- Discuss the employment considerations and concerns in balancing operational protection and defense of the CSG/ESG/MPF assets versus conducting offensive/defensive operations in support of CJTF objectives?
- What are some of the employment considerations for operating multiple carrier strike groups in the same JOA? Consider options for operational protection, counter air operations, operational fires support, maneuver, logistics support and SLOC protection.

- What employment considerations come to mind for landing and supporting USMC and/or Army forces ashore (specifically discuss capabilities/limitations of the MEB, MPS, Pre-position shipping)?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages for the C/JFMCC to control all ASW assets in the Area of Operations? How can other joint forces assist naval forces in combating the PRC submarine threat?
- How might coalition/multinational assets be used in conjunction with U.S. assets (i.e. should separate water space and air space be assigned to the different countries?
- How could a U.S. Theatre ASW Commander use operational functions to limit deficiencies or exploit disadvantages in his operational factors? What waterspace management concerns arise for this operation with the assigned forces (U.S. and coalition)?

Operational Sustainment:

- Do you need a sea base? What options exist to provide one in this vignette? Discuss the capabilities and limitations that the JFMCC has to protect maritime logistics lines of communication and shipping assets. How and where might the U.S. commander base critical supplies to support operations in the AOR?

E. Products:

The intention is to conduct a seminar wide discussion of the questions. Key points from each of the elements of the operational design should be captured on butcher paper for reference. Formal briefings are neither required nor desired.

F. Required Readings:

Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. *PRC-Taiwan Vignette,* 2007. (**NWC 4027B**), (Issued).

McVadon, RADM Eric A. "China's Maturing Navy," *Naval War College Review* 59, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 90–107. (**NWC 4008**).

Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations, U.S. Navy Briefing, CD-ROM, 2006.Review (**NWC 2002F**).

Vego, Milan, *Major Naval Operations.* Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, Newport Papers Vol 32, 2008. Read: Chapter 4 (pp. 63 – 75) (**NWC 5027)** .

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Database." https://jdeis.js.mil/. Scan UJTL Database.

G. Supplementary Readings:

Navy Warfare Development Command. *Joint Force Maritime Component (C/JFMCC) Planning and Execution,* TACMEMO 3-32-06. Newport, RI: NWDC, November 2006.*Forces/Capabilities Handbook.* Review Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Section and Appendix C (CWC Concept).

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO OPERATIONAL DECISION-MAKING AND PLANNING (Lecture)

The most important roles of intelligence are assisting JFCs and their staffs in visualizing the operational environment; assessing adversary capabilities and will; identifying the adversary's COGs; and discerning the adversary's probable intent.

—Joint Publication 2-0

A. Focus:

This lecture will focus on operational intelligence support to planning. A brief description/definition of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as well as their roles, responsibilities and tasks will set the foundation for follow-on discussion and application. Support across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) and from the strategic-to-tactical levels will be briefly highlighted; however, emphasis will focus on the theater-strategic and operational levels of war. The lecture will cover how the intelligence process is synchronized to support the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) and the Combatant Commander's campaign planning. Intelligence inputs and outputs (products and support) to the JOPP steps will be addressed (e.g., Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE), Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), Collection Management Plan, Red Cell participation, Intelligence Estimate, etc.). A brief review of how theater and Joint Task Force (JTF) intelligence organizations are formed to provide efficient and effective support will be presented—to include cross-functional participation in Joint Task Force boards, bureaus, cells, committees, and working groups—focusing on the Joint Collection Management Board (JCMB).

B. Objectives:

- Understand joint doctrinal terminology relating to intelligence.
- Understand and evaluate operational intelligence roles and responsibilities.
- Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces to
    - conduct the full range of military operations against the capabilities of 21st
    - century adversaries.
- Comprehend the Intelligence Process and associated intelligence functions.
- Understand how the Intelligence Process is synchronized to support operational decision-making and JOPP.
- Understand how intelligence products and support impact JOPP steps; and know when to stimulate the intelligence system if required support is lacking.
- Examine intelligence organization and operational-level integration.
- Know how command/control and battlespace awareness apply at the operational level of war and how they support operations conducted by a networked force.

- Recognize the importance—and challenges—of multinational intelligence operations.

C. Background:

The required readings provide a solid doctrinal background for intelligence support to operational decision-making and planning.

The point of contact for this session is CDR D. Mark Houff, USN, SE-118.

D. Questions:

How is the Intelligence Process synchronized to support operational decision-making and the JOPP?

What are the steps (operations) in the Intelligence Process?

What intelligence products support JOPP steps? When are they required?

What role does intelligence have in boards, bureaus, cells, committees, and working groups? What role does the J2, or J2 representatives, play?

What are the challenges associated with multinational intelligence operations?

E. Products:

None required for the lecture session. JIPOE production, center of gravity analysis, and other intelligence support to operational planning efforts will be conducted by the students during follow-on Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) and CAPSTONE exercise events.

F. Required Readings:

Mansoor, COL Peter R. and Major Mark S. Ulrich. "Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis," *Military Review* (September-October 2008): Available at http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/Military%20Review-200809010001-DOC.pdf (**NWC 5028**).

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Intelligence,* Joint Publication (JP) 2-0. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 22 June 2007. Read: Chapters I through III.

_____. *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations,* Joint Publication (JP) 2-01. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 7 October 2004. Read: Chapter IV and scan Appendix D.

_____. U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Task Force Headquarters,* Joint Publication (JP) 3-33. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 16 February 2007. Read: Chapter VI.

G. Supplementary Readings:

Hooker, Gregory. *Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Role of Military Assessments*. Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005.

Jones, Garrett. “Working with the CIA.” *Parameters* (Winter 2001–02): 228–39.

LeSavage, Michael. “Operation Provide Comfort I.” Naval War College, 2006, 2–18.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE COUNTRY TEAM (Lecture)

A "marriage of necessity and convenience" between two temperamental cultures (Defense and State) is slowly evolving; a relationship based on trust and respect; but with each still wary of the other. To achieve foreign policy goals both must clearly recognize, acknowledge, and respect the differences of the other. In the end this will dramatically reduce confusion, friction, and conflict while improving communication.

—National Defense University, "Defense Is from Mars, State Is from Venus"

A. Focus:

The Department of State (DoS) and the over 180 U.S. Embassies around the world are primarily responsible for leading and coordinating U.S. representation abroad. Geographic Combatant Commanders and Joint Force Commanders must coordinate with and complement DoS and U.S. Embassy efforts in order to ensure a unified effort in promoting and projecting American influence. This session addresses DoS organization, responsibilities, resources and limitations at both the national and theater levels. It highlights DoS/Embassy coordination and planning issues facing Joint Force Commanders, their relationship with U.S. Ambassadors, and provides insight on how to improve the prospects for success during joint, interagency, and multinational operations.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the organization, responsibilities, resources and limitations of the DoS and U.S. Embassies.
- Understand how Joint Force Commanders coordinate with the DoS and U.S. Embassies/Country Teams at the theater and operational levels.
- Understand the responsibilities of a U.S. Ambassador and his/her relationship with a Geographic Combatant Commander.
- Analyze how a Joint force commander and staff can best coordinate and plan with the U.S. Embassies/Country Teams in his/her area of responsibility to achieve operational objectives across the ROMO.

C. Background:

Under the constitution, both the executive branch and the Congress have constitutional responsibilities for U.S. foreign policy. Within the executive branch, the DoS is the lead foreign affairs agency and the Secretary of State is the President's principal foreign policy advisor. The Department also supports the foreign affairs activities of other U.S. Government entities, including the Department of Commerce and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Other primary roles for the DoS include:

Leading interagency coordination in developing and implementing foreign policy.

Leading and coordinating U.S. representation abroad, and conveying U.S. foreign policy to foreign governments and international organizations through U.S. embassies and consulates in foreign countries and diplomatic missions to international organizations.

Assembling coalitions to provide military forces for US-led multinational operations. In coordination with the NSC and DoD, DoS contacts foreign governments at the highest level to request participation of their forces in a planned multinational operation. When forces are offered, DoS formally accepts them from the foreign government and arranges for military-to-military contact between the foreign and US forces. Once a foreign government has committed its forces to the multinational effort, DoS includes its representatives in a political forum to ensure that the foreign government remains informed of the direction of the effort and committed to participation.

Conducting negotiations and concluding agreements and treaties on issues ranging from trade to nuclear weapons; and coordinating and supporting international activities of other U.S. agencies and officials.

The United States has diplomatic relations with over 180 of the 191 countries in the world and with many IGOs. DoS takes the leading role in maintaining and improving relationships with these countries and organizations. DoS is represented by its core staff of Foreign Service personnel at every one of the nearly 260 U.S. embassies, consulates-general, consulates, and missions to international diplomatic organizations

A US mission is the basic unit for the conduct of bilateral diplomacy with foreign governments overseas. They are headed by a chief of mission (COM), normally an ambassador, who is a Presidential appointee and the President's personal representative. As such, the COM is the senior US official in the country. By law, COMs coordinate, direct, and supervise all USG activities and representatives posted in the foreign country to which they are accredited. Bilateral COMs do not, however, exercise control of US personnel attached to and working for the head of a US Mission to an IGO or US military personnel operating under the command of a Geographic Combatant Commander. Each bilateral COM has an agreement with the Geographic Combatant Commander delineating which DoD personnel fall under the responsibility of each for security.

The point of contact for this session is Commander Mark Houff, USN.

D. Questions:

What are the major responsibilities for the Department of State at the national and theater levels?

What are the major responsibilities of a U.S. Embassy/Country Team?

What is the relationship between an Ambassador and Geographic Combatant Commander?

What U.S. Embassy/Country Team resources and limitations should a Joint Force Commander and staff leverage to achieve operational objectives across the ROMO?

E. Required Readings:

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Volume I, Washington, DC: 17 March 2006. **Review** page I-7, figure I-1.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Volume II, 17 March 2006. **Read** Annexes G and M to Appendix A, Department of State, and United States Agency for International development/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

Oakley, Robert D and Michael Casey, Jr., "The Country Team: Restructuring America's First Line of Engagement", *Joint Forces Quarterly,* issue 47, 4th quarter 2007. (**NWC 5029**).

Whittaker, Alan G., Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune. "The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System," April 2007, (**NWC 3026B**). Read pages 34-38. Posted on the JMO website. This is also a required reading for OPS 7-5 Interagency Coordination and NSDM.

F. Supplementary Readings:

A U.S. Embassy at Work, accessed 25 November 2008
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/8710.htm

U. S. Diplomacy, accessed 25 November 2008
www.usdiplomacy.org/state/abroad/countryteam**.php**

MODULE SIX
MILITARY DECISION MAKING AND PLANNING

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MILITARY DECISION MAKING AND PLANNING

A. Focus:

Successfully prosecuting a modern campaign requires more than technical competence in the military domain and effective operational concepts. Module SIX addresses the topics and processes necessary for understanding and meeting today's national security challenges lessons that lead to a comprehensive, complex planning exercise in a littoral region. Students will work through the Joint and Navy planning processes as members of both a Joint Task Force (JTF) and Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) staff.

B. Description:

This block of five sessions provides students the opportunity to sharpen different skill sets and develop a broader understanding of the complexity of military operations. Session OPS 6-1, *Military Decision Making and Planning*, provides an introduction to and an overview of the military planning process. OPS 6-2, *The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System* (JOPES), opens as a lecture by a representative from the Joint Staff J-7 who will share current developments and trends in the JOPES/Adaptive Planning arena. Following the lecture, students will meet in seminar to discuss both the lecture material and delve deeper into both the guidance documents and the military contingency and crisis action processes. OPS 6-3, *The Joint Staff and Staff Estimates*, focuses on the organization of a joint force in general, and the role of Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups (B2C2WG). OPS 6-4, *Military Briefings*, reviews the techniques for developing and presenting both military information and military decision briefs effectively to senior leaders. The final session, OPS 6-5, the Borneo Planning Exercise, is a multi-day, crisis action exercise that will allow students the opportunity to apply both the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) as a JTF staff and the Navy Planning Process (NPP) as a JFMCC to a fictional military scenario in Borneo. The sessions are intended as both an introduction to joint planning as well as an opportunity for students to appreciate the integral role of Operational Art in the planning process.

The objective of this Module is to provide students with the tools, concepts, principles, doctrine and practical planning application required for accomplishing modern military tasks. A strategic setting lecture will begin the Module. The detailed planning exercise will use the JOPP as found in Joint Publication 5-0 and the Navy Planning Process (NPP) detailed in NWP 5-01. Also used is the JOPP Workbook (**NWC 4111H**), which provides an outline of the joint planning process and formats to analyze the situation, conduct mission analysis, develop course of actions (COAs), and analyze and compare the student developed COAs. Students will prepare and give decision briefs to the seminar moderators. Students have the opportunity to work as members of a JTF/component staff and apply their knowledge of OPART, joint/combined operations, service capabilities, joint/service doctrine in a realistic, complex practical planning exercise.

MILITARY DECISION MAKING AND PLANNING (Lecture)

In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.

—Dwight D. Eisenhower

Failing to plan is planning to fail.

—Alan Lakein

Well, I'm not excusing the fact that planning and preparedness was not where it should be. We've known for 20 years about this hurricane, this possibility of this kind of hurricane.

—Michael Chertoff

A. Focus:

This lecture will focus on military planning in general and will identify various processes used in the Department of Defense for military planning and problem solving. While addressing the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) in general, the lecture also focuses on the many service planning processes and highlights the subtle differences in language, process, and format. The student comes to appreciate the similarities between the various processes and discovers that military planning is highly nonlinear and requires a deep appreciation of operational art, organization, human dynamics, and further requires a different style of leadership in order to reach a common solution.

B. Objectives:

- Appraise insights into decision support issues, decision making, and the role of planner in the joint force.
- Evaluate the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces to conduct the full range of military operations against the capabilities of twenty first century adversaries.
- Analyze theory and principles of war as they pertain to the operational level of war.
- Distinguish between the fundamentals of campaign planning and planning for major operations.

C. Background:

Planning is the vehicle used in the Department of Defense to solve problems. As stated in MCDP 5 *Planning*: Planning is the art and science of envisioning a desired future and laying out effective ways of bringing it about. It is a preparation process. Here we draw an important distinction between a process (a dynamic system of related activities) and a procedure (a prescribed sequence of steps for accomplishing some specified task). The planning process may often involve the use of procedures to perform certain tasks, but planning overall is too complex and situation-dependent to be treated as a routine procedure.

We should think of planning as a learning process, as mental preparation that improves our understanding of a situation. In its simplest terms, planning is thinking before doing. Even if the plan is not executed precisely as envisioned—and few are—the process should result in a deeper situational awareness that improves future decision making. We should thus think of planning as a learning activity that facilitates the exercise of judgment and not as merely a mechanical procedure.

Planning is also distinctly a process rather than merely an act because it involves a number of ongoing, iterative, and interdependent activities. Since situations (or the information available about them) continuously change, we must adapt—and our plans must change too. Planning is a process that should build upon itself—each step should create a new understanding of the situation that becomes the point of departure for new plans. Planning for a particular action only stops with execution, and even then adaptation continues during execution.

Planning encompasses two basic functions: envisioning a desired future and arranging a configuration of potential actions in time and space that will allow us to realize that future. Planning is thus a way of figuring out how to move from the current state to a more desirable future state, even if it does not allow us to control the transition precisely.

Planning involves projecting our thoughts forward in time and space to influence events before they occur rather than merely responding to events as they occur. This means contemplating and evaluating potential decisions and actions in advance. It involves thinking through the consequences of certain potential actions in order to estimate whether they will bring us closer to the desired future. In war, this naturally involves trying to anticipate possible enemy responses to our actions. Planning also involves integrating these individual decisions and actions together into potential sequences and examining the possible implications of these sequences.

Generically, a plan is any product of planning. It may be a formal, articulated document or an informal scheme. Since planning is an ongoing process, it is better to think of a plan as an interim product based on the information and understanding known at the moment and always subject to revision as new information and understanding emerge. A plan is thus a structured configuration of actions in time and space envisioned for the future. A plan is the basis for action, cooperation, and adaptation. Most military plans are arranged hierarchically, because plans for one echelon are nested within the plans of higher echelons.

As Naval War College graduates, you will not only be expected to serve as planning experts, but will also be expected to lead planning efforts. This lecture highlights some of the leadership skills necessary in leading diverse groups whose goals are not always aligned. Further, this lecture will address why we plan, how we plan, and for whom we plan.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Bill Hartig, C-428.

D. Questions:

How are planning for conflict and planning for post-conflict operations related?

How is planning related to command and control?

How do time and certainty relate to planning?

How are plans and planning related to orders?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Reading:

None.

G. Supplemental Readings:

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operations,* Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 13 February 2008 (change 1). (Issued)

———. *Joint Operation Planning,* Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 26 December 2006. (Issued).

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) (Lecture/Seminar)

During the fall of 1989, during DoD's regular planning process, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) recommended and the Secretary approved a shift in the principal U.S. focus in the Persian Gulf. . . . Accordingly, the Secretary directed DoD to sharpen its ability to counter such a regional conflict on the Arabian Peninsula. In turn, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directed CINCCENT to develop war plans consistent with this shift in emphasis.

—DoD, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress*

Turbulence is a constant: it is what happens when you have to balance the management requirements to plan an operation with the flexibility needed by those who will soon be carrying it out. While it may have certain flaws, the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the baseline system for all U.S. deployments, including those supporting peace operations.

—Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*

A. Focus:

This session introduces the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), which may soon be replaced by the Adaptive Planning and Execution Process (APEX). The session begins with an overview of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the roles of the SecDef, the CJCS, and the service chiefs in translating national policy objectives into definitive planning guidance. Currently, planning guidance for combatant commanders and their staffs can be found in the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

This session includes a classified briefing from the Joint Staff to discuss the GEF, JSCP and any updates to JOPES/APEX. This session will also examine tasking and coordination methodologies, and the relationships between the key elements and products of both the contingency and crisis action planning processes.

B. Objectives/Outcomes:

- Know the purpose, roles, functions, and responsibilities and relationships within the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC).
- Comprehend how the GEF and JSCP drive the planning cycle and frames the planning requirements for the combatant commander.
- Understand how to prepare plans and orders using Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) processes and products, particularly crisis action planning.
- Comprehend the differences between JOPES and APEX.
- Comprehend the purpose of campaign plans and the six phase construct.

C. Background:

As mandated by Title 10 USC, the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS are pivotal in translating national security objectives into definitive planning guidance for the combatant commanders. The combatant commanders are responsible for the actual development and production of the directed campaign plans but are dependent on support from the services, other combatant commanders, and the combat support agencies during the planning and execution process.

In past years there was a proliferation of documents providing narrow elements of strategic guidance to combatant commanders. These individual documents, often created without close coordination with other strategic policy documents, sometimes confused an already complicated planning process. The GEF (classified Secret), informed by both the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, integrates five former guidance documents into one strategic guidance document. Moreover, it directs combatant commanders to develop campaign plans to support theater and functional command end-states.

The GEF was developed concurrently with the JSCP to ensure a close linkage between the two documents. The JSCP is a companion document to the GEF and is the vehicle by which the CJCS initiates the contingency planning cycle. The JSCP includes regional objectives and planning assumptions; it specifies the type of plan for each task; and it apportions major combat and strategic lift forces to the combatant commanders for their planning. The JSCP also provides the combatant commanders with a framework for the scope of their plans, plan formats, and the amount of detailed planning that is required. Contingency planning is a complex and lengthy process, particularly when the combatant commanders are required to develop Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). The plans developed in support of the JSCP are integral the combatant commander's campaign plan.

The Adaptive Planning process consists of four key planning functions: strategic guidance, concept development, plan development and plan assessment (CJCSI 3141.01D). The Adaptive Planning process is intended to provide the nation's strategic leadership with a more responsive planning process, both in preparation time and option flexibility.

The six phases in JP 5.0 are a planning construct; they provide a flexible model to arrange combat and stability operations. In certain crises, however, the phases may be compressed, eliminated, or conducted concurrently. Moreover, the process could terminate during any of the phases should the crisis subside before the execution phase is reached. The 1983 Grenada operation, URGENT FURY, the 1989 Panama operation, JUST CAUSE, and the 1990 Southwest Asia crisis, DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, stand as examples of such dynamic situations, as well as the latest operations in Kosovo (ALLIED FORCE), Afghanistan (ENDURING FREEDOM), and Iraq (IRAQI FREEDOM).

Point of contact for this session is Commander Mark Houff, room SE-120.

D. Questions:

How does the GEF differ from the JSCP?

JOPES Vol. 1 states that "JOPES is applicable across the operational continuum of peace, crisis, and war." Do you agree?

How is a "campaign plan" executed?

To what extent is crisis action planning sufficiently flexible for "evolving" crises?

What is the "standard five-paragraph format" for plans and orders? What are the key items in each paragraph, and what are some of the "optional" parts of the directive not contained in the five paragraphs?

E. Required Readings:

Gates, Robert M. *Adaptive Planning Roadmap II.* Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 5 March 2008. Read the executive summary, pgs 6-8. (**NWC 6035**).

Gen (Ret) Gary Luck, *Joint Operations, Insights and Best Practices* (2ed.). July 2008, Joint Warfighting Center, JFC Norfolk VA. (**NWC 6034**).

Sweeney, Patrick C. "A Primer for: *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF), *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP), and the *Adaptive Planning and Execution* (APEX) *System*." Naval War College, 2 January 2009. (**NWC 6031**).

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning,* Joint Pub 5-0*,* (Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 26 December 2006). Read I-1–I-26 on Joint Strategic Planning, IV-36–IV-39 on Phasing, and review C-1–C-10 Appendix C on the Joint Operation Plan Format. (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Klein, Robert M. "Not Your Great Grandfather's Schlieffen Plan: Changing the Way We Think about Military Planning."

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)*, Volume I, *Planning Policies and Procedures*, CJCSM 3122.01A, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 29 Sept 2006. (Seminar Reserve).

_____. *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES),* Volume II*, Planning Formats and Guidance*, CJCSM 3122.03C, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 17 August 2007. (Seminar Reserve).

JOINT STAFF AND STAFF ESTIMATES (Seminar)

The secret of all victory lies in the organization of the non-obvious.

—Marcus Aurelius

Communication is about being effective, not always about being proper.

—Bo Bennett

The five essential entrepreneurial skills for success: Concentration, Discrimination, Organization, Innovation and Communication.

—Harold S. Geneen

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the organization of a joint force, in general, and the role of Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups (B2C2WG) in facilitating horizontal and vertical communication. While the overall organization of a joint staff is discussed, the session focuses on the roles and purposes of B2C2WG and highlights the subtle differences in structure and purpose. The student will come to appreciate the concept of boundary spanning and how the joint force planner leverages B2C2WGs to ensure horizontal and vertical communications within the staff are effective and reliable. The roles and responsibilities of Liaison Officers (LNOs) will also be discussed.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the structure and purpose of joint staff organizations
- Comprehend the lineage of the current joint force staff organization and its advantages and disadvantages in planning and execution.
- Appreciate the various organizational structures available for consideration.
- Comprehend the concept of boundary spanning.
- Consider the unique requirements of leading a multicultural planning group in an ambiguous environment.
- Understand how staff estimates support the preparation of plans and orders using Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) processes and products.

C. Background:

Organizational structure is a means of facilitating the achievement of objectives and mission accomplishment. Students will appreciate that such structures are not static, but exceptionally dynamic. They reorganize in response to changing conditions that occur in the environment (e.g., new missions, branch execution), new technology (e.g., airplanes, armored vehicles, and web-based operations), and organizational growth (e.g., coalition

partners joining the effort). Organizational structures are dependent on the mission assigned and often on the personality of the leader.

Communication and the rapid processing of information are essential if the joint force is to succeed. The Internet, with its linking of millions of computers, has evolved to become one of the greatest resources available to planners today. Planners can access, store, and move digital information (voice, sound, text, and numbers) easily and rapidly. This Information Age has fomented significant change in the information environment for joint force planners and leaders.

Organizations are simply people working together in a structured, formal environment to achieve stated goals. Commanders provide guidance, support implementation, and ensure coordination so assigned missions can be accomplished. The joint force leader mentors subordinates in order to develop teamwork, intended to facilitate mission accomplishment. The often cited autocratic military image with its rigid hierarchical system of leadership and communications and an all-knowing leader that demands Herculean effort from his subordinates is a relic of the past, and does not facilitate mission accomplishment in the modern operating environment. Current leaders provide an atmosphere of transparency by allowing subordinates to make selected decisions and facilitating rapid vertical and horizontal communications.

The venue for accomplishing this rapid vertical and horizontal communications is commonly a B2C2WG. Staff directorates, by their very nature are focused on specific roles and tasks—the so-called "cylinders of excellence." The J2 is focused on all aspects of intelligence, for example. When the joint force commander is presented a mission, almost universally an ill-structured problem to address, the medium used to address this problem is not a staff directorate. The staff directorate is too narrow a vehicle for solving a problem that needs inputs from the entire staff, subordinate commanders and their staffs, interagency partners, and coalition members. Consequently, a Joint Planning Group is often established. Members from each staff directorate are temporarily assigned to this organization to address the assigned issue—each an expert with specific knowledge. These members retain a relationship with their organic staff directorate thus facilitating horizontal communications. LnO's are often used in similar ways.

B2C2WGs are established as needed, and are generally composed of members from different directorates and different commands; they have a specific mission or task, and informal lines of communication exist back to their parent command or directorate. It is the B2C2WG that actually "solves" the majority of problems faced by the joint force, with the Napoleonic-era staff directorates providing specific functional support to the B2C2WG, as required.

While B2C2WG's and LnO's facilitate communication, some staff organizations are responsible for producing staff estimates. These estimates provide functional perspectives as the planning team develops a concept for the commander's approval. While time often dictates the ultimate structure and depth of the staff estimate, even the most rudimentary analysis by the individual staff elements will offer the planning team a better appreciation of discrete planning considerations. Ultimately, these functional staff estimates often become the basis for specific Course of Action (COA) recommendations. Once the concept is approved, the staff estimates become the basis for supporting

annexes and appendices for the plan or order and the functional staffs then maintain running staffs estimate to support the execution phase.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Al Bergstrom, C-430.

D. Questions:

How effective is the standard hierarchical chain of command in dealing with ambiguity?

How does the B2C2WG facilitate vertical and horizontal communications?

How is the battle rhythm affected by B2C2WGs?

How would a planner or commander organize a staff, in an unconstrained environment, to solve an ill-structured problem?

How do staff elements produce estimates? Why?

E. Required Readings:

Naval War College."Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, Working Groups, and LnO's." January 2009. Read pages 1 and 2. Scan remainder. (**NWC 6030**).

_____."Joint Staff Organization." January 2009. Read. (**NWC 6028**).

U.S. Department of the Navy. *Navy Planning Process*, Naval Warfare Publication 5-01, January 2007. Scan Annex K and sample staff estimates. (Issued).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operation Planning,* Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, (Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 26 December 2006). Read III-51–III-55. (Issued).

F. Supplementary Reading:

None.

MILITARY BRIEFINGS (Seminar)

Everything has been said before, but since nobody listens we have to keep going back and beginning all over again.

—Andre Gide

Nothing matures a military force quicker than actual military operations.

—Duncan Hunter

A. Focus:

Graduates of the Naval War College are expected to be fluent in the operational art, current in the Joint Planning Processes, and fluent in the language of the joint world. They are likewise expected to be able to present professional, well crafted military briefings to senior officers and civilian leadership. Briefings are a common means of presenting information to commanders, staffs, or other audiences. The purpose of the briefing, the desired response, and the role of the briefer determine the techniques employed. This seminar will provide the students with information on four types of military briefings; information, decision, staff and mission briefs. The aim is to arm students with the skills requisite for the professional preparation and delivery of a decision and information brief.

B. Objectives/Outcomes:

- Prepare the student in the delivery and preparation of a variety of military briefs.
- Introduce the student to military research, information and decision briefing formats.
- Understand the purpose of military briefings and how they support the commander's decision cycle and staff functions in the planning process.

C. Background:

An additional duty you will likely shoulder as a staff officer and War College graduate is to prepare and deliver various types of military briefings. The primary purpose of a military briefing may be to simply inform or to seek a decision, but it also may have other purposes: first, to ensure the listener's understanding of a particular mission, operation, or concept; second, to enable the listener to perform a specific procedure; and third, to provide the listener with information on which to base further analysis. Often, several people participate in a briefing and you may find yourself as the lead briefer or as a subject matter expert briefing a portion of a plan. In a briefing for an operation plan, for example, the J-1 may cover the administrative phase while the J-3 or J-5 may explain the mission. In either case, the techniques of sound briefing apply. To enable the listeners to grasp all this information as a whole, each briefer must give only the essential information in as few words and as short a time as completeness and clarity will permit. Remember, it is called a brief for a reason. In preparing to brief a senior officer or civilian leader, the staff officer must analyze applicable data, choose significant facts, and organize them carefully. Your explanation must be simple, precise, and

factual. The receivers of the brief want to hear the vital information on a specific subject presented as clearly as possible. When you give a briefing, you are likely to face a captive audience. If possible, and as far in advance as possible, analyze the rank and experience of the people you are to brief, and try to determine what your best approach will be. You cannot always say what your listeners want to hear, but you can try to speak in the manner they will most easily understand. A hallmark of a War College graduate is the ability to analyze a complex issue, research gaps in knowledge, and synthesize the cogent points in a clear, factual manner. The vehicle used to present this is the military brief.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Al Bergstrom, C-430.

D. Question:

How can the staff officer tasked with briefing develop a cogent, complete, and accurate brief?

E. Required Readings:

Naval War College. Military Briefing: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Success. (**NWC 7000**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

None.

PLANNING EXERCISE: BORNEO CASE STUDY (Seminar)

The one who is to draw up a plan of operations must possess a minute knowledge of the power of his adversary and of the help the latter may expect from his allies. He must compare the forces of the enemy with his own numbers and those of his allies so that he can judge which kind of war he is able to lead or to undertake.

—Frederick the Great, Letter 1748

A. Focus:

This session will introduce you to the planning process at both the operational and high tactical level. We will use both the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) and the Navy Planning Process (NPP) as the models for military decision making. The Joint Operation Planning Process Workbook (**NWC 4111H**) and NWP 5-01, Navy Planning Process (NPP), will be used as instructional tools and guides as we apply these planning concepts to a scenario based on crisis in a littoral region. Each seminar, using the Borneo case study and acting a JTF staff (and the subordinate JFMCC staff), will provide a JTF-level decision brief with OPORD (and JFMCC supporting OPORD) to the seminar moderators. As the seminar transitions from the JTF to JFMCC staff, students will understand both the roles and responsibilities of each staff and the need for effective and rapid communication/coordination.

B. Objectives/Outcomes:

- Value a thoroughly joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, combined and interagency efforts and teamwork.
- Understand the organizational dynamics and challenges as a member of a joint, multinational planning effort in an environment characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity.
- Analyze and apply the integration of all instruments of national power in achieving operational level objectives in support of theater objectives, with a focus on employment of military instrument of national power.
- Analyze and apply the concepts of operational art, doctrine, joint, operational planning, to develop an Operations Order at the Joint Task Force and Component Commander level.
- Analyze and synthesize the capabilities and limitations of military forces in the development of joint operational orders.
- Apply preparation and delivery of a variety of military briefs associated with the planning process.
- Analyze and synthesize the JOPES and naval planning process in the production of staff estimates, mission analysis, course of action development/selection, wargaming, and operations order with selected annexes for a real world planning exercise scenario.
- Synthesize the ability to integrate and synchronize information operations in plans at the operational level of war in a joint, multinational planning exercise.

C. Background:

The preceding sessions have provided you with the theoretical concepts of Operational Art and the unique planning considerations for specific operational functions and Service/Functional forces. Additionally, you have reviewed numerous joint publications to include Intelligence, Logistics, and Information Operations and considered the challenges presented by the various demands encountered in the Range of Military Operations. The JOPP applies and synthesizes these various considerations to support a sound military decision.

You will discover you have a wide range of planning experience in your seminar, ranging from the tactical level to sophisticated use of the JOPP on joint staffs. There are also differences in service perspectives in the planning framework—in addition to interagency and coalition views. The main purpose of the JOPP, and any planning framework, is to provide a logical sequence of actions in analyzing a military problem and achieve an acceptable course of action.

Military commanders must continually make decisions, often under unfavorable conditions. The opponent's will and actions can considerably affect the execution of one's own plans and actions. Moreover, the physical environment, climate, and weather can significantly interfere with the commander's accomplishment of the assigned mission. The JOPP and NPP are designed to ensure that no matter of importance is omitted by a commander.

These next two weeks focus on experiencing the JOPP and NPP using the workbook and readings, and then synthesizing the knowledge through the Borneo (PACIFIC TEAK) crisis planning exercise. The seminar will first act as members of a Joint Task Force (JTF). This exercise focuses on the operational planning aspects of how to use forces during a crisis that develops in a littoral region. The group will develop a concept of operations based on the intelligence assessment and information provided in the readings. During this planning exercise, the seminar will also have an opportunity to craft and integrate the information operations concept into the Courses of Action (COA).

As the seminar begins to consider the JTF mission and courses of action, they will also view the mission through the lens of a subordinate organization, in this case the JFMCC and his/her staff. The give and take between an operational level organization (JTF) and the JFMCC (low operational/high tactical) are essential to the development of the JTF plan and ultimately, its successful execution.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel Mike McGauvran, C-422.

D. Questions:

How does operational art theory get translated into real-world practical application?

How does the JOPP help us plan? What are its disadvantages?

What is the importance of Commander's Intent and Commander's Guidance and how are they formulated?

How do we determine command and control of the assigned forces?

E. Products:

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment

Mission Analysis Decision Briefing

Various Staff Information Briefings

Course of Action Decision Briefing

Transition Briefs

Operations Order

F. Required Readings (Pages, by date, will be assigned by seminar moderators):

Joint Forces Staff College. *Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook* (Amended Version—Unclassified). Joint Command, Control & Information Operations School, 2005.

Naval War College. *A Borneo Case Study for Expeditionary Warfare*, January 2009. (**NWC 6036**), (Issued).

U.S. Department of the Navy. *Navy Planning Process*, Naval Warfare Publication 5-01, January 2007. (Issued).

_____. *Joint Operations Planning Process Workbook,* 21 January 2008. (**NWC 4111H**), (Issued).

_____. *Forces/Capabilities Handbook*. (**NWC 3153J**), (Issued).

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations,* Joint Pub 3-32 (Ch 1), (Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 27 May 2008).

_____. *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,* Joint Pub 1, (Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 14 May 2007).

_____. *Joint Operation Planning,* Joint Pub 5-0, (Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 26 December 2006). (Issued).

_____. *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace,* Joint Pub 2-01.3, (Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 24 May 2000). Read Chapters I–III and Appendix A.

_____. *Universal Joint Task Manual (UJTM),* CJCSM 3500.04E, (Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 25 August 2008). Review Enclosures A and B; scan remainder.

G. Supplementary Readings/resources:

Gen (Ret) Gary Luck, *Joint Operations, Insights and Best Practices* (2ed.). July 2008, Joint Warfighting Center, JFC Norfolk VA. (**NWC 6034**).

"Operation Grey Guard" Planning Vignette, https://ca.dtic.mil/doctrine/interactive/courses/jopvig/course.htm

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations,* Joint Pub 3-0, (Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 17 September 2006). (Issued).

_____. *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)*, Volume I, *Planning Policies and Procedures*, CJCSM 3122.01A, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 29 Sept 2006. (Seminar Reserve).

_____. *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES),* Volume II*, Planning Formats and Guidance*, CJCSM 3122.03C, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 17 August 2007. (Seminar Reserve).

MODULE SEVEN
CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONS

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CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONS

A. Focus:

The focus of this set of seminars and exercises is on the "wicked problems" that contemporary operations present to planners.

B. Description:

The first topic covered is the phenomenon of the "failed state." The reason it's the first topic is because failed states have been and can be the source of all sorts of regional and even international problems—"wicked" problems that you will have to solve as best you can sometime in your career.

The second topic—homeland security—follows from the existence of failed and failing states. The problem is protecting the United States from a weapon of mass destruction being sent under cover in an innocent-looking merchant ship. The weapon most likely would come from or would be smuggled through a failed or failing state.

The third topic—stability, security, and reconstruction operations—also follows from the existence of failed and failing states. These operations have to be planned, and so the fourth topic is developing theater security cooperation plans. How can you plan in peacetime to forestall state failure? How can you plan on a regular basis to promote peace and stability in a region?

The fifth area covered in Contemporary Operations consists of the "tools" available for dealing with the problems of failed and failing states. These "tools" include (a) inter-agency coordination and cooperation, (b) civil-military operations, and (c) the work done by international government organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

The sixth area in Contemporary Operations is insurgency, including counter-insurgency, the global war on terrorists (GWOT) and "complex irregular warfare."

The seventh area in Contemporary Operations covers variations on the theme of countering the negative consequences of failed states. This area includes (1) post-conflict operations, (2) peace (and peace-keeping) operations, and (3) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Contemporary Operations will lead into the end-of-course planning exercise.

FAILED STATES (Lecture/Seminar)

We're going to find more and more throughout a section of the world that runs from North Africa to the Philippines, from Central Asia to Central Africa; that we have got an entire region of the world that is chaotic and in turmoil, and we have just seen the beginnings of it. For decades more, we're going to be dealing with this problem. You're going to be fighting terrorists, you're going to be fighting against failed or incapable states that are sanctuaries for problems. You're going to try to rebuild nations. You're going to deal with crises and threats that threaten our people and our property. And it's all going to be mixed into one big bag.

—General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.) (2003)

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the Failed State phenomenon and examines the planning challenges associated with intervention by U.S., U.N., or multinational forces in such states. The session comprises two parts. The first half is a lecture on the general characteristics of failed states. In the second half, each seminar will examine a case study of a failed state in greater detail.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the concept of failed (or failing) states and its operational implications.
- Comprehend the military and non-military consequences of state failure and what those consequences imply for operational planners.
- Examine and understand the challenges of restoring stability and peace in failed and failing states by U.S. and coalition forces working in coordination with other organizations (such as the UN).
- Examine the considerations involved with planning complex contingency operations to deal with "wicked problems."

C. Background:

Retired infantry Colonel Thomas Dempsey defined one failed state this way:

"Monrovia, the national capital of Liberia, was a frightening place in 1998. Eighteen months after the end of active hostilities and 7 months after the inauguration of a democratically elected government… Liberian security services remained factionalized, dysfunctional and inherently violent, and frequently preyed upon the very civilians they were charged with protecting. The criminal justice system was nonexistent: courts were, for the most part, not operating at all, and extra-judicial killings by Liberian police were common. The only forces enjoying any real legitimacy and displaying any genuine functionality were the African soldiers of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping forces.

… The country was without public utilities: no power, no running water, no functioning communications system, and no public transport. Road systems were primitive at best… Government administration … was almost nonexistent. There were no written or electronic records of residents, births, deaths, tax compliance, no drivers licenses, no government data bases, nothing left of the prewar criminal justice record system, and no

functioning intelligence system." (from *Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions*, by Thomas Dempsey, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2006, p. 1)

Regretfully, there are a significant number of states that are unable to function effectively—often temporarily, as in the case of Liberia in the late 1990s, and sometimes even permanently, as some observers say is the case in Somalia today. The resulting deterioration of governance in these states inevitably gives rise to serious problems, ranging from economic collapse to genocide and other human rights abuses, hunger and starvation, population dislocation and migration, insurgency, and even rule by terrorist and criminal organizations. These problems inevitably affect neighboring states and the region in general, and increasingly have global effects.

In module Seven we focus on the failed state phenomenon because it so often commands the involvement, willingly or unwillingly, of outside governments, especially the United States, in what have become known as "complex contingency operations." The government of the United States, the United Nations, and organizations such as NATO must therefore plan to intervene in failed states with the goal of restoring order and perhaps even with the goal of creating the foundations of a new society. What at first appear to be simple problems (e.g., famine relief in Somalia) usually prove to be much more complex and dangerous than initial appraisals indicate. So what can planners at the operational level do to maximize the chances of success in complex contingency operations?

The point of contact for this session is Prof Tom Hone, C-406

D. Questions:

What are the characteristics of a state described as "failing" or "failed"?

What are the causes of state failure?

Are there common threads to state failure or is each unique?

How can a joint commander employ scarce resources to deal with a failed state crisis?

What "danger signs" warn of impending state failure?

Should United Nations-led intervention be the preferred option of choice?

What are the risks to the U.S. of acting unilaterally?

How can military resources be applied most effectively or *can* they be?

E. Required Reading:

"The Failed States Index." *Foreign Policy* (July-August 2008). (**NWC 6004**).

Rice, Susan. "Why Darfur Can't Be Left to Africa." *Washington Post*, 7 August 2005. (**NWC 3076**).

JMO Department. "Crisis in Sudan, OPERATION URGENT RESPONSE" (Case Study). Naval War College, 2007. (**NWC 3086D**).

UN Security Council Resolutions pertaining to Darfur. Scan (**NWC 4026**).

Darfur Peace Agreement. Scan (**NWC 6005**), focus on pages 41-79 and 100-105.

F. Supplementary Reading:

State Failure Task Force. "Report: Phase III Findings." (September 2000).

Ballard, John R. *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994–1997*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998.

Clare, Michael T., and Daniel Volman. "Africa's Oil and American National Security." *Current History* (May 2004): 226–231.

Cohen, Stephen Philip. "The Nation and the State of Pakistan." *Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2002): 109–122.

Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security. "On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security." Center for Global Development, June 2004.

Dearth, Douglas H. "Failed State: an International Conundrum." *Defense Intelligence Journal* 5 (1996): 119–130.

Dobbins, James, John G, McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, Anga Timilsina. "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq." Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2003.

Dorff, Robert H. "Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability." *Parameters* (Summer 1996): 17–31.

Einsiedel, Sebastian von. "State Failure and the Crisis of Governance: Making States Work." New York: International Peace Academy, 2003.

Ferguson, Niall. Empire: *The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power*. New York: Basic, 2003.

Helman, Gerald B., and Steven R. Ratner. "Saving Failed States." *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1992–1993): 3–20.

Katzman, Kenneth. "Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns." Reprinted from *CRS Report for Congress—Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns* (updated December 12, 2001). Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2001.

Lyman, Princeton N., and J. Stephen Morrison. "The Terrorist Threat in Africa." *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2004): 75–86.

Marchi, Gina A. *Squaring the Circle: Attempting Peace in Northern Ireland*. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1997. (In the War College library)

McLean, Philip. "Colombia: Failed, Failing, or Just Weak?" *Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2002): 123–134.

Metz, Helen C., ed. *Somalia: A Country Study*. (Extract from Introduction). Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, May 1992.

Rotberg, Robert I. "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure." *Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2002): 85–96.

Treaty of Westphalia, Munster, 24 October 1648. Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and their respective Allies.

Vaughn, Bruce. "Malaysia: Political Transition and Implications for U.S. Policy." Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2003.

Wanandi, Jusuf. "Indonesia: A Failed State?" *Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2002): 135–146.

The White House. *National Security Strategy of the U.S.A.*, March 2006. (Issued).

Woodward, Susan L. "Failed States: Warlordism and 'Tribal' Warfare." *Naval War College Review* (Spring 1999): 55–68.

MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE

But there is an overriding and urgent mission here in America today, and that's to protect our homeland. We have been called into action, and we've got to act.

—President George W. Bush

A. Focus:

This lesson focuses on the national task of homeland security and defense, with emphasis on the defense of the United States against asymmetric maritime threats. Additionally, the mission of defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), where federal military forces provide support during domestic disaster response, is covered. The roles of the various players who share responsibility for securing the homeland are explored, highlighting the contributions of the Department of Defense (DoD). Students are exposed to the characteristics of the maritime domain which make achieving a useful level of maritime domain awareness (MDA) difficult and securing U.S. maritime borders a unique challenge. These include the disparate nature of the maritime threat, the capabilities and limitations of the various services and agencies with responsibilities in this area, as well as the key legal, policy and organizational challenges facing national leaders in securing U.S. maritime borders. A fictional maritime threat response exercise replicating the maritime operational threat response (MOTR) inter-agency decision making process is used to put these various factors into a tangible context, and to provide a venue for discussion of DSCA.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the federal government's approach to securing the homeland, including the conceptual difference between homeland security and homeland defense and the roles of the key departments and agencies that share responsibility in this area.
- Understand the Defense Department's role in securing the homeland, and specifically the distinction between defense missions (where DoD is in the lead) and support missions where civil authorities are the "supported commander".
- Understand the unique aspects of protecting the homeland against asymmetric maritime threats, including an understanding of the intrinsically interagency nature of the mission, the importance of close coordination between military and civilian authorities involved, and the key planning considerations necessary for success.
- Understand the role of the Department of Defense in supporting civil authorities during domestic disaster response, including an awareness of the organizational construct used for domestic incident response.

C. Background:

The attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 awakened many Americans to the reality that their homeland was not as safe as once was widely assumed. The U.S. government reevaluated its homeland security posture and made significant organizational adjustments, including creation of a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and a combatant commander (NORTHCOM) with a geographic area of responsibility that for the first time included the continental United States.

Securing the safety of the United States is a shared responsibility between many actors, including federal, state and local governments and the private sector. Responsibility for securing the homeland against maritime threats in particular crosses many organizational boundaries, and as such presents significant challenges to unity of effort. The Department of Defense (largely the Navy) and the Department of Homeland Security (primarily the Coast Guard) share much, but by no means all, of the responsibility for maritime security. The challenge is exacerbated by the immensity of the USA's largely unguarded coastlines.

In 2005, the National Strategy for Maritime Security addressed this challenge by calling for inter-agency planning in several areas. As a result, plans were developed for improving maritime domain awareness (MDA) and for inter-agency decision making for maritime operational threat response (MOTR), among others. While MDA (the focus of a joint USCG/Navy effort) remains very much a work in progress, the MOTR process has been heralded as a model for inter-agency decision making. The nature of the maritime environment demands a quickly and effectively coordinated inter-agency response to real-time emergent threats, and the MOTR process has proven very effective.

In the realm of domestic disaster response, the Department of Defense contributes by providing support to federal, state and local civil authorities when necessary under the auspices of the National Response Framework (NRF) and its underlying National Incident Management System (MINS) organizational construct. There are a number of important legal, doctrinal and practical considerations that make this mission of defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) different than military operations outside U.S. territory.

The point of contact for this session is Professor I. T. Luke, C-402.

D. Discussion Questions:

Which agencies have responsibilities for the security of the USA and who is/should be in charge overall? How does coordination occur? What are the command and control arrangements? What challenges do the current organizational arrangements present?

What's the Homeland Security desired end-state? What is the USA's strategic objective? Where is the U.S. government prepared to accept risk, how much risk, and why? Shouldn't the federal government just eliminate all risk? Why or why not?

What role does DoD play in homeland security? In homeland defense? What is the dividing line between homeland security and homeland defense? How can responsible

authorities prevent that line presenting a seam open to exploitation by enemies of the United States?

According to the Oct 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, contributing to homeland defense in depth is a strategic imperative and achieving maritime security is a core capability of U.S. naval forces. What challenges will planners likely face when trying to translate these concepts into real-world results?

How is the task of securing the USA's maritime borders different than that of securing the nation's air and land borders? Do those differences result in vulnerability?

What is the U.S. government's concept for protecting the nation's maritime borders? How is the U.S. Government organized for maritime homeland security? Who is responsible for what? Is that organization adequate?

What is DOD's role in maritime homeland security? Are DOD and DHS efforts complementary, conflicting, redundant? Why or why not?

How are inter-agency efforts in response to maritime threats coordinated? What are the strengths and weaknesses of this (the MOTR) process?

What is the C2 regime under which the U.S. government will respond to domestic disasters, either natural or manmade? Who will be in charge after the next big event? What role will DOD forces play? What challenges does the domestic disaster response organizational concept present to DOD planners? What considerations will be important for employing joint forces in the most effective manner?

E. Required Readings:

Greenberg, Michael D., et. al. "The Contemporary Threat of Maritime Terrorism", *Maritime Terrorism, Risk and Liability*. RAND Report. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006. (**NWC 7004**) Read chapter two (pages 9-28).

Luke, Ivan T. *"DoD's Role in Maritime Homeland Defense & Security."* Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, November 2008. (**NWC 3148A**).

Luke, Ivan T. "*Homeland Security—Civil Support: How DoD Plugs into the Interagency C2 Structure*." June 2008. (**NWC 3065C**).

Joint Pub 3-27, *Homeland Defense*, 12 July 2007. Read: Executive Summary (vii–xvi) and Chapter V.

Joint Pub 3-28, *Civil Support,* 14 September 2007. Read: Executive Summary (vii-xi) and scan Chapter I.

F. Supplementary Readings:

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. October 2007.

Bowman, Steve and Crowhurst, James. *Homeland Security: Evolving Roles and Missions for United States Northern Command*. CRS Report for Congress, RS21322, 16 November 2006.

Burns, Shawn. *Homeland Security Considerations*. U.S. Naval War College, NSDM Department, JMP 9-1, April 2006.

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Carafano, James Jay, Irving Varkonyi, and Richard Weitz. “Working Paper #1. The Future of Maritime Security: Competitive Issues.” *Making the Sea Safer: A National Agenda for Maritime Security and Counterterrorism*. Heritage Special Report SR-03.Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2005.

Cumti, Amanda Merritt. "U.S. Army North/5th Army: Building Relationships to Defend the Homeland and Meet Emerging Regional Challenges." *National Security Watch 07-1,* 15 February 2007.

The Department of Defense. *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support,* June 2005.

FM 3-28.1 Civil Support; Multi-service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Civil Support (CS) Operations, Signature draft, April 2007. Available through Army Knowledge Online (AKO) www.us.army.mil

Farrell, Richard. “Maritime Terrorism; Focusing on the Probable.” *Naval War College Review* 60, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 46-60.

Greenberg, Michael D., et. al. *Maritime Terrorism, Risk and Liability*, The Rand Corporation, 2006.

Goss, Thomas. “‘Who’s in Charge?’ New Challenges in Homeland Defense and Homeland Security.” *Homeland Security Affairs(1)*, Spring 2006.

Goward, Dana A. “Maritime Domain Awareness: The Key to Security.” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 133, no. 4 (Apr 2007): 20-24.

Holland, Mike. “Securing the Seas: The National Strategy for Maritime Security.” *Proceedings of the Marine Safety and Security Council* 63, no.3 (Fall 2006): 9-12.

Kane, Linda E. “Secure Trade: Maritime Cargo Security in the Age of Global Terrorism.” *Proceedings of the Marine Safety and Security Council* 63, no.3 (Fall 2006): 40-43.

Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) for the National Strategy for Maritime Security, October 2005. (FOUO).

National Governors Association Center for Best Practices, *A Governor's guide to Homeland Security*, 2007.

National Strategy for Maritime Security. September 2005.

National Plan to Achieve maritime Domain Awareness for the National Strategy for Maritime Security. October 2006.

National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002.

Parfomak, Paul W. and John Fritelli. *Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities*, CRS Report for Congress RL 33787 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007).

Preiss, Robert A. “The National Guard and Homeland Defense.” *Joint Force Quarterly* 36 (2004): 72–78.

Renuart, Victor E., GEN, USAF, and CAPT Dane Egli, USCG. "Closing the Capability Gap: Developing New Solutions to Counter Maritime Threats." *Naval War College Review* 61, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 15-24.

Thomas, Guy. "Maritime Domain Awareness: There is No Silver Bullet, Not Now, Not in the Foreseeable Future." *Proceedings of the Marine Safety and Security Council* 63, no.3 (Fall 2006): 24-26.

Vance, George, CAPT, USCG, and LCDR Paulo Vicente, USCG. "Maritime Domain Awareness: A Structure to Enhance Maritime Decision Making." *Proceedings of the Marine Safety and Security Council* 63, no.3 (Fall 2006): 6-8.

Wilson, J. R. "A Single Game Plan." *Armed Forces Journal* (May 2004): pp. 48–52.

SECURITY, STABILITY, TRANSITION, AND RECONSTRUCTION (SSTR) (Lecture)

Stability Operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support.

—DOD Directive 3000.05, 28 November 2005

But Fiasco is much more than simply a blunt condemnation of the war's military and civilian leaders, and its depth of reporting and detailed reconstruction of recent history should make it hard to ignore. Based on hundreds of interviews, and benefiting from the particular insight of retired Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni and retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner, the book offers a sober and enlightened account that deserves to be taken seriously.

—Robert Little, "Review," Thomas Ricks' *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*,
—U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, September 2006.

A. Focus

This session comprises a lecture on the still emerging concepts of Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction. Recent experiences in both Afghanistan and Iraq, along with U.S. military operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo in the 1990s have clearly demonstrated that the U.S. military must be prepared to conduct a wide range of operations. Many of these operations are found at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, yet require just as much, if not more planning, training, and preparation. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 of 28 November 2005 says that stability operations should be given the same priority as combat operations.

B. Objectives/Outcomes:

- Understand the role of SSTR in the range of military operations and how it fits into the planning for future operations.
- Synthesize the joint phasing construct where stability operations must be addressed in all phases.
- Comprehend the role of other U.S. governmental agencies in support of stability operations.

C. Background:

Throughout the history of the U.S. armed forces, the military has engaged in some form of stabilization operations. Because of its overseas role in the latter 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th Century, the Marine Corps created the *Small Wars Manual* to help focus military forces on operations in foreign lands before, during and after conflicts. Following the defeat of Germany and Japan during World War II, the U.S. military achieved great success restoring order to both nations.

The Cold War ushered in the new threat of the Soviet Union and the spread of communism. Not unreasonably, the U.S. military saw a conflict with the Soviet Union as its greatest threat, and prepared for the ultimate conventional war. Consequently, during this period the American military lost focus on post-war stabilization activities. Peace operations in Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo helped develop nation-building skills for some military personnel, but were not considered an important or primary mission.

Operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated that the U.S. military has a role or mission in stability operations. *DOD Directive 3000.05*, published in November 2005, makes stability and reconstruction operations a core requirement for U.S. military forces. Although as yet there is no Joint doctrine for stability and reconstruction operations, a Joint Operating Concept (JOC) was completed in 2006. This JOC provides the logical lines of operations intended to guide planning and execution. It provides the basis for analyzing and planning for stability operations. In September 2008, the Army completed its doctrine on stability operations. The Army's doctrine fully recognizes the role of other agencies within the U.S. Government as well as intergovernmental organizations and NGOs.

The point of contact for this session is Professor G. Oliver. C-408.

D. Questions:

What are stability operations?

What is the role of the U.S. military in security operations? And what does the security aspect mean as it relates to stability operations?

What role does the military have in humanitarian assistance, reconstruction of infrastructure, governance, and economic recovery in failed states?

How does the military integrate and synchronize its work with other U.S. government agencies?

How does the military integrate its efforts with other agencies, such as the United Nations and NGOs?

How do we train our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines for SSTR?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

U.S. Department of Defense. "Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, *Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*." December 2006, Version 2.0, read Executive Summary, scan pages 1-20, read pages 21-56. (**NWC 3015**).

Binnendijk, Hans and Stuart E. Johnson, ed. "Learning from History," in *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations.* Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2004. (**NWC 7005**).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Binnendijk, Hans and Stuart E. Johnson, ed. *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations.* Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2004.

Cerami, Joseph R. and Jay W. Boggs, ed. *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Roles.* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007.

Chiarelli, Peter W., and Patrick R. Michaelis. "Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations." *Military Review* (July–August 2005): 4–17.

Covey, Jock, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, eds. *The Quest for a Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press and the Association of the U.S. Army, 2005.

Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR)," 28 November 2005. (Available online at www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/ 300005.htm.)

Dobbins, James, Seth Jones , Keith Crane, Beth Cole DeGrasse, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation Building.* Santa Monica, CA; Rand Corporation, 2007.

Dobbins, James, Seth Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga Timilsina, *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq.* Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005.

Dobbins, James, John G. McGinn, Kieth Crane, Seth G Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger and Anga Timilsina, *America's Role in Nation-Building: Germany to Iraq.* Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2003.

Hoffman, Frank G. "Small Wars Revisited: The United States and Non-Traditional Wars." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28 (December 2005): 1–28.

Hubner, Bob. "Developing Joint Stability Operations Doctrine." *A Common Perspective: US Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center Doctrine and Education Group's Newsletter* 12 (October 2004): 9–12.

Joint Staff. "Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept (JOC)." December 2006, Version 2.0.

Kaufmann, Greg, ed. *Stability Operations and State Building: Continuities and Contingencies.* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008.

Orr, Robert C., ed. *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction.* Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004.

Petraeus, David H. "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq." *Military Review* (January–February 2006): 2–12.

United States Army. Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, February 2008.

United States Army, Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Final Approved Draft, 5 September 2008.

U.S. Joint Forces Command J7 Pamphlet, Version 1.0. "U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation." 1 December 2005.

United States Marine Corps. *Small Wars Manual*. With an Introduction by Ronald Schaffer. Manhattan, Kans.: Sunflower University Press, 1996 [Originally published 1940].

SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING (Seminar)

Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operations.
Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (2005)

One of the principal obstacles with which the naval forces are confronted in small war situations is the one that has to do with the absence of a clean-cut line of demarcation between State Department authority and military authority.
"Small Wars Manual," United States Marine Corps, 1940

[Usually] our view of the actions we can take is unduly constrained.
Harvey Brightman, *Problem Solving: A Logical and Creative Approach* (1980)

A. Focus:

How can security cooperation planning support the objectives of a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC)? What should go into a security cooperation plan, and what skills and knowledge are required by those who prepare a security cooperation plan for a GCC?

B. Objectives:

- Understand that security cooperation planning is designed to enable a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) to deal with a wide range of problems in a theater. Developing a security cooperation plan—still referred to in some GCC headquarters as a "Theater Security Cooperation Plan" or TSCP—is a problem-identification and problem-solving exercise.
- Understand that no security cooperation plan can be developed without close consultation with other elements of the U.S. government (especially an ambassador's country team) or without closely consulting with allies and coalition partners.
- Understand that developing a security cooperation plan also requires understanding what organizations such as the United Nations and CARE are doing in your region and how their staffs view the region's problems.
- Understand that the different geographic combatant commands often develop their security cooperation plans in different ways.
- Practice developing some elements of a TSCP.

C. Background:

After the end of the Cold War, the Commander, European Command (EUCOM) was directed to create programs that would "engage" the militaries and the governments of the nations of the former Warsaw Pact. The effort to do this successfully led the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to require all the Geographic Combatant Commanders to develop Theater Engagement Plans. These plans were not always based on clear operational or strategic goals. Sometimes they were just collections of military assistance programs and combined exercises, such as the UNITAS cruises conducted periodically by the U.S. Navy with South American navies.

After the attacks on the United States in September 2001, the issue of the value of security cooperation was examined critically by the staff of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. The result was guidance to the Geographic Commanders to develop comprehensive and well integrated security cooperation plans, often referred to as Theater Security Cooperation Plans or Programs (TSCPs). These plans were not supposed to be merely catalogues of activities such as combined exercises, visits by senior officers, and courses taught by military advisors. Instead, they were supposed to be serious plans that integrated all the "elements of national power."

The need for comprehensive regional planning was emphasized even more by the creation of guidance for the Global Employment of the Force, or GEF, in 2007. The GEF was created to give the President and the Secretary of Defense the opportunity to orchestrate security cooperation activities around the world. For example, in the late 1990s the navies of Chile, Brazil, and Argentina had asked the U.S. Navy to continue its UNITAS deployments. But did the "benefits" of these naval engagement activities justify their "cost"? The U.S. Navy was shrinking. Were there enough ships available to make a UNITAS cruise worthwhile, or would finding the ships for a meaningful UNITAS cruise put too much pressure on the Geographic Combatant Commanders outside SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility? The Secretary of Defense could answer that question only if he could match proposals for such activities against a worldwide security cooperation strategy based on plans put forward by the Geographic Combatant Commanders.

U.S. military forces have been engaged in security cooperation activities for a long time. The idea that these activities can be of value to both the United States and the other nations that participate is not new. What *is* new is the imperative to develop long-range and short-range plans that coordinate all the cooperative activities across a whole region, *including activities that are not military.* It makes no sense for an embassy country team to engage their counterparts in a host nation in order to achieve one set of objectives if the Geographic Combatant Commander's staff and forces are pursuing different objectives. But coordinating all the different activities (diplomatic, economic, informational, and military) is impossible without serious *interagency* planning.

So the staffs of the geographic combatant commanders have been handed two major problems. The first—the planning problem—is "wicked" because it deals with factors that are mostly non-military and therefore not easily dealt with using military methods. The second—coordinating across U.S. government agency boundaries—requires significant leadership skills among all the agency leaders involved. At the Naval War College, the National Security Decision-Making Department (NSDM) deals with the second problem. The Joint Military Operations Department (JMO) deals with the first, and this session is designed to give you an opportunity to think through the operational issues associated with developing a coherent TSCP.

Geographic Combatant Commanders take security cooperation planning seriously. This planning links national strategy with operational planning. Moreover, security cooperation can set the stage for accomplishing key national security missions (to include humanitarian relief and disaster assistance) in a region. Finally, security planners—working across agency and even national organizational boundaries—can create a reservoir of information and understanding about the nations in a geographic

area. This seminar introduces you to the process of examining an area and then analyzing it as an initial step in producing a TSCP.
The point of contact for this seminar is Professor Tom Hone, C-406.

D. Questions:

What part do security cooperation activities play in a combatant commander's overall theater campaign plan?
Combatant command resources are limited. How can a combatant commander's staff begin to identify those areas in a given region where combatant command resources (financial, human, informational, and military) can best be applied to achieve the strategic goals of the United States?
How can a combatant commander's staff best combine the resources (human, financial and informational) of the various U.S. agencies (including the State Department and the Agency for International Development) to plan an overall theater campaign plan?
What is the relationship between the planning done by a combatant commander's staff and planning done by a United States Chief of Mission's Mission Strategic Plan?
How can a combatant commander's staff know that its planning meets the guidelines set by decision-makers back in Washington?

E. Products:

You will have a short case (the "Mano River Case") to read and analyze. Please read the Bouchat article, the statements by General Ward and Deputy Assistant Secretary Whelan, and then come to seminar prepared to answer the questions posed in the "Introduction" to the case.

F. Required Readings:

Dyekman, Gregory J. "Security Cooperation: A Key to the Challenges of the 21st Century." *Strategic Studies Institute* (November 2007) (**NWC 2058**).

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 6 September 2006. Read 1-1 to 1-9 and IV-1 and 2. (Issued).

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 26 December 2006. Read 1-1 to 1-5, II-1 to II-8, and IV-36. (Issued).

"AFRICOM Posture Statement," General William E. Ward, USA, U.S. Congress, Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives, 13 March 2008. (**NWC 7006**).

"Africa Command," Testimony by Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, before the Committee on Oversight and Governmental Reform, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 16 July 2007. (**NWC 7007**).

"Mano River Case," edited by Thomas C. Hone, Naval War College, October 2008. (**NWC 7008**).

G. Supplementary Reading:

Sweeney, Patrick C. "A Primer for: *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF), *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP), and the *Adaptive Planning and Execution* (APEX) *System*." Naval War College, 2 January 2009.

Williamson, Joel E., and Jenifer D. P. Moroney. "Security Cooperation Pays Off: A Lesson from the Afghan War." *The DISAM Journal* (Spring 2002): 79-82.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION (Seminar)

Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military, diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power…. Successful interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination enables the USG to build international support, conserve resources and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared international goals.

—Joint Pub 3-08 "Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations", 17 March 2006

"Inside the Capitol Beltway, and particularly inside the Pentagon, if you really want to sound smart, you talk about 'The Interagency.' It's not an arm of the government. It's not a place. It has no formal director and certainly no troops. It's not even a thing: it's a process. But it is perhaps the one process that the government needs to do better……"

—"In Search of Harmony", Michele A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimely

A. Focus:

The range of military operations (ROMO) requires the appropriate application of all elements of national power. The majority of diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of the DIME reside outside the Department of Defense. Joint Force Commanders frequently state that coordinating these interagency elements is one of their biggest challenges. With this in mind, students must understand interagency coordination, at both the national and theater levels, to improve the prospects for success during joint, interagency, and multinational operations. This session addresses national and theater interagency coordination processes, joint doctrine for interagency planning and coordination, and highlights interagency resources available to a Joint Force Commander at the theater level.

B. Objectives:

- Evaluate the interagency coordination process at the national and theater levels.
- Evaluate interagency capabilities, capacities, and limitations a Joint Force Commander and staff can leverage at the theater level.
- Analyze how a Joint Force Commander and staff can best integrate joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities to achieve operational objectives across the range of military operations.

C. Background:

Military commanders and their staffs must understand the interagency coordination processes at the national and theater levels. This understanding of process, along with recognizing interagency partner capabilities and limitations, is key to the successful planning and execution of joint and multinational operations across the ROMO.

Knowledge of executive orders, joint doctrine, and civilian agency rules and procedures only partially determines the actual way in which interagency processes work. Successful coordination also hinges on understanding the culture of individual interagency partners. Comprehending these variables improves a command's ability to coordinate across the full range of military operations.

When the military has the lead for an operation involving other government organizations (and almost every operation will), these interagency partners can provide resources and capabilities that the military requires, but does not itself possess. For example, other government agencies can provide a range of information relevant to both military and political success via representatives in theater – both at embassies and on the Combatant Commander's staff.

The military will not always be the "lead agency" across a range of important and complex operations in which it will be involved—even though it may provide the preponderance of resources. For example, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) acts as the lead federal agency for foreign disaster assistance. In other circumstances, the Department of State, in the person of the in-country ambassador (the president's direct representative), will be supported, with military forces in a supporting role. Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security takes the lead in matters of homeland security, while the Department of Defense, through Northern Command and Pacific Command, has the lead for homeland defense.

Every government organization has its own distinct missions and roles, structures and procedures, resources, culture, and constituencies. Just as Joint Force Commanders synchronize and sequence military service capabilities in joint operations, they and their staffs must be aware of and take these interagency differences into account as they plan and execute operations across the ROMO. To assist with this coordination, the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG) has emerged at the Combatant Commander level to assist with theater level planning.

Interagency coordination is not static. Changes in organizations and their representatives, processes (used or not), and, most important, the objectives in any given situation are constantly changing. This makes interagency planning and coordination, particularly during international and coalition operations, extremely complex and demanding.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Dave Carrington, C-414.

D. Questions:

What is meant by "interagency coordination" and why is it important?

What are the interagency coordination processes in Washington? What do we mean by the term "lead agency"?

Why should the operational commander be concerned with interagency coordination and non-DoD resources?

What resources and processes are available at the theater level for the operational commander and staff to successfully organize and plan interagency operations?

F. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Bogdanos, Matthew. "Transforming Joint Interagency Coordination: The Missing Link Between National Strategy & Operational Success." *Case Studies in National*

Security Transformation Number 9, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, August 2007, (**NWC 7013**).

Joint Publication 3-08, Volume I, "Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations", 17 March 2006. Available on JCS web site: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/s_index.htm). **Read** pages iii, v-xiv; **Scan** I-1 to III-27.

Joint Publication 3-08, Volume II, "Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations", 17 March 2006. Available on JCS web site: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/s_index.htm). **Scan.**

Whittaker, Alan G., Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune. "The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System," April 2007, (**NWC 3026B**). Read pages 5-59. This is also a required reading in NSDM.

G. Supplementary Readings:

All supplementary readings are available in the library.

Flournoy, Michèle and Shawn Brimely. "In Search of Harmony: Orchestrating the Interagency for the Long War," *Armed Forces Journal,* July 2006.

Luck, Gary and Mike Findlay. "Insights and Best Practices: Interagency, Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Coordination (A Joint Force Operational Perspective)", Joint Warfighting Center, United States Joint Forces Command, July 2007.

Locher, James R. III, "The Most Important Thing: Legislative Reform of the National Security System", *Military Review,* May-June 2008.

NONGOVERNMENTAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS/ CONTRACTORS IN THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (Panel/Seminar)

There is a true clash of cultures, which has nothing to do with the culture you're involved with on the ground truth. The cultures of the soldier the diplomat, and the relief worker could not be more diverse or disparate. Creating cooperation requires creating a relationship and a means of communicating among groups that have different views on how that cooperation should take place.

—General Anthony Zinni, USMC, Managing Communications Lessons from Interventions in Africa Conference (1996)

In all countries engaged in war, experience has sooner or later pointed out that contracts with private men of substance and understanding are necessary for the subsistence, covering, clothing, and moving of any Army.

—Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance, 1781

A. Focus:

No operational commander can ignore the presence of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), and contractors in the contemporary operating environment. This session introduces a representative sample of organizations and people you will either encounter in your operating environment or have to take into account when planning an operation. All of these organizations and people pose challenges and risk for the combatant commander or joint task force commander in mission accomplishment.

B. Objectives:

- Identify the types of NGO/IGOs and contractors that may be employed in a Joint Force Commander's operating environment.
- Comprehend the differences in culture between military, NGO/IGO, and contractor communities. Analyze the impact these differences may have on building unity of effort throughout the phases of an operation.
- Comprehend the capabilities and requirements for NGO/IGOs and contractors operating in the joint operating environment. What is the impact on the Joint Force Commander if they leave?
- Comprehend how U.S. Civil Affairs (CA) units coordinate with NGO/IGOs and contractors during Civil Military Operations (CMO).
- Understand the benefits and costs of employing contractors in planning and execution of military operations across the ROMO.
- Comprehend the implications/risk of contracting key operational functions and the requirements for the loss or reduction of contractor capabilities.

C. Background:

The Interagency Coordination session addressed the challenges the military must address to work effectively with other U.S. government agencies. This session continues exploring the theme of "who you are going to meet when you get there" by examining the host of organizations—intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and contractors (hired for some purpose by almost every organization)—in the area of operations.

JP 5-0 defines a Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) as a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. While they may receive funding from national governments, NGO's operate, for the most part, independently of any government.

By contrast, an Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) is created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly-defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states, examples include the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the African Union (AU). This term replaces International Organization (IO), which was removed from the Joint dictionary in 2006.

Traditionally, there has been a distinction between military and non-military domains, built upon principles of international humanitarian law distinguishing combatants from noncombatants. In recent years, however, the military has become increasingly involved in a range of military operations, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Simultaneously, the humanitarian community has faced increased operational challenges along with greater risks and threats to their workers in the field, which at times have compelled them to seek military support or protection. Thus, practical realities have necessitated various forms of civil-military coordination for humanitarian operations.

Typically focused on various dimensions of long-term development and/or near-term humanitarian relief, NGOs and IGOs bring their own unique objectives, assets, and needs—which are not necessarily congruent with those of the U.S. military. They will be present during complex humanitarian emergencies and peacekeeping operations. They will also be present during post-conflict phases of operations. The military does not control their presence in the operating environment nor can it command or control them. At the same time, these organizations typically provide goods and services that augment or complement the military.

NGOs and IGOs often do not understand the military way of doing business; most prefer to go about their affairs independently of the military; some are actively hostile to the military; and sometimes compete with one another. Some will contract with local individuals or organizations to provide logistics support and/or armed security; others will engage external private security firms. Most, however, will want support in one form or another from the military. In some areas they may have long-standing experience; in other areas, they may never have operated before.

This session also addresses the practical challenges and risks associated with civilian contractors in the contemporary operating environment. Contractors are employed by most U.S. government agencies, as well as by IGOs and NGOs. NGOs may also be contractors. All of them may also employ contracted security providers. This is nothing new or unusual—contractors in one form or another have almost always been present on the battlefield and at sea.

In the present period, we confront an unprecedented mix of civilian contractors in the operating environment. These contractors range from cooks and latrine cleaners to truck drivers to intelligence functionaries to interrogators to operational planners to armed security personnel—some of whom may conduct combat operations. Put differently, contractors are now employed in large numbers for a wide array of core military functions as opposed to peripheral or support functions.

There is limited service doctrine (Army doctrine, largely addressing logistics contractors) and less joint doctrine governing contractors (only those accompanying U.S. armed forces). Nevertheless, no joint force commander can hope to plan and execute operations effectively without carefully considering contractors; especially with respect to their consequences for key operational functions, including command and control, operational security, force protection, and logistics. The presence of contractors in an area of operations also raises complex and mostly not yet resolved legal issues concerning Status of Forces Agreements, Rules of Engagement, and the Law of Armed Conflict, not to mention problems of fiduciary responsibility. Adding contractors to the mix makes the problem of maintaining unity of effort with other U.S. government agencies, NGOs, and IGOs even more challenging for the JFC.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Dave Carrington, C-414.

D. Discussion Questions:

What are the distinguishing characteristics of Non-Governmental/Inter-Governmental Organizations?

What are the sources of conflict between the military and NGOs?

In what areas do the interests of NGOs and the military overlap?

How are coordination and cooperation with NGO/IGOs different than interagency coordination and why are these differences important?

What are the main requirements NGO/IGOs seek from the military? How can NGO/IGO capabilities and limitations be incorporated into an OPLAN?

How can the operational commander effectively coordinate, cooperate and communicate with NGO/IGOs to accommodate their requirements and capabilities early in an operation?

What can a joint force commander do to mitigate the risks posed by contractors, NGOs and IGOs?

What considerations must be made for loss of capabilities provided by contractors?

What are the responsibilities of the joint force commander for contractors in his area of operations (e.g., force protection)?

How do contractors affect the management of operational security?

In what ways do contractors alter the level of risk for the joint force commander? Is the risk military, political, or both?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

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United Nations Standing Committee on Humanitarian Relief. "Position paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations in the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance." No Date.

United States Agency for International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. Field Operations Guide (Version 4.0), VI-34–49 (No Date).

Weiss, Thomas G. *Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crise*s. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.

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POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS (Seminar)

Over the course of this war, we have learned that winning the battle for Iraqi cities is only the first step. We also have to win the "battle after the battle."

—President George W. Bush, December 7, 2005

Penetration did not occur simply through synchronization of battlefield functions, but that and more: local infrastructure improvement; training of security forces, understanding and educating the fundamentals of democracy; creating long-lasting jobs that would carry beyond short-term infrastructure improvement; and an information operation (IO) campaign that supported the cultural realities of the area of operations

- MG Peter Chiarelli on Iraq, *Military Review* 2005

A. Focus:

In this session we focus on planning for post-conflict (or post-combat) operations which follow the conventional use of military force. We address the special challenges posed to the joint commander by what comes "after the shooting stops." In a previous session, we considered intergovernmental organizations (specifically the United Nations) and nongovernmental organizations. In this lesson we will expand on the lecture on stability, security, transition and reconstruction and take a look at three case studies: post-WWII Germany and two more modern day experiences, one in Panama and another in Kosovo. These cases provide insight into planning post combat phases – phases IV and V.

B. Objectives/Outcomes:

- Understand the role of the military commander when it comes to conflict termination.
- Comprehend the role of the military commander in phase IV (stabilization) and phase V (transfer of authority to civil authorities) operations.
- Understand the role of the U.S. ambassador and the organization and functions of a Country Team in a U.S. embassy or other elements in the U.S. government in planning post combat operations.
- Understand the role of international organizations—especially the United Nations—in exercising responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.
- Assess the price paid for the failure of military planners to practice regressive planning and to deal with the challenges of what happens after the cessation of conflict.

C. Background:

Military actions in the post-combat environment can be more challenging to plan and execute than in the combat phase. In fact, post-combat operations and combat operations may occur simultaneously until security conditions are right for other non-military activities. Operation Iraqi Freedom—more so than Up Hold Democracy (Haiti), Joint Endeavor (Bosnia) or Joint Guardian (Kosovo)— demonstrated that the military's role in post-combat operations may be significantly different than in normal combat. This is especially true for more senior commanders and staffs. Coordination will be done with other elements of the U.S. government, international organizations, regional organizations, other nations' militaries and civilian agencies, as well as

non-governmental organizations.

The problem becomes how to achieve U.S. objectives while dealing with a host of other actors. Often the objectives are vague and broadly defined, but, more importantly, military forces often have difficulty translating political objectives into concrete achievable military ones. For example, the long-term U.S. objective for Iraq was to create a democratic state in the Middle East. Exactly how the military assists in achieving that objective takes creative thinking and an understanding of the military's role during the post combat phase.

Also complicating the issue is the fact that other agencies within the U.S. government—and not the U.S. military—may have the lead in developing programs and policies. The Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury, as well as senior civilian officials in the Pentagon, may play a very active role in military operations during the post-conflict phase.

This is not a new phenomenon learned after the end of the Cold War. The U.S. military faced many of the same issues following combat operations leading to the surrender of Germany's Third Reich at the end of World War II. President Roosevelt strongly felt that rebuilding Germany should be a State Department effort, not a War Department focus. Then, as now, the State Department lacked the resources to engage right on the heels of combat operations. Consequently, the U.S. military—specifically, the U.S. Army—took on the task.

The invasion of Europe included two sequential plans, Operation Overlord and Operation Eclipse. The operations plan for Eclipse was published months after the Normandy invasion, but was in the hands of forward military units long before they had to carry out assigned tasks. Initially planned as a sequential operation, conditions and tasks for Eclipse were conducted while forward units were still conducting combat operations. The lessons from this historical case study provide some insight into what the military must consider during the planning for post combat operations.

In early 1989, President George H. W. Bush faced a dilemma in Panama. He had, during his victorious campaign for president, argued for a tough stand against General Manuel Noriega. Despite economic, political and diplomatic efforts to force him to resign, Noriega not only remained in control, but increasingly challenged U.S. policy in the region.

In the fall of 1989, as General Colin Powell assumed the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a new commander took over U.S. Southern Command in Panama, the situation reached the crisis stage. American lives and interests, the integrity of the Panama Canal, the Panamanian people's desire for democracy, and the U.S. fight against illegal drug trafficking were all being threatened by the Noriega regime.

Finally in Dec 1989, the U.S. military took action and forcibly removed Noriega from power in operation Just Cause. The combat phase lasted only a few days, and then the U.S. military was left with the task of installing a newly elected government (which Noriega denounced) and reestablishing a secure environment and services for the Panamanian people. The planning for the post-war phase was an afterthought and did

not go well.

Following the problems encountered by the U.S. military in Somalia in 1992-3, the U.S. government asserted that establishing peace in the Balkans was a European problem. Bosnia, however, proved challenging for most of the mid and late 1990s. As the conflict lingered and UN peacekeepers could not end it, the U.S. government chose to become involved. Military force was applied to get the parties to the negotiating table, and an American presidential envoy negotiated a settlement under the Dayton Accords. This resulted in the commitment of 17,000 American troops (of a total NATO force of 60,000) to a peace operation in Bosnia.

As peace began to spread across Bosnia, Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Serbia, turned his nationalist wrath against the ethnic Albanians in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo. International negotiations failed to halt the violence and ethnic cleansing. NATO, under the leadership of the United States took action. A 78-day air operation (Allied Force) from March to June 1999 finally brought Milosevic back to the negotiating table. In the end another 50,000 NATO troops (of which 8,000 were Americans) were sent to secure the peace. In developing objectives for the post combat phase, the U.S. European Command, working closely with NATO and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), integrated military forces from other nations with a host of UN agencies, international organizations and NGOs to solve the issues of humanitarian relief, security, rule of law, governance, and economic recovery. The peace operation in Kosovo still exists today, but at a much reduced strength. The original end state for Kosovo was as an autonomous region of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. That changed in February 2008 when Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia.

During this session, we will examine the nature of the crisis and the planning that was done to implement post-combat operations in Germany and Kosovo. Attention will focus on the way the United States dealt with post-conflict challenges. Analysis of these post combat operations will offer opportunities to see "historic illustrations" of theory and doctrine, principles of joint operations, the range of military operations (ROMO), the challenges of interagency planning, and the role of NGOs and other intergovernmental organizations in a post combat setting.

Students will analyze two case studies: Germany post-World War II and Joint Guardian (Kosovo). All students will read the article by Professor William Flavin. Half of the seminar will read and lead a discussion on Germany, while the other half will read and lead a discussion on Kosovo. In the end the seminar will compare the lessons from Germany and Kosovo to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The point of contact for this session is Professor G. Oliver, C-408.

D. Questions:

For those who have already taken the Naval War College's strategy course: What is the difference between war termination discussed in that course and conflict termination as approached in the Flavin article?

What are the challenges of working with other nations' militaries, international organizations, and NGOs in a post combat environment? How do they see the U.S.

military?

In planning for post-combat operations, what agencies are available to assist? To which can the military turn to optimize planning? From the vantage point of the operational commander, what are the "pros and cons" of interagency involvement?

How do the concepts outlined in the SSTR lesson apply to military operations in Germany and Kosovo?

When the "helm" is finally turned over to an organization other than a military one, how can military assets best be used to support interagency or international efforts in assisting a democratic government, especially a new democratic government trying to take over from an authoritarian regime?

E. Products:

Students will be prepared to discuss case studies on post war Germany and Kosovo. A moderator memorandum will be issued to assign more specific homework.

F. Required Readings:

William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post –Conflict Success," *Parameters,* Vol 33, Autumn 2003, pages 95-112. (**NWC 3140**).

Case Studies:

Germany

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Panama

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Kosovo

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Clay, Lucius. "Achievements of Military Government in 1948," In *Germany 1947–1949: The Story in Documents.* Department of State Publication 3556, Office of Public Affairs, March 1950.

Cole, Ronald H. *Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1998 to January 1990.* Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995.

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United States Army, 1992. Also on website: www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/civaff/index.htm, accessed 9 April 2006.

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Dobbins, James. "Nation-Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower." Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003.

Dobbins, James, Seth Jones , Keith Crane, Beth Cole DeGrasse, *The Beginner's Guide to Nation Building.* Santa Monica, CA; Rand Corporation, 2007.

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Donnelly, Thomas, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker. *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama.* New York: Lexington Books, 1991, 20–35, 57–87.

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Gimbel, John A. *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military 1945–1949.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968.

International Peace Academy. "The Future of UN State-Building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq." *Policy Report, Pocantico Conference Center of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund,* Tarrytown, N.Y., 14–16 November 2003.

Joint History Office (Cole, Ronald H.). *Operation Just Cause—The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama—February 1988–January 1990.* Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 1995.

Orr, Robert C., ed. *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction.* Foreword by John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Internaional Studies Press, 2004.

Paris, Roland. *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict.* Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004.

Phillips, Cody. *Operation Just Cause: The Incursion into Panama.* Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, CMH Pub No. 70-85-1.

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Vlahos, Michael. "A Post-Hostilities Moment," 345–359 in *Rethinking the Principles of War.* Edited by Anthony D. McIvor. Annapolis, MD.

Ziemke, Earl. "Improvising Stability and Change in Postwar Germany." In *American Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952*. Edited by Robert Wolfe. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS (Seminar)

. . . you will take every step in your power to preserve tranquility and order in the city and give security to individuals of every class and description—restraining as far as possible, till the restoration of civil government, every species of persecution, insult, or abuse, either from the soldiery to the inhabitants or among each other.

—General George Washington, 19 June 1778

Initial control of civil affairs will be exercised through the tactical chain of command. The Civil Affairs Section, Sixth Army, is charged with supervision and coordination of relations between the military forces, the civil government, and the resident civilian population. The Commanding General of each Corps, and ASCOM [Army Support Command] will establish a similar agency for supervision and coordination of civil affairs in their respective areas of responsibility.

—Headquarters Sixth Army, Annex 8 to Adm 0 14, Civil Affairs Plan,
Republic of the Philippines, 30 September 1944.

A. Focus:

Civil-Military Operations (CMO) are an inherent responsibility of command, and are conducted across the range of military operations to deal with issues such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and nation assistance. They may be conducted prior to, during, and after military conflict, after foreign disasters, or in support of counterinsurgency programs. The magnitude of the effort needed and the resources devoted will vary depending upon the nature and scope of the joint force commander's (JFC) mission.

B. Objectives:

- Examine the Joint Force Commander's responsibilities for Civil Military Operations and comprehend how the capabilities of Civil Affairs forces complement the Commander's responsibilities.
- Understand the various alternatives available for coordinating civil military operations with host nations, coalition partners, NGOs, IGOs, and other government agencies.
- Understand the challenges of working with host nations, coalition partners, NGOs and IOs at the operational level of war and the solutions developed for common and divergent problems.

C. Background:

According to Joint Publication 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, CMO encompasses the activities that commanders take to ensure positive relations between their forces and civil authorities and between their forces and the general population. CMO also includes protecting resources and institutions wherever U.S. military forces are employed, the goal being to facilitate the achievement of U.S. military and national objectives. Civil Affairs (CA) are the designated personnel trained, equipped and organized to conduct civil affairs activities in support of civil-military operations. Their special skills are often misunderstood by those unfamiliar with CMO.

Civil-military operations (CMO) have been an important part of U.S. military operations throughout U.S. history. Although not always recognized as such, CMO tasks have long been a concern of armies in the field: minimizing civilian interference with military operations, acquiring services and materiel, dealing with displaced civilian personnel in the battlespace, and assisting the commander in accomplishing his legal and moral obligations toward the civilian populace by providing basic humanitarian assistance. For example, Army regulations during the American Civil War cautioned soldiers against pillaging or marauding the enemy's populace or property. Moreover, protected status was provided to churches, hospitals, museums, post offices, and "institutions of public benefit."

During World War II, operational commanders in both Europe and the Pacific devoted considerable attention to CMO. For example, Headquarters U.S. Sixth Army in the Philippines included in its Operations Plan to occupy the Philippine archipelago a Civil Affairs Plan, stating clearly that Commanding General, Sixth Army, was "responsible for Civil Administration and Relief," and outlining broad phases for civil administration, addressing restrictions on the rights and freedoms of the Filipino people as well as adherence to the rule of law, and policy guidance for the reestablishment of local currency and proper compensation for locally-contracted labor. It also directed the creation of Philippine Civil Affairs Units (PCAUs) tasked to "assist field commanders in the administration of civil affairs and relief."

Notwithstanding this history, it was not until 1955 that the Department of the Army established the Civil Affairs and Military Government Branch, USAR, subsequently redesignated as the Civil Affairs (CA) Branch in October 1959. Until very recently, almost all of the U.S. military's civil affairs personnel were members of the Reserve Component—all U.S. Army CA personnel except a single active-duty unit, 96th Civil Affairs battalion (consisting of ~140 personnel with virtually no heavy equipment). There are also 2 Reserve Civil Affairs Groups (CAGs) in the U.S. Marine Corps—the 3d CAG, located on the West Coast, and the 4th CAG, located on the East Coast.

In the post-OEF/OIF environment, that has changed: in December 2005, the Marine Corps assigned all artillery regiments the secondary mission of executing CMO, while in March 2006, the Army announced activation of an active-duty CA brigade, the 95th, eventually to grow from one to four battalions with about 900 personnel by 2009. In a similar move, the U.S. Navy announced establishment of a Maritime Civil Affairs Group (MCAG), consisting of the First and Second Civil Affairs Squadrons (MCAS), reporting to Navy Expeditionary Combat Command when not forward deployed.

Establishing and maintaining civil-military relations is often an important though unstated component of the JFC's overall mission, entailing interaction among U.S. and coalition military personnel, host nation personnel, other government agencies, international governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and contractors, as well as local populations—all with significant roles to play in the JFC's area of responsibility. Properly planned and executed CMO not only reduces friction between the civilian populace and the military, but ultimately minimizes interference with the JFC's overall mission. Civil-Military operations must be considered by JFCs in every aspect of their daily activities from pre-crisis battlespace shaping operations—security cooperation planning—to disaster response, and termination and transition operations following hostilities.

This session focuses on the principal civil-military operations conducted by JFCs: foreign humanitarian assistance (which will be considered in OPS 6-13), populace and resources control, nation assistance, and support to civil administration.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. Hime, C-423.

D. Discussion Questions:

- At what point in a conflict do civil-military operations begin?
- Who has the primary responsibility for planning civil-military operations?
- Under what circumstances should a JCMOTF be established, and how is its mission determined?
- What are the differences between and among a CMOC, HACC, HOC, PRT and where should each be located?
- Who determines measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for civil-military operations and how is success validated?
- What are the differences between/among displaced persons, refugees, evacuees, stateless persons, war victims, internally displaced persons, returnees, and resettlers, and why do the distinctions matter . . . or do they?

E. Products

None.

F. Required Readings:

Fields, Major Kimberly. "Civil-Military Relations: A Military Civil Affairs Perspective." Cambridge, Mass.: Carr Center for Human Rights Policy. Harvard University, 17–18 October 2002. (**NWC 6002**).

Holshek, Christopher. "Civil-Military Power and the Future of Civil Affairs." ROA National Security Report. *The Officer* (May 2007): 45-48. (**NWC 6027**).

Joint Publication 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, 8 July 2008. Read: I-1–I-21 and II-21–II-33.

G. Supplementary Readings:

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Interagency Assessment. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006. Available at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/ pdf_docs/PNADG252.pdf.

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U.S. Marine Corps. MCWP 3-33.1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations, 7 April 2003.

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INSURGENCY (Seminar)

In great campaigns the opponent's system is understood; he is guided by like precedents, and is governed by the same code; it is only when some great reformer of the art of war springs up that it is otherwise. But each small war presents new features, and these features must if possible be foreseen or the regular troops will assuredly find themselves in difficulties and meet with grievous misfortune.

—C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (1906)

A. Focus:

In this session, we focus on the fundamental characteristics of insurgencies in general as well as important variations across individual insurgencies by considering several cases representative of the larger universe of historical insurgencies. The objective is for students to develop the capacity to analyze the structure of any given insurgency in order to devise effective operational plans for countering that insurgency.

B. Objectives/Outcomes:

- Comprehend the "usual" causes of insurgencies and how most insurgencies have been structured.
- Analyze how insurgencies are sustained? Why do they keep going?
- Comprehend the role of a government in discouraging or encouraging popular support for an insurgency.
- Comprehend the problems the result from a misunderstanding of the root causes of an insurgency. It is important to grasp the true nature of an insurgency if you are to counter it.

C. Background:

The American military historically has preferred to conduct conventional large-scale operations against state foes similarly structured and disposed to itself, and episodically has done so, typically (as in Operation Desert Storm in 1991) with great success. It has been much less enthusiastic about conflict at the lower end of the spectrum, although, ironically, such operations have occupied much more of its time and attention than their conventional counterparts.

Of the types of operations spanning the Range of Military Operations (ROMO), insurgency is likely to be among the most challenging, the most misunderstood, and the least likely to respond to the application of military force through conventional operations. It can therefore be assumed that insurgencies will continue to occur, although their specific forms and tactics may change (e.g., from highly developed and formalized Maoist or Leninist models to less formally organized and centrally-directed insurgencies). They may also increasingly take place in urban environments rather than the rural areas where they historically have flourished. Military officers and members of relevant civilian agencies must comprehend how to operate in an uncertain and

ambiguous environment against foes who will likely play by very different rules than those to which U.S. planners and commanders are accustomed.

All insurgencies share certain fundamental characteristics; at the same time *every insurgency has unique properties* that matter. Successfully countering insurgency must begin with an effective practical analysis of the insurgency itself—counterinsurgency campaigns cannot be designed in a vacuum. Historical, cultural, political, and economic factors must be considered, not simply as add-ons to military factors, but as integral to meaningful analysis.

Some concepts of operational art have direct applicability to analyzing and understanding insurgency; others require careful adaptation. Similarly, the Joint Operational Planning process (JOPP) was developed as a planning tool for conventional operations and needs careful tailoring for use in the assessment of insurgencies.

If the analysis is poorly done, the operational plans that follow will have a very small probability of success. As Albert Einstein famously commented: "Nature is very kind: if you ask it the right questions, it will give you the right answers." This session focuses on asking the right questions about insurgency. Students will use a framework of such questions (provided) to analyze specific cases of insurgency, some of which were successful, some which failed, and some of which are ongoing, and whose outcome is not yet known.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Mark Vaughn, C-412.

D. Questions:

If you analyze enemy military forces under the operational factor "force" and the civilian population under the operational factor "space," where should you analyze insurgents? Why? Are the "classic" tools of operational art suited to the analysis of insurgencies?

In what kinds of situations is the U.S. likely to encounter the problem of insurgency? Do the differences across these situations dictate different responses?

How can you plan against an insurgency if you can't know ahead of time just what form it will take?

How does the present global al-Qaeda threat differ from earlier insurgencies? What difference does this make for how the U.S. and its allies should respond?

If insurgency historically has been the resort of the "weak," why do the "strong" find it so challenging to defeat insurgencies?

What are the primary factors that must be present for an insurgency to succeed? Are these factors open to attack? Why?

Can the conditions that lead to insurgency be identified and acted upon early enough in order to preclude the insurgency from starting? How?

What is the danger of an incorrect or improper analysis of an insurgency's root cause (or causes)?

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COUNTERINSURGENCY (Seminar)

There are no easy shortcuts to solving the problems of revolutionary war.

—Bernard Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency" (1965)

. . . my first hours in the Philippines in 1950 were spent with most of the top officials in a country that had been independent for just four years and with the top local officials of the country that had given this newly independent nation its tutelage in self-rule. All were full of news about the threat the Communist Huk posed the infant nation. Yet, curiously enough, Philippine and American officials barely mentioned the political and social factors in briefing me. They dwelt almost exclusively on the military situation. It was as though military affairs were the sole tangible factor they could grasp, like shopkeepers worried about going bankrupt and counting the goods on shelves instead of pondering ways to get the customers coming in again.

—Edward G. Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars* (1972)

A. Focus:

This session addresses the problem of contriving effective counter-insurgency operations and campaigns. In so doing, it considers several case studies of counter-insurgency as representative of the larger universe of counter-insurgency efforts. The objective is for students to develop the capacity to analyze the characteristics of effective counter-insurgency operations and campaigns in order to be better prepared to plan similar such operations in the future

B. Objectives/Outcomes:

- Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations against the capabilities of 21st century adversaries.
- Comprehend (a) how counterinsurgency doctrine and practice have operated in historical insurgencies, and then (b) determine whether the lessons learned from past experiences can be successfully projected into future counterinsurgency operations.
- Understand and critique how the U.S. military is organized to plan and execute counterinsurgency operations.
- Analyze current joint counter-insurgency doctrine and consider how a joint staff should implement that doctrine.
- Understand the lessons of historical counter-insurgency operations that are appropriate to apply to current or future counter-insurgency operations.

C. Background:

While often called upon to conduct counter-insurgency operations, the U.S. military has for understandable reasons shown no great enthusiasm for them, treating such operations as aberrations and distractions from its real business of conducting large-scale conventional operations. However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent absence of a peer military competitor, along with the continued violence in failing and failed states, and burgeoning extremist movements in many parts of the world, U.S. forces are more likely to conduct counter-insurgency operations than

conventional operations for the foreseeable future.

In certain respects, counter-insurgency operations are significantly more complex than conventional operations. They inevitably involve greater uncertainty and ambiguity. Often their time frame is very long—and it is very hard to know when you are done. Typically, the military is cast in a supporting role to U.S. civilian agencies and the host government (where one exists). Finally, technological fixes are less applicable than in conventional operations. Finding meaningful measures of effectiveness is especially challenging when compared with conventional operations. Because of the long time frame, the foe may have the opportunity to adapt at both tactical and operational levels to U.S. and allied efforts. Information operations are also likely to loom more important in counter-insurgencies.

The character of effective counter-insurgency operations varies according to their time and place and the foes against which they are conducted; that is, the character of the insurgency strongly affects the character of the counter-insurgency operation. However, just as there are certain fundamental characteristics common to all insurgencies, certain basic characteristics describe effective counter-insurgency operations/campaigns.

Students will use a framework of questions (provided) to analyze specific cases of counter-insurgency operations of varying degrees of success. A competent, historically-based understanding of the basic characteristics of effective counter-insurgency operations will provide a foundation for designing future such operations.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Mark Vaughn, C-412.

D. Questions:

Can we determine those characteristics common to effective counter-insurgency campaigns? If so, what are they?

What are the consequences of failing to address popular grievances with an existing government? Should the counter-insurgent force compel the existing government to reform?

What are the consequences of misapplying conventional forces not prepared or trained for counter-insurgency operations?

Should we think about operational factors differently in counter-insurgency than in conventional combat operations? If so, how?

To what extent should the specifics of time and place drive counter-insurgency campaigns?

Why does the U.S. military find it difficult to prepare for counter-insurgency campaigns?

Is the Joint Operational Planning process (JOPP) well-adapted for analyzing insurgencies? If not, how would you adapt it?

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COMPLEX IRREGULAR WARFARE (Seminar)

The problems associated with countering irregular threats are complex, dynamic, and daunting. Their solutions require a long-term, comprehensive approach in the application of the instruments of national power and influence. While we are naturally predisposed toward quick and decisive conflict resolution, our conventional military preeminence virtually guarantees adversaries will resort to irregular means.

Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC, June 2006

Irregular wars in general, and hybrid wars in particular, reflect a style of war in which "finding and fixing" the opponent in a congested urban complex or in complex terrain is usually much more difficult than actually "finishing" him.

Lt. Col. Frank Hoffman, USMC (Ret.)

A. Focus:

In Book Eight of *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz argued that, "If war is part of policy, policy will determine its character. As policy becomes more ambitious and vigorous, so will war, and this may reach the point where war attains its absolute form." Are we seeing movement toward an "absolute form" of war, with combatants hiding among civilians, with non-state organizations usurping what were once the powers only of states, and with the range of military operations (ROMO) expanding into economics and "strategic communication"? Have organizations such as al Qaeda and Hezbollah begun a process of driving war toward its "absolute form," where there is no distinction between soldier and civilian, and where the global economy and the internet are battlegrounds? Some say this is what is happening. If it is, then you will have to find ways to plan for it at a level above the tactical.

B. Objectives/Outcomes:

- What are the trends in warfare? Identify their implications for operational planning and execution.
- Analyze current thinking about irregular warfare, global terrorism, and hybrid warfare. Are these forms of conflict basically the same, or are there major differences among them? Be able to discuss this intelligently.
- Identify the advantages and disadvantages possessed by U.S. and allied forces in irregular warfare.
- Explain how a planning staff can tap all the elements of U.S. national power and the resources and ideas of allies to counter irregular warfare and the current global insurgency, especially at the operational level of war.
- Decide whether the existing doctrinal planning process (JOPP) can be used in combating enemies skilled at irregular and/or hybrid warfare.

C. Background:

"Irregular" warfare and "hybrid" warfare are important concepts, but there is some debate about what each term means. Despite the disagreements that have led to this

debate, the military services in the United States and the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) have taken the initiative and produced several new publications to help military personnel deal with what appears to be a new form (or several new forms) of warfare.

In June 2006, the U.S. Marine Corps published a *Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats*. In August 2006, Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) put out a *Special Study on Irregular Warfare*. In December 2006, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps jointly published a new capstone manual for counterinsurgency, FM 3-24/USMC 3-33.5, that organized lessons from campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. In February 2007, the Defense Department issued the first *Joint Operating Concept for Irregular Warfare*.

In effect, military professionals in the United States are working out both new definitions of conflict and new ways of dealing with what is termed "irregular" warfare and "hybrid" warfare. The Joint Center for Operational Analysis at JFCOM is trying to (a) capture the relevant "lessons learned" from campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and (b) forge new approaches to the challenges posed by organizations that rely on "irregular" methods.

Other governments are also interested in new or novel forms of warfare. For example, two Chinese military officers began an intense international debate in 1999 by arguing that militarily weaker nations would have to resort to "war beyond limits" when confronted by an opponent such as the United States. This idea seemed to undercut the notion that there were areas (like international finance) and people (like women and children) normally and sometimes legally protected *by governments* from the effects of war.

Members of al Qaeda have also written about ways to attack nations—especially the United States—possessing powerful conventional forces. On September 11, 2001, for example, al Qaeda terrorists bypassed U.S. military defenses and struck directly and without warning at unarmed civilians. Such terrorists ignore the Law of Armed Conflict and see no limits to how and when they will strike civilians and military personnel alike. Is there a way to plan to defeat opponents like al Qaeda *without* abandoning the idea that war has limits? Will future wars be limited to attacks on the cybernetic infrastructure of modern societies, or will conflict become more absolute? These are some of the important issues that this session will address.

Point of contact for this session is Professor Tom Hone, C-406.

D. Questions:

How can a combatant commander's staff see the situation from the enemy's perspective in a world where states and non-state organizations practice "unrestricted warfare"?

Can the U.S. government defeat "terrorism" without moving beyond the idea that warfare should have limits?

What are the common threads (if any) that link terms such as "irregular" warfare, "hybrid" warfare, and "unrestricted" warfare?

How can you plan against an opponent who strikes while embedded within a civilian

population?

What are some ways that the staff of a combatant commander can plan to use the interagency resources needed for an effective campaign against international terrorists?

Is warfare changing in a fundamental way, or not? Why or why not?

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Joint Pub 3-40, *Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction*. July 2004. (JEL).

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Mattis, James N. "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars." *Proceedings* of the U.S. Naval Institute 131 (November 2005): 18-19.

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Peters, Ralph. "The New Warrior Class." *Parameters* 24 (Summer 1994): 16-26.

Post, Jerrold M. "Killing in the Name of God: Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda." In *Know Thy Enemy/Profiles of Adversary Leaders and their Strategic Cultures*. Edited by Barry R. Schneider and Jerrold M. Post. Maxwell AFB: USAF, 2003.

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U.S. Marine Corps, Combat Development Command and U.S. Special Operations Command Center for Knowledge and Futures. *Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, Aug. 2006.

_____. *A Concept for Countering Irregular Threats: A Comprehensive Approach*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps. 14 June 2006.

_____. *Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats: An Updated Approach to Counterinsurgency Operations*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 7 June 2006.

_____. *Small Wars Manual*. With an Introduction by Ronald Schaffer. Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1996 [Originally published 1940].

PEACE OPERATIONS (Seminar)

Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that defenses of peace must be constructed.

—Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Culture Organization (UNESCO)

My experience in Haiti reaffirmed my belief that combat trained soldiers, given a focused objective, time and resources to prepare, and led by adaptive and mentally agile leaders at all levels, will perform superbly as peacekeepers.

—Lieutenant General Joseph W. Kinzer,
U.S. Army Force Commander, United Nations Mission in Haiti

We learned that when you use land combat power in the peacekeeping or peace building role, you can't achieve an end state of long term peace—of stability and prosperity in the area. In general, a military element only can bring about the absence of war.

—Major General William Nash, U.S. Army Commanding General of Task Force Eagle, Bosnia

A. Focus:

This lesson focuses on peace operations from an operational perspective. The lesson begins with an overview of the U.S. history in peace operations. It then provides the central issues of planning for peace operations. This includes how the U.S. and the United Nations (UN) approach planning.

B. Objectives/Outcomes:

- Synthesize the fundamentals of peace operations and how they are different from the principles of war.
- Comprehend the evolution of peace operations since their inception in the late 1940s, and how the United States military might perform such an operation.
- Understand the role of international organizations, especially the United Nations, in exercising its responsibility to maintain international peace and security.
- Comprehend some planning considerations for peace operations with specific emphasis on missions that might be part of a peace operation.

C. Background:

The commitment of U.S. forces to peace operations (peacekeeping and peace enforcement) has proven controversial during the last decade. There are two basic camps in this policy debate: one favors a broader use of U.S. forces in many roles, while the other wishes to reserve the military for war-fighting. The issues of combat readiness, retaining flexibility in the use of force, command and control arrangements, and the role of the U.S. military in the post–Cold War era have been and remain an integral part of this debate.

To some degree, the debate was resolved in November 2005 with the promulgation of Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 ("Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations"), which states that "Stability operations are

a core U.S. military mission… [and] They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations…" But the publication of this directive did not settle all the issues surrounding peace operations.

During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union rarely participated in peace operations because both considered it best to keep the two superpowers apart. Since the Cold War's end, U.S. and Russian involvement in peace operations has increased. At the same time, peacekeeping missions have changed from neutral involvement (keeping the opposing sides apart) to impartial actions (promoting peaceful outcomes).

In recent missions, the consent of the opposing sides to impartial mediation and to the use of force to sustain a cease-fire has often been difficult to obtain. As a result, peace enforcement has largely become a mission for coalitions of the willing and for UN-sponsored "peace support operations" (a NATO term).

As the 1990s unfolded, some practitioners called into question the effectiveness of peace enforcement operations because of the failures in Somalia and Bosnia. However, more recent interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor have demonstrated that peace enforcement can be a useful tool for managing conflicts within nations that may have regional and international implications as well as conflicts between nations.

During the Clinton administration, the U.S. military executed several peace operations—Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, and a host of other, smaller UN missions. By contrast, the current Bush administration has refrained from engaging in such operations and even attempted to pull U.S. forces from on-going missions it inherited.

Following 9/11, the United States did not commit military forces to the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) (a peacekeeping force) in Afghanistan, but chose to remain separate and distinct from other forces and continue the search for Osama bin Laden. Eventually U.S. CENTCOM developed the concept of deploying Provisional Reconstruction Teams to assist Afghanistan with reconstruction.

In Iraq today, many of the skills being used by military forces coincide with the skills of peacekeepers. Given the large number of long-simmering intra-state and inter-state conflicts in the world today and the increasing interconnectedness of economic and security issues across states and regions, it is highly probable that the U.S. military will find itself planning and executing peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations well into the future.

This ninety minute session will expose the students to the challenges of modern day peace operations, familiarize them with the existing doctrine, and increase their comprehension of the issues involved in planning and preparing for peace operations.

The point of contact for this session is Professor G. Oliver. C-408.

D. Questions:

What is the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement? What key strategic and operational factors should be considered when planning for these missions?

Define the various fundamentals of peace operations and determine how and why they are different than the principles of war or other fundamentals.

Who is in charge of a peace operation and whom do the military commanders work for? How does the U.S. view command relationships in this context and how and why does the U.S. perspective differ from those of other nations?

What are the challenges of working with other nations' militaries, international organizations, and NGOs? How can those challenges be surmounted?

What role does the United Nations play in international peacekeeping, and how does the UN go about establishing a peacekeeping mission?

E. Required Readings:

Oliver, George. "Evolution of International and UN Peacekeeping." (**NWC 3008B**).

Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*, 17 October 2007. Read: "Executive Summary and Primer for Peace Operations, Chapter 1", pages vii through xiii and I-1 through I-18.

United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*. Chapter 1, pages 13-16, Chapters 4 and 5, pages 47-57, and Chapter 7, pages 66-74. (**NWC 7011**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Bellamy, Alex J., Paul Wiliams and Stuart Griffin. *Understanding Peacekeeping*. Cambridge: Polity, 2004.

Bolton, John. "United States Policy on United Nations Peacekeeping." *World Affairs,* Winter 2001: 129–148.

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Durch, William J. ed. *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*. New York: St Martin's Press, 1996.

Durch, William J. ed. *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. New York: St Martin's Press, 1993.

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PDD 25, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," May 1994.

Shawcross, William. *Deliver Us from Evil: Peacekeeping, Warlords, and a World of Endless Conflict.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000.

United Nations Charter, Chapter VI and VII.

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS (Seminar)

***Civil-Military Coordination**: The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.*

—Guidelines for Humanitarian Organisations on Interacting with Military and Other Security Actors in Iraq 20 October 2004

A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. While military assets will remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organization. This does not [imply] any civilian control over military assets.

—United Nations. "The Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies." March 2003.

A. Focus:

In this session we focus the Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) subset of the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) for which the joint force commander must plan and execute. Operation Unified Assistance, the relief efforts following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, is used as a case study to explore the planning challenges and special considerations common to HA missions.

B. Objectives/Outcomes:

- Understand the role of USAID/OFDA as the lead federal agency for foreign humanitarian assistance and the military-USAID/OFDA relationship during FHA operations.
- Understand the complexity of humanitarian assistance operations, the range of potential military FHA tasks, and the factors which should be considered when planning or executing FHA.
- Analyze the execution of Operation Unified Assistance (Indian Ocean tsunami relief) to gain insights into the complexity of FHA and determine any planning considerations that might be of use in future FHA operations.
- Comprehend the additional challenges of conducting FHA operations during "complex humanitarian emergencies".

C. Background:

During the last two decades, the U.S. military has conducted numerous humanitarian assistance operations. Those within the United States and Territories are classified as Defense Support of Civilian Authorities while those in other nations are classified as Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) operations. FHA operations range from simple to highly complex, from short to long duration, and take place in permissive to hostile environments.

As 2003 post-earthquake relief operations in Bam, Iran demonstrated, apart from

altruistic motivations, it is usually in the national interest of the United States to relieve human suffering from natural or man-made causes in other nations. This is especially important at a time when the United States and its allies are contending with organized religious extremists for the hearts and minds of people across the planet. The U.S. military inevitably plays some role in these efforts. There is every reason to believe that the U.S. military will continue to provide humanitarian assistance in the foreseeable future.

No two FHA operations are exactly the same, but there are common themes worthy of study. Some result from developments over the medium or long term, such as climate-caused famine; others from unpredictable catastrophic events, such as tropical cyclones, tsunamis, earthquakes or volcanic eruptions. Unfortunately, humanitarian disasters are increasingly intertwined with civil war and insurgencies. In these Complex Humanitarian Emergencies (CHEs) all sides may use provision of (or denial of) food and other forms of relief as weapons, or other forms of coercion, as evidenced in Somalia in the 1990s and presently in Darfur, Sudan. The military must therefore be prepared to conduct FHA operations as complex contingency operations.

Foreign humanitarian assistance operations may be conducted as a stand-alone mission or as part of post-conflict operations, peace operations, or other efforts. As such, some FHA operations are conducted under permissive conditions where U.S. military presence may be welcome while other FHA operations are conducted under combat or high threat conditions. For some operations, prior planning may be possible; others will require highly compressed crisis action planning.

At the same time, successful planning and execution of foreign humanitarian assistance operations require careful attention to the cultural factors specific to the locale, lest the military by its efforts inadvertently undermine U.S. national interests.

All FHA operations involve interaction with a wide array of nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), ranging from local organizations to the International Committee of the Red Cross; and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), including United Nations agencies, such as the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) and the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Host-nation, alliance, coalition, local, or third-country military forces may also be involved. Working with NGOs, IGOs, and other countries as partners in these operations involves special considerations and requires an understanding of the vast differences in cultures, missions, capabilities and concerns among the various parties.

The United States Agency for International development (USAID) is the lead federal agency for foreign humanitarian assistance. USAID coordinates the overall U.S. government response effort and coordinates U.S. efforts with the UN. When the military is involved in FHA the military is typically in a supporting role. Working thorough its Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Relief (OFDA), USAID also funds relief activities. Thus, effective interagency coordination comprises a key ingredient for successful foreign humanitarian assistance operations.

So we see that planning for FHA is particularly challenging. All geographic combatant commanders maintain functional plans for humanitarian assistance. However, the

nearly infinite variation in potential disaster types and locations in a combatant commander's AOR renders it impossible to pre-plan responses much beyond the cursory level. Once a disaster occurs, speed of response is of the essence, and planning is often done on the fly. Given these constraints, a solid understanding of the fundamental factors and considerations unique to the HA mission is crucial.

The point of contact for this session is Professor I.T. Luke, M-36

D. Questions:

What is the range of military tasks that might be useful in HA? What military components could provide those tasks?

What are some of the C2 options for organizing a joint force for an HA mission? What are the pros and cons of those options? What, if any, special organizational elements (centers, cells, and teams) might prove useful in HA?

How can the joint force commander address the surprise characteristic of natural disasters?

How should HA be treated differently when it is coupled with peace operations? With post-conflict operations? How does HA differ when the UN is involved? How does it differ when coalition partners participate? What additional planning considerations apply?

How does FHA differ from defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) during domestic disaster relief?

Which NGOs and IOs are likely to be encountered in HA? What are some considerations for working effectively with NGOs and IGOs?

From the Op Unified Assistance case study, what is you evaluation of the PACOM and CSF 536 restated missions and commander's intent? In hindsight, were they effective and useful for planning the operation? What insights might be drawn relevant to future FHA operations?

What useful insights might be drawn from the Op Unified Assistance USAID lessons learned?

Evaluate the C2 structure of CSF-536. What strengths and weaknesses were revealed?

Evaluate the decision to establish the JFACC remotely in Hawaii.

What are the key considerations for developing and executing an exit strategy for HA operations? Evaluate the exit strategy for Op Unified Assistance. Were the transition criteria appropriate in light of political and other considerations?

E. Required Readings:

Natsios, Andrew S. "Commander's Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies." *Parameters* (Summer 1996): 50–66. (**NWC 3082**).

JMO Department. "Operation Unified Assistance" (Case Study). Naval War College, 2007. (**NWC 3096A**).

United States Agency for International Development. Bureau for Humanitarian Response. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. *Field Operations Guide* (Version 4.0,September 2005), F-2 through F-17. (**NWC 3095**).

Wilhelm, Phil. *USAID and DoD Roles in Foreign Disaster Response*. (**NWC 6011**).

F. Supplementary Readings:

Baker, George W. and Dwight W. Chapman, eds. *Man and Society in Disaster*. With a foreword by Carlyle F. Jacobsen. New York: Basic, 1962.

Belgrad, Eric A., and Mitza Nachmias, eds. *The Politics of International Humanitarian Relief Operations*. With a foreword by General Sir Michael Rose. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997.

Byman, Daniel, et al. "Military Tasks in Complex Contingencies," "Overview of the Relief Community," "Advantages to Better Coordination with the Relief Community," "Barriers to Improved Coordination with Relief Agencies." Chapters 4, 6, 7, and 9 in *Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Responses*. Santa Monica, Calif,: RAND, 2000.

Cahill, Kevin M. *A Framework for Survival—Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993.

Constantine, G. Ted. *Intelligence Support to Humanitarian-Disaster Relief Operations*. An Intelligence Monogram. Center for the Study of Intelligence, December 1995.

Deng, Francis M., and Larry Minear. *The Challenges of Famine Relief—Emergency Operations in the Sudan*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992.

Davidson, Lisa Witzig, Margaret Daly Hayes, and James J. Landon. *Humanitarian and Peace Operations: NGOs and the Military in the Interagency Process*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1996.

Elleman, Bruce A. *Shaping the Maritime Environment: An Operational History of the U.S. Navy's Role in "Unified Assistance."* Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 17 August 2006.

_____. *Waves of Hope, The U.S. Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia*. Newport Paper 28. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press. February 2007.

Headquarters, Department of the Army. "Working With the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance" GTA 41-01-006, October 2007.

Joint Publication 3-07.6, *Joint TTPs for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 6 August 2001.

Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operation*s, Vols. I & II. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 17 March 2006.

United Nations. *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief*, May 1994.

United Nations Standing Committee on Humanitarian Relief. "Position paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations in the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance." No Date.

United Nations. "The Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies." March 2003.

United States Institute of Peace, *Taking It To The Next Level: Civilian-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies*, Virtual Diplomacy Initiative. http://www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/nextlevel.html

Weiss, Thomas G., and Cindy Collins. *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996.

MODULE EIGHT
CAPSTONE PLANNING EXERCISE

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CAPSTONE PLANNING EXERCISE

A. Focus:

Successfully prosecuting modern campaigns requires more than technical competence in the military domain, effective operational concepts, and finely honed planning skills. Military officers must also contend with a range of issues beyond the military aspects of national power. Exploring the entire range of military operations, Module EIGHT addresses the topics necessary for understanding and meeting today's national security challenges through a comprehensive Naval Planning Exercise using a DPRK Case Study. Students will work through the planning process as members of a CTF staff and its functional components/coalition/multinational partners to develop a comprehensive plan for the employment of joint and coalition/multinational forces in a complex contingency. The critical historical review undertaken in the Strategy and War trimester gives the student the intellectual background and experiences of the Great Captains. It serves as the intellectual equivalent of a kick start in the refinement of their strategic intuition. Force-planning problems developed in the National Security Decision Making trimester highlight to the students the tumultuous route the U. S. military follows to develop and field forces and that in most cases the fielded forces do not meet the capabilities needed. This further refines the student's experiential tool kit and assists in refining the student's problem solving skills.

B. Description:

This module provides the opportunity for students to demonstrate different skill sets, a broad understanding of the complexity of planning military operations as part of a large CTF Staff, and dig deeper into the critical issues of the contemporary operating environment, including interagency coordination, joint/coalition/multinational operations, and the political-military perspectives needed to achieve national objectives in theater. The objective is to provide students with the tools, concepts, principles, and doctrine required for accomplishing modern military tasks. A strategic setting lecture will begin the module. The CTF planning exercise will use JP 3.0, JP 5.0, NWP 5-01, the DPRK case study, PACOM Warning Order, Security Cooperation Plan, CONPLAN 5290, CONPLAN 5925 and JOPES planning formats to analyze the situation, conduct mission analysis, develop courses of actions (COAs), analyze and compare the student developed COA's through the wargaming technique. Students will prepare and give decision briefs as a CTF Staff to the seminar moderators. The planning exercise culminates with an Internal Transition Brief in the Pringle Auditorium

CAPSTONE EXERCISE (DPRK CASE STUDY)
(Lecture and Seminar/Staff Planning Exercise)

Plans must be simple and flexible. Actually, they only form a datum plane from which you build as necessity directs or opportunity offers. They should be made by the people who are going to execute them . . .

—George S. Patton

A. Focus:

The final event in the JMO JPME Phase I curriculum is a CAPSTONE Planning Exercise in a collaborative and distributed environment using some of the technology tools (DCTS, GCCS-M, etc). The purpose of the exercise is to finally synthesize and reinforce course material through practical application in a realistic Joint Task Force, multinational, interagency and component staff environment in the solving of a military problem. This is an educational planning exercise that provides students with an opportunity to apply the principles and concepts studied throughout the trimester. While the issues students confront in this exercise are real, the situations used to highlight these issues and the solutions the students select are hypothetical.

B. Objectives:

- Analyze the capabilities and limitations of military forces in the development of a Crisis Action Plan when there are competing global security demands
- Analyze the challenges associated with integrating and synchronizing information operations into plans at the operational level of war in a joint, multinational planning exercise
- Analyze and apply the integration of instruments of national power in achieving operational level objectives in support of theater objectives, with a focus on employment of military instrument of national power
- Analyze and apply the concepts of operational art, doctrine, joint, operational planning, to develop a course of action at the Combined Task Force (CTF) and component level
- Comprehend how a CTF staff and supporting component commands contribute to operational-level leadership and decision-making in an uncertain and complex environment
- Comprehend the challenges/friction associated with crisis action planning on a CTF staff/components: conducting collaborative communications, conducting staff transitions, conducting parallel planning, maintaining a common operational picture, managing information, operating in a resource-constrained environment, building unity of effort, coordinating with non-military agencies and synchronizing the CTF planning effort
- Develop and present a variety of military briefs and written products associated with the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP)

- Synthesize the ability to integrate and synchronize information operations in plans at the operational level of war in a joint, multinational planning exercise

C. Background:

The CAPSTONE Planning Exercise/War game is conducted in MLH and is normally scheduled from 0830-1630 each day. JPME Phase I students will receive a higher headquarters Warning Order, Security Cooperation Plans (SCPs) and conduct a mission analysis, COA development, COA War Game and analysis. Students will be required to leverage the skills learned during the academic year, including professional military briefing techniques. The exercise culminates in a Transition Brief given to a senior officer. Moderators will be assigned to critical positions in the exercise CTF, including commanders, principal staff officers, liaison officers and selected centers, boards and cells. Moderators are Officers Conducting the Exercise (OCE) whose primary purpose is to guide student combined, joint staff elements and components in attaining educational goals and developing required products.

The exercise is conducted in three phases: crisis development and deployment planning, humanitarian assistance planning, and transition planning. In the crisis development and deployment phase, staffs organize and familiarize themselves with the communications system and read information concerning the developing crisis. The various components will analyze their missions and develop potential Requests for Forces if allocated forces are felt to be insufficient. These forces will be provided to the CTF 4 who will, utilizing CFAST, determine transportation feasibility. In the event of flow conflict, the Component Commanders and the CTF Commander will determine flow of forces, accepting risk as appropriate.

As the crisis develops, staffs continue the process of crisis action planning. The exercise is designed to highlight the realities of distributive, collaborative, concurrent, and parallel planning in a networked environment, including the interaction of selected boards, bureaus, cells and centers. All staffs conduct their own estimates, make recommendations up the chain-of-command, and respond to tasking from their seniors. Similarly, the flow of information and events will challenge staffs to deal with immediate events while planning for future operations. Each component will conduct supporting planning and deployment planning. Without parallel planning, components will fail in this effort.

During the first week of the exercise, issues of how to secure the environment and how to deal with transition related issues will be planned. These closely relate to the Desired End State, as defined by the political (strategic) objective(s). Emphasis is placed on transition planning first, highlighting the regressive planning construct discussed and exercised previously. Recognizing that transition planning cannot be done in a vacuum; students will conduct the first week planning under the penumbra of humanitarian assistance, nesting transition concepts and plans with potential humanitarian assistance operations.

Following the development of transition plans by the CTF and supporting concepts by Components, the humanitarian assistance phase will present the staffs with the opportunity to respond to new and unexpected situations that will require new planning

or execution of various branches or sequels to their original plans. Modifications to the plans developed for transition will be developed as a result of planning for HA operations.

The Control Team for the exercise is composed of faculty moderators, War Gaming Department representatives, and representatives from the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) Detachment. Within each board, staff section, center, and cell a faculty moderator will assist students with organization, exercise mechanics, intelligence/information, and assessment. The Control Team provides feedback to student staffs in the form of event injects or intelligence assessments, enabling the control group to adjust the scenario and tempo to meet exercise objectives.

Throughout the exercise, several activities will recur with which the students will have to deal; including staff processes that integrate political, military, informational and economic factors; information operations; mine warfare; strategic mobility; conflict termination and transition operations. Students conduct shift change briefings daily to ensure continuity of effort between Blue and Gold Teams that work together as one CTF staff. A command update briefing is conducted each morning to maintain situational awareness across the staff and to provide commander's guidance within an evolving, complex operational environment. Additionally, a rigorous battle rhythm is executed by the students, that includes daily video teleconferences between the CTF Staff and its component Headquarters and with the higher PACOM Headquarters. The final student event will be a Rehearsal of Concept Brief to all students and faculty.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel Greg Reilly, C-421

D. Questions:

What are the fundamental responsibilities of the Combined, Joint Force Commander and his staff in the planning process?

How can the Combined Force Commander (CFC) ensure Components receive timely information that enables them to develop supporting plans in a parallel fashion?

How does the CFC plan transition operations under the rubric of HA operations? What modifications are required to transition plans once HA planning begins in earnest?

How does the CFC best integrate other elements of national power in accomplishing strategic objectives?

How does the combined staff maintain situational awareness across the staff and with components during the planning process?

E. Products:

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment

Mission Analysis Decision Briefing

Various Staff Information Briefings

Course of Action Decision Briefing

Transition/Rehearsal of Concept Briefs

F. Required Readings:

ILC Game Website

NWP 5-01 Navy Planning Process (Issued).

Security Cooperation Plan (Provided on the Game Web).

DPRK Scenario (Issued), and on the Game Web.

CONPLAN 5290 Defense of the Strait of Malacca (Game Web)

CONPLAN 5925 Defense of the Republic of Korea (Game Web)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Since the exercise involves application of material covered throughout the trimester, students can decide which references will be needed based on the role(s) assigned and individual knowledge and experience. In addition to the Joint Publication set, the documents listed below should be reviewed.

CJCSM 3122.01A *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)*, Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures, 29 September 2006.

CJCSM 3122.03A, (JOPES Vol. II), *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance*, 31 December 1999, CH-1, 6 September 2000 **(JEL)** and (Seminar Reserve), and on the Game Web.

U.S. Naval War College, *Forces/Capabilities Handbook*, Newport, R.I. (**NWC 3153J**), (Issued), and on the Game Web.

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*, Chapters 5–10 (Issued), and on the Game Web.

Joint Staff Washington, D. C., CJCSM 3500.04D, 1 August 2005, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL),* Review Annex C to Appendix C to Enclosure B, *Operational Tasks, Measures, and Criteria*. (JEL).

U.S. Naval War College. *Blue Force Standing Rules of Engagement*, Newport, R.I. (**NWC 2012A**), (Issued), and on the Game Web.

U.S. Naval War College, *IT Tools User Guide*, Newport, R.I. (**NWC 5012**), (Issued), and on the Game Web.

ADDENDA COURSE SESSION CRITIQUE NOTES

MODULE ONE COURSE FOUNDATIONS

OPS 1-1, 1-3 Course Overview/Introduction (Lecture & Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 1-2 The American Way of War (Lecture)
Comments:

OPS 1-4 Range of Military Operations (Lecture/Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 1-5 Operations Research Paper (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 1-6 The Naval Way of War (Lecture)
Comments:

OPS 1-7 Principles of War (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 1-8 U.S. National Military Organization
Comments:

OPS 1-9 Introduction to Planning (Lecture)
Comments:

General Comments:

MODULE TWO OPERATIONAL ART

OPS 2-1 Classical Military Thinkers and Operational Art (Lecture/Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 2-2 Introduction to Operational Art (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 2-3 Operational Art and Doctrine, Service Cultures (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 2-4 Leyte Operation: Strategic Setting (Lecture)
Comments:

OPS 2-5 Military Objectives and the Levels of War (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 2-6 Operational Factors (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 2-7 The Theater : Its Structure and Geometry (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 2-8 Methods of Combat Force Employment (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 2-9 Operational Functions (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 2-10 Elements of Combat Force Employment (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS2-11 Operational Design (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 2-12 Operational Leadership (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 2-13 Operational Lessons Learned (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 2-14 Falklands/Malvinas Case Study (Seminar)
Comments:

General Comments:

MODULE THREE OPERATIONAL & MARITIME LAW

OPS 3-1 International Law and the Legal Bases for the Use of Force (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 3-2 Maritime Operational Law (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 3-3 Law of Armed Conflict (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 3-4 Rules of Engagement (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 3-5 ROE Case Study (Seminar)
Comments:

General Comments:

MODULE FOUR OPERATIONAL WARFARE AT SEA

OPS 4-1 The Maritime Domain (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 4-2 Influence of Physical Environment on Naval Warfare (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 4-3 Employment of Naval Forces Across the Spectrum of War at Sea (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 4-4 Objectives of Naval Warfare (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 4-5 Major Naval Operations (Seminar)
Comments :

OPS 4-6 Fundamentals Surface Warfare (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 4-7 Fundamentals of Submarine Warfare (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 4-8 Fundamentals of Air/ Strike Warfare (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 4-9 Fundamentals of Anti-Submarine Warfare (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 4-10 Fundamentals of Mine Warfare (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 4-11 Fundamentals of Amphibious Warfare (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 4-12 Attack and Defense/Protection of Maritime Trade (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 4-13 Maritime Operational Functions (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 4-14 Designing Major Naval Operations (Seminar)

General Comments:

MODULE FIVE JOINT/COMBINED WARFARE

OPS 5-1 U.S. Navy Capabilities and Doctrine (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 5-2 U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Doctrine (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 5-3 U.S. Marine Corps Capabilities and Doctrine (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 5-4 Operational Command and Control (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 5-5 U.S. Army Capabilities and Doctrine
Comments:

OPS 5-6 U.S. Air Force Capabilities and Doctrine (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 5-7 U.S. Special Operations Forces: Capabilities and Employment Considerations (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 5-8 Multinational Operations (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 5-9 Information Operations (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 5-10 Operational Logistics (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 5-11 Strategic Deployment (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 5-13 Intelligence Support to Operational Decision-making and Planning (Lecture)
Comments:

OPS 5-14 Department of State and the Country Team (Lecture)
Comments:

General Comments:

MODULE SIX OPERATIONAL DECISION MAKING & PLANNING

OPS 6-1 Military Decision Making and Planning (Lecture)
Comments:

OPS 6-2 Joint Operational Planning & Execution System (JOPES) (Classified Lecture/Classified Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 6-3 The Joint Staff and Staff Estimates (Lecture)
Comments:

OPS 6-4 Military Briefings (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 6-5 Planning Exercise: Borneo Case Study (Seminar)
Comments:

General Comments:

MODULE SEVEN CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS

OPS 7-1 Failed States (Lecture/Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 7-2 Homeland Security (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 7-3 Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR) (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 7-4 Security Cooperation Planning (Seminar Exercise)
Comments:

OPS 7-5 Interagency Operations (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 7-6 NGOs and IGOs (Panel/Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 7-7 Post-Conflict Operations (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 7-8 Civil-Military Operations (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 7-9 Insurgency (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 7-10 Counterinsurgency (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 7-11 Complex Irregular Warfare and Global Insurgency (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 7-12 Peace Operations (Seminar)
Comments:

OPS 7-13 FHA and Disaster Relief (Seminar)
Comments :

General Comments:

MODULE EIGHT CAPSTONE PLANNING EXERCISE

OPS 8-1	Capstone Exercise (DPRK Case Study) (Lecture and Seminar/Staff Planning Exercise)

Comments:

JMO Department—Faculty and Staff Directory

NAME/RANK/SERVICE	PHONE	ROOM	STATUS
Barker, Jeffrey	16457	C-431	Faculty/Module 1&2 Lead
Barker, Michael	16598	H-243	Faculty/CDE
Bergstrom, Albion	16484	C-430	Faculty
Brown, Timothy LTC	15456	C-412	Faculty
Burke, Robert CDR	12671	C-406	Faculty
Butler, James	16478	C-429	Faculty/Phase II JPME
Carrington, David	16230	C-414	Faculty
Chisholm, Donald	12328	C-422	Faculty
Clarke, Patricia	12596	C-417	Staff
Cook, James CAPT	13556	C-213	Faculty/Department Chair
Croskey, Michael	12527	MLH-136	Faculty/NOPC
Crowell, Richard M.	12598	C-421	Faculty
Dalton, James CDR	17377	C-409	Faculty
Darnell, Kevin COL	12694	SP-213	Faculty/USAF Advisor
Donahue, Mark CAPT	16474	C-409	Faculty/Module 5 Lead
Duffy, Jerry	13114	MLH-136	Faculty/NOPC
Efflandt, Scott COL	16456	C-407	Faculty
Fitzpatrick, Michael CAPT	16482	C-425	Faculty
Forand, Stephen	16570	C-407	Faculty
Fountain, Roger	13980	H-243	Faculty/CDE
Gregor, Christopher	13486	H-242	Faculty/CDE
Hartig, William	16470	C-428	Faculty/SLC Course Director
Harysch, Mark, LT COL	17211	C-413	Faculty
Heaney Thomas COL	12134	SP212	Faculty/USA Advisor
Helm, Stephanie, CAPT	13209	C-426	Faculty
Helms, Chester	12869	C-404	Faculty
Henseler, Sean CDR	16468	C-431	Faculty/Module 3 Lead
Hime, Douglas	16463	C-423	Faculty
Hone, Thomas	11385	C406	Faculty/Module 7 Lead
Horne, Fred B.	16458	C-203	Executive Assistant
Houff, Mark	16485	SE120	Faculty
Husak, Michael CAPT	12397	SP-214	Faculty/USCG Advisor

Logan, Susan	12519	MLH-136	Support Staff
Luke, Ivan	16569	C-402	Faculty
Martin, Richard	16525	H-225	Faculty/CDE
Masterson, Kevin LTCOL	11226	C-405	Faculty
Mathis, J.R., CAPT	17361	C-415	Faculty
Maynard, Timothy CDR	16462	C-405	Faculty
McGauvran, Michael, Col	16564	C-422	Faculty/Module 6 Lead
McGrath, James LTCOL	17379	MLH-136	Faculty/NOPC
Moynihan, Patrick, CDR	17366	MLH-136	Faculty/NOPC
Oliver, George	12565	C-408	Faculty
Parker, Thomas	16473	C-424	Faculty/Module 4 Lead
Pellissier, Joseph	16434	C-411	Faculty
Perkins, James	16475	C-430	Faculty
Povlock, Paul CDR	16477	C-423	Faculty
Rauhut, Michael LTC	12151	C-404	Faculty
Ramos, Michael COL	14826	SP-215	Faculty/USMC Advisor
Reilly, Gregory, COL	16466	C-421	Faculty/Module 8 Lead
Richardson, Walter,CAPT, USN	12532	MLH-136	Faculty/NOPC Director
Roberts, John.	13277	H-230	Faculty/CDE
Rogers, Brian LTC	16552	C-429	Faculty
Romanski, Paul	12534	MLH-136	Faculty/NOPC
Ross, Angus	16528	H-226	Faculty/CDE
St. Laurent, Paul	17907	H-230	Faculty/CDE
Sass, Thomas CDR	13524	C-408	Faculty
Seaman, Mark	17297	C-428	Faculty
Shaw, Eric	16467	C-420	Faculty/IL Course Director
Soderlund, Susan	13414	C-211	Support Staff
Stewart, Carol	14120	C-214	Support Staff
Sweeney, Patrick	16480	C-424	Faculty
Thompson, Neil CDR	17368	C-426	Faculty/RN Liaison
Tranchmontagne, Marc, CDR	16419	C-402	Faculty
Vaughn, Mark	17378	C-412	Faculty
Vego, Milan.	16483	C-427	Faculty
White, Timothy LTCOL	14069	C-411	Faculty

JANUARY 2009 JMO ILC

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
			01	02
05	06	07	08	09
12	13	14	15	16
19	20	21	22	23
26	27	28	29	30

FEBRUARY 2009 JMO ILC

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
02	03	04	05	06
09	10	11	12	13
		0800-0830 OPS 1-1 JMO Chairman's Welcome (Lecture) ‡ 0830-0945 OPS 1-2 American Way of War (Lecture) ‡ OPS 1-3 1000-1130 Intro Seminar (Seminar) *	0830-1015 OPS 1-4 ROMO (Lecture/ Seminar) ‡ * 1030-1145 OPS 1-5 Operations Research Paper (Seminar)*	**Student Research Day**
16	17	18	19	20
President's Day Holiday	0830-0945 OPS 1-6 Naval Way of War (Lecture) ‡ 1000-1030 OPS 1-7 Principles of War (Seminar) * 1045-1145 OPS 1-8 National Mil Organization *	0830-0930 OPS 1-9 Introduction to Planning (Lecture)‡ 0945-1145 OPS 2-1 Classical Military Thinkers & Operational Art (Lecture/Seminar) ‡*	0830-0930 OPS 2-2 Introduction to OPART* 0945-1145 OPS 2-3 Operational Art & Doctrine, Service Cultures*	0830-0930 OPS 2-4 Strategic Setting-Leyte Gulf Case Study (Lecture) ‡ 0945-1145 OPS 2-5 Military Objectives and the Levels of War (Seminar) *
23	24	25	26	27
0830-1000 OPS 2-6 Operational Factors* 1015-1145 OPS 2-7 The Theater: Its Structure and Geometry*	0830-0945 OPS 2-8 Methods of Combat Force Employment* 1000-1145 OPS 2-9 Operational Functions*	**Student Research/Faculty Prep**	0830-0945 OPS 2-10 Elements of Combat Force Employment* 1000-1145 OPS 2-11 Operational Design*	0830-1000 OPS 2-12 Operational Leadership* 1015-1145 OPS 2-13 Operational Lessons Learned* **Initial Paper Topics Due**

MARCH 2009 JMO ILC

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
02	03	04	05	06
0830-1145 OPS 3-1 International Law and the Legal Bases for the Use of Force and OPS 3-2 Maritime Operational Law (Odd Seminars) * 1300-1615 OPS 3-1 International Law and the Legal Bases for the use of Force and OPS 3-2 Maritime Operational Law (Even Seminars) *	0830-1145 OPS 3-3 Law of Armed Conflict and OPS 3-4 Rules of Engagement (Even seminars) * 1300-1615 OPS 3-3 Law of Armed conflict and OPS 3-4 Rules of Engagement (Odd Seminars) *	0830-1000 OPS 3-5 ROE Case Studies (Odd seminars) * 1015-1145 OPS 3-5 ROE Case Studies (Even seminars) *	0830-1145 OPS 3-6 Operational Law Case Study (Odd seminars) * 1300-1615 OPS 3-6 Operational Law Case Study (Even seminars) *	0830-1145 OPS 2-14 Falklands/Malvinas Conflict Intro and Movie (Lecture)‡
	TUTORIALS	**TUTORIALS**	**TUTORIALS**	**TUTORIALS**
09	10	11	12	13
0830-1630 OPS 2-14 Falklands/Malvinas Conflict Case Study*	0830-1145 OPS 2-14 Falklands/Malvinas Conflict- Case Study (Student Briefs) * **Distribute Exam Read-Aheads**	0830-1145 OPART Exam Prep (Seminar)* **1145 Distribute OP ART Exam**	**1600 OP ART Exam Due To Moderators**	**Student Research Day**
16	17	18	19	20
0830-1000 OPS 4-1 The Maritime Domain* 1015-1145 OPS 4-2 The Influence of the Physical Environment on Maritime Ops*	0830-1000 OPS 4-3 Employment of Naval Forces Across the Spectrum of War at Sea* 1015-1145 OPS 4-4 Objectives of Naval Warfare*	0830-1000 OPS 4-5 Major Naval Operations* 1015-1145 OPS 4-6 Fundamentals of Surface Warfare*	0830-1000 OPS 4-7 Fundamentals of Submarine Warfare* 1015-1145 OPS 4-8 Fundamentals of Air/Strike Warfare*	**Student Research Day**
		ELECTIVES	**ELECTIVES**	
23	24	25	26	27
0830-1000 OPS 4-9 Fundamentals of Anti-Submarine Warfare* 1015-1145 OPS 4-10 Fundamentals of Mine Warfare*	0830-1000 OPS 4-11 Fundamentals of Amphibious Warfare* 1015-1145 OPS 4-12 Attack & Defense/Protection of Maritime Trade*	0830-1000 OPS 4-13 Maritime Operational Functions* 1015-1145 OPS 4-14 Designing Major Naval Operations*	0830-1145 OPS 5-1 US Navy Capabilities and Doctrine*	0830-1000 OPS 5-2 US Coast Guard Capabilities and Doctrine* 1015-1145 OPS 5-3 USMC Capabilities and Doctrine*
		ELECTIVES	**ELECTIVES**	
30	31			
0830-1145 OPS 5-4 Operational Command and Control*	0830-1000 OPS 5-5 US Army Capabilities and Doctrine* 1015-1145 OPS 5-6 US Air Force Capabilities and Doctrine*			

APRIL 2009 JMO ILC

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
		01	02	03
		0800-1000 OPS 5-7 Special Operations Forces Capabilities and Doctrine* 1000-1145 OPS 5-8 Multinational Operations* **ELECTIVES**	0830-1000 OPS 5-9 Information Operations* 1015-1145 OPS 5-10 Operational Logistics* **ELECTIVES**	**Student Research Day**
06	07	08	09	10
0830-1145 OPS 5-11 Strategic Deployment * 1300-1630 OPS 5-12 Taiwan Case Study*	0830-1145 OPS 5-12 Taiwan Case Study (Seminar)* 1300-1430 OPS 6-1 Military Decision Making and Planning (Lecture) ‡	0830-0900 OPS 6-2 JOPES Adaptive Planning (Int'l UNCLAS Lecture by JS J7 Rep) ‡ 0915-1000 OPS 6-2 JOPES Adaptive Planning (US Only Classified Lecture by JS J7 Rep) ‡ 1015-1145 OPS 6-2 JOPES Seminar (US Only Classified) * **ELECTIVES**	0830-0930 OPS 5-13 Intelligence Support to Operational Decision-making and Planning"(Lecture) ‡ 0945-1115 OPS 6-3 The Joint Staff and Staff Estimates (Seminar)* 1115-1145 OPS 6-4 Military Briefings (Seminar)* **ELECTIVES**	**Student Research Day**
13	14	15	16	17
SPRING RECESS	**SPRING RECESS**	**SPRING RECESS**	0830-1145 OPS 6-5 Strategic Setting Borneo Case Study* **ELECTIVES**	0830-1145 OPS 6-5 Planning Exercise* **ELECTIVES**
20	21	22	23	24
0830-1630 OPS 6-5 Planning Exercise*	0830-1630 OPS 6-5 Planning Exercise*	0830-1630 OPS 6-5 Planning Exercise*	0830-1630 OPS 6-5 Planning Exercise*	**Student Research Day**
27	28	29	30	
0830-1630 OPS 6-5 Planning Exercise*	0830-1630 OPS 6-5 Planning Exercise*	0830-1145* OPS 6-5 Planning Exercise* **ELECTIVES**	0830-1000 OPS 7-1 Failed States (Lecture) ‡ 1015-1145 OPS 7-1 Failed States (Seminar)* **ELECTIVES**	

MAY 2009 JMO ILC

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
				01
				Student Research Day
04	05	06	07	08
0800 OPS Papers Due to Moderators 0830-1145 OPS 7-2 Homeland Security (Seminar Exercise)*	0830-1000 OPS 7-3 Security, Stability, Transition, Reconstruction (SSTR) (Lecture)‡ 1015-1145 OPS 7-4 Security Cooperation Planning*	0830-1000 OPS 7-5 Inter-Agency Coordination * 1015-1145 OPS 5-14 DoS and the Country Team (Lecture) ‡ **ELECTIVES**	0830-1000 OPS 7-6 NGOs and IGOs (Panel) ‡ 1015-1145 OPS 7-6 NGOs and IGOs (Seminar)* **ELECTIVES**	**President's Cup**
11	12	13	14	15
0830-1000 OPS 7-7 Post-Conflict Operations* 1030-1145 OPS 7-8 Civil-Military Operations*	0830-1145 OPS 7-9 Insurgency *	0830-1000 OPS 7-9 Insurgency * 1015-1145 OPS 7-10 Counter-Insurgency* **ELECTIVES**	0830-1000 OPS 7-10 Counter-Insurgency (Cont'd)* 1015-1145 OPS 7-11 Complex Irregular Warfare* **1145 Exam Read-Ahead Handed Out/Group Prep** **ELECTIVES**	0830-1000 OPS 7-12 Peace Ops* 1015-1145 OPS 7-13 FHA & Disaster Relief*
18	19	20	21	22
0830 Exam Handed Out	**0830 Exam Due** 0845-1630 CAPSTONE TRAINING (Pringle Aud and MLH) † ‡	0830-1145 CAPSTONE Training † ‡ **ELECTIVES**	0830-1130 CAPSTONE Training † ‡ **ELECTIVES**	0830-1630 Capstone Training † ‡
25	26	27	28	29
Memorial Day Holiday	0830-1100 CAPSTONE TRAINING: PACOM MA Brief, CJTF Initial Guidance‡ 1200-1630 CAPSTONE§	0830-1145 CAPSTONE§ **ELECTIVES**	0830-1145 CAPSTONE§ **ELECTIVES**	0830-1630 CAPSTONE§

JUNE 2009 JMO ILC

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
01	02	03	04	05
0830-1630 CAPSTONE§	0830-1630 CAPSTONE§	0830-1630 CAPSTONE§	0830-1630 CAPSTONE§	0830-1130 CAPSTONE§ **Midway Celebration**
08	09	10	11	12
0830-1630 CAPSTONE§	0830-1630 CAPSTONE †§	0830-1630 CAPSTONE§	0830-1630 CAPSTONE †§	0830-1130 CAPSTONE HOTWASH†
15	16	17	18	19
STUDENT ADMIN DAY				**GRADUATION**
22	23	24	25	26
29	30			