NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE
AND
NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

SYLLABUS AND STUDY GUIDE

FOR

AUGUST 2008

* * * * * * * * *

FOREWORD

This syllabus provides a comprehensive overview of the Naval War College's Joint Military Operations course. Prepared for the College of Naval Warfare and the Naval Command College, this syllabus, along with the JMO Website provides session-by-session material to assist students in daily seminar preparation. Administrative information is also included.

JAMES COOK
Captain, U. S. Navy
Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department

Approved:

William R. Spain
Acting Provost

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD		i
TABLE OF CONTENTS		ii
COURSE STUDY GUIDES		iii
1.	Mission	v
2.	Course Overview	v
3.	Course Objectives	vi
4.	Student Educational Outcomes	vi
5.	CJCS Officer Professional Military Education Policy	vii
6.	Course Organization	ix
7.	Syllabus Organization	ix
8.	Methods of Instruction	x
9.	Readings	xi
10.	Operations Research Paper	xii
11.	Plagiarism and Misrepresentation	xiii
12.	Requirements	xiii
13.	JMO Department Grading Criteria	xiv
14.	Seminar Assignments	xviii
15.	Schedule	xviii
16.	Key Personnel	xix
17.	Faculty Assistance	xix
18.	Student Critiques	xx
19.	Faculty Biographies	xx
20.	Course Calendar	xx
21.	Joint Learning Area Matrix	xx

COURSE STUDY GUIDES

JMO-01	Course Overview (Lecture)	1
JMO-02	Introductory Seminar (Seminar)	3
JMO-03	An Introduction to Problem Solving (Lecture & Seminar)	5
JMO-04	Strategic Objectives (Seminar)	12
JMO-05	Operations Research Paper (Seminar)	16
JMO-06	Complex Irregular Warfare (Lecture & Seminar)	20
JMO-07	Range of Military Operations (Seminar)	25
JMO-08	Failed States (Lecture & Seminar)	30
JMO-09	The Art of the Campaign (Lecture & Seminar)	34
JMO-10	Theater Strategic Leadership (Seminar)	38
JMO-11	Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations (Optional Lectures)	43
JMO-12	Research Methodologies (Lecture)	46
JMO-13	Operational Art and Doctrine (Seminar)	48
JMO-14	The Theater and its Structure (Seminar)	53
JMO-15	Operational Factors (Seminar)	57
JMO-16	Operational Functions (Seminar)	61
JMO-17	Elements of Operational Warfare (Seminar)	65
JMO-18	Operational Planning (Seminar)	68
JMO-19	Legal Bases for the Use of force (Seminar)	71
JMO-20	Maritime Operational Law (Seminar)	74
JMO-21	Law of Armed Conflict (Seminar)	77
JMO-22	Post-Combat Legal Issues (Seminar)	81
JMO-23	Rules of Engagement (Seminar)	84
JMO-24	Operational Law Case Study (Seminar)	87
JMO-25	The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict (Lecture & Exercise)	89
JMO-26	The Operational Art Exam	93
JMO-27	Planning Processes (Lecture)	95
JMO-28	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) (Seminar)	98
JMO-29	Joint Operational Logistics (Seminar & Exercise)	102
JMO-30	Strategic Deployment (Lecture & Seminar)	105
JMO-31	NCC Intelligence Support to Operational Planning (UNCLASSIFIED Lecture)	108
JMO-32	Intelligence Support to Operational Planning (CLASSIFIED Lecture)	110
JMO-33	Information Operations (Seminar)	113
JMO-34	Operational Command and Control (Seminar)	116
JMO-35	Conflict Termination (Seminar)	119
JMO-36	Stability Operations (Seminar)	124
JMO-37	Insurgency (Seminar)	130
JMO-38	Counterinsurgency (Seminar)	135
JMO-39	Countering Global Insurgency (Lecture & Seminar)	142

JMO-40	Military Advising (Seminar)	146
JMO-41	Peace Operations (Seminar)	151
JMO-42	Interagency Coordination (Seminar)	155
JMO-43	NGO/IGO	159
JMO 44	JOPES (CLASSIFIED Lecture & Seminar)	164
JMO-45	Contractors in the Operating Environment (Seminar)	166
JMO-46	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (Seminar)	171
JMO-47	The Midterm Examination	175
JMO-48	Domestic Defense Support of Civil Authority (Seminar)	177
JMO-49	JOPP (Seminar & Exercise)	181
JMO-50	Joint Force Organization (Seminar)	184
JMO-51	Security Cooperation (Seminar & Exercise)	187
JMO-52	Capstone Synthesis Event	190

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS COURSE DESCRIPTION

1. Mission

In keeping with the Naval War College (NWC) mission, the Joint Military Operations (JMO) curriculum is designed to educate senior leaders for service at the theater-strategic level of war—capable of recognizing the multi-faceted command and staff actions necessary for the linkage of ends, ways, and means in the attainment of strategic and operational objectives.

2. Course Overview

The Joint Military Operations trimester is intended to refine students' critical and creative thinking skills under the umbrella of military problem solving. As such, the course is logically presented in a series of interlocking sessions, each intended to draw on those that preceded it and to reinforce those that follow. The faculty at the Naval War College realizes that, as seniors, you come with an understanding of many of the fundamentals of Joint Military Operations; however, we will focus on refining your higher order thinking skills through an academic regimen which incorporates evaluation, analysis, and synthesis. The trimester will flow from the simple to the more complex and will culminate in a synthesis event intended to allow students to display their understanding of the course concepts and to demonstrate critical and creative thinking skills. The JMO trimester is best captured by the titles of the various segments that make it up: The Introductory and Operational Warfare Theory Sessions, Constraints on the Use of Military Force, The Rational Analytical Processes of Military Problem Solving, Contemporary Operations and Environment, and the Capstone Synthesis Event.

The Joint Military Operations course is an in-depth study of the theater-strategic and operational levels of war throughout the range of military operations. This course builds on the learning objectives of JPME Phase I as defined in the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), and complements the Naval War College's National Security and Decision Making (NSDM) and Strategy and Policy (S&P) curricula. Where NSDM and S&P emphasize our national military strategy development as well as a nation's imperative for matching policy to its strategic goals, the JMO course prepares students for the operational arena by emphasizing problem solving through operational planning and joint force application to achieve military objectives. It examines joint operations from the standpoint of the combatant commander (CCDR) and Joint Task Force (JTF) commander with a maritime emphasis. It further develops joint attitudes and perspectives, exposes officers to, and increases their understanding of service cultures while concentrating on joint staff operations. Through extensive use of case studies, the JMO student is challenged with four enduring questions from the perspective of a joint force commander and staff:

- What conditions are required to achieve the objectives? (Ends)
- What sequence of actions is most likely to create those conditions? (Ways)

- What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
- What is the likely cost or risk in performing that sequence of actions?

The ability to answer these questions is the very essence of being able to support and lead joint operations.

3. Course Objectives

The below are provided to identify for the senior student the specific objectives that the JMO Department intends to achieve during the trimester. They are not to be confused with the Education Outcomes listed below. The Education Outcomes are those outcomes intended to be achieved at the completion of the Academic Year after students have had the opportunity to synthesize the education provided by all three academic departments. The Educational Outcomes may be viewed as the strategic objectives for the course. The below are the operational objectives we seek to achieve. Each session has tailored objectives that support the below.

- To enhance abilities to analyze and execute military strategy, to adeptly apply joint planning processes, and to creatively leverage the instruments of national power across the range of military operations.
- To strengthen leadership skills necessary to excel in major staff responsibilities and in theater-strategic positions of leadership, and to confidently act as trusted advisors to policy makers.
- To develop skilled senior war fighters, able to synthesize valid courses of action and to function in volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous operating environments.
- To hone critical and creative thinking skills, especially the ability to evaluate a range of potential solutions to ill-structured problems.

4. Student Educational Outcomes

The Joint Military Operations Professional Military Education (PME) outcomes for the College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College are designed to produce officers fully capable of serving as leaders or principal staff officers at the theater-strategic and operational levels of war. The purpose of these educational outcomes is to develop students who are:

- Skilled in evaluating and executing strategy and U.S. policy through the integrated employment of military and non-military instruments of national power.
- Skilled in joint war fighting, formulation of theater strategy, and campaign design and planning through the creative application of operational art.
- Adept at leading staff elements in the Joint Operation and Navy Planning Processes.
- Capable of strategically-minded critical thinking across the full spectrum of national security environments.
- Skilled in aligning and maximizing capabilities across joint force components, services, agencies, and international forces.

- Capable of excelling in positions of theater strategic leadership in peace, in crisis, and in war.

5. CJCS Officer Professional Military Education Policy

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) instruction CJCSI 1800.01_ sets the policies, procedures, objectives, and responsibilities for both officer Professional Military Education (PME) and Joint Officer Professional Military Education (JPME). It directs the services and service colleges to comply with the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) by meeting Joint Learning Area (JLA) objectives defined in the OPMEP. The CNW NCC Syllabus for 2008 lists the Naval War College (NWC) objectives to be addressed in each session. The below Senior Service-Level College (SLC) JLA objectives are presented to highlight to the student the linkage between the syllabus and Joint Learning Areas prescribed by the CJCS. The Joint Learning Area Matrix containing all JMO sessions and related OPMEP Learning Areas is contained in paragraph 21.

<u>Learning Area 1 – National Security Strategy</u>
a. Apply key strategic concepts, logic, and analytical frameworks to the formulation and evaluation of strategy.
b. Evaluate historical and/or contemporary applications of national security strategy to include the current U. S. national security strategy and military strategy.
c. Apply appropriate strategic security policies, strategies, and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations to support national objectives.
d. Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in achieving strategic objectives, with a focus on the employment of the military instrument of national power both as a supported instrument and as a supporting instrument of national power.

<u>Learning Area 2 – National Military Strategy and Organization.</u>
a. Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the Nation, in conjunction with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
b. Evaluate the national military strategy, especially with respect the changing nature of warfare.
c. Analyze the roles, relationships, and functions of the President, SecDef, CJCS, Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders, Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Service Chiefs.
d. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U. S. force structure affect the development of joint military strategy.

<u>Learning Area 3 – Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy and Campaigning.</u>
a. Evaluate the principles of joint warfare, joint military doctrine and emerging concepts to joint, unified, interagency and multinational operations, in peace and war.
b. Evaluate how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives and relate to the national strategic, national military strategic, theater strategic and operational levels in war.

c. Synthesize how national military and joint theater strategies meet national strategic goals across the range of military operations.
d. Synthesize the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans to include WMD/E.
e. Apply an analytical framework that incorporates the role that factors such as geopolitics, geo-strategy, society, culture and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns in the joint, interagency, and multinational arena.

Learning Area 4 – National and Joint Planning Systems and Processes
a. Evaluate the DOD systems and processes by which national ends, ways, and means are reconciled, integrated, and applied.
b. Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.
c. Analyze and apply the principal joint strategy development and operational planning processes.
d. Analyze the role of joint doctrine with respect to unified command.
e. Analyze how the interagency structures and processes influence the planning for and application of the military instrument of national power.

Learning Area 5 – Integration of Joint. Interagency and Multinational Capabilities
a. Synthesize the capabilities and limitations of all Services (own Service, other Service—to include Special Operations Forces (SOF)) in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in joint, interagency, and multinational operations.
b. Analyze the capabilities and limitations of multinational forces in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in coalition operations.
c. Analyze the capabilities and limitations of the interagency processes in achieving the appropriate strategic objectives in joint plans.
d. Analyze the integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities across the range of military operations and plans—both in preparation and execution phases—and evaluate its success in achieving the desired effects.
e. Comprehend the attributes of the future joint force and how this force will organize, plan, prepare and conduct operations.
f. Value a thoroughly joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, combined, interagency efforts and teamwork.

Learning Area 6 – Information Operations, C2 and Battlespace Awareness.
a. Analyze how information operations are integrated to support the national military and national security strategies and the interagency process.
b. Analyze how information operations apply at the operational and strategic levels of war and how they support the operations of a networked force.
c. Analyze the integration of information operations, C2 and battle space awareness to theater campaign development.
d. Analyze the principles, capabilities, and limitations of information operations across the range of military operations and plans—to include pre- and post-conflict operations.

e. Analyze the use of information operations to achieve desired effects across the spectrum of national security threats.

Learning Area 7 – Joint Strategic Leader Development.
a. Synthesize techniques for leading in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment.
b. Synthesize leadership skills necessary to sustain innovative, agile, and ethical organizations in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment.

6. Course Organization

The JMO trimester begins with a series of introductory sessions intended to prepare the intellectual battle space. These introductory sessions will be followed by a series of discussions in seminar on the theoretical underpinnings of Joint Military Operations as embodied in operational art. After students gain a deeper understanding of theory, the faculty will present some real-world constraints and restraints as we investigate the nexus of operational art and operational law. The senior student will then be provided the opportunity to consider the rational, analytical processes used by the United States Department of Defense in solving military problems across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO). Once students have grasped the theoretical foundations and the processes necessary for success in the operating environment in which operational and theater-strategic military problems are solved, the faculty will continue to build on the foundation sessions. This area of the JMO syllabus will require students to question their roles in future military operations across the ROMO. Following a brief study of the modern operating environment and its ramifications for problem solving and planning, a practical exercise will put into perspective the theoretical concepts learned, the constraints and restraints imposed on military forces by political leadership and international law, and the various planning processes and will allow students to demonstrate their mastery of the material thus far. The final event of the JMO trimester is a Capstone Synthesis Event intended to fuse all aspects of the trimester in a realistic, future-based crisis action scenario. At the conclusion of JMO, senior students should be capable of leading a Joint Planning Group in a problem solving endeavor, capable of fostering critical and creative thinking skills in subordinates, and demonstrate fluency in both operational art and joint terminology.

7. Syllabus Organization

This syllabus establishes the basis for required course work and serves as an intellectual roadmap that will guide you through the trimester. In each session, the *Focus* specifies the general context of the topic. Next, the *Objectives* section cites the session goals and provides an intellectual line of departure and focus to the readings. The *Background* section provides assistance in framing the individual session, that is, how it fits into the course flow and how each session relates to other sessions. The *Products* section identifies those items that may be produced in fulfillment of the learning objectives. The *Questions* section is designed to generate critical thinking and is the foundation of seminar discussion. The *Readings* section serves to focus student

preparation and enhance understanding of each session's topic. Readings may or may not be directly discussed in session. The final section of each syllabus session recognizes that not all of the students participating in this JPME Phase II course have completed JPME Phase I. Thus, the *Phase I Prerequisite Instruction* section identifies course material that *must* be reviewed by students who have not completed a JPME Phase I course, are having difficulty understanding the material presented in the required reading, or want a greater understanding of the session topic. These JPME Phase I requirements are located on the JMO Website.

8. Methods of Instruction

(a) *The Socratic Method*. The seminar is the fundamental learning forum for this course with student expertise being a significant part of the learning process. For a seminar to succeed there must be open and candid sharing of ideas and experiences, tempered with necessary military decorum. Students will find that even the most "off-the-wall" idea may have some merit. Successful seminars—that is, seminars whose members leave with the greatest knowledge and personal satisfaction—are those made up of students who come to each session equipped with questions based on thorough preparation. Most students leave the seminar with new insights or even more thought-provoking questions. Student preparation, free and open discussion, and the open-minded consideration of other students' ideas, all contribute to a valuable seminar experience. The one-third rule is the keystone of the seminar approach. The first third is a well-constructed, relevant curriculum. The second third is a quality JMO faculty to present the material and guide the discussion, and the most important third is the participation of the individual students. Only by thoroughly preparing for seminar sessions can students become active catalysts who generate positive and proactive seminar interaction and refine critical and creative thinking skills.

(b) *The Case Study Method*. This method of instruction is used to provide intellectual stimulation for students and is designed to develop student abilities to analyze and solve problems using the knowledge, concepts, and skills honed during the trimester. A concomitant benefit of the case study is to deepen the experiential pool in students through analysis of past great captains of war or to expand the knowledge of a specific geographic area. Some of the cases and problems stress individual effort and planning, while others require a team or staff approach. Cases may consist of historical events, analyzed for operational and theater strategic sessions, or postulated crisis situations that demonstrate the application of concepts such as presence, deterrence, international law, rules of engagement, and self-defense. Case studies sometimes will be narrowly focused to illustrate a specific force and its capabilities and limitations or to highlight explicit concepts involving an aspect of theater strategic warfare. Seminars are often split into smaller groups or teams to prepare solutions and responses. The Case Study method of instruction allows students to achieve a higher level of learning while providing students with many more data points relevant to problem solving in the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment in which we operate. Students will be tasked with analyzing the case study material, synthesizing information, and evaluating recommended courses of action that they create.

(c) The Lecture-Seminar Method. In order to share equally the vast experience of some of our faculty members and guest speakers, lectures are scheduled to be followed immediately by seminar discussion. Students are encouraged to analyze critically the information presented by speakers and engage actively in post-speaker seminar discussions. JMO lectures are intended to generate questions that the students may discuss in seminar and are not intended as merely the transmission of knowledge.

(d) The Practical Exercise Method. The opportunity for students to apply information presented in the various sessions is important. Practical Exercises allow students time to analyze critically information in order to develop viable solutions to ill-structured problems. Students may be assigned to practical exercise as individuals, small groups, seminar, or even multiple seminars.

9. Readings

All JMO Course sessions are supported by various readings. The purpose of these readings is to assist in understanding the many aspects of the topics being presented and often, to provide divergent points of view on the same topic. For the most part, the readings are intended to convey to the student basic information, the mastery of which will facilitate in-class discussions. Students are reminded, however, that as critical thinkers, all readings should be questioned concerning their relationship to the topic, to other readings, and to the personal experience of the student. A thorough understanding of the following information will significantly assist the student in using the course readings to best advantage:

(a) Categories of Readings. Each syllabus session lists categories of readings.

(1) *Required Readings* are those that must be read prior to the session. Moderators may offer additional guidance on the priority of the readings, based on the specific needs of the individual seminar. Readings are generally arranged alphabetically by author.

(2) *Supplementary Readings* are those relevant to a session topic that may be useful to a student seeking more information in order to gain insight beyond that provided by the Required Readings, and would include additional background material on case studies and exercises. On occasion, faculty moderators may assign Supplementary Readings to individual students to read and provide oral synopses to the seminar in support of topic discussion. Supplementary readings are likewise generally arranged alphabetically by author.

(b) Reading Identifiers. Each reading that is not a complete book or publication has a cover page that provides the four-digit reading identifier (e.g., NWC 1002). Oftentimes, this number is used instead of the title, but in either event, the readings are almost universally located on the JMO Web site under the specific session.

(c) Finding Specific Readings. Readings for any specific session may be located as follows:

(1) Required Readings are annotated as (*Issued*), (*Seminar Reserve*), or (*Posted on the JMO Website*).

(a) (*Issued*) means that the readings may be found in the JMO reading material issued to each student at the beginning of the trimester in a blue, bound book. Those Required Readings that are copyrighted are issued in a bound publication.

(b) (*Seminar Reserve*) means that the readings are located in the seminar classroom on the rolling book cart and quite often posted on the JMO Website.

(c) (*Posted on the JMO Website*) means the readings are electronically maintained on the JMO Website. In most cases, paper copies of posted and linked reading material will not be provided.

(2) Supplementary Readings may be found in the library or through library web access. Assistance is available from the reference librarians. These supplementary readings may assist the student in further research on a topic that interests them and often form an embryonic bibliography of the research paper. The point of contact (POC) identified for a given session can assist students experiencing difficulty in locating a particular reading.

(d) Management of Reading Load. The amount of preparatory reading required for each session depends on a variety of factors, including topic complexity and session objectives. Students are advised to review lesson reading requirements at least one week in advance of lesson presentation date in order to accurately plan preparation time and to ensure that all necessary readings are on hand. Be ready to address queries on the content of the assigned readings and to question the contents vis-à-vis the subject under discussion.

10. Operations Research Paper

The Operations Research Paper presents an opportunity to study a theater-strategic or operational level issue, to conduct research and analysis, and to prepare a paper that advances the literature and demonstrates critical thinking skills. It is a chance for students to address a topic that they personally believe is of value. It requires independent thought and graduate-level writing, since the final product must be a 14–17 page paper suitable for publication in a professional journal. The amount and depth of research should be adequate to support the student's approach and sufficiently justify the conclusions and recommendations. Papers may be used to demonstrate innovative thinking and serve as a source of information to service and joint staffs.

Numerous combatant and headquarters commands actively solicit papers and monographs on topics of current interest to them. The Naval War College is frequently canvassed for papers on particular subjects, and requested to generate interest in specific areas for research and writing to support requesting commands. Quality papers are retained in the Naval War College's Eccles Library, where qualified users can access them for use in a variety of applications.

Students are encouraged to submit their research papers for the War College Prize Competition as described in the Naval War College Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM), which is included in the *Student Handbook* and posted

on the JMO Website. Amplifying information and guidance on the selection and execution of a successful Operations Research Paper project is provided on the JMO Website in NWC 2062T. Moderators will answer questions and otherwise assist students in this most important intellectual undertaking during the Introductory Seminar, the Operations Research Paper Review lesson, and during student tutorials.

11. Plagiarism and Misrepresentation

Student attention is directed to the Naval War College SORM and the Statement of Academic Policy (located under the references section of the JMO Web site), which discuss the academic honor code and specifically prohibit cheating, plagiarism, and misrepresentation. For the military officer accustomed to the legitimate staff practice of adopting verbatim the language of orders and directives produced by other commands, the academic prohibition of using the words of other writers without proper attribution must be reviewed and internalized. The following definitions clarify this important issue:

Plagiarism is the duplication of an author's words without both quotation marks and accurate references or footnotes. It is also the paraphrased use of an author's ideas without accurate references or footnotes. Generally, plagiarism is a result of one of two specific errors; the first is an incomplete knowledge of the requirements and methods of properly citing and giving credit to another. The second, and by far less common yet more deleterious, is the intentional copying of another's work.

Misrepresentation is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgment. It may include the following:

- Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at the Naval War College without advance permission of the moderators.
- Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside the Naval War College without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

12. Requirements

Students are expected to prepare fully for each seminar and to participate in classroom discussions and exercises. A tough-minded, questioning attitude, and a willingness to enter into rigorous but disciplined discussion are central to the success of the course.

(a) Workload. Some peaks in the workload will occur. Advance planning and careful allocation of time will help mitigate these peaks. This is particularly true of the Operations Research Paper. Student experience indicates that the total course requirements will involve a weekly average workload of approximately 12–15 hours of in-class and 36–45 hours of out-of-class work. Additionally, students should expect to dedicate 80-100 hours in researching, drafting, and producing an acceptable graduate-level research paper. Time management is a critical aspect of a student's success in mastering the multiple requirements of the Joint Military Operations course.

(b) Oral and Written Requirements. The JMO Department has oral and written requirements that provide the opportunity for the student to demonstrate synthesis and progress. In addition, these requirements serve as a means for feedback and interaction between the faculty and members of the seminar. Not all requirements are graded, but each provides the student with some measure of how he or she is doing at that point in the course. To accomplish successfully the JMO curriculum, students must complete the below requirements. The following is a composite listing of these course requirements, type of activity, relative weights, and the key dates of graded events:

Requirement	Type Effort	Weight	Date
Paper Proposal	Approved by moderators	N/A	8 September
Operational Art Exam	Written/Individual	15%	18 September
Seminar Contribution	Daily assessment	20%	22 Aug–25 Oct
Midterm Examination	Written/Individual	15%	10 October
Operations Research Paper	Written/Individual	35%	31 October
Contribution in Exercises	Daily assessment	15%	3 – 18 Nov

13. JMO Department Grading Criteria

A course average grade of B- or higher is required for successful completion of Master's degree requirements. A minimum grade of C- is required for successful completion of the JMO course and receipt of JPME Phase II certification.

The overall guidance for grading students at the Naval War College is contained in the Naval War College SORM. Any assigned grade may be appealed in writing within seven calendar days after receiving the grade. Grades will be appealed first to the student's seminar senior moderator and then to the department Chairman. If deemed necessary, the Chairman may assign an additional grader who will review the assignment and provide an independent grade. Grade appeals may ultimately be taken to the Dean of Academics, whose decision will be final. Note that the review may sustain, lower, or raise the grade. The Academic Coordinator, Ms. Carol Stewart (Room C-214), can assist in preparing an appeal.

Three sets of general grading criteria help in the determination of the letter grades that will be assigned during the JMO trimester. The criteria below offer the student a suggestion of the standards and requirements for which faculty assess performance. Using the Naval War College SORM as basic guidance, the procedures below amplify the criteria as established within the Joint Military Operations Department.

a. Grading criteria for the Operations Research Paper:

The Operations Research Paper must have a thesis, provide sufficient background research to analyze the thesis, consider arguments and counterarguments for the thesis, compare conflicting points of view, present logical conclusions drawn from the material presented, and provide recommendations or lessons learned based on the conclusions. In addition to the examples of substantive criteria specified below, the

paper must be editorially correct (spelling, punctuation, grammar, syntax, format, and so forth).

A+ (98) Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Especially deserving of distribution to appropriate authorities and submission for prize competition. Thesis is definitive, research is extensive, subject is treated completely, and the conclusions and recommendations are logical and justified.

A (95) Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original thought. Suitable for distribution and submission for prize competition. Thesis is clearly articulated and focused, research is significant, arguments and counter-arguments are comprehensive, and conclusions and recommendations are clearly supported.

A- (92) Above the average expected of graduate work. Contains original thought. Should be retained in the Naval War College Library for future researchers. Thesis is clearly defined, research is purposeful, arguments and counter-arguments are presented, conclusions and recommendations are valid.

B+ (88) A solid paper. Above the average of graduate work. Thesis is articulated, research has strong points, subject is well-presented and constructed, and conclusions and recommendations are substantiated by the material.

B (85) Average graduate level performance. Thesis is presented, research is appropriate for the majority of the subject, analysis of the subject is valid with minor omissions and conclusions are presented with minor inconsistencies.

B- (82) Slightly below the average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, but the research does not fully support it; the analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are not fully developed. The paper may not be balanced and the logic may be flawed.

C+ (78) Fails to meet graduate level standards. Portions of the criteria are lacking or missing, the thesis may be vague or unclear, research may be inadequate, analysis may be incomplete, and the conclusions and recommendations may be lacking or not supported by the material.

C (75) Below graduate-level standards. Thesis is present, but support, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are either missing or illogically presented. Paper has flaws in construction and development.

C- (72) Well below graduate level standards. Thesis poorly stated with minimal evidence of research and or several missing requirements. Construction and development flaws detract from the readability of the paper.

D (65) Significantly below graduate-level standards. Paper attempts to present a thesis. Paper lacks evidence of graduate-level research and critical thinking. Significant errors in construction and development detract from the readability of the paper.

F (0–64) Fails to meet graduate-level standards. Paper has no thesis. Paper has significant flaws with respect to structure, grammar, and logic. Paper displays an apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements. Gross errors in construction and development detract from the readability of the paper and/or the paper displays evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.

b. Grading criteria for exams:

The Operational Art examination usually focuses on an historic case study. Moderators will provide read ahead material in advance of the exam date. The Midterm examination is an open-book examination that requires individual work. The exam will focus on aspects presented thus far in the course. Responses to both of these examinations will be in essay format. Grading will be assessed using the following criteria:

A+ (98) Organized, coherent and well-written response. Completely addresses the question. Covers all applicable major and key minor points. Demonstrates total grasp and comprehension of the topic.

A (95) Demonstrates an excellent grasp of the topic, addressing all major issues and key minor points. Organized, coherent, and well-written.

A- (92) Above the average expected of graduate work. Demonstrates a very good grasp of the topic. Addresses all major and at least some minor points in a clear, coherent manner.

B+ (88) Above the average expected of graduate-level work. Demonstrates a satisfactory grasp of the subject matter. Well-crafted answer that discusses all relevant important concepts with supporting rationale for analysis.

B (85) Average graduate-level performance. A successful consideration of the topic overall, but lacking either depth or containing statements for which the supporting rationale is not sufficiently argued.

B- (82) Slightly below graduate-level performance. Addresses the question and demonstrates a fair understanding of the topic, but does not address all key concepts and is weak in rationale and clarity.

C+ (78) Below graduate-level performance. Demonstrates some grasp of topic, but provides insufficient rationale for response and misses major elements or concepts. Does not merit graduate credit.

C (75) Significantly below graduate-level performance. Demonstrates poor understanding of the topic. Provides marginal support for response. Misses major elements or concepts.

C- (72) Appreciably below graduate-level performance. Addresses the question, but does not provide sufficient response to demonstrate adequate understanding of the topic.

D (65) Considerably below graduate-level performance and lacking any evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter. In some measure, fails to address the entire question.

F (0–64) Fails to address the questions or paper displays evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.

c. Grading criteria for seminar and Joint Planning Exercise contributions:

The seminar and joint planning exercise contribution grades are determined by moderator evaluation of the quality of a student's contributions to seminar discussions, projects, and exercises. All students are expected to contribute to each seminar session, and to listen and respond respectfully when seminar mates or moderators offer their ideas. This overall expectation underlies all criteria described below:

A+ (98) Peerless demonstration of wholly thorough preparation for individual seminar sessions. Consistently contributes original and highly insightful thought. Exceptional team player and leader.

A (95) Superior demonstration of complete preparation for individual sessions. Frequently offers original and well-thought-out insights. Routinely takes the lead to accomplish team projects.

A- (92) Excellent demonstration of preparation for individual sessions. Contributes original, well-developed insights in the majority of seminar sessions. Often takes the lead to accomplish team projects.

B+ (88) Above-average graduate level preparation for seminar sessions. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights. Obvious team player who sometimes takes the lead for team projects.

B (85) Average graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Occasionally contributes original and insightful thought. Acceptable team player; takes effective lead on team projects when assigned.

B- (82) Minimally acceptable graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Infrequently contributes well-developed insights; may sometimes speak out without having thought through an issue. Requires prodding to take lead on team projects.

C+ (78) Generally prepared, but not to minimum acceptable graduate level. Requires encouragement to contribute to discussions; contributions do not include original

thinking or insights. Routinely allows others to take the lead in team projects.

C (75) Preparation for individual sessions is only displayed when student is called upon to contribute. Elicited contributions reflect at best a basic understanding of session material. Consistently requires encouragement or prodding to take on fair share of team project workload. Only occasionally engages in seminar dialogue with peers and moderators.

C- (72) Barely acceptable preparation. Contributions are extremely limited, rarely voluntary, and reflect minimal grasp of session material. Displays little interest in contributing to team projects.

D (65) Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are uncommon and reflect below minimum acceptable understanding of session material. Engages in frequent fact free conversation.

F (0–64) Unacceptable preparation. Displays no interest in contributing to team projects; cannot be relied on to accomplish assigned project work. At times may be seen by peers as disruptive.

14. Seminar Assignments

The principal criterion in assigning students to a seminar is a balanced distribution among services and agencies, essentially creating a 'joint force', as well as student specialties and operational expertise. The Chairman of the JMO Department will assign a minimum of two faculty members to each seminar. The Chairman will also publish separately the student seminar and classroom assignments.

15. Schedule

Seminars may meet in the mornings and in the afternoons. Depending on the work assigned, students may meet for scheduled periods in seminar as a group, in smaller teams depending on tasking, or conduct individual study and research. Students should pay close attention to the start times for each event since they may vary throughout the trimester. Classes normally are scheduled from 0830–1145 and 1300–1630. Moderators may adjust these times to facilitate the learning objectives for each segment of instruction. A course-planning schedule containing meeting dates and times is provided on the JMO Website. Late changes will be announced by the moderators in class and posted to the JMO Website under the Announcements section and students will be provided weekly schedules in their mailboxes. Be aware, however, that changes to the schedule occur and these changes will announced by moderators, on the Website and/or by email.

16. Key Personnel

If you require additional information on the course, or if problems develop that cannot be resolved by your moderators, you may contact the Chairman or the Executive Assistant. Key departmental personnel are:

Chairman	CAPT James Cook, USN Room C-213, 841-3556
Executive Assistant	PROF F. B. Horne Room C-211, 841-6458
Academic Coordinator	Ms. Carol A. Stewart Room C-214, 841-4120
CNW & NCC Course Coordinator	PROF Bill Hartig Room C-428, 841-6470
Coordinator, Introductory Sessions and Operational Warfare Theory Sessions	PROF Doug Hime Room C-423, 841-6463
Coordinator, Restraints on the Use of Military Force	CDR Sean Henseler, USN Room C-409, 841-6468
Coordinator, Planning Sessions	PROF Pat Sweeney Room C-424, 841-6480
Coordinator, Contemporary Operations & Environments Sessions	PROF D. Chisholm Room C-412, 841-2328
Coordinator, Capstone Synthesis Event	LtCol Mark Harysch, USAF Room C-413, 841-7211

17. Faculty Assistance

Faculty members are available to assist students with course material, to review a student's progress, and to provide counseling as required or requested. Students with individual concerns are encouraged to discuss them as early as possible so that faculty moderators can render assistance in a timely manner. We urge students to make use of this non-classroom time with the faculty. During tutorials, scheduled in conjunction with the Operations Research Paper, moderators may take the opportunity to discuss student progress as well as to solicit student input on the course to date. The faculty is located on the fourth deck of Conolly Hall and is available to assist as needed.

18. Student Critiques

The Joint Military Operations Department strives continually to improve this course. To assist in this goal, students are required to complete a confidential End-of-Course Questionnaire that is submitted electronically via the JMO Web site. Submit your questionnaire with an acknowledged receipt not later than the CAPSTONE "hot wash." Students are encouraged to point out areas for improvement immediately and not to wait until the end of course questionnaire. Your constructive comments will help ensure that the course remains relevant and vital in the years to come.

19. Faculty Biographies. Faculty biographies are posted on the JMO Web site.

20. Course Calendar. A course calendar is included at the end of this syllabus. Be forewarned, however, that this calendar is subject to change. Changes will be announced by the moderators and posted on the web as they arise.

21. Joint Learning Area Matrix. The matrix located immediately following provides interested students ready reference for determining the linkage between the OPMEP Learning Areas and the specific session objectives. For example, the Problem Solving Lecture and Seminar partially meets (hence the 'p') the requirements of Joint Learning Areas (JLA) 3a, 3e, and 4e. Looking at JLA 3e as an example:

e. Apply an analytical framework that incorporates the role that factors such as geopolitics, geo-strategy, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns in the joint, interagency, and multinational arena.

The lecture and seminar addresses society, culture, and religion in planning for major operations and campaigns. Students will notice that the vast majority of JLAs are partially met. There is no objective metric to describe or measure the attainment of a specific JLA. It is through the syllabus as a whole, with each session partially meeting the JLA, and through the education presented in the National Security Decision Making and Strategy and Policy Departments that the students achieve the broad, joint education as required by CJCS.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK

COURSE OVERVIEW (Lecture)

No matter where we fight in the future, no matter what the circumstances, we will fight as a joint team. We will have fingers on the team that are individual Services, but when it comes to the fight we want the closed, clenched fist of American military power. The days of single Service warfare are gone forever.

—ADM David E. Jeremiah, USN

A. Focus:

This introductory lecture will provide an overview of the academic requirements and expectations for the upcoming trimester.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the objectives of the College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College Joint Military Operations course.
- Understand the internal and external JMO Websites and their utility to the student.

C. Background:

For the century ahead, the use of military and naval power and their inter-relationships with the political, diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power will remain essential to achieving desired end states. During this trimester, we will study how to wield the military instrument of power, in peace and in war, to achieve national policy goals. We will examine relationships of national power at two levels—theater strategic and operational. This will include varying perspectives of the Executive Branch (President, cabinet members), Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, Joint Task Force Commanders, and component commanders. Our focus remains on joint operations at the theater and task force level with a maritime emphasis. National level strategy, implementation, and campaign planning are also discussed. This course will enhance student's senior leadership skills and critical thinking abilities to plan theater strategies and translate them into naval, joint, interagency, and multinational operations.

We will review the current theory of operational art, compare it to the doctrinal basis for contemporary application of military power, and begin to distill the next generation of doctrine for our armed forces. Today's operational art theory and the doctrinal basis for the U.S. armed forces reflect the zenith of our wisdom and knowledge of Industrial Age warfare and nation-state relationships. The advent of the Information Age creates an additional challenge in the creation of the next generation of doctrine because some of our theoretical and fundamental beliefs may change. The joint community and each of the military services are exploring this issue. Through this prism, we will examine the nation's near term challenges and the tenets of twenty-first century warfare.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Bill Hartig, C-409.

D. Questions:
None.

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Reading:

U.S. Naval War College. College of Naval Warfare & Naval Command College Joint Military Operations Department Syllabus and Study Guide for August 2008. (Posted on the JMO Website and Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:
None.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:
None.

INTRODUCTORY SEMINAR

You can make more friends in two months by becoming interested in other people than you can in two years by trying to get other people interested in you.
—Dale Carnegie

A. Focus:

This session is devoted to the introduction of seminar faculty and student members, a review of the administrative requirements and procedures for the trimester, an introductory discussion of the Operations Research Paper, and an overview of the general ground rules of seminar conduct.

B. Objectives:

- Relate each seminar member's background and area of expertise to the whole seminar.
- Comprehend seminar guidelines.
- Identify the links between the Joint Military Operations (JMO) course and the National Security Decision Making and Strategy & Policy courses.
- Discuss information contained in the syllabus. Specifically, address reading and writing requirements, the schedule, grading criteria and faculty expectations.
- Discuss social and administrative matters and assign seminar responsibilities.
- Review the JMO Web site.

C. Background:

The introductory seminar sets the tone for the trimester. This session is intended to provide the opportunity for everyone in the seminar to be introduced and to reveal relevant professional backgrounds and areas of expertise. Further, this session provides the forum for moderators and students to discuss appropriate social and administrative matters pertaining to the conduct of the seminar. The major writing requirement is introduced; however, the research paper will be discussed in more detail during the Operations Research Paper session scheduled for 22 August 2008.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Doug Hime, C-423.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Products:

Students are required to turn in their biographical data. Forms will be provided prior to the first session and are available in the Auditorium during the Introductory Lecture.

F. Required Reading:

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. "Operations Paper: Guidance for Students." Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 2008. (**NWC 2062T**), (Posted on JMO Website and Issued).

Review the internal JMO Web site at: https://portal.nwc.navy.mil/Pages/Default.aspx

Review the external JMO Web site at: http://navalwarcollege.blackboard.com

G. Supplementary Readings:
None.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:
None.

AN INTRODUCTION TO PROBLEM SOLVING (Lecture and Seminar)

Always keep in mind the product which the country desperately needs is military leaders with the capability of solving complex problems and of executing their decisions. . . . You must keep your sights on problem solving as your objective.

—VADM Stansfield Turner, USN
Naval War College Convocation, 24 August 1972

We come now to the region dominated by the powers of intellect. War is the realm of uncertainty . . . . War is the realm of chance. . . . Two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead. The first of these qualities is described by the French term, coup d'oeil; the second is determination."

—Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

A. Focus:

This lecture and seminar address the fundamental challenges of military planning and decision making—especially with respect to complex problems—within the broader framework of human problem solving and decision making. In so doing, it considers the components of problem solving, limits on rationality, and different categories of problems and relates them to appropriate decision making processes and command and staff structures and processes. The intent is to improve student critical problem solving abilities, especially as applied to organizing, planning, and commanding at the operational level. A seminar follows the Problem Solving lecture and is intended to allow the students to address many of the questions raised in the lecture regarding the typology of problems, consensus decision making, 'satisficing', and the role of culture and religion on military planning and planners. In so doing, moderators and students will discuss problem solving and how it relates to the military planning process, to the Effects Based Approach to Operations and to Information Operations, how planning groups may organize by outcome, and the development of the human intellect vis-à-vis problem solving. This will be done using as a backdrop a case study that investigates the decision General Douglas MacArthur made, in the face of universal opposition, to land at Inchon during the early stages of the Korean War. This specific operation will be revisited in JMO Session Theater Strategic Leadership. The intent of these sessions is to improve student critical problem solving capabilities while providing an opportunity to discuss the challenges associated with solving ill-structured problems and the requisite intellectual tools needed to aid in that endeavor.

B. Objectives:

- Evaluate the impact of culture on the planning process and on the individual members of the planning group.

- Analyze the heuristic character of human decision making, especially as it relates to decision makers operating in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment.
- Understand the concept of satisficing and how it relates to joint operations and campaign planning.
- Recognize the fundamental differences between decision making and consensus decision making.
- Identify critical problem solving attributes.
- Evaluate the complexities involved in human decision making and how, as planners, we must organize and present information to the decision maker in a manner and form particular to the specific decision maker.

C. Background:

Operational planning and senior officer decision-making comprise a specific category of the more general processes of human problem solving and decision making. The military commander and his staff almost inevitably address problems of organized complexity in the face of considerable uncertainty. This is especially true today. No longer afforded the luxury of a single, large opponent that operates conventionally and can be relatively well understood, the United States faces a post-Cold War world composed of both state and well-resourced, non-state, trans-national actors who pose extremely diverse threats and who are more likely to engage in unconventional, unrestricted, irregular, or hybrid warfare than in conventional military operations. Globalization has ensured that the United States is no longer effectively screened from such threats by its geo-strategic position—new threats can come from anywhere and the U. S. military must in consequence be prepared to operate on any part of the planet.

At the same time, the U. S. military is required to plan and execute an expanding, more varied array of activities across the entire Range of Military Operations (ROMO). Responses to these diverse threats are increasingly likely to require unorthodox diplomatic, information, military, and economic efforts effectively coordinated over lengthy periods of time. Thus it is that the U. S. military will inevitably be working with more actors in the future than it ever has before, including other U. S. government agencies, state and local governments, other states' militaries and civilian agencies, non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and private contractors. Compounding the challenges are the profound effects that individual tactical events may have at the operational and strategic levels. Moreover, outcomes are more likely ambiguous, solutions never complete, and solutions absent the kind of conclusive character that we achieved against state actors in conventional warfare in the not-so-distant past.

Taken together, the challenges of the contemporary operating environment constitute what have been variously called wicked, ill-defined, or ill-structured problems, as opposed to tame, well-defined, or well-structured problems. It is therefore imperative that professional military officers develop a sound understanding of the fundamental characteristics of problem solving and decision making in the face of complexity and consciously apply that knowledge in pragmatic ways in order to be more effective operational planners and commanders. In this session we focus specifically on the

contributions of psychology and cognitive science to a descriptive theory of decision making and its implications for sound military planning and command decision making. As Nobel Laureate Herbert A. Simon noted, the descriptive theory of decision making gives great attention to the limits on human rationality that are imposed by "the complexity of the world in which we live, the incompleteness and inadequacy of human knowledge, the inconsistencies of individual preference and belief, the conflicts of value among people and groups of people, and the inadequacy of the computations we can carry out, even with the aid of the most powerful computers." Notwithstanding these substantial limitations, humans often manage to make rational decisions. The descriptive theory of decision making is founded in problem solving, first codified by the philosopher John Dewey, but also exemplified in the Commander's Estimate of the Situation, developed by officers at the Naval War College before World War I, and in more recent efforts such as the Navy Planning Process and the Joint Operation Planning Process.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Bill Hartig, C-428.

D. Questions:

How did MacArthur arrive at the decision to conduct an amphibious assault at Inchon?

How did MacArthur address the conflict between the presentation of his operational idea and the concerns of his staff and component commanders during the planning for Operation CHROMITE?

How would someone from a related but different discipline (DOS, NGO, and so forth) look at this specific problem, and could an interdisciplinary approach improve the analysis / discussion / evaluation?

How do the differences between decision making and consensus decision making affect a planning group or a commander?

How do culture and religion affect planning and problem solving in general? Is this impact always negative?

Does contemporary thought regarding Information Operations effectively account for the complexities of human decision making?

How does the planning team leader organize the group to maximize the efficacy of the effort? Are so-called cylinders of excellence always to be avoided?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Facione, Peter A. "Critical Thinking and Why It Counts, 2007 Update" **(NWC 3068).** (Posted on the JMO Website)

Floru, Arthur J. Lt Col (USANG) and Hartig, William J. Col (USMC (Ret)), *Operation Chromite: MacArthur and Strategic Intuition*. Newport, RI, 2007. **(NWC 1035)** (Posted on the JMO Web site).

Hartig, William J. *Problem Solving and the Military Professional*. Newport, RI. 2007. **(NWC 1029)** (Posted on the JMO Web site).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Agre, Gene P. "The Concept of Problem." *Educational Studies* 13(1982): 126–127.

Chisholm, Donald. "Ill Structured Problems, Informal Mechanisms and the Design of Public Organizations." In Jan-Erik Lane, ed. *Bureaucracy and Public Choice*. London: Sage, 1987.

———. "Problem Solving and Institutional Design." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 4 (1995): 451–191.

Cowan, David A. "Developing a Process Model of Problem Recognition." A*cademy of Management Review* 11 (1986): 763–776.

Cyert, Richard M., Herbert A. Simon, and Donald B. Trow. "Observation of a Business Decision." *Journal of Business* 29 (1956): 237–248.

Dewey, John. *How We Think*. Boston: Heath, 1910.

———. *Reconstruction in Philosophy*. New York: Henry Holt, 1920.

———. *The Public and Its Problems*. Athens, OH: Swallow Press, 1985 [1927].

Dillon, J. T. "Problem Finding and Solving." *Journal of Creative Behavior* 16 (1982): 97–111.

D'Zurillia, Thomas J., and Arthur Nezu. "A Study of the Generation of Alternatives Process in Social Problem Solving." *Cognitive Therapy and Research* 4 (1980): 67–72.

Einstein, Albert, and Leopold Enfeld. *The Evolution of Physics: The Growth of Ideas from Early Concepts to Relativity and Quanta.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942.

Fernandes, Ronald, and Herbert A. Simon. "A Study of How Individuals Solve Complex and Ill-Structured Problems." *Policy Sciences* 32 (1999): 225–245.

Hayes-Roth, Barbara, and Frederick Hayes-Roth. "A Cognitive Model of Planning." Cognitive Science 3 (1979): 275–310.

Isenberg, Daniel J. "Thinking and Managing: A Verbal Protocol Analysis of Managerial Problem Solving." *Academy of Management Journal* 29 (1986): 775–788.

Klein, Gary A., and J. Weitzenfeld. "Improvement of Skills for Solving Ill-Defined Problems." *Educational Psychologist* 13 (1978): 31–41.

Landau. Martin., "On the Concept of a Self-Correcting Organization." *Public Administration Review* 33 (1973): 533–542.

Landau, Martin, and Donald Chisholm. "The Arrogance of Optimism: Notes on Failure-Avoidance Management." *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management* No. 3 (1995): 67–80.

Landau, Martin, and Russell Stout. "To Manage Is Not to Control or the Folly of Type II Errors." *Public Administration Review* 39 (1979): 148–156.

Lang, James R., John E. Dittrich, and Sam E. White. "Managerial Problem Solving Models: A Review and a Proposal." *Academy of Management Review* 3 (1978): 854–866.

LaPorte, Todd R. "Organized Social Complexity: Explication of a Concept." In Todd R. LaPorte, ed. *Organized Social Complexity: Challenges to Politics and Policy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Lindblom, Charles E. "The Science of Muddling Through." *Public Administration Review* 19 (1959): 79–88.

Luckman, John. "An Approach to the Management of Design." *Operational Research Quarterly* 18 (1967): 345–358.

Lyles, Marjorie A. "Formulating Strategic Problems: Empirical Analysis and Model Development." *Strategic Management Journal* 2 (1981): 61–75.

Lyles, Marjorie A., and Ian I. Mitroff. "Organizational Problem Formulation: An Empirical Study." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 25 (1980): 102–119.

March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations*. Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1979.

Mintzberg, Henry, Duru Raisinghani, and Andre Theoret. "The Structure of Unstructured Decision Processes." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 21 (1976): 246–275.

Newell, Allan, J. C. Shaw, and Herbert A. Simon. "Elements of a Theory of Human Problem Solving." *Psychological Review* 65 (1958): 151–166.

Pople, H. E., Jr. "Heuristic Methods for Imposing Structure on Ill-Structured Problems: The Structuring of Medical Diagnostics." In P. Szolovits, ed. *Artificial Intelligence in Medicine*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982.

Ramaprasad, Arkalgud, and Ian I. Mitroff. "On Formulating Strategic Problems." *Academy of Management Review* 9 (1984): 597–605.

Reitman, Walter. "Heuristic Decision Procedures, Open Constraints, and the Nature of Ill Defined Problems." In M. W. Shelley II and G.L. Bryan, eds. *Human Judgments and Optimality*. New York: Wiley, 1964.

Rittel, Horst, and Melvin M. Webber. "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning." *Policy Sciences* 4 (1973): 155–69.

Scott, Richard W. *Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981.

Simon, Herbert A., and Associates. "Decision Making and Problem Solving." In *Research Briefings 1986: Report of the Research Briefing Panel on Decision Making and Problem Solving*. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1986.

Simon, Herbert A. "The Executive as Decision Maker" and "Organizational Design: Man-Machine Systems for Decision Making." In Herbert A. Simon, *The New Science of Management Decision*. New York: Harper and Row, 1960.

———. "The Architecture of Complexity." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 106 (1962): 467–482.

———. "On the Concept of Organizational Goal." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 8 (1963): 1–22.

———. "The Structure of Ill Structured Problems." *Artificial Intelligence* 4 (1973): 181–201.

———. "Style in Design." In J. Archea and C. Eastman, eds. *Proceedings of the 2d Annual Environmental Research Association Conference*, October 1970. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie-Mellon University Press, 1975.

———. “On How to Decide What to Do.” *Bell Journal of Economics* 9 (1978): 494–507.

———. “Rationality in Political Behavior.” *Political Psychology* 16 (1995): 45–62.

Thompson, James D., and Arthur Tuden. “Strategies, Structures, and Processes of Organizational Decision.” In James D. Thompson, ed. *Comparative Studies in Administration*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959.

Voss, James F., and T.A. Post. “On the Solving of Ill-Structured Problems.” In M.T.H. Chi, R. Glaser, and M.J. Farr, eds. *The Nature of Expertise.* Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1988.

Wagner, Richard K. “Managerial Problem Solving.” In Robert J. Sternberg and Peter A Frensch, eds. *Complex Problem Solving: Principles and Mechanisms*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991.

Weaver, Warren. “Science and Complexity.” *American Scientis*. 36 (1948): 563–544.

Wildavsky, Aaron. “The Self-Evaluating Organization.” *Public Administration Review* 32 (1972): 509–520.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:
None.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES (Seminar)

Red China is not the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world. Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.
—General Omar Bradley, Testimony to the Senate, May 15, 1951

A. Focus:

This session will focus on *strategic objectives* and how they must drive military thinking and actions throughout the entire range of military operations. The direct relationship between national strategic objectives and operational objectives and the concept of regressive planning to maintain focus on the goal will also be discussed. We will also consider the interrelationship among the four elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and how the *strategic objective* relates to the *desired end state* (the strategic vision of how things should look at the conclusion of the operation). Discussions will only briefly address the policy documents that provide strategic direction to the military such as the *National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy,* and the *National Military Strategy*, because NSDM sessions "National Security Strategy," and "Defense Strategic Guidance," respectively, review the above three national strategies. This session also relates to the essence of the S&P trimester—in particular, S&P's initial course theme, "The Interrelationship of Policy, Strategy, and Operations."

B. Objectives:

- Analyze the interrelationship among the four elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and how the *strategic objective* relates to the *desired end state.*
- Discuss the concept of regressive planning and operational-level planning.
- Discuss the "Four Questions" and analyze how they can help the theater-strategic and operational level commanders apply assets in the pursuit of strategic objectives.
- Analyze how strategic communication is integrated into theater planning to support the national military and national security strategies.

C. Background:

As a starting point, the seminar will briefly discuss the primary policy documents that provide strategic direction to the military, recognizing that entire seminar sessions will be dedicated to each of these strategies during the NSDM trimester: the *National Security Strategy* (NSS), the *National Defense Strategy* (NDS), and the *National Military Strategy* (NMS). The *National Military Strategy* and the *National Defense Strategy* support the aims of the President's *National Security Strategy*.

The *National Security Strategy* (NSS) provides a broad strategic context for employing military capabilities in concert with other elements of national power. The

National Military Strategy (NMS) derives objectives, missions, and capability requirements from an analysis of the NSS. The seminar will examine the inter-relationship among the four main elements of national power as they relate to the operational commander.

The *National Military Strategy* (NMS) provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives and joint operating concepts from which the service chiefs and combatant commanders identify desired capabilities and against which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assesses risks. Operational art promotes unified action by helping joint force commanders and staffs facilitate the integration of other agencies and multinational partners in achieving the national strategic end state. Among the tools that will assist military commanders with that challenge is a set of four operational art questions found in joint doctrine:

1. What conditions are required to achieve the objectives? (Ends)
2. What sequence of actions is most likely to create those conditions? (Ways)
3. What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
4. What is the likely cost or risk in performing that sequence of actions?

The theater-strategic/operational commander must ensure that the response to the "four questions" (the essence of the plan) remains in line with strategic guidance. While some situations allow for clear military answers to these questions, in other cases there may be no military condition that will contribute to the stated or implied strategic objective(s). Often, the appropriate action may be diplomatic or economic, with the military in a supporting role. When military conflict appears necessary, the joint force commander must also anticipate and plan for war termination and post-conflict activities, which will include both military and civilian elements. Without considering these aspects from the outset of planning, there is little chance that even the best planned military operation can achieve the desired end state. The concept of regressive planning will be discussed using excerpts from Thomas Ricks' *Fiasco* and Gordon and Trainor's *Cobra II* to focus on pre-conflict, post-hostilities planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Excerpts from both of these books will be used again later in the trimester as well as during the Strategy and Policy (S&P) trimester later in the academic year. The S&P assigned readings, however, emphasize the policy-strategy relationship, focusing on keys issues such as civil-military relations, inter-service cooperation and rivalry, and interaction with the enemy.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Doug Hime, C-423.

D. Questions:

How do the NDS and the NMS help operational commanders translate strategy into operational plans?

How can the "four questions" help an operational commander respond to strategic guidance?

Explain the concept of regressive planning.

Who is responsible for strategic communication (SC) within the U. S. government, and how do combatant commanders employ SC?

What is the connection between planning for conflict and planning for post-conflict operations? Why does it matter when you do this planning? What other government agencies should be involved in this process?

How and by whom are the terms and conditions for conflict termination determined?

How effective was the pre-conflict post-hostilities planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. (New York: Pantheon, 2006), 70-74. (Issued).

Hime, Douglas N. "Strategic Communication—State of Play." Newport, RI: Naval War College, March 2008. (**NWC 4050**), (Posted on JMO Website).

U. S. Department of Defense. *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.* Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2008. Scan, (Posted on JMO Website).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow*. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 2004. Scan, (Posted on JMO Website).

———. *Joint Operations,* Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, 13 February 2008 with change 1. Read: I-1 to I-11, II-1 to II-3, and IV-3. (Issued).

———. *Joint Operation Planning,* Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, 26 December 2006. Read: II-1 to II-5, Appendix A. (Issued).

Ricks, Thomas E. *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq.* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006), 78-81. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "Policy-Strategy-Operational Art Nexus." *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: I-35 to I-50. (Posted on JMO Website and Issued).

The White House. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,* Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 2006. Scan, (Posted on JMO Website).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Iklé, Fred C. *Every War Must End.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, 1–16.

Reed, James W. "Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination . . ." *Parameters* No. 32, 2 (Summer 1993): 41–51.

Vego, Milan. "Policy, Strategy and Operations." In *Strategic Logic and Political Rationality*. Edited by B. A. Lee and K. F. Walling. London: Frank Cass, 2003.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:
None.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH PAPER (Seminar)

Although one can think without writing (and) one can write without thinking, these are not, ultimately, separate activities. I am not much impressed when a student tells me that he has thought A-Plus thoughts but has written them in C-Minus language. We do not think wordlessly and later put our thoughts into words. Language is a medium of thought as well as of expression; we think in and with words, just as we speak and write with words. In short, I believe that muddy writing is, more often than not, a symptom of muddy thinking. If I cannot say clearly what I want to say, I probably haven't thought it out clearly. Taking the time to think can do wonders for our writing.

—Inis L. Claude, Jr.

A. Focus:

This seminar amplifies the Operations Research Paper requirements addressed in the Introductory Seminar. The Operations Research Paper is an objective vehicle for students to demonstrate critical thinking skills and professional competence at the Master's level. It is an essential element of the curriculum, affording the opportunity to address a topic relevant to any syllabus session. This session addresses specific paper requirements, including guidance on research and writing, due dates, grading criteria, and appropriate research topics.

B. Objectives:

- Evaluate the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- Evaluate in formal, written work a contemporary issue in one of the following joint professional learning areas: national security strategy; national military strategy and organization; joint warfare, theater strategy, or campaigning; national and joint planning systems and processes; integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities; information operations, command & control, or battle space awareness; and joint force leader development.
- Create formal, written work dealing with the theater-strategic or operational level of war, operational art, or an issue of concern to theater-strategic or operational level commanders.
- Craft literature in operational and strategic thinking.
- Develop papers worthy of publication in professional journals and military periodicals.

C. Background:

The Operations Research Paper provides an opportunity to study a theater-strategic or operational level issue, conduct research and analysis, and write a paper that advances the literature in the selected area. It enables students to address topics that they

believe are of significant value. It requires independent thought and competent writing because the final product should be suitable for publication in a professional journal. The range and depth of research should be adequate to support the student's thesis, and justify sufficiently the conclusions and recommendations or lessons learned. Another use of the paper may be to contribute innovative thinking to Service component and joint force staffs dealing with the many complex issues of military force employment.

Combatant commanders, operating forces, and headquarters staffs solicit papers and monographs on topics of current interest to support initiatives, develop concepts, and provide fresh looks at the methods of accomplishing missions. The Naval War College is canvassed frequently for papers on particular subjects, and requested to stimulate interest in specific areas for research and writing to support requesting commands. An example is innovation in the application of military force—how to accomplish the goal of fighting *smarter* rather than fighting with *more*. While some aspects of this project fall outside the parameters of the Operations Research Paper requirement, many of the issues therein are JMO applicable. These especially include doing the right things and doing them "right"—the result of integrating effectiveness and efficiency.

1. *Requirements.* The Operations Research Paper requires the following:

a. A thesis—a definitive position that the paper will aim to defend, support, or justify.

b. Sufficient research to analyze the thesis properly.

c. Arguments and counter-arguments that allow thorough contrast of conflicting points of view.

d. Logical conclusions drawn from the material presented within the paper.

e. Recommendations or lessons learned, as appropriate, demonstrating the paper's relevance to the modern operational commander.

2. *Topics.* Topics should be taken from one of the following areas:

a. A current issue at the operational or theater-strategic level of war.

b. Operational art or the use of operational art to examine or analyze a case.

c. An option in support of a military strategy or a new doctrinal concept.

d. An issue dealing with planning, execution, tasks, or functions at the operational or theater-strategic level of war.

e. Innovation such as the application of naval force at the operational or theater-strategic level of war.

f. An issue that applies to contemporary or near-future major operations or campaigns.

g. A topic of value to an operational or theater-strategic commander.

NOTE: The Operations Research Paper should not be an examination of tactics, technology, force structure, or future force planning concepts. Also, it should not be a library search and recitation of published material. The paper should not contain proposals or recommendations regarding numbers and types of weapon platforms, nor modifications to platforms, weapons, sensors, or force structure. Moderators will answer any questions on specific issues relating to topic selection.

The required reading (NWC 2062T) contains the JMO Chairman's guidance for selecting a suitable topic and crafting a research question. It also contains candidate topical areas from requesting commands, a list of topics dealing with the operational level of war, extracts on the awards program, and instructions for submission of papers to professional journals. NWC 2062T is an excellent resource for developing ideas and selecting a topic and may be found on the JMO Website.

3. *Paper Proposal.* Using the format contained in enclosure (1) to NWC 2062T, a paper proposal must be provided to the moderators. The proposal will state the student's thesis, approach, relevance, and methodology so that the moderators can determine if the paper will satisfy JMO course requirements. Once the moderator team accepts a proposal, this constitutes an understanding between student and moderator grading team. An accepted proposal means that both the student and the moderators understand the depth of research, extent of analysis, and quality of writing expected of the student, in addition to the requirements discussed in paragraph one of this section.

4. *Research and Writing.* Research and writing shall meet standards appropriate to the Master's degree level of intellectual effort.

5. *Format.* The *Naval War College Writing and Style Guide* (located on the JMO Website) is the standard for unclassified written work. Guidance for classified papers is available from the moderators.

6. *Report Document Page.* The final version submitted to the moderators requires a Standard Form (SF) 298 as the Report Document Page. The SF-298 format is installed on computers in the various student computer rooms at the College.

7. *Length.* The text of the Operations Research Paper will be 14 to 17 double-spaced pages in Times New Roman font size 12 to meet standard format for publication and award submissions. Moderators may accept longer papers depending on the paper purpose and topic, but students must obtain this acceptance prior to paper submission.

8. *Faculty Advisor.* A paper advisor may help a student define the scope of the research effort, keep research, analysis, and writing on track, and review outlines and drafts. Students are not required to have an advisor, but one is strongly recommended. Seminar moderators may suggest advisors who have subject matter expertise relevant to paper topic.

9. *Grading.* The Operations Research Paper represents a substantial portion of the JMO Course grade. The paper will be evaluated for substance, content, format, and writing quality. Grades will be based on the criteria specified in the Grading Criteria section of the JMO Syllabus.

10. *Prizes and Awards.* Operations Research Papers may compete for the prizes and

awards bestowed annually during the June graduation ceremony. Students are encouraged to prepare their Operations Papers with the additional purpose of competing for one or more of these honors. Details are included in NWC 2062T.

11. *Schedule:*

8 September 2008: Submit paper proposal to seminar moderators.

9-10 September 2008: Conduct individual tutorials per schedule arranged with moderators; moderators and student agree on research topic and course of action.

6 October 2008: Suggested date to terminate research, commence analysis and writing.

22 October 2008: Suggested latest date for submission of *final* draft to faculty advisor.

31 October 2008: Deliver paper to seminar moderators.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Romanski, MLH 135.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Products:

The required product is a Joint Military Operations research paper that creates new knowledge/advances the literature in theater-strategic or operational areas.

F. Required Readings:

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. "Operations Paper: Guidance for Students." Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 2008. (**NWC 2062T**), (Posted on JMO Website and Issued).

_____. *Naval War College Writing and Style Guide.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, August 2007. (Posted on JMO Website)

_____. JMO Paper Template. (Posted on JMO Website)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Booth, Wayne C., Gregory G. Colomb, and Joseph M. Williams. *The Craft of Research.* 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.

Strunk, William, Jr. *The Elements of Style.* 4th ed. With revisions, an introduction, and a chapter on writing by E. B. White. New York: MacMillan, 1999.

Turabian, Kate L. *A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations, 7th Edition.* Revised by Wayne G. Booth, Gregory G. Colomb, Joseph M. Williams and University of Chicago Press Staff. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

COMPLEX IRREGULAR WARFARE (Lecture/Seminar)

The problems associated with countering irregular threats are complex, dynamic, and daunting. Their solutions require a long-term, comprehensive approach in the application of the instruments of national power and influence. While we are naturally predisposed toward quick and decisive conflict resolution, our conventional military preeminence virtually guarantees adversaries will resort to irregular means.

— Lieutenant General James N. Mattis, USMC, June 2006.

A. Focus:

This session addresses evolving patterns of warfare and recent efforts to comprehend what has been variously characterized as fourth generation (4GW), unconventional, unrestricted, hybrid, and complex irregular warfare (IW), as practiced by both state and non-state actors. In concert with the Problem Solving, Range of Military Operations, and The Art of the Campaign sessions, this session provides the conceptual foundation for subsequent sessions which address in detail the planning for and conduct of specific kinds of campaigns and operations across the Range of Military Operations.

B. Objective:

- Define trends in evolving patterns of warfare and their implications for operational planning and execution.
- Analyze contemporary efforts of state and non-state actors to develop theories of irregular warfare.
- Comprehend contemporary U. S. efforts to develop theories of irregular warfare.

C. Background:

The dramatic reshaping of the global security environment during the two decades following the end of the Cold War—including the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, rapid economic globalization, continuing effects of de-colonialization and failing states, the demonstrated preeminence of U. S. military forces in the conduct of conventional warfare and the corresponding absence of a peer state competitor, and the rise of so-called "rogue states" and well-resourced, trans-national, non-state actors—has generated considerable thought about emerging "new" patterns of conflict and warfare and their implications for the planning and conduct of operations. Some, however, have suggested that these – unconventional, irregular, hybrid, and unrestricted warfare—are not really new patterns but represent a reversion to conflict as usual as has occurred throughout most of human history, following an aberrant period of Western-style conventional state versus state warfare during the past two or so centuries.

Irrespective of new or old patterns, the plain fact is that life is different in the post-Cold War period than it was during World War II and the decades immediately following. In consequence, the U. S. and friendly states as well as potential competitors and present foes, state and non-state, have been struggling to come to terms with how

warfare is to be conducted in the foreseeable future. Efforts to understand evolving patterns of warfare have been ongoing for nearly two decades. However, the challenge is considerable and U. S. thinking about these patterns has not yet reached a level of clarity and consistency that permits its distillation into practically useful doctrine. Just before the Berlin Wall came down, several U.S military officers described what they called fourth-generation warfare which they viewed as "an evolved form of insurgency," ostensibly growing out of Mao's concept of the People's War. One observer contends that it is "the only type of war the United States has lost (Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia)," and it "makes use of all of society's networks—political, economic, social, and military—to carry on the fight."

More recently (June 2006), the U. S. Marine Corps published a *Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats*, its title indicating its equivalence to the 1930's *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* as an initial step toward building doctrine for a new form of warfare. In some sense, however, this publication may be considered a return to the longstanding Marine Corps focus on "small wars," formally codified in its justly famous 1940 *Small Wars Manual* (its title deriving from a late 19th century book that addressed British military endeavors in the Empire). In December 2006, the U. S. Army and Marine Corps co-published a new capstone manual for counterinsurgency (FM 3-24/USMC 3-33.5), an effort to understand, organize, and apply lessons from Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.

In August 2006, USJFCOM published a *Special Study on Irregular Warfare*. That same month, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM co-published a *Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare*. Completing this initial effort was the February 2007 DOD publication of the first *Joint Operating Concept for Irregular Warfare.* In light of this ferment, the USJFCOM Special Study argues that "The working definitions of IW in the IW roadmap, current Joint Capability Area (JCA) lexicon, draft JCA lexicon, and draft NATO usage are not harmonized and in fact are contradictory. Without an accepted and approved definition, IW cannot be included in joint doctrine." It is imperative therefore, that professional military officers engage closely in this discussion.

Other states are also keenly interested in emerging patterns of warfare. For example, two Chinese military officers have elaborated their concept of "war beyond limits" (originally translated as "unrestricted warfare") which they view as a means for conventionally weaker state and non-state actors to fight stronger opponents, such as the U.S. They view it as warfare without rules, across a wide spectrum of actions, including conventional and unconventional means, along with coordinated employment of all sources of national power, including economic and informational, in novel ways.

Among non-state actors, members of al Qaeda have written systematically and persuasively about new ways to attack and defeat the conventionally superior U. S. and other Western states in support of their long-term objectives. Complicating matters, many of our opponents will not be professional military personnel—not necessarily rendering them less effective but certainly making them less predictable and less prone to adhere to those institutions, such as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) which constrains and restrains state actors.

"Complex irregular warfare" is sometimes used to capture the evolving patterns of

modern conflict and is employed in this lesson as a general rubric for the emerging patterns of warfare. Similarly, "hybrid warfare" is gaining increasing currency as a descriptor of a combination of conventional and irregular warfare conceptualized and practiced by both state and non-state actors.

It is essential for the professional military officer and civilian leaders to comprehend not only these emerging patterns but also to grasp how present and future opponents, state and non-state, are themselves thinking about those patterns in order to effectively plan and conduct operations across the entire Range of Military Operations (ROMO) using all elements of national power.

Point of contact for this lesson is Professor D. Chisholm, C-422.

D. Questions:

Are presently emerging patterns of warfare really new forms or do they actually represent a return to historically common means for conducting war?

What are the common threads in the several concepts of unconventional, irregular, hybrid, and unrestricted warfare? How do these concepts differ?

How can the U. S. joint force commander and staff most effectively plan for countering threats from the conduct of complex irregular warfare by both state and non-state actors?

What are the implications of facing opponents who do not field professional military forces?

What are the consequences of complex irregular warfare for the coordinated application of the several elements of national power?

What are the implications of complex irregular warfare for the processes by which the U. S. joint force commander and staff plan and conduct military operations? Should existing processes be amended?

E. Products:

None**.**

F. Required Readings:

Al-Zawahiri, Ayman. "Letter to al-Zarqawi." 9 July 2005. ODNI News Release No. 2-05. (**NWC 6022**), (Posted on JMO Website).

Bin-Ladin, Shaykh Usama Bin-Muhammad Bin Ladin, et al. "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, World Islamic Front Statement," 23 February 1998. (**NWC 6023**), (Posted on JMO Website).

Kilcullen, David J. "New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict." http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0507/ijpe/kilcullen.htm. (**NWC 3031**), (Posted on JMO Website).

Liang, Qiao, and Wang Xiangsui. *Unrestricted Warfare*. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999. (**NWC 6021**), (Posted on JMO Website).

Liang, Qiao, and Wang Xiangsui. *Unrestricted Warfare* Authors: Idea is 'Beyond

Limits,' Not 'Unrestricted'. Shanghai Guoji Zhanwang in Chinese 01 Nov 05 pp 86-89. (Posted on JMO Website). [Originally published in March 2000 issue of Jianchuan Zhishi]. **NWC 3013)**

U. S. Department of Defense. *Irregular Warfare (IW), Joint Operating Concept (JOC*). Version 1.0. 11 September 2007. (**NWC 3032**), (Posted). pp. 5-18.

G. Supplementary Readings:

Blanchard, Christopher M. *Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology.* Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2005.

Bohannan, C. T. A. "Unconventional Operations." Transcript of a Talk before the Counter-Guerrilla Seminar. NC: Fort Bragg, 15 June 1961.

Callwell, C. E. *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice.* 3d ed. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996 [Originally published in 1892].

Cassidy, Robert M. "The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency." *Parameters* 36 (Summer 2006): 15-29.

Davis, Jacquelyn K. *Radical Islamist Ideologies and the Long War: Implications for U. S. Strategic Planning and U. S. Central Command's Operations*. Future Strategic Contexts for WMD–Related Planning and Operations HDTRA1–06–F–0054. Washington, D.C.: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, January 2007.

Gray, Colin S. "Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters." Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Symposium 2007: Counterinsurgency. 24-26 April 2007.

_____. *Another Bloody Century, Future Warfare*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006.

Hoffman, Frank G. "NEO-Classical Counter-Insurgency?" *Parameters* 37 (Summer 2007): 71-87.

_____. "Small Wars Revisited: The United States and Non-Traditional Wars." J*ournal of Strategic Studies* 28 (December 2005): 1–28.

_____. "Principles for the Savage Wars of Peace." pp. 299-322. in *Rethinking the Principles of War*. Anthony D. McIvor, ed. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005.

Krause, Michael G. *Square Pegs for Round Holes: Current Approaches to Future Warfare and the Need to Adapt*. Working Paper No. 132. Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, June 2007.

Lawrence, T. E. "Science of Guerrilla Warfare." *Encyclopedia Britannica.* 14th Edition. 1929.

Lind, William S., Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, and Gary I. Wilson. "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 1989): 22–26.

Long, Austin. *On "Other War:" Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006.

Mattis, James N. "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars." *Proceedings* 131 (November 2005): 18-19.

Peters, Ralph. "The New Warrior Class." *Parameters* 24 (Summer 1994): 16-26.

U. S. Department of the Army. *Counterinsurgency*. FM 3-24/USMC 3-33.5. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 15 Dec 2006.

U. S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center. *Irregular Warfare Special Study.* Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Command, 4 August 2006.

U. S. Marine Corps, Combat Development Command and U. S. Special Operations Command Center for Knowledge and Futures. *Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare.* Washington, D.C.: U. S. Marine Corps, August 2006.

_____. *A Concept for Countering Irregular Threats A Comprehensive Approach.* Washington, D.C.: U. S. Marine Corps. 14 June 2006.

_____. *Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats: An Updated Approach to Counterinsurgency Operations.* Washington, D.C.: U. S. Marine Corps, 7 June 2006.

_____. *Small Wars Manual*. With an Introduction by Ronald Schaffer. Manhattan, KS.: Sunflower University Press, 1996 [Originally published 1940].

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS (ROMO) (Seminar)

The conduct of small wars is in certain respects an art by itself, diverging widely from what is adapted to the conditions of regular warfare, but not so widely that there are not in all its branches points which permit comparisons to be established.

—Colonel C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice,* 1906.

Like it or not, most of you will find yourselves in a place you never heard of, doing things you never wanted to do.

—General John Shalikashvili, CJCS (1993–1997)

A. Focus:

This session addresses the Range of Military Operations (ROMO), the kinds of operations that populate this concept, and the differences in the key planning considerations appropriate for these several kinds of operations, especially with respect to the principles of war, operational factors, and operational functions. In concert with the Problem Solving and Complex Irregular Warfare sessions, this session provides the conceptual foundation for subsequent sessions that address in detail the planning for and conduct of specific kinds of operations across the Range of Military Operations.

B. Objectives:

- Recognize the development of the term "ROMO" and its implications for how the military understands its profession.
- Analyze the problems associated with planning and conducting operations across the entire ROMO.
- Value effective means for solving planning problems across the ROMO.

C. Background:

Americans have, since before the founding of the republic, developed an image of the war they would prefer to fight: maintain a defensive posture, but once attacked, mobilize, deploy, conduct large-scale, speedy, extremely violent, and decisive operations, substituting physical capital, materiel, and advanced technology for human capital wherever possible, leading to a clear-cut victory, and expeditious return home.

So too, have the individual military services developed images of the wars they would prefer to fight and the operations they would prefer to conduct: the Army, a large-scale land-air combined-arms battle as evinced by a description of the Cold War's Fulda Gap scenario; the Navy, a Mahanian decisive fleet action in the open ocean like Nelson at Trafalgar; the Marines, a high-tempo series of assaults as in World War II's Central Pacific drive; and the Air Force, a meticulously planned, centrally-controlled strategic bombing campaign.

These images have profoundly affected (1) public expectations; (2) force structures and organization; (3) officer education, training, and career paths; (4) planning

processes and plans; and (5) doctrine. However, history shows that these preferred images of war have only episodically accorded with the kinds of conflicts and operations the U. S. military has actually been called upon to confront and conduct almost daily.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, for example, has to date comprised several weeks of conventional combat operations followed by more than five years of belligerent occupation, stability, and counter-insurgency operations. Nearly seven years after quickly routing the Taliban in Afghanistan, the United States and its Allies still find themselves conducting significant operations there.

The U. S. military has found it challenging to conceptualize, develop doctrine, organize, train, and plan for operations such as those in Iraq after summer of 2003 for the following reasons:

- Historically, unconventional or non-conventional operations have not been the operations that senior U. S. military leaders have really wanted to conduct. The Naval War College, for example, spent more than a generation before World War II preparing its graduates to win a major conventional war against Japan in the Pacific; it spent no time at all preparing for the occupation of Japan that would almost inevitably follow successful conduct of that conventional war.
- The U. S. military has thus historically focused most of its efforts on conventional combat operations. Such operations are, relatively speaking, tame problems that the military has over time made well structured, and as such are susceptible of solution.
- However, stability operations, counterinsurgency operations, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping operations, to name but a few, differ greatly from conventional combat operations and from one another. These operations are much more likely to be wicked problems that resist well structured status and are therefore much less amenable to algorithmic or formulaic solutions. It is also much harder to define success for such operations and to know when they are completed than it is for conventional combat operations.
- Although it is possible conceptually to sort operations into discrete categories, in the actual event different kinds of operations tend to be executed simultaneously, a fact duly recognized by the term "complex contingencies."
- The skills needed to prevail in conventional combat operations are not necessarily the ones required for other operations, even though senior civilian leaders may assume that there is no significant difference.

Lesser conflicts—"small wars" as the British once called them—and a wide spectrum of other operations have always been important, and at least some U. S. military have thought about how to conduct them. On the eve of World War II, the United States Marine Corps published its now justly famous *Small Wars Manual*. Its cogent lessons—gained from several decades of hard-won experience—were largely put aside and forgotten as the U.S. was swept into the greatest of all conventional wars.

The lengthy post-World War II process of decolonization produced many insurgencies and intra-state conflicts, some of which are still playing out—in East Timor, for example. A generation after the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, U. S.

officers argued among themselves whether the conflict they were fighting in Southeast Asia was a conventional conflict or a counterinsurgency. The answer they derived greatly affected how the conflict was prosecuted.

The 1970s saw development of the term "Low Intensity Conflict" (LIC) as a less charged alternative to "counterinsurgency," which had become anathema after Vietnam. It denoted those operations conducted as the U.S. and Soviet Union jockeyed for position through proxy conflicts (usually insurgencies) client states. As the Cold War wound down in the late 1980s, and military assets began to be employed in more and more "atypical" missions, LIC was supplanted by the now familiar Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Unfortunately, MOOTW created an artificial divide between "war" and "other" operations, most of which at times still looked a great deal like war—especially to those required to execute them.

As U. S. military forces continued to deploy on myriad non-conventional missions through the 1990s, now referred to as "complex contingency operations" and increasingly executed in the joint/interagency environment, this change was reflected in the new term, Operations Other Than War (OOTW). However, OOTW was never fully embraced, and operations in the Balkans led to a focus on that subset comprising "peace operations" and, subsequently, "Stability and Support Operations." But neither of these terms yet encompassed all the operations the military was even then conducting.

The challenges confronting the U. S. military are today as dramatic as any challenges the services have confronted during the past century. The incidence of state-on-state conventional warfare has declined and our attention (and active involvement) has increasingly been drawn to intra-state conflicts and against well-resourced, transnational, non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Ironically, perhaps, because of the United States' terrible effectiveness in conventional combat operations, few of its present or potential opponents choose to engage with us symmetrically—to do so would virtually assure their failure. Instead, both state and non-state actors have planned for and engaged in "complex irregular warfare," aiming to exploit what they perceive as U. S. weaknesses.

The conceptual guideline for comprehending these changes is now the "Range of Military Operations" (ROMO). It assumes, fundamentally, that *conventional military forces can at any time successfully conduct operations across a spectrum of operations so wide that there may be little in common between operations at one end of the spectrum and those at the other.*

In 2003, *Joint Operations Concepts* (JOC) recognized and codified the cumulative changes and experiences of the past several decades, integrating them with newly developed perspectives on war and military operations, to provide an over arching concept describing how the U. S. military would operate in the future across the Range of Military Operations. As promulgated in the JOC, ROMO represented a potential sea change in military thinking about operations by removing the artificial divide between the preferred image of war (namely, conventional combat operations) and all the other kinds of operations the military regularly conducts.

Joint Publication 3-0, *"Joint Operations"* (13 February 2008 with change 1),

defines ROMO to include: military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, crisis response contingencies, and major operations and campaigns. Thus, ROMO represents the way in which the military presently thinks about those problems it will be called upon to address across a broad spectrum of operations.

This session requires that you think about how you will plan operations now that this boundary has been erased (conceptually, at least). The different categories of operations are distinguished one from the others by their peculiar implications for how we think about operational factors (time, space, force) and in consequence how we address operational functions. At the same time, the several kinds of operations vary systematically in their requirements for skills resident principally in other U. S. government agencies, in intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and in private contractors. You will also need to recognize which kinds of operations tend to occur together in space and time.

A final point: an enduring challenge is for the military to maintain the capability to provide credible Strategic Deterrence and conduct Major Combat Operations against a peer competitor while improving its effectiveness in such areas as Stability Operations and Domestic Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

The point of contact for this lesson is Professor D. Chisholm, C-422.

D. Questions:

How do planning and conducting different types of operations require different thinking about the operational functions?

Is there a generic operations planning model that can be effective across the entire ROMO?

What types of operations are likely to be tame problems? Which ones wicked problems? Why?

What effect do changing political objectives have on the selection of objectives for operations? Do some operations within the ROMO demand special skills that military officers are not normally trained to acquire? What are the practical effects on the planning and conduct of such operations?

E. Products:

None**.**

F. Required Readings:

Fishel, John T. "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night." *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* 4 (Winter 1995): 372–398. (**NWC 3077**), (Posted on JMO Website).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations,* 13 February 2008 with change 1. Read: Chapter 1, "Strategic Context." (Issued).

Waghelstein, John D. "Preparing the U. S. Army for the Wrong War: Educational and Doctrinal Failure 1865-1891." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 10 (1999): 1-33. (**NWC**

3113), (Posted on JMO Website).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Boot, Max. *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*. New York: Basic Books, 2003.

Callwell, C. E. *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice.* 3d ed. London: General Staff, 1906.

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). *MEMO 023-03, Interim Range of Military Operations (ROMO).* Washington, D.C.: 28 January 2003.

United States Marine Corps. *Small Wars Manual*. With an Introduction by Ronald Schaffer. Manhattan, KS.: Sunflower University Press, 1996 [Originally Published 1940].

Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy.* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977. [Originally published 1973].

White, Jeffrey B. "Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare." *Studies in Intelligence* 39, No. 5 (1996): 51–57.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction.

None.

FAILED STATES (Lecture and Seminar)

The military probably since Vietnam, maybe before, became more and more saddled with conflict resolution—strange conflict resolution—peacekeeping, humanitarian efforts, nation building. The military has resisted this. They don't like it. They're not trained for it. But there's no one else to do it and it continues to be the mission that confronts us.

— General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.)

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the Failed State phenomenon and examines the practical challenges associated with U. S. and other western intervention in such states. The first half of the session comprises a lecture on the general problems of failed states. In the second half, each seminar will discuss potential military mission statements regarding Darfur.

B. Objective:

- Recognize the concept of failed (or failing) states.
- Analyze the pathology of the degeneration of states.
- Examine the effects of failed and failing states on U. S. national interests.
- Examine the considerations involved with planning complex contingency operations.

C. Background:

The modern "state," characterized by a permanent bureaucracy and a standing military force, is a western European invention, generally considered to date to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. At a minimum, states control their own borders, conduct external relations with other states, and provide internal security and stability. The effectiveness of the state compared with other forms of social organization, and the rise to dominance of European powers, coupled with their vast colonial empires, created the modern international system of states.

The modern phenomena of "weak," "failing," and "collapsed" states began with the post-World War II process of de-colonization. This process was temporarily stayed by the Cold War. Former colonies, typically lacking the political maturity and economic wherewithal to prosper as independent nation states, were kept viable as client states, as Washington and Moscow competed for their loyalty. With the Cold War's end and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, more new states arose, often driven by previously suppressed ethnic and religious differences, adding to the number of governments whose future viability was and remains dubious.

The beginning of the twenty first century has seen a growing number of states unable to survive as viable entities. Caught between traditional cultures, long-standing tribal or ethnic conflicts, and the thin veneer of modern institutions, these fragile states show a remarkable inclination to deteriorate rapidly into instability and violence—Kenya in early 2008, for example.

The resulting deterioration of governance in these states gives rise to serious problems, ranging from economic collapse to genocide and other human rights abuses, hunger and starvation, population dislocation and migration, civil war, insurgency, international terrorist activity, and other internal instability. These problems almost inevitably affect neighboring states, the region in general, and increasingly, have global effects. Often times, failing states also contain within their territory valuable natural resources that increase their salience to modern states—Sudan, for example, contains extensive petroleum reserves.

In consequence, failing states often demand the involvement, willingly or unwillingly, of outside powers, especially the United States, in what have become known as "complex contingency operations." Such operations include, to name but a few, noncombatant evacuations, counter-narcotics, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, foreign internal defense, and various kinds of peace operations. Almost all such operations will be conducted in non-Western contexts, within traditional cultures, usually with only rudimentary physical and institutional infrastructures, often in large inhospitable spaces.

Thus, apparently tame problems (e.g., famine relief in Somalia) will almost always prove to be much more complex and wicked than initial appraisals indicate. The U. S. military will usually find itself liable for conducting more than one kind of operation simultaneously and realistic criteria for measuring success will be very difficult to come by. Inevitably, the military will find it necessary to work with a wide range of other U. S. government agencies, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and private contractors. At times the host-nation government will complicate matters by declining to be a gracious host.

Seminar assessment of U. S. options and analysis of the military role in dealing with complex contingency operations provide this session's main focus.

The point of contact for this lesson is Professor D. Chisholm, C-422.

D. Questions:

What are the characteristics of a state described as "failing" or "failed?"

What are the causes of state failure? Are there common threads to state failure or is each unique?

If such states are outside our region, should the U.S. care? Why or why not?

What are useful indicators of impending failure?

How can military resources be applied most effectively? What other resources are usually required?

What other agencies and organizations are likely to be involved? What are the implications of their involvement for the military?

E. Products:

Students will discuss possible CENTCOM J-5 mission statements regarding a potential humanitarian relief operation in Darfur, Sudan.

F. Required Reading:

Fund for Peace. "The Failed States Index." *Foreign Policy* (July-August 2008). (**NWC 6004**), (Posted on JMO Website).

Rice, Susan. "Why Darfur Can't Be Left to Africa" *Washington Post*, August 7, 2005. (**NWC 3076**), (Posted on JMO Website).

The United Nations, UN Security Council Resolutions Pertaining to Darfur. UN Security Council, New York, 2005. **(NWC 4026),** (Posted on JMO Website).

U.S. Department of State. *Darfur Peace Agreement*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 5 May 2006. **(NWC 6005),** (Posted on JMO Website).

U.S. Naval War College, JMO Department. "Crisis in Sudan, OPERATION URGENT RESPONSE" (Case Study). Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2008. (**NWC 3086D**), (Posted on JMO Website and Issued).

G. Supplementary Reading:

Ballard, John R. *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994–1997.* Westport, CT: Praeger/Greenwood, 1998.

Clare, Michael T., and Daniel Volman. "Africa's Oil and American National Security." *Current History* (May 2004): 226-231.

Cohen, Stephen Philip. "The Nation and the State of Pakistan." *Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2002): 109–122.

Commission on Weak States and U. S. National Security. "On the Brink: Weak States and U. S. National Security." Center for Global Development, June 2004.

Dearth, Douglas H. "Failed State: an International Conundrum." *Defense Intelligence Journal* 5 (1996): 119–130.

Dobbins, James, John G, McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, Anga Timilsina. "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq." Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2003.

Dorff, Robert H. "Democratization and Failed States: The Challenge of Ungovernability." *Parameters* 26 (Summer 1996): 17–31.

Einsiedel, Sebastian von. *State Failure and the Crisis of Governance: Making States Work*. New York: International Peace Academy, 2003.

Ferguson, Niall. *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power.* New York: Basic Books, 2003.

Helman, Gerald B., and Steven R. Ratner. "Saving Failed States." *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1992–1993): 3–20.

Katzman, Kenneth. "Afghanistan: Current Issues and U. S. Policy Concerns." Reprinted from *CRS Report for Congress—Afghanistan: Current Issues and U. S. Policy Concerns* (updated December 12, 2001). Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2001.

Lyman, Princeton N., and J. Stephen Morrison. "The Terrorist Threat in Africa." *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2004): 75-86.

McLean, Philip. "Columbia: Failed, Failing, or Just Weak?" *Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2002): 123–134.

Metz, Helen C., ed. *Somalia: A Country Study.* (Introduction). Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, May 1992.

Ronfeldt, David. *In Search of How Societies Work: Tribes—The First and Forever Form*. WR-433-RPC. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, December 2006.

Rotberg, Robert I. "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure." *Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2002): 85–96.

Treaty of Westphalia, Munster, 24 October 1648. *Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and Their Respective Allies*.

Vaughn, Bruce. "Malaysia: Political Transition and Implications for U. S. Policy." Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2003.

Wanandi, Jusuf. "Indonesia: A Failed State?" *Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2002): 135–146.

The White House. *National Security Strategy of the United States.,* March 2006.

Woodward, Susan L. "Failed States: Warlordism and 'Tribal' Warfare." *Naval War College Review* 52 (Spring 1999): 55–68.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

THE ART OF THE CAMPAIGN (Lecture and Seminar)

The immediate strategic objective of the forces of the PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS is to obtain positions from which the ultimate surrender of Japan can be forced by intensive air bombardment, by sea and air blockade, and by invasion if necessary. The ultimate strategic objective is to establish our sea and air power, and if necessary our amphibious forces, in those positions and force the unconditional surrender of Japan.

—Campaign Plan Granite, 15 January 1944

The second stage in decision making is to devise or discover possible courses of action. This is the activity that in fields like engineering and architecture is called "design"; in military affairs "planning; in chemistry, "synthesis"; in other contexts, "invention"; "composition"; or – that most approving of labels – "creation." In routine, repetitive decision making, design may play a small role, for the alternatives of action may already be at hand, to be taken off the shelf as occasion requires. In slightly less structured and repetitive situations, design may require only relatively unproblematic assembly of action alternatives from prefabricated components. In most human affairs, however, the design stage in decision making occupies a far larger part of the mind's information processing capacity than either the stages of attention getting or of choice.

—Herbert A. Simon, "The Logic of Heuristic Decision Making" (1977)

A. Focus:

This session addresses the art and science of campaign design. It considers the cognitive and organizational requirements for designing and executing effective campaigns (vice operations) whether conventional, irregular, or some combination thereof. In so doing, it attends to the general challenges of design, especially as applied to ill-structured and wicked problems.

B. Objective:

- Evaluate how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- Value the iterative nature of campaign design.
- Appreciate the complexity of campaign design and impact of shifting policy on the campaign designer.
- Understand the campaign planning implications presented by different types of conflict.
- Apply an analytic framework that incorporates the roles that geo-strategy, society, and culture play in shaping campaigns.

C. Background:

Military forces achieve strategic objectives in order to allow our national leadership to impose our national will on a thinking enemy. This is typically done in two different ways. A military campaign may seek to destroy the enemy's ability to defend himself through the destruction of his armed forces and/or his national capacity to wage war. Or, a military campaign may compel or convince an adversary that the value of his objective is not worth the cost of achieving it. The first approach is known as a strategy of annihilation. The second is considered a strategy of erosion. Once this basic decision regarding campaign aim is made, planners design the campaign using a combination of conceptual planning, functional planning, and detailed planning.

As MCDP 1-2, *Campaigning,* states succinctly, "the art of campaigning consists of deciding who, when, and where to fight and for what purpose." Unlike operations planning, campaign design has no stopping point and consists of a series of reassessments of the original campaign design. History demonstrates that the length of campaigns typically translates to greater uncertainty about future outcomes than for operations, and consequently for greater need to refrain from attempting to plan to the tiniest detail and simultaneously to build in branches and sequels to account for surprise. That is, the campaign plan addresses problems that are not yet well-structured and whose structure change even as we attempt to solve them.

History also shows us that during the execution of a campaign, it is not uncommon for the strategic objective to be changed significantly, with profound consequences for the design itself—the Central Pacific Campaign against Japan was initially predicated on the negotiation of a conditional surrender. President Roosevelt, however, announced at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 that the United States and Britain would accept nothing less than an "unconditional surrender" by Japan. The military had to adjust campaign plans accordingly.

We note also that present formal joint organization and processes for planning are well adapted to conventional campaigns against other states – problems that the U.S. military has by now rendered almost tame. However, they require some adjustment/adaptation in order to design effective campaigns against non-state opponents, whether national-level insurgents or trans-national actors, which are far more likely to present themselves as wicked problems. Increasingly, such wicked problems are addressed effectively only when military action is combined with contributions from other U.S. government agencies, coalition partners, contractors, NGOs, and IGOs.

Point of contact for this session is CAPT James Cook, USN, C-213.

D. Questions:

How do campaigns and operations differ? What are the implications of these differences for how we think about each?

What are the challenges associated with design, generally? Are they same for campaign design? How are they different?

What are the different categories of campaign? What are the implications of their differences for how they are designed?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas. *Campaign Plan Granite.* A16/Ge. Serial 0004. 13 January 1944. Record Group 38: Strategic Plans Division records, Plans and Strategic Studies, 1942-1946 (Series IX), Box 138, Folder: Desecrate… Hotfoot. National Archives and Records Administration. College Park, MD. **(NWC 3033)**, (Posted on JMO Website).

Simon, H.A. "Problem Forming, Problem Finding, and Problem Solving in Design." pp. 245-258 in Design and Systems, General Applications of Methodology. Praxiology: The International Annual of Practical Philosophy and Methodology. Volume 3. Edited by Arne Collen and Wojciech W. Gasparski. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1995. **(NWC 3035)**, (Posted on JMO Website).

United States Marine Corps. MCDP 1-2, *Campaigning*. Ch. 2, "Designing the Campaign." **(NWC 3036)**, (Posted on JMO Website).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Alexander, Christopher. *Notes on the Synthesis of Form.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964.

Department of Defense, United States. *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)* Version 1.0. 11 September 2007.

_____. *Major Combat Operations: Joint Operating Concept*. Version 2.0. December 2006.

Dorst, Kees. "Design Problems and Design Paradoxes." *Design Issues* 22 (Summer 2006): 4-17.

Hone, Thomas C., and Trent C. Hone. "The Pacific Naval War as One Coherent Campaign,1941-1945." http://www.ijnhonline.org/volume2_number2_Aug03/

Joint Advanced Warfighting School. "Operational Art and Campaigning Primer AY 08, Joint Operation Planning Process." Norfolk, VA: 2008.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States. *Joint Publication 5.0, Joint Operation Planning.* 24 August 2006.

_____. *Joint Publication 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning.* 25 January 2002.

Kem, Jack D. *Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade.* 2d Ed. Ft. Leavenworth, KS:

Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Lessard, Pierre. "Campaign Design for Winning the War . . . and the Peace." *Parameters* (Summer 2005): 36-50.

Department of the Army. Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, U. S. Army War College. *Campaign Planning Handbook* AY 08, Final Working Draft. Carlisle, PA: 2008.

Navy Department. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. *Naval Manual of Operational Planning.* Washington, D.C.: Navy Department, 1948.

Simon, H. A. *The Sciences of the Artificial*. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981.

_____. *Models of Discovery and Other Topics in the Methods of Science*. London: D. Reidel, 1977.

_____. "Style in Design," pp. 287-309 in C.M. Eastman (ed.), *Spatial Synthesis in Computer-Aided Building Design.* London: Applied Science, 1975.

United States Army. *Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design.* Version 1.0. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500. 28 January 2008.

United States Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. *A Concept for Interagency Campaign Design.* Quantico, VA. 5 May 2007.

Vego, Milan. *Joint Operational Warfare.* Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2007. Part V – "Methods of Combat Forces Employment," pp. V-5 – V-10.

Well, Gordon M. "No More Vietnams: CORDS as a Model for Counterinsurgency Campaign Design." Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U. S. Army Command and General Staff School, 1991.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None**.**

THEATER-STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP
(Seminar)

During an operation decisions have usually to be made at once: there may be no time to review the situation or even to think it through . . . if the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.

—Clausewitz, *On War*

A. Focus:

This session addresses the fundamental components of theater-strategic leadership. It contrasts the responsibilities of theater-strategic and operational commanders with analogous endeavors at the tactical and strategic levels, employing a series of case studies to highlight the types of decisions theater-strategic and operational-level commanders face.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the major responsibilities and tasks of theater-strategic commanders.
- Understand why theater-strategic and operational commanders and their staffs need an operational perspective.
- Develop a framework of thought through which the distinction between decisions made at the theater-strategic and operational levels of war and those made at the tactical level of war can be examined and understood.

C. Background:

Theater-strategic leadership is a collective term for levels of command with the authority and responsibility for accomplishing strategic and operational-level objectives, and as such, is exercised by levels of command from the combatant-level to subordinate joint task commands. It requires a leader with broad vision who can focus on broad military objectives that lie beyond the realm of tactics. With objectives ranging from the destruction of the enemy forces in the field to undermining the enemy's public support for war or the enemy's will to fight, theater-strategic commanders must be able to view accurately even the most complex situation in a given theater. Further, these leaders need to comprehend fully how actions at each level of war impact actions that may be taking place at each of the other levels. In the United States today, plans for large-scale employment of combat forces all include cooperation with other agencies as well as forces from allied or coalition partners; therefore, it is imperative that theater-strategic and operational commanders understand joint/combined operations, and how to coordinate interagency issues. The command and control issues alone pose significant

challenges—and also opportunities—in the planning and preparations of a campaign or major operation.

To move beyond the narrow focus of a tactical commander, theater-strategic and operational commanders must be capable of visualizing trends in the military, political, economic, and other elements of the situation for weeks and months ahead of time. In short, they must think operationally. This also means that they must stop thinking tactically, which is unintuitive because, in most cases, tactical expertise is what enabled these officers to be promoted to the position of an operational leader.

Operational thinking is not something that comes naturally to a future commander but must be acquired by conscious effort and hard work. It can be obtained through practical experience in war or through participation in large-scale exercises and maneuvers in peacetime as well as through operational and strategic war gaming. However, there is little or no opportunity for most future theater-strategic and operational commanders to obtain the necessary broad vision in the practical execution of their responsibilities; hence such a perspective is acquired through both professional education (e.g., attending a war college) and systematic self-study of military history, geography, international relations, economics, ethnicity and nationalism, culture, society, religions, and so forth. Study of past wars, and major operations and campaigns, in particular, is the best method for acquiring an operational perspective, which is a key prerequisite for what is called *operational vision*. The latter is in fact practical application of operational thinking in the planning, preparation, and execution of a campaign or major operation.

Success in combat is considerably enhanced by applying certain selected aspects of operational art, here arbitrarily called "prevailing principles" by theater-strategic and operational commanders. Like the principles of war, there is no common agreement either with regard to what the principles are or to their number. They are also not universal, but are primarily based on one's way of war. Yet, despite national differences in the conduct of operational warfare, experience has shown that overlooking or violating the selected principles of operational leadership will greatly complicate chances for success and can result in the failure of a major operation or campaign. This session will study the theater-strategic leadership of some past military leaders as you distill some prevailing operational leadership principles, considering their utility as a framework for further application.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Doug Hime, C-423.

D. Questions:

Explain and analyze the main responsibilities of a theater-strategic commander. What personal traits do you think a theater-strategic commander should have to be successful?

Explain and analyze the principal types of decisions made by theater-strategic commanders.

What are the differences between and among tactical, operational, and strategic decisions? What is their relationship?

What is the real meaning of the term operational thinking? What are the principal sources of operational thinking?

Explain the role military/naval history has in acquiring operational thinking. How should military/naval history be studied by a future operational or theater-strategic commander?

Analyze and explain the most important prevailing principles of successful operational leadership.

What were several of the most important operational decisions made by the theater-strategic and operational commanders, Allied and Japanese, during planning, preparation, and execution of the Leyte operation?

Explain the differences between operational thinking and operational vision.

E. Products:

Student teams will be assigned by the moderator to analyze the elements of decisions made by various past leaders and the consequences of those decisions. Students will lead seminar discussions on theater-strategic leadership based on their findings and analysis.

F. Required Readings:

Field, James A., Jr. "The End of a Navy." *The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: The SHŌ Operation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947, 131-50. (**NWC 1050**), (Issued).

Potter, E. B. "Return to the Philippines." Extracts from *Nimitz.* Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976. Read: 321–345, (**NWC 2039**), (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "Operational Leadership." In *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: X-5 to X-13. (CD-ROM), (Issued).

———. "The Decisions." In *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: X-61 to X-71. (CD-ROM), (Issued).

——— "Operational Vision." In *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: XI-35 to XI-39. (CD-ROM), (Issued).

In addition to the above, student teams will be assigned to report on one reading from those listed below:

Builder, Carl H., Steven C. Bankes, and Richard Nordin. "The Visionary: MacArthur at Inchon." *Command Concepts: A Theory Derived from the Practice of Command and Control.* Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1999, 73-88. (**NWC 1054**), (Posted on JMO Website).

Crane, Conrad C. "Leadership, Technology, and the Ethics of Total War: Curtis LeMay and the Fire Bombing of Japan." In Christopher Kolenda, *Leadership: The Warrior's Art*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College Foundation Press, 2001, 205-24, (**NWC 1022**), (Issued).

Eisenhower, Dwight D. "Problems of Combined Command." Speech presented at the National War College, Washington, DC, 18 June 1948. (**NWC 1055**), (Posted on JMO Website).

Parshall, Jonathan B., and Anthony P. Tully. "Genesis of a Battle." *Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway*. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005, 19-38. (**NWC 1063**), (Issued). (For a brief overview of the Japanese military organization in 1942, see http://www.users.bigpond.com/ battleforAustralia/battaust/AustInvasion/JapHighCommd.html).

Ridgway, Matthew B., and Harold H. Martin. *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956, (**NWC 1002**), (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Blumenson, Martin, and James L. Stokesbury. *Masters of the Art of Command* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1975).

Collins, Lawton J., "Leadership at Higher Echelons." *Military Review* 70 (May 1990): 33–45.

De Czege, Huba Wass. "A Comprehensive View of Leadership." *Military Review* 72, No. 8 (August 1992), 21–29.

Gardner, Gregory C. "Generalship in War: The Principles of Operational Command." Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 4 May 1987.

Kolenda, Christopher. *Leadership: The Warrior's Art*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College Foundation Press, 2001.

Slim, William J. *Defeat into Victory.* London: Macmillan, 1956. I-40.

Smith, Stuart W., ed. "Extract." *Douglas Southall Freeman on Leadership.* Commentary by Stuart W. Smith and foreword by James B. Stockdale. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane, 1993.

Zais, Mitchell M. "Strategic Vision and Strength of Will: Imperatives for Theater Command." *Parameters* (Winter 1985): 59–63.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:
None.

SERVICE CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

(Optional Lectures)

Institutions, while composed of many, ever-changing individuals, have distinct and enduring personalities of their own that govern much of their behavior.

—Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War*

A. Focus:

This series of lectures will focus on each of the Services (and Special Operations Forces) and examine how they are organized, equipped, and postured to provide a range of capabilities to commanders in the execution of joint and combined operations. An understanding of this material is an essential prerequisite for the remainder of the JMO trimester. These lectures are intended for those students who have not previously received JPME Phase 1 and for those students who feel they need a refresher on some or all of the Services' capabilities and employment considerations.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend how each of the Services and Special Operation Forces are organized, equipped, and doctrinally postured to respond to the requirements of Combatant Commanders.
- Comprehend employment considerations for each of the Services and Special Operation Forces at theater-strategic and operational-level of war.

C. Background:

Before a joint force headquarters can effectively employ units in its command, the commander and members of the staff must appreciate the capabilities and employment considerations of its subordinate organizations. Each Service and Special Operations Forces offers the joint force commander a range of capabilities. These capabilities, however, can only be maximized if the units are properly employed. Proper employment entails many factors, both tangible and intangible. Tangible factors include the obvious areas of organizational structure and equipment capabilities. Intangible factors encompass Service doctrinal perspectives, and the closely related subjects of Service values and culture. Each lecture will address both areas for consideration.

The overall point of contact for these sessions is Professor Pat Sweeney, C-424.

- The point of contact for the USMC session is Colonel Mike Ramos, USMC.
- The point of contact for the USAF session is Colonel Mike McGauvran, USAF.
- The point of contact for the U.S. Navy session is Captain M. Fitzpatrick, USN.
- The point of contact for the U.S. Army session is Colonel Greg Reilly, USA.
- The point of contact for the USCG session is Captain Michael Husak, USCG.

- The point of contact for the SOF session is Captain Thomas Sass, USN.

D. Questions:

How do the Services organize for combat operations? What are the Services' primary formations at the operational level of war?

What joint interdependences do the Services rely upon?

What are the greatest operational challenges faced by the Services? How can other Services mitigate these challenges?

What are the key values embraced by each of the Services?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations .Department. *Forces/Capabilities Handbook.* Review Service specific chapter. (**NWC 3153J**), (Issued and Posted on the JMO Website).

_____. *Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2008. Review Service specific briefing (**NWC 2002F)** (CD-ROM), (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JP 3-02*, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, Sept. 19, 2001.

_____. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, Dec. 17, 2003.

_____. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, May 6, 2003.

_____. JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations,* 31 March 2004.

_____. JP 3-32*, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations,* Aug. 8, 2006.

DOCNET Sessions (as appropriate) available online at:

C2 of Joint Air Operations
https://ca.dtic.mil/ doctrine/interactive /courses/c2air/course.htm

C2 of Joint Land Operations
https ://ca.dtic.mil /doctrine/ interactive/courses/jflcc/course.htm

Joint Force Employment Considerations
https://ca.dtic.mil /doctrine/interactive/courses/jfec/course.htm

JTF: From the Commander's Perspective (Sections 3 through 5)
https://ca.dtic.mil/doctrine/interactive/courses/jtf/course.htm

Special Operations (available online at
https://ca.dtic.mil/doctrine /interactive/courses/sof/course.htm

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:
None.

JMO-12

RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES (Lecture)

Education is not received. It is achieved.

— Author Unknown

Life happens. Research takes effort.

—Wayne Rowe

A. Focus:

This lecture is intended to familiarize students with the many resources and capabilities at the U. S. Naval War College library in order to facilitate the completion of various research papers required during the academic year.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the role of the Library and its staff in assisting students with their research.
- Be exposed to the various computer-based research databases and search tools.

C. Background:

The Research Methodologies Lecture is presented since the majority of the student body has likely not been required to conduct academic research since attending college. The lecture exposes students to modern research techniques and provides practical examples of various library search tools, databases, and services. The point of contact for this session is Mr. Wayne Rowe, HL 117, 1-6500, Chief, Reference Branch, NWC Library.

D. Questions:
None.

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Reading:

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. "Operations Paper: Guidance for Students." Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 2008. (**NWC 2062T**), (Posted on JMO Website and Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:
None.

H. **Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:**
None.

OPERATIONAL ART AND DOCTRINE (Seminar)

Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.

—General George H. Decker, USA

Operational art provides a framework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations.

—Milan Vego

A. Focus:

This session will begin by examining the respective cultures of the various U. S. services and how those cultures affect the services' differing perspectives of doctrine. Next, the session will address how service doctrine and joint doctrine are related. Finally, the relationship between operational art and doctrine will be examined. A thorough understanding of operational art provides the foundation for the development of robust joint doctrine.

B. Objectives:

- Examine the relationship and fundamental differences between doctrine and operational art.
- Contrast the different perspectives (cultures) of the U. S. military services.
- Analyze the varying roles and importance of written doctrine for each of the U. S. military services.
- Examine the relationship between U. S. joint doctrine and service doctrine.
- Examine the impact of joint doctrine on combatant commanders.

C. Background:

Operational Art

In modern war, a sound strategy alone is insufficient to ensure victory. Likewise, a combat force trained in tactics and capable of winning battles against the strongest foe is inadequate by itself to ensure overall victory. An effective combination of strategy and tactics must exist in order to achieve victory. That need for the integration of tactics and strategy is the reason for the emergence of the intermediate area of theoretical study and practice called operational art. Operational art provides the fundamental structure necessary to link successfully military and tactical actions to national security and military strategies. Joint operational art allows commanders to arrange and synchronize joint forces efficiently in time, space, and purpose.

Operational theory and practice should always be consistent with operational realities, otherwise the operational concepts, no matter how well conceived, are almost certain to

fail. For example, history shows that a focus on technology at the expense of operational thinking can preclude success against an opponent who, though not having the most advanced weapons and equipment, has developed superior operational concepts. In a war between two strong opponents, victory will go to the side that thinks more clearly and acts faster and with greater determination. This of course does not deny the need for more advanced weapons and equipment than one's opponent; however, superior thought processes, complemented by a historical awareness, is far more critical than technology.

The American study and practice of operational art began after the War of 1812 and recurred intermittently over the next century. During the period between the twentieth century's two world wars, operational art (under the label of "strategy" and influenced chiefly by the operational concepts of Clausewitz), permeated the conceptual innovations of this extraordinarily productive period. The success of joint and combined campaigns in World War II reflected a sophisticated underpinning of operational art in U. S. military campaign planning and execution. The war's immediate aftermath saw a major revision of the military's publications; these new editions were enriched with a deft blend of superb, operational thinking and the practical wisdom of experienced campaigners.

Then, with nuclear weapons proliferation and the belief that the next war would be nuclear and short, such thinking receded, this time for nearly three decades. The trauma of the Vietnam experience compelled a reassessment. With the leadership of William DePuy, Donn Starry and others in the U. S. Army, operational art reemerged. This time the term **operational art** entered the American lexicon, and U. S. Army doctrine in 1982 clearly identified it. During the subsequent years, this thinking about operational art has expanded throughout the U. S. military's training and educational institutions as a foundation upon which doctrine is built. Today's military publications library reflects a significant and growing influence of operational art concepts.

Doctrine

Every military Service operates in a unique environment, employing forces (ground, air, space, or naval) in accordance with war fighting methods developed over many years and optimized for each service-unique environment. These methods constitute each Service's doctrine. More recently, joint doctrine has been established to prescribe the methodology that will facilitate integrated, multi-service operations to achieve national and theater-level objectives. An extensive joint publications system, with a topical hierarchy and a prescribed development process, exists to ensure that sufficient authoritative joint operations guidance exists to "shape fundamentally the way we think about and train for war."

Doctrine, both Service and joint, must evolve as influencing factors change. Modern history is replete with failed rulers and defeated nations whose doctrine failed to change or changed incorrectly because of a fatal misinterpretation of influencing factors and/or an ignorance of the operational concepts upon which predecessor doctrine was founded.

Doctrine, by its nature, involves specific application of general insights regarding "how to fight," as influenced by relevant political and military perspectives, economic factors, geography, weapon systems, and so forth. Thus, effective doctrine is clearly a derivative of sound operational art. Because the forces and assets of each Service must train and fight synergistically with those of the other Services, as elements of joint or coalition forces, the study of operational art begins with a review of the Services' doctrinal perspectives and then proceeds to a consideration of operational art as applied to joint operations.

A key point to remember as an analysis of operational art and its many components is started, is that military "truths" established and verified through history, have evolved from experience and lessons learned, for the most part, in combat. Many of these truths will remain valid and vital to future joint military planning and operations, even as technology and concepts such as "Network Centric Warfare" and the "system of systems" approach evolve. However, some of our doctrinal thinking may no longer be relevant in that context. The challenge ahead is to discern what to keep and what to discard. Understanding the historical, theoretical, and practical underpinnings of both doctrine and operational art are vital for the development of sound future doctrine.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Doug Hime, C-423.

D. Questions:

To what extent does the "Perspectives on Service Culture" reading about service cultures capture the essence of our military services?

Describe the difference(s) between operational art and doctrine? How are they related? Which is more dynamic? Why?

To what extent is culture more important than doctrine in determining how a service fights?

To what extent are current service perspectives on doctrine distinct? Why might each service have a different view of doctrine?

How does specific service doctrine relate to joint doctrine?

What factors influence doctrine (both service and joint)?

Why is published joint doctrine almost always out-of-date and compromised?

What impact does joint doctrine have on joint force commanders?

Consistent and correct terminology application is vital to clear communications. Milan Vego claims that the usage of terminology in our joint doctrine is frequently incorrect. What fundamental issue do you think creates this problem?

E. Products:

Students will examine and analyze service and agency cultures with respect to the required readings. One product will be a comparative matrix that illustrates similarities and differences in organizational cultures.

F. Required Readings:

"Perspectives on Service Culture: Developing an Awareness of the Impact of Culture in the Planning Group." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2008. (**NWC 1037**), (Posted on JMO Website).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Influence of Joint Doctrine." *Joint Doctrine Development System*. CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 5120.02A. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 31 March 2007, Read: Enclosure A. (Posted on JMO Website).

———. *Joint Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1. Read: IV-3, (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "On Doctrine." *Joint Operational Warfare, Theory and Practice.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2008. Read: XII-3 to XII-22. (Posted on JMO Website and Issued).

———. "Operational Art and Doctrine." *Joint Operational Warfare, Theory and Warfare.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: XII-27 to XII-36. (Posted on JMO Website and Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Brown, C. R. "The Principles of War." *Proceedings* 75, no. 6 (June 1949): 621–33.

Brodie, Bernard. "The Worth of Principles of War." Lecture delivered on March 7, 1957 to the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Builder, Carl H. *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989, 1-44.

Glenn, Russell W. "No More Principles of War?" *Parameters* 28 (Spring 1998): 48–66.

Hughes, Wayne P., Jr., Capt, USN (Ret). "The Power in Doctrine." *Naval War College Review* (Summer 1995).

Johnson, Paul. "Doctrine Is Not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behavior of Armies." *Parameters* 30, No. 3 (Fall 2000): 30-39.

Meilinger, Phillip S., Col, USAF. "Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power." *Airpower Journal* (Spring 1996).

Murdock, Paul. "Principles of War on the Network-Centric Battlefield: Mass and Economy of Force." *Parameter*s 32 (Spring 2002), 86–95.

Nelson, Bradford K. "Applying the Principles of War in Information Operations." *Military Review* 78 (September–October–November 1998), 31–35.

Toffler, Alvin, and Heidi Toffler. "Air Land Battle." W*ar and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1993.

Tritten, James J. "Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine." *Naval War College Review* 48, 2 (Spring 1995): 22–38.

Waghelstein, John D. "Preparing the U. S. Army for the Wrong War, Educational and Doctrinal Failure, 1865–91." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 10, 1 (Spring 1999): 1–33.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

"A Short History of Operational Art." Newport, RI: Naval War College, April 2007. (**NWC 1012**, (Posted on JMO Website)).

THE THEATER AND ITS STRUCTURE (Seminar)

A theater should be militarily organized to ensure the most favorable conditions for the employment of one's forces across the entire spectrum of conflict, from peacetime competition to high-intensity conventional war. The larger the assigned military objectives, the larger the source of power required; and, therefore, the larger the physical environment required to deploy, concentrate, and maneuver the force, and the larger the infrastructure needed to support the employment of one's forces.

—Milan Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*.

The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

A. Focus:

This session will examine the physical and artificial features of the theater. The Allied division of the Pacific Ocean Area during the Second World War is used to illustrate the importance of understanding the levels of command (war) and the key elements of a theater.

B. Objectives:

- Examine the relationship between levels of war and levels of command and the differences between the two.
- Analyze a current or historical case with respect to the levels of war and command.
- Analyze a current or historical case with respect to the key elements of theater geometry including interior vs. exterior positions, base of operations, physical objectives, decisive points, lines of operation, and lines of communication.

C. Background:

Levels of command exist during both peace and wartime and are characterized by clearer separation than levels of war. The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) notes that although "there is no direct link between levels of command and levels of war, certain commands tend to operate at particular levels of war." In support of this perspective, the UJTL contains a matrix relating levels of war with notional levels of command. U.S. Army doctrine considers commands above the division to be operational level commands. In practice, the level of command is determined not only by the objectives to be accomplished, but by the size and shape of the area in which the command operates and the size and composition of forces engaged.

After the military objectives and methods of combat force employment are determined, the next step is to determine the size of the physical space required for basing, deployment, combat employment, and logistical support and sustainment of the forces assigned to accomplish respective military objectives—among the first and most important organizational decisions to be made by the commander. At the operational and theater-strategic levels of war, the organization of physical space ranges from combat zones/sectors and areas of operation to theaters of operation and theaters of war.

Any theater contains a variety of natural and artificial features called "theater elements" or "theater geometry" that significantly affect the planning and execution of military action at any level of war. These theater elements include: positions, distances, bases of operation, physical objectives, decisive points, lines of operation, and lines of communication—any of which may have tactical, operational, or even strategic significance. Key to evaluating the military importance of these features involves not only their number and characteristics, but also their relative position and distance from each other—the geometry of the situation. Therefore, operational commanders and their staffs must know and understand the advantages and disadvantages of these elements to ensure the most effective employment of their forces.

The creation of Allied organizations to conduct military operations in the Pacific Area during the Second World War aptly demonstrates of the complexity of level of war and theater geometry issues. Design of the Allied command and control organization in the Pacific required the resolution of many problems, including assuaging the vexing problem of American service parochialism and allied objections to lead-nation proposals. Only through the cooperative efforts of commanders at the highest levels of the Allied political and military establishment were such challenges resolved. The theater structure, while imperfect, was sufficiently effective to permit successful Allied offensives and the eventual defeat of Imperial Japan.

In current U. S. doctrinal terminology, the geographic combatant commander's area of responsibility (AOR) encompasses a theater. In the event two or more regional conflicts are occurring within a combatant commander's AOR, a theater of war may be established. For a major regional conflict (e.g., the Gulf War of 1990–1991 or Operation IRAQI FREEDOM of 2003), a portion of the combatant commander's AOR can be delineated and formally (or informally) declared a theater of operation–where the operational level of command is established and the operational level of war is conducted. A single campaign is generally conducted in a respective theater of operation, whereas a major operation is normally conducted in an area of operation and tactical actions take place in a given combat sector/zone. The term "battlespace" (or battle space) is used in referring to the combat sector/zone or an area of operation and its corresponding cyberspace.

The point of contact for this session is CDR P. A. Povlock, C-423.

D. Questions:

What is the basis for establishing the theater structure? What is theater geometry and why are its "main elements" important?

To what extent is the concept of the theater of operation outdated in the information age?

How proper is it to focus exclusively on the concept of battlespace versus traditional concepts of the theater of operation and areas of operation?

What are the distinctions among tactical, operational, and strategic physical objectives?

Explain the concept of decisive point. How do decisive points differ from the concept of decision point?

Discuss the concept of physical lines of operation. How does this concept compare with lines of effort? To what extent are LOOs still a valid concept in the information age?

Leyte Case Study:

Why was the Pacific Theater during World War II divided into several subordinate "ocean areas"? How could have these areas been altered after the war changed from the defensive phase to the offensive? How did the Americans consider coalition partner objections to the creation of the Southwest Pacific Area boundary? What effect did these divisions have on the planning and execution of the Leyte Gulf operation?

Was General MacArthur a strategic or operational level commander during OPERATION KING II? At what levels did Admirals Nimitz and Halsey operate?

What were the theater-strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war in the Leyte Operation?

Evaluate the relative advantages and disadvantages of the geostrategic position for the Japanese forces on land, at sea, and in the air in their defense of the Philippines in October 1944?

Identify and evaluate Allied theater strategic and operational objectives on land in the OPERATION KING II. What were Allied operational objectives at sea and in the air for that operation?

Discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages of the lines of operation used by the Japanese naval forces and land-based air in their defense of the Philippines in October 1944. To what extent did the Japanese consider what we now call Lines of Effort during the planning for the Sho Operation?

What were operational decisive points for the respective Allied and Japanese naval commanders in the Leyte Operation? How did the operational commanders impress upon their subordinates the importance of these points?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Morton, Louis. "Organization and Command in the Pacific." *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1962. Read Chapter XI, 240-263. (**NWC 1053**), (Posted on JMO Website).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Universal Joint Task List,* CJCSM 3500.04D. Change 1, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 15 September 2006, Scan:

Appendix C and Enclosure D. (Posted on JMO Website).

_____. *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1. Read: II-15 – II-21 and IV-11 – IV-12. (Issued).

_____. *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 26 December 2006. Read: IV-16 – IV-23. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "Military Objectives and the Levels of War," and "The Theater and Its Structure." *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: II-3 – II-23, and IV-3 – IV-23. (Posted on the JMO Website and Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Collins, John M. *Military Geography for Professionals and the Public*. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1988.

MacGregor, Douglas A. "Future Battle: The Merging Levels of War." *Parameters* (Winter 1992–93): 33–47.

United States Marine Corps. "Levels of War." In *Warfighting,* MCDP 1, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy and Marine Corps, 1997. Read: 28–32.

Vego, Milan. "Theater Geometry." In *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: IV-49 – IV-78. (Posted on JMO Website and Issued).

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

OPERATIONAL FACTORS (Seminar)

Those who do not know the conditions of mountains and forests, hazardous defiles, marshes, and swamps, cannot conduct the march of an army.

—Sun Tzu

A. Focus:

This session addresses one of the key aspects of operational art—the factors of space, time, and force with regard to objectives. The impact of information on operational factors is also considered. Examples from the Battle of Leyte Gulf are used throughout the session to illustrate the application of operational art on warfare in a maritime theater. Application of operational factors in recent non-warfare military operations will also be considered.

B. Objective:

- Analyze the operational factors of space, time, and force and their interrelationships, in light of operational and strategic objectives.
- Evaluate the process by which the operational commander balances operational factors against each other in order to obtain freedom of action.
- Analyze the impact of information on the other operational factors and the commander's ability to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

C. Background:

At the most basic level, *operational factors* are simply the factors of *space, time,* and *force* in relation to a given *objective*. War is a monumental undertaking; commanders and staffs significantly improve the likelihood of successfully achieving operational and strategic objectives through a careful analysis of the effect of *space, time,* and *force* on the theater. In reality, these operational factors will rarely be in harmony with each other, or with the assigned operational or strategic objectives. Nonetheless, a careful assessment of the impact of the various operational factors on a commander's options provides a link between the art of conceiving an operational scheme and the science of turning that scheme into an effective operational plan. Therefore, it is the task of the operational commander to evaluate operational factors individually and to arrange their mutual relationships to enhance collectively freedom of action within the given constraints and restraints, such as political or legal imperatives.

Space, time, and force are closely and dynamically interrelated. *Space-Time, Space-Force, and Time-Force* are interactive relationships between the individual operational factors that affect the commander's options and even play a significant role in defining attainable objectives. *Space-Time-Force* is the most complex relationship to assess, but to do so effectively is the essence of operational art. Operational commanders and their planners must evaluate the situation in a given theater or area of operations in its entirety. They must discern trends in the operational situation weeks or months in advance. The greatest danger is to focus too much on the battlefield area—that is, to have only a tactical perspective of the situation. The commander must keep a broad perspective across the

entire theater and bring the operational factors into rough balance in light of the objective. Balancing is accomplished by countering deficiencies in the factors space, force or time with available advantages or surplus value in another factor. Thus, in the final analysis, the operational commander who best evaluates and controls space, time, and force, and the interrelationships between them, is best likely to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

The enormous advances in information technology in recent years have elevated information as a common link among the factors of space, time and force. Some military theoreticians and practitioners claim that information has emerged as a fourth factor in addition to the three traditional operational factors. Information is data collected from the environment that is processed and put into context. Another aspect of information, public perception of an operation, may matter more even than the correlation of forces on the ground. In a media-intense environment, the relevant public can be unforgiving of even minor mistakes or transgressions in the application of force, leaving in doubt the necessary public support for the conflict or even the attainment of the operational or strategic objectives. In terms of time and force, information allows a dramatic reduction in the time needed to make decisions, to plan and to evaluate courses of action. Thus, information affects, sometimes profoundly, all three traditional operational factors.

An assessment of the operational factors can be undertaken methodically by the commander through application of the following process:

1. Analyze enemy factors of space, time, and force in relationship to the friendly military objectives.
2. Evaluate friendly factors of space, time, and force in light of the operational and strategic objectives. Consider the impact of information on operational factors.
3. Analyze interrelationships between friendly and enemy factors.
4. Balance or harmonize friendly factors with the assigned operational or strategic objective. The key for obtaining larger freedom of action is to balance disadvantages in one factor with the surplus or advantage in another.

The first two steps can be viewed as the scientific portion of the analysis. The last two steps can be difficult, complicated, and time-consuming processes. They are also more art than science. Most successful military leaders of the past possessed an uncanny ability to assess and then balance the factors of space, time, and force against the assigned operational or strategic objectives. Military commanders and staff officers can improve their ability to assess operational factors through the study of military history and through practical application.

Some general considerations about operational factors:

1. Although operational commanders and their staffs may not be able to choose the *space* in which they will be forced to operate, their ability to shape the operating environment is essential.
2. The gain or loss of *space* in itself is not inherently an advantage or disadvantage; what matters most is the relationship between *space* and military *forces* available to influence the enemy's ability react.

3. Of the factors, only *time* cannot be regained.
4. The size, shape, and nature of a *space* will affect the quantity and type of *force* employed as well as the *time* required to conduct a successful military operation. While *space* or geography alone cannot determine the success of a military effort, the relationship between *space* and *force* can be decisive.
5. Without credible *force, time* and *space* lose much of their significance.
6. Spatial distances and *force* size and type have a relationship with *time*.
7. Information, public perception and law are increasing in importance. Currently, they are considered within other factors in our analysis. In the future, these may become one or more factors themselves.
8. A smaller *force* can require more *time* and dictate a smaller *space* for achievement of objectives, while a larger *force* may allow faster action in a larger *space*.

Operational Factors must be considered early in the development of campaigns or major operations. For an experienced practitioner of operational art they are often an intuitive consideration. During the rest of the trimester, operational factors will be considered explicitly to ensure thorough analysis.

Point of contact for this session is Professor Doug Hime, C-423.

D. Questions:

What are the relationships between the operational factors space/time, space/force, and time/force as they relate to a given objective?

How does a staff balance the operational factors space/time, space/force, and time/force?

Have technology and information reduced the importance of factor space?

How is information or public perception an operational factor? In what type of operations is it most significant?

To what extent should the human element of factor force always be assessed in terms of one's own forces and enemy forces, or are there some forms of conflict in which other human elements in the theater play a vital role in determining whether a commander reaches operational or strategic objectives?

What is the difference between combat potential and combat power? How is it possible to assess the tangible factor of force precisely? To what extent are smaller forces the trend in the future? Why?

To what extent are the operational factors still critical for success in planning and executing major operations and campaigns in the information age?

What is the difference between Milan Vego's approach to operational factors and joint doctrine, the latter of which calls upon commanders to arrange forces according to "time, space, and purpose"?

Leyte Case Study:

How did the force available affect Japanese plans for Leyte Gulf? To what extent were these plans executable?

How did the Allies balance the operational factors of space, time, and force at the Battle of Leyte Gulf? How did the Japanese?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Cannon, M. Hamlin. "The Nature of the Target." *United States Army in World War II – The War in the Pacific: Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1992. Read: 10-14. (**NWC 2032**), (Issued).

College of Distance Education. "The Battle for Leyte Gulf." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2002. Interactive, (**NWC 2040**), (CD-ROM), (Issued).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. J*oint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1. Read: IV-3. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "Part II: Operational Factors," *Joint Operational Warfare, Theory and Practice.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. Read: III-3 to III-5 and III-51 to III-72. Scan III-7 to III-46 (Posted on JMO Website and Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

None.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS (Seminar)

In modern war, battle areas frequently extend over hundreds of miles of front and are equally extensive in depth. Throughout such a theater are troops, replacement camps, hospital centers, lines of communication, repair shops, depots, ports, and a myriad of service organization, both air and ground. In the same region dwells a civil population, sometimes friendly, sometimes hostile, sometimes neutral or mixed in attitude. All these units, individuals, and activities must be carefully controlled, so that everything is coordinated toward the achievement of the commander's strategic plan.

—Dwight David Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*

A. Focus:

This session is intended to define further the framework within which operational art is practiced. It deals in some detail with theater-wide or operational functions intended primarily to support the planning, preparation, conduct, and sustainment of major operations and campaigns. Operational functions are sequenced and synchronized in the employment of one's own and friendly forces across the range of military operations.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the various definitions of operational functions, to include individual service understandings and differences, joint doctrine definitions and descriptions, and Universal Joint Task Listing (UJTL) language.
- Analyze each of the operational functions and their role in campaign and major operation planning.
- Analyze operational functions' sequencing and synchronization in time, space, and force at the operational and theater-strategic levels of war.
- Comprehend the integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities across the range of military operations and plans—both in preparation and execution phases—and evaluate its success in achieving the desired effects.
- Comprehend the impact information operations are having on each of the operational functions.

C. Background:

Joint Publication 3-0 states that "**joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations**." Both JP 3-0 and JP 5-0 note that operational art "includes fundamental methods associated with synchronizing and integrating military forces and capabilities," and JP 5-0 notes that synchronizing forces and functions is a key element of operational design. While all U. S. military services recognize these functions, the services do not universally agree on what to call them. Joint and service doctrinal publications refer to these "capabilities and activities" by a variety of terms:

- JP 3-0 and JP 5-0 – "Joint Functions"
- CJCSM 3500.04D Universal Joint Task List – "broad functional task areas"
- JP 3-31 Command and Control for Joint Land Operation – "core functions"
- U. S. Army FM 3-0 Operations – "Warfighting Functions"
- U. S. Marine Corps MCDP 1-2 Campaigning – "Warfighting Functions"
- U. S. Air Force AFDD 1 – "Air and Space Power Functions"
- OPNAVINST 3500.38A/USCG COMDT INST 3500.01A, Universal Navy Task List (UNTL) – "major tasks"
- NWP 5-01– "Operational Functions"

The Naval War College refers to them as operational functions. The synchronization of these operational functions ensures and enhances the ability of operational commanders and their subordinate elements to carry out their missions in both peace and war—shaping thorough actions prior to and throughout a campaign or major operation.

JP 3-31 discusses the criticality of these functions for successful friendly execution of operations. Conversely, the disruption of these functions can create vulnerabilities.

In a *mature theater*, operational functions will normally be established nearly in their entirety. However, in an *immature theater,* they may exist in a rudimentary form, or not at all. Understanding the impact and interaction of warfighting functions at the operational level of war is critically important for proper planning, preparation, employment, and support of one's own forces in attainment of assigned objectives.

The key joint warfighting functions are: *Operational command and control, operational movement and maneuver, operational intelligence, operational fires, operational logistics,* and *operational protection*. The required readings provide a brief overview of each of these functions and associated activities. You will notice slight differences in the list of functions depending on the service or level of war. For some, you will find that you are already familiar with these functions at the tactical level.

The true operational artist recognizes the close interrelationship between the operational factors—time, space, and force—and operational functions. For example, interior lines are normally considered a spatial advantage. In the absence of sound operational intelligence and mobility, however, interior lines may in fact be a liability because the enemy may attack at the time and place of his choosing. A deep understanding of the history and theory behind the art enables a savvy operational artist to meld the various facets into a synergistic whole that leads to a marked advantage.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Doug Hime, C-423.

D. Questions:

What are the advantages or disadvantages of having operational functions in place during peace and war? How and by whom are warfighting functions synchronized during campaigns and major operations?

Based upon your earlier readings of Leyte Gulf by Potter and Field for JMO-16, what

impact did the following operational functions have on the Leyte Gulf operation from the perspective of both belligerents?

- *Command and Control*—What are some of the factors that influenced the composition of specific command structures? This particular area is cited for many of the difficulties and poor decisions that occurred throughout the operation. Identify the flaws and their associated consequences with specific command structures and guidance/orders issued to subordinates. What elements of Information Operations can you find in the Leyte Gulf operation?
- *Movement and Maneuver*—How did the opposing forces plan and employ movement and maneuver at Leyte?
- *Operational Intelligence*—To what extent did the Allies operate on a basis of Japanese intentions rather than capabilities? What result did this have on the eventual outcome of the battle?
- *Operational Fires*—How were operational fires used during the Leyte Operation? To what extent were they effective? Why?
- *Operational Protection*—To what extent did either of the opposing forces at Leyte consider and plan adequately for operational protection? Discuss examples of where and how operational protection was provided. What is the relationship of operational protection to the more commonly used term—force protection?
- *Operational Logistics*—How did the Allies address this area? What was the operational impact for the Allies? What impact did operational logistics have on the Japanese?

To what extent did the Allies synchronize their operational functions? What functions did they synchronize and what effect did it have on the operation?

As modern forces become ever more information based, what are the impacts on the operational functions? To what extent does one function's significance increase in relation to the others?

How were operational functions used to offset disadvantages in time, space, or force? How were they used to take advantage of temporal, spatial, or force aadvantages?

To what extent are these functions still relevant? The UJTL also includes Counter CBRNE Weapons in the JOA as an additional category. Why?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Goodrich, David M. "Forgotten Mission: Land Based Air Operational Fires in Support of the Leyte Gulf Invasion." Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 2000. Read: 124–138. (**NWC 2037**), (Posted on JMO Website).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1. Read: III-1 to III-37. (Issued).

_____.*Universal Joint Task List,* CJCSM 3500.04D. Change 1, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 15 September 2006, Read: Enclosure A, Appendix A to Enclosure B, pages B-A-1 to B-A-6. Scan Annex A to Appendix to Enclosure B. (Posted on JMO Website).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Bolick, Joseph A. *The Influence and Reasons for Acceptance or Rejection of Operational Intelligence during the 1914 and 1943 Kursk Campaigns.* Fort Leavenworth, KS.: School of Advanced Military Studies, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 26 April 1988.

Handel, Michael I. "Intelligence and Military Operations." In *Intelligence and Military Operations.* London: Frank Cass, 1990.

Hutcherson, Norman B. "Command and Control Warfare: Putting Another Tool in the War-Fighter's Data Base." Maxwell AFB, AL.: Air University Press, 1994.

Porter, Laning M. *Preconceptions, Predilections, and Experiences: Problems for Operational Level Intelligence and Decision making,* Fort Leavenworth, KS.: School of Advanced Military Studies, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 12 May 1986.

Rockwell, Christopher A. "Operational Sustainment: Lines of Communication and the Conduct of Operations." Fort Leavenworth, KS.: School of Advanced Military Studies, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 3 May 1987.

Vego, Milan. "Operational Functions." In *JoinI Operational Warfare.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2008 VIII-3 to VIII-100.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE (Seminar)

The capital was the center of gravity of the Ba'athist regime; as long as his troops still controlled the city, Saddam Hussein would never relinquish power.

—General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*

A. Focus:

The essence of operational art involves applying decisive force against the enemy's main source of strength. This session focuses on several disparate, but related aspects of operational warfare including the concepts of critical factors, the center of gravity, and the culminating point.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the process of identifying both enemy and friendly critical factors and centers of gravity.
- Evaluate the performance of opposing commanders in a current or historical case with respect to the concepts of critical factors, the center of gravity, and the culminating point.

C. Background:

Initial planning for both major operations and campaigns must include identifying critical factors that pertain to both enemy and friendly forces. The term "critical factors" has changed somewhat in current usage. Traditionally, the critical factors have been called critical strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. Recent joint doctrine, however, has begun to classify critical factors as critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities. The readings discuss the differences between these two approaches. Regardless of the terminology used, the purpose of identifying these critical factors and the related centers of gravity is not to conduct an academic exercise. The purpose of identifying them is to help focus the application of military power in planning operations and campaigns.

Successful planning and employment of combat forces hinge on the proper identification of a center of gravity (COG) for both the enemy and friendly forces. In generic terms, a center of gravity is defined as a source of massed strength—physical or moral, or a source of leverage—whose serious degradation, neutralization, or destruction will have the most decisive impact on the enemy's or one's own ability to accomplish a given military objective. The enemy's COG must be neutralized or destroyed, while one's own COG must be protected in order to accomplish the assigned military objective.

An important element of warfare, especially at the operational and strategic levels, is the concept of a culminating point (or culmination). Culmination applies to both offensive and defensive actions. In the offense, culmination is the point when the attacker no longer has sufficient combat power to continue successfully the attack. The attacker seeks to secure his objective before reaching his culmination point. In the defense, the culminating point is the point where the defender has inadequate combat power to defend

successfully or to counterattack.

The point of contact for this session is Professor S. L. Forand, C-407.

D. Questions:

The readings for this session describe two distinct approaches to the concept of critical factors: the traditional approach described by Dr. Milan Vego and the approach developed by Dr. Joe Strange that has been incorporated into joint doctrine. To what extent are these two approaches incompatible? Can they be used to complement one other?

Is there such a thing as an air campaign? Explain and defend your position.

Has modern technology blurred the differences between tactical actions and major operations? If so, how?

Was the Allied amphibious landing at Leyte planned to accomplish an operational or strategic objective?

To what extent did the plans of the Allies and the Japanese clearly address the operational concept of the center of gravity? What critical factors did each side identify?

Explain and analyze the concept of culmination. What key factors cause culmination? Did either the Japanese or the Allies reach a culmination point in the Leyte operation?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College. *Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) Workbook*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 21, 2008, Appendix C. (**NWC 4111H**), (Issued and posted on the JMO Website).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 26 December 2006. Read: IV-2 – IV-20. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "Concept of Critical Factors and Center of Gravity" VII-13 – VII-28; Concept of the Culminating Point VII-73-VII-96; *Joint Operational–Warfare: Theory and Practice.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. (Posted on JMO Website and Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Izzo, Lawrence L. "The Center of Gravity Is Not an Achilles Heel." *Military Review* (January 1988): 72–77.

Mendel, William W., and Lamar Tooke. "Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity." *Military Review* (June 1993): 2–11.

Strange, Joseph L. "Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the

Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language." *Perspectives on Warfighting*, No. 4. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Foundation, 1996.

Strange, Joseph L., and Richard Iron. "Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant." *Joint Force Quarterly* (October 2004): 20–27.

Webb, George S. "The Razor's Edge: Identifying the Operational Culminating Point of Victory." Naval War College, Joint Military Operations, Student Paper, 16 May 1995.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING (Seminar)

No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength. Only the layman sees in the course of a campaign a consistent execution of a preconceived and highly detailed original concept pursued consistently to the end.

—Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Sr., 1871

A. Focus:

This session will focus on operational design and the fundamentals of operational planning in designing major operations and campaigns.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the fundamentals of operational design and operational planning.
- Comprehend national military objectives, guidance, and theater strategies into theater strategic guidance, objectives, and operational focus in theater campaign plans.
- Analyze the practical application of the elements of operational design in major operations and campaigns.
- Comprehend the importance and key elements of an operational idea (scheme).
- Comprehend the fundamentals, considerations, and design elements of campaign planning including integration of unified, joint multinational forces into theater campaign plans.

C. Background:

Military planning is a continuous process in preparation for assigned or future objectives/tasks. It involves a detailed and methodical evaluation of all aspects of contemplated military action. Planning makes future actions easier by allowing for quick, subsequent and coordinated actions by the staff and other elements of the command. Proper planning allows for detailed and systematic examination of all factors involved in a forthcoming military action.

A major operation or campaign contains a number of elements that collectively ensure the accomplishment of the selected or assigned military objective(s). Thus, an overall *operational design* should exist to ensure that one's forces are employed in a coherent manner, and focused on the assigned operational or strategic objectives in the theater. The principal elements of operational design for a major operation are: *desired end state,* (in case a major operation is intended to end the hostilities), *ultimate operational* (and sometimes *strategic*) *objective, interior vs. exterior lines*, *identification of the enemy's and one's own critical factors and centers of gravity, direction/axis,* and *operational idea* (*scheme*).

An operational idea (sometimes referred to as an operational scheme) represents the very heart of the design for a major operation or campaign. In its essence, it is very similar to what is commonly known today as concept of operations (CONOPS) or "scheme of maneuver" (used in tactical plans). An operational idea should describe in

broad terms the intended sequence for the employment of service or functionally based forces (in a campaign) or combat arms (in a major operation) necessary to accomplish the assigned strategic or operational objectives. Optimally, an operational idea should be novel, avoid stereotyped employment of one's forces, present the enemy with a multi-dimensional threat, provide for surprise and deception, and ensure speed of execution. It should clearly focus on the destruction or neutralization of the enemy's strategic (in a campaign) or operational (in a major operation) center of gravity.

The elements of an operational idea are as follows: selected principles of war; operational maneuver and fires, methods of defeating the enemy's center of gravity; application of one's military/non-military sources of power; sectors of main and secondary effort; point of main attack (defense); operational deception; operational sequencing; operational synchronization; branches and sequels; operational phasing; operational pause; anticipating one's own operational/strategic point of culmination; protection of one's own operational/strategic center of gravity; operational momentum; operational reserves; regeneration of combat power; and operational sustainment.

In theory, a basic operation plan (OPLAN) normally contains only the most important elements of operational design in a rudimentary form; however, many aspects of the design are elaborated in detail in OPLAN annexes, and the plans of subordinate commanders.

The point of contact for this session is Professor S. L. Forand, C-407.

D. Questions:

What are the fundamentals of operational planning?

How are the elements of operational design integrated in planning a campaign?

What is strategic guidance? What do you expect the guidance to contain?

Explain the process of identifying critical factors and center of gravity in designing a campaign.

Explain the concept of operational sequencing. What is the linkage between operational objective, tasks, and the factor of time?

Explain the concept of operational synchronization. What is its main purpose?

What is the purpose of operational/strategic deception? Explain the relationship between tactical and operational/strategic deception.

Applying the principal elements of operational design, analyze the naval aspects of the Leyte Operation:

1. How would you assess the operational objectives determined by Admiral Toyoda? To what extent did the operational idea (scheme) employed by the Japanese provide an opportunity for success? How could they have made it more effective?
2. Explain and analyze the Japanese plan for operational deception. To what extent was the plan successful and why? To what extent did the Allies apply operational deception in executing the Leyte Operation? Provide examples to support your arguments.

3. How are sequencing and synchronization different? Give examples of each from the Japanese plans. Did Admiral Toyoda have a better option to apply operational sequencing in his plans for naval defense of the Philippines?
4. How did the Japanese plan envisage operational synchronization?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 26 December 2006. Read: IV-20 to IV-38. (Issued).

Vego, Milan. "Operational Planning" IX-63 to IX-79. "Operational Design: Major Combat Phase" IX-83 to IX-102. "The Operational Idea" IX-103 – IX-133; "Operational Sequencing," IX-135 – IX-144; "Operational Synchronization," IX-145 – IX-155; "Deception Planning," IX-163 – IX-172. *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. (Posted on JMO Website and Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Cannon, M. Hamlin. "Plans Are Made and Forces Are Readied." *United States Army in World War II – The War in the Pacific: Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1992.

Critz, Mike. "Operational Deception," Newport, RI: Naval War College, September 1996.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

LEGAL BASES FOR THE USE OF FORCE (Seminar)

"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any state…"

U.N. Charter Article 2(4)

"Nothing in the present Chapter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security…"

U.N. Charter Article 51

A. Focus:

This seminar introduces the "operational law" portion of the JMO curriculum. Operational law is a broad term which encompasses those facets of international law, U.S. domestic law, and the domestic law of other nations that impact military planning and operations. This seminar will explore what is known as *jus ad bellum* (the law of resorting to war). Specifically, this seminar will examine the question, "When can a nation legally use force under international law?" After discussing the U.N. Charter and the role of the U.N. Security Council the seminar will examine developments in this area of the law post-9/11 to include the "Bush Doctrine of Preemption" as well as the use of force against non-state actors.

B. Objectives:

- Identify the primary sources of international law related to *jus ad bellum* and understand those provisions of the U.N. Charter related to a nation's use of force.
- Discuss the impact of the U.N. Charter and the role of the U.N. Security Council as they relate to the development of international law, particularly with respect to the concept of national and collective self-defense.
- Discuss developments in international legal norms post-9/11 related to a nation's use of force against non-state actors.
- Discuss how international law affects the combatant and operational commander in planning and executing military operations.

C. Background:

Relations among nations necessarily involve the application of international law. For example, international law regulates such diverse activities as aviation safety, communications, financial transactions, nautical rules of the road, and environmental protection. International law also directly impacts the legality of a nation's use of force.

There are two primary sources of international law; state practice and international agreements. Only when state practice attains a degree of regularity and is accompanied by the general conviction among nations that behavior in conformity with that practice is obligatory can it be said to have become a rule of customary law binding upon all nations. Bilateral or multilateral formal agreements between and among nations are also

primary sources of international law. Such agreements are often styled as *treaties* or *conventions*. Significant conventions and treaties related to the conduct of hostilities include the Hague Conventions of 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the U.N. Charter, the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. Secondary sources of international law include general principles of law, judicial decisions, and the writings of publicists are applied.

Historically, international law focused on the conduct between and among sovereign nations. In the last half century, however, international law has focused increasingly on the rights and responsibilities of individuals, e.g. the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). This trend has had a significant impact on both the conduct and public perception of war. Finally, state practice since 9/11, combined with U.N. Security Council actions and decisions of the International Court of Justice ICJ), indicate that perhaps new norms are evolving regarding the legal basis for nation states to use force against non-state actors.

The point of contact for this lesson is Commander Sean Henseler, JAGC, USN, C-409.

D. Questions:

- What are the sources of international law? Why do nations care about international law when deciding whether or not to use force? What motivates them to comply with its provisions?
- What are the two commonly accepted legal bases for the employment of armed force by a nation state?
- Describe the role of the U.N. Security Council regarding the use of force against a nation or non-state actors.
- What role, if any, should international law play in U.S. national security decisions regarding the use of force?
- What are the legal bases for coalition military operations in Iraq? Afghanistan? Elsewhere in the so-called "terror war?"

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Schmitt, Michael. "Preemptive Strategies in International Law." *Michigan Journal of International Law* (Winter 2003), 513-548. (**NWC 1033**), (Posted on JMO Website).

United Nations Security Council. *Security Council Resolution 1269*. 1999. (**NWC 1031**), (Posted on JMO Website).

United Nations Security Council. *Security Council Resolution 1368*. 2001. (**NWC 1031**), (Posted on JMO Website).

United Nations Security Council. *Security Council Resolution 1373*. 2001. (**NWC**

1031), (Posted on JMO Website).

G. Supplementary Readings:
None.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:
None.

MARITIME OPERATIONAL LAW (Seminar)

"Our new maritime strategy emphasizes the importance of leveraging other nation's capabilities. The growing interdependency of the community of nations will continue to offer similar opportunities. I support the United States' accession to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, and I believe that joining the Convention will strengthen our military's ability to conduct operations."

—Michael G. Mullen Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, February, 2008

The Department of Defense strongly supports U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. A universally respected ocean regime, with strong, unambiguous guarantees of fundamental operational rights, such as passage through foreign territorial seas, through international straits, and through the world's archipelagoes, preserves the ability of the U.S. to deter and respond to threats whenever and wherever required.

—Secretary of Defense, 2001 Annual Report to the President and the Congress

---

A. Focus:

This seminar focuses on the law that affects military operations in the maritime environment. Legal classifications or regimes of ocean and airspace directly affect maritime operations by determining the degree of control that a coastal nation may exercise over the conduct of foreign merchant ships, warships, and aircraft operating in those areas. This seminar will discuss not only constraints maritime operational law might have on military operations but also how the operational commander can utilize the law to achieve mission success.

B. Objectives:

- Discuss operational considerations resulting from the sovereign right of nations to limit the entry and movement of foreign forces within their land territory, territorial seas, and national airspace.
- Understand the navigational rights of innocent, transit, and archipelagic sea lanes passage.
- Understand how operational commanders can use the right of belligerent control of the immediate area of operations, maritime warning zones, and blockade to contribute to mission success.
- Understand traditional legal rights of belligerent and neutral nations and how these rights might impact military operations.
- Become familiar with the various legal bases for maritime interception operations (MIO).
- Become familiar with the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) concept.

C. Background:

Among the operational art tools used by the operational planner are the factors of time, force, and space. "Factor Space" is heavily influenced by international law governing the establishment of land, sea and air "boundaries." These boundaries directly impact the freedom of movement of military forces. For example, during the deterrent or pre-hostilities phase of an operation, military forces typically respect the sovereign rights of nations regarding their land territory, national waters, and national airspace.

During the hostilities phase of an operation, when the Law of Armed Conflict becomes the *lex specialis* or law that governs the situation, the movement of military forces may be conducted without regard to the sovereign territorial rights of the enemy belligerent nation. However, the traditional sovereign rights of other states (e.g. neighboring states) as a matter of law must continue to be respected. As such, limitations on the freedom of movement of forces within the land, sea, and air boundaries of such states must be factored into operational planning. When limited navigation and over flight rights within another nation's air and sea space prove insufficient, operational planners may consider notifying the State Department and seek assistance in obtaining access and transit agreements in order to facilitate planned operations or modifying existing Rules of Engagement.

Possessing the freedom to utilize international waters and airspace is fundamental to implementing U.S. national and military strategies. This freedom allows access to strategic areas of the world, facilitates support and reinforcement of forward-deployed forces, enables U.S. and coalition forces to operate worldwide, and ensures uninterrupted world commerce. During this lesson we will discuss the rights of all nations in international waters and airspace, as well as the limited rights of coastal nations to exercise jurisdiction over some portions of the sea and airspace adjacent to their coastline.

Since 1983, the United States has recognized the LOS Convention's description of the various maritime zones and boundaries and the rights and responsibilities associated with them to be accepted customary international law. Since that time, it has been presidential policy for U.S. forces to actively "exercise and assert [U.S.] navigation and over flight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the Convention." Moreover, presidential policy has been that the United States shall not "acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and over flight and other related high seas uses."

Although the Senate has yet to ratify U.S. participation in the Law of the Sea Convention, by an Executive Order signed by President Reagan in 1983 it is official government policy that all military operations will be conducted in accordance with the Convention's delineation of rights and responsibilities. The U.S. Navy publishes detailed guidance on the LOS regimes in Part I of The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M. This handbook is a great resource for the operational commander and his/her staff.

The point of contact for this lesson is Commander Sean Henseler, JAGC, USN, C-

409.

D. Questions:

- What sovereign rights does a nation have regarding its land territory, territorial sea, and national airspace, and how does this affect the movement or operation of foreign military forces in these zones?
- What are the distinctions between innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea-lane passage, and high seas freedoms of navigation?
- How, if at all, are military planning and operations affected by the various legal regimes of oceans and airspace?
- How can operational planners use the concepts of belligerent control of the immediate area of operations, maritime warning zones, and blockade to assist mission accomplishment?
- To what extent may the military operations of a belligerent nation be conducted within the land territory, national airspace, and national waters of a neutral or non-belligerent?
- When, where, and how may coastal nations lawfully employ naval mines?
- What legal issues are associated with MIO, PSI, and MOTR?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

U.S. Department of the Navy. Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*. Norfolk, VA: Department of the Navy, 2007. Read: Chapters 1, 2,and 7. (Issued).

Stephens, Dale, CMDR, CSM, RAN. "The Law of Naval Warfare and Zones." In *Maritime Operational Zones*, Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006. Read: 4-1 to 4-30. (**NWC 1069**), (Posted on JMO Website).

Winner, Andrew C. "The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdictions." *Washington Quarterly* (Spring 2005), 129-143. (**NWC 1071**), (Posted on JMO Website).

G. Supplementary Reading:

None.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

United Nations. *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. 1983. Articles 1-25, 29-54, 86-111 and 121. (**NWC 1003**), (Posted on JMO Website).

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (Seminar)

Those skilled in war cultivate the Tao (the way of humanity and justice) and preserve the laws and are therefore able to formulate victorious policies.

—Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

A. Focus:

Historically, the application of the law of war has been divided into two parts. The first, *jus ad bellum*, addresses the legality of a nation's decision to engage in war (see JMO-19). The second, *jus in bello*, provides rules and guidance related to the actual conduct of hostilities once initiated. Pursuant to DoD policy, U.S. armed forces shall comply with the law of war in the conduct of military operations and related activities in armed conflict, however such conflicts are characterized (DoD Dir 5100.77). As such, it is incumbent upon military commanders to ensure that all operations are planned and executed in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). This session will focus on the sources and basic principles of LOAC as well as the law of targeting, to include the targeting and killing of civilians taking a direct part in hostilities. A theme running throughout this session will be, "Why should U.S. forces comply with the Law of Armed Conflict when it appears adversaries do not?"

B. Objectives:

- Review the sources of and the purposes served by the law of armed conflict.
- Understand the LOAC principles of necessity, distinction, proportionality, and unnecessary suffering.
- Be able to articulate why a nation or a military commander might believe it is either required and/or in their best interest to comply or attempt to comply with the Law of Armed Conflict.
- Understand DoD policy concerning possible violations of the LOAC by subordinates.

C. Background:

The law of armed conflict (LOAC), also referred to as the Law of War or International Humanitarian Law (IHL), is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. The law of armed conflict seeks to minimize unnecessary suffering and destruction by controlling and mitigating the harmful effects of hostilities through standards of protection to be accorded to combatants, noncombatants, civilians and civilian property. To achieve this goal, the law of armed conflict is based on four general principles: military necessity, unnecessary suffering, distinction, and proportionality. These principles must be considered collectively as they impact on and interrelate with each other. No one principle of the law of war can be considered in isolation.

1. Principle of Military Necessity

The law of armed conflict is not intended to impede the waging of hostilities. Its purpose is to ensure that the violence of hostilities is directed toward the enemy's war efforts and is not used to cause unnecessary human misery and physical destruction. The principle of military necessity recognizes that force resulting in death and destruction will have to be applied to achieve military objectives, but its goal is to limit suffering and destruction to that which is necessary to achieve a valid military objective. Thus it prohibits the use of any kind or degree of force not required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources. It is important to note that the principle of military necessity does not authorize acts that are otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict and that military necessity is not a criminal defense for acts expressly prohibited by the law of armed conflict.

In applying the principle of military necessity a commander should ask whether the object of attack is a valid military objective and, if so, whether the total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization of the object of attack will constitute a definite military advantage under the circumstances at the time of the attack. An object is a valid military objective if by its nature (e.g., combat ships and aircraft), location (e.g., bridge over enemy supply route), use (e.g., school building being used as an enemy headquarters), or purpose (e.g., a civilian airport that is built with a longer than required runway so it can be used for military airlift in time of emergency) it makes an effective contribution to the enemy's war fighting/war sustaining effort and its total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstance at the time, offers a definite military advantage. Purpose is related to use, but is concerned with the intended, suspected, or possible future use of an object rather than its immediate and temporary use.

It is important to note that the principle of military necessity does not prohibit the application of overwhelming force against enemy combatants, units, and material consistent with the principles of distinction and proportionality.

2. Principle of Distinction

The principle of distinction is concerned with distinguishing combatants from civilians and military objects from civilian objects so as to minimize damage to civilians and civilian objects. Commanders have two duties under the principle of distinction. First, they must distinguish their forces from the civilian population. This is why combatants wear uniforms or other distinctive signs. Second, they must distinguish valid military objectives from civilians or civilian objects before attacking.

The principle of distinction, combined with the principle of military necessity, prohibits indiscriminate attacks. Specifically, attacks that are not directed at a specific military objective (e.g., Iraqi SCUD missile attacks on Israeli and Saudi cities during the Persian Gulf War), attacks that employ a method or means of combat that cannot be directed at a specific military objective (e.g., declaring an entire city a single military objective and attacking it by bombardment when there are actually several distinct military objectives throughout the city that could be targeted separately), or attacks that employ a method or means of combat, the effects of which cannot be limited as required

by the law of armed conflict (e.g., bombing an entire large city when the object of attack is a small enemy garrison in the city).

3. Principle of Proportionality

The principle of proportionality is directly linked to the principle of distinction. While distinction is concerned with focusing the scope and means of attack so as to cause the least amount of damage to protected persons and property, proportionality is concerned with weighing the military advantage one expects to gain against the unavoidable and incidental loss to civilians and civilian property that will result from the attack. The principle of proportionality requires the commander to conduct a balancing test to determine if the incidental injury, including death to civilians and damage to civilian objects, is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. Note that the principle of proportionality under the law of armed conflict is different than the term proportionality as used in self-defense.

4. Principle of Unnecessary Suffering

The law of armed conflict prohibits the use of arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants. Because this principle is difficult to apply in practice, it is usually addressed through treaties or conventions that limit or restrict the use of specific weapons. DOD policy requires that before a new weapon or weapons system is acquired, an authorized attorney must conduct a legal review to ensure the new weapon is consistent with all applicable domestic laws and international agreements, treaties, customary international law, and the law of armed conflict. The review need not anticipate all possible uses or misuses of a weapon, however, commanders should ensure that otherwise lawful weapons or munitions are not being altered or misused to cause greater or unnecessary suffering.

Part II of the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations and the Army's Operational Law Handbook present an overview of the rights and duties of military personnel under the law of armed conflict.

The point of contact for this lesson is Commander Sean Henseler, JAGC, USN, C-409.

D. Questions:

- Why is it in a nation's interest to comply with the law of armed conflict? Why is it in the interest of the military commander?
- How can LOAC violations by U.S. forces affect mission success?
- What can a commander do to ensure adherence to the law of armed conflict by U.S. forces?
- What are the principal international law considerations with respect to selection of targets and selection of weapons? What is the balancing test that must be done during targeting analysis?
- What does is mean to respond to a hostile act with "proportional" force?
- What are the requirements to be a lawful combatant? To be a noncombatant? What is an unlawful (or unprivileged) combatant?

- What are the major protections afforded by the law of armed conflict to the wounded and sick, prisoners of war, and civilians in occupied areas?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts. *Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,* 8 June 1977 (Protocol I), Articles 48-58, (Contained within the *Law of War Documentary Supplement*, pages 362-366), (**NWC 1039**), (Posted on JMO Website).

Harmon, Christopher C. *"*Are We Beasts?" "Churchill and the Moral Question of World War II," and "Area Bombing*."* Newport Paper 1. Newport, RI: Naval War College, December 1991. (**NWC 1080**), (Posted on JMO Website).

Schmitt, Michael N. "Targeting and Humanitarian Law: Current Issues." *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights* 34 (2004), 59–104. **(NWC 1001).** (Available online at www.michaelschmitt.org/Publications.html.)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Additional Protocol II.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, U.S. Army. *Operational Law Handbook*. (Charlottesville, VA: U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, 2007), 11-80. (Posted on JMO Website).

U.S. Department of the Navy. Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*. Norfolk, VA: Department of the Navy, 2007. Read: Chapters 5 through 12. (Issued).

POST-COMBAT LEGAL ISSUES (Seminar)

"To establish legitimacy, commanders transition security activities from combat operations to law enforcement as quickly as feasible. When insurgents are seen as criminals, they lose public support. Using a legal system established in line with local culture and practices to deal with such criminals enhances the HN government's legitimacy."

—FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency

The events of Oct.-Dec. 2003 on the night shift of Tier 1 at Abu Ghraib prison were acts of brutality and purposeless sadism. We now know that these abuses occurred at the hands of both military police and military intelligence personnel. The pictured abuse, unacceptable even in wartime, were not part of authorized interrogations nor were they even directed at intelligence targets. They represent deviant behavior and a failure of military leadership and discipline.

—Schlesinger Report on DoD Detention at Abu Ghraib

Rebellions can be made by 2% active in a striking force, and 98% passively sympathetic.

—T. E. Lawrence ("of Arabia")

A. Focus:

Commanders and their staffs must plan for all phases of a military operation to include those post-combat. As such, planners must consider and be prepared to comply with all relevant aspects of international and domestic law regarding detention and occupation. Additionally, the increased use of civilian contractors to supplement U.S. military forces engaged in post-combat operations also entails various legal issues commanders must consider. Finally, commanders must consider the priority of effort to be placed on establishing the "rule of law" following major combat operations. This lesson is devoted to discussing the law related to post-major combat operations.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the legal issues related to the "status" of individuals in the battlespace and how such status might impact operations to include detention and interrogation.
- Know the main source of and understand the basic requirements of "occupation law."
- Gain familiarity with the practical and legal issues regarding establishing the "rule of law" in another sovereign nation following major combat operations.

C. Background:

One of the Joint Force commander's key operational tasks is to ensure that military operations are conducted in a manner that is perceived as legitimate by the local population, American citizens, and arguably world opinion. As one commentator has

noted, "Legitimacy arises from the conviction that state action proceeds within the ambit of law, in two senses: first, that action arises from rightful authority . . . and second, that it does not violate a legal or moral norm. Ultimately, however, legitimacy is rooted in public opinion, [which] is why it is an elusive quality." (Tucker and Hendrickson. "The Sources of American Legitimacy." *Foreign Affairs* [November/December 2004]: p. 18) A thorough understanding of the legal issues regarding detention, occupation, and establishing the rule of law is essential to effective regressive operational planning, in which the desired end state drives the planning for each phase of operations.

The point of contact for this lesson is Commander Sean Henseler, JAGC, USN, C-409

D. Questions:

- Understand the practical implications of being labeled a lawful combatant, an unlawful combatant, a civilian taking a direct and active part in hostilities, or a civilian during an armed conflict.
- What is the legal basis to hold detainees in Guantanamo Bay? In Iraq? In Afghanistan?
- Of what consequence is it whether or not U.S. forces conduct detention, interrogation, and rule of law activities in accordance with international and domestic law to mission success? Perceived legitimacy?
- What issues does the presence of large numbers of civilian contractors, to include Private Security Contractors like Blackwater, have on post-combat planning and operations?
- What are the major protections afforded by the law of armed conflict to the wounded and sick, prisoners of war and civilians in occupied areas?
- What authority does the law give to occupying forces to achieve stability and security in occupied areas? What impact does exercise of these authorities have on the ability to achieve the desired end state?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War. *Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*, August 12, 1949, Articles 13-26 and 47-88. (Contained within the *Law of War Documentary Supplement* 238-240 and 244-251), (**NWC 1045**), (Posted on JMO Website).

Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War. *Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War*, August 12, 1949, Articles 1-42. (Contained within the *Law of War Documentary Supplement* 199-208), (**NWC 1046**), (Posted on JMO Website).

Friend, Jim. "Military Occupation and the Law of Armed Conflict: Discouraging Resistance." Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations

Department, 2003. Read: 1-10. (**NWC 5009**), (Posted on JMO Website).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Ford, Christopher Captain. "The Rule of Law for Commanders." Military Review Jan-Feb 2008. (posted on JMO website)

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (Seminar)

The determination of hostile intent is the single most difficult decision that a commander has to make in peacetime.

—Admiral Frank Kelso

A. Focus:

Rules of Engagement (ROE) are directives issued by competent authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement. This lesson reviews the U.S. Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (SROE/SRUF) with particular emphasis on the use of force in self-defense and the development of supplemental ROE measures for a particular mission. After a brief discussion regarding ROE in the coalition environment this session will examine real world scenarios designed to foster discussion about issues to be considered when developing ROE to achieve success in both a COIN and an asymmetric environment.

B. Objectives:

- Recognize the role of ROE in maintaining civilian control of the military.
- Comprehend the terms hostile act and hostile intent.
- Consider how a commander might employ either conduct-based, status-based, or a mixture of status and conduct-based ROE to accomplish a mission.
- Consider the significance of commander's guidance as it pertains to the widespread understanding of ROE by U.S. forces.
- Examine ROE development in the planning process and understand the process by which modifications to ROE are obtained from higher authority.

C. Background:

Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the primary means by which the president, through the secretary of defense and the combatant commanders, exercises Constitutional responsibility as commander-in-chief to guide U.S. military forces in the use of force to obtain national objectives. U.S. forces operate under the Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (SROE/SRUF) contained in chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B. The SROE/SRUF provide direction and guidance regarding the inherent right of self-defense, which are rules based on the conduct of others and which apply at all times from peace to war. The SROE/SRUF also provides a list of supplemental measures which allow operational planners to request authority to use force in order to achieve mission accomplishment.

The inherent right to use force, including deadly force, in self-defense has as its legal basis the right of military self-defense recognized under customary international law and the right of national self-defense recognized under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Mission accomplishment ROE are issued by senior civilian and military commanders as a means of shaping a military operation to best achieve political and military goals, and to ensure

that forces comply with the law of armed conflict at all times. All ROE should be consistent with national policy, military strategy, and the missions assigned by higher authority. ROE must be framed and interpreted in conjunction with the mission and should support, not inhibit, mission accomplishment. Thus, although international law relating to the use of force is an important consideration in drafting ROE, political guidance and operational requirements are perhaps the most significant factors that shape mission accomplishment ROE.

In operational planning, the adequacy of existing ROE is assessed during the mission analysis in the Commander's Estimate of the Situation. If additional authority to use force is required, operational planners should be prepared to brief the commander on the specific existing ROE limitations that need to be relaxed in order to facilitate mission accomplishment. Alternatively, if operational planers believe that subordinate commanders should have limitations on their authority to use force or should otherwise receive through ROE clear direction on how to use force in mission accomplishment, they should be prepared to recommend ROE for the commander to issue.

In all subsequent phases of the military decision-making process, it is vitally important that commanders and their planning staffs continue to be alert to the effect that existing ROE have on mission accomplishment, and to seek or order changes to the ROE when appropriate. The J-3 is normally responsible to the Commander for ROE development, with the assistance of other staff officers, including the staff judge advocate.

The point of contact for this lesson is Commander Sean Henseler, JAGC, USN, C-409.

D. Questions:

- What is the significance of ROE to mission planning and execution?
- Who should be responsible for ROE in mission planning and execution?
- What role should the Combatant Commander and the JTF Commander have with respect to ROE? What is the appropriate role of the legal advisor in developing and implementing ROE?
- How can commanders use the ROE to enhance the likelihood of mission success? Under what circumstances might it be desirable to mix conduct and status based ROE?
- How can a combatant commander ensure that subordinate commanders do not misinterpret the ROE or put an undesired "spin" on the approved ROE?
- What value, if any, does Positive Identification (PID) add to self-defense ROE?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Martins, Mark S. "Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering." *Military Law Review* 143, (Winter 1994), 33-55. (**NWC 1048**), (Posted

on JMO Website).

Henseler, Sean P. "Self-Defense in the Maritime Environment Under the New Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SROE/SRUF)." *Naval Law Review* 53 (2006): 211-228. (**NWC 4042**), (Posted on JMO Website).

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, CFLCC ROE Card (unclassified) of 31 January 2003. **(NWC 5011**), (Posted on JMO Website).

U.S. Naval War College. "Blue Force Standing Rules of Engagement." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2004. Read: 11-12, (Mock ROE message formats), (**NWC 2012A**), (Posted on JMO Website).

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Extracts." *JCS Standing Rules of Engagement and Rules for the Use of Force*. CJCS Instruction 3121.01B. Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 June 2005. (**NWC 1062A**), (Posted on JMO Website).

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Washington, DC: CJCS, 17 September 2006. Read: Chapter I, paragraph 3.e. (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Rose, S. "Crafting the Rules of Engagement for Haiti." In *International Law Studies: The Law of Military Operations,* ed. M.N. Schmitt, 225-237. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1998. (**NWC 1051**), (Posted on JMO Website).

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:
None.

OPERATIONAL LAW CASE STUDY (Seminar)

You will usually find that the enemy has three courses open to him, and of these he will adopt the fourth.

—Helmut von Moltke ("The Elder")

A. Focus:

This seminar provides the opportunity to apply operational law and to discuss the effective application of ROE to specific military operations.

B. Objectives:

- Demonstrate knowledge of the elements of the law of the sea and airspace and the law of armed conflict by applying them in a factual context involving the employment of military forces.
- Demonstrate an understanding of the various political, military, and legal considerations involved in crafting rules of engagement for a specific military operation.
- Apply the CJCS SROE in a factual context involving the employment of military forces.
- Practice using a set of supplemental ROE in a specific military operation.

C. Background:

Refer to sessions JMO 19 through JMO 23.

The point of contact for this session is Commander Sean Henseler, JAGC, USN, C-409.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Products:

Students work in small groups to prepare briefs to present to a notional JTF Commander concerning a specified aspect of operational law.

F. Required Reading:

U. S. Naval War College, JMO Department. "Crisis in Sudan, OPERATION URGENT RESPONSE" (Case Study). Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2008. (**NWC 3086D**), (Posted on JMO Website and Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

U. S. Department of the Navy. Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*. Norfolk, VA: Department of the Navy, 2007. Read: Chapters 1-2 and 5-12. (Issued).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . "Extracts." *JCS Standing Rules of Engagement and Rules for the Use of Force*. CJCS Instruction 3121.01B.

Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 13 June 2005. (**NWC 1062A**), (Posted on JMO Website).

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS CONFLICT: A CASE STUDY

(Lecture and Exercise)

A senior officer said after the war that it had proved that 'the things we did on the basis of well-tried and proven formations worked, and the ad hoc arrangements turned out much less happily.' Joint-service liaison and staff work left much to be desired.

—Hastings and Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*

A. Focus:

This session serves as the synthesis event for the components of operational art explained and discussed in preceding Block I sessions. Emphasis is on the decisions and actions of operational-level commanders on both sides.

B. Objectives:

- Synthesize and apply the components of operational art learned to date
- Analyze and evaluate how commanders and staffs applied operational art in an historical case study
- Apply concepts from operational law in order to evaluate the legal issues in an historical case study.
- Analyze the operational lessons valid for the employment of modern, multinational and joint forces

C. Background:

This case study is presented in three consecutive sessions starting with a faculty presentation of the historical/strategic background to the conflict. There will also be a 60-minute film drawing out elements from both sides involved that will be shown following the lecture. Students will have seminar time available to study the case materials and develop student-led discussions of the assigned questions. The final session is devoted to student-led discussions of the case study.

This session is designed to reinforce the aspects of operational art studied and discussed in preceding sessions. Historical examples provide an excellent opportunity for illustrating the complexities of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns and the reasons why certain military actions either succeeded or failed. This particular case is used because it is rich with examples of the application, lack of application, misapplication, or inability to apply the concepts associated with operational art.

The goal of this session is to provide in-depth discussion and analysis of major aspects of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982 from an operational perspective. As the major synthesis event for the operational art portion of the syllabus, the motivations, planning, and actions of both sides in the conflict will be examined in some detail. Seminar moderators will assign specific responsibilities for student discussion of the case.

The point of contact for this session is Commander Neil Thompson, Royal Navy, C-414.

D. Questions

- Analyze and critique the following strategic and theater-level decisions made during the conflict:
- British decision to withdraw HMS *Endurance* from the South Atlantic in 1982.
- Argentine decision to solve the issue by force.
- Argentine decision to advance D-day for Operation ROSARIO from sometime in July or August to 1 (later 2) April.
- Argentine decision to plan initially for a garrison force only on the Malvinas and not to plan for a defense.
- British decision to send submarines to the South Atlantic immediately followed by other naval forces without first making basic decisions about what course of action to follow.
- British decision to plan for military action while still attempting to resolve the issue through diplomacy.
- British decision to appoint Admiral Fieldhouse as the operational commander and have him remain at his headquarters at Northwood in the UK with no single, overall commander on the scene in the South Atlantic.
- Argentine failure to appoint a single commander for the entire operation.
- Argentine decision to keep the most combat-ready forces on the border with Chile and to garrison the Malvinas with draftees from many of the regions of Argentina as opposed to a more cohesive group.
- Argentine decision not to lengthen the runway at Stanley to accept fighters.
- British decision to have the TF depart the UK before it was completely ready knowing that it would have to be reloaded at Ascension Island.
- British decision to use force to retake the Falklands and South Georgia.
- British decision to establish a 200-mile MEZ/TEZ and later to extend it to within 12 miles of Argentina.
- British decision to retake South Georgia before landing in the Falklands.
- Argentine decisions or lack of same that resulted in no comprehensive defensive strategy or operational plans.
- British decision to use Vulcan bombers from Ascension Island to attack the runway at Stanley.
- British decision to order HMS *Conqueror* to sink the *Belgrano* even though she was outside the MEZ.

- Argentine decision to keep the remainder of the Argentine fleet in port after the sinking of the *Belgrano*.
- British decision not to attack targets on the Argentine mainland.
- Argentine decision not to attack the British base of operations at Ascension Island or the British SLOCs.
- British decision to land at San Carlos.
- Argentine decision to give targeting priority to British carriers rather than to the amphibious ships.
- British decision to order 3 Commando Brigade to attack Goose Green before the remainder of the ground forces arrived at the beachhead.
- Argentine decision to surrender Port Stanley without further attempts to delay the British advance.
- Decisions made by both sides regarding freedom of the press and the impact those decisions had on aiding enemy intelligence collection.
- Having considered the various strategic and operational decisions made, or not made, by the British and Argentine leaders during the conflict, what lessons stand out for U. S. leaders?

E. Products:

Student-led discussions answering assigned questions.

F. Required Readings:

Gatchel, Theodore L. "Operational Art and Joint Task Force Operations during the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict." (**NWC 1044**), (Posted on JMO Website).

Thompson, Julian. "Amphibious Logistics—Falklands 1982." Extract from Chapter 8 in *The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflicts.* (**NWC 1086**), (Posted on JMO Website).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Clapp, Michael. *Amphibious Assault Falkland Islands: The Battle of San Carlos Water*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996.

Freedman, Lawrence. *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign—Vol 2*. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2005. (Seminar Reserve).

Freedman, Lawrence, and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse. *Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991.

Hastings, Max, and Simon Jenkins. *The Battle for the Falklands*. New York: Norton, 1983. (Seminar Reserve).

Middlebrook, Martin. *Task Force: The Falklands War, 1982*. Rev. ed. London: Penguin, 1987. (Seminar Reserve).

Selected extracts from *Conflicto Malvinas, Official Report of the Argentine Army*, Vol. II. **(NWC 1038)** (Seminar Reserve).

Selected extracts from *Falkland Islands Campaign: Understanding the Issues*, Vol. 1. **(NWC 1115).** (Seminar Reserve).

Summers, Harry G., Jr. "Strategic Lessons Learned: The Falkland Islands Campaign." *The Art of War Quarterly* (September 1983): 91-112. **(NWC 1111).** (Seminar Reserve).

Thompson, Julian. *No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic: 1982*. New York: Hippocrene, 1985.

U.K., The Defence Council. "The Falklands War 1982 from the Viewpoint of Doctrine." **(NWC 4060).** (Seminar Reserve).

Van der Bijl, Nick, and David Aldea. *5th Infantry Brigade in the Falklands 1982*. Barnsley, West Yorkshire, UK: Leo Cooper, 2003.

Woodward, Sandy. *One Hundred Days—The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992. (Seminar Reserve).

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

THE OPERATIONAL ART EXAMINATION (Individual Effort)

No wonder then, that war, though it may appear to be uncomplicated, cannot be waged with distinction except by men of outstanding intellect.

—Clausewitz, *On War*

A. Focus:

This session is designed to permit the War College student to demonstrate the synthesis of the Introductory and Theory of Operational warfare sessions presented to date and to further demonstrate higher order thinking skills.

B. Objectives:

- Synthesize operational art concepts through the analysis of a case study.
- Create a cogent response to the examination questions that demonstrate an internalization of the various concepts of operational art.

C. Background:

Written examinations serve three fundamental purposes; to evaluate students understanding of a given subject, to evaluate the students ability to critically think and respond to a complex question, and lastly, to evaluate a professor's ability to convey information and to create new knowledge. This session presents the student the opportunity to demonstrate mastery of the first two purposes stated above and further allows the moderators to ensure that there exist no intellectual gaps in student learning to this point.

Students will be provided a case study with sufficient information to address the questions presented. This case study will be issued on 16 September in order to permit sufficient time to prepare. 17 September is dedicated to student preparation. Students are strongly encouraged to prepare as a seminar. The examination will be issued at 0830 18 September and is due to the moderators not later than 1230 18 September 2008. Grading criteria for the midterm examination may be found on page xiv of this Syllabus.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Doug Hime, C-423.

D. Questions:

See examination question sheet.

E. Products:

A written examination that demonstrates student mastery. This effort should not exceed 10 double spaced typed pages in Times New Roman font 12 point.

F. Required Reading:

A case study will be issued prior to the examination with sufficient time for student's to conduct a thorough analysis and prepare for the examination.

G. Supplementary Readings:
None.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:
None.

PLANNING PROCESSES (Lecture)

Plans are useless, but planning is everything.

—General Dwight D. Eisenhower

A. Focus:

This lecture will focus on military planning in general and will identify various processes used in the Department of Defense for military planning and problem solving. While addressing the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) in general, the lecture instead focuses on the service planning processes and highlights the subtle differences in language, process, and format. The student comes to appreciate the similarities between the various processes and discovers that military planning is highly nonlinear and requires a deep appreciation of operational art, organization, human dynamics, and further requires a different style of leadership in order to reach a common solution.

B. Objectives:

- Evaluate the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces to conduct the full range of military operations against the capabilities of twenty first century adversaries.

- Analyze theory and principles of war as they pertain to the operational level of war.

- Distinguish between the fundamentals of campaign planning and planning for major operations.

- Appraise insights into decision support issues, decision making, and the role of the planner in the joint force.

C. Background:

Planning is the vehicle used in the Department of Defense to solve problems. As stated in MCDP 5 *Planning*: Planning is the art and science of envisioning a desired future and laying out effective ways of bringing it about. It is a preparation process. Here we draw an important distinction between a process (a dynamic system of related activities) and a procedure (a prescribed sequence of steps for accomplishing some specified task). The planning process may often involve the use of procedures to perform certain tasks, but planning overall is too complex and situation-dependent to be treated as a routine procedure.

Planning is also distinctly a process rather than merely an act because it involves a number of ongoing, iterative, and interdependent activities. Since situations (or the

information available about them) continuously change, we must continue to adapt our plans as time allows. Planning is a process that should build upon itself—each step should create a new understanding of the situation that becomes the point of departure for new plans. Planning for a particular action only stops with execution, and even then adaptation continues during execution.

Planning encompasses two basic functions: envisioning a desired future and arranging a configuration of potential actions in time and space that will allow us to realize that future. Planning is thus a way of figuring out how to move from the current state to a more desirable future state, even if it does not allow us to control the transition precisely. Planning involves projecting our thoughts forward in time and space to influence events *before* they occur rather than merely responding to events as they occur. This means contemplating and evaluating potential decisions and actions in advance. It involves thinking through the consequences of certain potential actions in order to estimate whether they will bring us closer to the desired future. In war, this naturally involves trying to anticipate possible enemy responses to our actions. Planning also involves integrating these individual decisions and actions together into potential sequences and examining the possible implications of these sequences.

We should think of planning as a learning process, as mental preparation that improves our understanding of a situation. In its simplest terms, planning is thinking before doing. Even if the plan is not executed precisely as envisioned—and few ever are—the process should result in a deeper situational awareness that improves future decision making. We should thus think of planning as a learning activity that facilitates the exercise of judgment and not as merely a mechanical procedure. Generically, a plan is any product of planning. It may be a formal, articulated document or an informal scheme. Since planning is an ongoing process, it is better to think of a plan as an interim product based on the information and understanding known at the moment and always subject to revision as new information and understanding emerge. A plan is thus a structured configuration of actions in time and space envisioned for the future. A plan is the basis for action, cooperation, and adaptation. Most military plans are arranged hierarchically, because plans for one echelon are nested within the plans of higher echelons.

As Senior War College graduates, you will not only be expected to serve as planning experts, but will also be expected to lead planning efforts. This lecture highlights some of the leadership skills necessary in leading diverse groups whose goals are not always aligned. Further, this lecture will address why we plan, how we plan, and for whom we plan.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Bill Hartig, C-428.

D. Questions:

How are planning for conflict and planning for post-conflict operations related?

How is planning related to command and control?

How do time and certainty relate to planning?

How are plans and planning related to orders?

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Reading:
None.

G. Supplemental Readings:

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operations,* Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1. II-11 (Issued)

———. *Joint Operation Planning,* Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 26 December 2006. (Issued).

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:
None.

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) (Seminar)

In war, nothing is achieved except by calculation. Everything that is not soundly planned in its detail yields no result.

—The Maxims of Napoleon

A. Focus:

This session examines the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and its evolving role in support of a Combatant Commander's strategy. It provides an overview of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the roles of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Joint Staff, and the service chiefs and their staffs in translating national policy objectives into definitive planning guidance for the combatant commanders and their service component commanders. Particular attention is given to the initial implementation of *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF) and its relationship to the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP).

B. Objectives:

- Evaluate the application of the JOPES process in support of U. S. planning for OIF.
- Analyze the strategic guidance in development of a plan in support of national objectives and the friction experienced in the process.
- Synthesize the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing joint and multinational theater plans in support of national objectives.
- Evaluate how the planning process assists in ensuring national ends, ways, and means are reconciled, integrated, and applied.
- Comprehend how JOPES can integrate the instruments of national power to attain national security objectives.
- Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.
- Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U. S. force structure affect the planning process.
- Synthesize the capabilities and limitations of interagency processes and of all services (own service, other services—to include Special Operations Forces (SOF)) to meet planning objectives.

C. Background:

As mandated by Title 10 USC, the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS are pivotal in translating national security objectives into definitive planning guidance for the combatant commanders. The service chiefs and their staffs are also involved in the process, both as contributors to the joint planning guidance and in deriving service plans that provide trained and equipped forces to support that process. Combatant commanders are responsible for developing strategies for their commands and the development and

production of a theater (or function) campaign plan with supporting operation plans (OPLANs) and concept plans (CONPLANs).

JOPES provides the overall framework for the military planning process. Prior to JOPES, there existed the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) and the Joint Deployment System (JDS). The need for JOPES stemmed from the recognition, based on actual crisis situations, that JOPS and JDS focused primarily on deployment and did not adequately support employment activities. JOPES was therefore developed to give senior level decision-makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and control events during both planning and execution of joint operations.

In recent years there has been a proliferation of documents providing narrow elements of strategic guidance to combatant commanders. These individual documents, often created without close coordination with other strategic policy documents, contributed to an already unwieldy system of planning. The GEF (classified Secret), released in 2008, provides a single document that presents strategic guidance once found in five separate directives and directs combatant commanders to develop a campaign plan to support achievement of theater and functional command end states. The GEF offers:

- Strategic end states
- Prioritized contingency planning scenarios and end states
- Global posture and global force management guidance
- Security Cooperation and global force management priorities
- Strategic assumptions
- Overarching DOD and USG nuclear policy

Reflecting another innovation, the GEF was developed concurrently with the JSCP, ensuring a close linkage between the two documents. The JSCP is the vehicle by which the CJCS initiates the contingency planning cycle (formally known as deliberate planning). It includes regional objectives and planning assumptions; it specifies the type of plan for each task; and it apportions major combat and strategic lift forces to the combatant commanders for their planning. The JSCP also provides the combatant commanders with a framework for the scope of their plans, plan formats, and the amount of detailed planning that is required. Contingency planning is a complex and lengthy process, particularly when the combatant commanders are required to develop Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). The plans developed in support of the JSCP are integral the combatant commander's campaign plan.

Shortly after the terrorist attacks on 9-11, it became apparent to the Secretary of Defense that the existing planning system was not nimble enough to react to emerging needs. In view of this lengthy planning process and the need for greater flexibility, DOD has developed an emerging concept termed Adaptive Planning (AP).

Adaptive Planning allows planners to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require. Adaptive Planning (AP) occurs in a networked, collaborative environment, requires the regular involvement of senior DOD leaders, and results in plans containing a range of viable options. At full maturity, AP will form the

backbone of a future joint adaptive planning and execution system, supporting the development and execution of plans. AP will preserve the best characteristics of present day contingency and crisis planning with a common process. AP is a "system-of-systems" approach to planning that has four major elements: process, products, people, and technology. While some aspects of AP have already been implemented, AP will require several years to reach its full potential.

Point of contact for this session is Professor Patrick C. Sweeney, C-424.

D. Questions:

Why expend a great deal of effort in the contingency planning process, including development of detailed force deployment information, when contingency plans always change prior to execution?

Why has the DOD developed the concept of adaptive planning, and how does a combatant commander incorporate that concept into his region's planning?

How are limited resources and forces matched to planning requirements necessary to support the national security strategy and objectives?

What do you consider to be the most important aspects of the crisis action and contingency planning processes? Why?

What are the fundamental responsibilities of the theater commander to provide for strategic direction, unified action, and operational focus?

In support of the OIF readings in *Fiasco* and *Cobra II* and using the "JMO Operational Leadership Prevailing Principles / Competencies" discussed in the Theater Strategic Leadership session:

- Assess General Franks decisions during his staff's formulation of the plan for OIF.
- In hindsight, was 1003V a bad plan or a good plan?
- How might Adaptive Planning have mitigated some of CENTCOM's challenges?

E. Products: None**.**

F. Required Readings:

Sweeney, Patrick C. "A Primer for: *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF), *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP), and the *Adaptive Planning and Execution* (APEX) *System*." Naval War College, 14 May 2008. (**NWC 2061**). (Posted on the JMO website).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operation Planning,* Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 26 December 2006. Review: pp. I-1 thru I-27. (Issued).

<u>As designated by seminar moderators</u>, half the seminar should read the *Cobra II* reading and the other half *Fiasco* (Note: you will revisit these readings in the Strategy and Policy Department when examining the issues of strategic-level civil-

military relations, war planning, inter-service cooperation and rivalry, and the evolution of US warfighting capabilities).

Gordon, Michael R., and General Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2006. Read pp. 24-54; 66-74; 86-94. (Issued).

Ricks, Thomas. *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq.* New York: Penguin Books, 2007. Read pp. 32-45; 66-76; 78-80; 104-111. (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Gates, Robert M. *Adaptive Planning Roadmap II.* Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 5 March 2008. (Posted on the JMO website).

Naval War College. *Plans and Orders*, September 2002. (**NWC 2159A**). (Posted on the JMO website).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)*, Volume I, *Planning Policies and Procedures*, CJCSM 3122.01A, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 29 Sept 2006. (Posted on the JMO website and Seminar Reserve).

_____. *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES),* Volume II*, Planning Formats and Guidance*, CJCSM 3122.03C, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 17 August 2007. (Posted on the JMO website and Seminar Reserve).

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

Planning Joint Operations (available online at https://ca.dtic.mil/doctrine/interactive/courses/planning/course.htm) stop at "Multinational Considerations" section.

JOINT OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS (Seminar and Exercise)

A sound logistics plan is the foundation upon which a war operation should be based. If the necessary minimum of logistics support cannot be given to the combatant forces involved, the operation may fail, or at best be only partially successful.

—Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN, Commander Fifth Fleet, 1946

A. Focus:

This session provides an overview of logistics at the theater-strategic level of war. It addresses the principles of logistics, joint boards and cells, and the geographic combatant commander's logistics responsibilities. Finally, it examines joint operational logistics planning considerations.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend logistics operations and planning at the theater-strategic level.
- Identify and evaluate logistics tools that enable the Joint Force Commander to properly execute his logistics responsibility in the JOA.
- Comprehend the importance of the Logistics Estimate.
- Evaluate and synthesize specific logistics issues that must be addressed when conducting a logistics estimate for a joint operation.

C. Background:

The joint operational commander, as well as members of the commander's staff, must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of operational logistics to successfully execute daily peacetime operations and, certainly, missions across the range of military operations. Providing logistics to our forces throughout the world is a very complicated process and requires a great deal of coordination and synchronization by both supported and supporting commands and organizations. Even though logistics is normally a service responsibility, the combatant commander retains directive authority for logistics and must decide if and when it is appropriate to exercise that authority.

This session provides an overview of the fundamentals of operational logistics to include the principles of logistics and the classes of supply. It identifies logistics tools that enable the geographic combatant commander to properly execute logistics responsibilities in the operational area. These tools include directive authority for logistics, common servicing, joint logistics boards and offices, Acquisition Cross Service Agreements (ACSA), and coalition/contract logistics. This session also emphasizes the importance of the Logistics Estimate and how it should be used as a tool to ensure that critical logistics issues are properly considered throughout the joint staff planning process.

Following this session, students will participate in a practical exercise that will allow them to analyze operational logistics issues that are an inherent part of coalition and joint operations. The "Operation Urgent Response" (NWC 3086D) case study and the

Instructions for the Logistics Estimate (NWC 2066) will be used to guide student efforts during this exercise.

The point of contact for this session is LTC Tim Brown, USA, C-412.

D. Questions:

How does operational logistics bridge the gap between tactical and strategic logistics?

Describe the critical logistics responsibilities of the Joint Force J-4 during the staff planning process?

How does the logistics estimate serve as a tool to facilitate critical logistics planning during the joint planning process?

How does the Joint Force Commander leverage host nation, coalition, and contract logistics capabilities to accomplish his mission?

What critical intra-theater distribution management issues must be properly addressed when planning joint operations? Why are these distribution management issues so critically important?

Why should a combatant commander be concerned about exercising Directive Authority for Logistics (DAL), if logistics is an individual service responsibility?

E. Products:

Using the scenario in **NWC 3086D**, student teams will be assigned by the moderator to analyze the logistical challenges and considerations in developing a logistics estimate. Students will prepare a brief to be presented to the seminar on their findings and analysis.

F. Required Readings:

Christianson, Claude V. "Joint Logistics - Shaping Our Future: A Personal Perspective" *Army Logistician* (July-August 2006). (**NWC 2019**) (Posted on JMO Website).

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. *Instructions for the Logistics Estimate*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 2006. Review. (**NWC 2066**) (Posted on JMO Website).

_____, JMO Department. "Crisis in Sudan, OPERATION URGENT RESPONSE" (Case Study). Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2008. (**NWC 3086D**) (Posted on JMO Website and Issued).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Logistics*, Joint Publication (JP) 4-0, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 18 July 2008. Read: Executive Summary (vii-xxiv) and Chapter III. (Linked from the JMO Website and Issued)

_____. *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common-User Logistics during Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 4-07, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 11 June 2001. Read: Chapter I and Chapter IV. (Linked from the JMO Website)

G. Supplementary Reading:

U. S. Department of the Navy. Naval Doctrine Publication 4, *Naval Logistics*.

Washington, D.C.: CNO, 20 February 2001. (Posted on JMO Website).

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

Logistics Support available at https://ca.dtic.mil/doctrine /interactive/courses/ log/ course.html

STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT (Lecture and Seminar)

Victory is the beautiful, bright-colored flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.

—Winston Churchill, *The River War* (1899)

USTRANSCOM . . . their motto should be "try fighting without us."

—General Henry Shelton, CJCS

A. Focus:

This session emphasizes how the national strategic deployment system works. It addresses the organization and mission of the U. S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and its component commands. Finally, it examines the United States' ability to deploy in support of global contingencies.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the elements of the strategic deployment triad, which focuses on transportation and sustainment by land, sea, and air assets.
- Understand and synthesize the role of the U. S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in working with the combatant commanders on strategic mobility and sustainability issues.
- Comprehend the importance of the Time Phased Force Deployment Data/List (TPFDD/L).
- Understand the doctrinal concepts and evaluate the responsibilities for intra-theater and inter-theater transportation.

C. Background:

The ability of the U. S. military to successfully carry out its assigned tasks per our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy depends greatly on its capability to deploy forces, equipment, and sustainment to a theater of operations in a timely manner. Logistics includes all those supporting activities required to sustain a deployed force, strategic mobility defines that part of the logistics process which transports people, equipment, supplies, and other commodities by land, sea, and air, to enable military force projection. The operational commander must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the strategic mobility process to successfully execute a major operation or campaign. Force selection, phasing of operations, and risk assessment are directly tied to the ability to project both forces and support from the United States to the area of responsibility, area of operation, or theater of war.

USTRANSCOM oversees the strategic deployment process. USTRANSCOM's charter is to maintain and operate a deployment system for orchestrating the transportation aspects of worldwide mobility planning, integrate deployment-related information management systems, and provide centralized wartime traffic management. Actual movement is executed by USTRANSCOM's component commands: Military

Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC—Army), Military Sealift Command (MSC—Navy), and Air Mobility Command (AMC—Air Force). The Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration (MARAD) bridges MSC, U. S.-flag commercial companies, and U. S. unions for sealift procurement and operations.

During the planning process, the Joint Force Commander's staff must develop a prioritized movement plan that supports the commander's concept of operations. The joint force's detailed movement plan is communicated in the Time Phased Force Deployment Data/List (TPFDD/L). The TPFDD/L serves as the commander's primary tool for managing the flow of forces/capability into the area of operations. The TPFDD/L uses each leg of the Strategic Mobility Triad to depict the movement of forces. The Strategic Mobility Triad consists of pre-positioned material, sealift, and airlift. Each triad component has distinct advantages and disadvantages in terms of response time, expense, availability of assets, and carrying capacity. Sealift and airlift have access to only limited U. S. Government-owned assets, and thus are highly reliant on commercial industry under a variety of programs, including the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA).

The point of contact for this session is LTC Tim Brown, USA, C-412.

D. Questions:

Evaluate the relative advantages and disadvantages of each leg of the strategic deployment triad?

How does the combatant commander or the Joint Force Commander (JFC) interface with USTRANSCOM? Describe the supported/supporting commander relationship?

What are the major planning considerations and challenges facing operational planners in deploying a force to the theater of operations?

How does the JFC use the Time Phase Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) to manage the movement of forces into an area of operations?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. *Instructional Timed Phased Force Deployment List*, Newport, RI: Naval War College, June 2005. (**NWC 2072**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

_____. *Reference Guide, Forces/Capabilities Handbook*, Newport, RI: Naval War College, August 2006. Read: 128-140 (**NWC 3153J**), (Issued and Posted on the JMO Website)..

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-35. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 7 May 2007. Read: Chapters I and III. (Linked from JMO Website)

_____. *Sealift Support to Joint Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 4-01.2*. Washington D.C.: CJCS, 31 August 2005. Read: Chapter I. Scan: Chapters III and

IV. (Linked from JMO Website)

G. Supplementary Readings:

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System*. Joint Publication (JP) 4-01, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 19 March 2003. (Posted on JMO Website)

_____. *Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Air Mobility Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-17, Washington, D.C.: CJCS. (Posted on JMO Website)

U. S. Transportation Command Handbook 24-2, *Understanding the Defense Transportation System.* 3d ed. Scott AFB, IL: 1 September 2000, 1–17. (Posted on JMO Website)

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

Deployment and Redeployment Operations available at: https://ca.dtic.mil/doctrine/interactive/courses/dro/course.htm

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO OPERATIONAL PLANNING
(Unclassified Lecture for NCC Students Only)

The most important roles of intelligence are assisting JFCs and their staffs in visualizing the operational environment; assessing adversary capabilities and will; identifying the adversary's COGs; and discerning the adversary's probable intent.

—Joint Publication 2-0

A. Focus:

This lecture will focus on operational intelligence support to planning. A brief description of intelligence definitions, roles and responsibilities, and tasks will set the foundation for follow-on discussion. Support across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) and from the strategic-to-tactical levels will be briefly highlighted; however, emphasis will focus on the theater-strategic and operational levels of war. The lecture will cover how the intelligence process is synchronized to support the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) and the Combatant Commander's campaign planning. Intelligence inputs and outputs (products and support) to the JOPP steps will be addressed (e.g., Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment [JIPOE], Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), Collection Management, Plan Red Cell participation, Intelligence Estimate, etc.). The requirement to adjust intelligence focus and prioritization across operational phases in support of the main effort will be highlighted. A brief review of how theater and Joint Task Force (JTF) intelligence organizations are formed to provide efficient and effective support will be presented, with active cross-functional participation in Joint Task Force boards, bureaus, cells, committees, and working groups highlighted, with a focus on the Joint Collection Management Board (JCMB). Finally, intelligence implications of multinational operations will be addressed (e.g., intelligence sharing and systems interoperability).

B. Objectives:

- Understand joint doctrinal terminology relating to intelligence.
- Understand and evaluate operational intelligence roles and responsibilities.
- Comprehend the Intelligence Process and associated Intelligence Operations.
- Analyze how the Intelligence Process is synchronized to support operational decision-making and JOPP.
- Examine how intelligence products and support affect the JOPP and understand when to stimulate the intelligence system if required support is lacking.
- Examine intelligence organization and operational-level integration.
- Recognize the importance—and challenges—of multinational intelligence operations.

C. Background:

The required readings provide a solid doctrinal background for intelligence support to operational decision-making and planning.

The points of contact for this session are CDR D. Mark Houff, USN, SE-118.

D. Questions:

How is the Intelligence Process synchronized to support operational decision-making and the JOPP?

What intelligence products support JOPP steps? When are they required?

What role does intelligence have in boards, bureaus, cells, committees, and working groups? What role does the J2, or J2 representatives, play?

What are the challenges associated with multinational intelligence operations?

E. Products:

A practical exercise focused on creation of PIRs, and a rudimentary ISR/collections matrix to address those PIRs, will be conducted/completed during the mission analysis phase of the JOPP scenario-based exercise later in the course.

F. Required Readings:

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Intelligence,* Joint Publication (JP) 2-0. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 22 June 2007. Read: Chapters I through III. (Posted on JMO Website).

_____. *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations,* Joint Publication (JP) 2-01. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 7 October 2004. Read: Chapter IV and scan Appendix D. (Posted on JMO Website).

_____. U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Task Force Headquarters,* Joint Publication (JP) 3-33. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 16 February 2007. Read: Chapter VI. (Posted on JMO Website).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Hooker, Gregory. *Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Role of Military Assessments*. Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005. **(NWC 2071).** (Issued)

Jones, Garrett. "Working with the CIA." *Parameters* (Winter 2001–02): 228–39.

LeSavage, Michael. "Operation Provide Comfort I." Naval War College, 2006, 2–18.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. (Available online at https://ca.dtic.mil/ doctrine/ default.htm)

JIPB. (Available online at https://ca.dtic.mil/doctrine/default.htm)

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO OPERATIONAL PLANNING

(Classified Lecture)

The most important roles of intelligence are assisting JFCs and their staffs in visualizing the operational environment; assessing adversary capabilities and will; identifying the adversary's COGs; and discerning the adversary's probable intent.

—Joint Publication 2-0

A. Focus:

This lecture will focus on operational intelligence support to planning. A brief description of intelligence definitions, roles and responsibilities, and tasks will set the foundation for follow-on discussion. Support across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) and from the strategic-to-tactical levels will be briefly highlighted; however, emphasis will focus on the theater-strategic and operational levels of war. The lecture will cover how the intelligence process is synchronized to support the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) and the Combatant Commander's campaign planning. Intelligence inputs and outputs (products and support) to the JOPP steps will be addressed (e.g., Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment [JIPOE], Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), Collection Management, Plan Red Cell participation, Intelligence Estimate, etc.). The requirement to adjust intelligence focus and prioritization across operational phases in support of the main effort will be highlighted. A brief review of how theater and Joint Task Force (JTF) intelligence organizations are formed to provide efficient and effective support will be presented, with active cross-functional participation in Joint Task Force boards, bureaus, cells, committees, and working groups highlighted, with a focus on the Joint Collection Management Board (JCMB). An overview of the intelligence disciplines (HUMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, etc.) and their supporting capabilities/sensors at the national through tactical levels will be provided, with an emphasis on synchronizing these capabilities to address operational commander PIRs and planning. The federated nature of the U. S. intelligence community will be discussed, highlighting national and regional intelligence organizations, which support operational commands. Finally, intelligence implications of multinational operations will be addressed (e.g., intelligence sharing and systems interoperability).

B. Objectives:

- Understand joint doctrinal terminology relating to intelligence.
- Understand and evaluate operational intelligence roles and responsibilities as they relate to national, theater, and component/tactical ISR organizations.
- Comprehend the Intelligence Process and associated Intelligence Operations.
- Analyze how the Intelligence Process is synchronized to support operational decision-making and JOPP.

- Examine how intelligence products and support impact JOPP steps; and know when to stimulate the intelligence system if required support is lacking.
- Examine intelligence organization and operational-level integration.
- Examine the capabilities, limitations, and challenges of employing multi-national, national, theater, and component/tactical ISR systems and organizations in different intelligence disciplines (HUMINT, SIGINT, etc.) from an operational-level perspective.

C. Background:

The required readings provide a solid doctrinal background for intelligence support to operational decision-making and planning.

The points of contact for this session are CDR D. Mark Houff, USN, SE-118.

D. Questions:

How is the Intelligence Process synchronized to support operational decision-making and the JOPP?

What intelligence products support JOPP steps? When are they required?

What role does intelligence have in boards, bureaus, cells, committees, and working groups? What role does the J2, or J2 representatives, play?

What are some of the capabilities and limitations of ISR capabilities available to the operational commander? How can they support the operational commander's requirements? What national intelligence resources/capabilities are available to the Joint Force Commanders in the Combatant Commander regions?

What are the relationships among national, theater, and component ISR organizations? How are they integrated to support the operational commander?

What are the challenges associated with multinational intelligence operations?

E. Products:

A practical exercise focused on creation of PIRs, and a rudimentary ISR/collections matrix to address those PIRs, will be conducted/completed during the mission analysis phase of the JOPP scenario-based exercise later in the course.

F. Required Readings:

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Intelligence,* Joint Publication (JP) 2-0. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 22 June 2007. Read: Chapters I through III. (Posted on JMO Website).

_____. *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations,* Joint Publication (JP) 2-01. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 7 October 2004. Read: Chapter IV and scan Appendix D. (Posted on JMO Website).

_____. *Joint Task Force Headquarters,* Joint Publication (JP) 3-33. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 16 February 2007. Read: Chapter VI. (Posted on JMO Website).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Hooker, Gregory. *Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Role of Military Assessments*. Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005. **(NWC 2071).** (Issued)

Jones, Garrett. "Working with the CIA." *Parameters* (Winter 2001–02): 228–39.

LeSavage, Michael. "Operation Provide Comfort I." Naval War College, 2006, 2–18.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. (Available online at https://ca.dtic.mil/doctrine/default.htm)

JIPB. (Available online at https://ca.dtic.mil/doctrine/default.htm)

INFORMATION OPERATIONS (Seminar)

The profoundest truth of war is that the issue of battle is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders, not the bodies of their men.

—Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, British Army

A. Focus:

This session focuses on Information Operations (IO) support to the Joint Force Commander (JFC) at the operational level of war. It addresses how IO can be integrated into national military and national security strategies and how IO capabilities can be used in solving military problems. The session develops an understanding of the Information Environment (IE) and how friendly and adversary decision makers gain and maintain information necessary to make decisions. The students should keep in mind that they will need to apply the IO capabilities learned in this session in an IO Practical Exercise within Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) and in the CAPSTONE Exercise.

B. Objectives:

- Identify the use of IO that support the NSS, NMS and interagency process and how they are used at the operational and strategic levels of war.
- Examine appropriate IO capabilities to be used to assist in achieving the desired strategic and operational effects across the range of military operations and plans.
- Examine the principles, capabilities, and limitations of IO across the range of military operations and plans—in all phases.

C. Background:

Information Operations are key to the successful execution of military operations in the twenty first century. One of the primary goals of IO is to achieve information superiority for the U. S. and its allies. Understanding the Information Environment (IE) and the physical, cognitive, and information dimensions that make up the IE are integral to successful IO. The Joint Pub 3-13, *Information Operations* definition of IO is, "The integrated employment of the core capabilities of EW, CNO, PSYOP, Military Deception and OPSEC, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making, while protecting our own." Consequently, IO touches upon and is influenced by many elements of the joint operation planning process. For any staff, integrating the core, supporting, and related IO capabilities into the overall plan can be especially challenging.

The purpose of this session is to explore the theoretical basis of IO, to comprehend IO capabilities and limitations, and to understand how and why IO is integrated into military planning at the operational and theater-strategic levels of war. The development of a specific IO concept and IO objectives to accomplish the Joint Force Commander's mission will also be explored. U. S./Coalition military operations in Iraq (OIF) provide an excellent case study to highlight the capabilities and limitations of our current IO

systems, concepts, and organizations. Readings from the Iraqi Perspectives project will be used to highlight the use of IO capabilities.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Dick Crowell, C-421.

D. Questions:

Can modern conflicts be won by use of kinetic capabilities alone? Why or why not?

Is information an element of national power? Why or why not?

What are some of the common perceptions/misperceptions regarding IO?

What are the US military objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan? How can IO capabilities be used to achieve those objectives?

What are some of the benefits of effective IO?

In OIF, how were Information Operations employed by the coalition?

E. Products:

In the JOPP section of the course, all students will conduct an IO Practical Exercise (PE) and are required to present an in-seminar brief based upon the IO PE.

F. Required Readings:

Darley, William M. "Clausewitz's Theory of War and Information Operations." *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 40), 73–79. (**NWC 2064**), (Posted on JMO Website)

Joint Forces Staff College. *Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook* (Amended Version—Unclassified). Joint Command, Control & Information Operations School, 2005. (Posted on JMO Website). Scan

Post, Jerrold M. "Psychological Operations and Counterterrorism" *Joint Force Quarterly* 37, (2d[d] Quarter 2005): 105–110. (**NWC 2063**), (Posted on JMO Website)

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Information Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 13 February 2006. Read: Chapters 1, 2 and 4. (Posted on JMO Website).

Woods, Kevin M. *Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership.* Suffolk, VA: Joint Center for Operational Analysis. Untied States Joint Forces Command, 2006, Read: Chapter VI 123-130; Scan 131-150. (**NWC 2034**), (Posted on JMO Website).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Army War College. *IO Primer,* Jan 2008.

Caddell, Joseph W. *Deception 101—Primer on Deception.* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College, Dec 2004.

Chisholm, Donald. "The Risk of Optimism in the Conduct of War." *Parameters* 33, No. 4 (Winter 2003): 114–131.

Joint Information Operations Center. *IO Sphere: The Professional Journal of Information*

Operations (Spring 2005–Spring 2006).

Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook (Amended-UNCLAS). March 2005 (Joint Command Control & Information Operations School at the Joint Forces Staff College).

Jones, Jeffrey B. "Strategic Communication: A Mandate for the United States." *Joint Force Quarterly* 39, (4th Quarter 2005): 108–114.

Lamb, Christopher J. "Information Operations as a Core Competency." *Joint Force Quarterly* 36(Dec 2004): 88–96.

O'Connell, Ed, & Dr. Cheryl Benard. "A New IO Strategy: Prevention and Disengagement." *Strategic Insights* 5, 5.

Payne, Kenneth. "The Media as an Instrument of War." *Parameters* 35, No. 1 (Spring 2005): 81–93.

Peters, Ralph. "In Praise of Attrition." *Parameters* 34, No. 2 (Summer 2004): 24–32.

Putnam, Bill. "Information Wars: Are the Iraqis Getting the Message?" *Strategic Insights* 3, 12.

Steele, Robert D. *Information Operations: Putting the 'I' Back in DIME*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College, Feb 2006.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

Armistead, Leigh, ed. *Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power.* Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2004. Read: Chapter 4, 137–162. (Issued).

Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (IO). (Available at https://ca.dtic.mil/doctrine/default.htm).

OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL (Seminar)

As we consider the nature of warfare in the modern era, we find that it is synonymous with joint warfare.

—Joint Publication (JP) 1

The teams and staffs through which the modern commander absorbs information and exercises his authority must be a beautifully interlocked, smooth-working mechanism. Ideally, the whole should be practically a single mind.

—General Dwight D. Eisenhower

Give me allies as an enemy so that I can defeat them one by one.

—Napoleon Bonaparte

A. Focus:

This session examines and analyzes a Joint Force Commander's organizational options and considerations when establishing the command and control (C2) framework for a joint force, as well as the considerations (both tangible and intangible) of which the commander should remain mindful when extending a C2 structure to the multinational arena.

B. Objectives:

- Evaluate the range of considerations influencing the crafting of command and control frameworks for joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations.
- Synthesize the combatant commander and staff's roles in developing command and control structures to support achievement of theater objectives.
- Explain the strengths and limitations of a joint multinational command and control architecture.
- Explain the increased power available to commanders when supported by an effective joint, combined, interagency command and control structure that exploits the strengths of the team and mitigates potential weaknesses or vulnerabilities.

C. Background:

Combatant commanders face the possibility of executing missions across the full range of military operations. They must plan for major wars at the high end of the conflict spectrum as well as a variety of military operations at the lower end of the spectrum. Whatever the scope or intensity of any particular action, the joint force commander must consider how best to organize a force in order to achieve the following goals:

- Clarity of Objective
- Unity of Effort

- Centralized Direction
- Decentralized Execution

To address both the mission to be accomplished and the objective to be attained, a prudent commander will account for the six operational functions when structuring a force. This session focuses one of those functions, Command and Control (C2). Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, helps bring the seminar discussion on C2 into focus within the framework of joint doctrine. This reading reviews the authorized command relationships and authorities military commanders can use; provides doctrine, principles, and policy for the exercise of that authority; provides doctrine, principles, and policy for organizing joint forces; and prescribes policy for selected joint activities.

Once U.S. organizational considerations are understood, the more thorny issue of multinational warfare must be examined. A variety of key planning documents, including the U.S. National Security and National Military Strategies, highlight the U.S. preference for operating with alliance and coalition partners to achieve U.S. national objectives. In fact, key tenets of U.S. military strategy (e.g., forward presence and engagement) depend heavily upon other nations to realize success. Current joint doctrine for the conduct of multinational operations is contained in the readings from Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, *Multinational Operations*. This publication presents a variety of unique operational considerations for the military commander, not the least of which is the problematic issue of establishing unity of effort/command. Alliances, which offer more formal and enduring command relationships, provide a range of capabilities from which the commander may draw. Organizing an allied force, however, can still present significant headaches given potential diplomatic and political sensitivities, as witnessed during the Kosovo crisis for example. Coalitions, which are normally formed in an *ad hoc* manner, often represent a disparate group of nation-states responding to a common specific threat at a particular time, thus posing even more demanding challenges to the commander than the more stable alliance. Designing a workable command relationship for coalition forces during Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and OIF/OEF are recent examples of such challenges. Maintaining the integrity of a coalition may become a critical factor/objective in the successful execution of a combined operation. Consequently, any planning must cater to an astute adversary who, recognizing the strategic importance of coalition cohesion, seeks to exploit any perceived weaknesses.

The *Command and Control Vignette* (NWC 2053) offers the seminar an opportunity to examine the various pitfalls encountered when constructing a C2 structure for joint and/or multinational organization.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Pat Sweeney, C-424.

D. Questions:

It has been said that Operational Command and Control is one of the most unforgiving operational functions if you don't get it right at the beginning. Why?

What is the relationship of operational area organizational measures to command and control?

How can the Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters improve future Joint Task Forces? What are the challenges faced by the concept?

The joint force commander faces a number of C2 challenges in a multinational organization: cultural, tactics, intelligence sharing, equipment/communications compatibility, objectives, ROE, logistics, to name a few. How can these be mitigated?

E. Products:

Using the *Command and Control Vignette* (NWC 2053), students will be required to critique the proposed command and control structure. The students will present a briefing that highlights any weaknesses or potential pitfalls in the offered command and control structure.

F. Required Readings:

"Standing Joint Force Headquarters-Core Element." *CHIPS*, Jan-Mar 2007. (**NWC 2052**). (Posted on JMO Website)

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. *Command and Control Vignette*, March 2008. (**NWC 2053**), (Posted on the JMO Website and Issued).

_____, Joint Military Operations Department. *Forces/Capabilities Handbook*, "Operational Command and Control:" 141-150**. NWC 3153J** (Issued and Posted on the JMO Website).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,* Joint Publication (JP) 1, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 14 May 2007. Read IV-1 – IV-19; V-1 – V-11; V-17 – V-20. (Posted on JMO Website).

_____. *Multinational Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 7 March 2007, Read: I-1 – I-7; II-3 – II-12; Review: III-1 – III-43. (Posted on JMO Website).

G. Supplementary Reading:

Rice, Anthony J. "Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare." *Parameters* (Spring 1997): 152–67.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

https://ca.dtic.mil/doctrine/interactive/courses/mno/course.htm "Multinational Operations."

CONFLICT TERMINATION (Seminar)

[l]et them once surrender… and reach their homes, they won't take up arms again. Let them go, officers and all. I want submission and no more bloodshed. Let them have their horses to plow with, and, if you like, their guns to shoot crows with. I want no one punished; treat them liberally all round. We want those people to return to their allegiance to the Union and submit to the laws. Again, I say, give them the most liberal and honorable terms.

—President Abraham Lincoln,
Instructions to Generals Grant and Sherman, March 1865

We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

—Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender
(The Potsdam Proclamation), 26 July 1945

A. Focus:

This session addresses the challenge of conflict termination. Planning for conflict termination represents one aspect of the broader push to align campaign phases with each other and with the strategic objective and desired end state. Although few officers will ever be in a position to set the terms for war termination (addressed in Strategy and Policy), history shows that the specific timing and the conditions established during planning at the operational level for the termination of conflict profoundly affects achievement of the desired end state. Consequently, it is important to understand the complexity of conflict termination, appreciate the meaning of terminating conflict with leverage, and its effect on transition to post-conflict operations and all subsequent activities. This session provides the foundation for the Stability Operations session.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the concept of conflict termination and its place in a campaign.
- Summarize the differences between war termination and conflict termination.
- Comprehend how a desired end state outlined at the beginning of conflict changes during that conflict, but aids the military commander in ending hostilities on terms acceptable to the political leadership.
- Comprehend the decision making processes surrounding conflict termination.

C. Background:

History has amply demonstrated the complexity of conflict termination and the importance of effective transition from major combat operations to post-conflict operations. History has also shown various ways to terminate hostilities effectively, transitioning with

relative smoothness toward the desired end state. Joint doctrine increasingly addresses this critical seam, yet the key to success may reside outside the military's control.

Although a clearly defined desired end state provided by civilian leadership is strongly desired by senior military commanders; this has most often been an ideal rather than the reality. In the case of lengthy conflicts, the civilian leaders in place at the end are often not those who were in place at the beginning (Civil War, World War II, Korean War, Vietnam War, etc.), producing changes in desired end states. Even when civilian leadership remains constant or continuity of desired end state is otherwise secured, as conflicts near their end, military imperatives become increasingly likely to clash with what civilian leaders may view as actions consonant with national interests. Moreover, boundaries between the proper spheres for senior military and civilian leaders tend to blur, not infrequently leading to conflict between the two sets of actors. Occasionally, warm contentions may also develop among operational commanders as to when and how the conflict should end.

It is not unknown for planning assumptions made during the conflict anticipating how that conflict will end to prove substantially inaccurate in the event. Nonetheless, the operational commander must plan for conflict termination, in order set in motion the right actions prior to, including such aspects as physical location of forces, mix of forces in the area of operations, coordination with other federal agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations, along with movement of necessary logistics, and the like.

At the same time, coalition warfare presents particular challenges for conflict termination—the common interests that bind partners together at the beginning of conflicts often unravel as those conflicts near their conclusion. Differences among coalition partners become increasingly obvious and important, and indeed are intentionally exploited by the nearly defeated enemy.

Just as Clausewitz famously observed that it is essential to understand the nature of the conflict in which one is about to embroiled, so must we also understand a conflict's nature in order to terminate it to our advantage. Conventional wars fought between states are most likely to have clearly defined terminations; irregular wars fought by states, civil wars, and insurgencies/counter-insurgencies are much less likely to terminate in definite terms. The joint commander must therefore be prepared to terminate conflict in that manner adapted to the type of conflict. Even then, in some cases, such as insurgency, that the conflict actually ended may only ever be known well after the fact.

During this session, students examine historical operations in order to understand the issues of conflict termination. At the end of this session, students should be able to translate national strategic guidance (from the president and the secretary of defense) into a plan to terminate combat and transition to post-conflict operations.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. Chisholm, C-422.

D. Questions:

Does conflict termination equate to conflict resolution? Why or why not?

Who determines the terms and conditions for conflict termination? What role does the enemy play in conflict termination?

What is the relationship between the president, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, and the combatant commander during conflict termination?

How does the joint task force commander translate the political objectives of a conflict into military conditions to be achieved as a product of a campaign?

In the event, how does the joint task force commander know when to terminate conflict?

How does conflict termination play out in a large area or theater of operations in which fighting in some places may stop sooner than in others?

How may accepting surrender and granting PW status to enemy forces contribute to conflict termination?

How does conflict termination play out in irregular warfare? In civil war? In counterinsurgency? How does this differ from conflict termination in conventional state on state warfare?

E. Products:

Student presentations of analyses of conflict termination case studies.

F. Required Readings:

Flavin, William. "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success." *Parameters* (Autumn 2003): 95–111. (**NWC 3140**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Fondaw, Jeffrey E. "Conflict Termination—Considerations for the Operational Commander." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 16 May 2001. (**NWC 4017**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Case Studies: (Posted on the JMO Website).

Germany

McCreedy, Kenneth O. "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany." Journal of Military History 65(July 2001): 713-740. (**NWC 3037**).

Pogue, Forrest C. "The German Surrender." Chapter XXV, pp. 475–494 in *The European Theater of Operations: The Supreme Command.* Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954. (**NWC 3138**).

Japan

Spector, Ronald H. "After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan's Empire, 1945-1947." *Journal of Military History* 69 (October 2005): 1121-1136. (**NWC 3048**).

"Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender" (The Potsdam Proclamation). 26 July 1945. (**NWC 3056**).

"Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan." 26 June 1947. (**NWC 3049**).

Extracts from *Reports of General MacArthur; MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase*. General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1966. (**NWC 3051**).

American Civil War

Waghelstein, John D. and Donald Chisholm. "The Road Not Taken: Conflict Termination and Guerrillaism in the American Civil War." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006. (**NWC 3139**).

Insurgency

Waghelstein, John D., and Donald Chisholm. "Are We Done Yet? Conflict Termination in Insurgency." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2008. (**NWC 3009**).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Bailey, Sydney Dawson. *How Wars End: The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict 1946–1964*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Berdal, Mats R. *Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the Termination of Armed Conflicts.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Boulé, John R. "Operational Planning and Conflict Termination" *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 2001–2002): 97–102.

Cimbala, Stephen J. *Through a Glass Darkly: Looking at Conflict Prevention, Management, and Termination.* Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001.

Cimbala, Stephen J., and Sidney R. Waldman, ed. *Controlling and Ending Conflict: Issues Before and After the Cold War*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1992.

Clarke, Bruce B. G. "End-State Planning: The Somalia Case." In *Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success.* Edited by Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olson. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.

Cordesman, Anthony. "Iraq and Conflict Termination: The Road to Guerrilla War?" Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 July 2003.

Gray, Colin S. "Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory." Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2002.

Holbrooke, Richard. *To End a War.* New York: Random House, 1998.

Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. 10 September 2001. Chs. I and IV.

Joint Publication 5-00.1, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*.

Joint Publication 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.*

Kahn, Herman, et al. *War Termination Issues and Concepts; Final Report*. New York: Hudson Institute, 1968.

Rast, Vicki. *Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia*. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004.

Reed, James W. "Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning." *Parameters* (Summer 1993): 41–52.

Rotermund, Manfred K. "The Fog of Peace: Finding the End-State of Hostilities." Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army Institute for Strategic Studies, November 1999.

Salem, Paul. *Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays.* Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1997.

Sorfleet, K. R. "Conflict Termination: Implications for Military Officers." *Defense Studies* 1 (Spring 2001): 49.

Soucey, Robert R., Kevin A. Shwedo, and John S. Haven II. "War Termination and Joint Planning." *Joint Force Quarterly* (Summer 1995): 95–101.

Wittmann, Christopher. "War Termination Theory in Operations Other Than War: U. S. Disengagement from Somalia, l993." Quantico, VA: USMC Command and Staff College, 18 April l995.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

STABILITY OPERATIONS (Seminar)

Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation. Your aim is not oppression but to occupy Germany for the purpose of realizing certain important Allied objectives.... The principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world.

— JCS 1067, Directive to the Commander in Chief of the U. S. Forces of Occupation, April 1945

The greatest difficulty is that most of the requisite skills of civil affairs are not those which the soldier acquires in his ordinary training and experience. They are political, economic, and technical skills-the skills of civilian more than of military life. Moreover, even though the civil affairs officer does not make basic policy, these skills are not, in practice, merely executory. Because policy directives are often not entirely clear or leave considerable discretion, because there are many unforeseen exigencies which they do not cover, and because officials issuing the directives generally feel dependent upon the recommendations and information of people on the spot, civil affairs requires more than mere ability to follow orders. It demands, at least at higher levels, an understanding and sensitivity with regard to political and economic interests and the ability to sense what policy makers would wish done about such interests under particular circumstances. In sum, when the soldier becomes governor he must transcend the limits of his knowledge, experience, and even values as a soldier; he must become, as best he can, something of a statesman.

— Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, 1962.

A. Focus:

This session addresses the fundamental characteristics and challenges for the operational commander of those operations that follow active conflict and which have been variously labeled as belligerent occupation, post-conflict operations, and most recently as Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. Regardless of the label, such operations must be effectively planned before and during the conduct of hostilities and executed in their wake in order for strategic objectives to be achieved and the desired end state reached. The specific content of those operations will vary according to the nature of the conflict, the characteristics of the foe, and the associated strategic objectives and desired end state. This session rests on the foundation established in Conflict Termination.

B. Objectives:

- Value the challenges for the operational commander and planners concerning those operations that follow active conflict.
- Recognize the historical linkage between belligerent occupation and SSTR.

- Understand the nature of the peculiar problem structures associated with SSTR.
- Devise concepts for the inclusion of non-standard actors in SSTR Operations including, but not limited to NGO/IGO, coalition partners, and the media.

C. Background:

U.S. armed forces have engaged in some form of security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations (now SSTR; formerly under a variety of names) in other lands for many years. The causes of instability and the strategic objectives these operations were conducted in order to achieve have varied widely. The paths to U.S. involvement in such operations were also many and varied—perhaps in consequence of a conventional state-on-state war, an insurgency, a civil war, or other forms of state failure such as a coup d'état. All shared in common some significant effect on U.S. national interest that provided the animus for U.S. involvement.

One circumstance that involves SSTR operations, belligerent occupation, often (but not always) follows the termination of conflict between states. Indeed, the U. S. military has planned and executed occupation episodically, beginning with Mexico (1846), the South in the aftermath of the American Civil War, Cuba following the Spanish-American War, in Europe after World War I, in Europe and Asia following World War II, and most recently, in Iraq. However, because such operations vary so widely in character and because they are only infrequently executed, the practical challenges associated with them and those solutions to them which have proven effective tend to slip from the military's collective memory when those officers and men who conducted them depart. In consequence, each generation of officers and men typically has to learn anew the same lessons as earlier generations.

At the same time, as we saw in The Range of Military Operations (ROMO), the American way of war historically has emphasized the planning and conduct of major conventional operations against other states. Those endeavors which now fall under the rubric of SSTR were relegated, along with such activities as counterinsurgency, to the rump category of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) or Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and not deemed by many in the military as worthy of close attention.

The Cold War exacerbated this problem. The U. S. military saw a major conventional (and nuclear) conflict with the Soviet Union as its greatest threat, and prepared for that ultimate conventional war. During this period the American military substantially reduced its attention to post-war activities such as belligerent occupation. The Army's assumption was, apparently, that if it could conduct high intensity operations it could surely conduct those of lower intensity. In recent decades, peace operations in Haiti and the Balkans helped develop nation-building skills for some military personnel, but these endeavors remained at best a secondary mission for the military.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was embarked upon absent a deep and practical understanding of the peculiar challenges that attend belligerent occupation generally, and of the specific problems that would most likely arise. It was not until the November 2005 publication of DOD Policy 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," that stability operations were established as a core mission for the U. S. military.

Although there is as yet no U. S. joint doctrine for stability and reconstruction operations, this emerging concept does, however, have a joint operating concept (JOC) that outlines the lines of effort that are to guide planning and execution. Much of practical value can be learned about the general problems (while recognizing the peculiarities of specific instances) of belligerent occupation from examining historical cases. Thus, in this session students examine historical cases of belligerent occupation by the U. S. military. Note that any given belligerent occupation will be driven by a specific set of objectives, in some respects unique to that event. At the same time, it is important to recognize and account for those factors that differentiate today's operating environment from those describing earlier occupations.

The point of contact for this lesson is Professor D. Chisholm, C-422.

D. Questions:

What are the peculiar challenges associated with belligerent occupation?

What are stability operations? Under what conditions will the military be tasked with conducting them?

How is belligerent occupation related to stability operations?

How is security related to stability operations?

What role has the military historically played in reconstruction?

How can the military coordinate work with other U. S. Governmental agencies, United Nations agencies, and non-governmental organizations?

E. Products:

Student presentations of analyses of case studies.

F. Required Readings:

Chiarelli, Peter W., and Patrick R. Michaelis. "Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations." *Military Review* (July-August 2005): 4-17. (**NWC 6017**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Coles, Harry L., and Albert K. Weinberg. *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors.* Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1992 [originally published 1962]. pp. 3-7. (**NWC 3053**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

U. S. Department of Defense. "Military Support for Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," DOD 3000.05. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 28 November 2005. (**NWC 3145**), (Issued). Scan.

_____. Joint Operating Concept, December 2006, "Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations." Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006. Read: i-x, and 1-7. **(NWC 3015)**, (Issued).

The White House. "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," National Security Presidential Directive, NSPD-44. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 7 December 2006. (**NWC 3146**), (Issued). Scan.

Case Studies: (Posted on the JMO Web site and Issued).

Germany

McCreedy, Kenneth O. "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany." *Journal of Military History* 65 (July 2001): 713-740. (**NWC 3037**).

JCS 1067, "Directive to the Commander in Chief of the U. S. Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany in the Period Immediately Following the Cessation of Organized Resistance (Post Defeat)." April 1945. (**NWC 3043**).

Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin [Potsdam] Conference. 1 August 1945.

JCS 1779, 1947 Directive to the Commander in Chief of the U. S. Forces of Occupation. 15 July 1947. (**NWC 3044**).

Ziemke, Earl F. "The Formulation and Initial Implementation of U. S. Occupation Policy in Germany." pp. 27-44 in *U. S. Occupation in Europe after World War II; Papers and Reminiscences from the April 23-24 1976, Conference Held at the George C. Marshall Research Foundation, Lexington, Virginia.* Edited with an Introduction by Hans A. Schmitt. Lawrence, KS: Regents Press of Kansas, 1978. (**NWC 3045**).

Japan

Spector, Ronald H. "After Hiroshima: Allied Military Occupations and the Fate of Japan's Empire, 1945-1947." *Journal of Military History* 69(October 2005): 1121-1136. (**NWC 3048**).

"Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan." 26 June 1947. (**NWC 3049**).

Martin, Edward M. *The Allied Occupation of Japan*. New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948. Ch. 1, "The Formulation and Execution of Allied Occupation Policy," pp. 3-13. (**NWC 3050**).

Extracts from *Reports of General MacArthur. Macarthur In Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase, Volume I Supplement.* Prepared by MacArthur's General Staff. Tokyo: Headquarters, Far East Command, 1950. (**NWC 3051**).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace.* New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995.

_____. *An Agenda for Peace,* New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1992.

Burgess, Christopher Todd. "U. S. Army Doctrine and Belligerent Occupation." Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2004.

Chase, John L. "The Development of the Morgenthau Plan Through the Quebec Conference." *Journal of Politics* 16 (May 1954): 324-359.

Covey, Jock, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, eds. *The Quest for a Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation.* Washington, D.C.: U. S. Institute of Peace Press and the Association of the U. S. Army, 2005.

Crocker, Bethsheba, with John Ewers, and Craig Cohen. "Rethinking and Rebuilding the

Relationship between War and Policy." In Anthony D. McIvor, ed. *Rethinking the Principles of War.* Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005, 360–387.

Dobbins, James, Seth Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole DeGrasse. *Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007.

_____, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga Timilsina. *The United Nations Role in Nation Building: From the Congo to Iraq.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005.

_____, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, and Anga Timilsina. *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003.

Gareau, Frederick H. "Morgenthau's Plan for Industrial Disarmament in Germany." *Western Political Quarterly* 14 (June 1961): 517-534.

Gimbel, John. "On the Implementation of the Potsdam Agreement: An Essay on U. S. Postwar German Policy." *Political Science Quarterly* 87 (June 1972): 242-269.

Glazier, David. "Ignorance Is Not Bliss: The Law of Belligerent Occupation and the U. S. Invasion of Iraq." *Rutgers Law Review* 58, No. 1 (Fall 2005): 121-194.

Hoffman, Frank G. "Small Wars Revisited: The United States and Non-Traditional Wars." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28 (December 2005): 1–28.

Hubner, Bob. "Developing Joint Stability Operations Doctrine." *A Common Perspective: U. S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center Doctrine and Education Group's Newsletter* 12 (October 2004): 9-12.

Lear, Elmer. *The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, Leyte, 1941-1945.* Ithaca, NY: Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University 1961.

Lemkin, Raphael. *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress.* Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944.

Mattis, James N. LTG US Marine Corps, and Frank Hoffman "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars." *Proceeding*s 132 (November 2005): 18-19.

Mazower, Mark. *Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941-44.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993.

Orr, Robert C., ed. *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction.* Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004.

Petraeus, David H. U. S. Army. "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq." *Military Review* (January-February 2006): 2-12.

Starr, Joseph R. *Denazification, Occupation, and Control of Germany, March-July 1945.* Salisbury, NC: Documentary Publications, 1977 [originally written as a classified document in 1950].

State Department, United States. *Germany, 1947-1949, The Story in Documents.*

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950.

_____. *Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress*. Publication 2671, Far Eastern Series 17. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947.

United States Marine Corps. *Small Wars Manual*. With an Introduction by Ronald Schaffer. Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1996 [originally published 1940].

Wennberg, S. G. "Some Economic Problems of Allied Occupation Policy in Germany." *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 5 (1946): 425-447.

Ziemke, Earl F. The U. S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1975.

Zink, Harold. *American Military Government in Germany*. New York: MacMillan Co., 1947.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

INSURGENCY (Seminar)

In great campaigns the opponent's system is understood; he is guided by like precedents, and is governed by the same code; it is only when some great reformer of the art of war springs up that it is otherwise. But each small war presents new features, and these features must if possible be foreseen or the regular troops will assuredly find themselves in difficulties and meet with grievous misfortune.

—C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practic*e (1906)

A. Focus:

This is the first of three complementary sessions addressing insurgency and counterinsurgency. This session focuses on the fundamental characteristics of insurgencies generally, as well as important variations across individual insurgencies. It considers several cases representative of the larger universe of historical insurgencies. The intent is for students to develop the capacity to analyze the structure of any given insurgency in order to devise effective operational plans for countering that insurgency in furtherance of U. S. national objectives—addressed in the sessions subsequent: Counterinsurgency and Countering Global Insurgency.

B. Objective:

- Comprehend the fundamental structures and historical causes of insurgencies.
- Analyze how the elements of national power apply in an insurgency.
- Comprehend how CI doctrine and practice have operated in historical insurgencies and the soundness of projecting that experience into future insurgency situations.

C. Background:

The American military historically has preferred to conduct conventional large-scale operations against state foes similarly structured and disposed to itself, and episodically has done so, typically with great success. It has been much less enthusiastic about conflict at the lower end of the spectrum, although, ironically, such operations have occupied much more of its time and attention than their conventional counterparts.

Of the types of operations spanning the Range of Military Operations (ROMO), insurgency is likely to be among the most challenging, the most misunderstood, and the least likely to respond to the application of military force through conventional operations. We may safely assume that insurgencies will continue, although their specific forms and tactics may change (e.g., from highly developed and formalized Maoist or Stalinist models to less formally organized and centrally-directed insurgencies). They may also increasingly take place in urban environments rather than the rural areas where they historically have flourished. Military officers and members of relevant civilian agencies must comprehend how to operate in an uncertain and ambiguous environment against foes that will likely play by very different rules than to which they are accustomed in conventional operations.

All insurgencies share certain fundamental characteristics; at the same time *every insurgency has unique properties* that matter. Successfully countering insurgency must begin with an effective practical analysis of the insurgency itself—counterinsurgency campaigns cannot be designed in a vacuum. Historical, cultural, political, and economic factors must be considered, not simply as add-ons to military factors, but as integral to meaningful analysis.

Some concepts of operational art have direct applicability to analyzing and understanding insurgency; others require careful adaptation. Similarly, the Joint Operational Planning process (JOPP) was developed as a planning tool for conventional operations and needs careful qualification for use in the assessment of insurgencies.

If the analysis is poorly done, the operational plans that follow will have a very small probability of success. As Albert Einstein famously commented: "Nature is very kind: if you ask it the right questions, it will give you the right answers." This session focuses on asking the right questions about insurgency. Students will use a framework of such questions (provided) to analyze specific cases of insurgency, some of which were successful, some which failed, and some of which are ongoing, and whose ultimate outcome is yet unknown.

The point of contact for this lesson is Professor D. Chisholm, C-422.

D. Questions:

In what kinds of situations is the U. S. likely to encounter the problem of insurgency? Do the differences across these situations dictate different responses?

How does the present global al-Qaeda threat differ from earlier insurgencies? What difference does this make for how the U. S. and its allies should respond?

If insurgency historically has been the resort of the "weak," why do the "strong" find it so challenging to defeat insurgencies?

What are the primary factors that must be present for an insurgency to succeed? Are these factors open to attack? Why?

Can the nascent conditions for insurgency be identified and acted upon early enough in order to preclude the insurgency from starting? How?

E. Products

Students will analyze cases of insurgency and present their finding in seminar.

F. Required Readings:

Fall, Bernard B. "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency." *Naval War College Review* (Winter 1998): 46–57. (**NWC 3097**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Metz, Steven, and Raymond Millen. "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response." Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2004. (**NWC 3098**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

U. S. Department of the Army. *Counterinsurgency*. FM 3-24/USMC 3-33.5. Washington

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 15 Dec 2006. Read: Ch. 1. (Posted on the JMO Website).

Waghelstein, John, and Donald Chisholm. "Analyzing Insurgency." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006. (**NWC 3099**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Waghelstein, John. "Insurgency." Lecture. Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 2006. (**NWC 3100**), (CD-ROM), (Issued).

Case Studies: (Posted on the JMO Website)

Calder, Bruce J. "Caudillos and Gavilleros versus the United States Marines: Guerrilla Insurgency during the Dominican Intervention, 1916–1924." *Hispanic Historical Review* 59 (1978): 649–678. (**NWC 3129**).

Lyon, David L. "An Analysis of the RENAMO Insurgency in Mozambique." Washington, D.C.: National War College, February 1987. **(NWC 3131).**

McCormick, Gordon H. *Sharp Dressed Men: Peru's Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993. (**NWC 3132**).

Marks, Thomas A. "Insurgency in Nepal." Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2003. (**NWC 3133**).

Marks, Thomas A. "Maoist Miscue I: The Demise of the Communist Party of Thailand, 1965–1983." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006. (**NWC 3134**).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How the Weak Win Wars." *International Security* 26 (Summer 2001): 93–128.

Callwell, C. E. *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice.* 3d ed. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996 [Originally published 1892].

Chaliand, Gerard. *Guerrilla Strategies: A Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982.

Conable, Ben. "Marines Are from Mars, Iraqis Are from Venus." 1st Marine Division, G-2 Section, 30 May 2004.

Cordesman, Anthony H. "New Patterns in the Iraqi Insurgency: The War for a Civil War in Iraq." Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies Working Draft, Revised: 23 September 2005.

Director of Central Intelligence. "Analyzing Insurgency: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Goals, Capabilities, and Prospects." Langley, VA: DCI Environmental and Societal Issues Center, 27 November 2000.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97 (February 2003): 75–90.

Grivas, George. *Guerrilla Warfare.* Athens: Longmans, 1964.

Guevara, Che. *Reminiscences of a Cuban Revolutionary War.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968.

Gurr, Ted Robert. *Why Men Rebel.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970.

Johnson, Chalmers. "Civilian Loyalties and Guerilla Conflict." *World Politics* 14 (July 1962): 46–66.

Karl, Terry L. "El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution." *Foreign Affairs* 71 (Spring 1992): 147–164.

Kilcullen, David. "Countering Global Insurgency." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28 (August 2005): 597–617.

Larteguy, Jean. *The Guerillas*. Translated by Stanley Hoffman. New York: World Publishing Company, 1970.

Lawrence, T. E. *Seven Pillars of Wisdom.* London: Penguin Modern Classics, 1987.

Leighton, Richard M., and Ralph Sanders, ed. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: An Anthology*. Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1962.

Marighella, Carlos. *Manual of the Urban Guerrilla*. Chapel Hill, NC: Documentary Publications, 1985.

McCormick, Gordon H. *From the Sierra to the Cities: The Urban Campaign of the Shining Path,* Publication R-4150-USDP. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1992.

Manwaring, Max G. *Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency.* Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2005.

_____. "Non-State Actors in Columbia: Threats to the State and to the Hemisphere." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 13 (2002): 68–80.

Marks, Thomas A. "Insurgency in a Time of Terror." *Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International* 11 (2005): 46–53.

O'Neill, Bard. *Insurgency and Terrorism*. London: Brassey's, 2005.

Sullivan, John P., and Robert J. Bunker. "Drug Cartels, Street Gangs, and Warlords." in *Non-State Threats and Future Wars.* Edited by Robert J. Bunker. London: Frank Cass, 2002.

Taber, Robert. *The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Practice*. New York: Lyle Stuart, 1965.

Taw, Jennifer M., and Bruce Hoffman. *The Urbanization of Insurgency: The Potential Challenge to U. S. Army Operations.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994.

Tse-Tung, Mao. *On Guerilla Warfare*. 2d ed. Edited by Samuel B. Griffiths. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000.

United States Marine Corps. *Small Wars Manual*. With an Introduction by Ronald Schaffer. Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1996 [Originally Published 1940].

White, Jeffrey B. "Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare." *Studies in Intelligence* 5 (1996): 51–57.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:
None.

COUNTERINSURGENCY (Seminar)

There are no easy shortcuts to solving the problems of revolutionary war.

— Bernard Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency" (1965)

. . . my first hours in the Philippines in 1950 were spent with most of the top officials in a country that had been independent for just four years and with the top local officials of the country that had given this newly independent nation its tutelage in self-rule. All were full of news about the threat the Communist Huk posed the infant nation. Yet, curiously enough, Philippine and American officials barely mentioned the political and social factors in briefing me. They dwelt almost exclusively on the military situation. It was as though military affairs were the sole tangible factor they could grasp, like shopkeepers worried about going bankrupt and counting the goods on shelves instead of pondering ways to get the customers coming in again.

— Edward G. Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars* (1972).

A. Focus:

This session directly complements the immediately preceding lesson, Insurgency and provides a foundation for the ensuing session, Countering Global Insurgency. Where the previous session focused on the analysis of insurgency, this session addresses the problem of designing effective counterinsurgency campaigns. In so doing, it considers several case studies of counterinsurgency as representative of the larger universe of counterinsurgency efforts. The objective is for students to develop the capacity to analyze the characteristics of effective counterinsurgency campaigns in order to be better prepared to plan similar such efforts in the future.

B. Objective:

- Discuss the capabilities and limitations of U. S. military forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations against the capabilities of twenty first century adversaries.
- Explain how the U. S. military is organized to plan, train, execute, and sustain for counterinsurgency operations.
- Analyze current joint counterinsurgency doctrine.
- Apply solutions to counterinsurgencies using current joint doctrine.
- Analyze a plan for employment of joint forces in a counterinsurgency.

C. Background:

As noted in the Insurgency session, while regularly called upon to conduct counterinsurgency campaigns, the U. S. military has shown no great enthusiasm for them, treating them as aberrations and distractions from its real business of conducting large-scale conventional operations and campaigns. However, following the collapse of the

Soviet Union and the consequent absence of a peer military competitor, along with the continued churn in failing and failed states, and burgeoning extremist movements in many parts of the world, U. S. forces are more likely to conduct counterinsurgency efforts than conventional operations for the foreseeable future.

In certain respects, counterinsurgency campaigns are significantly more complex than conventional campaigns. They inevitably involve greater uncertainty and ambiguity; often their time frame is *very* long—and it is very hard to know when you are done; typically the military is cast in a supporting role to U. S. civilian agencies and the host government (where one exists); and technological fixes are less applicable than in conventional operations and campaigns. Finding meaningful measures of effectiveness is especially challenging when compared with conventional operations. Because of the long time frame, the foe will likely have the opportunity to adapt at both tactical and operational levels to U. S. efforts. Information operations are also likely to become more important in counterinsurgency campaigns.

The character of effective counterinsurgency campaigns varies according to their time and place and the foes against which they are conducted; that is, the character of the insurgency strongly affects the character of the counterinsurgency efforts. However, just as there are certain fundamental characteristics common to all insurgencies, certain basic characteristics describe effective counterinsurgency operations.

Students will use a framework of questions (provided) to analyze specific cases of counterinsurgency operations, some of which were successful, some which failed, and some of which are ongoing, and whose outcome is yet unknown. A competent, historically based understanding of the basic characteristics of effective counterinsurgency operations will provide a foundation for designing future such operations when called to do so.

The point of contact for this lesson is Professor D. Chisholm, C-422.

D. Questions:

Can we determine those characteristics common to effective counterinsurgency campaigns? If so, what are they?

Should we think about operational factors differently in counterinsurgency than in conventional combat operations and campaigns? If so, how?

To what extent should the specifics of time and place drive counterinsurgency campaigns?

Why does the U. S. military find it difficult to prepare for counterinsurgency campaigns?

How well adapted is the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) for analyzing insurgencies and devising counterinsurgency campaigns?

E. Products:

Students will analyze selected case studies dealing with counterinsurgency operations, and report their finding to the seminar.

F. Required Readings:

Cohen, Elliot, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath, and John Nagl. "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency." *Military Revie*w (March–April 2006): 49–53. (**NWC 6026**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Sepp, Kalev I. "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency." *Military Review* (May–June 2005): 8–12. (**NWC 3119**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

U. S. Department of the Army. *Counterinsurgency*. FM 3-24 Washington D.C.: CJCS, 15 Dec 2006. Re-read: Chapter 1. (Posted on the JMO Website).

U. S. Marine Corps. *Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats: An Updated Approach to Counterinsurgency Operations*. Quantico, VA.: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 7 June 2006. Read pp. 3-36. (**NWC 6020**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Case Studies: (Posted on the JMO Website).

Cassidy, Robert. "Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict." Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2003. (**NWC 3135**).

Greenberg, Lawrence M. *The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946–1955*. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1987. (**NWC 3102**).

Hoffman, Bruce, Jennifer Taw, and David Arnold. *Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience.* Publication R-3998-A. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991. (**NWC 3103**).

Komer, Robert W. *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort.* Publication R-957-A. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1972. (**NWC 3104**).

Lee, Chong-Sik. *Counterinsurgency in Manchuria: The Japanese Experience 1931–1940.* Memorandum RM-5012-ARPA. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1967. (**NWC 3105**).

Marks, Thomas A. "Sustainability of Columbian Military/Strategic Support for 'Democratic Security.'" Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2004. (**NWC 3106**).

Marks, Thomas A. "India: State Response to Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir—The Jammu Case." *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* 12 (Autumn 2004): 122–143. (**NWC 3107**).

Waghelstein, John D. "Military to Military Contacts: Personal Observations, The El Salvador Case." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2005. (**NWC 3038**).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Akehurst, John. *We Won a War: The Campaign in Oman 1965–75*. London: Michael Russell, 1982.

Beckett, Ian F. W. *Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: Guerillas and Their Opponents Since 1750*. London: Routledge, 2001.

Blaufarb, Douglas S. *The Counter-Insurgency Era: U. S. Doctrine and Performance 1950 to the Present.* New York: Free Press, 1977.

Birtle, Andrew J. *U. S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860–1941*. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Army Center of Military History, 1988.

Boot, Max. *Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*. New York: Basic, 2003.

_____ "A Century of Small Wars Shows They Can Be Won." *New York Times Week in Review*, 6 July 2003.

Bulloch, Gavin. "Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: A British Perspective." *Parameters* 26 (Summer 1996): 4–16.

Bundt, Thomas S. "An Unconventional War: The Philippine Insurrection, 1899." *Military Review* (May/June 2004): 9–10.

Callwell, C. E. *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice.* 3d ed. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996 [Originally published 1892].

Cassidy, Robert M. "Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly." *Military Review* (September–October 2002): 41–53.

_____ *Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya: Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict.* Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003.

_____ "Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars." *Parameters* 34 (Summer 2004): 73–83.

_____ "The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture." *Military Review* (May–June 2005): 53–59.

Celeski, Joseph D. *Operationalizing COIN*, JSOU Report 05-2. Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2005.

Conetta, Carl. "Strange Victory: A Critical Appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan War." Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute, Project on Defense Alternatives, 2002.

Cordesman, Anthony H. "Zarqawi's Death: Temporary 'Victory' or Lasting Impact." Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 June 2006.

_____. "The Quarterly Report on 'Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq:' Fact, Fallacy, and an Overall Grade of 'F.'" Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5 June 2006.

_____. "The 'Post Conflict' Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan." Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 19 May 2004.

_____. "The Iraq War and Its Strategic Lessons for Counterinsurgency." Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 December 2005.

_____. "Iraq and Conflict Termination: The Road to Guerrilla War?" Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 July 2003 (Revised).

_____, with the assistance of Eric M. Brewer and Sara Bjerg Moller. "Iraq's Evolving Insurgency: Risk of Civil War." Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 April 2006.

Deady, Timothy K. "Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899–1902." *Parameters* 35 (Spring 2005): 53–68.

Evans, Ernest. "El Salvador Lessons for Future U. S. Interventions." *World Affairs* (Summer 1997): 43–48.

Fall, Bernard B. *Street Without Joy*. Revised Edition. London: Stackpole, 1994.

Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. With a foreword by Robert R. Bowie. New York: Praeger, 1964.

Gott, Kendall D. "In Search of an Elusive Enemy: The Victorio Campaign." Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 5. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004.

Hoffman, Bruce. "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq." OP-127-IPC/CME. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, June 2004.

Hoffman, Bruce, and Jennifer Taw. "A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency." N-3506-DOS. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1992.

Hoffman, Frank G. "Principles for the Savage Wars of Peace." pp. 299-322 in Anthony D. McIvor, ed. *Rethinking the Principles of War*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005.

Kitson, Frank. *Bunches of Five.* London: Farber & Farber, 1977.

_____. *Low Intensity Operation: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping.* Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1971.

Kramer, Mark. "The Perils of Counterinsurgency: Russia's War in Chechnya." *International Security* 29 (Winter 2004/2005): 5–63.

Krepinevich, Andrew F. "The Thin Green Line." Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 14 August 2004.

_____. "Iraq & Vietnam: Déjà Vu All Over Again?" Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 8 July 2004.

Linn, Brian M. *The U. S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902.* Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.

Lansdale, Edward. *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia.* New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

Larteguy, Jean. *The Centurions.* New York: Avon Books, 1961.

Linn, Brian M. "Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900–1901: The First District Department of Northern Luzon." *Military Affairs* 51 (1987): 62–66.

Melnik, Constantine. *The French Campaign against the FLN.* Memorandum RM-5449-ISA. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1967.

Metz, Steven. "Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability." Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 28 February 1995.

_____. "A Flame Kept Burning: Counterinsurgency Support After the Cold War." *Parameters* 25 (Autumn 1995): 31–41.

Nagl, John A. *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife.* Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.

Nawroz, Mohammad Yahya, and Lester W. Grau. "The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of Future War?" Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S Army Foreign Military Studies Office, 1996.

Paget, Julian. *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning.* London: Farber and Farber, 1967.

Record, Jeffrey, and W. Andrew Terrill. "Iraq and Vietnam: Differences, Similarities, and Insights." Carlisle, PA: U. S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2004.

Sarkesian, Sam C. *America's Forgotten Wars: The Counterrevolutionary Past and Lessons for the Future.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984.

Siegrist, Jeremy T. *Apache Wars: A Constabulary Perspective.* Fort Leavenworth, KS: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2005.

Tomes, Robert. "Schlock and Blah: Counter-insurgency Realities in a Rapid Dominance Era." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 16 (2005): 37–56.

_____. "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare." *Parameters* 34 (Spring 2004): 16–28.

Trinquier, Roger. *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency.* New York: Praeger, 1964.

"US Counterinsurgency in the Information Age." *Jane's Intelligence Review* (December 2005): 6–11.

U. S. Department of the Army. *Winning The West: The Army In The Indian Wars, 1865–1890*, Chapter 14. Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1998.

_____. *Counterinsurgency Operations.* FM 3-07.22. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2004.

United States Marine Corps. *Small Wars Manual*. With an Introduction by Ronald Schaffer. Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1996 [Originally Published 1940].

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Foreign Internal Defense*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.1. Washington, DC: CJCS, 30 April 2004.

_____. *Joint Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 13 February 2008 with change 1.

Vick, Alan J., Adam Grissom, William Rosenau, Beth Gill, and Karl P. Mueller. *Air*

Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

COUNTERING GLOBAL INSURGENCY (Lecture and Seminar)

... long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort . . . .

—9/11 Commission Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton, 22 July 2004

A. Focus:

This session addresses what has been officially known as the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) and more recently has come to be known as "The Long War." However, the problem is more usefully considered as a global insurgency, with practical implications for how best to combat this world-wide threat against the United States and its allies. This session examines the problem, with special attention to the application of a range of instruments of national power. It proceeds from the foundation established by the Complex Irregular Warfare, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency sessions.

B. Objective:

- Identify the key characteristics of terrorist activities and how they have changed over the past two decades.
- Explain how the various components of the U. S. government define and apply the terms of the struggle, especially combating terrorist groups, anti-terrorism, counterterrorism, and consequence management.
- Appraise the relationships among all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and the importance of interagency and multinational coordination in these elements, including homeland security and defense, in combating terrorism.
- Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U. S. military forces in combating terrorism.
- Analyze the planning implications of structuring the problem of Jihadist terrorism as a global insurgency.

C. Background:

Recent years have seen a trend from state-sponsored terrorist organizations to loose networks of international terrorists operating without state sponsorship (although sometimes with the tacit compliance of states). Extremists claiming legitimacy based on their versions of religious teachings have demonstrated their ability to mount relatively sophisticated asymmetric attacks against the United States and its allies. The long-term goal of the most prominent of these groups, al-Qaeda, is the overthrow of several regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere, and the creation of states based on its version of *sharia*, or Islamic law. Al-Qaeda sees U. S. power and influence as the main obstacles to

achieving this goal. The group has considered many means to achieve its ends, to include weapons of mass destruction (WMD/E), which lends a distinct sense of urgency to the issue.

Although the State Department retains overall responsibility for combating terrorism (CT) outside the United States, U. S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has the lead for planning and executing the DOD component of the Long War. However, since 11 September 2001, all combatant commanders, both geographic and functional, have also found themselves directly involved in CT in one way or another. Further complicating the situation, if the president authorizes a covert action program to combat terrorism in a particular area, and later calls on the military to become involved, the military might find the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) already on the ground with significant programs and local relationships that will have to be factored into any operation plan. At the same time, DOD Anti-Terrorist (AT) activities are integrated within geographic combatant commands and the military services to address terrorist threats to military installations, bases, facilities, equipment, and personnel.

Some have argued that al-Qaeda has proven itself adept at finding ways to provoke U. S. responses that are likely to alienate international public opinion. The challenge for the operational commander and his interagency partners is to figure out how to defeat this adversary while avoiding that trap. This may translate into determining how best to use military forces in dealing with particular terrorist groups, or it may mean providing military support to other instruments of power, if those instruments are likely to be more effective in reaching the desired end state. Whatever the combatant commander does will almost certainly be a function of his theater security cooperation plan.

Given its far-reaching goals as well as its organization, one student of terrorism, David Kilcullen, has argued that the best way to understand al-Qaeda is to think of it in terms of global insurgency. His concept is that the leaders at the core provide general support, including concepts of operation, to what are often home-grown action elements, without controlling them in a rigid, hierarchical way. The relationship between center and periphery is something more like that of a networked franchise in the commercial world. Kilcullen's concept has profound implications for how we plan and execute the campaign.

Point of contact for this lesson is Professor D. Chisholm, C-422.

D. Questions:

Is the U. S. national objective to defeat terrorism or to defeat the groups that choose to use it as a means toward their ends?

What are the characteristics of the global insurgency?

Given that global insurgent groups are non-state actors vice nation-states, what special challenges would WMD attacks by such groups include? How could these be mitigated?

What are the regional combatant commanders' responsibilities for combating terrorism as employed by insurgent groups?

What are some ways the combatant commander can plug into the interagency

resources needed for an effective plan to combat terrorism as employed by insurgent groups?

What are some strengths and weaknesses of the use of military force in combating terrorists in general, and al-Qaeda in particular?

What other instruments of power are important in any campaign to combat insurgent groups that use terrorism? What are the strengths and weaknesses of each? Why do these other instruments matter in practical terms to a combatant commander constructing a plan to combat insurgency in his theater?

E. Products

Students analyze a case study of an insurgent organization that uses terrorist methods and report their findings to their seminar.

F. Required Readings:

Conetta, Carl. "Dislocating Alcyoneus: How to Combat al-Qaeda and the New Terrorism." Scan. (**NWC 3011**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

George, Roger Z., and Robert D. Kline, eds. *Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: Enduring Issues and Challenges.* Washington, D.C.: NDU, 2004. Scan: Chapters 37 and 39. (Issued).

Joint Military Operations Department, U. S. Naval War College. "Terrorist Threat in the Pacific: Jemaah Islamiah Case Study." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. (**NWC 3118**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Kilcullen, David. "Countering Global Insurgency." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28 (August 2005): 597–617. (**NWC 3101**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

The White House. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, September, 2006. Scan: Chapters 1 (Overview), IV (Strategic Vision), and V (Strategy for Winning). (Posted on the JMO Website).

The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the United States. Washington, D.C.: GPO, July 2004. Scan: Chapters 2, 11, and 12. (Posted on the JMO Website and Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Cronin, Audrey Kurth. "How al-Qaida Ends/The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," *International Security* 31 (Summer 2006): 7-48.

Davis, Jacquelyn K. *Radical Islamist Ideologies and the Long War: Implications for U. S. Strategic Planning and U. S. Central Command's Operations.* Future Strategic Contexts for WMD–Related Planning and Operations. HDTRA1–06–F–0054. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., January 2007.

International Crisis Group. "Pakistan: Karachi's Madrasas and Violent Extremism." *Asia Report* No. 130 (29 March 2007).

Bin-Ladin, Shaykh Usama Bin-Muhammad Bin Ladin, et al. "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, World Islamic Front Statement," 23 February 1998.

Post, Jerrold M. "Killing in the Name of God: Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda." In Barry R. Schneider and Jerrold M. Post, eds. *Know Thy Enemy/Profiles of Adversary Leaders and their Strategic Cultures*. Maxwell AFB, AL: U. S. Air Force, 2003.

Shultz, Richard. "Global Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: United States Plans and Strategy for the 'Long War.'" Boston: Tufts University, The Fletcher School, no date.

United States Marine Corps, "Expeditionary Warrior 2006 Final Assessment." Quantico, VA: Warfighting Lab/Wargaming Division, June 2006.

Al-Zawahiri, Ayman. "Letter to al-Zarqawi." 9 July 2005. ODNI News Release 2-05.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

MILITARY ADVISING (Seminar)

It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

— President Harry S. Truman,
Addressing a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947.

Like many, I got the call to join this Long War not with U. S. forces, but with Iraqis. If I ever thought somebody might need me for the real thing, I sure never expected it to be with foreign troops.

—BGEN Daniel P. Bolger, USA (2006).

A. Focus:

This session addresses the functions of military advising and the enduring practical problems associated with planning and executing effective military advisory systems, focusing on their use in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations (CI) and foreign internal defense (FID).

B. Objectives:

- Discuss the mental and physical challenges associated with military advising.
- Contrast the relationship between the advisor and those he advises.
- Value the importance of the advisory effort in not only creating stable and professional militaries but in developing personal relationships with other nation's military leaders.
- Analyze the planning and execution challenges attendant to military advising.
- Explain the impact of culture on planning and executing advisory duties.

C. Background:

The sessions on Complex Irregular Warfare, ROMO, and Failed States demonstrated that failing states, the consequent prevalence of intra-state conflicts, including insurgencies and civil wars, and the salience of many of them to U.S. national security interests mean that stability operations, peace operations, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, counter-narcotic, and security assistance will require the close attention of the U. S. military for the foreseeable future. In the main, these are problems that can only be solved by the locals, and over extended periods of time. However, the U.S. military, through the combatant commanders' Phase 0 Security Cooperation Plans (SCP), seeks to shape those events as they unfold. An effective program of military advising is integral to advancing the objectives of the SCPs.

Successfully solving these problems usually depends on (1) improving the ability of the indigenous populations to resolve their immediate conflicts; and (2) developing stable governance structures for the long haul. Effective, professional militaries have historically been one of the means for creating the security required for long-term stability and development. Some have argued that prudent employment of military

advisors in other states can reduce the probability of insurgency and of other sources of state failure and that Combatant Commanders' Security Cooperation Plans ought therefore to include military advising as an integral component.

Beginning with World War II and throughout the Cold War, the U.S. employed military advisors in various forms at strategic, operational, and tactical levels to assist the militaries of other states to professionalize their militaries and to defeat insurgencies. Although advising has typically included a technical component on the use of weapons, its role has actually been much broader.

U.S. use of advisors sometimes met with success, sometimes not. This mixed record has led to some ambivalence within the U.S. military about employing advisors. For almost five decades, the advising function resided within Army Special Forces, much of that time an organization at the margins of the U.S. military.

Since the 1990s, however, Army Special Forces have been increasingly employed in short-term efforts, are now burdened with an extremely high operational tempo, and tasked with other missions—such as liaison teams, special reconnaissance, direct action, and counterterrorism—that cumulatively have reduced their ability to practice the fine art of advising. Special Operation Command's (SOCOM) *Special Operations Forces Reference Manual*, Version 2.1 (January 1998) contained only two references to advising other states' forces.

Ambivalence or not, advising has assumed a new centrality for the U. S. military, especially in prosecuting the Long War. The internal stability of other states and their ability to govern the spaces within their borders are essential to success in the Long War and to counter the Global Insurgency. The current multi-service capstone document for counterinsurgency, U.S. Army FM 3-24/USMC 3-33.5 *Counter-insurgency* (December 2006), notes, for example, that during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II "Establishing a secure environment involved both offensive and defensive operations with a heavy emphasis on training and advising the security forces of the fledgling Iraqi government."

The numbers of military advisors required for this effort are extraordinary—over 5,000 now serve in Iraq alone. Many officers and enlisted personnel now engaged in the advising effort are very new to the enterprise. Generating numbers alone does not suffice, however. The operational commander and his staff must understand the fundamental, unique challenges of effective military advising and the practical means for addressing those challenges that have historically proven effective. The personnel function looms very large indeed. Officers adept in planning and commanding conventional combat operations do not necessarily make good advisors; at the same time, good advisors often are those who are not necessarily effective in conventional operations.

The point of contact for this lesson is Professor D. Chisholm, C-422.

D. Questions:

How are the leadership techniques of a military advisor different than the techniques used while in command of American forces? How must these techniques be adapted for the tactical, operational, and strategic levels?

How should a combatant commander think about the problem of military advising?

What are the different roles that an advisor must play? Do they conflict with one another? What problems does this create?

To whom does the advisor report? What difference does this make to how he executes his responsibilities?

How are advisory efforts linked to the relevant Theater Security Cooperation Plan?

How closely do the conclusions drawn by Hickey in his study of advising in Vietnam accord with the advice tendered by Lawrence out of his World War I experiences in the Middle East?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Gatchel, Theodore. "Advising Vietnamese Marines." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. (**NWC 3020**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Hartig, William. "Commander's Guidance." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. (**NWC 3021**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Hickey, G.C., with the assistance of W. P. Davison. "The American Military Advisor and His Foreign Counterpart: The Case of Vietnam." Memorandum RM-4482-ARPA. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1965. Read: Preface and Summary of Findings and Conclusions, iii-xviii. (**NWC 3022**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Lawrence, T. E. "Twenty-Seven Articles," pp. 3-10 in Robert D. Ramsey III, Editor. *Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present.* Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006. (**NWC 3059**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Waghelstein, John. "The Problems of Advising in Counterinsurgency Operations." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. (**NWC 3024**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Aylwin-Foster, Nigel. "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations." *Military Review* (November-December 2005): 2-15.

Bacevich, A.J., James Hallums, Richard White, and Thomas Young. *American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador.* Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988.

Baker, James A. III, Lee H. Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese, III, Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, Alan K. Simpson. *The Iraq Study Group Report.* Washington, D.C.: 2006.

Bolger, Daniel P. "So You Want to Be an Adviser." *Military Review* (March-April 2006): 2-8.

Cassidy, Robert M. "The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency." *Parameters* 36 (Summer 2006): 47-62.

Currey, Cecil. *Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988.

Corum, James S. "Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies." Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006.

Grunow, Carl D. "Advising Iraqis: Building the Iraqi Army." *Military Review* (July-August 2006): 8-17.

Hosmer, Stephen T., and Sibylle O. Crane. "Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16–20, 1962." Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006 [originally published 1963].

Jones, Seth G., Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley "Establishing Law and Order after Conflict." Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005.

Lahue, William. "Security Assistance in Kazakhstan: Building a Partnership for the Future." *DISAM Journal* 25 (January 2003): 6-18.

Lansdale, Edward. *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia.* New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

Leftwich, W. G. "An Afternoon with Bernard Fall." *Small Wars Journal Magazine* (February 2006). [Originally published in *Marine Corps Gazette* (1969)].

McNerney, Michael J. "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?" *Parameters* 36 (Winter 2005-06): 32-46.

Marks, Paul. "Joint Publication 3-07.15 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces and the American Mission." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 12(Spring 2001): 31-58.

_____. "Peacetime Engagement: A Role for Military Advisors?" *Joint Force Quarterly* (Spring 2000): 104-109.

Marquis, Susan L. *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U. S. Special Operations Forces*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1997.

Riley, Jonathan P. "The U.K. In Sierra Leone: A Post-Conflict Operation Success?" Heritage Lecture No. 958, Delivered 15 June 2006. Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, August 2006.

Sarkesian, Sam C. *Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993.

Sheehan, Neil. *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and the American Experience in Vietnam*. New York: Random House, 1988.

U.S Army FM 31-20-3. *Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces.* 20 September 1994.

FM 3-24/USMC 3-33.5 *Counterinsurgency*. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army.; Headquarters, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, December 2006.

U. S. Marine Corps. "Foreign Military Advisor Conference: Lessons and Observations

from Transition Teams, OIF 05-07 and OEF VI." 24–26 October 2006. [FOUO]

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.* Joint Publication (JP) 3-07. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 16 June 1995.

_____. *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-05. Washington, DC: CJCS, 17 April 1998.

Valenzuela, Alfred A., and Victor M. Rosello. "Expanding Roles and Missions in the War on Drugs and Terrorism: El Salvador and Colombia." *Military Review* (March-April 2004).

Vick, Alan J., Adam Grissom, William Rosenau, Beth Grill, and Carl P. Mueller. "Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

PEACE OPERATIONS (Seminar)

We are the world's leader. We fill a void. There is no one out there that even comes close to filling the leadership role that we have, and some of the moral responsibilities that we have.

—General Anthony Zinni, USMC, Commander, U. S. Central Command

We learned that when you use land combat power in the peacekeeping or peace building role, you can't achieve an end state of long term peace—of stability and prosperity in the area. In general, a military element only can bring about the absence of war.

—Major General William Nash, USA, Commander, Task Force Eagle, Bosnia

A. Focus:

This session addresses the peace operations portion of Stability Operations resident within the Range of Military Operations (ROMO), addressing the several categories of peace operations and the use of U. S. military forces therein. In so doing, it considers the planning and execution challenges inherent in contemporary peace operations for the U. S. military. It builds on the foundations established in Complex Irregular Warfare, Range of Military Operations (ROMO), and Failed States, and ties directly to NGOs and IGOs.

B. Objective:

- Understand the several types of peace operations and the planning implications consequent upon the differences.
- Understand the military's role in peace operations.
- Comprehend the role of inter-governmental organizations, especially the United Nations, in exercising its responsibility to maintain international peace and security.

C. Background:

During the past decade, decisions about whether to commit U. S. forces to peace operations (peacekeeping and peace enforcement) have consistently proven controversial. In this policy debate, one position has favored a broader use of U. S. forces in many roles, while the other wishes to reserve the military almost exclusively for war fighting. Combat readiness, retaining flexibility in the use of force, command and control arrangements, and the role of the U. S. military in the post–Cold War era have been central factors in this debate.

During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union rarely participated in peace operations because both considered it best to keep the two superpowers apart. Since the Cold War's end, however, U. S. and Russian involvement in peace operations have increased. As the 1990s unfolded, some practitioners called into question the effectiveness of peace enforcement operations following failures in Somalia and Bosnia. However, subsequent operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor demonstrated that peace enforcement could be a useful tool—not only for addressing intra-state conflicts

with regional and international implications but for international conflicts as well.

During the Clinton administration, the U. S. military figured importantly in several peace operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, and participated in a host of smaller UN missions. However, the current Bush administration has largely refrained from new peace operations and even attempted to diminish or end the participation of U. S. forces from peace operations it inherited. In practical terms, commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq have precluded most US participation in peace operations.

Nonetheless, given the large number of weak and failing states, the associated intra-state and inter-state conflicts, and the increasing interconnectedness of economic and security issues across states and regions, the U. S. military will find itself planning and executing peace operations well into the future. This session addresses the central issues associated with planning and executing peace operations.

The point of contact for this lesson is Professor D. Chisholm, C-422.

D. Questions:

What are the principal differences between major combat operations and peace operations? What are the planning implications of these differences?

What are the key differences between peace enforcement and peace keeping? What are the central strategic and operational factors to be considered when planning for these missions?

Who is typically in charge of a peace operation and for whom do U. S. military commanders work? How does the U. S. view command relationships in this context and how and why does that perspective differ from the perspectives of other nations?

What roles do the other agencies within the U. S. Government play, especially the Department of State, in planning peace operations? How and when does the military enter into this process?

What are the challenges of working with the militaries of other nations, intergovernmental organizations (United Nations and regional organizations) and NGOs? How can they be effectively addressed?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Bah, A. Sarjoh, Bruce D. Jones, Benjamin C. Tortonlani, and Victoria DiDomenico. *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* – "Briefing Paper." New York: Center on International Cooperation International Security Institutions Program, New York University, 2008. (**NWC 3060**), (Issued).

Oliver, George. "Evolution of International and UN Peacekeeping." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. (**NWC 3008**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

United Nations Peacekeeping: List of Operations, 1948-2008. New York, United

Nations, 2008. (**NWC 3054**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Primer for Peace Operations*. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 17 October 2007. Read Executive Summary, pp. vii-xi. (Linked from the JMO Website).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Bellamy, Alex J., Paul William, and Stuart Griffin. *Understanding Peacekeeping.* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004.

Bolton, John. "United States Policy on United Nations Peacekeeping." *World Affairs* 163 (Winter 2001): 129–148.

Dickens, David. "The United Nations in East Timor: Intervention at the Military Operational Level." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 23 (August 2001): 213-232.

Durch, William J., ed. *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis.* New York: St Martin's Press, 1993.

_____. *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s.* New York: St Martin's Press, 1996.

Jett, Dennis C. *Why Peacekeeping Fails.* New York: Palgrave, 1999.

Joint Warfighting Center. *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*. Fort Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 16 June 1997.

Martin, Ian, and Alexander Mayer-Rieckh. "The United Nations and East Timor: From Self Determination to State Building." *International Peacekeeping* 12 (Spring 2005): 104–120.

"Okinawa Marines Deploy to East Timor." *Marine Corps Gazette* 83 (November 1999): 6.

Orr, Robert C., ed. *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction.* Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004.

_____. "East Timor: The United States as Junior Partner." In *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction.* Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004. Read: 210-221.

Ryan, Alan. "The Strong Lead-Nation Model in an Ad Hoc Coalition of the Willing: Operation Stabilize in East Timor." *International Peacekeeping* 9 (Spring 2002): 23–44.

Shawcross, William. *Deliver Us from Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000.

Smith, Michael G. *Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence.* New York: International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series, 2003.

United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support. *Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*. New York, United Nations, 2008.

_____. *United Nations Charter*. New York: United Nations, 26 June 1945.

U. S. Army and U. S. Marine Corps. *Peace Operations, Multi-Service Tactics and Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations.* Field Manual 3-07.31, MCWP 3-33.8 and AFTTP 3-2.40*,* Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, October 2003.

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations." White paper on PDD 25. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 5 May 1994.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION (Seminar)

Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military, diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power…

—Joint Publication 3-08 Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, 17 March 2006.

Inside the Capitol Beltway, and particularly inside the Pentagon, if you really want to sound smart, you talk about 'The Interagency.' It's not an arm of the government. It's not a place. It has no formal director and certainly no troops. It's not even a thing: it's a process. But it is perhaps the one process that the government needs to do better to win 'the long war' against terrorism and in the greater Middle East.

—Michele A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, "In Search of Harmony."

A. Focus:

Contemporary military operations require the appropriate application of all elements of national power, and yet operational commanders regularly state that interagency coordination is one of their biggest challenges. With this in mind, students must understand interagency coordination processes, at both the strategic and operational levels, to improve prospects for success during joint, interagency, and multinational operations. The NSDM Department addresses the national strategic level issues in "The President and the Making of National Security Policy" and "The National Security Council" and "Interagency." This session addresses problems of interagency coordination at the operational level, with special emphasis on joint doctrine; tools for national and theater interagency planning; and the basic roles and authorities vested in a U.S. Ambassador and country team. This session is closely linked to NGOs and IGOs, and Contractors in the Operating Environment.

B. Objectives:

- Analyze the relationships among all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) and the importance of interagency coordination of these elements.
- Evaluate interagency coordination processes at the Theater level.
- Analyze how a combatant commander can best integrate joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities to achieve theater objectives across the range of military operations.
- Analyze the capabilities and limitations of interagency partners in the planning and execution of complex contingency operations by phase.
- Evaluate the role of the U. S. ambassador and the organization and functions of an embassy country team. Analyze how combatant and joint force commanders

coordinate interagency and multinational planning and operations with an ambassador and country team.

C. Background:

Military commanders and their staffs must understand how national security policy is developed, planned, and executed through the strategic-level interagency process. They must also understand how non-military government agencies contribute to the successful prosecution of joint and multinational operations.

At the operational level, developing effective working relationships among U. S. ambassadors in the theater, the combatant commander, joint or combined task force commanders, and their staffs hold the key to success. Executive orders, joint doctrine, and civilian agency rules and procedures only partially determine the actual ways in which interagency coordination is accomplished. Every government organization has its own distinct missions and roles, structures and procedures, resources, culture, and constituencies. Just as they synchronize and sequence military service capabilities in joint operations; operational commanders and their staffs must be aware of and take these differences into account as they attempt to coordinate their efforts with other, relevant government agencies.

When the military has the lead, other government organizations can provide resources and capabilities that the military requires, but does not itself possess. For example, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) can provide a range of information relevant to both military and political success via the in-country chief of station, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) representative to the combatant commander, or (along with other members of the intelligence community) as part of a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST).

However, the military will not always be the "lead agency" across a range of important and complex operations in which it will be involved—even though it may provide the preponderance of resources. For example, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) acts as the lead federal agency for foreign disaster assistance. In other circumstances, the Department of State, in the person of the in-country ambassador (the president's direct representative), will be the lead agency, with military forces in a supporting role. Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security takes the lead in matters of homeland security, while Department of Defense through Northern Command has the lead for homeland defense.

In response to the widely perceived need for more effective coordination across federal departments and agencies, various formal coordination interagency mechanisms have been promulgated for the strategic and operational levels. Effectiveness of these mechanisms has varied widely across issues and over time. At the combatant commander level, mandated effective November 2005, the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG) has emerged as an organizational mechanism for the coordination of planning. Each JIACG's specific form and place has evolved uniquely at each combatant command. Similarly, the Provincial reconstruction Team (PRT) has been employed in both Afghanistan and Iraq, but in markedly different ways.

Apart from civilian government resources, the commander also has military assets particularly well suited for accomplishing tasks across the spectrum of operations. For example, civil affairs units and SOF are useful both in their "traditional" roles and as liaison officers between the military and external agencies, non-government organizations, or other military forces.

Interagency coordination processes do not remain static. Changes in organizations and their representatives, procedures (used or not), and, most important, the objectives in any given situation are constantly changing. This makes interagency planning and coordination, particularly during international and coalition operations, extremely complex and demanding.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. Carrington, C-414.

D. Questions:

What is meant by "interagency coordination" and why is it important?

What is meant by the term "lead agency"? How does this affect the military?

Why should the operational commander be concerned with interagency processes and non-DoD resources?

How may we effectively organize and plan for successful interagency operations at the operational level?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Whittaker, Alan G., Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune. "The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System," April 2007, (**NWC 3026B**), (Posted on the JMO Website). Scan pp. 5-54. (This is also a required reading in NSDM).

Locher, James R. III. "The Most Important Thing: Legislative Reform of the National Security System." *Military Review* (May-June 2008): 4-12. **(NWC 3030)**, (Posted on the JMO Website).

Joint Publication 3-08, Volume I, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.* September 2006. (Linked from the JMO Website). pp. iii, v-xiv; Scan I-1 to III-27.

Joint Publication 3-08, Volume II, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations*. August 2007. (Linked from the JMO Website). Scan**.**

G. Supplementary Readings:

National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization." 07 December 2006.

Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Transition,

and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations." 28 November 2005.

United States Joint Forces Command J7 Pamphlet. "US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation." 01 December 2005.

Flournoy, Michèle, and Shawn Brimley. "In Search of Harmony: Orchestrating the Interagency for the Long War." *Armed Forces Journal* (July 2006): 36-39.

Bogdanos, Matthew F. "Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step." *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Spring 2005): 10-18.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

JMO-43

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (Seminar)

What's the relationship between a just arrived military force and the NGO… that might have been working in a crisis-torn area all along? What we have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful; and, if they are successful, you are successful. We need each other.

—General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations

There is a true clash of cultures, which has nothing to do with the culture you're involved with on the ground. The cultures of the soldier, the diplomat, and the relief worker could not be more diverse or more disparate. Creating cooperation requires creating a relationship and a means of communicating among groups that have different views on how that cooperation should take place.

— General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.), Managing Communications:
Lessons from Interventions in Africa Conference (1996)

A. Focus:

This session examines the diverse characteristics of Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Organizations and their effects on accomplishing the joint task force commander's mission. In so doing, it addresses the challenges of planning, working, and coordinating with NGO/IGOs in both permissive and non-permissive environments and their effects on operational functions in applicable phases of operations.

B. Objectives:

- Identify the differences and similarities across the types of NGO/IGOs.
- Comprehend the central differences between the military and the NGO/IGO community and their implications for planning.
- Analyze and plan for the capabilities and requirements for NGO/IGOs operating in the joint operating environment or requirements the joint force commander may have to assume if NGO/IGOs leave.
- Comprehend the role that Civil Affairs units (Army, Navy and Marine Corps) play in Civil Military Operations (CMO) in coordinating with the NGO/IGOs throughout the Joint Task Force (JTF) Joint Operations Area (JOA).

C. Background:

The Interagency Coordination session addressed the challenges of working effectively with other U. S. government organizations at the operational level. Contemporary operations also require a practical understanding of methods of coordinating and integrating the joint task force's efforts with those of nongovernmental

and intergovernmental organizations often present within the operating environment before, during, and long after military operations.

Long before a joint task force arrives in a given area to conduct operations (e.g., Foreign Internal Defense, Peace Enforcement, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) will, in many if not most instances, have already commenced their own operations.

NGOs range from small local organizations to large international institutions. Each one is unique, with its own particular missions, specialized capabilities, and funding sources. IGOs are formed by treaty between two or more governments. They range in size and scope from global organizations such as the United Nations, to regional organizations like the European Union (EU) or the African Union (AU). IGOs may also be formed for functional purposes, such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or special purposes, such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

Every NGO/IGO has its own mission, objectives, and reasons for engaging in near-term relief work or long-term nation-building in a particular area. Every NGO/IGO must comply with its charter while also accommodating special restrictions placed on its activities by the donors that provide operating funds. In order to maintain their effectiveness, NGO/IGOs must also remain impartial and neutral. In practice, these constraints mean that most NGO/IGOs carefully limit the amount and type of their contact with the military.

NGOs and IGOs together provide a comprehensive civilian capacity for responding to complex humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters, as well as long-term development problems. If these organizations are unable to conduct their humanitarian operations, the military will likely be called upon to provide them directly. In consequence, no combatant commander or joint task force commander can ignore the presence of NGO/IGOs or conduct Stability Operations without them.

Notwithstanding comparable objectives (i.e., relieving human suffering), the inherent culture and nature of relief agencies departs greatly from that of the military. This has the potential to and in the event actually does cause friction between the two. In recent years the military has become increasingly involved in SSTR Operations—along with relief efforts in complex humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters—and has realized that cooperation with, and support from, the international community through NGO/IGOs is essential. This trend, which increased dramatically with non-permissive environments in Afghanistan and Iraq, has caused consternation among relief agencies who feel that the military has intruded on their domain.

NGO/IGOs do not fall under the "command and control" of military units in charge of a particular area and regularly operate where and when they feel necessary to accomplish their mission. However, there are important points of common interest. The military benefits by allowing NGO/IGOs to provide relief for affected populations because it relieves the military of that responsibility. NGO/IGOs usually bring many of their own assets to support their relief efforts. Frequently, however, they will require

assistance from the military in the form of operational security, force protection (area, not individual), and heavy lift/logistics support. Thus, coordination and cooperation is vital to meeting both military and NGO/IGOs objectives.

The point of contact for this lesson is Professor D. Chisholm, C-422.

D. Questions:

What are the primary differences across the various NGO/IGOs? Why do these differences matter to the joint force commander?

What are the primary cultural differences between NGO/IGOs and the military?

How are the challenges of coordination and cooperation with NGO/IGOs different than those associated with interagency coordination and why are those differences important? How do these challenges vary with the type of operation and the phase of operation?

By what means can the joint force commander effectively coordinate, cooperate, and communicate with NGO/IGOs to accommodate their requirements and capabilities early in an operation?

What are the relationships of other U. S. agencies, such as USAID and OFDA, with IGOs and NGOs? How might the joint force commander benefit from these relationships?

What is the operational impact of NGO/IGO operations on the joint task force? How can NGO/IGO capabilities and limitations be incorporated into an OPORD?

E. Products:

Students working groups will develop practical mechanisms for incorporating current NGO/IGO operations and capabilities into a joint task force mission, based on the Darfur, Sudan case study. Each group will brief its concepts to the seminar.

F. Required Readings:

Bishop, James K. "Combat Role Strains Relations between America's Military and Its NGOs." *Humanitarian Affairs Review* (Summer 2003): 26–30. (**NWC 2048**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Byman, Daniel, et al. *Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Responses*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2000. Read: Chapters 4, 6, 7, and 9. (**NWC 2049**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Harleman, Christian. *An Introduction to the UN System: Orientation for Serving on a UN Field Mission.* New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Program of Correspondence Instruction, 2003. Scan: Chapters 1–3. (**NWC 3110**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Joint Military Operations Department, U. S. Naval War College. "Crisis in Sudan Case Study," Newport, RI: Naval War College, August 2008. (**NWC 3086D**), (Posted on the JMO Website and Issued). Scan.

United States Institute of Peace. *Guidelines for Relations between U. S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments.* Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, March 2005. (**NWC 3061**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Davidson, Lisa Witzig, Margaret Daly Hayes, and James J. Landon. *Humanitarian and Peace Operations: NGOs and the Military in the Interagency Process.* Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1996.

Frandsen, Grey. *A Guide to NGOs: A Primer about Private, Voluntary, Non-governmental Organizations that Operate in Humanitarian Emergencies Globally*. Bethesda, MD: Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine, Fall 2002.

Interaction. Inter*Action Member Activity Report: Sudan and Chad, A Guide to Humanitarian and Development Efforts of InterAction Member Agencies in Sudan.* Washington, D.C.: Interaction, May 2006.

_____. *Nongovernmental Organizations in Overseas Assistance*. Washington, D.C.: Interaction, September 2004.

James, Eric. "Two Steps Back: Relearning the Humanitarian-Military Lessons Learned in Afghanistan and Iraq." *Journal of Humanitarian Affairs* (October 2003): 1-9.

Natsios, Andrew S. "Commander's Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies." *Parameters* 26 (Summer 1996): 50–66.

United Nations, Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Reference Group on Contingency Planning and Preparedness. "Civil-Military Relationships in Complex Emergencies." 28 June 2004.

_____. "Inter-Agency Contingency Planning Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance." November 2001.

United Nations Standing Committee on Humanitarian Relief. "Position paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations in the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance." No Date.

United Nations. "The Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies." March 2003.

United States Agency for International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. *Field Operations Guide*. (Version 4.0). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Version 4.0, no date.

United States Army. Stability *and Support Operations*. FM 3-07. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, February 2003.

_____. *Civil Affairs Operations*. FM 3-05.40. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 15 September 2006.

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-57. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 8

February 2001.

_____. *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-08. Volume I & II, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 17 March 2006.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) (Lecture and Seminar) (SECRET)

Few things are brought to a successful issue by impetuous desire, but most by calm and prudent forethought.

—Napoleon Bonaparte

A. Focus:

This is a classified session for U. S. students. It builds upon the JOPES unclassified session by exposing students to the details of *Guidance for Employment of the Force* (GEF) and the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP).

B. Objectives:

- Evaluate the application of the JOPES process in support of U. S. planning for OIF.
- Using planning for OIF as an example, analyze the strategic guidance in development of a plan in support of national objectives and the friction experienced in the process.
- Synthesize the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing joint and multinational theater plans in support of national objectives.
- Evaluate how the planning process assists in ensuring national ends, ways, and means are reconciled, integrated, and applied.
- Comprehend how JOPES can integrate the instruments of national power to attain national security objectives.
- Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.
- Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U. S. force structure affect the planning process.
- Synthesize the capabilities and limitations of interagency processes and of all services (own service, other services—to include Special Operations Forces (SOF)) to meet planning objectives.

C. Background:

The first part of the session will consist of a classified lecture presented by a member of the Joint Staff J7, Joint Operational War Plans Division. The purpose of this lecture is to offer students a more detailed appreciation of the current GEF and JSCP, and a broader exposure to some of the practical realities of the strategic planning process. Upon completion of the lecture, students will retire to their seminar rooms and review copies of the GEF and JSCP.

Point of contact for this session is Professor Patrick C. Sweeney, C-424.

D. Questions:
None.

E. Products:
None.

F. Required Readings:

There is no reading requirement before the lecture. The classified readings reflected below will be distributed for review in the seminar room after the lecture.

Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) (SECRET)

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) FY 2008 (SECRET)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Sweeney, Patrick C. "GEF & JSCP and Adaptive Planning Primer." Naval War College, 14 May 2008. (**NWC 2061**). (Previously read during session number 28, JOPES) (Posted on JMO Website).

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:
None.

CONTRACTORS IN THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (Seminar)

In all countries engaged in war, experience has sooner or later pointed out that contracts with private men of substance and understanding are necessary for the subsistence, covering, clothing, and moving of any Army.

—Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance, 1781

The end of the Cold War left a huge vacuum and I identified a niche in the market.

—Eben Barlow, Founder of Executive Outcomes

We have been forced to use US and foreign contractors to substitute for required military functions. (128,000 contractors in Iraq-includes more than 2,000 armed contractor personnel.) Thousands of these brave and dedicated people have been killed or wounded. They perform most of our logistics functions in the combat zone. (Transportation, maintenance, fuel, long-haul communications, food service, contractor operation of computer based command and control, etc.) Under conditions of great danger such as open warfare caused by Iranian or Syrian intervention – they will discontinue operations. Our logistics system is a house of cards."

— General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 17 April 2007.

A. Focus:

This session addresses the planning considerations occasioned by the presence of civilian contractors in the operating environment. Although contractors have been regularly employed on and off the battlefield by the U.S. military since before the Civil War, dramatic increases in their numbers, the increased centrality of their roles in system support, and the operational and strategic consequences of their behavior require that the military systematically consider contractors in the planning and conduct of operations. This session considers the different types of contractors (including whether they are armed or unarmed) and how considerations of contractors, including risks to mission accomplishment, should be incorporated into the Joint Operations Planning Process across the Range of Military Operations, and all phases of operations.

B. Objectives:

- Distinguish between the types of contractors employed in the operating environment.
- Analyze the implications of contracting out key operational functions and the requirements to account for loss or reduction of contractor capabilities.
- Define trends in the employment of contractors in the operating environment and their implications for planning and execution.

- Analyze operational planning considerations throughout all phases of an operation with regard to how contractors will affect the coordination and execution of key operational functions.

C. Background:

Contractors, in one form or another, have nearly always been present in the battle space, whether on land or at sea. However, personal, private armed forces ultimately gave way over the centuries to state monopolies on force and the realm of the contractor was reduced to that of primarily providing logistics support. That trend has now turned in the other direction. Since the end of the Cold War, in particular, there has been a steady upward trend in so-called "private military forces." At the same time, support services, such as logistics, have historically been—by 1775, European armies had used a contract system for more than 150 years—and continue regularly to be supplied from the private sector.

In the present period, the joint force confronts an unprecedented and sometimes bewildering mix of civilian contractors in the operating environment, whose numbers have increased dramatically, and who have in common only that they are civilians under contract to the military, to other government agencies, or to nongovernmental organizations. They range from cooks and latrine cleaners to truck drivers, intelligence personnel, interrogators, operational planners, and even armed security personnel who conduct combat operations. Put differently, contractors are now employed for a wide array of core military functions as opposed to peripheral or support functions.

It is estimated that there are presently over 150,000 U. S. contractors (100,000 of these are DOD contractors) serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, approaching a ratio of 1:1 with deployed troops. The actual figure very likely exceeds that formally reported given the lack of comprehensive reporting requirements. Moreover, our coalition partners, IGOs, NGOs, other government's agencies, and host nations all employ a wide range of contracted personnel. The effect of these contractors on the joint commander's ability to coordinate and synchronize operational functions, while maintaining unity of effort, cannot be overstated.

Causes for the steep upswing in the use of contractors include: (1) U. S. public policies since 1966 favoring outsourcing of public services to the private sector; (2) gradual development of relevant capabilities in the private sector; (3) legal or administrative limits on uniformed personnel, both overall and to be deployed to specific locations; (4) the All-Volunteer Military and the Total Force concepts; (5) availability of a pool of former professional military personnel in consequence of post–Cold War force draw-downs; (6) increased complexity of combat systems and support requirements (greater tail-to-tooth ratio); (7) expansion of the size of the operating environment; and (8) an increase in the number and frequency of complex contingency operations whose effective execution requires capabilities not always present in the military inventory.

No combatant commander or joint task force commander can hope to plan and execute operations effectively without carefully considering the effects of contractors in the area of operations, especially with respect to their consequences for key operational functions, including command and control, operational security, force protection, and

logistics. To date, however, there has been little service doctrine and less joint doctrine governing contractors. The October 2005 instruction by the Secretary of Defense covers only those contractors accompanying U. S. Armed Forces; other contractors to be found in the operating environment were not addressed.

The presence of contractors in an area of operations also raises complex and mostly unresolved legal issues concerning Status of Forces Agreements, Rules of Engagement, and the Law of Armed Conflict, not to mention problems of fiduciary responsibility. The October 2007 Defense Bill expanded the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), placing contractors and others accompanying the military in the field under UCMJ, by defining UCMJ to cover civilians not just during declared war but also during contingency operations. It remains to be seen whether the change will be practically enforceable.

In sum, there is no going back to the days of a fairly self-contained, vertically-integrated military industrial base and support supply chain. There has been no initiative to increase the size of the armed forces enough to reduce—let alone preclude—the need for contractors in the operating environment. Contractors are and will likely remain an integral and permanent part of U. S. military logistics and support. They also provide critical security services. It is also probable that a broad range of other actors—non-DOD U. S. government agencies, host governments, coalition partners, NGO's, and IGO's will continue to employ private contractors.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. Chisholm C-422.

D. Questions:

What are the essential planning considerations for the employment of contractors during the JOPP? How do these considerations change by phase of operation?

In what ways do contractors alter the level and types of risk for the Joint Force Commander and how can the JFC mitigate these risks? Are the risks military, political, or both?

How do the risks posed by contractors differ across the Range of Military Operations?

What is the responsibility of the Joint Force Commander for contractors in his area of operations (e.g., force protection, medical, evacuation)?

What are the command and control (C2) issues across the range of contractors (DoD, DoS, Coalition Partners, Host Nation, IGO, NGO, other government agencies, etc.), especially in non-linear, asymmetric war zones, that the Joint Force Commander must account for?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Avant, Deborah. "Mercenaries." *Foreign Policy* (July–August 2004): 20–28. (**NWC**

2054), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Congressional Research Service. Report RL32419, *Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues.* (**NWC 3027**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Department of Defense. *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany U. S. Armed Forces*, DOD Instruction Number 3020.41. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 3 October 2005. (**NWC 6009**), (Issued). Scan.

Lexington Institute. *Contractors on the Battlefield.* February 2007. Available at www.lexingtoninstitute.org/docs/contractors_final.pdf. (**NWC 3025**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Singer, Peter W., "Peacekeepers, Inc." *Policy Review Online* (June/July 2003). **(NWC 3010),** (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Baffer, B. D. "The Professional Military Services Industry: Have We Created A New Military-Industrial Complex?" Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University, 20 May 2005.

Campbell, Duncan. "Marketing the New 'Dogs of War.'" Center for Public Integrity, 30 October 2002.

Campbell, Gordon L. "Contractors on the Battlefield: The Ethics of Paying Civilians to Enter Harm's Way and Requiring Soldiers to Depend Upon Them." A Paper Presented to the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics 2000, Springfield, VA, 27–28 January 2000.

International Peace Operations Association. "International Peace Operations Association Code of Conduct." Version 11. Washington, D.C.: IPOA, 1 Dec 2006.

Hamontree, George (Sam) III. "Contractors on the Battlefield: Planning Considerations and Requirements." Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, Air University: January 2002.

Higgins, Peter J. "Civilian Augmentation of Joint Operations." *Army Logistician* 35 (January–February 2003): 14-15.

House of Representatives, United States. Committee on Government Reform, Minority Staff and United States Senate, Democratic Policy Committee Joint Report, "Contractors Overseeing Contractors: Conflicts of Interest Undermine Accountability in Iraq." 18 May 2004.

Mattox, Philip M., and William A. Guinn. "Contingency Contracting in East Timor." *Army Logistician* 32(July–August 2000): 30-34.

Niekirk, Philip van. "Making a Killing: The Business of War." Center for Public Integrity, 28 October 2002.

Peterson, Laura. "Privatizing Combat: The New World Order." Center for Public Integrity, 28 October 2002.

Shrader, Charles R. "Contractors on the Battlefield." Arlington, VA: AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, 1999.

Singer, P. W. *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF (Seminar)

From our own experiences, we know that nothing can take away the grief of those affected by tragedy. We also know that Americans have a history of rising to meet great humanitarian challenges and of providing hope to suffering peoples. As men and women across the devastated region begin to rebuild, we offer our sustained compassion and our generosity, and our assurance that America will be there to help.

—President George W. Bush,
referring to the Indian Ocean Tsunami, January 3, 2005

A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. While military assets will remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organization. This does not [imply] any civilian control over military assets.

—United Nations. "The Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies." March 2003.

A. Focus:

In this session we focus Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) and Disaster Relief (DR) operations (often conducted during Complex Humanitarian Emergencies), a major component of the Range of Military operations (ROMO) for which the joint force commander must plan and execute. Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, the relief effort following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, is employed as a case study in order to explore the planning considerations and special challenges common to FHA/DR operations.

B. Objective:

- Discuss the role of USAID as the lead federal agency for foreign humanitarian assistance and the military-USAID relationship during FHA.
- Discuss the complexity of humanitarian assistance operations, the range of potential military FHA tasks, and the factors which should be considered when planning or executing FHA.
- Analyze the peculiar challenges of conducting FHA operations during "complex humanitarian emergencies" and the difficulty in achieving long term objectives.

C. Background:

During the last two decades, almost every year the U. S. military has conducted foreign humanitarian assistance operations, ranging from simple to highly complex, short duration to long-term support, and in permissive to hostile environments.

As the 2005 post-earthquake relief operations in Kashmir demonstrated, apart from altruistic motivations, it is usually in our national interest to relieve human suffering from natural or man-made causes in other nations—this is especially important at a time when

the United States and its allies are contending with organized religious extremists for the hearts and minds of people across the globe. The U. S. military inevitably plays some role in these efforts. There is every reason to believe that we will continue to conduct foreign humanitarian assistance in the foreseeable future.

The central characteristic of foreign humanitarian operations is surprise. We cannot know exactly when and where we will be called upon to conduct them (except in terms of probabilities based on history), their intensity and scope, and how they may be tied to other social, economic, and political problems. Thus, we will almost inevitably be compelled to work in a reactive mode and with a high degree of improvisation.

No two foreign humanitarian operations are ever exactly the same, but there are common themes worthy of study. Some result from developments over the medium or long term, such as climate-caused famine; others from unpredictable catastrophic events, such as earthquakes or volcanic eruptions. Unfortunately, humanitarian disasters are increasingly intertwined with civil war and insurgencies, in which all sides may, for example, use food and other forms of relief as a weapon, as evidenced in Somalia in the 1990s, and presently in Darfur, Sudan. The military must therefore be prepared to conduct foreign HA operations as complex contingency operations.

Thus, foreign humanitarian assistance may be conducted as a stand-alone mission or as part of stability operations, peace operations, or other efforts. As such, some FHA operations are conducted under permissive conditions where U. S. military presence may be welcome while other FHA operations are conducted under combat or high threat conditions.

All geographic combatant commanders maintain concept plans for humanitarian assistance. However, the nearly infinite variation in potential disaster types and locations in a combatant commander's AOR renders it well-nigh impossible to pre-plan responses much beyond the cursory level. Once a disaster occurs, speed of response is of the essence, and planning is often done on the fly. Given these constraints, a solid understanding of the fundamental factors and considerations unique to the FHA mission is crucial.

All FHA operations involve interaction with a wide array of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), ranging from local organizations to the International Committee of the Red Cross; and International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), including United Nations agencies, such as the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) and the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Host-nation, alliance, coalition, local, or third-country military forces may also be involved.

The United States Agency for International development (USAID) is the lead federal agency for foreign humanitarian assistance. USAID coordinates the overall U. S. government response effort and coordinates U. S. efforts with the UN. When the military is involved in FHA the military is typically in a supporting role. Working thorough its Office of U. S. Foreign Disaster relief (OFDA), USAID also funds relief activities. Thus, effective interagency coordination comprises a key ingredient for successful foreign humanitarian assistance operations.

The point of contact for this session is Professor I. T. Luke, C-402.

D. Questions:

How can the joint force commander address the surprise characteristic of natural disasters?

What are the military tasks usually associated with FHA? What military components/services can accomplish those tasks?

What are C2 options for organizing a joint force to plan and conduct an FHA mission? What are the pros and cons of those options? What, if any, special organizational elements prove useful in FHA?

What are the likely challenges during FHA operations under "Complex Humanitarian Emergency" conditions? How can they be addressed?

Which NGOs and IGOs are likely to be encountered during FHA?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

JMO Department. "Operation Unified Assistance" (Posted on the JMO Web site and Issued). Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007. (**NWC 3096A**), (Posted on the JMO Website and Issued).

Natsios, Andrew S. "Commander's Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies." *Parameters* (Summer 1996): 50–66. (**NWC 3082**), (Posted on the Website).

United States Agency for International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. *Field Operations Guide* (Version 4.0). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, no date. Read: VI-34–49. (**NWC 3095**), (Posted on the JMO Website).

Wilhelm, Phil. "USAID and DOD Roles in Foreign Disaster Response." Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2006. (**NWC 6011**), (Posted on the JMO Website). Scan.

G. Supplementary Readings:

Baker, George W., and Dwight W. Chapman, eds. *Man and Society in Disaster*. With a foreword by Carlyle F. Jacobsen. New York: Basic Books, 1962.

Belgrad, Eric A., and Mitza Nachmias, eds. *The Politics of International Humanitarian Relief Operations*. With a foreword by General Sir Michael Rose. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.

Byman, Daniel, et al. "Military Tasks in Complex Contingencies," "Overview of the Relief Community," "Advantages to Better Coordination with the Relief Community," "Barriers to Improved Coordination with Relief Agencies." In *Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Responses*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000.

Cahill, Kevin M. *A Framework for Survival—Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian*

Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993.

Constantine, G. Ted. *Intelligence Support to Humanitarian-Disaster Relief Operations*. An Intelligence Monogram. Center for the Study of Intelligence, December 1995.

Deng, Francis M., and Larry Minear. *The Challenges of Famine Relief—Emergency Operations in the Sudan*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992.

Davidson, Lisa Witzig, Margaret Daly Hayes, and James J. Landon. *Humanitarian and Peace Operations: NGOs and the Military in the Interagency Process.* Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1996.

Elleman, Bruce A. *Shaping the Maritime Environment: An Operational History of the U. S. Navy's Role in "Unified Assistance."* Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 17 August 2006.

_____. *Waves of Hope; The U. S. Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia*. Newport Paper 28. Newport RI: Naval War College Press. February 2007.

United Nations. Standing Committee on Humanitarian Relief. "Position Paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations in the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance." New York: UN, No Date.

_____. *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief.* New York: UN, May 1994.

_____. "The Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies." New York: UN, March 2003.

United States Institute of Peace, *Taking It to the Next Level: Civilian-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies*, Virtual Diplomacy Initiative.

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint TTPs for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 6 August 2001.

_____. *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operation*s, Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Vols. I & II. Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 17 March 2006.

Weiss, Thomas G., and Cindy Collins. *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention.* Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

THE MIDTERM EXAMINATION (Individual Effort)

Any nation that uses it (people's war) intelligently will, as a rule, gain some superiority over those who disdain it.

—Clausewitz, *On War*

A. Focus:

This session is designed to permit the War College student to demonstrate the synthesis of the education presented to date and to demonstrate higher order thinking skills in a complex, uncertain, and ambiguous situation involving the use or contemplated use of military force.

B. Objectives:

- Synthesize course concepts including operational art, the Law of Armed Conflict, and environmental considerations through the analysis of a case study.
- Create a reasoned response to the examination questions demonstrating an internalization of the various concepts of the Joint Military operations curriculum.

C. Background:

The case study presented will provide the students with a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous situation in which the use of military force may or may not be well considered. Students will, utilizing a rational, analytical framework, analyze the situation and using the concepts presented in the course thus far, present a reasoned response.

Students will be provided a case study with sufficient information to address the questions presented on 9 October 2008. The examination questions will be issued at 0830 10 October 2008 and is due to the moderators not later than 1600 the same day (10 October 2008). Grading criteria for the midterm examination may be found on page xiv of this Syllabus.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Don Chisholm, C-422.

D. Questions:

See examination question sheet.

E. Products:

A written examination that demonstrates student mastery. This effort should not exceed 10 double spaced typed pages in Times New Roman font 12 point.

F. Required Reading:

A case study will be issued prior to the examination with sufficient time for student's to conduct a thorough analysis and prepare for the examination.

G. Supplementary Readings:
None.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:
None.

DOMESTIC DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (Seminar)

This government will learn the lessons of Hurricane Katrina. We are going to review every action and make necessary changes so that we are better prepared for any challenge of nature, or act of evil men, that could threaten our people.

– President George W. Bush

A. Focus:

This session addresses the complex topic of Homeland Security and Defense, focusing on the Department of Defense (DOD) role in support of civil authorities under the National Response Framework (NRF), with special attention to the challenges attendant to planning and conducting Civil Support operations within U. S. territory.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the complex nature of the Homeland Security (HS) mission, the distinction between Homeland Defense (HD) and Civil Support (CS), and the key planning considerations necessary for effective joint, interagency domestic operations.
- Analyze the capabilities and limitations of joint forces employed in Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), including domestic incident response and consequence management.
- Analyze the command and control concepts employed in domestic disaster relief/incident management and their implications for joint forces operating in support of civil authorities.

C. Background:

Federal military forces provide important capabilities to federal civilian, state, local, and tribal authorities for domestic incident response. However, military operations on U. S. territory involve planning considerations that differ significantly from those for operations overseas. Under the umbrella of Homeland Security, the DOD plans and conducts operations in two distinct but interrelated mission areas—Homeland Defense (HD) and Civil Support (CS). DOD has the lead for homeland defense but operates in support of U. S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement activities, and other civil support missions approved by the Secretary of Defense.

The attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 awakened many Americans to the reality that their homeland was less secure than once assumed. The U. S. government reevaluated its homeland security posture and made significant organizational adjustments, including a new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and a new combatant commander (USNORTHCOM) with a geographic area of responsibility including, for the first time, the continental United States

The 9/11 attacks also highlighted the inadequacy of existing national-level

disaster response mechanisms for coordinating efforts (1) across federal agencies, and (2) among federal, state, and local agencies. Initial efforts to rectify this problem resulted in the 2004 National Response Plan (NRP), which made great strides toward a common response doctrine. Its effectiveness was immediately tested when Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast. As one of the worst natural disasters in U. S. history, Katrina made manifest continuing shortfalls in the federal government's ability to bring the elements of national power to bear in domestic incident response. Based on what were viewed as the lessons of Katrina, the January 2008 National Response Framework (NRF) replaced the NRP. The NRF is the construct under which USNORTHCOM will provide military support to civil authorities during future domestic disaster response efforts.

The point of contact for this session is Professor I. T. Luke, C-402.

D. Questions:

What are the key differences between homeland security and homeland defense? What are the practical planning implications of these differences for NORTHCOM?

What is the C2 construct for response to domestic disasters? What role are DOD forces to play? What challenges does planning for DOD domestic disaster response present?

How does Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) differ from Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)? What unique considerations, political, legal, practical, affect the planning and conduct of domestic disaster relief operations?

How does the *Posse Comitatus* Act (PCA) affect planning and conduct of DSCA?

How do the roles of federal (Title 10) and state (National Guard) military forces differ in domestic operations. What planning considerations (limitations or constraints?) do these differences impose?

E. Products:

None.

F. Required Readings:

Federal Emergency Management Administration. *National Response Framework*. January 2008. Read pp. 1-13, 24-26, 53-69. Available online at www.fema.gov/NRF

Luke, Ivan T. "Homeland Security—Civil Support: How DOD Plugs into the Interagency C2 Structure." Newport, RI: Naval War College JMO Department, June 2008. (**NWC 3065C**), (Posted on the JMO Website.).

Department of Defense. *Civil Support,* Joint Publication 3-28,. 14 September 2007. Read Executive Summary, Scan Ch. I, II, and III. (Posted on the JMO Website).

_____*Homeland Defense.* Joint Pub 3-27. 12 July 2007. Read Executive Summary; Scan remainder. (Posted on the JMO Website.).

Rumsfeld, Donald, and Chertoff, Michael. *Joint DHS/DOD Letter to the President.* 7 April 2006. Read. (**NWC 3028**) (Issued).

U. S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Hurricane*

Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (2006), Ch. 26, "Military Operations." Read highlighted sections. (**NWC 3029**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Luke, Ivan T. "DOD's Role in Maritime Homeland Defense & Security," Newport, RI: Naval War College, August 2006.

CDRUSNORTHCOM, USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501-05, Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 11 April 2006

Bowman, Steve, and James Crowhurst. *Homeland Security: Evolving Roles and Missions for United States Northern Command*. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RS21322. 16 November 2006.

Burns, Shawn. *Homeland Security Considerations*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, NSDM Department, JMP 9-1, April 2006.

Cumti, Amanda Merritt. "U. S. Army North/5th Army: Building Relationships to Defend the Homeland and Meet Emerging Regional Challenges." *National Security Watch 07-1.* 15 February 2007.

Department of Defense. *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.* June 2005.

FM 3-28.1 *Civil Support; Multi-service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Civil Support (CS) Operations*, Signature draft, April 2007. Available on Army Knowledge Online (AKO) www.us.army.mil.

Goss, Thomas. "'Who's in Charge?' New Challenges in Homeland Defense and Homeland Security." *Homeland Security Affairs* 2, No. 1 (April 2006): 1-12.

Homeland Security, Department of. "Quick Reference Guide for the National Response Plan." 22 May 2006. Version 4.0. Available at www.dhs.gov/nationalresponseplan.

JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination during Joint Operations* Vol. I. 17 March 2006.

National Governors Association, Center for Best Practices. *A Governor's Guide to Homeland Security*, 2007.

Preiss, Robert A. "The National Guard and Homeland Defense." *Joint Force Quarterly* 36 (December 2004): 72–78.

Thompson, Larry M., and Randy G. Wietman. *Hurricane Katrina*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, NSDM Department, JMP 10-1. April 2006.

White House. *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*. February 2006.

_____. *National Strategy for Maritime Security*. September 2005.

_____. *National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for the National Strategy for Maritime Security*. October 2006.

_____. *National Strategy for Homeland Security.* July 2002.

_____. *Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) for the National Strategy for*

Maritime Security. October 2005. (FOUO).

Wilson, J. R. "A Single Game Plan." *Armed Forces Journal* (May 2004): 48–52.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS (Seminar and Exercise)

The one who is to draw up a plan of operations must possess a minute knowledge of the power of his adversary and of the help the latter may expect from his allies. He must compare the forces of the enemy with his own numbers and those of his allies so that he can judge which kind of war he is able to lead or to undertake.

—Fredrick the Great, Letter (1748)

A. Focus:

This session provides a review of the planning techniques employed in the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP). Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning,* and the Naval War College *JOPP Workbook* (NWC 4111H) will be used as instructional guides as we apply the JOPP to a scenario based on warfare in a littoral region. The exercise will use a fictional scenario in the Strait of Malacca (SOM) as the basis for the seminar's analysis. The seminar's planning efforts will result in a framework for a concept plan (CONPLAN) that will be leveraged in subsequent sessions.

B. Objectives:

- Apply strategic guidance in development of a plan in support of national objectives.
- Synthesize the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing joint and multinational theater plans in support of national objectives.
- Evaluate how the planning process assists in ensuring national ends, ways, and means are reconciled, integrated, and applied.
- Comprehend how the JOPP can integrate the instruments of national power to attain national security objectives.
- Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.
- Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U. S. force structure affect the planning process.
- Synthesize the capabilities of all services (own service, other services—to include Special Operations Forces [SOF]) to meet planning objectives.
- Synthesize how the intelligence process is synchronized to support operational decision-making and how intelligence products impact the JOPP steps; understand how and when to stimulate the intelligence system if required support is lacking.
- Select appropriate IO capabilities to be used to assist in achieving the desired strategic and operational effects across the range of military operations and plans.
- Develop IO concept and IO objectives that support the commander's mission and objectives.

C. Background:

The planning techniques employed during both contingency and crisis action planning (CAP) share many common attributes. While CAP begins when an appropriate authority recognizes the potential for a military capability being required in response to a potential or actual crisis, this planning exercise attempts to replicate the early planning steps of a JSCP directed contingency planning requirement. In this case, seminars will perform the role of PACOM staff planners tasked to develop a SOM security concept.

The exercise begins with the seminar's review of the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) and Mission Analysis. The Mission Analysis offers a number of logical steps that allows for a systematic review of initiating directives and an understanding of elements within the operational environment to arrive upon a clearer vision of the tasks and purposes at hand. This early critical step concludes with a proposed mission statement and the commander's initial planning guidance. Members of the seminar planning staff will also have an opportunity to craft proposed Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), to include Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIRs) and Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), during this initial planning step.

The seminar then considers the role of the staff as it develops valid Courses of Action (COAs). Valid COAs must be adequate, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete. After tentative COAs have been developed, the seminar will allocate some additional planning time to a deeper consideration of Information Operations (IO) and its potential role in accomplishment of the PACOM Commander's mission.

COAs are further scrutinized by the staff when it conducts COA analysis. This critical step, frequently marginalized by inexperienced or harried staffs, allows for a deeper examination into the strengths and limitations of the given COA. Integral to both the construction and analysis of a COA is a solid understanding of individual service and functional component capabilities and employment considerations, as well as coalition member contributions.

The staff's final responsibility in this exercise is to determine which COA to bring forward to the PACOM Commander for a decision.

Points of contact for this session is Professor Pat Sweeney, C-424.

D. Questions:

See Seminar assignment memo (Issued Separately)

E. Products:

Seminar will produce: A Mission Analysis Briefing, Proposed CCIRs, Courses of Action with course of action analysis, initial IO concept, and a COA Decision Briefing.

F. Required Readings:

NOTE: Seminar moderators will assign specific reading assignments from the references below during the course of the planning exercise.

Hooker, Gregory. *Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Role of Military*

Assessments. Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005, pp. 1-41. **(NWC 2071).** (Issued).

Joint Forces Staff College. *Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook* (Amended Version—Unclassified). Joint Command Control & Information Operations School, 2005, (Posted on the JMO Website).

U. S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. *Forces/Capabilities Handbook*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006. Scan. (**NWC 3153J**), (Issued and Posted on the JMO Website).

_____. *Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) Workbook*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 21, 2008. (**NWC 4111H**), (Issued and posted on the JMO Website).

_____. *Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2008. (**NWC 2002F)** (CD-ROM), (Issued).

_____. *Strait of Malacca (SOM) Case Study*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, May 2008. (**NWC 2057**), (Posted on the JMO Website and Issued).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Information Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 February 2006. Read: Chapter 5 (Linked from JMO website).

_____. *Joint Operation Planning,* Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 26 December 2006. (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

U. S. Department of the Navy. *Navy Planning,* Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 5-01, Norfolk, VA: Department of the Navy, January 2007. (Issued).

U. S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace,* Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 24 May 2000. (Linked from JMO website).

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

Planning Joint Operations: https://ca.dtic.mil/doctrine/default.htm).

*Joint Operation Planning Vignette: Operation GRAY GUARD (*available online at https://ca.dtic.mi l/doctrine/interactive/courses/jopvig/course.htm)

JOINT FORCE ORGANIZATION (Seminar)

The secret of all victory lies in the organization of the non-obvious.

—Marcus Aurelius

A Mission Statement is a dense slab of words that a large organization produces when it needs to establish that its workers are not just sitting around downloading Internet porn.

—Dave Barry

A. Focus:

This session will focus on the organization of a joint force in general and the role of Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups (B2C2WG) in facilitating horizontal and vertical communications. While addressing the Joint Force in general, the session focuses on the roles and purposes of B2C2WG and highlights the subtle differences in structure and purpose. The student will come to appreciate the concept of boundary spanning and how the joint force planner leverages B2C2WGs to ensure horizontal and vertical communications within the force is effective and reliable. The roles and responsibilities of Liaison Officers (LnOs) will also be discussed.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the lineage of the current joint force staff organization and its advantages and disadvantages in planning and execution.
- Appreciate the various organizational structures available for consideration.
- Comprehend the concept of boundary spanning.
- Consider the unique requirements of leading a multicultural planning group in an ambiguous environment.

C. Background:

Organizational structure is a means of facilitating the achievement of objectives and mission accomplishment. Students will appreciate that such structures are not static, but exceptionally dynamic. They reorganize in response to changing conditions that occur in the environment (e.g., new missions, branch execution), new technology (e.g., airplanes, armored vehicles, and web-based operations), and organizational growth (e.g., coalition

partners joining the effort). Organizational structures are dependent on the mission assigned and often on the personality of the leader.

Communication and processing information are essential if the joint force is to succeed. The Internet, with its interconnection of millions of computers, has evolved to potentially become one of the greatest resources available to planners today. Planners can access, store, and move digital information (voice, sound, text, and numbers) easily and rapidly. This Information Age has fomented significant change in the information environment for joint force planners and leaders.

Organizations are simply people working together in a structured, formal environment to achieve stated goals. Commanders provide guidance, support implementation, and ensure coordination so assigned missions can be accomplished. The joint force leader mentors subordinates in order to develop teamwork, intended to facilitate mission accomplishment. The often cited autocratic military image with its rigid hierarchical system of leadership and communications and an all-knowing leader that demands Herculean effort from his subordinates is a relic of the past, and does not facilitate mission accomplishment in the modern operating environment. Current leaders provide an atmosphere of transparency by allowing subordinates to make selected decisions and facilitating rapid vertical and horizontal communications.

The venue for accomplishing this rapid vertical and horizontal communications is commonly a B2C2WG. Staff directorates, by their very nature are focused on specific roles and tasks. The J2 is focused on all aspects of intelligence, for example. When the joint force commander is presented a mission, almost universally an ill-structured problem to address, the medium used to address this problem is not a staff directorate. The staff directorate is too narrow a vehicle for solving a problem that needs inputs from the entire staff, subordinate commanders and their staffs, interagency partners, and coalition members. Consequently, a Joint Planning Group is often established. Members from each staff directorate are temporarily assigned to this organization to address the assigned issue. These members retain a relationship with their organic staff directorate thus facilitating horizontal communications. Another example may be the Logistics Coordination Center (LCC). The LCC is the central logistics planning center within the JTF headquarters and functions in parallel with the Joint Operations Center (JOC) to support JTF planning and execution, while maintaining situational awareness of logistics actions and future requirements. The mission of the LCC is to provide coordination of multinational logistics planning and support. Further, it ensures logistics planning is fully integrated into the JTF planning process. This center is normally established early in the activation of the JTF parallel with the other planning cells and JOC activation.

B2C2WGs are established as needed, and are generally composed of members from different directorates and different commands; they have a specific mission or task, and informal lines of communication exist back to their parent command or directorate. It is the B2C2WG that actually "solves" the majority of problems faced by the joint force, with the Napoleonic-era Staff Directorates providing specific functional support to the B2C2WG, as required.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Bill Hartig, C-409.

D. Questions:

How does the B2C2WG facilitate vertical and horizontal communications?

How is the battle rhythm affected by B2C2WGs?

Are B2C2WGs the preferred medium for solving problems? Is there a better model?

How would a planner or commander organize a staff, in an unconstrained environment, to solve an ill-structured problem?

How effective is the standard hierarchical chain of command in dealing with ambiguity?

E. Products:
None

F. Required Reading:
"Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells and Working Groups," Read pages 1 and 2. Scan remainder. **(NWC 4051).** (Posted on the JMO Website)

G. Supplemental Readings:
None.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:
None.

SECURITY COOPERATION (Seminar and Exercise)

In times of peace the general staff should plan for all contingencies of war. Its archives should contain the historical details of the past, and all statistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and papers for the present and future.

—Jomini, 1838

A. Focus:

This session examines the role of Security Cooperation objectives and supporting activities in support of a combatant commander's regional strategy and the subsequent function of such activities in the commander's theater campaign plan.

B. Objectives:

- Assess how the GEF impacts a Combatant Commander's Security Cooperation activities and objectives.
- Evaluate the role of and perspectives of U.S. and international armed services when developing Security Cooperation activities for a Combatant Commander.
- Design a concept that demonstrates how Security Cooperation activities can be integrated with international partner capabilities to attain Theater Campaign Plan objectives in support of national objectives.
- Analyze the capabilities and limitations of interagency organizations in developing Security Cooperation activities and comprehend the requirement to synchronize those activities with all elements of national power.

C. Background:

In FY99, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) issued initial Theater Engagement Planning (TEP) guidance. In FY04, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued the Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG), which effectively deleted TEP and its broad-based engagement strategy, and introduced Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) with focused themes. This required Combatant Commanders to write a Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) that focused their security activities within their assigned areas of responsibility.

In FY08, CJCS consolidated and integrated Department of Defense (DOD) planning guidance related to operations and other military activities into a single, over arching document that is now found in the Global Employment of the Force (GEF). As discussed in the JOPES session, the GEF consolidates the guidance the DOD previously promulgated separately through five separate plans: the Contingency Planning Guidance

(CPG), SCG, Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (NUWEP), Global Force Management Guidance (GFM) and Global Defense Posture (GDP).

With the implementation of the GEF, Combatant Commanders are now required to develop an over arching Theater Campaign Plan that includes Security Cooperation activities, which were formerly written in the Combatant Commanders' SCP. The GEF does not direct how Combatant Commanders are supposed to do this, but gives them the choice of either writing a separate Security Cooperation activities document (Annex, Appendix) in support of the campaign plan, or subsuming those Security Cooperation activities directly into the campaign plan.

Security Cooperation activities have been viewed by Combatant Commanders as their primary theater strategic enabler. They set the stage for accomplishing the theater mission and regional tasks as articulated in the GEF. Security Cooperation activities are pertinent through all phases of campaign planning, and are a visible characteristic of how subordinate Component Commanders support the Combatant Commander's campaign plan.

The simulated USPACOM Security Cooperation documents will be used in this session in order to replicate the SCP integration tasks faced by a combatant command staff. Combatant Commanders Security Cooperation activities are designed to meet the objectives laid out in the campaign plan and GEF. They identify mil-to-mil activities to conduct during the fiscal year to advance specific objectives both within partner nations and regionally. An "activity" may be an exercise, education, training, humanitarian service, security assistance, conferences, and other mil-to-mil contacts. The aim is to build relationships with key nations and assist partner nations in the development of key capabilities that mutually enhance our and their security needs. Security Cooperation activities, goals and objectives are developed with the involvement of components and country teams, through a Combatant Commander's planning group.

After a discussion on the topic of security cooperation, the seminar will separate into three groups and develop concepts for integrating specific security cooperation objectives and activities for a hypothetical security challenge in the Strait of Malacca.

Point of contact for this session is Professor Tom Parker, C-424.

D. Questions:

What part do Security Cooperation activities play in the Combatant Commander's overall Theater Campaign Plan?

How do Security Cooperation activities fit into the new GEF theater campaign construct?

Is there global integration of Security Cooperation activities? If so, how? If not, what is missing and how could it be accomplished?

What elements of national power are required for an effective Security Cooperation activities program?

How do the individual Services get involved with Security Cooperation activities?

What interagency considerations should be taken into account for Security Cooperation activities?

How do Security Cooperation activities relate to the U. S. Chief of Mission's Mission Strategic Plan (MSP)?

What role does the U. S. Mission's Country Team play in the Security Cooperation activities development?

E. Products:

During the exercise portion of the session, students will be required to produce Security Cooperation objectives, activities, and proposed Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) that support the accomplishment of operational objectives in a scenario involving the Strait of Malacca (SOM), as planned for during the JOPP session.

F. Required Readings:

Dykeman, Gregory J. "Security Cooperation: A Key to the Challenges of the 21st Century." **(NWC 2058)**. (Posted on JMO Website).

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Washington D.C.: CJCS, 6 September 2006. Read 1-1 to 1-9 and IV-1&2. (Issued).

_____. *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Washington, D.C.: CJCS, 26 December 2006. Read 1-1 to 1-5, II-1 to II-8, and IV-36. (Issued).

Fallon, William J. USPACOM Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, (7 March 2007) **(NWC 2060)**. (Posted on JMO Website)

Huang, Victor. "Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia." *Naval War College Review* (Winter 2008, Vol 61, No 1) (**NWC 2068).** (Posted on JMO Website)

United States Naval War College. "Strait of Malacca Security Cooperation Exercise." Naval War College, June 2008. (**NWC 2069)**. (Posted on the JMO Website and Issued).

F. Supplementary Reading:

Sweeney, Patrick C. "GEF & JSCP and Adaptive Planning Primer." Naval War College, 14 May 2008. (**NWC 2061**). (Previously read during JMO–27 JOPES) (Posted on JMO Website).

U. S. Naval War College. *Strait of Malacca (SOM) Case Study*. Newport RI: Naval War College, May 2008 **(NWC 2057).** (Posted on the JMO Website and Issued).

Williamson, Joel E., and Dr. Jenifer D. P. Moroney. "Security Cooperation Pays Off: A Lesson from the Afghan War." *The DISAM Journal* (Spring 2002): 79-82.

G. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:

None.

CAPSTONE SYNTHESIS EVENT

If men make war in slavish obedience to rules, they will fail.
—General Ulysses S. Grant

A. Focus:

The final event in the JMO curriculum is a CAPSTONE Planning Exercise that emphasizes a Crisis Action Planning process. The purpose of the exercise is to synthesize and reinforce course material through practical application in a realistic staff environment in the development of a series of Courses of Action intended to address a fictional, yet real-world wicked problem. A robust white cell is available for support to planners. This is an educational, planning exercise that provides students with an opportunity to apply the principles and concepts studied throughout the trimester while serving at the operational level on a nominal Joint Task Force staff. While the issues students confront in this exercise are real, the situations used to highlight these issues and the solutions the students select are hypothetical.

B. Objectives:

- Synthesize how the planner balances the competing objectives of the interagency effort, including NGO and contractors, in achieving stated objectives.
- Hone ability to lead a multidisciplinary and multinational planning team in a volatile and uncertain environment solving an ill-structured problem.
- Synthesize how national military and joint theater strategies meet national strategic goals across the range of military operations and how they and relate to the national strategic, national military strategic, theater strategic, and operational levels of war.
- Synthesize leadership skills necessary to sustain innovative and agile organizations in a joint and multinational environment.
- Synthesize the ability to integrate and synchronize information operations in plans and operations.
- Evaluate the use of information operations in plans and operations.

C. Background:

The CAPSTONE Planning Exercise is a Joint Task Force-level planning exercise conducted in McCarty Little Hall (MLH) and is normally scheduled from 0830–1630 each day. Students will review the previously developed Security Cooperation Plan

(SCP) and numerous Concept Plans (CONPLAN) based on a scenario provided. The focus of this exercise is to refine the students' ability to conduct crisis action planning at the operational/theater strategic level of war and to demonstrate this skill set during Mission Analysis and Course of Action Development phases of the planning process. Students will leverage information gathered during the Theater Security Cooperation Planning and Joint Planning sessions to develop a range of potential Courses of Action (COAs) for consideration. Students act in assigned Joint Task Force J5 Joint Planning Group (JPG) billets with moderators guiding them through the crisis action planning process and Mission Analysis and COA selection briefs. Moderators serve as Officers Conducting the Exercise (OCE) and provide all guidance and intent to the students in order to ensure a base line for planning. A robust white cell serves as the focal point in the educational process providing common answers to Requests for Information (RFI's), generating support issues as required to sustain the educational momentum, and providing over arching guidance to all planning groups. The first portion of Week One is dedicated to Mission Analysis and culminates with a formal Mission Analysis Brief to the moderators. After the moderator team approves or modifies the Restated Mission Statement, Planning Guidance will be issued and Course of Action (COA) Development will begin. During Week Two, the JPG will develop Courses of Action that balance objectives in the Dominate Phase (Phase 3) with those in the Stabilize and Enable Civil Authority (Phase 4 and 5) Phases, ensuring the plans are nested and mutually supportable. Students will utilize the McCarty-Little Intranet GameWeb in order to simulate a collaborative information environment. The exercise culminates with a Transition Brief presented to a senior mentor. During the exercise, students will deliver a formal Mission Analysis Brief, a Course of Action Decision Brief, present a Transition Brief to a senior mentor, and develop running estimates.

The point of contact for this session is LtCol Mark Harysch, C-413.

D. Questions:

What are the fundamental responsibilities of a Joint Planning Group?

How does the J5 plan post hostility operations under the rubric of decisive combat?

What modifications are required to post hostility plans once decisive combat planning begins in earnest?

How does the Commander of a Joint Task Force best integrate elements of national power to accomplishing strategic objectives?

E. Products:

Students will produce/refine:

1. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (JIPOE)
2. Mission Analysis Brief

3. COA Decision Brief
4. Transition brief

F. Required Readings:

Security Cooperation Plan (Student developed).

U. S. Naval War College. "JMO Senior Capstone Exercise Book," October 2008. (**NWC 5000.1E**), (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Since the exercise involves application of material covered throughout the trimester, students can decide which references will be needed based on the role(s) assigned and individual knowledge and experience.

H. Phase I Prerequisite Instruction:
None.