NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE
&
NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE

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THE JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

SYLLABUS AND STUDY GUIDE

FOR

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS

2001

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FOREWORD

THIS SYLLABUS AND STUDY GUIDE provide a comprehensive overview of the Naval War College Joint Military Operations Department course on Joint Military Operations. Prepared for the College of Naval Warfare and the Naval Command College, it also provides detailed session-by-session assignment and study guide material to assist the student in daily seminar preparation. Administrative information is also included.

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CONTENTS

Foreword i
Table Of Contents ii
Course Session Study Guides iii
Course Description vi
Mission vi
Course Overview vi
Course Objectives vi
Course Organization vii
Student Guidelines viii
Methodology viii
Readings ix
Operations Research Paper xi
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation xii
Gaming xii
Cases xiii
Lectures by Senior Military Leaders xiii
Requirements xiii
JMO Department Grading Criteria xiv
Seminar Assignments xvii
Schedule xviii
Key Personnel xviii
Faculty Assistance xviii
Student Critiques xix
JMO Departmental Directory xix
Faculty Biographies xxi

Course Session Study Guides
Introduction

CF-1 Course Overview 2
CF-2 Introductory Seminar 4
CF-3 The American Way of War 5
CF-4 The Naval Way of War 7
CF-5 The Strategic Objective 10
CF-6 Diplomacy and Military Force 13
CF-7 Introduction to Network Centric Warfare 16
CF-8 Operations Research Paper—Review 19
CF-9 Joint Military Operations Course Conclusion 23
CF Bibliography 24
CF Critique 27

Block One
Operational Concepts / Law

Listing of Operational Concepts and Law Sessions 31
Introduction to Operational Concepts 32
OPS-I-1 Introduction to Operational Art (Seminar) 33
OPS-I-2 Operational Art and Doctrine (Seminar) 36
OPS-I-3 The Battle for Leyte Gulf—Film (Seminar) 40
OPS-I-4 Operational Factors (Seminar) 41
OPS-I-5 Theater Elements (Seminar) 44
OPS-I-6 Levels of War (Seminar) 47
OPS-I-7 Operational Functions (Seminar) 49
OPS-I-8 Elements of Operational Warfare (Seminar) 53
OPS-I-9 Methods of Combat Force Employment (Seminar) 56
OPS-I-10 Principles of War (Seminar) 61
OPS-I-11 Operational Planning (Seminar) 63
OPS-I-12 Operational Leadership (Seminar) 67
OPS-I-13 The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict: A Case Study (Seminar) 70
OPS-I-14 Operational Concepts Examination 74

OPS-I-15 Use of Force Under International Law (Lecture) 75
OPS-I-16 Operational Law and Factor Space (Lecture)..... 78
OPS-I-17 Law of Armed Conflict (Seminar) 81
OPS-I-18 Rules of Engagement (Seminar)..... 83
OPS-I-19 Operational Law Case Study (Seminar) 86
Block One Bibliography 87
Block One Critique..... 99
Block One Operational Law Critique..... 102

Block Two
Military Organization And Planning Concepts

Listing of Military Organization and Planning Concepts Sessions 105
Introduction to Military Organization and Planning Concepts 106
OPS-II-1 U. S. National Military Organization (Seminar)..... 107
OPS-II-2 Weapons of Mass Destruction Considerations (Seminar)..... 111
OPS-II-3 U. S. Maritime Forces (Navy and Marine Corps)
Doctrine and Capabilities (Seminar)..... 113
OPS-II-4 U. S. Coast Guard Capabilities (Lecture) 120
OPS-II-5 U. S. Army Doctrine and Capabilities (Seminar) 123
OPS-II-6 U. S. Air Force Doctrine and Capabilities (Seminar)..... 126
OPS-II-7 Special Operations Forces (Lecture) 129
OPS-II-8 Strategic Mobility (Seminar) 131
OPS-II-9 Alliance and Coalition Considerations (Seminar) 134
OPS-II-10 Joint Warfare Considerations (Seminar)..... 138
OPS-II-11 C4ISR and Information Operation (Seminar)..... 141
OPS-II-12 Service Capabilities Vignettes/Case Studies (Seminar) 144
OPS-II-13 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)(Seminar) 146
OPS-II-14 Theater Planning (Seminar) 151
OPS-II-15 Plans and Orders & Planning (Seminar)..... 154
OPS-II-16 The Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) (Seminar) 157
OPS-II-17 Naval Expeditionary Warfare Problem (NEWP) 162
Block Two Bibliography..... 165
Block Two Critique 179

Block Three
Military Operations Other Than War

Listing of Military Operations Other Than War Sessions 183
Introduction to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) 184
OPS-III-1 Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) (Lecture) 185
OPS-III-2 The Interagency Process (Seminar) 187
OPS-III-3 Combating Terrorism (Seminar) 191
OPS-III-4 Planning for Post-conflict Operations (Seminar) 193
OPS-III-5 Foreign Internal Defense (Lecture) 196
OPS-III-6 Failed States 198
OPS-III-7 Foreign Internal Defense: Case Study 200
OPS-III-8 Peace Operations (Lecture) 202
OPS-III-9 Peace Operations—Case Studies (Seminar) 204
OPS-III-10 Operation CONDOR RESCUE (Seminar) 207
Block Three Bibliography 210
Block Three Critique 217

Block Four
Regional Contingency Planning And Warfighting

Listing of Multi-crisis War Game 221
OPS-IV-1 Multi-crisis War Game 222
Block Four Critique 226

CNW/NCC Addenda

NCC Enrichment Opportunities 231
Course Session Critique Notes 233
End of Course Questionnaire 241
Course Planning Schedule 249

COURSE DESCRIPTION

1. Mission.

The mission of the Joint Military Operations Department is to develop in our students the ability to translate contemporary national and regional military strategies into naval, joint, and multinational operations, with particular emphasis on operational art and employment of the sea services. Furthermore, the department aspires to enable our students to make sound operational decisions in both command and staff positions in order to prepare them for higher responsibilities in future Service, joint, and multinational assignments.

2. Course Overview.

The Joint Military Operations (JMO) course focuses on enhancing the capability of officers to think and to make decisions at the theater-strategic and operational levels of war. In conjunction with the other two academic departments, the Advanced Research Department, and the Electives Program, JMO provides the student with a key element in the mutually complementary War College education. Within the three core curricula, S&P offers the student a foundation in strategic thinking; NSDM familiarizes the student with strategic planning and the procurement of military forces; and JMO prepares students to think operationally, and to plan for and apply resources to meet the military goals and objectives derived from the nation's security strategy. This course expands student familiarity with joint and Service capabilities, and exposes the student to a range of methods and disciplines employed in using those capabilities. Examples of these are: threat assessment; the military planning process; analysis of Service and joint doctrines; and war gaming. The focus is on joint operations at the theater level and at the task force level; however, maritime operations and sea service contributions are emphasized. Reference is made throughout the trimester to the ability of the CINC and the staff planners to be able to answer confidently four fundamental questions:

- What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational arena to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)
- What sequence of actions is most likely to produce those conditions? (Ways)
- How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish the desired sequence of actions? (Means)
- What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?

Instilling the ability to answer these questions is the very essence of the Joint Military Operations course.

3. Course Objectives.

- Acquire the capacity to focus thought at the theater-strategic and operational levels of war.

- Improve the ability to assess the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) as they apply to joint and multinational military operations.
- Strengthen the skills used in assessing regional security issues.
- Understand the relationships among military forces, other government agencies (OGAs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private volunteer organizations (PVOs).
- Develop the expertise to select, allocate, and task military forces across the range of military operations.
- Improve upon the ability to understand, analyze, and communicate complex issues clearly and effectively, both orally and in writing.

4. Course Organization.

Following the Course Foundations sessions, the trimester is grouped into four "blocks." In general terms, these blocks are subdivided further into three sections which equate to approximately one week each of "concepts and doctrine," "illustration," and "application," where students will conduct staff studies, problem analyses, or war gaming exercises. Week One is used to acquaint the student with basic information, to level the playing field, or to introduce new concepts and ideas. In Week Two, the faculty will use cases, in conjunction with student presentations, to illustrate these concepts and ideas in a format which the student will then apply in a practical exercise in the final week. The course is cumulative in that each week and each block builds on the previous segment. The culmination of the trimester is a multi-crisis war game, which will permit the students to apply the material covered in the JMO trimester.

The first eight sessions of the trimester constitute what is called Course Foundations. In these seminar sessions and lectures the student is introduced to the fundamental themes which are subsequently woven throughout the ensuing four blocks.

- Block One, "Operational Concepts/Law," will introduce operational art concepts, illustrate these concepts using the Battle of Leyte Gulf as a case study, and then provide the students an opportunity to employ operational art in an analysis of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. Following the Operational Concepts examination, international law considerations are discussed.
- Block Two, "Military Organization and Planning Concepts," will consider the various Service doctrines, capabilities, and limitations. A review of the planning processes used by the CINCs and an introduction to the Commander's Estimate of the Situation are included in this block, as well.
- Block Three, introducing Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), uses historical cases covering the interagency process, Foreign Internal Defense (insurgency/counterinsurgency), terrorism, failed (and failing) states, and peace operations. Block Three concludes with a synthesis event during which the interagency process is challenged with applying resources to the solving of

fundamental governmental problems in Colombia, offering the students an opportunity to apply the material covered thus far in the course.

- Block Four is the culmination of the course. Students prepare a Commander's Estimate of the Situation, in addition to an overall campaign plan and appropriate operations orders. The war game serves as a course synthesis in a networked facility that permits simultaneous, distributed, collaborative planning to occur. The final portion of this block is dedicated to applying the plan developed by the seminars. The course concludes with the Final Examination, which takes into account the entire trimester's readings, classroom seminar work, exercises, *and* the war game.

The Operations Research Paper, discussed in more detail later in this section, is a significant contribution to the trimester learning experience. Demanding research, analysis, and discussion of a subject chosen by the student early in the trimester, it takes the form of a 14–17 page paper, due near the end of Block III.

In summary, the course is organized so that the individual student will reap the benefits of the combined contributions of faculty, guest speakers, and—most importantly—the richness of the shared experiences, professional expertise, and research achievements of seminar student groupings and the corporate student body.

5. Student Guidelines.

The syllabus provides the basis for each session's course work. The "Focus" section provides the general context of the topic. Next, the "Objectives" section cites the goals of the session, including objectives required for Professional Joint Education (**PJE**) certification. The "Background" section provides assistance in framing the individual session. Finally, the "Questions" and "Readings" sections serve to focus your individual preparation and enhance your understanding of the topic.

The Joint Military Operations course fulfills approximately 80 percent of the Phase I, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) objectives. Many of the objectives listed in the syllabus reflect requirements for Phase I JPME certification.

Students who are just now joining the class as March "phased inputs" should read *Clausewitz and Sun Tzu Compared* by Professor Michael Handel of our Strategy and Policy Department. This book, placed in the March students' mailboxes, will assist in discussing operational art and other topics with classmates who have already completed the Strategy and Policy course.

6. Methodology.

The foundation of the Joint Military Operations course is the seminar, emphasizing an active learning environment. The course builds upon lessons and concepts from the study of history, strategy, joint and combined operations, the case method, decision-making, and gaming theory. These are coupled with the experiences and ideas of students, moderators, and in-house or visiting lecturers to provide greater understanding in the study of joint military operations.

The seminar is the fundamental learning forum. Student expertise is a significant part of the learning process. For a seminar to succeed there must be open and

candid sharing of ideas and experiences, tempered with decorum. You will find that even the most "off-the-wall" idea may have some merit. Successful seminars—that is, seminars whose members leave with the greatest knowledge—are those made up of members who come to each session "loaded" with questions based on thorough preparation. Most students leave the seminar with new insights, or even more thought-provoking questions. Student preparation, free and open discussion, and the open-minded consideration of the ideas of others, all contribute to a valuable seminar experience.

The "one-third" rule is the keystone of the seminar approach. The first third is a well-constructed, relevant curriculum. The second third is the quality of the faculty. *The most important third is you, the individual student.* You are the active catalyst that generates the "action."

7. Readings.

All JMO Course sessions are supported by readings, the purpose of which is to assist in understanding the many aspects of the topics being presented. For the most part the readings are intended to convey to the student basic information, the mastery of which in study outside the class will facilitate the discussions to take place within the class. A thorough understanding of the following information will significantly assist the student in using the course readings to best advantage:

a. **Categories of Readings.** Each syllabus session lists three categories of readings.

(1) *Required Readings* are those which should be read prior to the session, usually in the order listed. These readings are listed in a logical sequence to best understand the session material. Often your moderators will offer additional guidance on the priority of the readings, based on the special needs of the individual seminar.

(2) *Reference Readings* are those listed for the benefit of students who seek more information about a session topic in order to gain insight beyond that provided by the Required Readings; this would include additional background material on case studies and exercises. On occasion, faculty moderators may assign Reference Readings to individual students to read and provide oral synopses to the seminar in support of topic discussion.

(3) *Supplementary Readings* are those relevant to a session topic which may be useful to a student seeking to gain more in-depth knowledge of the subject, doing research for the Operations Research Paper, or fulfilling an elective requirement.

b. **Block Bibliographies.** At the end of each Block in the JMO Syllabus, students will find an annotated Block Bibliography, alphabetically listing that Block's Required, Reference, and Supplementary Readings, with a brief explanation of each.

c. **Reading Identifiers.** Each reading that is not a complete book or publication has a cover page which provides the four-digit reading identifier (e.g., NWC 1002) in the upper right-hand corner, and the reading title found below the Naval War College crest.

d. **Finding Specific Readings.** Readings for any specific session may be located as follows:

(1) Required Readings are annotated as (Issued) at the end of the reading entry. This means they may be found in the Banker's Box of Readings provided to each student at the beginning of the JMO trimester. The Banker's Box is internally divided into specific JMO sessions by marked tabs (e.g., OPS I-2, III-3, etc.). The Issued Readings for the session are directly behind the session tab. *Bulky Issued Readings such as books, publications, and large extracts are found either at the back of the Banker's Box or in a separate bag.*

(2) *Reference Readings* are annotated as (Issued), (Seminar Reserve), or (Library Reserve) at the end of each Reading entry. If Issued, the reading is in the Banker's Box. If Seminar Reserve, the reading (usually five copies per seminar) is located on the rolling book cart in the seminar classroom. If Library Reserve, the reading (usually three to five copies) is located in the JMO Library Reserve section for JMO student use.

(3) *Supplementary Readings* are not issued or placed on reserve. These readings are, however, generally available in the Henry E. Eccles Library.

(4) *CNW 2001 Reading List.* This extremely useful handout is located at the very front of the Banker's Box and may be the critical key to finding a reading when all else fails. It lists all NWC-numbered readings (e.g., NWC 1002) in numerical order, identifies status (Issued, Seminar Reserve, or Library Reserve), and identifies the course session to which the reading pertains. Readings are also listed by session number. The same information is also provided for books and publications. The Reading List is particularly useful for linking NWC numbered readings to their specific course sessions in situations where the readings are distributed after the Banker's Box or are otherwise separated from the Box.

(5) *Readings Relevant to More Than One Session.* Some NWC-numbered readings (Issued) may be listed as Required or Reference *for more than one session.* In such cases, the reading will be found with the session tab (in the Banker's Box) of the first session to which the reading has been assigned. Duplicate copies of the reading are *not* provided for later sessions in which the reading is listed. Therefore, if an Issued Reading is not found with a session tab in the Banker's Box, cross-reference it using the Reading List to determine if the reading has been utilized for a previous session. If that fails, check the back of the Banker's Box in case the reading is bulky. If the reading isn't there, advise your faculty moderator, who will determine if the reading was inadvertently not included in your Banker's Box or if there is a class-wide problem.

(6) *Classified Readings.* The very few classified readings used in the JMO Course will not be issued until near the date required for a specific session. Sufficiently in advance of the session, students will be advised when and where to draw the classified readings. Normally arrangements are made for

students to obtain the classified reading from PUBS (located in the basement of Conolly Hall).

IMPORTANT NOTE: Students are cautioned that *classified readings and documents must be read on the premises of the Naval War College*. Ensure such materials are properly safeguarded at all times. Do not leave the materials unattended, even in your cubicle area. Students are not provided with classified material storage containers (safes); it is therefore necessary to **check out and return classified material on a daily basis**. Faculty moderators will provide additional information as required during the JMO trimester.

e. **Management of Reading Load.** The amount of preparatory reading required for each session depends on a variety of factors, including topic complexity and session objectives. It is recommended that students review session reading requirements at least a week ahead of time in order to accurately plan preparation time and ensure that all necessary readings are in hand.

8. Operations Research Paper.

The Operations Research Paper provides students an opportunity to study a theater-strategic or operational-level issue, conduct research and analysis on the topic, and prepare a paper that advances the literature. It is a chance for students to conduct research and analysis on an operational topic that they personally feel is of value. It requires independent thought and graduate-level writing, as the final product must be a 14 – 17 page paper suitable for publication in a professional journal. The amount and level of research should be adequate to support the student's approach, and to justify the conclusions and recommendations. Another use of the paper may be to provide a source of innovative thinking to the Service and joint staffs involved with the many issues bearing on employment of forces.

Various staffs, CINCs, and numerous operating force commands actively solicit papers, theses, and monographs on topics of current interest to them. The Naval War College is frequently canvassed for papers on particular subjects, and requested to stimulate interest in specific areas for research and writing to support requesting commands. One recent example is a U.S. Navy project dealing with innovation in the application of naval force, and options in organization of the force; i.e., how to accomplish the goal of fighting smarter rather than fighting with more. In addition, quality papers are provided to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), where qualified users can access the data base for a variety of applications.

Students are encouraged to submit their research papers for the War College Prize Competition as described in the Naval War College Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM), which is included in the "Student Handbook." Amplifying information and guidance on the selection and execution of a successful Operations Research Paper project are provided in NWC 2062G. Your moderators will answer questions and otherwise assist you in this most important intellectual undertaking during the Introductory Seminar (12 March), again in

seminar on 15 March, and during student tutorials in early April. Moderators will also meet with you whenever you need assistance.

9. Plagiarism and Misrepresentation.

While occurrences of either plagiarism or misrepresentation are exceedingly rare, the consequences of such illegal acts are so serious as to warrant specific mention here and will also be reviewed in seminar by the moderator team at the beginning of the trimester. Your attention is directed to the Naval War College SORM, which discusses the academic honor code and which specifically forbids cheating, plagiarism, and misrepresentation. For the military officer accustomed to the legitimate staff practice of adopting verbatim the language of orders and directives produced by other commands, the academic prohibition of using the words of other writers without proper attribution needs to be reviewed and emphasized. The following definitions should help clarify this important issue:

- *Plagiarism* is the duplication of an author's words without both quotation marks and accurate references or footnotes. It is also the use of an author's ideas in paraphrase without accurate references or footnotes.
- *Misrepresentation* is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgment. It may include the following:
  - Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at the Naval War College without advance permission of the faculty.
  - Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside the Naval War College without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

10. Gaming.

Gaming is a term used generically to cover those sessions in which actions appropriate to various scenarios are the focus of the instruction period. The types of games in this course include seminar decision games and a Multi-crisis War Game (MCWG) that is supported by the War Gaming Department.

a. Considerations for the application of military force are studied in various scenarios. The situations analyzed or played range from political-military interactions to conventional engagements to complex theater-level operations. The unifying factor in these exercises is their importance to joint and combined military operations. Games will involve strategic and operational concepts and functions, available force capabilities, rules of engagement, and operational-level planning. All games will require students to make difficult decisions in a timely manner, and are predicated on student preparation and involvement.

b. The MCWG will involve planning sessions and briefings—given by student commanders or staff members—to present the student-developed Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES), operations order or campaign plan, schemes of maneuver, and follow-on planning. Running estimates are given when appropriate, as are spot critiques of key actions.

11. Cases.

Like games, case method discussions generate active student involvement and are designed to develop student abilities to solve problems using the knowledge, concepts, and skills honed during the JMO trimester. Some of our cases and problems stress individual effort and planning, while other cases will require a team or staff approach. Cases may consist of historical events, analyzed for operational and strategic lessons, or postulated crisis situations demonstrating the application of concepts such as presence, deterrence, international law, rules of engagement, and self-defense. Case problems sometimes will be narrowly focused to demonstrate a specific force and its capabilities and limitations, or to highlight specific concepts involving an aspect of warfare. Seminars are often split into small groups or teams to prepare solutions and responses.

12. Lectures by Senior Military Leaders.

Enrichment lectures by senior military leaders occur periodically during the course. Most of these presentations feature the Chiefs of Service or regional and functional commanders-in-chief. These speakers are invited to discuss views and ideas from their perspective as operational commanders, Service Chiefs, or as senior staff officers. The lectures are normally scheduled for Monday or Tuesday afternoons from 1330-1500. The busy schedules of senior officers may make an occasional departure from this schedule unavoidable. The weekly blue and white schedules will specify the final date and time of each enrichment lecture. Last minute changes will be disseminated by seminar moderators. In order to gain the most benefit from these sessions, it is critical that students be prepared to ask penetrating questions of the guest lecturer.

Note: The substance of the lectures and the ensuing question and answer period are "Not for Attribution" and must **not** *be referenced or identified outside the War College confines, or in any written work, including the Operations Research Paper, without the* **express** *permission of the speaker. Care should be taken not to quote an earlier speaker when posing questions to a subsequent speaker.*

13. Requirements.

Students are expected to prepare fully for each seminar and to participate in classroom discussions and exercises. A tough-minded, questioning attitude and a willingness to enter into rigorous discussion are central to the success of the course.

a. **Workload**. Some peaks in the workload will occur. Advance planning and careful allocation of time will help mitigate these peaks. This is particularly true of the Operations Research Paper. Student experience indicates that the total course requirements will involve a weekly average workload of about 10-15 hours of in-class and 40-45 hours of out-of-class work.

b. **Oral and Written Requirements.** Each section of the course has oral and/or written requirements that provide the opportunity for the student to demonstrate progress. In addition, these requirements serve as a means for feedback and interaction between the faculty and members of the class. Not all requirements are graded, but each provides the student some measure of how he or she

is doing at that point in the course. The following is a composite listing of these course requirements, type of activity, relative weights and the key dates of graded events:

Requirement	Type Effort	Weight	Due Date
Operations Research Paper Proposal	Written/Individual meetings with moderators		30 March (Proposal due) 2-4 April (Tutorials)
Operational Concepts Exam	Written/Individual	15%	30 March
Operations Research Paper	Written/Individual	35%	18 May (CNW) 25 May (NCC)
Final Examination	Written/Individual	25%	7 June
Seminar Contribution	Assessment by moderators	25%	Daily

14. JMO Department Grading Criteria.

The overall guidance for grading students at the Naval War College is contained in Naval War College Instruction SORM. The most salient points in this instruction are:

- Based on the analysis of past grade achievements, a grade distribution of 35% - 45% "A's" and 55% - 65% "B's" and "C's" combined can be expected. While variations from this norm might occur from seminar to seminar and subject to subject, it would be unusual to reach an overall "A" to "B/C" ratio greater than an even 50/50 distribution.
- Numerical averages will not be rounded up (i.e., 89.95 is a B+ and will not be rounded up to an A-).
- Any assigned grade may be appealed *in writing within seven days* after receiving the grade. Grades will be appealed first to the senior moderator and then to the Department Chairman, using forms available in Room C-203. If deemed necessary, the Chairman may assign an additional grader who will review the assignment and provide an independent grade. *Note that the review may sustain, lower, or raise the grade*.

Grade appeals may ultimately be taken to the Dean of Academics, whose decision will be final. Students have the right to appeal any grade, but such appeal may result in a *lower grade*. The academic coordinator, Ms. Carol Stewart, in Room C-203, can assist in preparing an appeal.

A course average grade of B- or higher is required for successful completion of master's degree requirements. A minimum grade of C- is required for successful completion of the JMO course and receipt of JPME Phase I certification.

Three sets of grading criteria determine the letter grades that will be assigned during the Joint Military Operations trimester. The first set covers the Operations Research Paper; the second covers the examinations; and the third covers individual contribution grades.

Using the Naval War College Instruction as basic guidance, the procedures below amplify the criteria as established within the Joint Military Operations Department.

a. Grading criteria for the Operations Research Paper:

The **Operations Research Paper** must have a thesis; provide sufficient background research to analyze the thesis; consider arguments and counter-arguments for the thesis and compare conflicting points of view; present logical conclusions drawn from the material presented; and, as appropriate, provide recommendations or lessons learned based on the conclusions. In addition to the substantive criteria described below, the paper must be editorially correct, i.e., spelling, punctuation, grammar, format, etc.

A+ (98) Offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Especially deserving of distribution to appropriate authorities and submission for prize competition. Thesis is definitive, research is extensive, subject is treated completely, and the conclusions and recommendations are logical and justified.

A (95) Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original thought. Suitable for distribution and submission for prize competition. Thesis is clearly articulated and focused, research is significant, arguments and counter-arguments are comprehensive, and conclusions and recommendations are supported.

A- (92) Above the average expected of graduate work. Contains original thought. Should be retained in the library or Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). Thesis is clearly defined, research is purposeful, arguments and counter-arguments are presented, conclusions and recommendations are valid.

B+ (88) A solid paper. Slightly above the average of graduate work. Thesis is articulated, research has strong points, subject is well presented and well-constructed, and conclusions and recommendations are substantiated by the material.

B (85) Average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, research is appropriate for the majority of the subject, analysis of the subject is valid with minor omissions, and conclusions and recommendations are presented with few inconsistencies.

B- (82) Slightly below the average graduate-level performance. Thesis is presented, but the research does not fully support it; the analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are not fully developed. The paper may not be balanced and the logic may be flawed.

C+ (78) Fails to meet the standards of graduate work. A responsible effort, but portions of the criteria are lacking or missing. The thesis may be unclear, research may be inadequate, analysis may be incomplete, and the conclusions and recommendations may be lacking or not supported by the material.

C (75) Below the standards required of graduate work. Thesis is present, but support, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are either missing or are illogically presented. Paper has significant flaws in construction and development.

C- (72) Well below standards. Thesis poorly stated with minimal evidence of research and several missing requirements. Subject is presented in an incoherent method that does not warrant serious consideration.

F (65 or lower) Paper has no thesis, or does not support the thesis. Paper has significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, logic. An apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements for the paper.

b. Grading criteria for the exams:

A+ (98) Organized, coherent and well-written response. Completely addresses the question. Covers all applicable major and key minor points. Demonstrates total grasp and comprehension of the topic.

A (95) Demonstrates an excellent grasp of the topic, addressing all major issues and key minor points. Organized, coherent, and well-written.

A- (92) Above the average expected of graduate work. Demonstrates a very good grasp of the topic. Addresses all major and at least some minor points in a clear, coherent manner.

B+ (88) Well-crafted answer that discusses all relevant important concepts with supporting rationale for analysis.

B (85) Average graduate performance. A successful consideration of the topic overall, but either in less depth than a B+ or containing statements for which the supporting rationale is not sufficiently argued.

B- (82) Addresses the question and demonstrates a fair understanding of the topic, but does not address all key concepts and is weak in rationale and clarity.

C+ (78) Demonstrates some grasp of topic, but provides insufficient rationale for response and misses major elements or concepts. Does not merit graduate credit.

C (75) Demonstrates poor understanding of the topic. Provides marginal support for response. Misses major elements or concepts.

C- (72) Addresses the topic, but does not provide sufficient discussion to demonstrate adequate understanding of the topic.

F (65 or lower) Fails to address the question.

c. Grading criteria for seminar contributions:

The seminar contribution grade is determined by moderator evaluation of the quality of a student's contributions to seminar discussions, projects, and exercises.

All students are expected to contribute to each seminar, and to listen and respond respectfully when seminar-mates or moderators offer their ideas. *This overall*

expectation underlies all criteria described below. Interruptive, discourteous, disrespectful, or unprofessional conduct or attitude detracts from the overall learning experience for the seminar and *will negatively affect the contribution grade*.

A+ (98) Peerless demonstration of wholly thorough preparation for individual seminar sessions. Consistently contributes original and highly insightful thought. Exceptional team player and leader.

A (95) Superior demonstration of complete preparation for individual sessions. Frequently offers original and well thought-out insights. Routinely takes the lead to accomplish team projects.

A- (92) Excellent demonstration of preparation for individual sessions. Contributes original, well-developed insights in the majority of seminar sessions. Often takes the lead to accomplish team projects.

B+ (88) Above-average graduate level preparation for seminar sessions. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights. Obvious team player who sometimes takes the lead for team projects.

B (85) Average graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Occasionally contributes original and insightful thought. Acceptable team player; takes effective lead on team projects when assigned.

B- (82) Minimally acceptable graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Infrequently contributes well-developed insights; may sometimes speak out without having thought through an issue. Requires prodding to take lead on team projects.

C+ (78) Generally prepared, but not to minimum acceptable graduate level. Requires encouragement to contribute to discussions; contributions do not include original thinking or insights. Routinely allows others to take the lead in team projects.

C (75) Preparation for individual sessions is only displayed when student is called upon to contribute. Elicited contributions reflect at best a basic understanding of session material. Consistently requires encouragement or prodding to take on fair share of team project workload. Only occasionally engages in seminar dialogue with peers and moderators.

C- (72) Barely acceptable preparation. Contributions are extremely limited, rarely voluntary, and reflect minimal grasp of session material. Displays little interest in contributing to team projects.

F (65 or lower) Unacceptable preparation. Contributions are rare and reflect below-minimum acceptable understanding of session material. Displays no interest in contributing to team projects; cannot be relied on to accomplish assigned project work.

15. Seminar Assignments.

The principal criterion in assigning students to a seminar is a balanced distribution among Services and agencies, as well as student and moderator specialties and

operational expertise. Two faculty members are assigned as moderators to each seminar.

Student seminar, classroom, and faculty assignments are published separately.

16. Schedule.

Seminars generally meet in the morning. Depending on the work assigned, you may all meet for scheduled periods in seminar as a group, in smaller teams depending on tasking, or to conduct individual study and research. *Please pay close attention to the start times for each event since they vary throughout the trimester*. Classes normally are scheduled for 0830-1145. Moderators will adjust these times to facilitate the learning objectives for each segment of instruction. A course-planning schedule containing meeting dates and times is provided on pages 249 through 252. The CNW and NCC weekly schedules (printed on blue and white paper respectively) reflect revisions and supersede the schedule contained in the syllabus. Late changes will be announced by memo delivered to student mailboxes or orally by the moderators in class.

17. Key Personnel.

If you require additional information on the course, or if problems develop that cannot be resolved with your moderators, contact one of the following individuals:

Chairman of the Department	COL W. R. Spain, USMC Room C-203, 841-6461
Executive Assistant	PROF J. C. Hodell Room C-203, 841-6458
Academic Coordinator	Ms. C. A. Stewart Room C-203, 841-4120
Head, Block One Operational Concepts	CAPT C. E. Helms, USN Room C-422, 841-6471
Head, Block Two Military Organization and Planning Concepts	CAPT J. T. Locks, USN Room C-413, 841-6466
Head, Block Three Military Operations Other Than War	PROF J. D. Waghelstein Room C-421, 841-6469
Head, Block Four Regional Contingency Planning and War Fighting	PROF D. N. Hime Room C-423, 841-6463
Head, Intelligence Division (CI)	CAPT J. R. FitzSimonds, USN Room SE-117, 841-6485
Head, International Law Division (IL)	CAPT J. P. Edwards, JAGC, USN Room C-424, 841-6473

18. Faculty Assistance.

Assigned faculty members, or moderators, are available to assist students with course material, to review a student's progress, to provide counseling as required, and to offer advice. Students with individual concerns are encouraged to discuss

them as early as possible so that moderators can render assistance in a timely manner. Students are urged to make use of this non-classroom time with the faculty. Tutorials regarding the Research Paper are scheduled in the third and fourth week of the course; student's initial seminar contributions will also be discussed. Mid-course meetings to discuss student progress and to solicit student input on the course to date may be scheduled. Since faculty members also teach electives, participate in war games, instruct military groups outside the Naval War College, and travel for course and faculty development purposes, a mutually agreeable time should be arranged between the moderator and student beforehand. Faculty room numbers and telephone extensions are listed on pages xix-xx. The majority of the faculty are located on the fourth deck of Conolly Hall, except where noted.

19. Student Critiques.

We strive continually to improve this course. To assist us in this goal, critiques are provided at the end of each block of instruction in the syllabus. In addition to the block critiques, students are provided an End-of-Course Questionnaire (see page 241) for completion. We have provided "Course Session Critique Notes" in the syllabus (page 233) to allow students to record information as they go along. These note pages will enable you to record your insights on matters you may otherwise forget by the time you fill out the Block Critiques and the End of Course Questionnaire (e.g., which readings were particularly helpful, and which ones missed the mark.) ***The timely submission of the End-of-Course Questionnaire (no later than 1430 on Friday, 8 June) is required.*** Your constructive comments will help ensure that the course remains relevant and vital in the years to come.

20. JMO Departmental Directory.

Position	Name	Room	Phone #
<u>Departmental Administration</u>			
Chairman	COL W. R. Spain, USMC	C-203	16461
Secretary	Ms. S. Gagne	C-203	13414
Executive Assistant	PROF J. C. Hodell	C-203	16458
Academic Coordinator	Ms. C. A. Stewart	C-203	14120
Faculty Support Clerk	Mrs. C. A. Durkin	C-417	12596
4th Deck FAX	(401) 841-2597 (DSN 948-2597)	C-417	
<u>Operational Concepts</u> (Block I)			
Division Head	CAPT C. E. Helms, USN	C-422	16471
Faculty	COL A. N. G. Bray, USA	C-407	16482
Faculty	PROF D. W. Chisholm	C-412	12328
Faculty	LTCOL P. H. DiJulio, USAF	C-415	16462
Faculty	COL L. M. Feero, USA	SP-212	12134
Faculty	PROF T. L. Gatchel	C-413	13467
Faculty	PROF D. M. Goodrich	C-420	16457
Faculty	PROF M. N. Vego	C-414	16483

Military Organization and Planning Concepts (Block II)

Division Head	CAPT J. T. Locks, USN	C-413	16466
Faculty	LTC (P) J. Anderson, USA	C-408	16570
Faculty	CDR J. L. Barker, USN	C-409	16484
Faculty	LTCOL J. C. Dill, USAF	C-414	16481
Faculty	CAPT J. T. DuGene, USN	C-411	12598
Faculty	CAPT J. R. FitzSimonds, USN	SE-117	16485
Faculty	CDR D. M. Galicki, USN	C-410	16474
Faculty	CDR S. J. Kenny, RN	C-409	13209
Faculty	CAPT J. F. Murray, USCG	SP-214	12397
Faculty	COL P. C. Sweeney, USA	C-424	16480

Military Operations Other Than War (Block III)

Division Head	PROF J. D. Waghelstein	C-421	16469
Faculty	PROF J. R. Ballard	C-411	16415
Faculty	CAPT J. M. Brick, USN	C-420	16460
Faculty	PROF D. F. Chandler	C-425	16478
Faculty	COL R. A. Coe, USAF	SP-213	12694
Faculty	CDR E. J. Dahl, USN	SE-117	16486
Faculty	CAPT V. P. Mocini, USN	C-410	16476
Faculty	CAPT P. T. Toohey, USN	C-407	16468

Regional Contingency Planning and War Fighting (Block IV)

Division Head	PROF D. N. Hime	C-423	16463
Faculty	CAPT R. Babb, USN	C-415	16467
Faculty	LTC (P) W.F. Brown, Jr., USA	C-412	16477
Faculty	CAPT J. P. Edwards, JAGC, USN	C-424	16473
Faculty	COL D.T. Lennox, USMC	C-422	16230
Faculty	PROF E. A. McIntyre	C-425	13394
Faculty	CDR M. Michaels, USN	SE-117	16487
Faculty	PROF R. Reilly (MARAD)	C-408	16475
Faculty	CAPT M. Felmly, USN	C-423	13556

Intelligence Division (CI)

Division Head	CAPT J. R. FitzSimonds, USN	SE-117	16485
Staff Intel Officer	CDR E. J. Dahl, USN	SE-117	16486
Staff Intel Officer	CDR M. R. Michaels, USN	SE-117	16487
Assistant SSO	CTA1 C. C. Seerden, USN	SE-117	16488
Intel Assistant	Mr. W. A. Leaver	SE-117	14709

International Law Division (CJ)

Division Head	CAPT J. P. Edwards, JAGC, USN	C-424	16473

Naval Operational Planner Course (NOPC)

Director	CAPT E. F. Caffrey, USN	C-217	12532
Deputy Director	PROF P.A. Romanski	C-217	12534
Administrative Assistant	Ms. S. A. Logan	C-217	12519

21. Faculty Biographies.

COLONEL WILLIAM R. SPAIN, USMC, returned to the Naval War College faculty in August 1997 from Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, where he served in Manpower and on the USMC QDR team. During his career, he has served in each of the artillery regiments of the four USMC Divisions. His most recent command was Camp Fuji, Japan. Colonel Spain has a B.A. in History and an M.A. in International Relations. He holds the Holland M. Smith Military Chair of Expeditionary Warfare.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL (P) JOSEPH ANDERSON, USA, joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 2000 following his completion of the Naval War College. He was commissioned in the Army as an Infantry Officer through the United States Military Academy in 1981. His company grade tours of duty include a variety of Infantry assignments in the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), command of an airborne company in the 193d Infantry Brigade, Panama, and command of a ranger company in the 2d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. As a ranger company commander, he led the main effort for the Joint Special Operations Task Force at Rio Hato, Panama during Operation Just Cause. His field grade tours of duty include an assignment as an Infantry Branch assignment officer at the Total Army Personnel Command, battalion and brigade operations officer and brigade executive officer in the 25th Infantry Division (Light) and aide-de-camp to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific. He commanded an airborne battalion in the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, NC and led the first U.S. ground forces into Kosovo during Operation Joint Guardian. LTC Anderson is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He holds a bachelor of science degree in Engineering from West Point, a master of science in Administration from Central Michigan University and a master of arts with highest distinction in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.

CAPTAIN ROBIN M. BABB, USN, joined the Naval War College faculty in the fall of 1999, having completed a tour as Deputy Chief, Strategic Plans Division, USCINCPAC, Honolulu, Hawaii. She is a Fleet Support Officer with a communications subspecialty. Her communications assignments include tours at NAVCOMMSTA Greece, NAVCAMSLANT Norfolk, FACSFAC San Diego, CNO OPNAV 941H, NAVCOMTELSTA London, NAVCOMTELSTA Diego Garcia. She also was a Placement Officer at BUPERS. Her degrees include a B.A. in Math from Stonehill College (1975), M.S. in Telecommunications Systems Management from Naval Postgraduate School (1987), and an M.S. in National Resources Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (1996).

PROFESSOR JOHN R. BALLARD joined the Naval War College faculty this year, having completed several years of service at the National Defense University. He comes to Newport directly from a tour as visiting professor of Defence and Strategic Studies at Massey University, in Palmerston North, New Zealand. Previously his National Defense University duties were at the Armed Forces Staff College, where he served as Professor of Military History and Strategy and the Director of Curriculum. Professor Ballard's career has included broad experience in teaching

in the general areas of operational planning, command and control, interagency coordination, and military history, with a focus on Joint Task Forces and Peace Operations. Currently writing a book on Operation STABILISE, the multinational operation in East Timor, Professor Ballard's past writing efforts have included prize-winning articles in numerous military and professional publications; his latest book, published in 1998, was *Upholding Democracy, the United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997.* His active duty in the U. S. Marine Corps included tours at Headquarters Marine Corps and the staff of U.S. Atlantic Command. Professor Ballard's degrees include a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Naval Academy, a master of arts in history from California State University, and a doctorate from Catholic University of America.

COMMANDER JEFFREY L. BARKER, USN, returned to the Naval War College faculty in August 1999, and is the current holder of the Matthew Fontaine Maury Military Chair of Oceanography. A 1976 graduate of the Georgia Institute of Technology, with a B.S. in Physics, he earned a M.S. in Oceanography and Meteorology from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in 1987, and also earned an M.A. from the Naval War College in 1994. In his initial sea tour in USS KALAMAZOO (AOR-6) Commander Barker was designated a Surface Warfare Officer. After assignment at the U.S. Naval Academy, he was redesignated as a Meteorology and Oceanography Officer and reported to Fleet Numerical Oceanography Center in Monterey, CA as the Fleet Applications Division Officer. In addition to his initial Naval War College faculty tour, Meteorology and Oceanography assignments have included: A sea tour in USS WISCONSIN (BB-64) and; overseas tours as the Executive Officer of the Naval Oceanography Command Facility in Yokosuka, Japan, and as the Staff METOC Officer in the London headquarters of Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Force Europe.

COLONEL ARNOLD N. G. BRAY, USA, joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty last year, having graduated from the United States Air War College (Class of 1999). He was commissioned as a Distinguished Military Student in the Army as an Infantry Officer through the ROTC program at Central Missouri State University in 1978. His tours of duty include a variety of Infantry platoon leader assignments in the 2nd Infantry Division, Camp Liberty Bell, Korea, two company commands in the 501st and 502nd Infantry Regiments, and Battalion Operations Officer of the 2nd battalion 502nd Infantry Regiment in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Aide-de-Camp to the Commander XVIII Airborne Corps, Battalion Operations Officer, and Executive Officer with the 2d Battalion 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, Chief of Training in the Joint Special Operation Command, at Fort Bragg, NC, and Special Assistant to Generals Franks and Hartzog in the TRADOC Command Planning Group. He also commanded the 1st Battalion 508th Airborne Combat Team in Vicenza, Italy. He has participated in Hurricane Andrew relief operations, Albania evacuations and conducted extensive study for operations in central Africa. In addition to the Air War College, Lieutenant Colonel Bray is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms Services and Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College—JPME II, NATO Staff Officers Course, and numerous other military

schools. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Central Missouri and an M.A. in international relations from the United States Air War College, Montgomery, Alabama.

CAPTAIN JAMES M. BRICK, USN, joined the Joint Military Operations Department in July 1999, on completion of a tour of duty on the OPNAV Staff. He was commissioned from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1971 and completed Nuclear Power training in 1972. His sea duty assignments include: junior officer in USS DANIEL BOONE (SSBN 629)(BLUE) where he completed six strategic patrols; Navigator/ Operations Officer in USS TUNNY (SSN 682) where he completed deployments to the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans; Executive Officer in USS BIRMINGHAM (SSN 695) where he completed a Western Pacific deployment; Commanding Officer in USS BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (SSBN 640)(BLUE), where his boat completed five strategic patrols, won the Battle 'E' and was recognized as the Most Outstanding SSBN in the Atlantic Fleet (1991); and Commanding Officer in USS PENNSYLVANIA (SSBN 735)(BLUE) where he completed four strategic patrols. Ashore, he served on the COMSUBLANT staff; as 3rd Battalion Officer at the U.S. Naval Academy; and as Deputy Director, Strategy and Policy Division (N51) on the OPNAV staff. He holds a B.S. in Chemistry from USNA and an M.S. in Engineering (Engineering Management) from Catholic University. Captain Brick holds the Charles A. Lockwood Military Chair of Undersea Warfare.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL (P) WILFRED F. BROWN, USA, joined the joint Military Operations faculty in June 2000 after graduating from the College of Naval Warfare class of 2000. Prior to attendance at the CNW, he served in the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division from 1996-1999 as Deputy G3, Commander of 3-101 Aviation (AH-64), and as Deputy Commander, 101st Aviation Brigade. He entered the Army in September 1970, completed flight school in January of 1972 and served as an Aviation Warrant Officer until September of 1980 when he was commissioned as a First Lieutenant of Armor. LTC Brown served in a variety of command and staff positions in Korea, Germany and the United States in both armor and cavalry units. After completing the Infantry Officer's Advanced Course, he served as an exchange officer with the United States Marine Corps from 1983 through 1987, assigned to HMLA 269 deploying to the Mediterranean, Central America, and the northern flank of NATO. LTC Brown completed CGSC in 1991 and subsequently served at the Army's personnel command and with the 4th Infantry Division. LTC Brown holds a B.S. in History from Bradley University, a B.A. in Business Administration from Troy State University, and an M.A. from the Naval War College.

CAPTAIN EDWARD F. CAFFREY, JR., USN, joined the Joint Military Operations Department in March 1998 following graduation from the College of Naval Warfare. He was commissioned through Aviation Officer Candidate School in 1971 and designated a Naval Aviator in 1972. His sea duty assignments include tours of duty in Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 113 (VAW 113), flying the E-2B, embarked in USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65) for two Western Pacific deployments, between 1972 and 1975; again in 1980 through 1982, with VAW 113 flying E-2B's

embarked in USS Coral Sea (CV-43) for two Western Pacific deployments and serving as the Operations Officer; in USS SARATOGA (CV-60) as the Aircraft Handling Officer for a Mediterranean/Indian Ocean deployment, 1984-1986; as the Executive Officer and Commanding Officer of VAW 121 embarked in USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN-69), 1986-1989; as Navigator on USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67), deployed to the Red Sea in 1990-1991, in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm; as the Chief of Staff for Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group Two, deployed as George Washington Battle Group, embarked in USS GEORGE WASHINGTON to the Mediterranean Sea and Arabian Gulf, 1996-1997. Ashore, he served with the Naval Recruiting District, Newark, NJ as an Officer Programs Recruiter, 1975-1978; in VAW 110, NAS Miramar, San Diego, CA. as an E-2B/C instructor pilot, the Operations Officer and Executive Officer, 1982-1984; as the Commanding Officer of the E-2C and C-2 fleet replacement squadron VAW 120, Norfolk, Va., 1991-1992; and as Commander, Airborne Early Warning Wing, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (COMAEWWINGLANT), 1993-1994. He holds a B.S. in Finance from LaSalle College in Philadelphia and an M.A. from the Naval War College. Captain Caffrey occupies the William F. Halsey Chair of Air Warfare.

PROFESSOR DAVID F. CHANDLER reported to the Joint Military Operations Department in August 1993 as a member of the faculty, having already completed one year in the Department as a Senior SECNAV Research Fellow. He retired from the Navy in 1992 after 34 years of active duty. A native of Bradford, Massachusetts, Professor Chandler holds degrees in foreign languages from the University of Miami and in International Relations from the American University. He is a graduate of the German General Staff College. As a surface warfare officer, Professor Chandler served in amphibious, logistics, and destroyer force ships. Among his commands were USS MAHAN, USS LIPAN, Destroyer Squadrons Twenty and Six, the U.S. South Atlantic Force, the Inter-American Defense College, and service on the staffs of U.S. Southern Command and Military Sealift Command.

PROFESSOR DONALD W. CHISHOLM joined the Naval War College in 2000. Previously, he was a member of the graduate public administration faculty at the University of Illinois, Chicago (1996-2000). He has also taught political science and public policy at the University of California, Los Angeles (1989-1996), at Ohio State University (1987-1989), and the University of California, San Diego (1984-1986). Professor Chisholm earned his A.B., M.A., and Ph.D. in political science at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of *Coordination Without Hierarchy: Informal Structures in Multi-organizational Systems* (University of California Press, 1989) and *Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793-1941* (Stanford University Press, 2000), along with a number of journal articles on problems of organizations. He is presently at work on a book on the amphibious operations of the Korean War to be published by the U.S. Naval Institute Press.

COLONEL ROBERT A. COE, USAF, serves as the Senior Air Force Advisor to the President, Naval War College, and is on his second faculty assignment with the Joint Military Operations Department. He arrived in August 1999 from Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, where he was the U.S. Defense Representative and Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office for the American Embassy. Colonel Coe first reported to the JMO Department in July 1996 following graduation from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. He is a Command Pilot with experience in numerous operational F-16 squadrons throughout the Pacific and the United States, including tours as Commander the 80th Fighter Squadron at Kunsan AB, Korea and Operations Officer of the 13th and 14th Fighter Squadrons in Misawa, Japan. He also served on the staff of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs as Chief of International Fighter Programs and as Executive Officer to the Director of International Programs, HQ USAF Plans and Programs. He earned his Air Force ROTC commission in 1975 from Washington State University, along with a bachelor's degree in secondary education. Colonel Coe holds master's degrees in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Army Command and General Staff College and in National Resource Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

COMMANDER ERIK J. DAHL, USN, joined the JMO faculty in July 1999, following a tour as Chief of the Indications and Warning Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Forces Korea in Seoul. An intelligence officer, he was commissioned through AOCS in 1981. His previous assignments have included operational tours with Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE (VQ-1), USS CARL VINSON (CVN70), and Carrier Air Wing FIVE (CVW5) in USS INDEPENDENCE. He has also served on the staff of HQ, U.S. European Command; as deputy chief of the CNO Intelligence Plot in the Pentagon; and as Intelligence Officer for the Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC). He holds a bachelor's degree in Government from Harvard and a master's degree in West European Politics from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAUL H. DiJULIO, USAF, reported to the Joint Military Operations Department in February 1998 following an assignment at the Pentagon. He was commissioned in the Air Force through Officer Training School in 1981 and graduated from pilot training in 1982. A B-52 Pilot, he has served in both operational and training squadrons throughout the United States. Following his graduation from Air Command and Staff College in 1993, he attended the Air Force's School of Advanced Airpower Studies for an additional year of graduate work. He was subsequently assigned to the Pentagon where he served on the personal staffs of both the Air Force's Deputy Director for Plans and Operations and the Secretary of the Air Force. He graduated from the University of New Haven with a B.S. in Forensic Science and a B.A. in Criminal Justice, has an M.A.S. in Aeronautical Science from Embry Riddle, and a Master of Airpower Art and Science degree from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSEPH C. DILL, USAF, joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty this year, following a one year tour in Riyadh,

Saudi Arabia as the Chief of Long Range and Contingency Plans, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia. He was commissioned through ROTC following graduation from Wilkes College in 1984. He is a Command Navigator with over 12 years flying experience in the B-52 and B-1. His B-52 years were spent at Carswell AFB, TX sitting monthly Strategic Air Command nuclear alert as an Electronic Warfare Officer. In the B-1, Major Dill was an Instructor Weapon Systems Officer and the Commander of the Weapons and Tactics Flight at Ellsworth AFB, SD. At Ellsworth he oversaw 28 Bomb Wing exercises, the wing's flying standards and day-to-day flying operations. He later served as the Chief of NATO Contingency Plans at United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE). He played a major role in developing USAFE's first Air Expeditionary Force War Plan. Major Dill is a graduate of the Naval War College's Naval Operational Planner Course (initial cadre), the Naval War College Command and Staff Course and the Air Force Squadron Officer School. Major Dill holds master's degrees from the Naval War College, Texas Christian University and Texas A and M.

CAPTAIN JOHN T. DuGENE, USN, joined the Naval War College faculty in 1998, having completed a tour as the Air Boss in USS CARL VINSON (CVN 70). His many operational tours as a fighter pilot include duty in VF 1, shipboard duty in USS INDEPENDENCE (CV 62), an exchange tour with the U.S. Air Force at Nellis Air Force Base, and command of the "Aggressor Squadron," VF 45, in Key West, Florida. Commander Dugene holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering from Purdue University and an M.A. in Political Science from the University of Nevada. He is a graduate of the Royal Naval Staff Course at the Royal Naval College, UK.

CAPTAIN JONATHAN P. EDWARDS, JAGC, USN, holds the Howard S. Levie Military Chair of Operational Law. Captain Edwards was called to active duty in 1980. His operational law experience includes serving as: an instructor in the law of armed conflict at the U.S. Naval Academy; the Staff Judge Advocate to Commander, Iceland Defense Force (a sub-unified command under CINCUSACOM); a State Department attorney-advisor expert in peacekeeping, security assistance, and the War Powers Resolution; and as an action officer on the Joint Staff (J-5) for ocean policy matters. Captain Edwards joined the faculty in 1999, following his graduation from the College of Naval Warfare. He also holds an LL.M. in International & Comparative Law and Environmental Law from The George Washington University (1992), a J.D. from Saint Louis University (1980), and a B.A. from Stonehill College (1977).

COLONEL LANCE M. FEERO, USA, joined the Naval War College faculty in July 1998 after serving as G3 and Chief of Staff, 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command, Fort Bliss, Texas. An Air Defense officer, he has served in a variety of leadership and staff positions in Germany, Korea and CONUS. Colonel Feero commanded 5th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery, 2nd Infantry Division, in Korea. He has experience with the Improved HAWK, Vulcan, Stinger and Avenger air defense systems. His military education includes the Air Defense Artillery Basic Course, Air Defense Artillery Advanced Course, Chemical Additional Specialty

Course, Army Command and General Staff College, and the Naval War College. He holds a bachelor's degree in Elementary Education from the University of Maine and a master's degree from the Naval War College. Colonel Feero holds the Tasker Howard Bliss Chair of Land Warfare.

CAPTAIN MICHAEL FELMLY, USN, reported to the Joint Military Operations Department in October 1999 following a twenty-eight month assignment as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Information (ACOS for C4I) for COMMANDER, Seventh Fleet embarked in USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC 19) and forward deployed to Yokosuka, Japan. He was commissioned through Officer Candidate School, Newport, RI in 1977 and designated as a Surface Warfare Officer in 1979. His sea duty assignments include tours of duty embarked in USS DAMATO (DD 871) as Anti-Submarine Officer (ASWO) between 1978 and 1979; in USS JESSE L. BROWN (FF 1079) as ASWO and Navigator, between 1979 and 1981; in USS McCANDLESS (FF 1084) as Engineer Officer, between 1985 and 1986; in USS MERRIMACK (AO 179) as Engineer Officer, between 1987 and 1989, as ACOS for Material (N4) on the staff of COMMANDER, Logistics Group Two Norfolk, VA, between 1989 and 1990; in USS SYLVANIA (AFS 2) as Executive Officer, between 1990 and 1992; and in USS CIMARRON (AO 177) as Commanding Officer, between 1994 and 1996. Ashore, he attended Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1980; served as Foreign Military Sales/Training Officer and Military Standards Officer at Service School Command, San Diego, CA between 1982 and 1984; as Combat Logistics Force Resource Sponsor on the Navy Staff (OPNAV OP03/N86), between 1992 and 1994. He holds a B.A. degree in Biology from SUNY Plattsburgh, NY (1974), a M.S. degree in Educational Administration from the University at Albany, NY (1976), and a M.S. degree in Instructional Technology from National University, San Diego, CA (1983). He is a 1997 graduate of the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Captain Felmly holds the Arleigh Burke Chair of Surface Warfare.

CAPTAIN JAMES R. FITZSIMONDS, USN, holds the Edwin T. Layton Chair of Intelligence. A 1974 graduate of the United States Naval Academy, Captain FitzSimonds began his commissioned service as a Surface Warfare Officer in USS BLAKELY (FF-1072). In 1980 he was redesignated a special duty Intelligence Officer. His afloat intelligence assignments include USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65) and staff duty with Cruiser-Destroyer Group Two where he served as Intelligence Officer for the USS AMERICA (CV-66) Battle Group during Operation DESERT STORM. His ashore assignments include tours on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Navy Operational Intelligence Center Detachment (Newport, RI), the CNO Strategic Studies Group, and the Net Assessment Directorate of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He holds a Master of Science degree in Defense Policy Analysis from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and is a distinguished graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

COMMANDER DENNIS M. GALICKI, USN, joined the Joint Military Operations department in August 1999, following completion of a tour as the Future Operations/ Plans and Surface Operations Officer on the staff of Commander,

Cruiser Destroyer Group TWO. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Naval Academy, and has extensive operational experience at sea in destroyers, the combat logistics force, and aircraft carriers, including service in USS MULLINNIX (DD 944), USS WILLIAM C. LAWE (DD 763), USS SANTA BARBARA (AE 28), USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69), USS PLATTE (AO 186), and USS LEXINGTON (AVT 16). Commander Galicki has also served on the staff of Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group FIVE deploying with the KITTY HAWK Battle Group in support of humanitarian relief efforts in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, and combat operations in support of Operation Desert Storm/Southern Watch in the Persian Gulf. During his most recent assignment he deployed with the GEORGE WASHINGTON Battle Group to the Mediterranean Sea and Arabian Gulf. He is a proven subspecialist in Naval/Mechanical Engineering and Operational Logistics.

PROFESSOR THEODORE L. GATCHEL rejoined the Joint Military Operations faculty in July 1998, having taught in the department twice while on active duty. He retired from the Marine Corps in 1991 as a colonel after a thirty-year career that included a wide variety of both staff and command assignments and two combat tours in Vietnam. He holds a B.S. in Geological Engineering from the University of Oklahoma and an M.S. in Management from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is also a graduate of the Naval War College, the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the U.S. Army's Infantry Officers Advanced Course. He is the author of *At the Water's Edge: Defending Against the Modern Amphibious Assault* (Naval Institute Press, 1996) and *Eagles and Alligators: An Examination of the Command Relationships That Have Existed Between Aircraft Carrier and Amphibious Forces During Amphibious Operations* (Naval War College Press, 1997), in addition to numerous magazine and journal articles and a monthly newspaper column on military affairs.

PROFESSOR DAVID M. GOODRICH joined the faculty of the Naval War College in July 1998. He is a 1959 graduate in the first class of the United States Air Force Academy. He retired from the USAF in 1991, after 32 years of service. A native of San Antonio, Texas, he holds degrees in engineering and International Relations/Soviet Affairs, the latter from the University of California at Los Angeles. He was selected for the first Chief of Staff of the Air Force Senior Fellowship at the National War College, graduating in 1971. His service includes Commander, 24th Air Division, North American Air Defense Command; Commander, 86th Tactical Fighter Wing (USAFE); Commander, 50th Tactical Fighter Wing (USAFE), the first USAF F-16 wing in Europe; Chief, Director Defense Intelligence Agency Staff Group; USAF Special Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; USAF Special Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe; Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff USAF Programs and Resources; Deputy for Current Operations (J-3) and Plans Officer (J-5), the JCS Joint Staff; and Commandant, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

CAPTAIN CHESTER E. HELMS, USN, enlisted in the Navy in 1969 and received his commission via the Navy Enlisted Scientific Education Program (NESEP). He

graduated with honors from North Carolina State University in 1974 with a B.S. in Nuclear Engineering and holds an M.A. from the Naval War College. Captain Helms served sea tours aboard USS OMAHA (SSN 692), USS BOSTON (SSN 703), USS PHILADELPHIA (SSN 690), and as Commanding Officer of USS GEORGE C. MARSHALL (SSBN 654). His shore tours include the staff of Admiral McKee at Naval Reactors, Department of Energy; Tactical Development Staff of Submarine Development Squadron Twelve; and Executive Assistant to the Director for Operations and Logistics and Senior Controller in the Command Center at U.S. Strategic Command. Captain Helms reported to the Naval War College in August 1995.

PROFESSOR DOUGLAS N. HIME first joined the Naval War College faculty in 1992, following a tour as Chief, International Negotiations, U.S. Delegation to the NATO Military Committee. Following a tour as a member of the faculty at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, Professor Hime retired from the Air Force in September 1998 and rejoined the Naval War College faculty in October 1998. His previous assignments include several operational flying tours in B-52s and a staff assignment in Bomber Operations at Headquarters, Strategic Air Command. He has commanded avionics and field maintenance squadrons in addition to a B-52 squadron. His military schooling includes Air War College and the NATO Defense College. He holds an undergraduate degree from Emporia State University and a graduate degree from the University of Southern California. Professor Hime is currently completing his dissertation as a Ph.D. candidate in humanities at Salve Regina University.

PROFESSOR JOHN C. HODELL is a 1963 graduate of Villanova University, Villanova, PA. He holds master's degrees from the Naval War College and Salve Regina University. He has begun working on his dissertation toward a doctorate in Humanities from Salve Regina University. He had tours in several Electronic Warfare Squadrons including Commanding Officer of VAQ-130, an EA-6B Squadron. He was a Naval War College faculty member in the Operations Department from November 1981 to September 1984 followed by a tour in the Research, Development and Acquisition Directorate of the OPNAV staff before returning to the War College in 1987. He retired in August 1991, as a Captain, and remained on the faculty.

COMMANDER STEVE J. KENNY, ROYAL NAVY, joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in February 2000. A seaman officer and AWW specialist, he spent six years in the Merchant Marine as a Deck Officer before joining the Royal Navy and graduating from Britannia Royal Naval College in 1985. After tours as an Intercept Controller, he qualified as a Principal Warfare Officer in 1990. After further study at the School of Maritime Operations, he graduated as an Area AAW Specialist and after a tour as a Operations Officer of a destroyer, he joined the Staff of the Flag Officer Sea Training as his Senior Warfare Officer, teaching all aspects of warfare at sea to UK, NATO, and non-NATO navies. Following a tour as XO of the destroyer HMS Manchester, he was promoted to commander in December 1997 and given command of the Type 42 destroyer HMS

Newcastle. While in command he saw operations in the Caribbean, Arabian Gulf and more recently in the Adriatic during the Kosovo conflict in 1999.

COLONEL DYER T. LENNOX ,USMC, joined the JMO faculty in July 2000 after a tour as the Chief of Staff at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, CA. He was commissioned through the NROTC program at the University of Michigan in 1973. An Artillery officer, he has served in a wide variety of leadership and staff billets in CONUS, Hawaii, Okinawa and Italy. Commands include an artillery battery at Camp Lejeune, NC, the security company at Camp David, MD and Second Battalion, Twelfth Marines on Okinawa. Besides staff assignments at the artillery battalion and regimental level, he has served in the NMCC, OJCS and as the amphibious plans and operations officer on the COMSTRIKFORSOUTH staff in Naples, Italy. Here he was involved in the planning, preparation and employment of IFOR. His military schooling includes Amphibious Warfare School, the Armed Forces Staff College and the Naval War College. He holds an undergraduate degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Michigan and a MA from the Naval War College.

CAPTAIN JOHN T. LOCKS, USN, reported to the faculty of the Naval War College in August 1998 from sea duty on the staff of the Commander, U.S. SIXTH FLEET, homeported in Gaeta, Italy. He graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1976, with a B.S. in Marine Engineering. He served at sea in USS FINBACK (SSN 670), USS NATHAN HALE (SSBN 623 (GOLD)), USS HELENA (SSN 725), and as Commanding Officer of USS MARIANO G. VALLEJO (SSBN 658 (GOLD)) and USS TREPANG (SSN 674). Between assignments at sea, Captain Locks accumulated 46 months of shore duty at the Bureau of Naval Personnel and on the staff of the Commander, Submarine Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet. He has used his spare time while ashore to earn a master's degree from Georgetown University (National Security Studies) and the U.S. Naval War College (National Security and Strategic Studies).

PROFESSOR ELIZABETH A. MCINTYRE, CIA FACULTY REPRESENTATIVE of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), returned to the Naval War College in October 2000 from CIA HQS where she had served in a senior position in the Latin America Division of the CIA Directorate of Operations (DO). She holds the George Herbert Walker Bush Chair of National Intelligence. During her career, Dr. McIntyre has served four tours overseas, first as an operations officer and later as Chief of Station in Western Europe. She has completed several Washington assignments, serving as chief of units focusing on operations in Russia and Central Asia, and spent 1994-95 on the DCI's staff where the majority of her work related to Interagency issues. Dr. McIntyre holds an M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University of Oxford (England) and a B.A. from Emmanuel College in Boston. She previously served on the JMO faculty at the Naval War College from 1995-99.

COMMANDER MICHAEL R. MICHAELS, USN, graduated from the College of Naval Command and Staff of the Naval War College in 1995 with Highest Distinction. He joined the faculty of JMO in the fall of 1998 having completed a tour of duty at the United States European Command's Joint Analysis Center at

Molesworth, United Kingdom. His career as an intelligence officer has included tours at CINCUSNAVEUR, the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center at Dam Neck, Virginia, and duty on the staff of Commander United States SECOND Fleet. A designated Joint Specialty Officer, Commander Michaels served as Deputy Director of Intelligence for Combined Task Force (CTF) OPERATION NORTHERN WATCH, Incirlik, Turkey from January to June 1997. He holds a bachelor's degree in Sociology and Criminal Justice from North Carolina State University.

CAPTAIN VINCENT P. MOCINI, USN, reported to the JMO faculty in October 2000 following a tour as Defense, Naval, and Naval Attaché for Air at the U.S. Embassy in Rome. Prior to that he served twice in command in both joint and Navy staff assignments. Commissioned in 1973, Captain Mocini has served extensively at sea in cruisers and destroyers, including tours in USS RICHARD L. PAGE (FFG 5), homeported in Athens, Greece; USS FANNING (FF 1076) and USS HALSEY (CG 23), as engineer officer. In 1984 he assumed command of the patrol hydrofoil missile ship USS TAURUS (PHM 3). In March 1992 he assumed command of the guided missile frigate, USS CLIFTON SPRAGUE (FFG 16). A graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School and the National War College, he served as Special Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic/U.S. Commander in Chief, Atlantic. While on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, he worked on the development of the Navy's newest ship, the "Zumwalt class" destroyer. A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Captain Mocini was born in Chicago and raised in Saugatuck, Michigan.

CAPTAIN JAMES F. MURRAY, USCG, is the Coast Guard Advisor to the President of the Naval War College and member of the Joint Military Operations Faculty. He is a 1976 graduate of the United States Coast Guard Academy and served as First Lieutenant in Coast Guard Cutter CHEROKEE (WMEC 165). He has extensive experience in coastal - shore operations and law enforcement. He served as Intelligence Section Chief and Chief of Current Operations in the Seventh Coast Guard District, Miami, Florida. Additionally, he was Assistant Branch Chief of the Fifth District's Office of Law Enforcement. His coastal-shore operations tours include command of Coast Guard Station St. Petersburg, Florida, and Group Southwest Harbor, Maine. He also served as Deputy Group Commander, Group St. Petersburg, Florida. Captain Murray was assigned as Operating Expenses Appropriation Coordinator in the Office of Programs for the Chief of Staff of the Coast Guard from 1992 to 1995. He earned a Bachelor of Science in Mathematics degree from the USCG Academy (1976), a Master of Operations Research and Statistics from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, N.Y.(1982), and a Master of Science in National Resource Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (1996). Captain Murray joined the faculty and staff in July of 1999.

PROFESSOR ROBERT K. REILLY, MARAD REPRESENTATIVE, returned to the Naval War College and the JMO Department in September 1995. He was an Operations Professor and the Emory S. Land Chair of Merchant Marine Affairs from 1983-86 and assumes the chair again. Professor Reilly holds two B.S. degrees

from the Massachusetts Maritime Academy (Marine Transportation), a B. A. degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in Government and International Affairs, and a J.D. from Fordham School of Law. He has extensive experience in the commercial shipping industry and several assignments in the Military Sealift Command. He served in the Naval Control of Shipping Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-06N). After retiring from the Navy as a Commander, he practiced Admiralty Law for two civilian law offices. Most recently, he has been a member of the Board for Development of the Marine Transportation Curriculum, Massachusetts Maritime Academy; member of a Massachusetts state panel concerning Maritime Affairs and shipyard purchase and lease; and, most recently, a Principal Analyst for Sonalysts, Inc., in support of transportation issues in the CNWS Global War Game Series.

PROFESSOR PAUL A. ROMANSKI, a 1968 graduate of the NROTC Program at the University of Notre Dame, joined the Naval War College faculty in August 1994 as an active duty Navy captain and held the Arleigh Burke Chair of Surface Warfare until his retirement from active duty in 1998. His Navy career included destroyer escort and Combat Logistics Force duty, junk force riverine operations in Vietnam, and shore assignments on the CNO's staff, at the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and Military Sealift Command. Professor Romanski's career included tours in command of USS PYRO (AE-24), USS WICHITA (AOR 1), and the composite Task Force 63—Naval Surface Group Mediterranean—Task Force 505 (NATO). He holds Master of Arts degrees from the University of Illinois and the Naval War College, and is pursuing a Ph.D. at Salve Regina University. After his retirement in July 1998, Professor Romanski joined the civilian faculty of the Joint Military Operations Department.

COLONEL PATRICK C. SWEENEY, USA, joined the Joint Military Operations Department faculty in 1999, having completed a tour in NATO as the Chief of Contingency Plans for Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). He was commissioned in the Army as a Field Artillery Officer through the ROTC program at The Citadel in 1973. His tours of duty include a variety of artillery assignments in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Division G3 Ops with the 2d Infantry Division in Korea, a Fire Support Instructor at the U.S. Army Infantry School, command of a Pershing 2 Battery in Germany, Corps Plans Officer and artillery battalion executive officer in XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, NC, followed by an assignment as the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery G3 during DESERT SHIELD / STORM. He commanded an artillery battalion at the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum NY, and participated in Hurricane Andrew relief operations as well as operations in Somalia and Haiti. His most recent assignment at AFSOUTH focused primarily as the Deputy CJ5 for the IFOR mission in Bosnia and as a NATO planner for Kosovo operations. Colonel Sweeney is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advance Military Studies, and the Army War College. He holds a bachelor of science degree in Business Administration from The Citadel and master's degrees in Public Administration from Western Kentucky University and Military Arts and Science from the School of Advance Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth.

CAPTAIN PATRICK T. TOOHEY, USN, enlisted in the Navy in 1969, graduated from Golden Gate University with a B.S. in Management Science and received his commission through OCS in 1978. He is a 1986 graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College. Captain Toohey served multiple tours with: Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) 21 and 22; SEAL Team SIX; SEAL Team FOUR; and NAVSPECWARGRU TWO (NSWG-2). He served as Platoon Commander and Training Officer in UDT 22, Assault Team Leader and Operations Officer in SEAL Team SIX, Executive Officer and Commanding Officer of SEAL Team FOUR and Chief Staff Officer of NSWG-2. Additionally, he served with Commander SIXTH Fleet (COMSIXTHFLT) as the N34, Special Operations Officer, and two tours with Commander, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) as the Chief of Current Operations and the Deputy J3. CAPT Toohey joined the Naval War College faculty in 1998, graduated from the Naval War College, with distinction, in 1999, and holds the William F. Donovan Military Chair of Special Operations.

PROFESSOR MILAN N. VEGO was an instructor at the Defense Intelligence College (1985-91) and an adjunct instructor at the War Gaming and Simulations Center, National Defense University (1989-91) before joining the Naval War College faculty in August 1991. He was a Senior Fellow at the Center for Naval Analyses (1985-87) and in the Foreign Military Studies Office (formerly Soviet Army Studies Office), Ft. Leavenworth, KS (1987-89). Professor Vego is a native of Capljina, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Professor Vego holds a B.A. in Modern History and an M.A. in U.S. History, Belgrade University, and a Ph.D. in European History from George Washington University. He also holds a Master Mariner's license since 1973. Professor Vego's book, "Soviet Navy Today," was published by Arms and Armour Press (London) in 1986; "Soviet Naval Tactics" was published by the Naval Institute Press in 1992; and "The Austro-Hungarian Navy 1904-1914" was published by Frank Cass Publishers (London) in September 1996. Professor Vego's most recent book, "Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas," was published by Frank Cass Publishers in 1999. He is also a frequent contributor to many professional journals and magazines.

PROFESSOR JOHN D. WAGHELSTEIN brings to the Naval War College faculty thirty years of operational experience in Low Intensity Conflict, Special Operations and Security Assistance. In addition to two tours in Vietnam, he served five tours in Latin America and commanded U.S. Army Special Forces at every level from a Detachment to Group (0-6). Other assignments include: Commander of a Mobile Training Team in the Dominican Republic, Airborne-Infantry Advisor in Bolivia, Commander of the U.S. Military Group in El Salvador and Executive Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command. He holds an M.A. in International Relations from Cornell and a Ph.D. in History from Temple University.

Listing of Course Foundations

CF-1 Course Overview 2
CF-2 Introductory Seminar 4
CF-3 The American Way of War 5
CF-4 The Naval Way of War 7
CF-5 The Strategic Objective 10
CF-6 Diplomacy and Military Force 13
CF-7 Introduction to Network Centric Warfare 16
CF-8 Operations Research Paper—Review 19
CF-9 Joint Military Operations Course Conclusion 23
CF Bibliography 24
CF Critique 27

COURSE OVERVIEW (Lecture)

Extraordinary as it may appear, the naval officer whose principal business is to fight is not taught the higher branches of his profession. The U.S. is not singular in this respect. The defect is common to nearly all navies and is an inheritance of a past and less enlightened age. But with the recent revolution in naval warfare comes a demand for a higher order of talent in the conduct of naval operation.

—Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, 8 August 1877
Founder and First President of the Naval War College

A. Focus:

The Chairman of the Joint Military Operations Department will overview the Joint Military Operations course.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the objectives of the Joint Military Operations Course.

C. Background:

For the century ahead, the use of military and naval power and their interrelationships with the political, diplomatic, economic and informational instruments of national power will remain a key challenge. During this course, we will study how to wield the military instrument of power, in peace and war, to achieve the national policy goals. We will examine the power relationships at two levels, strategic and operational, which incorporate the varying perspectives of the Congress and the Executive Branch (President, Cabinet members, Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, joint task force commanders and their naval component commanders). Our focus remains joint operations at the theater and task force level; however, national level strategy formulation, implementation and campaigning are emphasized. This course is designed to develop our abilities to craft regional strategies and translate them into naval, joint, interagency and multinational operations.

We will review current theory of operational art, compare it to the doctrinal basis for contemporary application of military power, and begin to distill the next generation of doctrine for our armed forces. Today's operational art theory and the doctrinal basis for the U. S. armed forces reflect the zenith of our wisdom and knowledge of Industrial Age warfare and nation-state relationships. The advent of the Information Age creates an additional challenge in the creation of the next generation of doctrine as some of our theoretical fundamentals may change. The joint community and each of the military services are exploring this issue. The U. S. Navy advocates Network Centric Warfare as its conceptual basis for 21st century war fighting. Through its prism, we will examine our nation's near term challenges and the tenets of 21st century warfare.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Required Readings:

U.S. Naval War College, *Joint Military Operations Syllabus and Study Guide for Joint Military Operations 2001,* Course Description (Issued). Read pp. vi-xix, 31-34, 105, 187, 223-226.

F. Reference Readings:

The Constitution of the United States. Article 1, Sections 8 & 9; Article 2, Section 2; Article 3, Sections 2 & 3. (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Hattendorf, John B.; Simpson III, B. Mitchell and Wadleigh, John R., *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U. S. Naval War College.* Naval War College Press, Newport, RI, 1984.

INTRODUCTORY SEMINAR

A. Focus:

This session is devoted to the introduction of seminar faculty and student members, a review of the administrative requirements and procedures for the trimester, an introductory discussion of the Operations Research Paper and the general "ground rules" of seminar conduct.

B. Objectives:

- Identify the background and expertise of the faculty and student members of the seminar.
- Establish seminar guidelines for conduct and evaluations.
- Explain course requirements, including the Operations Research Paper requirement.
- Discuss social and administrative matters.

C. Guidance:

The introductory seminar provides the opportunity for the moderators to identify faculty and student background and expertise, and for moderators and students to discuss relevant social and administrative matters. The Operations Research Paper, discussed in more detail later in Session CF-8, is a significant contribution to the trimester learning experience. Demanding research, analysis, and discussion of a subject chosen by the student early in the trimester, it takes the form of a 14–17 page paper, due at the end of Block Three. Time has been allotted for brief student presentations of significant research findings. These presentations will be made in individual seminar rooms just prior to the start of the war game.

In preparation for the seminar, in addition to completion of the Required Reading, students are asked to complete a short, one page questionnaire, which will be collected at the beginning of the session.

The point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel (P) W. F. Brown, C-412.

D. Required Reading:

None.

E. Reference Readings:

None.

F. Supplementary Readings:

None.

THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR (Lecture)

A. Focus:

The JMO course focuses on the operational level of war across the spectrum of conflict, from all-out war to military operations other than war (MOOTW). As we begin our study of operational art, it is important to understand the historical context and resulting American mindset on the use of military force. After introducing the spectrum of conflict, this lecture traces American war-making habits and examines a set of unique and contradictory relationships: conventional versus unconventional warfare; professional versus citizen soldiers; and preparedness versus unpreparedness. The specific focus is on the formative period prior to American preeminence as a military power.

B. Objectives:

- Analyze American perceptions about war and peace.
- Understand the historical relationship between U.S. professional and citizen service members.
- Examine our legacy of contradictions regarding war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how historical baggage, roles, functions, capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces affect the development of joint military strategy and military operations.

C. Background:

The JMO course concentrates on the theater-strategic and operational levels, i.e., that level which provides the coherent connection between the strategic level and the tactical level. As we look at this across the full spectrum of conflict, from all out war to military operations other than war, it is important to understand the historical context and resulting American mindset on the use of military force.

Every nation has a predisposition as to how it fights its wars, a bias that is the result of culture and experience. For the U.S. there is a strong dependence on mobilization, a penchant for reliance on technology, a tendency toward rapid action once engaged, a willingness to use a high level of violence, and a precipitous demobilization and return to "peacetime," viewed as normality.

There is a uniquely American approach to national defense based in part upon our prejudice against standing armies. This prejudice influenced how the regulars and the people's militia and volunteers evolved, along with the national defense establishment. There is a tradition of friction between citizen soldiers and regulars in time of war.

In the 18th, 19th and most of the 20th century there was a disconnect between the U.S. military's doctrine and military education and the missions it was actually called upon to accomplish—a disconnect that often led to early disasters in our wars or difficulty in dealing with small wars.

The relationship among national vision/strategy, military operations and tactical (combat) choices reflects our national character.

These issues or sets of relationships constitute distinctly American cultural baggage. Examining our historic approach to war and the baggage we carry with us into the 21st century helps us understand our political, social and cultural evolution. You will have the opportunity throughout the Joint Military Operations Course to determine the extent to which this baggage still applies.

The point of contact for this session is Professor J. D. Waghelstein, C-421.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Required Readings:

John T. Fishel, "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, The GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night," pp. 375-379 (**NWC 3077**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine For Joint Operations*, 1 Feb. 1995 (Issued). Read Preface, Chapters 1 and 5.

Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War,* 16 June 1995 (Issued). Read Glossary definitions.

F. Reference Readings:

None.

G. Supplementary Readings:

Cunliffe, Marcus, *Soldiers and Civilians, The Martial Spirit in America 1775-1865*. Boston & New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1968.

Millett, Alan R. and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense, A Military History of the United States of America.* New York: The Free Press, 1994.

Millis, Walter, *Arms and Men, A Study of American Military History.* New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981.

Millis, Walter (Ed), *American Military Thought*. Indianapolis, New York and Kansas City: the Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966.

Waghelstein, John D., "Preparing the U.S. Army for the Wrong War—Educational and Doctrinal Failure 1865–1891," pp. 1–33. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol 10, No. 1 (Spring 1999): London: Frank Cass.

Weigley, Russell F., *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. The Macmillan Wars of the United States*, ed. Louis Morton. New York: the Macmillan Company, 1973.

THE NAVAL WAY OF WAR (Lecture)

A. Focus:

In the American Way of War we focused on the operational level of war across the spectrum of conflict, from all-out war to military operations other than war (MOOTW). The objective was to understand the historical context and resulting American mindset concerning the use of military force. In this lecture we will examine the historical context in which the U.S. Naval Service—the Navy and Marine Corps—evolved its way of "doing business." The objective is to enhance student understanding of these specifically naval traditions of planning and conducting operations. In so doing, the contrast will be drawn between the "naval way of war" and how officers of the Army and Air Force plan and conduct their operations.

B. Objectives:

- Examine the spectrum of conflict as it involves naval forces.
- Analyze American perceptions of and beliefs about the U.S. Naval Service.
- Understand the historical relationship between senior Navy and Marine Corps officers and their Army and Air Force counterparts.
- **PJE**—Understand the historical basis of the current U.S. defense establishment; its structure, policies, and strategies; understand how the functions, capabilities, and limitations of U.S. military forces affect the development of joint military strategy and military operations.

C. Background:

At any given point in time, the naval services are, like people, the sum of their experiences. These experiences are codified in their formal structures, doctrines, and operating procedures, as well as in less obvious informal usages and patterns of assumptions and beliefs. These factors are reinforced by professional training programs, the structure of careers, and day-to-day operations. Although subject to change, these factors tend to lag changes in immediate circumstances.

In their two centuries of existence, the Navy and Marine Corps have developed unique ways of defining, planning, and conducting their operations, which are distinct from those of the other military services. These include deeply held beliefs about (1) how decisions should be made; (2) the place of the naval services in the implementation of national policy; (3) command relations and the importance of discretion for subordinates; (4) the relationship of plans to operations; (5) the relationship of technology to naval warfare; and (6) the appropriate relationship of the naval services to the other military services in the conduct of joint operations.

The peculiarly American naval way of war has been and continues to be conditioned by: (1) the fundamental characteristics of naval warfare; (2) the historical era during which the naval services were created and formed; (3) U.S. national policy; (4) the technologies of naval warfare; (5) developments in thinking about naval

warfare; (6) operational experience, especially pivotal points of success and failure; and (7) relations with the other military services, especially competition for mission and budget, and cooperation in conduct of operations.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-412.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Required Readings:

None.

F. Reference Readings:

Baer, George, *One Hundred Years of Seapower: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Barlow, Jeffrey, *The Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945-1950*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995.

Coletta, Paolo E., *The United States Navy and Defense Unification, 1947-1953*. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1981.

Huntington, Samuel P., "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy." *Naval War College Review*, May 1954: 483-493.

Keiser, Gordon, *The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification, 1944-47*. Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company, 1996.

Krulak, Victor H., *First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1984.

Millett, Allan R., *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps*, Revised and Expanded Edtion. New York: The Free Press, 1991.

Sprout, Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1946.

Sprout, Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943.

Uhlig, Frank, Jr., *How Navies Fight: The U.S. Navy and Its Allies*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1994.

U.S. Marine Corps, *Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS)*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996.

U.S. Navy, *Forward...From the Sea: the Navy Operational Concept*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997.

Wylie, Joseph C., Jr., "Why a Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1957: 811-817. (**NWC 3071**).

G. Supplemental Readings

Bartlett, Merrill L. (editor), *Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1983.

Chisholm, Donald, *Waiting for Dead Men's Shoes: Origins and Development of the U.S Navy's Officer Personnel System, 1793-1941*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.

Davis, Vincent A, *Postwas Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1966.

Herrick, Walter R., Jr., *The American Naval Revolution*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1966.

Isley, Jeter A. and Philip A. Crowl., *The U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare: Its Theory, and Its Practice in the Pacific*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951.

Karsten, Peter, *The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern American Navalism*. New York: The Free Press, 1972.

McKee, Christopher, *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Navy Officer Corps, 1795-1815*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1991.

Spector, Ronald, *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977.

U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940.

Vlahos, Michael, *The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919-1941*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1980.

THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session will focus on the *Strategic Objective* and how it must drive military thinking and actions throughout the entire range of military operations. We will discuss the direct relationship between national strategic objectives and operational objectives and the concept of "regressive planning" to keep planning properly focused. We will look at the interrelationship between the four elements of national power (political, military, economic, and "informational") and how the *strategic objective* relates to the *Desired End State* (i.e., the strategic vision of how things should look at the end of the day). Our discussion will include a brief look at the policy documents which provide strategic direction to the military, i.e., the *National Security Strategy,* and the *National Military Strategy*.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Understand how national security and military strategic direction are integrated into defense policy, Service programs, and the DoD budget using current national systems and processes.
- **PJE**—Translate national security objectives, guidance, and strategic endstate into national military objectives guidance, and endstate.
- Introduce the concept of regressive planning which is key to grasping the perspective and operational-level planning that is the focus of the course.
- Introduce the "Four Questions" and analyze how they can help the operational commander apply assets in the pursuit of strategic objectives.
- Examine the interrelationship between the four elements of national power (political, military, economic, and "informational") and how the *Strategic Objective* relates to the *Desired End State*.
- Analyze the direct relationship between planning for possible conflict and for post-conflict operations, and thinking through both in advance of military action.

C. Background:

The *National Military Strategy* (NMS) establishes foundations and principles for the employment of U.S. military forces across the spectrum of conflict. Its purpose is to implement the agenda of the President's *National Security Strategy* (NSS). The most recent versions of these two documents reflect core national goals long pursued by the U.S. They also, however, reflect a continued shift in emphasis toward a more regional approach. The idea is for the CINC (and others) to "shape" the situation in a particular region in order to minimize the chances for conflict while maximizing U.S. advantages should conflict nevertheless erupt.

In keeping with the NMS and NSS, when a problem arises which the National Command Authorities (NCA) believe may require military involvement, the NCA will

turn to the CINC for possible solutions. In responding to this, the CINC must assess the strategic goal in terms of "four questions:"

1. What **military** (or related political and social) **conditions** must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)
2. What **sequence of actions** is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)
3. How should the **resources** of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
4. What is the likely **cost or risk** to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?

The operational commander must ensure his response to the "four questions" (the essence of his plan) remains in line with strategic guidance. While some situations allow for clear military answers to these questions, in some cases there may be no "military condition" which will contribute to the stated or implied strategic objective. In other cases, the appropriate action may be diplomatic or economic, with the military in a supporting role. When a period of military conflict appears necessary, the operational commander must also anticipate and plan for war termination and post-conflict activities (which will include both military and civilian elements). Without considering these aspects up front, there is little or no chance of even the best planned military operation achieving, or helping achieve, the Desired End State.

The point of contact for this session is Professor J. R. Ballard, C-411.

D. Questions:

How does the NMS help operational commanders translate strategy into operational plans?

How can the "Four Questions" help an operational commander respond to strategic guidance?

What is the connection between planning for conflict and planning for post-conflict operations? Why does it matter when you do this planning?

Who decides when a war ends and under what terms: "winner" or "loser?"

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 February 1995, pp. I-1 to I-10, II-1 to II-3. (Issued).

JMO, "Putting First Things First," Newport, 1999. (**NWC 3012**) (Issued).

National Military Strategy of the United States, Washington, 1997. (Issued). [Scan]

The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, December 1999, Pt II, "Shaping the International Environment," "Responding to Threats and Crises." (Issued).

"U.S. Military Debates Link Between Kosovo Air War, State Objectives," *Inside Washington,* 20 April 2000, (**NWC 3043**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

"Flexible Deterrent Options, (FDOs)" Extracts from *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (**NWC 3081**). (Issued).

Iklé, Fred C., *Every War Must End,* pp. 1-16 (Seminar Reserve).

Reed, James W., "Should Deterrence Fail: War termination . . . ," Parameters, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, Summer 1993, pp. 41-51 (**NWC 2171**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

None.

DIPLOMACY AND MILITARY FORCE (Seminar)

You can get more with a kind word and a gun than with just a kind word.

—Al Capone

You can do a lot with diplomacy, but you can do more with diplomacy backed up by firmness and force.

—Kofi Annan

A. Focus:

Because military assets are employed in support of political objectives throughout the entire spectrum of conflict, from deterrence through war, this session focuses on the relationship of the military and diplomacy at this early point in the trimester. The session examines the particular ways that leaders, both political (diplomatic) and military leaders, orchestrate military actions in the pursuit of national objectives. Military forces, used in a variety of ways and under a variety of circumstances, can influence the actions of governments or non-state actors. Credibility, military presence, and the manipulation of risk are some of the elements considered in achieving national objectives.

B. Objectives:

- Explain the link between national objectives and supporting military objectives, and the importance of conflict termination.
- Comprehend the link between diplomacy and military force in pursuing the National Security Strategy and the derivative National Military Strategy (NSS/NMS).
- Analyze the conditions necessary to establish credibility of military threats to achieve political or diplomatic goals.
- Understand the influence of overseas military presence on the perceptions, intentions, or actions of governments or non-state actors, and its application in the conduct of Theater Engagement Planning by the Unified CINCs.

C. Background:

Diplomacy among nations is variously described as negotiation or as bargaining; it may be polite or rude; and it may entail threats as well as offers. Military force, which helps shape the security environment, can be used along with the other instruments of power to deter, compel, support or coerce other actors. Military actions may be designed primarily to support political or diplomatic goals (with the intermediate goal of preventing war) to achieve national objectives. In order for these actions to have credibility, however, there must exist the capability and the will to conduct large-scale combat actions.

"Flexible deterrent options" (FDOs) in theater strategy illustrate how the use of the instruments of national power should be mutually supporting. What military

force the CINC selects and how it is used must be matched to the stated national objective, be in concert with political, diplomatic, and economic actions, and be appropriate to the level of national commitment. Overseas presence is customarily a factor in the selection of military force in a crisis; however, developing technologies and increasing international economic ties suggest reduction in our dependence on traditional presence missions.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. W. Chisholm, C-412.

D. Questions:

Why is a clearly articulated Desired End State (DES), understood by all players on both sides of the game, the key to success in attempts to change behavior through use of military force?

How is credibility established to convince a potential adversary that military threats are serious? Can military forces in CONUS be a credible force for influencing the behavior of other countries, or does actual overseas presence constitute an essential factor?

What inhibits an opponent from escalating a confrontation by accident or by design?

E. Required Readings:

Shelton, Henry H., "From the Chairman: The U.S. Military and Foreign Policy" (**NWC 3002**) (Issued).

Nathan, James, "The Rise and Decline of Coercive Statecraft" (**NWC 3027**) (Issued).

"Flexible Deterrent Options," Extracts from Armed Forces Staff College *Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (**NWC 3081**) (Issued).

Gordon, Michael and Trainor, Bernard, "Warning of War," extract from *The Generals' War* (**NWC 3001**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Blaauw, Extract from "Report on the Role of Europe in Bosnia," 15 Oct. 1996, paras. 61-70 (**NWC 3080**) (Issued).

Cable, James, *Gunboat Diplomacy* 1919-1979: *Political Applications of Limited Naval Force* (Seminar Reserve).

Iklé, Fred Charles, *Every War Must End* (Seminar Reserve).

Armed Forces Staff College, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (AFSC Pub 5) (Seminar Reserve).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Arnold, Edwin J., Jr., "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Objectives," *Parameters,* Spring 1994, pp. 4-12.

Craig, Gordon A. and George, Alexander L., "Coercive Diplomacy," *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990 (second edition), Chapter 14.

White, Donald, "Mutable Destiny: The End of the American Century?" *Harvard International Security Review,* Winter 97/98, pp. 42-47.

Owens, "Naval Voyage to an Uncharted World," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings,* December 1994, pp. 30-34.

Tangredi, "Are We Firing Tomahawks Too Easily?" United States Naval Institute *Proceedings,* December 1996, pp. 8-9.

INTRODUCTION TO NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session focuses briefly on understanding the fundamental concepts of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and then investigates some of the issues associated with NCW.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Understand IO and C4 concepts and how they relate.
- **PJE**—Demonstrate a thorough understanding of how IO and C4 are integrated to support the National Military and National Security Strategies and interagency process.
- **PJE**—Demonstrate how IO and C4 are integrated into the theater and strategic campaign development process.
- **PJE**—Understand how the joint operational planning and execution system is integrated in theater and operational IO campaign planning and execution to support theater and national strategic sustainment and warfighting efforts.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how technological change affects the art and science of war and evaluate key ongoing and anticipated technological developments pertinent to the military instrument.
- **PJE**—Analyze JV 2020 and the nature of warfare in the information age, to include examining key current developments.

C. Background:

Network Centric Warfare (Navy terminology) seeks to exploit superior information capabilities to the detriment of the enemy. This approach to warfare is consistent with that being pursued by the other Services and with *Joint Vision 2020,* albeit using different nomenclature. NCW envisions three *grids* (networks)—the sensor, the shooter, and the warfighter grids—linked together to provide a comprehensive shared awareness. This shared awareness will allow for rapid decision-making and action that will always render the enemy disadvantaged. NCW focuses on human factors—the techniques, the procedures, the command and control structures, and the thought processes—that will facilitate the exploitation of the network technology.

The following is quoted from "Network-Centric Warfare: An Emerging Military Response to the Information Age," a presentation at the 1999 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium by Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski:

> *Network-centric warfare is about human and organizational behavior. It focuses on attaining access—access to gather, process, and manage information to take advantage of the growing power resident in information networks. It offers a method to build information sustaining superiority, a key factor to success in the future battlespace. It facilitates the creation and sustaining of shared awareness at all com-*

mand levels. Network-centric warfare supports speed of command—the conversion of a superior information position to action. Because geographically dispersed forces enjoy information superiority, they can self-synchronize or self-organize to accomplish time-urgent tasks. In brief, NCW's not narrowly about technology, but broadly about an emerging military response to the information age.

Network-centric warfare is a concept. As a concept, it cannot have a definition, because concepts and definitions are enemies. Concepts are abstract and general, while definitions are concrete and specific. Thus, if a concept can be defined, it is no longer a concept. It's not overreacting to suggest that those who lament most strongly that NCW has no definition are not counted among its friends.

Network-centric warfare is a concept about **means**. *To operate in a network-centric environment is not an* **objective** *or a goal of combat. Likewise, to operate network-centrically is not a* **strategy** *for conducting combat. Rather, network-centric warfare is a tool, a means to empower strategies to accomplish objectives, or ends. Whatever the question, NCW is neither the answer nor the plan to obtain the answer.*

Network-centric warfare is a relatively new concept, and it needs maturing. Research, field experimentation, war gaming, and exercises will all help to crystallize the concept. Establishing of the kind of technical structure the concept requires in order to shift military operations to a higher plane of execution has started. Organizational changes to accommodate the needed new directions are underway. And the process of developing doctrine to fully incorporate the concept into the warfighter's toolkit has begun. There's no cookbook here with a recipe for success. Instead, NCW points to a course to steer in order to assist the military in transitioning to the information age.

The point of contact for this session is Captain C. E. Helms, U.S. Navy, C-422.

D. Questions:

Are the benefits advertised for NCW automatic? What alterations in our current methods of operation might be required to achieve these benefits?

What might be some of the problems with implementation of NCW?

Will our current fundamentals of modern warfare remain constant throughout the implementation of NCW? Why or why not?

E. Required Readings:

Alberts, David S., et al., *Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, 2nd Edition (Revised)* pp. 87-114 (Issued).

_____, "Network Centric Operations: A Capstone Concept for Naval Operations in the Information Age" (draft) (**NWC 1078**) (Issued).

Barnett, Thomas P., "The Seven Deadly Sins of Network-Centric Warfare." *Proceedings,* December 1999, pp. 28-32. (**NWC 1079**) (Issued).

Zimm, Alan, D., "Human-Centric Warfare." *Proceedings,* May 1999, pp. 28-31. (**NWC 1080**) (Issued).

Lescher, W. K., "Network-Centric Warfare: Is It Worth the Risk?" *Proceedings,* July 1999, pp. 58-63 (not including the sidebar, "The Power of e-Sailors") (**NWC 1081**) (Issued).

Dawson, J. Cutler, et al., "The IT-21 Advantage." *Proceedings,* December 1999, pp. 28-32. (**NWC 1082**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Cebrowski, A. K., et al., "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future." *Proceedings,* January 1998, pp. 28-35. (**NWC 1140**) (Issued).

Cebrowski, A. K., "Network-Centric Warfare: An Emerging Military Response to the Information Age." (**NWC 1141**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Boorujy, James R., "Network-Centric Concepts Can Guarantee Access". *Proceedings,* May 2000, pp. 60-63.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH PAPER—REVIEW (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session revisits the Operations Research Paper discussion, which was briefly covered during the Introductory Seminar on 12 March. With the paper topics due 30 March, this session is intended to address student questions concerning Paper requirements, guidance, deadlines, grading criteria, and suggested topics.

B. Objectives:

- Clarify all requirements for the Operations Research Paper. The purpose of the Paper is to:
  - Write on a topic dealing with the operational level of war, operational art, or a topic of current interest to an operational level commander.
  - Develop and refine original ideas in military strategy and operations through research and analysis.
  - Advance operational and strategic thinking.
  - Encourage writing for publication in professional journals and military periodicals.
  - Foster competition for prizes and awards offered by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Naval War College, and other sources.
  - Analyze topics that reflect current and future operational issues of interest to Service and joint staffs, and operational level commanders.

C. Guidance:

The Operations Research Paper provides students an opportunity to study a strategic or operational-level issue, conduct research and analysis on the topic, and prepare a paper that advances the literature in the selected area. It is a chance for students to conduct research and analysis on an operational topic that they personally feel is of value. It requires independent thought and high caliber writing because the final product should be suitable for publication in a professional journal. The amount and level of research should be adequate to support the student's approach and justify sufficiently the conclusions and recommendations. Another use of the paper may be to contribute innovative thinking to the Service and joint force staffs involved with the many complex issues associated with military force employment.

Various staffs, combatant commanders, and operating force commands actively solicit papers, theses, and monographs on topics of current interest to support initiatives, develop concepts, and provide fresh looks at the current means of accomplishing tasks and goals. The Naval War College is solicited frequently for papers on particular subjects, and requested to stimulate interest in specific areas for research and writing to support requesting commands. A recent example is a U.S. Navy project dealing with innovation in the application of naval force, options in

organization of the force, and suggested alternatives in force planning and procurement; i.e., how to accomplish the goal of fighting *smarter* rather than fighting with *more*. While some aspects of this project fall outside the parameters of the Operations Research Paper requirement, many of the issues therein are JMO - applicable. These especially include doing the right things and doing them right—the synergistic effect of combining efficiency and effectiveness. Quality papers are provided to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) where qualified users can access the data base to meet a variety of needs.

1. ***Requirements***. The Operations Research Paper should comprise the following:
   a. A thesis: a definitive position that the paper will aim to defend, support, or justify.
   b. Sufficient research to analyze the thesis properly.
   c. Arguments and counter-arguments that allow thorough comparison of conflicting points of view.
   d. Logical conclusions drawn from the material presented within the paper.
   e. Recommendations or lessons learned, as appropriate, showing the relevance of this paper for today's operational commander.
2. ***Topics***. The topic search should be in progress. Topics should be taken from one of the following areas:
   a. A current issue at the operational or theater-strategic level of war.
   b. A topic on operational art, or the use of operational art to examine or analyze a historical case.
   c. An option in support of a military strategy or a new doctrinal concept.
   d. An issue dealing with planning, execution, tasks, or functions at the operational level of war.
   e. Innovation topics such as the application of naval force at the operational level of war.
   f. A topic that applies to current, near-term, or future major operations or campaigns.
   g. A topic of value to an operational level commander.

Required reading NWC 2062G contains the JMO Chairman's guidance for selecting a suitable topic. It also contains lists of possible topics from requesting commands, a list of topics dealing with the operational level of war, extracts on the awards program, and instructions for submission of papers to professional journals. This is an excellent resource for helping you develop your own ideas and select a topic.

NOTE: The Operations Research Paper should not be an examination of particular tactics, technology, force structure, or future force planning concepts. Also, it should not be just a library search and summary of published material. The paper

should not contain proposals or recommendations regarding numbers and types of weapon platforms, nor modifications to platforms, weapons, sensors, or force structure (i.e., it cannot be an NSDM-type force planning paper). Moderators will answer any questions concerning topic selection.

3. ***Paper Proposal***. A paper proposal is required and due to the moderators on Friday, 30 March. The proposal will state the student's thesis, approach, relevance, bibliography, and methodology so that the moderator team can determine if the paper will satisfy the requirements of the course. Once the moderator team accepts a proposal, this constitutes an understanding between the student and the moderator grading team. An accepted proposal means that both the student and the moderators have a good appreciation of the depth of research, extent of analysis, and quality of writing that is expected of the student in addition to the requirements that are discussed in paragraph (1) of this section. The paper proposal is covered in more detail in Required Reading NWC 2062G, enclosure (1).

4. ***Research and Writing***. Research and writing shall meet graduate-level standards. The *Naval War College Writing Guide* provides guidance and additional references.

5. ***Format***. Format and style for both unclassified and classified papers are contained in the *Naval War College Style Manual and Security Classification Guide*. Kate L. Turabian's *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations* (6th ed.) is also an acceptable guide to producing written work.

6. ***Report Document Page***. The report document page is a completed DD Form 1473. Students must fill in blocks 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, and 15 of the report document page. Seminars will be provided with the DD1473 in electronic format. *Only the original of the paper* requires the DD Form 1473 — copies do not.

7. ***Length***. The text of the Operations Paper should be 14 to 17 double-spaced pages in 12-pitch type to conform to commonly accepted limits for publication and award submissions. Your moderators may accept longer papers depending on the paper purpose and topic, but this acceptance must be obtained prior to paper submission.

8. ***Faculty Advisor***. An advisor can help a student define the scope of the study; keep research, analysis, and writing on track; and review outlines and drafts. While there is no requirement for a student to have a faculty advisor, an advisor is strongly recommended. Faculty and staff members are quite willing to act as advisors; your moderators can suggest appropriate advisors depending on topic. Any Naval War College faculty member may assist the student in choosing a topic; however, *your seminar moderators cannot act as your paper advisor*. An advisor should not be asked to evaluate the paper in terms of the grade; that is a function of the moderators.

9. ***Grading***. The Operations Research Paper represents a substantial portion of the Operations Course grade. The paper will be evaluated for both substance and quality of writing. Grades will be based on the criteria outlined in the Course Description section of the JMO Syllabus.

10. ***Prizes and Awards***. Operations Research Papers may be submitted in competition for the prizes and awards that are bestowed annually during the June graduation ceremony. Students are encouraged to prepare their Operations Papers with the additional purpose of competing for one or more of these honors. In a few cases, this will require expanding the Operations Paper to meet the length specification for the prize. Details are included in Required Reading, NWC 2062G.

11. ***Schedule***:

30 March:	Submit paper proposal to seminar moderators.
2 – 4 April:	Conduct individual tutorials per schedule arranged with moderators; moderators and student agree on research topic and course of action.
18 April:	Suggested latest date for research to terminate, analysis and writing to commence.
11 May:	Suggested latest date for submission of smooth draft to faculty advisor.
18 May:	CNW Paper due to seminar moderators.
25 May:	NCC Paper due to seminar moderators.

The point of contact for this session is Professor Paul Romanski, C-217.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Required Readings:

Operations Paper: Guidance for Students. Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 2001. (**NWC 2062G**) (Issued).

Naval War College Writing Guide. Newport, RI, 2000. (Issued).

Naval War College Style and Security Classification Guide. Newport, RI, 2000. (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Research in the Library 2000. Newport, RI: Naval War College Library, 2000. (Issued).

Turabian, Kate L., *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*. 6th ed., revised by John Grossman and Alice Bennett. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996. (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Strunk, William, Jr., With revisions, an introduction, and a chapter on writing by E.B. White, *The Elements of Style, 4th ed.* New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1999.

JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS COURSE CONCLUSION

A. Focus:

This is the final session of the JMO course. It affords students and moderators the opportunity to review the course and its main components.

B. Objectives:

- Review the JMO course in terms of course objectives, methodology, tools employed, and opinions concerning the extent to which objectives were achieved.
- Discuss the various methodologies for answering the questions in the final examination.
- Complete course critiques.

C. Guidance:

This session concludes the JMO course. Students and moderators are afforded the opportunity to review the JMO course, to discuss the key components of acceptable answers to the final exam questions, and to complete the end of course questionnaire.

D. Required Readings:

Joint Military Operations Syllabus–2001, End of Course Questionnaire, pp. 243-250.

Alberts, David S., et al., *Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, 2nd Edition (Revised)* pp. 87-114 (Issued).

_____, "Network Centric Operations: A Capstone Concept for Naval Operations in the Information Age" (draft) (NWC 1078) (Issued).

Armed Forces Staff College, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (AFSC Pub 5) (Seminar Reserve).

Arnold, Edwin J., Jr., "The Use of Military Power in Pursuit of National Objectives," *Parameters,* Spring 1994, pp. 4-12.

Barnett, Thomas P., "The Seven Deadly Sins of Network-Centric Warfare." *Proceedings,* December 1999, pp. 28-32. (NWC 1079) (Issued).

Blaauw, Extract from "Report on the Role of Europe in Bosnia," 15 Oct. 1996, paras. 61-70 (NWC 3080) (Issued).

Boorujy, James R., "Network-Centric Concepts Can Guarantee Access". *Proceedings,* May 2000, pp. 60-63.

Cable, Sir James, *Gunboat Diplomacy* 1919-1979, *Political Applications of Limited Naval Force*. New York: St. Martins Press, 1982. This is an excellent source of information on the application of limited naval force in the pursuit of national objectives. It provides a wide range of examples and demonstrates that many nations have used this avenue to achieve their objectives. (Seminar Reserve).

Cebrowski, A. K., et al., "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future." *Proceedings,* January 1998, pp. 28-35. (NWC 1140) (Issued).

Cebrowski, A. K., "Network-Centric Warfare: An Emerging Military Response to the Information Age." (NWC 1141) (Issued).

Clinton, William J., *National Security Strategy for a New Century*. The White House 1999. This is the latest NSS for the United States, spelling out the major interests of the United States and the regional approach that will be used to protect and foster those interests. (Issued).

The Constitution of the United States. Article 1, Sections 8 & 9; Article 2, Section 2; Article 3, Sections 2 & 3.

Cunliffe, Marcus, *Soldiers and Civilians, The Martial Spirit in America 1775-1865*. Boston & New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1968.

Craig, Gordon A. and Alexander L., George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 189-204. Chapter 14, "Coercive Diplomacy," is an analysis of the conditions necessary for successful employment of coercive diplomacy in major crisis situations. (Library Reserve).

Dawson, J. Cutler, et al., "The IT-21 Advantage." *Proceedings,* December 1999, pp. 28-32. (NWC 1082) (Issued).

"Flexible Deterrent Options," Extracts from *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (NWC 3081). (Issued).

Gordon, Michael and Trainor, Bernard, "Warning of War," extract from *The Generals' War* (NWC 3001) (Issued).

Hattendorf, John B.; Simpson III, B. Mitchell and Wadleigh, John R., *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U. S. Naval War College.* Naval War College Press, Newport, RI, 1984.

Iklé, Fred Charles, *Every War Must End*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. This book is written by the former Under Secretary of Defense and gives an excellent presentation of the role of escalation in war, war termination and the pursuit of national goals. (Seminar Reserve).

JMO, "Putting First Things First," Newport, 1999. (NWC 3012) (Issued).

John T. Fishel, "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, The GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night," pp. 375-379 (NWC 3077) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 February 1995. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War,* 16 June 1995 (Issued). Read Glossary definitions.

Lescher, W. K., "Network-Centric Warfare: Is It Worth the Risk?" *Proceedings,* July 1999, pp. 58-63 (NWC 1081) (Issued).

Millett, Alan R. and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense, A Military History of the United States of America.* New York: The Free Press, 1994.

Millis, Walter, Arms and Men, *A Study of American Military History.* New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981.

Millis, Walter (Ed), *American Military Thought*. Indianapolis, New York and Kansas City: the Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966.

Nathan, James, "The Rise and Decline of Coercive Statecraft," *Proceedings*, October 1995, pp. 59-65. The author argues that the art of using credible military power in support of the diplomatic measures used in pursuing national objectives is misused in the United States. In particular, the Cheney Doctrine and Powell Corollary undermine the credibility of use military threats and limits the options available to our national leaders. (NWC 3027) (Issued).

National Military Strategy of the United States, Washington, 1997. (Issued). [scan]

Naval War College Manual Writing Guide. Newport, RI, 2000. (Issued).

Naval War College Style and Classification Guide. Newport, RI, 2000. (Issued).

Operations Paper: Guidance for Students. Newport, RI: Naval War College, October 2000. (NWC 2062G) (Issued).

Owens, William A., "A Naval Voyage to an Uncharted World," *Proceedings*, December 1994, pp. 30-34. The role of naval forces in the presence mission will continue to grow

as the world changes, and the drawdown of U.S. military forces continues. To the author, this is natural and consistent with the role and mission of the naval service.

Reed, James W., "Should Deterrence Fail: War termination . . . ," Parameters, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, Summer 1993, pp. 41-51 (NWC 2171) (Issued).

Research in the Library Autumn 2000. Newport, RI: Naval War College Library, 2000. (Issued).

Shelton, Henry H., "From the Chairman: The U.S. Military and Foreign Policy" (NWC 3002) (Issued).

Strunk, William, Jr., *The Elements of Style,* 4th ed. With revisions, an introduction, and a chapter on writing by E.B. White. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1999.

Tangredi, "Are We Firing Tomahawks Too Easily?" United States Naval Institute *Proceedings,* December 1996, pp. 8-9.

Turabian, Kate L., *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*. 6th ed., revised by John Grossman and Alice Bennett. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996. (Issued).

U.S. Military Debates Link Between Kosovo Air War, State Objectives, Inside Washington, 20 April 2000, (NWC 3043) (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, Joint Maritime Operations Syllabus and Study Guide 2001, Course Description (Issued). Read pp. vi-xvii, 17-18, 89-90, 168, 198-201.

Waghelstein, John D., "Preparing the U.S. Army for the Wrong War—Educational and Doctrinal Failure 1865–1891," pp. 1–33. *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol 10, No. 1 (Spring 1999): London: Frank Cass.

Weigley, Russell F., *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. The Macmillan Wars of the United States*, ed. Louis Morton. New York: the Macmillan Company, 1973.

White, Donald, "Mutable Destiny: The End of the American Century?" *Harvard International Security Review,* Winter 97/98, pp. 42-47.

Widnall, Sheila E. and Ronald R. Fogelman, "Global Presence." *Joint Force Quarterly,* Spring 1995, pp. 94-99. This is the conceptual framework devised by the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chief of Staff, USAF that presents a different view of overseas military presence. This USAF white paper supersedes "Global Reach-Global Power." (NWC 2048) (Issued).

Yost, David S., "The Future of Overseas Presence." *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1995, pp. 70-82. The article reviews the history of U.S. presence. Using the past as a springboard, the author then addresses the principles of overseas presence and presents a view of the future uses of military forces in this role.

Zelikow, Philip D., "The United States and the Use of Force: An Historical Summary." Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Unpublished draft, 1985. This paper contains a useful bibliography of incidents. (NWC 2092) (Library Reserve).

Zimm, Alan, D., "Human-Centric Warfare." *Proceedings,* May 1999, pp. 28-31. (NWC 1080) (Issued).

Seminar #_____

CNW / NCC JMO COURSE FOUNDATIONS CRITIQUE

Three of the sessions in the Course Foundations block of instruction, CF-1, CF-2, and CF-8 all serve to provide you with a clear idea of how the JMO course is organized and to set down the principal guidelines and requirements of the trimester. CF-8 expands upon the description of the JMO Operations Research Paper requirements given in the introductory CF-1 and CF-2 sessions. The five seminar sessions and lectures, CF-3 through CF-7, are intended to provide you with the fundamental ideas, principles and concepts which you will find woven throughout the next four blocks of instruction. As the block title, Course Foundations, implies, you should be comfortable with these basics as you embark on the substance of the course in Block One. This critique seeks to capture your impressions, while the experience is still fresh in your mind, of how successful Course Foundations sessions were in achieving those aims and to solicit your suggestions on how to improve them for future classes. Please take the time to give us your thoughtful, constructive opinions. We rely heavily on student feedback in our ongoing efforts to improve the JMO trimester. (Please provide specific comments for any mark of 5 or below.)

1. The Course Foundations block was successful in providing me with an understanding of the JMO course organization.

   (strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

   Comments:_____

   _____

2. The block made clear what is required and expected of us in writing the Operations Research Paper.

   (strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

   Comments:_____

   _____

3. The class interaction during the Course Foundations block was successful in providing us with an awareness of the experience and backgrounds of our seminar colleagues.

   (strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

   Comments:_____

   _____

4. The American Way of War lecture was helpful in engendering an understanding of the historical roots and reasons for the style of our approach to the use of military force in pursuing national objectives.

   (strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

   Comments:_____

   _____

5. The Naval Way of War lecture was helpful in understanding the "cultural" bases for the way modern naval leaders have employed our U.S. Navy and Marine Corps assets across the spectrum of conflict.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments:_____

6. The Strategic Objective session clarified the idea of "regressive planning" and various associated concepts such as the Desired End State, strategic objectives, war termination, and post-conflict operations.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments:_____

7. After the Strategic Objective session I understood better the relationship between national strategic objectives and the planning for military operations at the operational level of war, including the Four Questions.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments:_____

8. Session CF-6, Diplomacy and Military Force, enhanced my understanding of the interdependence of military and diplomatic initiatives in the common pursuit of national political objectives.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments:_____

9. My ability to grasp the fundamental concepts of Network Centric Warfare was strengthened by the readings and seminar discussions associated with session CF-7.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments:_____

10. What might be added to this session which would better prepare you for the four blocks of instruction to follow? (You may also respond to this same question by commenting during the End of Course Questionnaire, at which time you may feel better able to offer constructive suggestions.)

_____

11. Rank these sessions as to their value in contributing to your appreciation of the overall thrust and direction of the JMO course? (Rate each from 1 (low) to 7 (high)) *DO NOT RANK ORDER THE SESSIONS—ASSIGN A NUMERICAL VALUE FROM 1-7 FOR EACH SESSION*

    _____ CF-1 Course Overview

    _____ CF-2 Introductory Seminar

    _____ CF-3 The American Way of War lecture

    _____ CF-4 The Naval Way of War lecture

    _____ CF-5 The Strategic Objective

    _____ CF-6 Diplomacy and Military Force

    _____ CF-7 Introduction to Network Centric Warfare

12. The following are comments I would add regarding the quality of the Course Foundations sessions, how they did or did not clarify the course direction, and how well they laid the groundwork needed by my colleagues and me to proceed with the course.

    _____
    _____
    _____
    _____
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Block One
Operational Concepts / Law

Listing of Operational Concepts and Law Sessions 31
Introduction to Operational Concepts 32
OPS-I-1 Introduction to Operational Art (Seminar) 33
OPS-I-2 Operational Art and Doctrine (Seminar) 36
OPS-I-3 The Battle for Leyte Gulf—Film (Seminar) 40
OPS-I-4 Operational Factors (Seminar) 41
OPS-I-5 Theater Elements (Seminar) 44
OPS-I-6 Levels of War (Seminar) 47
OPS-I-7 Operational Functions (Seminar) 49
OPS-I-8 Elements of Operational Warfare (Seminar) 53
OPS-I-9 Methods of Combat Force Employment (Seminar) 56
OPS-I-10 Principles of War (Seminar) 61
OPS-I-11 Operational Planning (Seminar) 63
OPS-I-12 Operational Leadership (Seminar) 67
OPS-I-13 The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict: A Case Study (Lecture & Seminar) 70
OPS-I-14 Operational Concepts Examination 74
OPS-I-15 Use of Force Under International Law (Lecture) 75
OPS-I-16 Operational Law and Factor Space (Lecture) 78
OPS-I-17 Law of Armed Conflict (Seminar) 81
OPS-I-18 Rules of Engagement (Seminar) 83
OPS-I-19 Operational Law Case Study (Seminar) 86
Block One Bibliography 87
Block One Operational Concepts Critique 99
Block One Operational Law Critique 102

INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

A. Focus:

The first block of the Joint Maritime Operations Course aims to provide a theoretical framework for understanding the operational concepts that will be discussed in greater detail throughout the remainder of the course. The sessions in this block offer an intensive exposure to operational art, the basic elements of operational warfare, and a multitude of operational terms that are essential to the study and mastery of the material that follows.

B. Objectives:

- Listed by individual session.

C. Guidance:

The material offered in Block One may be more familiar to some students than to others depending upon Service background, operational experience, and previous military education. In an age when it is incumbent upon all military officers to be able to communicate with colleagues from other Services and other nations, you will find a wealth of invaluable material to be gained—not only from the readings, but particularly in the daily seminar discussions. Upon completion of this block of study you should be comfortable with the terminology and concepts of operational art—the theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns to accomplish operational and/or strategic objectives in a theater.

The first two weeks of Block One are designed to provide you with a quick introduction to some of the terminology, elements, and principles of operational art. The Leyte Gulf case study will be used to provide illustrative examples of the OPART ideas and concepts being introduced and will also be utilized for a moderator guided analysis to reinforce operational terms and concepts—methods of combat employment, operational functions, operational design (operational sequencing, synchronization, and deception in particular), and operational leadership. Finally, during the third week, you will do an in-depth analysis of the Falklands/Malvinas case study using the terms, elements, principles, and concepts you have learned during the first two weeks of the course.

We will not teach you operational art in a week or even in a full trimester. However, we are trying to produce officers who can think creatively, reason critically, and act decisively in ambiguous, high-stakes situations. This block does not address all the components of operational art, but only those we feel are most important. It is not intended or designed to serve as a manual for operational art. The Operational Concepts block will have been successful if, at the end, you have a basic understanding of the concepts of operational art and the importance of its practice.

INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONAL ART (Seminar)

The truth is that the mistrust of theory arises from a misconception of what it is that theory claims to do. It does not pretend to give the power of conduct in the field; it claims no more than to increase the effective power of conduct.

—Julian Corbett

A. Focus:

This session will focus on: defining the concept of *operational art*; understanding the historical roots of operational art; the linkage between *operational art* and *strategy* and *tactics*; and the relationship between *operational art* and the *operational level* of warfare. Additionally, this session provides important background for developing the skills required for effective operational planning which are exercised in subsequent JMO lesson blocks.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Analyze the strategic art; i.e., developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to secure national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how technological change affects the art and science of war and evaluate key ongoing and anticipated technological developments pertinent to the military instrument.
- Understand the historical evolution of the *operational level* of warfare and its relationship to the emergence and development of *operational art*.
- Comprehend the meaning of the term *operational art*.
- Comprehend the linkage between *operational art, strategy and tactics*.
- Comprehend that an understanding of the components of *operational art* will facilitate the use of these components as analytical tools for evaluating historical examples of *operational level* warfare and conducting operational level planning and employment of military forces.
- Understand the importance of applying sound *operational art* concepts to military planning and force employment.

C. Background:

Operational art, in its essence, deals with the study, theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns designed to accomplish operational or strategic objectives in a given theater.

Operational art is one of the three components of military art, along with strategy and tactics. All of the components of military art are inextricably linked. Operational art is applied across the three *levels* of warfare, strategic, operational and tactical, and across the *range* of military *conflict*, that is, from military operations other than war (MOOTW) to war.

As will be seen during the discussions of this lesson, the *conduct* of warfare at the operational level preceded the emergence of formal operational art. The operational level of warfare emerged as a result of various deliberate national policy decisions and the explosion of military technology. The search by military professionals for effective methods of conducting war at the operational level led to the emergence and evolution of operational art. This interaction among study, theory and practice continues to this day.

Operational art is *not* doctrine. Effective doctrine is a derivative of sound operational art. In that regard, the combat employment of ground, naval, air and space forces manifests some functional commonalities, but there are also clear differences in practice, due primarily to differences in the "medium" (land, sea, air, and space) in which these forces operate and the weapon systems each Service employs in these media. Therefore, as a result of these and other influences, each Service develops and practices its own adaptation of operational art and related doctrine, while the joint employment of forces is guided by joint operational art and derivative joint doctrine. It is relevant to note that, in a modern context, no employment of combat forces at the operational or theater-strategic level has taken place without some involvement of two or more Services.

Operational art is also *not* strategy. Strategy is normally developed and implemented at the national level, while operational art is applied across the spectrum of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare, in order to develop the operational level concepts and plans which will integrate national strategic objectives with battlefield tactical actions, defined by tactics, through effective theater and joint task force level operations. Operational art is thus the enabling function for theater/task force operations. In addition, operational art and the operational level of warfare are *not* synonymous. Operational art is a cognitive *process*, while the operational level of war is a *category* of military operations.

The point of contact for this session is: Professor D. M. Goodrich, C-420.

D. Questions:

What is the operational level of warfare? How/why did it develop? When?

What is operational art? How/why did it emerge? When?

What is the relationship of operational art to the operational level of warfare?

Briefly, how would you define strategy and tactics?

What is the relationship of operational art to strategy and tactics?

Will NCW change the importance of operational art? If so, how?

Why study and learn operational art? What is its utility for you as future joint operations and staff officers?

E. Required Readings:

Helms, Chester E., "A Short History of Operational Art". **(NWC 1059A)** (Issued)

Vego, Milan, "On Operational Art" *Operational Warfare* Part I: Fundamentals. (**NWC 1035C)** (Issued).

Schneider, James J., "The Loose Marble-and the Origins of Operational Art." (**NWC 4004**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Vego, Milan, Glossary of Operational Terms, *Operational Warfare*. (**NWC 1004**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Schneider, James J., "Theoretical Implications of Operational Art."

Record, Jeffrey, "Operational Brilliance, Strategic Incompetence: The Military Reformers and The German Model."

Adams, Dwight L., and Newell, Clayton, R., "Operational Art in the Joint and Combined Arenas."

Newell, Clayton R., "Exploring the Operational Perspective."

Allen, Ralph L., "Piercing The Veil Of Operational Art."

Luvaas, Jay, "Thinking At The Operational Level."

Navy Strategic Planning Guidance: With Long Range Objective. April 2000.

OPERATIONAL ART AND DOCTRINE (Seminar)

"I think it is fair to say that while good theory will not guarantee good generalship, bad theory will certainly guarantee the reverse ... It seems to me there was a profound decline in the quality of strategic thought. The decline finally took the form of a search for axioms which were simple and easy to grasp, something Clausewitz had scrupulously avoided...Clausewitz insists that there are no principles of war; that there is no system of rules which, if pursued will guarantee success...I consider it to his great credit rather than a ground for criticism..."

—Dr. Bernard Brodie

A. Focus:

This session examines the relationship of *operational art* to *doctrine*, and the differences between the two concepts. In addition, current *Service* and *Joint doctrine*, and their relationship to *operational art* are briefly examined, and the *Joint doctrine development process* is discussed.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the role of joint doctrine with respect to unified command.
- **PJE**—Understand the relationship of *doctrine* to *operational art*, to include the differences between the two concepts.
- **PJE**—Understand the relationships between and service and joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Understand how *operational art* developed in the United States.

C. Background:

Every military Service operates in a unique environment, employing forces (*ground, air, space* or *naval*) in accordance with war fighting methods developed over many years and optimized for each service-unique environment. These methods constitute each Service's doctrine. In parallel, joint doctrine has been established to prescribe the methodology that will facilitate integrated, multi-service operations to achieve national and theater-level objectives. An extensive joint publications system, with a topical hierarchy and a prescribed development process, exists to ensure that sufficient authoritative joint operations guidance exists to "fundamentally shape the way we think about and train for war."

Doctrine, both Service and joint, must evolve as influencing factors change. Modern history is replete with failed rulers and defeated nations whose doctrine failed to change or changed incorrectly, because of a fatal misinterpretation of influencing factors and/or an ignorance of the operational concepts upon which predecessor doctrine was founded. Doctrine, by its nature, involves specific application of general insights regarding "how to fight", as influenced by relevant political and military perspectives, economic factors, geography, weapon systems, etc. Thus, effective doctrine is clearly a derivative of sound Operational Art.

Because the forces and assets of each Service must train and fight synergistically with those of the other Services, as elements of joint or coalition forces, our study of operational art begins with a review of the Services' doctrinal perspectives, and then proceeds to a consideration of operational art as applied to joint operations.

A key point to remember as we start into the analysis of operational art and its many components is that military "truths" established and verified through history have evolved from experience and lessons learned, for the most part, in combat. Many of these truths will remain valid and vital to future joint military planning and operations, even as technology, Network Centric Warfare and the "system of systems" evolve. However, some of our doctrinal thinking may no longer be relevant in that context. The challenge ahead is to discern what to keep and what to discard. Understanding the historical, theoretical and practical underpinnings of doctrine and operational art is vital for the development of sound future doctrine.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. M. Goodrich, C-420.

D. Questions:

What is *doctrine?* What is its role? What is the relationship of *operational art* to *doctrine?*

Is Carl Builder still correct in his assertions about *Service Culture*? Does culture affect *doctrine*?

Is the joint perspective on *operational art* comprehensive? Should it be? Are today's *Service* perspectives on *operational art* really distinct?

What precautions are relevant when rewriting *doctrine?* Does our current *joint doctrinal development system* effectively account for significant influencing factors and safeguard against, for example, "change for its own sake"? What precautions might be particularly important when rewriting *joint* doctrine, since it is specified as **authoritative?**

What are some *factors* that influence *doctrine*?

Does the specification of *joint doctrine* as **authoritative guidance** conflict with Dr. Brodie's quoted observations at the beginning of this session overview?

How does service doctrine relate to *joint doctrine?*

The military Services and the joint community are rational organizations dedicated to promoting the interests and protecting the security of the United States. As such, they value predictability, stability and certainty, because these characteristics reduce risk and facilitate the training and equipping of military forces. Moreover, these organizations generally exhibit behavior that favors incremental, gradual change. Many believe the start of the 21st Century coincides with the dawning of a new era—the Information Age. New eras herald great change and demand innovation. Are the military Services or the joint community prepared to facilitate innovative thinking, attuned to the new era?

Have the services embraced and facilitated information operations in doctrine? Does Network Centric Warfare (NCW) represent such innovative thinking? Is the Navy prepared to include NCW in its doctrine?

E. Required Readings:

Builder, Carl H., *Mask of War,* "Personalities", Part 1, pp.1-44. The Rand Corporation. 1989. Johns Hopkins Press. Baltimore, Maryland. 1991. (Issued).

Hughes, Wayne P., Jr., Capt, USN (Ret), "The Power in Doctrine." *Naval War College Review, Summer 1995.* (**NWC 1018**) (Issued).

Meilinger, Phillip S., Col, USAF, "Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power." *Airpower Journal, Spring 1996.* (**NWC 1011**) (Issued).

Toffler, Alvin and Heidi, "AirLand Battle," Chapter 7, pp. 44-56, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century.* (**NWC 1019**) (Issued).

Joint Doctrine and Capstone and Keystone Primer, "The Joint Doctrine Story," pp. 83-86. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-0: *Doctrine for Joint Operations,* pp. III-9 to III-24.(Issued).

In all Services there is a dynamic of doctrinal introspection that is outdistancing most published critiques and official publications on the subject. Listed below are the doctrinal proponent Internet sites for each of the Services and the Joint Staff. Students should browse these sites to become familiar with the organization-unique perspectives provided at each.

Joint Staff:	www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jrm/opart
Army:	www.tradoc.mil/dcsdoc/doctrine
Navy:	www.nwdc.navy.mil.navagation/doctrine.htm
Air Force:	www.af.mil.doctrine
Marine:	www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil
Coast Guard:	www.uscg.mil/hq/mcpocg/1study/cgds/htm

F. Reference Readings:

Clay, John S., "The Fifth Service Looks at Doctrine." *Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 96-97.* (**NWC 1010**) (Issued).

Lovelace, Douglas C. Jr., and Young, Thomas-Durell, "Joint Doctrine Development: Overcoming a Legacy." *Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 96-97.* (**NWC 1039**) (Issued).

Owens, William A., "Making the Joint Journey", *Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1999.* (**NWC 1068**) (Issued).

Tritten, James J., "Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine", *Naval War College Review, Spring 1995.* (**NWC 1064**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

"An Assessment of Joint Doctrine." *Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 96-97.*

Cox, Gary C., Major, USAF, "Beyond the Battle Line: U.S. Air Attack Theory and Doctrine, 1919-1941." School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, April 1996.

Kagan, Frederick, "Army Doctrine and Modern War: Notes Toward a New Edition of FM 100-5." *Parameters, Vol. xxvii, No. 1, Spring 1997.*

Matheny, Michael R., Major, USA, "The Development of the Theory and Doctrine of Operational Art in the American Army, 1920-1940." School of Advanced Military Studies, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 22 March 1988.

Millett, Alan R. and Murray, Williamson, editors, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period.*

Romjue, John L., *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982.* TRADOC Historical Monograph Series, June 1984.

Weigley, Russell F., *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy.*

Posen, Barry P., *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars.*

Tritten, James J. and Donolo, Luigi, Vice Admiral, Italian Navy (Retired), *A Doctrine Reader: The Navies of United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Spain. Newport Paper Number Nine.*

Waghelstein, John D., "Preparing the U.S. Army for the Wrong War, Educational and Doctrinal Failure, 1865-91," *Small Wars and Insurgencies,* Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 1999).

THE BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF—Film (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session is designed to provide the student a broad overview of the concept and execution of the Allied invasion of Leyte in 1944.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the concept and execution of operations associated with the invasion or defense of Leyte from both Allied and Japanese perspectives.

C. Background:

Operational art has its genesis in the necessity to move, employ and sustain large military forces. Some aspects of operational art certainly are applicable to operations other than war and low intensity conflict, but a full understanding of the subject requires analysis in the context of full-scale military action. The Battle of Leyte Gulf provides that context. We will examine two mature but differently organized warfighting opponents in the planning and execution of major combat operations. The challenges they faced in command relationships, command and control of forces, intelligence, sequencing and synchronizing maneuver, fires and logistics, etc., are still very much relevant to the current world.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf was the largest naval battle ever fought and epitomizes joint warfare in the littorals. On the Allied side, it was joint (multiservice) and combined (multinational). For both sides, forces came together from more than one theater to cooperate in tactical actions designed to achieve operational and theater-strategic objectives in support of national strategic objectives. These forces had to be moved to the area of operations, employed effectively and sustained. How this was accomplished will be considered and used to illustrate the concepts being explored during the study of operational art. Furthermore, examining the Japanese and Allied leaders and their staffs' planning, communicating, decision-making, and adapting under the duress of combat provides useful insight into leadership aspects of operational art.

The overview of Leyte Gulf provided by the Time-Life video, *The Battle of Leyte Gulf,* is designed to provide a basic understanding of the events of the battle. With this foundation, the student can then concentrate on analysis and understanding rather than spending time trying to discern the sequence of actions.

The point of contact for this session is Captain C. E. Helms, U.S. Navy, C-422.

D. Required Readings:

None.

OPERATIONAL FACTORS (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session will address the operational factors of space, time and forces. Examples from the Battle of Leyte Gulf will be used throughout the session as an illustration of how operational art applies to the maritime theater.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Analyze the strategic art; i.e., developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to secure national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.
- **PJE**—Analyze and apply the principal joint strategy development and operational planning process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- Understand the operational factors of space, time and forces and their interrelationships.

C. Background:

Operational Factors, properly managed, allow commanders to obtain freedom of action. The key operational factors are *space, time*, and *forces.* Recently some theoreticians have added *information* and *law* as two new key factors.

The art of warfare at any level, but especially at the operational and strategic levels, consists of properly balancing the factors of space, time, and forces. Any military operation takes place in a certain space, in a certain amount of elapsed time and with some quantity and nature of forces. All of these factors are interrelated and adjustments in one will likely affect the others. Additionally, one or more of these

factors may be beyond the control of the commander and, thus, mandate adjustments to the factors that are under his or her control.

The size, shape and nature of a space affects the quantity and types of forces and the time required to conduct a successful military operation. The commander may or may not be able to shape or choose the space. Gain or loss of space in itself is not inherently a disadvantage or advantage; what matters more is the relation between space and military forces. While space or geography cannot alone determine the success of a military effort, the relationship between space and forces can be a decisive factor.

Time and space have a distinct reciprocal effect upon each other. For an attacker, the aim is to expend the least time possible in gaining space. The less time used by the attacker for mobilization, deployment, and concentration, the less prepared will be the defender. In the extreme case the attacker can hope that the defender will give up without fighting. Another advantage of rapid action is that by quickly seizing or controlling an objective area, the defender's area of operations is steadily reduced, and thereby also his freedom of maneuver. The defender will try to increase the time expended by maintaining control over space. Hence, every delay is to the advantage of the defender, since it causes the attacker to increase his efforts and thereby deplete his combat power over time.

The quantity and types of forces that a commander is able or willing to commit directly affect the time required for a military operation and the size of the space he can use. Smaller forces can require more time and dictate a smaller space for achievement of objectives while larger forces may allow faster action in a larger space.

The point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel P. H. Di Julio, U.S. Air Force, C-415.

D. Questions:

Discuss the operational factors of space, time and forces from the perspectives of the Allies and the Japanese in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

Discuss how advances in Network Centric Warfare (NCW) may affect the operational factors of space, time and forces. Specifically:

How will NCW impact the commander's decision time?

Will NCW make space irrelevant?

How might NCW affect the space, forces and time required to accomplish a given mission?

E. Required Readings:

Helms, C. E., Captain, "Operational Factors", (**NWC 4092A**) (Issued).

Goodrich, David M., (compiler), Part II: Operational Factors, pp. 40–72, The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings (**NWC 1034A**) (Issued).

Appendix 7 to Annex "L" to Commander Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific, Operations Plan 12-44.

Bates, Richard, et al., *"Allied Arrangements-Allied Command Relations."*

Bates, Richard, et al., *"Strategic Area."*

Cannon, M. Hamlin, *"The Nature of the Target."*

F. Reference Readings:

Vego, Milan, "The Factor Space;" "The Factor Time;" "The Factor Forces;" "The Factor Space-Time-Forces;" "Information and Operational Factors;" Part II: Operational Factors, *Operational Warfare,* (**NWC 1004**) (Issued).

Alberts, David, et al., Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority pp. 113-145 (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

None.

THEATER ELEMENTS (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session addresses the factor space by introducing the concept of theater structure. Examples from the Battle of Leyte Gulf will be used throughout the session as an illustration of how operational art applies to the maritime theater.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Analyze the strategic art; i.e., developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to secure national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.
- **PJE**—Analyze and apply the principal joint strategy development and operational planning process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the CINCs.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- Comprehend how peacetime and wartime "theaters" are designed, including the key elements of a maritime theater.

C. Background:

Once the aims, or objectives, of major operations and campaigns have been established, the physical space or geography needs to be delineated in order to tie together the echelons of command and the specific objectives to be achieved and to provide a framework for the management of space. In U.S. doctrine, such delineations are called theaters or operating areas, depending on the level that is applicable, and they can be further broken into sub-levels.

Joint Pub 1-02 defines a theater of war as, "that area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of war." A theater of war will not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander's entire peacetime area of responsibility (AOR); and it could straddle the boundary between two geographic AORs. In a global conflict, several theaters of war may exist simultaneously, differentiated by geography, priority, or existing infrastructure. Geographic combatant

commanders may further define one or more theaters of operations within the theater of war, each with its own designated commander and strategic objective.

Joint Pub 3-0 outlines how theaters and operational areas can be organized, depending upon the nature and size of the joint action and the objectives to be achieved. For operations that are limited in scope or duration, a Joint Force Commander (JFC) may establish Joint Operations Areas, Joint Special Operations Areas, or other smaller areas of operations as part of a theater of operations or as a stand-alone area. We will discuss the distinctions and applications during this seminar session.

The point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel P. H. Di Julio, U.S. Air Force, C-415.

D. Questions:

Summarize the meaning of "theater" in U.S. terms. When is a theater of operations established? Explain the meaning of the term "area of operations." Analyze the difference between "theater of war" and "theater of operations" with regard to objective and command relationships.

Analyze the key elements or "geometry" of the maritime theater involved with the Leyte Gulf example. How were these elements important to the conduct and outcome of the conflict? Include the following in your analysis:

1. The main features of the lines of operation with respect to the Allies and the Japanese during the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
2. The basing structure and its impact on the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
3. The decisive points in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

Will Network Centric Warfare (NCW) change the "shape" or "design" of the theater and its elements? Will NCW eliminate all areas of operations below the theater level?

E. Required Readings:

JMO Department, "Maritime Theater and Its Elements," (**NWC 4095A**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine For Joint Operations,* pp. II-17 - II-20 (Issued).

Goodrich, David M., (Compiler), *The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings,* (**NWC 1034A**) (Issued).

Potter, E. B., "The Battle for Leyte Gulf," Part VI: Execution of the Operation, pp. 279–297.

F. Reference Readings:

Vego, Milan, "Theater Organization and Structure," Theater Operational Features" and "Theater Geometry" Part III: The Theater, *Operational Warfare, (***NWC 1004**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Alberts, David, et al., *Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority,* pp. 1-4.

LEVELS OF WAR (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session addresses the factors space and forces (and, to a lesser degree, time) with an examination of the levels of war and how operational art applies across those levels. Examples from the Battle of Leyte Gulf will be used throughout the session as illustration.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- Understand the distinctions between the *strategic*, *operational*, and *tactical* levels of war, and how operational art is interwoven with the different levels.

C. Background:

To further the understanding of the fundamentals of operational art, it is important to define and delineate the levels of war and see how they apply to the construction of encompassing national and military plans.

There are three basic levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. The strategic level needs to be further identified into two sub-levels: national-strategic and theater-strategic. Moreover, some theorists discuss an additional set of sub-levels: operational-strategic and operational-tactical. The levels of war cannot always be neatly delineated because they are all interrelated; the events at a lower level often have direct influence or consequences at a higher level(s), and vice-versa. But in order to properly focus the objective of your planning effort, you must understand which level applies.

Generally, each level of war correlates to a specific command echelon. In a truer sense, however, command echelons are established *based on the aims to be attained.* The levels of warfare normally relate to the size and extent of the physical environment in which one's own forces operate, based upon the extent of a specific echelon's ability to influence events and command and control forces.

The point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel P. H. Di Julio, U.S. Air Force, C-415.

D. Questions:

Are operational art and the operational level of war the same thing? If not, how are they distinguished?

Explain how operational art applies to each level of war.

Provide examples of how a geographic combatant CINC might serve as either a strategic level commander or an operational level commander. Was General MacArthur a strategic or operational level commander during Operation King II? How about Admiral Nimitz?

As modern warfare becomes more Network Centric, will the levels of war change?

How might Network Centric Warfare impact the type of control exerted on military endeavors by civilian leadership?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0: *Doctrine for Joint Operations,* pp. II-1–II-3, (Issued).

MCDP 1, Warfighting "Levels of War," pp. 28–32, (**NWC 2006**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Vego, Milan, "Levels of Command and Levels of War." Part I: Fundamentals, *Operational Warfare,* (**NWC 1004**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Alberts, David, et al., *Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority* pp. 85-112.

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session is intended to further define the framework within which Operational Art is practiced. It deals in some detail with theater-wide or operational functions intended primarily to support the planning, preparation, conduct, and sustainment of major operations and campaigns. Operational functions are sequenced and synchronized in the employment of one's own and friendly forces across the range of military operations-from "operations other than war" (OOTW) to war.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- **PJE**—Demonstrate how IO and C4 are integrated into the theater and strategic campaign development process.
- Understand the basic purposes and the key elements of *operational command and control* and support C4I structure.
- Understand the purposes of *operational movement and maneuver*.
- Examine the purposes and tasks of *operational intelligence*.
- Understand the meaning, purposes, and types of *operational fires*.
- Examine the purposes and elements of *operational logistics*.
- Examine the purposes and elements of *operational protection*.
- Understand the importance of *synchronization* of the key operational functions.

C. Background:

The existence of an operational level of war suggests the concurrent existence of theater-wide functional areas. The synchronization of these operational functions ensures and enhances the ability of operational commanders and their subordinate elements to carry out their missions in both peace and war. In a *mature theater*, operational functions will normally be established in their entirety. However, in an *immature theater,* they may exist in a rudimentary form, or not at all. Understanding the impact and interaction of these functions at the operational level of war is critically important for proper planning, preparation, employment, and support of one's own forces in attainment of their assigned objectives.

The key operational functions are: *Operational command and control, operational movement and maneuver, operational intelligence, operational fires, operational logistics,* and *operational protection*. The required readings provide a brief overview

of each of these functions and associated activities. During your reading, you will probably find that you are already familiar with these functions at the tactical level.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel L. M. Feero, U.S. Army, SP-212.

D. Questions:

Are there advantages or disadvantages of having operational functions in place during peace and war? Discuss and explain the purpose of each operational function.

What impact did the following operational functions have on the Leyte Gulf operation from the perspective of both belligerents?

- *Command and Control*—What are some of the factors that influenced the composition of specific command structures? This particular area is cited for many of the difficulties and poor decisions that occurred throughout the operation. Identify the flaws and their associated consequences with specific command structures and guidance/orders issued to subordinates.
- *Movement and Maneuver*—How did the opposing forces plan and employ movement and maneuver at Leyte?
- *IW/C2W*—Can you find elements of IW/C2W in the Leyte Gulf operation? If so, discuss them.
- *Operational Intelligence*—To what extent did the Allies operate on a basis of Japanese intentions rather than capabilities? What result did this have on the eventual outcome of the battle?
- *Operational Fires*—Were operational fires used during the Leyte Operation? If so, where and how? To what extent were they effective? Why (or why not) were they effective?
- *Operational Protection*—Did either of the opposing forces at Leyte consider and plan adequately for operational protection? Discuss examples of where and how operational protection was provided. What is the relationship of operational protection to the more commonly used term—force protection?
- *Operational Logistics*—How did the Allies address this area? What was the operational impact for the Allies? What impact did operational logistics have on the Japanese?
- Did the Allies synchronize their operational functions? If so, what functions did they synchronize and what effect did it have on the operation?

How might network-centric warfare change the operational functions?

- Will Command and Control structures be different?
- What impact will NCW have on Operational Maneuver?
- Will the Operational Intelligence function be implemented differently under NCW?

- Clearly the NCW implications for Fires and IW/C2W can be dramatic-what might some of these be?
- Will the network associated with NCW add a new dimension to Operational Protection?
- What impacts might NCW have on Operational Logistics?

E. Required Readings:

JMO Department, "Operational Functions," (**NWC 4103A**) (Issued).

Goodrich, David M., (Compiler), Part III: Operational Functions, *The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings*, (**NWC 1034A**) (Issued).

Bates, Richard, et al., "Allied Arrangements." pp 77-89.

Bates, Richard, et al., "Japanese Command Relations." pp 91-101.

Bates, Richard, et al., "Allied Arrangements—Information Available to the Allied Commander." pp 103-112.

Bates, Richard, et al., "Japanese Command Relations—Information Available to the Japanese Commander." pp 121-123.

Commander Third Fleet: "Operation Plan 21-44 (4 October 1944): Forces Under W.F. Halsey, USN, to Conduct Air Strikes on Okinawa, Formosa, Luzon, and the Vision Island in Support of Landing on and Occupation of Leyte." pp121-123.

Goodrich, David M., "Forgotten Mission: Land Based Air Operational Fires in Support of the Leyte Gulf Invasion." pp124-136.

Joint Pub 2-0: *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations,* (Scan) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-0: *Doctrine for Joint Operations, pp. III-17, (Forces and Functions)* (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-13.1: *Joint Doctrine for Command & Control Warfare (C2W),* (Scan) (Issued).

Joint Pub 4-0: *Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations*, (Scan) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Vego, Milan, "Operational Command and Control Warfare (C2W)," and "Operational Protection," Part IV: Operational Functions, *Operational Warfare*, (**NWC 1004**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Bolick, Joseph A., "The Influence And Reasons for Acceptance or Rejection of Operational Level Intelligence during the 1914 and 1943 Kursk Campaigns."

Handel, Michael I., "Intelligence and Military Operations."

Hutcherson, Norman B., “Command and Control Warfare: Putting Another Tool in the War-Fighter’s Data Base.”

Porter, Laning M., “Preconceptions, Predilections, and Experiences: Problems for Operational Level Intelligence and Decisionmaking.”

Rockwell, Christopher A., “Operational Sustainment: Lines of Communication and the Conduct of Operations.”

ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session continues to examine the theoretical framework and fundamental concepts of operational art. It focuses on the elements of operational warfare; specifically deployment/redeployment, "critical factors," concentration, operational maneuver, and the concept of the "culminating point."

B. Objectives:

- Identify and examine the principal elements of warfare as applied to the operational level of war.
- Know and understand the meaning and concept of the terms "critical factors," "culminating point" and "center of gravity."
- Understand the meaning and the main forms of operational maneuver.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.

C. Background:

The essence of operational art is applying decisive force against the enemy's main source of strength. This session will examine several key concepts that are essential to effectively plan and employ military forces to achieve desired military objectives.

Initial planning must include identifying "**critical factors**" that pertain to both enemy and friendly forces. The term critical factors is used to describe the critical strengths and critical weaknesses of both sides in a conflict. "**Critical strengths**" are those capabilities considered vital to achieve a given military objective. "**Critical weaknesses**" are those elements that, while vital, are quantitatively or qualitatively inadequate by themselves to achieve a given or derived objective. Critical strengths and weaknesses can become "**critical vulnerabilities**" if they are directly related to the enemy's center of gravity and are vulnerable to attack by friendly forces.

Successful planning and employment of combat forces at any level of war hinges on the proper identification of a "**center of gravity**" for both the enemy and one's own and friendly forces. In generic terms, a center of gravity is defined as a source of "massed" strength—physicial or moral, or, a source of leverage—whose serious degradation, neutralization, or destruction will have a decisive impact on a military force's ability to accomplish a given military objective. The enemy's COG must be

neutralized or destroyed, while one's own COG must be protected in order to accomplish the assigned military objective.

Success in combat is largely dependent on rapidly massed, superior combat power at a decisive time and place on the battlefield. A series of specific actions is required to successfully concentrate forces at a desired time and location. This series of actions includes deployment, employment, and sustainment.

Deployment is the process of moving one's own forces and assets to their planned starting positions or designated lines and areas for the commencement of actions. Timely phasing of forces into the area of operations is critical for success at the higher levels of war (operational and strategic). Errors in deployment at the operational or theater-strategic levels cannot be easily corrected, if at all, once hostilities start. Deployment precedes employment and maneuver.

Employment of military forces frequently involves maneuver. The principal aim of **maneuver** is to obtain a position that offers a force an advantage relative to the enemy. Forces can employ maneuver in both the offense and defense. Maneuver facilitates direct or indirect attack on the enemy's COG or strikes at the enemy's critical capabilities such as logistical support. Maneuver is categorized as tactical, operational, or strategic based on the nature of the desired objective (tactical, operational, strategic).

An important element of warfare, especially at the operational and strategic levels, is the concept of a **culminating point**, (or **culmination**.) Culmination applies to both offensive and defensive actions. In the offense, the culminating point is the point when the attacker no longer has sufficient combat power to successfully continue the attack. The attacker seeks to secure his objective before reaching his culmination point. In the defense, the culminating point is the point where the defender has inadequate combat power to defend successfully. The defender wants to draw the attacker to his culmination point and then strike when the attacker has exhausted his resources and is no longer capable of a successful defense. The ability to prevent one's own culmination while causing the enemy to reach his is one of the prerequisites to operational success. In general, the point of culmination occurs in time and space, when and where the attacker must stop and defend his gains if he wishes to avoid losing them. It is the combat power that culminates, and the operational commander must determine his combat power relative to that of the opponent.

Point of contact for this session is Colonel L. M. Feero, U.S. Army, SP-212.

D. Questions:

What is the purpose of strategic and operational deployment? Explain and analyze operational deployment. Did the Japanese and the Allies correctly assess the challenge of deployment in building their plans for the Philippines?

What is the relevance of the concept of "critical factors?" Explain the relationship between "critical strengths" and "critical weaknesses."

What is your understanding of the concept of the "center of gravity?" What is the relationship between the objective and the enemy center of gravity (COG)?

To what extent did the plans of the Allies and the Japanese clearly address the operational concept of the center of gravity (or recognition of appropriate critical factors)? What critical factors did each side identify? Do you agree with them?

What forms of operational maneuver did the Allies and Japanese employ during the Leyte operation? Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the forms of operational maneuver.

Explain and analyze the concept of "culmination". What key factors cause "culmination"? Did the Japanese or Allies reach a culmination point in the Leyte operation?

How might network centric warfare impact our determinations of some of these elements?

E. Required Readings:

JMO Department, "Elements of Operational Warfare," (**NWC 4096A**) (Issued).

Vego, Milan, "Stages and Elements of Operational Warfare," "Force Deployment," and "Concept of Culmination Point," Part V: Stages and Elements of Operational Warfare, *On Operational Art,* (**NWC 1004**) (Issued).

Huber, Jeff, "You Can't Defy the Laws of Gravity," (**NCW 1083**) (Issued).

Izzo, Lawrence L., "The Center of Gravity is not an Achilles Heel," (**NWC 1026**) (Issued).

Webb, George S., "The Razor's Edge: Identifying the Operational Culminating Point of Victory," (**NWC 1027**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Goodrich, David M., (Compiler), Part VI: The Execution, *The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings,* (**NWC 1034A**) (Issued).

Anderson, Charles R., "Leyte, The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II." Pp 298-329.

Potter, E. B., "The Battle for Leyte Gulf." pp 279-297.

Goodrich, David M., (Compiler), Part IV: Operational Plans, *The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings,* (**NWC 1034A**) (Issued).

Bates, Richard, et al., "Japanese Command Relations-Japanese Plan." pp. 218-228.

G. Supplementary Readings:

Mendel and Tooke, "Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity."

METHODS OF COMBAT FORCE EMPLOYMENT (Seminar)

"The beginnings of wisdom is to call things their right name."

—Confucius

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is to explain and analyze the principal methods of combat force employment to accomplish operational or strategic objectives in a given theater.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate US military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.
- **PJE**—Translate national security and military direction into development of theater strategies, and strategies of supporting combatant commanders, for use in the geographic areas (AORs) identified in the Unified Command Plan (UCP).
- **PJE**—Translate national military objectives, guidance, and theater strategies into theater strategic guidance, objectives, and operational focus in theater campaign plans.
- **PJE**—Develop a geographic combatant commander's strategic concepts of operations and logistics of the theater campaign plan.
- **PJE**—Understand the fundamentals, considerations, and design elements of campaign planning including integration of unified, joint, and multinational forces into theater and subordinate campaign plans.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- Understand the relationships among theater functional areas such as force requirements and readiness, allied relations, C4I, movement and maneuver, firepower, protection, and sustainment.
- Know and understand the principal methods of combat force employment in general.
- Understand the proper definition and meaning of the term "major operation" and its importance in planning as a part of a campaign.

- Describe the differences between tactical actions, major operations, and campaigns, and how they relate to the levels of war.
- Understand theater command and control relationships, with special emphasis on the functions and use of a JTF.

C. Background:

Methods of combat force employment are an important component of operational art. However, since the end of World War II this important area of theoretical study has received little or no attention in the U.S. military. While battles and campaigns have received inordinately greater attention in U.S. doctrinal publications, the same cannot be said about *major operations*. This lack of interest has been compounded by differences in terminology. Each Service, although using the same or similar terms, defines methods of combat force employment differently (even differently than joint doctrine). The full extent of Service differences is such that some of the terms used are not recognized by other Services, while other terms have no generally accepted definition or are not defined at all. More often than not, terms are used loosely and without regard to their real meaning or commonly accepted definitions.

Modern methods of combat force employment are the result of a long evolution of warfare. In the nineteenth century, "decisive" battles were the area of study and practice of *tactics,* while *strategy* was concerned with the conduct of campaigns. In that era, campaigns were conducted primarily by a single Service, although there are examples where navies took part as well (the American War of Independence, the Peninsular War, the Crimean War, the American Civil War, etc.).

The principal methods of combat force employment today are *tactical actions, major operations,* and *campaigns*. The terms are differentiated by the *military objectives* they are intended to accomplish and the corresponding command echelon responsible for their planning and execution. Tactical actions are normally conducted to accomplish tactical objectives, while the principal methods for accomplishing strategic or operational objectives are major operations and campaigns.

Tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes, attacks, etc.) are aimed to accomplish major or minor tactical objectives in a given combat zones or sectors and, in some cases, can encompass an area of operations. They are an integral part of major operations. Tactical actions are predominant method of combat force employment in some warfare areas, specifically, trade warfare (attack on the enemy's and protection of one's maritime trade) and defense. When conducted over time and in a certain sea or ocean area or airspace, tactical actions can cumulatively accomplish operational objective(s). Tactical actions can be either defensive or offensive in nature and are differentiated by the physical environment (land, sea, or air) in which they occur.

In the U.S. military, the term "major operation" is not a widely understood or accepted term. The more generic term "operation" is used so often and interchangeably that it lost its true meaning. U.S. joint doctrine defines operation as "a military

action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, Service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign."

The term "major operation" was introduced by the U.S. Army to make a clear distinction between combat force employment to accomplish operational objectives and the employment of combat force for other purposes. In generic terms, a *major operation* consists of series of related battles, engagements, and strikes and other tactical actions sequenced and synchronized in terms of time and space to accomplish an operational objective. Major operations are normally an integral part of a campaign. Sometimes, a major operation could be planned to accomplish a strategic objective in a situation short of war, and usually in an undeveloped theater. The examples of such major operations are U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983 (Operation *Urgent Fury*), U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989 (Operation *Just Cause*), and NATO's actions in the Kosovo Conflict of 1999 (Operation *Allied Force*).

In contrast to tactical actions, major operations are invariably planned. With respect to their purpose, they can be offensive or defensive. Ground (or land), naval (or maritime), air (space), and special forces major operations are differentiated with regard to the physical environment in which the preponderance of the major operation is conducted and with respect to the scope of Service involvement.

With respect to the degree of Service participation, *independent, joint* (multi-Service), and *combined* (multi-national) major operations are differentiated. *Independent major operations* are conducted *predominantly* by the combat arms of a single Service. They could be conducted by navies or air forces, but rarely by ground forces. A joint *major operation* is conducted by forces of two or more Services, while a *combined major operation* is conducted with two or more Services of allied countries or coalition member states. A major operation can be both joint and combined (as was the case during the Coalition's air offensive against Iraq in the Gulf War of 1990-1991, and NATO's action against Serbia in 1999). When only a single-type force is used, a major operation can be combined without necessarily being joint (e.g., the combat employment of a multi-national naval forces or air forces).

The term *campaign* is used interchangeably by the U.S. military for describing a wide range of military actions. The DOD and the Services differ in their understanding of what constitutes a campaign. Joint Pub 1-02 (1994) defines a campaign as a "series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space." Joint Pub 5-0 (1995) describes a campaign as "a series of related *joint major operations* that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space."

In generic terms, a *campaign* consists of a series of related major operations (land, air/space, naval, special forces) sequenced and synchronized in terms of time and space and aimed to accomplish a military *strategic* or *theater-strategic objective* in a

given (declared or undeclared) theater of operations. These operations are executed simultaneously or sequentially and are conducted according to a common plan controlled by a theater commander. The main purpose of a campaign may be either offensive or defensive. *Land campaigns* and *maritime campaigns* are differentiated according to the physical environment in which major operations predominantly take place. Because airspace is an inseparable part of a maritime or land theater, air forces are always employed jointly with other Services.

A single campaign is planned and conducted for each strategic threat or strategic objective to be accomplished in a theater. A strategic objective, particularly in a developed (or "mature") theater, encompasses not only military, but also political, diplomatic, economic, and very often ideological, ethnic, religious, and psychological elements. Hence, despite claims to the contrary, no single Service can accomplish all the aspects of strategic objective by its own efforts. Afterward, strategic success must be consolidated; otherwise a campaign will not achieve all its stated objectives. This does not mean that a single Service, as the Air Force did in the Gulf War of 1990-1991, cannot make a greater contribution to the campaign's ultimate success than other Services.

In contrast, a campaign in "military operations other than war" (MOOTW), such as counterinsurgency or counter terrorism consists of a series of related minor or sometimes major tactical actions rather than major operations. These actions are coordinated in time and place to accomplish strategic objectives within a given part of the theater commander's area of responsibility. Some campaigns in MOOTW, specifically counter drug or counter terrorism campaigns are not limited to a specific theater, but are conducted in several theaters that might or might not be adjacent to each other.

Each method of combat force employment differs considerably from the other, principally with regard to: the objectives to be accomplished, force size and mix, and scope and duration of combat actions. Differences between major operations and campaigns are more than just cosmetic, particularly with respect to the ways in which major operations and campaigns are *designed*.

The point of contact for this session is Professor M. N. Vego, C-414.

D. Questions:

Why is it important to know and understand the true meanings of the key terms dealing with the methods of combat force employment?

Explain the principal methods for accomplishing major and minor tactical objectives. What are the differences between a battle and an engagement and between a strike and an attack?

What is the true meaning of the term "major operation?"

Explain what constitutes a "campaign." Is there such a thing as an "air campaign?"

How might network centric warfare (NCW) change the way we think of employing forces in combat? For example:

Might NCW blur the differences between tactical actions and major operations? Why?

Will the planning of tactical actions now become the purview of the operational commander? Why or why not?

Leyte Case Study:

Did the Allied landing at Leyte have an operational or strategic objective?

Identify the type of major operations in terms of their main purpose (fleet vs. fleet, fleet vs. shore, etc.) and timing (main, supporting, preliminary, initial, etc.) conducted by the Allied and Japanese forces in the Philippines and the adjacent sea/airspace between 17 and 26 October 1944.

What naval battles and engagements constitute what is popularly known as the "Battle of Leyte Gulf?" Were all battles or engagements planned or are seen in retrospect as such?

Identify the key elements of the major naval and air operations conducted by the Japanese forces in defense of the Philippines in October 1944.

E. Required Readings:

JMO Department, "Methods of Combat Force Employment," (**NWC 4099A**) (Issued).

Potter, E. B., "The Battle for Leyte Gulf," Part VI: The Execution of the Operation, pp. 279-297, Goodrich, David H. (Editor), *The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings,* (**NWC 1034A**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Vego, Milan, "Methods of Combat Force Employment," "Major Naval Operations," Part VI: Methods of Combat Force Employment, pp. 373-409, ibid., *Operational Warfare* (**NWC 1004**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-0: *Doctrine for Joint Operations,* Preface and Executive Summary, pp. vii-xiii, (Issued).

U.S. Department of Army. FM 100-5, *Operations,* Chapter 6: Planning and Execution Operations, pp. 6-0 through 6-8, (Issued).

Vego, Milan, Glossary of Operational Terms, *Operational Warfare* (**NWC 1004**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

None.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR (Seminar)

Under the glass top of Nimitz's desk were several cards bearing military slogans, and in a central position one small card with a list: ''Objective, Offensive, Surprise, Superiority of Force at Point of Contact, Simplicity, Security, Movement, Economy of Force, Cooperation.'' Some people call such lists ''principles of war,'' but Nimitz thought of his merely as reminders, a check-off list of things to be considered before launching an operation…

—E.B. Potter, *Nimitz*

A. Focus:

This session deals with the principles of war as listed in current joint doctrine, their applicability to operational art, and the question of whether they are true principles as opposed to guidelines that are subject to change as the nature of warfare changes.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend current joint doctrine regarding the principles of war.
- Explain how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war.
- Analyze historical case studies using the principles of war.

C. Background:

Historians and military leaders have always studied past wars in an effort to discover if there are underlying principles or elements that would help to explain the victories of successful commanders and that would serve as guides for the conduct of future operations. These studies have consistently identified several "principles" as being worthy of consideration.

The armed forces of most nations accept the general validity of certain fundamental principles of war and teach them to each new generation of officers. Although the principles vary in name, number, and definition from nation to nation, it is important for military officers to know that such principles exist and to decide for themselves how and to what extent to apply them when making operational decisions.

Admiral Mahan wrote that principles are "fundamental truths correctly formulated. They are nothing more than the proper conclusions from the observation of a large number of naval campaigns in the past." He also stated that "historical examples are more valuable than principles, because by being narrative of the past events they are a story of practical experience."

Errors and failures are generally more illustrative of principles than are successes. The principles of war must be continuously reexamined in the light of changes in doctrine and technology over time. They are not recipes, but guides which, appropriately invoked, can enhance the probability of success. Adherence to any one principle may frequently require violation of another.

The point of contact for this topic is Professor T. L. Gatchel, C-413.

D. Questions:

Principles of war are fundamental truths governing the prosecution of war, and their application is essential to strategic, operational, and tactical success. Do you agree or disagree? Support your position.

Do the tenets of network-centric warfare change the principles of war or their application?

Some historians have criticized Admiral Halsey's actions as the Third Fleet Commander during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Yet, Halsey, until his death, believed that his actions were correct in view of the information he had and his interpretation of his mission. Do you think Admiral Halsey acted properly in carrying out the tasks of operational protection and support of the Leyte operation (*King II*)? Defend your position in terms of the principles of war.

Can the failure of the Japanese plan at Leyte Gulf be explained in terms of violations of the principles of war? If so, how?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0: *Doctrine for Joint Operations,* Appendix A, "Principles of War," (Issued).

Brodie, Bernard, "The Worth of Principles of War," (**NWC 1057**) (Issued).

Caneva, Joseph W., ''Network-Centric Warfare: Implications for Applying the Principles of War,'' (**NWC 1058**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Brown, C. R., "The Principles of War," (**NWC 1025**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Alger, John I., *The Quest for Victory: The History of the Principles of War*.

Bennett, William C., ''Just Cause and the Principles of War.''

Fishel, John T., ''Operation Uphold Democracy: Old Principles, New Realities.''

Frost, Robert S., "The Growing Imperative to Adopt 'Flexibility' as an American Principle of War."

Glenn, Russell W., ''No More Principles of War?''

Graziano, Paul E., ''Leyte Invasion: A Comparative Analysis of the Application of the Principles of War.''

Leonhard, Robert R., *The Principles of War for the Information Age*.

Nelson, Bradford K., "Applying the Principles of War in Information Operations.''

OPERATIONAL PLANNING (Seminar)

"No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength. Only the layman sees in the course of a campaign a consistent execution of a preconceived and highly detailed original concept pursued consistently to the end."

—Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Sr., 1871.

A. Focus:

This session will focus on the fundamentals of operational planning, and selected elements of operational design in planning campaigns and major operations.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate US military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.
- **PJE**—Demonstrate how IO and C4 are integrated into the theater and strategic campaign development process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the CINCs.
- Know and understand fundamentals of planning of major operations and campaigns.
- Understand the meaning and the practical application of the selected elements of operational design.
- Know and understand the importance and key elements of an operational idea (scheme).
- Know and understand the purpose and difference between operational sequencing, synchronization, and phasing and the important contribution these concepts play in the formulation and plan development of major operations and campaigns.
- Understand and appreciate the use of operational/strategic deception in the planning and the execution of major operations and campaigns.

- Translate national security and military direction into development pf theater strategies, and strategies of supporting combatant commanders, for use in the geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) identified in the Unified Command Plan.
- Translate national military objectives, guidance, and theater strategies into theater strategic guidance, objectives, and operational focus in theater campaign plans.
- Understand the fundamentals, considerations, and design elements of campaign planning including integration of unified, joint multinational forces into theater and subordinate campaign plans.

C. Background:

Military planning, in general, is a continuous process in preparation for assigned or future tasks. It involves a detailed and methodical evaluation of all aspects of contemplated military action. Planning makes future actions easier by allowing for quick subsequent and coordinated actions by the staff and other elements of the command. Proper planning allows for detailed and systematic examination of all factors involved in a military action. The larger the unit is, the greater the need to foresee and plan for long-range future actions.

Major operations and campaigns are planned and conducted by the theater commanders and their staffs. Sometimes a joint task force commander (COMJTF) and the staff will be required to plan for a major operation when assigned an operational (or sometimes strategic) objective.

Any major operation or campaign contains a number of elements that collectively ensure the accomplishment of the selected or assigned objective(s). Thus, an overall *operational design* should exist to ensure that one's forces are employed in a coherent manner, and focused on the assigned operational or strategic objectives in the theater. The principal elements of operational design are: *desired end state, ultimate and intermediate objectives, interior vs. exterior geostrategic position (*for a campaign), *interior vs. exterior lines* (for a major operation), *identification of the enemy's critical factors and center of gravity, direction/axis,* and *operational idea* (*scheme*).

The basic operation plan (OPLAN) normally contains only the most important elements of operational design in a rudimentary form. Many aspects of the design are elaborated in detail in the annexes to the OPLAN, and plans of subordinate component commanders. An operational idea (or scheme) represents the very heart of the design for a major operation or campaign. In its essence, it is very similar to what is commonly known as concept of operations (CONOPS) or "scheme of maneuver" (used in the past). An operational idea should describe in broad terms the intended sequence for the employment of service or functionally based forces (in a campaign) or combat arms (in a major operation) necessary to accomplish the assigned strategic or operational objectives. Optimally, an operational idea should be novel, avoid stereotyped employment of one's forces, present a multi-dimensional threat which

the opponent cannot counter, provide surprise and deception, and ensure the speed of execution. It should clearly focus on the destruction or neutralization of the enemy's strategic (in a campaign) or operational (in a major operation) center of gravity.

Operational sequencing is one of the key elements of any operational idea. A sound sequencing is also the prime prerequisite for effective synchronization. Sequencing is the arrangement of events aimed to create overwhelming combat power in the order most likely to accomplish a given objective. Normally, these events are arranged by deriving a series of tasks/objectives carried out simultaneously and/or sequentially.

Operational synchronization is the coordination of actions by diverse combat arms and/or service forces in terms of objective and time aimed to generate a synergistic effect, at the decisive point. The effect of all the elements of force combined should exceed the sum of their individual capabilities. Among other things, synchronization is ensured by proper command relationships and by assigning missions based on common operational concepts. Clarity of the commander's intent is the critical factor in ensuring synchronization of efforts, especially in the employment of multi-service or multi-national forces.

Operational/strategic deception is one of the principal force multipliers in a given major operation or campaign. The *operational/strategic* level of command allows the commander to employ multi-service and often multi-national forces and assets in planning and executing *operational/strategic* deception measures and actions. When properly conceived and executed, *operational/strategic* deception can significantly enhance the effectiveness of one's forces, prevent surprise, and reduce the effectiveness of the enemy forces. To realize possible benefits, operational commanders must not only understand the concept but also must be willing to dedicate the time and forces required for operational deception to be successful.

The point of contact for this session is Professor M. N. Vego, C-414.

D. Questions:

Discuss and analyze the fundamentals of planning of major operations and campaigns.

How are the elements of operational design integrated in planning a major operation or campaign?

What is "strategic guidance" and why is it important?

How does "desired end state" differ from "objective"? Explain their mutual relationship.

Explain the process of identifying "critical factors," and "center of gravity" in particular.

Explain the concept of operational sequencing. What is the linkage between operational objective, tasks and sequencing?

Explain the concept of operational synchronization. What is its main purpose?

What is the purpose of *operational/strategic* deception? Explain the relationship between tactical and *operational/strategic* deception.

Applying the principal elements of operational design, analyze the naval aspects of the Leyte Operation:

1. How would you assess the operational objectives provided determined by Admiral Toyoda? To what extent did the operational idea employed by the Japanese provide an opportunity for success? How would you have made it more effective?
2. Explain and analyze the Japanese plan for operational deception. To what extent was the plan successful and why? To what extent did the Allies apply operational deception in executing the Leyte Operation? Provide examples to support your arguments.
3. How are sequencing and synchronization different? Give examples of each from the Japanese plans. Did Admiral Toyoda have a better option to apply operational sequencing in his plans for naval defense of the Philippines?

How did the Japanese plan envisage operational synchronization?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan, "Operational Planning, "Campaign Design," "Operational and Strategic Deception," "Operational Sequencing," and "Operational Synchronization," pp. 409-468, 495-518, and 531-560. Part VII: Operational Planning, *ibid., Operational Warfare* (**NWC 1004**) (Issued).

Goodrich, David, M., (Compiler), Part IV: Operational Plans, *The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings,* (**NWC 1034A**) (Issued).

Cannon, M, Hamlin, "Plans are made and Forces are readied," pp. 161-165.

Magari, Toshimo, "Philippine Defense Plans, July 1944," pp. 228-244.

Bates, Richard, et al., "Japanese Command Relations — Japanese Plan," pp. 245-250.

Vego, Milan, "Operational Aspects of the SHO-1 Plan," pp. 251-256.

F. Reference Readings:

Critz, Mike, "Operational Deception," (**NWC 4083**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Builder, Carl H., and Dear, James, A., "A Time for Planning? If Not Now, When?"

Mendel and Tooke, "Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity."

Silkett, Wayne A., "Downfall: The Invasion that Never Was."

Williamson, William, R., "Campaign Planning."

OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP (SEMINAR)

A. Focus:

This session will examine basic elements of operational leadership, with a particular emphasis on the responsibilities of operational commanders, operational thinking, and operational decisions.

B. Objectives:

- Know and understand the major responsibilities and tasks of operational commanders in peacetime and time of war.
- Know and understand why having an operational perspective (or thinking operationally) is so critical for operational commanders and their staffs.
- Develop a framework of thought wherein the distinction between decisions made at the operational and tactical levels of war can be examined and understood.
- **PJE—**Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.
- **PJE—**Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE—**Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE—**Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the CINCs.
- **PJE—**Comprehend how to coordinate US military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.
- **PJE—**Demonstrate how IO and C4 are integrated into the theater and strategic campaign development process.

C. Background:

The larger the objectives are, the larger must be the commander's perspective required to employ one's forces most effectively. Broad objectives mean broad vision. In contrast to the tacticians, the operational commanders must focus on broad military objectives that lie beyond the realm of tactical actions—ranging from the destruction of the enemy forces in the field to undermining the enemy's public support for war or the enemy's will to fight. Operational commanders must possess what is generically known as *operational perspective* on all the aspects of the situation in a given theater. To be successful, they must be able to see the situation in a given theater broadly and in its full complexity. They must understand how the actions at each level of war affect the actions at other levels. Operational commanders

must be capable of visualizing trends in the military, political, economic, and other elements of the situation for weeks and months ahead of time.

Operational thinking is not something that comes naturally to a future commander but must be acquired by conscious effort and hard work. It can be obtained through practical experience in war or large-scale exercises and maneuvers in peacetime, and operational and strategic war gaming. However, there is little or no opportunity for most of the future operational commanders to obtain the necessary broad vision in the practical execution of their responsibilities; hence such a perspective is acquired through both professional education (e.g., attending a war college) and systematic self-study of military history, geography, international relations, economics, ethnicity and nationalism, society, religions, etc. Study of past wars, and major operations and campaigns, in particular, is the best method for acquiring an operational perspective.

A much larger perspective at the operational level necessarily requires more complex and challenging decision-making processes than normally take place at the tactical level. While the tactical commander is limited to fighting battles and engagements, the operational commander is concerned with setting the stage for conducting a major operation or campaign.

The operational commander's success depends heavily on the decisions, which must be made, and the consequences of those decisions. These decisions are categorized as informational, organizational, and operational. The operational commander makes *operational decisions* in a time-space window that is much different from that of the tactical commander. Several courses of action must be weighed, based on the information available and in the face of uncertainties about future events. These decisions are in fact hypotheses because they are based on courses of action containing many assumptions. Because of the steadily compressed time-space relationships, operational decisions are made not only in a very short time, but their impact is almost immediate and affects the actions of one's forces over a major part of a given theater. Operational decisions will often have to be made by the commander on the basis of his own instinctive judgment and without the benefit of a careful analysis of the situation that weighs all the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative course of action.

The point of contact for this session is Professor M. N. Vego, C-414.

D. Questions:

Explain and analyze in generic terms the main responsibilities of the operational commander in peacetime and wartime. What are the personal traits an operational commander should have to be successful?

Discuss the meaning of the term "operational thinking." What are the differences between the tactical and operational perspective? Explain and analyze the principal type of decision made by the operational commanders.

Explain and discuss the main organizational and operational decisions made by the operational commanders on both sides during planning, preparation and execution of the Leyte operation.

Explain the relationship between the principal *operational* decisions and operational (or strategic) consequences.

How might network centric warfare have changed the role of the operational commanders on both sides during the Leyte operation?

E. Required Readings:

Vego, Milan, "Operational Leadership," "Exercising Operational Leadership," and "The Decisions," Part VIII: Operational Leadership, *Operational Warfare,* pp. 561-618 (**NWC 1004**) (Issued).

Goodrich, David M., (Compiler), Part VII: Operational Leadership, *The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings* (**NWC 1034A**) (Issued).

Smith, Robert, Ross, "Luzon versus Formosa," pp. 371-387.

Potter, E.B., "Nimitz," pp. 388-413.

"The Leyte Operation," Admiral Soemu Toyoda, *The End of the Imperial Navy,* pp. 428-437.

F. Reference Readings:

Rubel, Robert C., "Operational Level Leadership," (**NWC 1032**) (Issued).

Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven, *The Power of Personality in War,* translated by the Historical Section, Army War College, September 1938, in *Roots of Strategy,* Book 3 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1991).

Thomas B. Buell, *The Quiet Warrior*. A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988).

Gregory C. Gardner, *Generalship in War: The Principles of Operational Command* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 4 May 1987).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Collins, Lawton J., "Leadership at Higher Echelons."

De Czege, Huba Wass, "A Comprehensive View of Leadership."

Forsythe, George H., "The Preparation of Strategic Leaders."

Gerner, Mark, H., "Leadership at the Operational Level."

Holder, L.D., "Educating and Training for Theater Warfare."

Horner, Donald, H., "Leader Development and Why It Remains Important."

Tooke, Lamar, and Allen, Ralph, "Strategic Intuition and the Art of War."

Zais, Mitchell M., "Strategic Vision and Strength of Will: Imperatives for Theater Command."

THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS CONFLICT: A CASE STUDY (Seminar)

A senior officer said after the war that it had proved 'the things we did on the basis of well-tried and proven formation worked, and the ad hoc arrangements turned out much less happily.' Joint-service liaison and staff work left much to be desired.

—Hastings and Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*

A. Focus:

This session serves as the synthesis event for the components of operational art explained and discussed in preceding Block I sessions. Emphasis is on the decisions and actions of operational-level commanders on both sides.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Analyze the strategic art; i.e., developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to secure national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- **PJE**—Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- Analyze how commanders and staffs applied operational art in a historical case study.
- Comprehend the key factors that affect the development of joint plans and assess the relative influence of these factors.
- Analyze the operational lessons valid for the employment of modern, multinational and joint forces.

C. Background:

This case study is presented in three sessions. On Tuesday, 27 March a faculty member will give a lecture on the strategic background to the conflict that will be followed by a 60-minute, edited video on the background and highlights of the conflict. You will have the remainder of the day to study the case materials and develop presentations. The mornings of Wednesday, 28 March and Thursday, 29 March will be devoted to presentations and discussion of the case study.

This session is designed to reinforce the aspects of operational art studied and discussed in preceding sessions. Historical examples provide an excellent opportunity for illustrating the complexities of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns and the reasons why certain military actions either succeeded or failed. This particular case is used because it is rich with examples of the application, lack of application, misapplication, or inability to apply the concepts associated with operational art.

The goal of this session is to provide in-depth discussion and analysis of major aspects of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982 from an operational perspective. As the major synthesis event for the operational art concepts portion of the syllabus, the motivations, planning and actions of both sides in the conflict will be examined in some detail. Seminar moderators will assign specific responsibilities for student discussion of the case.

Point of contact for this session is Professor T. L. Gatchel, C-413.

D. Questions:

Why did Argentina decide to invade? Why did they choose April 1982?

How did two "friendly" countries come to fight each other? Why did the UK misread the signals?

What was the effect of British "gunboat diplomacy" on the Argentines? What lessons can be drawn for the U.S. Navy?

Why did Argentina fail to properly gauge the British reaction to an "invasion"? What was the effect of U.S. SECSTATE's "shuttle diplomacy"? Did either side's strategic objective change as a result of that diplomacy?

What was the Argentine strategic objective? What did Argentina perceive as the British centers of gravity at the strategic and operational levels or was that determination even made? Did these centers of gravity change as time progressed?

What was the British strategic objective? What did the UK perceive as the Argentine centers of gravity at the strategic and operational levels? Did these centers of gravity change as time progressed?

How did the fact that members of the Junta were de facto both the strategic and operational leaders affect the British planning?

To what extent were the elements of operational design considered in the planning and execution of Argentine operations? In the planning and execution of the UK's operations?

How did the Argentines plan to use their fleet initially? What was their strategy after 2 May? What was the Air Force strategy?

What was Woodward's strategy for attaining "battlespace dominance?" Did it work? Why or why not?

What was the Argentine C2 organization? How did this affect the outcome?

What was the British C2 organization? How did this affect the outcome?

Which aspects of the principles of war did the Argentines consider in their planning, and which aspects did they appear to overlook or disregard? What about the British?

Which key operational functions had a significant impact on how each side employed their forces? For example, how did both sides employ operational fires?

To what extent and by whom was sound operational leadership displayed? For example, what considerations were given to consolidation of operational successes, delegation of authority, commitment of reserves, etc.?

What considerations were given to operational logistics by both sides?

How did the actions at sea impact the land operations? What was the impact of the MEZ/TEZ?

To what extent was war termination efficiently conducted?

What were the operational-level lessons learned on both sides? Which ones can we apply in the future?

E. Required Readings:

Gatchel, Theodore L., "Operational Art and Theater Level Decisions During the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict" (**NWC 1087**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Selected extracts from Conflicto Malvinas, Official Report of the Argentine Army, Vol. II, (**NWC 1038**) (Issued).

Selected extracts from Falklands Islands Campaign: Understanding the Issues, Vol. 1. (**NWC 1115**) (Issued).

Woodward, Sandy, Admiral, RN, *One Hundred Days—The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander*. Naval Institute Press, 1992. (Chapters 4 (pp. 92-95 only), 7, 8, 12 & 13) (Issued).

Summers, Jr., Harry G., "Strategic Lessons Learned: The Falkland Islands Campaign." (**NWC 1111**) (Issued).

Duffner, Robert W., "Conflict in the South Atlantic: The Impact of Air Power." Air University Review, Mar- Apr 1984. (**NWC 1118**) (Issued).

Freedman, Lawrence, and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, *Signals of War*. (Library Reserve).

Hastings, Max, and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*. (Seminar Reserve).

Middlebrook, Martin, *Task Force: The Falklands War, 1982*. (Seminar Reserve).

Thompson, Julian, *Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict.* Chapter 8, "Amphibious Logistics—Falklands 1982, " (**NWC 1086**) (Issued).

U.K., The Defence Council. "The Falklands War 1982 from the Viewpoint of Doctrine." (**NWC 4060**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Clapp, Michael, and Ewen Southby-Tailyour, *Amphibious Assault Falklands: The Battle of San Carlos Water*.

Middlebrook, Martin, The Fight for the 'Malvinas': The Ar*gentine Forces in the Falklands War*.

Thompson, Julian, *No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic: 1982*.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS EXAMINATION

A. Focus:

This writing requirement is intended to measure your knowledge and understanding of the operational concepts discussed during Block One of the curriculum.

B. Objectives:

- Demonstrate an understanding of operational concepts.
- Demonstrate the ability to deduce operational lessons valid for the employment of modern military forces.
- Evaluate student understanding of the operational employment of military force in joint and combined operations.
- Provide feedback on student understanding of operational concepts as they translate into naval, joint, and multi-national operations.

C. Background:

The operational concepts examination is a three-hour examination and may be completed anywhere within the War College complex. Students are encouraged to prepare for the exam in group discussion; however, once the exam question(s) is (are) issued to students, no collaboration is permitted—only individual work will be accepted. Students will be allowed to use any course materials when developing their answers. However, the examination will contain sufficient specific factual information so that the need to use any external references will be minimized.

The examination will reflect a synthesis of the course material covered up to this point. The basis for evaluation of the examination will be:

1. Complete, logical, and well-supported solutions to each question or problem presented.
2. Application of appropriate course concepts to the specific question chosen.
3. Clear and concise articulation of ideas.

The student should prepare complete responses to the questions and problems posed. The examination does not require recall of specific facts, but rather the integration and application of major principles, ideas, and concepts addressed during Block One of the Joint Maritime Operations curriculum.

The point of contact for this session is Captain C. E. Helms, U.S. Navy, C-422.

USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Lecture)

At all times, commanders shall observe, and require their commands to observe, the principles of international law. Where necessary to fulfill this responsibility, a departure from other provisions of Navy Regulations is authorized.

Article 0705, U.S. Navy Regulations (rev. 1999)

A. Focus:

This lecture introduces the operational law portion of the operations curriculum. International law affects the planning and conduct of military operations in a number of critical ways. This session will address sources of international law, and the international legal basis for the use of force by one nation against another.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the development of international law in its historical context.
- Identify the primary sources of international law, compare the sources of international law with the sources of domestic U.S. law, and understand important provisions of the UN Charter.
- Discuss the impact of the UN Charter on the development of international law, particularly with respect to the concept of individual and collective self-defense.
- Understand how international law definitions and concepts affect the operational commander in planning and executing military operations.
- **PJE**—Understand the historical basis for current U.S. Defense Establishment policies.
- **PJE**—Understand the organizational and political influences on the development of national security strategy and strategic decision making.
- **PJE**—Understand how the NCA performs its crisis action role of coordinating U.S. interagency and multinational participation in support of a crisis situation.

C. Background:

Relations among the nations necessarily involve the application of international law. International practice and agreements regulate such diverse activities as aviation safety, communications, financial transactions, nautical rules of the road, environmental protection and the use of force. While the international legal system, like its domestic counterpart, is not perfect, nations nevertheless comply with most international law most of the time.

Nations create international law by long-standing practice and by agreement—as a result, they usually regard it as fair and find it in their best interest to comply with its provisions. Compliance is also a function of reciprocity by which nations follow the law out of concern for adverse responses by other nations against unlawful conduct. Moreover, nations usually desire the reputation of reliably keeping promises. They want to foster respect for the "rule of law," while being sensitive to the

pressures of domestic and world public opinion and valuing the need for order and predictability.

For many, international law appears to lack the precision and predictability that is more evident in domestic law. One of the reasons for the apparent uncertainty in international law is that it lacks central legislative and judicial mechanisms. Nevertheless, there are principles of international law. These principles are by and large the "standards of conduct" by which nation-states seek to characterize their actions as compliant with international law.

So, "what is the law" in the international context? The commonly accepted sources for determining international law are:

1. Customary law formed from the widespread practice of nations out of the belief that such a practice is legally required;
2. International agreements between and among the nations; and
3. General principles of law, usually employed in areas not already settled by customary practice or agreements.

Secondary factors include the general principles of law reflected in the domestic legal systems of nearly all nations, court decisions, and the publications of recognized scholars. Resolutions of international organizations may also be a factor; by virtue of the UN Charter, one type of binding, law-declaring resolution is a "decision" by the UN Security Council.

The early development of international law involved exclusively rules of conduct between and among nations. More recently, international law has focused increasingly on the rights and responsibilities of individuals. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which the U.S. and nearly all nations are parties, are examples of humanitarian law applicable during armed conflict. Human rights law, written in treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified by the U.S. in 1992) is another example. Many international human rights principles echo U.S. Constitutional guarantees.

Defining the authority of a nation to use force against another nation is the primary purpose of the UN Charter. The Charter specifies that a nation may use force either pursuant to an authorization from the Security Council (or in limited circumstances a regional arrangement under the Charter), and in individual or collective self-defense. However, recent events such as the NATO intervention in Kosovo hightlight that customary international law may provide additional authority for a nation to use force (such as on the basis of humanitarian intervention). The reading by Professor Lillich suggests that this is the case.

The U.S. regards itself as a country which abides by international law and it is increasingly looked to as a chief proponent (and sometimes enforcer) of the rule of law in the international community. Violations of international law by the military commander can be detrimental to U.S. national interests and the military mission. However, international law should not be viewed only as a "constraint" on operations; it should be viewed as a facilitator as well. Consider, for example, the

"force-multiplying" effect of coalition operations in the Gulf War being justified under the UN Charter (Article 51 guaranteeing the rights of individual and collective self-defense) and numerous Security Council resolutions.

A note about the law-related sessions: Sessions I-15 through I-19 are intended to provide a basic understanding of how international law influences the conduct of military operations. The scope and depth of coverage is, by necessity, limited. The purpose is to instill awareness of how law can affect the planning and execution of operations and to convey that operational commanders should seek advice from qualified judge advocates. The reference reading by Gen Zinni (NWC 1048) underscores this theme.

To this end, some of the considerations addressed in these sessions will be illustrated in the case study during Session I-19 and in seminars and exercises during the Blocks which follow. Specifically, we will discuss how legal considerations are factored into the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) process, examine some law-related issues in the Operation PACIFIC TEAK Crisis Planning Exercise, and finally, consider legal issues in the context of the Multi-Crisis War Game.

The point of contact for this session is Captain J. P. Edwards, JAGC, U.S. Navy, C-424.

D. Questions:

What are the sources of international law? Why do nations care about international law? What motivates them to comply with its provisions?

What role does international law play in the NCA's policy-making process?

What role does international law play in the military decision-making process in general? At the strategic level? At the operational level?

E. Required Readings:

Robertson, H.B., Jr., "Contemporary International Law: Relevant to Today's World?" (**NWC 5002**) (Issued).

Lillich, Richard B., "Forcible Self-Help Under International Law" (**NWC 1063**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

The Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945. (**NWC 5003**) (Relevant articles: 1, 2, 23 [1963 text], 24, 25, 27 [1963 text], 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53) (Issued).

Bunn, George, "International Law and the Use of Force in Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships Have to Take the First Hit?" (**NWC 1074**) (Library Reserve).

Szasz, Paul, "The Law of Economic Sanctions" (**NWC 1073**) (Library Reserve).

Zinni, A. C., "The SJA in Future Operations" (**NWC 1048**) (Issued).

OPERATIONAL LAW AND FACTOR SPACE (Lecture)

As a global power, the United States depends on ready and unrestricted access to the world's oceans and international airspace. The mobility needed to maintain a military presence around the world and move military forces where needed requires daily exercise of these navigational rights and freedoms.

—Secretary of Defense William Cohen,
1998 Annual Report to the President and the Congress

A. Focus:

This session focuses on a basic understanding of operational law affecting the operational factor of space. The right of all nations to complete control of their land and air boundaries, and the right of all nations to navigation and overflight within international waters and airspace are essential in planning military operations.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the operational considerations resulting from the sovereign right of all nations to limit the entry and movement of foreign forces within their land territory and national airspace.
- Apply the law of the sea and law of airspace at the operational level of war.
- Understand the traditional international legal rights of belligerent nations and neutral nations and how these rights effect military operations during armed conflict.
- **PJE**—Understand the historical basis for current U.S. Defense Establishment policies.
- **PJE**—Understand the considerations and design elements of campaign planning.

C. Background:

Among the operational art tools used by the operational planner are the three key operational factors of time, forces and space. Factor space is heavily influenced by widely accepted international law rules governing the establishment and meaning of land, sea and air boundaries (a key characteristic of factor space). These boundaries directly effect the freedom of movement of the operational commander. During the deterrent (or pre-hostilities) phase of a military operation, military forces must respect the sovereign rights of all nations within the boundaries of their land territory, national waters and national airspace. This means that with a few limited exceptions, military forces may not operate within another nation's boundaries without its permission.

During the hostilities phase of an operation, our movement will be conducted without regard to the sovereign rights of the enemy belligerent nation. However, the traditional sovereign rights of neutral states will likely continue to be respected and hence limitations on the freedom of movement of our forces within the land, sea

and air boundaries of neutral states must be factored into our operational planning. Where limited navigation and overflight rights within neutral air and sea space prove insufficient, operational planners must notify the State Department of the need to obtain access and transit agreements in order to facilitate a planned operation.

Freedom of navigation and overflight over and through *international* waters and airspace (as well as the limited right of navigation and overflight in *national* waters and airspace) are fundamental requirements in implementing U.S. military strategy. These freedoms allow support and reinforcement of forward-deployed forces, enable U.S. and coalition forces to operate world-wide, and ensure uninterrupted world commerce. This session will include a study of the freedoms of all nations to navigation and overflight, as well as the rights of coastal nations to exercise jurisdiction over some portions of the sea and airspace for certain purposes.

Customary international law, as reflected in the UN Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention, provides widely accepted rules for global navigation and overflight. These rules have as their basis internationally agreed upon air and sea boundaries defined in the LOS Convention, and depicted in NWC 1049. These boundaries, and the navigation and overflight rights associated with them, strongly affect the planning and conduct of military operations.

Since 1983, U.S. policy has recognized the non-deep sea bed mining provisions of the LOS Convention to be customary international law. Since that time, it has been Presidential policy for U.S. forces to "exercise and assert [United States'] navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the Convention." Moreover, Presidential policy has been that the U.S. would not "acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other related high seas uses."

In July 1994, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution containing an agreement to modify the LOS Convention's deep seabed mining provisions. The U.S. signed the agreement on 29 July 1994. As a result, the basic LOS Convention, along with the supplemental agreement, were submitted to the Senate in October 1994 for its advice and consent (which remains pending). The U.S. Navy has published guidance on the LOS regimes in Part I of The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M (formerly NWP-9). The first two chapters, along with the other readings, address a number of significant oceans policy issues. Among them are the following:

The authority to restrict navigation by ships and aircraft by a coastal or island nation in and over its internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and archipelagic waters.

The distinctions between and importance of innocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea lane passage.

The national security interests served by navigation and overflight rights and freedoms.

The traditional customary international law of neutrality is the final portion of international law likely to affect factor space with regard to military operations during armed conflict. This body of law defines the rights and obligations of nations engaged in an armed conflict (belligerents) as well as the rights and obligations of those other nations not taking part in the conflict (neutrals). As a general rule, belligerents are prohibited from any act of hostility on the land territory, national waters and airspace of a neutral nation. However, belligerents retain the same navigation and overflight freedoms through and over national waters and airspace which they enjoyed during peacetime. While many legal scholars question the continued existance of the customary law of neutrality, many nations as well as a growing number of scholars continue to rely upon it.

The point of contact for this session is Captain J. P. Edwards, JAGC, U.S. Navy, C-424.

D. Questions:

What sovereign rights does a nation have within its land territory and national airspace, and how does this effect the movement or operation of foreign military forces therein?

What are the distinctions between innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea lane passage, and high seas freedoms of navigation? What are the rights and responsibilities of maritime and coastal nations with respect to each of these concepts?

To what extent may military operations of a belligerent nation be conducted within the land territory, national airspace and national waters of a neutral nation?

E. Required Readings:

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. Chapters 1 and 2, and pp. 7-1 through 7-4. (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, "Legal Regimes of Oceans and Airspace Areas" **(NWC 1049)** (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

U.S. Naval War College, "Warning Zones" **(NWC 1046)**. (Issued).

U.S. Department of Defense, National Security and the Convention on the Law of the Sea **(NWC 1017)**. (Library Reserve).

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea **(NWC 1003)**. (Library Reserve).

Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics **(NWC 1045)**. (Library Reserve).

Nandan, Satya N. and Rosenne, Shabtai (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982—A Commentary: Volume II. (Library Reserve).

Roach, CAPT J. Ashley and Smith, Robert W., Excessive Maritime Claims. (Library Reserve).

Robertson, RADM Horace B., The "New" Law of the Sea and the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea". (**NWC 1071**) (Library Reserve).

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (Seminar)

Those skilled in war cultivate the Tao (the way of humanity and justice) and preserve the laws and are therefore able to formulate victorious policies.

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War

A. Focus:

When planning and conducting military operations, commanders and their subordinates must comply with that portion of international law that governs the conduct of hostilities. This session is devoted to discussing the law of armed conflict for land, air, and naval warfare.

B. Objectives:

- Examine the origins of and the purposes served by the law of armed conflict and comprehend the reasons that nations comply or attempt to comply with it.
- Know the basic principles of the law of armed conflict.
- Apply the concepts of the law of armed conflict to the operational level of war.
- **PJE—**Understand the historical basis for current U.S. Defense Establishment policy.
- **PJE—**Analyze the functions of the NCA, CJCS, and CINCs.
- **PJE—**Understand the considerations and design elements of campaign planning.
- **PJE—**Use current joint doctrine to develop theater-level and subordinate campaign plans that require the employment of joint and multinational forces.

C. Background:

The law of armed conflict (also referred to as the law of war) is the part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is based on international custom and on international agreements. There are three general principles of the law of armed conflict: military necessity, proportionality, and humanity. The principle of **military necessity** allows a belligerent to apply force to achieve legitimate military objectives, while the principle of **proportionality** means that the degree of force used must be no greater than what is necessary and proportionate to the prompt realization of those legitimate military objectives. The principle of **humanity** forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes. These principles require, for example, that belligerents distinguish as much as reasonably possible between combatants and noncombatants when targeting.

The law of armed conflict is also consistent with certain principles of war, such as objective, mass, and economy of force. Both the law of armed conflict and the principles of war stress the importance of directing force against critical military targets,

while avoiding the waste of resources against objectives that are militarily unimportant.

Part II of the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations presents an overview of the rights and duties of military personnel under the law of armed conflict.

In DOD Directive 5100.77, the Secretary of Defense has directed that the U.S. Armed Forces will comply with the law of armed conflict during all armed conflicts and will apply the principles and spirit of the law of armed conflict during all other military operations.

The point of contact for this session is Captain J. P. Edwards, JAGC, U. S. Navy, C-424.

D. Questions:

Why is it in a nation's interest to comply with the law of armed conflict? Why is it in the interest of the military commander?

To what extent does the law of armed conflict apply to civil wars and to Military Operations Other Than War?

What are the major protections afforded by the law of armed conflict to the wounded and sick, prisoners of war and civilians in occupied areas?

What are the principal international law considerations with respect to selection of targets and selection of weapons?

How does the law of armed conflict regulate naval blockade, contraband regimes, and the use of mines and other weapons?

E. Required Readings:

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. Chapters 5 through 12 (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Capece, Christian M., "The Ottawa Treaty and Its Impact on U.S. Military Policy and Planning." (**NWC 1075**) (Issued).

Robertson, RADM Horace B., "The Obligation to Accept Surrender." (**NWC 1072**) (Issued).

Shotwell, C. B., "A Look at the Aerial Rules of Engagement in the 1991 Gulf War." (**NWC 1076**) (Issued).

Rodriguez, Cara L., "Slaying the Monster: Why the United States Should Not Support the Rome Treaty." (**NWC 1077**) (Library Reserve).

U.S. Department of Defense, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress. Appendix O—The Role of the Law of War" **(NWC 1031)** (Library Reserve).

Levie, Howard S., Terrorism in War — The Law of War Crimes. (Library Reserve).

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (Seminar)

Rules of engagement that read like a rental car contract or a rock star's separation agreement impede combat operations and cost lives. Rules of engagement are useful and effective only when [personnel] understand, remember and apply them.

—LTCOL Heintzelman & LTCOL Bloom
Legal Input Into The Combat Execution Process

A. Focus:

This session concerns rules of engagement (ROE), which define for operational forces the circumstances and extent to which they may use force. The session highlights the JCS Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE), and then reviews the foundation for and process involved in developing ROE and how they are employed in military missions (whether we are dealing with conventional warfare or operations other than war).

B. Objectives:

- Understand the need for clear and comprehensive ROE, the principles underlying them, and their role in the civilian control of the military.
- Gain a basic understanding of ROE and the process by which modifications to ROE are obtained from higher authority.
- Examine ROE development in the planning process.
- **PJE**—Understand how the NCA performs its crisis action role of coordinating U.S. interagency and multinational participation in support of a crisis situation.
- **PJE**—Analyze the relationships and functions of the NCA, CJCS and CINCs .
- **PJE**—Understand the considerations and design elements of campaign planning.
- **PJE**—Understand theater command and control relationships with special emphasis on the functions and use of a JTF.

C. Background:

ROE are the primary means by which the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the CINCs guide U.S. military forces in the use of force. U.S. forces operate under the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) contained in a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 3121.01A). The SROE provide ROE for self-defense which remain in effect at all times (from peace to war) and also provide a menu list of supplemental measures from which appropriate ROE can be drawn for a given operation to provide additional ROE for mission accomplishment.

Both self-defense ROE and mission accomplishment ROE have as their legal basis the inherent right of nations to self-defense under the UN Charter. (Depending upon the circumstances surrounding a given operation, mission accomplishment ROE may also be based upon Security Council authorization.) Because the

self-defense ROE are intended for single unit guidance, they generally limit the use of force to defensive responses to hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile intent. Because of their nature, mission accomplishment ROE typically authorize a more robust use of force. When mission accomplishment ROE are issued for armed conflict (in which case enemy forces have been declared hostile), the law of armed conflict will apply and will shape the ROE selected. Although international law relating to the use of force is an important consideration in drafting ROE, political guidance and operational requirements are the most significant factors which shape ROE.

All ROE should be consistent with national policy, military strategy, and the missions assigned by higher authority. ROE must be framed and interpreted in conjunction with the mission and should support, not inhibit, mission accomplishment. In operational planning, the adequacy of ROE is assessed during the mission analysis in the Commander's Estimate of the Situation. In all subsequent phases of the military decision-making process, it is vitally important that commanders and their planning staffs continue to be alert to the effect that ROE have on mission accomplishment, and to seek changes to the ROE when appropriate.

The point of contact for this session is Captain J. P. Edwards, JAGC, U. S. Navy, C-424.

D. Questions:

What factors lead to the need for unit or individual self-defense?

What are the limits of actions that may be taken in self-defense?

Is preemptive action consistent with the SROE?

How can a combatant commander ensure that subordinate commanders do not misinterpret the ROE or put an undesired "spin" on the approved ROE?

To what extent should the SROE continue to be used during armed conflict?

What measures have to be incorporated into the SROE to transition from MOOTW to war?

What additional ROE considerations are involved in coalition warfare? In UN operations?

What is the appropriate role of the legal advisor in developing and implementing ROE?

E. Required Readings:

Duncan, James C., "The Commander's Role in Developing the Rules of Engagement" (**NWC 1066**) (Issued).

Rose, S., "Crafting the Rules of Engagement for Haiti" (**NWC 1051**) (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, Extracts from CJCS Instruction 3121.01A, "JCS Standing Rules of Engagement" (**NWC 1062**) (Issued) (Scan).

U.S. Naval War College, "Blue's War Game Rules of Engagement" (**NWC 1139**) (Scan) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Phillips, Guy R., "Rules of Engagement: A Primer" (**NWC 1037**) (Issued).

Lorenz, F.M., "Rules of Engagement in Somalia" (**NWC 1007**) (Issued).

Humphries, John G., "Operations Law and the Rules of Engagement in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm" (**NWC 1029**) (Issued).

Schmitt, M. N., "Clipped Wings: Effective and Legal No-fly Zone Rules of Engagement" (**NWC 1052**) (Issued).

U.S. Department of the Army, Judge Advocate General's School. Operational Law Handbook, 2001. Chapters 14, 18-20, 22-22 (**NWC 1065**) (Issued).

Heintzelman and Bloom, "A Planning Primer: How to Provide Effective Legal Input into the War Planning and Combat Execution Process." Part IV on ROE (**NWC 1137**) (Library Reserve).

OPERATIONAL LAW CASE STUDY (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This seminar provides students the opportunity to apply operational law and to explore the effective application of ROE to specific military operations.

B. Objectives:

- Demonstrate a working knowledge of the basic elements of the law of the sea and airspace and the law of armed conflict by applying them in a factual context involving the employment of military forces.
- Demonstrate an understanding of the various political, military, and legal considerations involved in crafting rules of engagement for a specific military operation.
- Apply the JCS SROE in a factual context involving the employment of military forces.
- Practice using a set of supplemental ROE in a specific military operation.

C. Background:

See OPS Sessions I-16 through I-18.

D. Required Readings:

U.S. Naval War College, "Case Study for Operational Law, Operation UPHOLD PAPUA" (**NWC 1070**) (Issued).

E. Reference Readings:

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. Chapters 1-2 and 5-12 (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, "Extracts from CJCS 3121.01A, "JCS Standing Rules of Engagement" (**NWC 1062**) (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, "Blue's War Game Rules of Engagement" (**NWC 1139**) (Issued).

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Graziano, Paul E., *Leyte Invasion: A Comparative Analysis of the Application of the Principles of War* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1984). A lengthy student paper that analyzes the Battle of Leyte Gulf by comparing how the Allies and the Japanese applied the principles of war.

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_____, *Doctrine for Logistics Support to Joint Operations* (Joint Pub 4-0) Washington: 6 April 2000. Chapter II discusses logistics principles and considerations while Chapter IV addresses joint theater logistics. Scan the appendices for useful information. (Issued).

_____, *Joint Training Policy* (CJCSM 3500.01A) Washington: July 1997. Section V provides a description of the Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) development process. (Library Reserve)

_____, "The Joint Doctrine Story" *Joint Doctrine and Capstone and Keystone Primer*. Washington: 15 July 1997. This keystone publication describes the post-Goldwater-Nichols Act organization and process for developing and publishing joint doctrine. (Issued).

_____, *Universal Joint Task List*, Version 4.0 (CJCSM 3500.04A) Washington: September 1996. Sections I and II provide an excellent overview of the Universal Joint Task List and the relationship of levels of war to aims or objectives. (Library Reserve).

Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Jackson Hole, WY: 23 September, 1989. After the "Black Sea Bumping Incident," the U.S. and USSR discussed the regime of "innocent passage" and issued a joint statement. (NWC 1045) (Library Reserve).

Kagan, Frederick, "Army Doctrine and Modern War: Notes Toward a New Edition of FM 100-5." *Parameters*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1, Spring 1997. Dr. Kagan contends that the changes in the 1993 edition of FM 100-5 (from its 1986 AirLand Battle precursor) are not all for the better. He concludes the flaws are significant and undermine previous conceptual growth.

Leonhard, Robert R., *The Principles of War for the Information Age* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998). Deals with the applicability of the principles of war in today's environment of information operations.

Levie, Howard S., *Terrorism in War—The Law of War Crimes*. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceans Publications, 1993. A classic text regarding the enforcement mechanism for violations of the law of armed conflict. (Library Reserve).

Lillich, Richard B., "Forcible Self-Help Under International Law." Lillich, Richard B. and Moore, John N. ed., *International Law Studies, Volume 62*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1980; pp. 129-138. Professor Lillich suggests that retorsion, reprisal, forcible self-help and humanitarian intervention remain lawful uses of force by nations in addition to those provided for in the U.N. Charter. (NWC 1063) (Issued).

Lorenz, F.M., "Rules of Engagement in Somalia: Were They Effective?" *Naval Law Review*, Vol. 42, 1995, pp. 62-78. Colonel Lorenz discusses the challenges in maintaining ROE in a changing MOOTW environment. (NWC 1007) (Issued).

Lovelace, Douglas C. Jr. and Young, Thomas Durell, "Joint Doctrine Development: Overcoming a Legacy." *Joint Force Quarterly*, Winter 1997. The authors present the dissonance on this issue of doctrine and contend current joint doctrine "has limited value" and "is only weakly linked to national military strategy." (NWC 1039) (Issued).

Luvaas, Jay, "Thinking At The Operational Level," *Parameters*, Spring 1986, pp. 3-6.

Matheny, Michael R., MAJ, USA, "The Development of Theory and Doctrine of Operational Art in the American Army, 1920-1940." Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 22 March 1988. "This Monograph seeks to answer the question, was operational art developed in the U.S. Army during the interwar period?" The author concludes that today's doctrine writers may find this period particularly useful.

Meilinger, Phillip S., Col., USAF, "Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power." *Airpower Journal*, Spring, 1996. Colonel Meilinger encapsulates "the essence of airpower" in his ten propositions to better inform those who would use the military instrument of national power in order to achieve national objectives. (NWC 1011) (Issued).

Mendel, William H., and Tooke, Lamar, "Operational Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity." *Military Review*, June 1993, pp. 3-11. This is a well-written and

well-argued article that describes the linkage between the objective(s) and center(s) of gravity from a campaign planner's perspective. Historical examples are cited from the German Kaiserschlacht major operation in 1917, War Plan Orange, the Allied landing at Normandy, the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, and Desert Storm.

Middlebrook, Martin, *The Fight for the 'Malvinas': The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War* (London: Viking, 1989). An account by a British author who tries to present an Argentine perspective of the conflict.

Middlebrook, Martin, *Task Force: The Falklands War, 1982*. New York: Viking Penguin, Inc., 1987. Factual and readable account of the Falklands War at the tactical and operational-tactical level, primarily from the British perspective. (Seminar Reserve).

Millett, Alan R. and Murray, Williamson, eds., *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. The remarkable story of military innovation during the 1920s and 1930s is recounted for its similarities to the post-Cold War era. The editors designed this work to provide insights into the processes and institutional changes that previously facilitated and impeded innovation.

Nandan, Satyan and Rosenne, Shabtai (ed.), *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982- A Commentary: Volume II*. Boston: Kluwer Academy Publications, 1993. An exhaustive but easily-accessed analysis of the negotiating history of the LOS Convention, this book provides a definitive understanding of the key Convention provisions regarding navigation and overflight rights and freedoms. (Library Reserve).

National Defense University, Falklands Islands Campaign: Understanding the Issues, Vol. 1. (Selected extracts) Washington: September 1986. Contains selected unclassified extracts from a NDU analysis of the conflict. It is particularly useful in understanding key operational issues that are not discussed in the general media. (NWC 1115) (Issued).

Nelson, Bradford K., "Applying the Principles of War in Information Operations." *Military Review*, September-October-November 1998, pp. 31-35. Assesses the impact of information operations on each of the nine U.S. principles of war.

Newell, Clayton, R., "Exploring The Operational Perspective," *Parameters*, Autumn 1986, pp. 19-25.

Nichols, John B. and Barrett, Tillman, *On Yankee Station: The Naval Air War Over Vietnam*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1987. Chapter 2 "Rules of Engagement" (pp. 15-32), and Chapter 9, "What If?" (pp. 131-138). Commander Nichols, a Vietnam combat veteran F-8 pilot, vividly describes the use — and misuse — of ROE for bombardment of North Vietnam.

Owens, William A., "Making the Joint Journey." *Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1999.* (NWC 1068).

Phillips, Guy R., "Rules of Engagement: A Primer." *The Army Lawyer*. July 1993, pp. 4-27. Commander Phillips addresses ROE in both historical and current contexts. (NWC 1037) (Issued).

Porter, Laning M., *Preconceptions, Predilections, and Experiences: Problems for Operational Level Intelligence and Decisionmaking*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 12 May 1986.

Posen, Barry P., *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars*.

Record, Jeffrey, "Operational Brilliance, Strategic Incompetence: The Military Reformers and the German Model," *Parameters*, Autumn 1986, pp. 2-8.

Roach, CAPT J. Ashley and Smith, Robert W., *Excessive Maritime Claims*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1994. This unique text provides a well-organized and thorough explanation of the views of the U.S. Government regarding those maritime claims of other governments which exceed that permitted under customary international law as reflected in the LOS Convention. The book also details the efforts of the United States to preserve navigation and overflight rights under customary international law as reflected in the LOS Convention. (Library Reserve).

Robertson, Horace B., Jr., "Contemporary International Law: Relevant to Today's World?" *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1992, pp. 89-103. Admiral Robertson discusses the development of international law principles, current trends in the international law arena, and principles of exercising self-defense under the U.N. Charter. (NWC 5002) (Issued).

_____, "The 'New' Law of the Sea and the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea." Moore, John Norton and Turner, Robert F. (ed.) *International Law Studies, Volume 68*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1995, pp. 263-312. RADM Robertson provides an excellent analysis of problems which arise by applying the traditional law of armed conflict to the vast new ocean areas subject to coastal state and archipelagic state sovereignty. (NWC 1071) (Library Reserve).

_____, "The Obligation to Accept Surrender". Moore, John Norton and Turner, Robert F. (ed.) *International Law Studies, Volume 68*. Newport RI: Naval War College Press, 1995, pp. 542-552. This article recounts the controversial USS NICHOLAS incident during the Gulf War in which a U.S. warship fired upon Iraqi personnel, some of whom waived white flags. The article thoroughly reviews the applicable international law as well as discusses the difficulties of discerning enemy intent in the middle of a conflict. (NWC 1072) (Issued).

Rockwell, Christopher A., Operational Sustainment: Lines of Communication and the Conduct of Operations, Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 3 May 1987.

Rodriguez, Cara L., "Slaying the Monster: Why the United States Should Not Support the Rome Treaty", *American University International Law Review,* Vol. 14, 1999,

pp. 805-844. The author reviews the international agreement which will establish a standing international court for the punishment of war crimes. The article highlights the key provisions of the Convention as well as the shortcomings which caused the United States to decline to sign it. (NWC 1077) (Library Reserve).

Romjue, John L., From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982. TRADOC Historical Monograph Series, June 1984. John Romjue tells the story of the evolution form the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 (Active Defense) driven by General DePuy, to the AirLand Battle doctrine in the1983 edition of FM 100-5. This story reflects the maturation of operational art concepts within the U.S. Army.

Rose, Stephen A., "Crafting Rules of Engagement for Haiti." Schmitt, Michael N. ed. *International Law Studies, The Law of Military Operations*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1998, pp. 225-238. Capt. Rose provides and excellent example of ROE development in a MOOTW context. (NWC 1051) (Issued).

Rubel, Robert C., "Operational Level of Leadership." Unpublished Paper. Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 1996. An interesting discussion of how leadership vision at the operational level differs from tactical-level leadership. (NWC 1032) (Issued).

Schmitt, Michael N., "Clipped Wings: Effective and Legal No-Fly Zone Rules of Engagement." Schmitt, Michael N. ed. International Law Studies, The Law of Military Operations. Newport RI: Naval War College Press, 1998, pp. 239-296. Colonel Schmitt provides a detailed analysis of ROE in a MOOTW context. (NWC 1052) (Issued).

Schneider, James J., "The Loose Marble—and the Origins of Operational Art." *Parameters*, March 1989, pp. 85-99. An excellent analysis on the origins of operational art in land warfare. The author's main purpose was, in his words, to determine "those unique and essential characteristics of operational art that distinguish it from classical military strategy and to establish roughly that point in history—the American Civil War—when the sum of operational characteristics coalesced to give rise to this qualitatively distinct style of military art." (NWC 4004) (Issued).

Schneider, James J., "Theoretical Implications of Operational Art." *Military Review*, September 1990, pp. 17-27. The author claims that one of the difficulties in studying operational art is due to analytical biases of the military community. He suggests that the study of operational art should be focused on the developments 12 to 15 years from now.

Shotwell, C.B., "A Look at the Aerial Rules of Engagement in the 1991 Gulf War." *The United States Air Force Academy Journal of Legal Studies*, 1993, pp. 15-57. The author describes the historical development of the law of targeting, and the legal review of targeting in the Gulf War. The article also responds to criticisms that the targeting by U.S. forces was unlawful. (NWC 1076) (Issued).

Silkett, Wayne A., "Downfall: The Invasion that Never Was," *Parameters*, Autumn, 1994, pp. 111-121.

Summers, Jr., Harry G., "Strategic Lessons Learned: The Falkland Islands Campaign," *The Art of War Quarterly*, Vol. II; Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, September 1983, pp. 91-112. Discusses the key strategic issues of the conflict, primarily from the British perspective. Clausewitz's "primacy of politics," comes to life in a real-world example. (NWC 1111) (Issued).

Szasz, Paul, "The Law of Economic Sanctions". Schmitt, Michael N. and Green, Leslie C. (ed.) *International Law Studies, Volume 71.* Newport RI: Naval War College Press, 1998, pp. 455-482. This article provides a thorough discussion of the international legal authority for the imposition and enforcement of economic sanctions against another nation. (NWC 1073) (Library Reserve).

Thompson, Julian, *Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict* (London: Brassey's, 1991), Chapter 8, "Amphibious Logistics-Falklands 1982." (NWC 1086) (Issued). An analysis of logistics during the Falklands operation by the Royal Marine brigadier who commanded the landing force.

_____, *No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic: 1982* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1985). A first-hand account of the Falklands operation by the commander of the landing force.

Toffler, Alvin and Heidi, "AirLand Battle" Chapter 7, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1993, pp. 44-56. In Chapter 7, the Tofflers describe how the U.S. Army, through General Don Starry's intellectual leadership, led the U.S. military's transformation from Second Wave (Industrial Age) to Third Wave (Information Age) warfare. (NWC 1019) (Issued).

Tooke, Lamar, and Allen, Ralph, "Strategic Intuition and the Art of War," *Military Review*, March-April 1995, pp. 10-18.

Tritten, James J., "Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine." *Naval War College Review*, Spring, 1995. Dr. Tritten focuses his discussion on military doctrine; the types, what it influences and what influences it, and what it does and does not do.

Tritten, James J. and Donolo, Luigi, Vice Admiral, Italian Navy (Retired), *A Doctrine Reader: The Navies of United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Spain. Newport Paper Number Nine.*

U.K., The Defence Council. "The Falklands War 1982 from the Viewpoint of Doctrine." *The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine*. London: HMSO, 1995. This is an excellent assessment of the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict from an "operational" perspective. (NWC 4060) (Issued).

The Charter of United Nations, 26 June 1945 (as amended). (NWC 5003) (Issued).

Toffler, Alvin and Heidi, "AirLand Battle," Chapter 7, pp. 44-56, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*. A futurist's viewpoint of where we are headed made by studying the remake of the Army.

"United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea." These articles from the Law of the Sea treaty concern traditional navigational and overflight freedoms. (NWC 1003) (Library Reserve).

U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations*. (FM 100-5) June 1993. "FM 100-5 describes how the Army thinks about the conduct of operations." Operational art concepts permeate this reading. (Issued).

U.S. Department of the Army, Judge Advocate General's School. *Operational Law Handbook,* 2001. Chapters 14, 18-20, 22-23 discuss the legal issues arising in the conduct of MOOTW. (Issued).

U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War; Final Report to Congress," Appendix J: "Special Operations Forces" and Appendix O: "The Role of the Law of War." April 1992. The principal author is Colonel W. Hays Parks, USMC (Ret), Special Assistant for Law of War Matters, Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army. (NWC 1031) (Library Reserve).

_____, *National Security and the Convention on the Law of the Sea*, January 1996. This is the latest, most current delineation of U.S. oceans policy and national security interests. (NWC 1017) (Library Reserve).

U.S. Department of the Navy, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*, (Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7 (formerly NWP-9)), Washington: October 1995. Chapters 1 and 2 provide an authoritative interpretation of and guidance on the navigational articles of the 1982 LOS Convention. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with ROE and self-defense. Chapters 5 through 9 summarize the existing law of armed conflict and the law of naval warfare. (Issued).

U.S. Department of the Navy, *Navy Strategic Planning Guidance*, Washington: April 2000. Provides a prioritized set of capabilities to the IWAR/OPNAV PPBS planning process with direct strategic linkage to a maritime concept that builds upon *From the Sea* and *Forward…From the Sea* and provides the organizing principles by which naval forces will exploit new concepts and capabilities to assure U.S. access forward in order to continue to influence events directly and decisively in the future.

_____, *Warfighting* (MCDP 1) 20 June 1997. Warfighting represents "the way marines think about warfare" and discusses the complexity of modern warfare; Chapter 4 presents the maneuver warfare philosophy that forms the foundation for the Marine approach to today's and tomorrow's warfare challenges. (NWC 2006) (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, "Blue's War Game Rules of Engagement," Newport, RI: April 1995. These ROE will be used during the regional contingency wargame. (NWC 1139) (Issued).

_____, "Case Study for Operational Law, Operation UPHOLD PAPUA." Newport, RI: 2000. Case studies to be discussed in the seminar session. (NWC 1070) (Issued).

_____, "Legal Regimes of Oceans and Airspace Areas." Newport, RI: 1992. This diagram portrays the international jurisdictional regimes for the sea and airspace described in Chapter 1 of NWP 1-14M. (NWC 1049) (Issued).

_____, Extracts from CJCS Instruction 3121.01A, 1 15 January 2000; *JCS Standing Rules of Engagement*. Newport, RI: 2000. These pages discuss the rationale and purpose behind the standing rules, and their foundation in the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. (NWC 1062) (Issued).

_____, "Warning Zones." Newport, RI: 1986. This reading describes the danger or warning zone concept. Enclosures provide examples of the wide variety of warnings that have been used. (NWC 1046) (Issued).

Vego, Milan N., *Operational Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, December 2000. (NWC 1004) (Issued).

Waghelstein, John D., "Preparing the U.S. Army for the Wrong War, Educational and Doctrinal Failure, 1865-91," *Small Wars and Insurgencies,* Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 1999).

Webb, George S., "The Razor's Edge: Identifying the Operational Culminating Point of Victory." Unpublished Article, Newport, RI: Naval War College, 16 May 1995. The author argues that doctrine is lacking in its discussion of the "culminating point." He argues that doctrine only defines the concept without providing the commander any insight into identifying the culminating point. (NWC 1027) (Issued).

Weigley, Russell F., *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1973. By studying American wars from the Revolution through Vietnam, Dr. Weigley develops a characteristically American way to wage war; the evolution of strategic thought and war studies by the U.S. military is embedded in this work.

Williamson, William, R., "Campaign Planning," *Parameters*, Winter 1984, pp. 20-25.

Woodward, Sandy, *One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 1992. Provides some of the operational leadership aspects of the conflict from a personal viewpoint. (Issued).

Zais, Mitchell M., "Strategic Vision and Strength of Will. Imperatives for Theater Command," *Parameters*, Vol. XV, No. 4., pp. 59-63.

Zinni, Anthony C., "The SJA in Future Operations" *Marine Corps Gazette* February 1996, pp. 15-17. LtGen. Zinni discusses the relevance of law across the spectrum of future conflict. (NWC 1048) (Issued).

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

Seminar #_____

The Operational Concepts sessions of the JMO course were designed to provide you with a basic understanding of the key concepts associated with operational art, and some initial practice in thinking operationally. This critique seeks to capture your impressions, while the experience is still fresh in your mind, of how successful Block I instruction was in achieving those aims and to solicit your suggestions on how to improve operational concepts instruction in the future. Please take the time to give us your opinion. Please provide specific comments for a mark of 5 or below.

1. Block I was successful in providing me with an understanding of the operational level of war and the operational art.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

_____

2. The aspect(s) of operational art with which I am most comfortable is/are:

_____
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3. The aspect(s) of operational art with which I am least comfortable is/are:

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4. The Operational Concepts block (including group exam study) adequately prepared me for the operational art exam.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

_____

5. The following two questions deal with the Leyte Case Study, specifically how it was presented and received.

a. The case study readings contained in The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings contributed to my understanding of the concepts presented in the block.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

_____

b. The overview of the Battle of Leyte Gulf presented by the film shown in the seminar rooms was beneficial as an introduction and clarified some of the reading requirements.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

_____

6. Are there specific readings you believe should be deleted or replaced? If so, please list them by title and author.

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7. Are there any concepts or readings that you believe should be added? Please elaborate as necessary.

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8. Rate these sessions as to their value in contributing to your understanding of operational art? (Rate each from 1 (low) to 7 (high)) *DO NOT RANK ORDER THE SESSIONS—ASSIGN A NUMERICAL VALUE FROM 1-7 FOR EACH SESSION*

_____ OPS I-1 Introduction to Operational Art

_____ OPS I-2 Operational Art and Doctrine

_____ OPS I-4 Operational Factors

_____ OPS I-5 Theater Elements

_____ OPS I-6 Levels of War

_____ OPS I-7 Operational Functions

_____ OPS I-8 Elements of Operational Warfare

_____ OPS I-9 Methods of Combat Force Employment

_____ OPS I-10 Principles of War

_____ OPS I-11 Operational Planning

_____ OPS I-12 Operational Leadership

_____ OPS I-13 The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict

_____ OPS I-17 Operational Art Exam (Including group study)

9. Do you believe the Operational Concepts block of instruction was a worthwhile contribution to your overall professional military education? Please feel free to elaborate.

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10. Do you believe the Operational Concepts block of instruction enhanced your awareness of the potential impact of NCW? Please feel free to elaborate.

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11. Here are things I want to tell you about the block in addition to my responses to the previous questions.

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Seminar #_____
CNW/NCC CRITIQUE

OPERATIONAL LAW SESSIONS (I-15 through I-19)

The Operational Law sessions of the JMO course were designed to provide you with a basic understanding regarding the wide range of legal issues that might face an operational commander. This critique seeks to capture your impressions of how successful these sessions were in achieving that goal, and to solicit your suggestions on how to improve our operational law instruction in the future. Please take the time to give us your opinion.

1. The Use of Force Under International Law lecture and readings (Session I-15) were successful in providing me with an understanding of the basic principles of international law.

   (strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

   Comments:_____

   _____

2. The Operational Law and Factor Space lecture and readings (Session I-16) were successful in providing me with a basic understanding of international laws effecting various land, air and sea boundaries which may restrict military operations.

   (strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

   Comments:_____

   _____

3. The Law of Armed Conflict seminar and readings (Session I-17) were successful in providing me with a basic understanding of Law of Armed Conflict issues and principles.

   (strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

   Comments:_____

   _____

4. The Rules of Engagement seminar and readings (Session I-18) were successful in providing me with a basic understanding of Rules of Engagement issues and principles.

   (strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

   Comments:_____

   _____

5. The Operational Law Case Study (Session I-19) was successful in enhancing my understanding of how operational law affects the employment of military forces.

   (strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

   Comments:_____

   _____

6. The aspect(s) of operational law with which I am most comfortable is/are:

_____
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7. The aspect of operational law with which I am least comfortable is:

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8. The law moderator visiting my seminar was well prepared for these sessions.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments:_____
_____

9. Overall, I would rate the law moderator as:

(poor) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (excellent)

Comments:_____
_____

10. Are there specific readings you believe should be deleted, added, or replaced? If so, please list them by title and author.

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11. Are there any other legal sessions you believe should be added? If so, please elaborate.

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12. How valuable were each of the sessions to your understanding of the importance of international law principles to the operational commander? [Please rate each from 1 (low) to 7 (high)]

_____ Use of Force Under International Law (Lecture)

_____ Operational Law & Factor Space (Lecture)

_____ Law of Armed Conflict (Seminar)

_____ Rules of Engagement (Seminar)

_____ Operational Law Case Study

13. Do you believe the operational law instruction was a worthwhile portion of your overall professional military education? Please feel free to elaborate.

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14. Other comments:

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Block Two
Military Organization And Planning Concepts

Listing of Military Organization and Planning Concepts Sessions 105

Introduction to Military Organization and Planning Concepts 106

OPS-II-1 U. S. National Military Organization (Seminar)..... 107

OPS-II-2 Weapons of Mass Destruction Considerations (Seminar)..... 111

OPS-II-3 U. S. Maritime Forces (Navy and Marine Corps) Doctrine and Capabilities (Seminar)..... 113

OPS-II-4 U. S. Coast Guard Capabilities (Lecture) 120

OPS-II-5 U. S. Army Doctrine and Capabilities (Seminar) 123

OPS-II-6 U. S. Air Force Doctrine and Capabilities (Seminar)..... 126

OPS-II-7 Special Operations Forces (Lecture) 129

OPS-II-8 Strategic Mobility (Seminar) 131

OPS-II-9 Alliance and Coalition Considerations (Seminar) 134

OPS-II-10 Joint Warfare Considerations (Seminar)..... 138

OPS-II-11 C4ISR Information Operations (Seminar) 141

OPS-II-12 Service Capabilities Vignettes (Seminar) 144

OPS-II-13 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)(Seminar) 146

OPS-II-14 Theater Planning (Seminar) 151

OPS-II-15 Plans, Orders & Planning (Seminar)..... 154

OPS-II-16 The Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) Concepts (Seminar) .. 157

OPS-II-17 PACIFIC TEAK Crisis Planning Exercise..... 162

Block Two Bibliography..... 165

Block Two Critique 179

INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING CONCEPTS

A. Focus:

Block II sessions build upon the Block I framework and components by relating them to current U.S. military organization and planning concepts. Block II sessions afford a comprehensive view of: service cultures, doctrine, and capabilities; essential supporting systems; and the foundations of formal planning. Each student brings to the seminar unique expertise and experience in one or more of the Block II topics. The overall educational objective is to weave faculty seminar presentations, student contributions, readings, lectures, and an assigned mission problem into a seamless fabric of baseline joint operational competence. It is expected that this competence will be reflected in student understanding and application of formal planning and decision making principles to the proper employment (selection, assignment, tasking) of forces, in joint and combined environments, to accomplish assigned missions.

B. Objectives:

- Listed by individual session.

C. Background:

Sessions II-1 through II-12 provide fundamental considerations for U.S. military organization and planning, and cover service doctrine and capabilities, joint and combined warfare considerations, and supporting systems, enabling students to consider how best to employ forces to accomplish assigned missions. Sessions II-13 through II-16 introduce students to formal planning processes, decision making techniques, and execution methodologies. Block II concludes with Session II-17, which provides students an opportunity to apply lessons from the other sessions. With operational art principles as the foundation, students will apply planning process and force employment knowledge to the development of a CES and OPORDER appropriate to accomplishing the specified mission and solving the given problem.

Block II covers much territory and students should not allow themselves to be overwhelmed by details. The key to success is not “how much of what type” experience one brings to the seminar. Rather, it is one of applying common sense and logic in a joint planning framework to develop the correct sequence of actions that properly employ available resources to accomplish a mission. It is essential that students think broadly and remain open to alternative perspectives on war fighting. Think big.

D. Questions:

None.

E. Readings:

None.

U.S. NATIONAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Seminar)

In 1948, then Secretary of Defense James Forrestal convened a meeting of the military service chiefs in Key West to allocate responsibilities among the four services. It failed. As President, I will order the Pentagon to convene a similar meeting to hammer out a new understanding about consolidating and coordinating military missions in the 1990s and beyond.

—President William J. Clinton, August 1992

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the organization and roles of the Department of Defense (DoD) and its components, and the methods and doctrine employed to achieve unity of effort, if not unity of command. To begin this seminar, we will analyze the role of DoD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—with particular emphasis on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs, the Services, and the Reserve components. We will also examine the current plan for the organization of U.S. military forces throughout the world, and the authority that a commander can exercise over joint forces.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the historical basis for the current U.S. Defense Establishment; its structure, policies, and strategies.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the process by which military advice is provided to the NCA and the NSC for development into national strategic direction and Desired End State for transmission to combatant commanders.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to formulate national security direction and a strategic endstate, in terms of the instruments of national power, so that combatant commanders can determine the military endstate to achieve the national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the organizational and political influences, to include cabinet-level departments, Congress, NSC, DOD agencies, the media, and public opinion on the development of national security strategy and strategic decision making.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the NCA performs its crisis action role of coordinating U.S. interagency and multinational participation in support of a crisis situation.
- **PJE**—Apply the relationships and functions of the NCA, CJCS, CINCs, Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Chiefs of the Services.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to translate national security and military direction into development of theater strategies, and strategies of supporting combatant commanders, for use in the geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) identified in the Unified Command Plan (UCP).
- **PJE**—Comprehend theater command and control relationships, with special emphasis on the functions and use of a Joint Task Force (JTF).

C. Background:

The National Security Act of 1947 was the first legislative attempt to achieve unity of military effort in U.S. history. This Act provided for a Secretary of National Defense and established the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as a permanent agency. The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 had extensive impact on DoD. Two of the principal aims of this legislation were to reduce the effects of service parochialism on defense policy and to improve unity of effort by increasing the authority of the Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs). The Unified Command Plan (UCP) provides guidance to the Department of Defense to carry out the provisions of legislative action. Just as the National Security Act of 1947 has been amended several times, the UCP is reviewed on a routine basis in an effort to optimize the warfighting and support command structure.

Direction of U.S. military forces is currently accomplished through a single chain of command with two distinct branches. The operational (and strategic) direction of combatant forces is accomplished through the operational chain of command, which runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Unified CINCs, with communications running through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For matters not involving strategic and operational direction of combatant forces, guidance is issued through the administrative branch of the chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to Service secretaries and chiefs to commanders of Service forces. The preparation and provision of forces to the combatant commands are accomplished through this "administrative" branch of the chain of command, separate and distinct from the operational branch.

Various command relationships may exist among active duty and reserve component organizations involved in joint operations. How much authority a commander can exercise over a supporting or subordinate organization depends upon the specifically delineated command relationship that exists with that organization. A thorough understanding of command relationship alternatives is, therefore, essential in joint operations. Some important command relationship alternatives are:

- Combatant Command (COCOM)
- Operational Control (OPCON)
- Tactical Control (TACON)
- Administrative Control (ADCON)
- Coordinating Authority (COORDAUTH)

Point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel J. C. Dill, U.S. Air Force, C-414.

D. Questions:

Who are the NCA and how is "civilian control" maintained? When did joint efforts begin? Was this the same period as when the JCS system was formalized?

As highlighted in the readings, the CJCS exercises control over no forces, nor can he deploy forces. Consequently, is the CJCS just a figurehead? If not, what kind of power and authority does he have and how does he get it? Is CJCS too powerful?

How has the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act impacted the National Military Organization? What are the pluses and minuses that have resulted from this statute? Should it go farther than it already has? If so, in what ways?

Are there different types of combatant commands? If so, why? How does geography present problems to the geographic CINCs? Should the geographic structure be modified?

What changes are introduced in the SEP 99 UCP? What new roles have CINCs been assigned? What is/should be the role of CINC, U.S. Joint Forces Command?

In almost any envisioned conflict, the CINC with primary responsibility for employment of forces will require support from other combatant commanders. Does the "in support of" relationship between supporting and supported commanders provide sufficient authority to the supported CINC to ensure unity of effort?

What kinds of tension and conflict can result from the operation of the two branches of the chain of command described in the readings? Does Service parochialism still exist?

Does the commander of a combatant command derive sufficient authority from COCOM to fulfill all assigned responsibilities?

How is the "Total Force" concept organized? Describe the organization of the Reserve Component. Should a reserve or guard commander sit on an equal basis with the other Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Does the advent of Network Centric Warfare affect the way we organize our National Military Organization?

E. Required Readings:

Armed Forces Staff College, *Joint Staff Officers' Guide, AFSC PUB 1,* 1997, pp. 2-2 to 2-43 (**NWC 2075**) (Issued).

Unified Command Plan, "Extracts from....." (**NWC 2021A**) (Issued).

Lovelace, "Unification of the Armed Forces of the United States" (**NWC 2081A**) pp. i-iii, 7-17, and 26-28. (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

White, "Meeting the Needs of the Secretary of Defense" (**NWC 2112**) (Issued).

Shalikashvili, "Goldwater-Nichols Ten Years From Now" (**NWC 2113**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 0-2: *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF), pp. vii-xvi. (Issued).

Chiarelli, "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols" (**NWC 4055**) (Issued).

Grossman, "A Joint Venture" (**NWC 4101**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Issued).

"Summary of Major Provisions of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986" (**NWC 4022**) (Issued).

U.S. DoD, Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Component Programs,* 2000, pp. 1-25, 143-149 (Seminar Reserve).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Secretariat, Historical Division, *A Concise History of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1942-1979.*

Lovelace and Young, *U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus.*

U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc. "An Act to Reorganize the Department of Defense."

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session focuses on critical issues for the operational commander with respect to the use, or potential use, of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Primary emphasis is placed on the possible introduction of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons in a theater conflict. It is not unlikely that such weapons will be seen by prospective adversaries as a means to counter the significant technological superiority of U.S. conventional forces. This session will provide an understanding of the nature of the threat, and primary considerations for deterrence, defense, and consequence management. Different cases will be examined to explore the principal issues surrounding the use, or threatened use of WMD in a range of possible future contingencies.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of the US force structure affect the development of joint military strategy.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the CINCs.
- Comprehend the unique threat posed by nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and the primary considerations for the potential use of such weapons by an adversary
- Comprehend the basic elements of deterrence theory and how they might be applied in the case of weapons of mass destruction at the operational level of war.
- Comprehend the current and near term capabilities of U.S. forces to defend against weapons of mass destruction.
- Comprehend the concept of consequence management as it relates to weapons of mass destruction.

C. Background:

More than two dozen nations worldwide possess, or are actively working to acquire nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons and the ability to deliver them against military or civilian targets. Although such weapons have seen little battlefield use, they appear to be increasingly viewed by many nations and non-government groups as a potential means to counter the military superiority of the United States or other adversaries. The significant technological lead that the U.S. enjoys in conventional military forces may increase the prospect that a future adversary will view WMD as a credible response to U.S. presence and power projection in his region. The possible employment of NBC weapons is of particular concern to the

U.S. operational commander given the potential consequence of use and the problematic nature of defense. The wide range of prospective foes that may threaten the use of WMD equates to an equally wide range of deterrence, defense, and response considerations for the operational commander. Among the goals of Network Centric Warfare is an enhanced capability to deal with the WMD threat.

Point of contact for this session is Captain J. R. FitzSimonds, U.S. Navy, Sims Hall, E-115.

D. Questions:

What are the critical differences in the utility and potential uses of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons?

What are the basic elements of deterrence? How does one establish the credibility and will to employ both defensive and retaliatory capabilities?

What are current and near-term U.S. capabilities to defend against WMD?

What are the primary considerations for consequence management following the use of WMD?

Are deterrence and response options case specific? What are the primary considerations of the operational commander in applying those options against specific adversaries?

How might Network Centric Warfare enhance the operational commander's ability to deter, defend against, or better respond to the use of WMD?

E. Required Readings:

JMO Department, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: Considerations for the Operational Commander*, 2000. (**NWC 2115**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Payne, Keith B., "Deterring the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Lessons from History," *Comparative Strategy* (Vol.14 No. 4, 1995) pp. 347-359 (**NWC 3028**) (Issued).

Schneider, Dr. Barry R. "Strategies for Coping with Enemy Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Airpower Journal* (Special Edition 1996) pp. 36-47. (**NWC 2068**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense* (July 2000) (Issued).

Swicker, Charles C., *Theater Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea*, Newport Paper Number Fourteen (Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, Newport, RI: August 1998) (Library Reserve).

G. Supplementary Readings:

None.

U.S. MARITIME FORCES (Navy and Marine Corps) DOCTRINE AND CAPABILITIES (Seminar)

"Whosoever can hold the sea has command of everything."

—Themistocles (524 – 406 B.C.)

A Military, Naval, Littoral War, when wisely prepared and discreetly conducted, is a terrible Sort of War. Happy for that People who are Sovereigns enough of the Sea to put it into Execution! For it comes like Thunder and Lightning to some unprepared Part of the World.

—Thomas More Melgneux, 1759

A. Focus:

"Our three maritime Services—Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—conduct operations in the world's oceans and littoral regions. (The term naval forces will mean both the Navy and the Marine Corps, and when under Navy operational control, the Coast Guard.) With such capable naval forces, we view the oceans not as an obstacle, but as our base of operations and our maneuver space, which we either can control or deny to an opponent. Whenever we face an adversary without a blue-water fleet, the oceans serve as barriers for our defense. As important though, the oceans provide the United States avenues of world trade and military lines of communication with allies and friends—when they are protected by our strong naval forces. To appreciate operations in the maritime environment, it is necessary to understand the distinctive character of naval forces."

—Naval Doctrinal Publication 1, Naval Warfare, p.6

This session will be conducted in two, interrelated parts exploring first the U. S. Navy, then the U. S. Marine Corps. Navy and Marine seminar members, under the guidance of their moderators, will prepare and present this session in seminar format. The illustrative case for both parts of the session is the time period of OPERATION DESERT SHIELD and OPERATION DESERT STORM.

U.S. NAVY

This first part of the maritime session focuses on the capabilities and limitations which naval forces offer to operational and strategic commanders and the associated doctrine and organization that underpin those capabilities.

U.S. MARINE CORPS

During this second part of the maritime session, you will examine: the role of the Marine Corps in national defense and how it functions to fulfill its role; doctrine for warfighting; current Marine Corps organization, capabilities and limitations; and the utility of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) to an operational commander.

B. Objectives:

U.S. NAVY

- Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. naval operating forces, including systems integration in the 21st century battlespace.

- Comprehend the command structure, organizational concepts, and command relationships applicable to the U.S. Navy in joint and combined commands.
- Comprehend how naval force capabilities and doctrine affect joint doctrine and joint interagency and combined campaigns and operations at both tactical and operational levels of war.
- Develop the ability to apply naval forces at the theater and operational levels of war. Understand space/time/force/international considerations in the naval context.

U.S. MARINE CORPS

- Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces participating as components in joint, interagency and multinational operations, including system integration into the 21st Century battlespace.
- Comprehend the command structure, organizational concepts, and command relationships applicable to the U.S. Marine Corps in joint and combined commands.
- Comprehend how current U.S. Marine Corps capabilities and doctrine affect joint doctrine and joint interagency and combined operations at both the tactical and operational levels of war.
- Develop the ability to apply Marine Air-Ground Task Forces at the theater-strategic and operational levels of war. Understand space/time/force/informational considerations in the naval and littoral context.

C. Background:

U.S. NAVY

The Naval Service's approach to war fighting and military operations short of war is guided by the roles specified in law by Congress and by specific service functions prescribed by the President and Secretary of Defense, as codified in DOD Directive 5100.1.

Naval Service roles and functions remained stable from post-World War II through the 1980s, although the capability to perform each function varied, depending on national security strategy and resource decisions of the time. Disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Cold War's end led to an August 1990 articulation of a new national security strategy, shifting focus from a global foe to regional contingencies. The Naval Service developed and articulated its vision of the part it would play in this new strategy in the September 1992 White Paper...*From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century.* This was followed in September 1994 by an additional White Paper, *Forward...From The Sea*, which reflected two years' hard operational experience with forward presence and contingency response. In March 1997, *Forward...From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept* was released, promulgating guidance on operational primacy-the ability to carry out swiftly and effectively any naval, joint, or multinational mission, and to prevail decisively over any foe across the spectrum of conflict.

As one of the major initiatives precipitated by ...*From The Sea*, the U.S. Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) was established in February 1993 in Norfolk, VA. The first major NDC task was to synthesize and promulgate naval doctrine in six major parts: Warfare, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Planning, and Command & Control. The first of these capstone documents is Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (NDP-1), *Naval Warfare*, published in 1994. In July 1998, the Navy Warfare Development Command was established at Newport, R.I. under the Naval War College. Among its responsibilities is naval doctrine.

In the White Papers and NDP-1, the Naval Service identifies four key/critical operational capabilities which the theater or joint force commander should expect to be resident in assigned naval forces: Command, Control, and Surveillance; Battlespace Dominance; Power Projection; and Force Sustainment. Each key capability relies on the performance of specific, naval warfare tasks by ships, aircraft, and composite groups in order to accomplish assigned missions. Fundamental or primary tasks include: amphibious warfare (AMW); air warfare (AW)/air defense (AD); strike warfare (STW); surface warfare (SUW), undersea warfare (USW), sea combat command (SCC) and command, & control warfare (C2WC). Supporting tasks include: intelligence (I), logistics (LOG); mine warfare (MIW); special warfare (NSW); ocean surveillance (OS); and space and electronic warfare (SEW).

While all Navy ships are designed and organized to operate independently to various degrees, their individual capabilities are complementary, leading to the formation of composite groups/forces to accomplish core Naval Service tasks. Typical consolidated "building blocks" readily available to the Joint Force Commander include:

Aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG)—composed of carrier, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, attack submarines, and logistics ships;

Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)—composed of three amphibious ships carrying a Marine Expeditionary Unit—Special Operations Capable (MEU (SOC));

Surface Action Group (SAG)—composed of a variable number of surface combatants, but does not include the aircraft carrier. Used for a variety of tasks, but primarily power projection or forward presence missions;

Mine Counter Measures (MCM) Group—a blend of air, surface and support units;

Underway Replenishment Group (URG)—assets of the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) which include a tailored mix of oilers, repair, and cargo replenishment ships necessary to sustain the forward deployed force.

A detailed description of organization, capabilities, and operational concepts is contained in publication NWC 3153F. Individual ship descriptions are available in the Almanac of Seapower.

The point of contact for the Navy portion of this session is Commander D. M. Galicki, U. S. Navy, C-410.

U.S. MARINE CORPS

The Marine Corps is an expeditionary force-in-readiness that is manned, trained, and equipped specifically to respond quickly to a broad variety of crises and conflicts across the full range of military operations anywhere in the world. The Marine Corps' philosophy of warfighting is based on the tenets of maneuver warfare and is in consonance with joint doctrine. Marines provide a unique combat capability that combines air, land, and naval forces from the sea—the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The key characteristic of these forces is their expeditionary mindset—operationally and logistically. Marines possess the ability to adapt and engage upon arrival, and then sustain operational momentum. Marine aviation is another element that characterizes the unique concept of MAGTFs. The primary function of Marine aviation is, and always has been, support of ground troops; focused, versatile, flexible, and responsive to the needs on the ground.

It is the Marine Corps ability to deliver a unique blend of ground, air, and service support elements in a responsive and adaptive manner that makes it the nation's most effective land combat, forcible entry option. The time period of OPERATION DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM provides an illustrative example of the versatility, flexibility and utility of MAGTFs. We will examine the ability of the Marine Corps to support the nation's main effort in U.S. CENTCOM and simultaneously support the other combatant commanders in their ongoing, regional efforts. Our discussion will conclude by highlighting the subsequent maturation in doctrine (especially OMFTS), organization, capability and limitations in the last decade.

The point of contact for the Marine portion of this session is Colonel D. T. Lennox, U.S. Marine Corps, C-422.

D. Questions:

U.S. NAVY

What capabilities and options do U.S. naval forces bring to a joint force commander, and how can these be integrated into joint operations? Illustrate, whenever possible, using DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM time periods.

How relevant to the post-Cold War global security environment are the Naval Service functions of strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and sealift?

The concepts of expeditionary and littoral warfare are central to the 1992 and 1994 Naval Service White Papers. What are the implications and operational challenges of these warfare concepts for the U.S. maritime force commander and the joint force commander?

What does the Navy Operational Concept entail? Is it anything more than an amplification of *Forward...From The Sea*? How does or doesn't it support *Joint Vision 2010* and *Joint Vision 2020*? Does Network Centric Warfare complement the Navy Operational Concept, *Forward…From the Sea* and *From the Sea*?

Does NDP-1, *Naval Warfare*, adequately translate the key/critical operational capabilities mandated by the White Papers into doctrinal reality? Does NDP-1 complement U.S. Army and Air Force doctrines such that joint operations will be properly supported? Illustrate using OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

U.S. MARINE CORPS

What is the Marine Corps warfighting doctrine for winning in the uncertain, chaotic and fluid environment expected on the battlefields of the future?

Did the Joint Force Commander's use of the Marine forces in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM exploit this fundamental, doctrinal philosophy?

How are MAGTFs structured to perform missions across the range of military operations? Illustrate this capability using DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM.

What are the Marine Corps' four fundamental operating concepts for the conduct of expeditionary operations? Illustrate each with examples from the time period of DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM.

Why are Marine Corps forces assigned to Joint Force Commanders typically organized under two separate component commands—the Marine Corps component and the Navy component? Cite examples using DESERT SHIELD or DESERT STORM.

How do the Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts for the 21st Century fit into the Network Centric Environment expected on future battlefields?

E. Required Readings:

U.S. NAVY

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington DC: Naval Doctrine Publication 1, NDP-1, *Naval Warfare*. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, March 1994. (Seminar Reserve).

Rubel, Robert C., Captain, USN, "Naval Operational Concepts." Newport, Rl: Naval War College, August 1998. (**NWC 2004**) (Issued).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: *...From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, September 1992. (**NWC 3125**) (Issued).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: *Forward...From The Sea*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, September 1994. (**NWC 3236**) (Issued).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: *Forward...From The Sea: The Navy Operational Concept*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, March 1997. (**NWC 2028**) (Issued).

Navy faculty, Naval War College, "U.S. Navy Brief and Notes," 31 August 2000. (**NWC 3054**) (Issued).

Extracts from *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,* Final Report to Congress, pp. 61-81, 101, 145, 249-309, 331. (**NWC 1088**) (Issued).

Navy League of the United States. *The Almanac of Seapower1999*. Arlington, VA: January 1999. (Seminar Reserve). (Scan).

U.S. MARINE CORPS

MCDP 1, *Warfighting*, Chapter 4, pp 69-96. (**NWC 2006**) (Issued).

MCDP 3, *Expeditionary Operations*, Chapters 3 and 4, pp 61-94. (**NWC 2008**) (Issued).

Marine faculty, Naval War College, "U. S. Marine Corps Brief and Notes." 31 August, 2000. (**NWC 3068**) (Issued).

Goodman, Glenn W. Jr., "Special Ops Afloat," *Armed Forces Journal International*, April 1995. (**NWC 3053**) (Issued).

Spain, William R., Colonel, "U.S. Marines at the Time of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM." (**NWC 3070**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

U.S. NAVY

DeGeus, Stan, Lieutenant Commander, USN. *Forces/Capabilities Handbook*. Newport, RI. Naval War College. (**NWC 3153F**) (Issued).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: Naval Doctrine Publication 2, NDP-2, *Naval Intelligence*. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, September 1994. (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: Naval Doctrine Publication 4, NDP-4, *Naval Logistics*. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, January 1995. (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: Naval Doctrine Publication 5, NDP-5, *Naval Planning*. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, January 1996. (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: Naval Doctrine Publication 6, NDP-6, *Naval Command and Control*. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, May 1996. (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of the Navy, Washington, DC: *Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS)*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, January 1996. (**NWC 3022**) (Issued).

U.S. MARINE CORPS

FMFMRP 2-12, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A Global Capability*. (**NWC 3057**) (Issued).

DeGeus, Stan, *Forces/Capabilities Handbook*. (**NWC 3153F**) (Issued).

U.S. Marine Corps, Krulak, Charles C., *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, 4 January 1996. (**NWC 3022**) (Issued).

U.S. Marine Corps, Rhodes, J. E. and Holder, G. S., *Seabased Logistics: A 21st Century Warfighting Concept,* 12 May 1998. (**NWC 2009**) (Issued).

U.S. Marine Corps, Van Riper, Paul K., *Ship-To-Objective Maneuver*, 25 July 1997. (**NWC 2011**) (Issued).

U.S. Marine Corps, Krulak, Charles C., *MPF 2010 and Beyond*, 30 December 1997. (**NWC 2013**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

U.S. NAVY

Pokrant, Marvin, *Desert Storm at Sea: What the Navy Really Did*. _____ Westport, Ct: Greenwood Press, 1999.

Marolda, Edward J. and Schneler, Robert J., Jr., *Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War*. U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) Superintendent of Documents, 1999.

U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC: DOD Directive 5199.1, 25 September 1987. "Subj: Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components."

Strasser, Joseph C,, "The Role of Naval Forces in Combat." Naval Forward Presence and the National Military Strategy. Boston, MA: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1993.

U.S. MARINE CORPS

Brown, Ronald J., *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991, With Marine Forces Afloat on Desert Shield and Desert Storm*. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1998. Library call number DS 79.72.B7, 1998.

Dawson, David A., et.al, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: An Anthology and Bibliography*. History and Museums Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1992. Library call number DS79.72.M528, 1992.

Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (Chapter 4, pp. IV-3 TO IV-6).

Joint Pub 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, Chapters 1 and 2.

Mundy, Carl E. Jr., GEN, USMC, "Reflections on the Corps: Some Thoughts on Expeditionary Warfare." *Marine Corps Gazette*, March 1995, pp. 26-29.

Quilter, Charles J., *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991. With I Marine Expeditionary Force on Desert Shield and Desert Storm*. History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1993. Library call number DS79.72.Q6, 1993.

U.S. COAST GUARD CAPABILITIES (Lecture)

The Coast Guard provides National Command Authorities a unique instrument in the nation's national security tool bag.

—General Colin Powell

The U.S. Coast Guard provides daily value to America. We provide economic vitality. We enforce laws and treaties. We ensure safe and efficient marine transportation. We protect natural resources. We protect our nation's borders and we provide for the national defense. We live our motto, Semper Paratus. The American taxpayer receives a double benefit-a ready and effective defense force and crisis responder, as well as a cost-effective force delivering vital services everyday.

—Admiral James M. Loy,
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard

A. Focus:

The Coast Guard is the country's fifth and smallest Armed Service with myriad capabilities to support both national and military security objectives—but only if national and military commanders are aware of this "unique instrument" in their tool bag. This session discusses Coast Guard mission areas, functions, equipment, and capabilities to support joint force commanders.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze the roles, relationships, and functions of the NCA, CJCS, JCS, CINCSs, Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Service Chiefs.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of the US force structure affect the development of joint military strategy.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate US military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.

C. Background:

Founded in 1790, the Coast Guard has participated in every American war since then, yet its true contribution to national security transcends its military capability. As a model for coast guards and small navies around the world, and with a humanitarian reputation, the U.S. Coast Guard can often provide forward presence in places where DOD forces would be politically unwelcome. Its personnel can contribute to nation building, help with disaster relief, and provide general humanitarian aid, thus fostering good will for the United States.

The Coast Guard also has expertise of unique value to maritime forces. This includes detailed knowledge of merchant ships, shipping practices, and international law invaluable for maritime intercept operations; experience with handling

thousands of refugees, a skill very applicable to non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO); unparalleled skill in search and rescue (SAR); and conducting commerce control and maritime interdiction operations in blue, green, and brown water environments. These skills have been requested more and more by U.S. regional CINCs and joint force commanders. Opportunities for USCG and DOD forces to work jointly in conducting missions important to U.S. national security have been increasing steadily since the end of the Cold War and attendant increased involvement of the U.S. military in operations other than war.

Point of contact for this session is Captain J. F. Murray, U.S. Coast Guard, SP-214.

D. Questions:

What are the Coast Guard's five maritime security roles/mission areas? What is meant when we say the Coast Guard is a 'unique instrument of national security'? How does the USCG view itself as a military service? What are its strengths and weaknesses? What unique capabilities does it bring to the joint force?

Which of the USCG's capabilities can be of value to a Joint Task Force (JTF) commander in a contingency/wartime environment?

How does a JTF commander or DOD command request and receive USCG support, and what are the issues associated with integration into the joint force?

How have Coast Guard forces contributed to CINCs' theater engagement plans?

How do USCG and USN/DOD assets work together in Maritime Exclusion Zones (MEZ) and in counter-drug operations? When do USN/DOD assets participate in Maritime Law Enforcement operations? Under whose authority?

E. Required Readings:

Loy, James M., "The United States Coast Guard: A Unique Instrument of National Security," *Sea Power,* December 99, pp. 8-13. (**NWC 2078**) (Issued).

Loy, James M., "Shaping America's Joint Maritime Forces: The Coast Guard in the 21st Century," *Joint Force Quarterly,* Spring 98, pp. 9-16. (**NWC 2077**) (Issued).

Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation on the use of U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in support of the National Military Strategy, October 3, 1995. (**NWC 2138**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Stubbs, Bruce B., Captain, USCG, and Truver, Scott C., "America's Coast Guard: Safeguarding U.S. Maritime Safety and Security in the 21st Century," pp. i-iii, 53-81, 131-132, 139-140, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters (G-O), January 2000. (**NWC 2134**) (Issued).

Commandant Instruction M3000.3A (COMDTINST M3000.3A) Coast Guard Capabilities Manual (CAPMAN). (Library Reserve).

Navy League of the United States, *The Almanac of Seapower,* January 1999. (Seminar Reserve).

DeGeus, Stan, *Forces/Capabilities Handbook*. (**NWC 3153F**) (Issued).

Naval War College, "The U.S. Coast Guard: A Unique National Security Instrument." (**NWC 3123**)(Library).

Stubbs, Bruce B., Captain, USCG, "Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century," Newport, RI: Naval War College Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1992. (Library).

G. Supplementary Readings:

None.

U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE AND CAPABILITIES (Seminar)

The real object of having an Army is to provide for war.

—Elihu Root, 1899

A. Focus:

This session examines the capabilities, limitations, and basic organization of the Army's combat forces. The primary emphasis is on the contribution those forces make to joint operations. Particular attention is paid to the role of the Army's Contingency Corps.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Know U.S. Army doctrine, how the Army intends to fight, and how it affects other services in joint and combined operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of Army forces affect the development of joint military strategy.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the relationship between current joint doctrine and Army doctrine used to develop operational level plans and orders (i.e., campaign plans, OPORDS, OPLANS) that require employment of joint and multinational forces, and coordination with other government/nongovernmental organizations.
- Comprehend the Army's Reserve Component capabilities.
- Comprehend how the Army is organized to support missions assigned by the combatant commander.

C. Background:

Army students in each seminar, under the guidance of the session point of contact, will prepare for and moderate this session. There will be a guidance session for the designated Army seminar member(s) prior to the beginning of the Block II portion of the trimester.

The class is conducted as a seminar where students will discuss the contributions of the Army to joint force operations. It is imperative that the students properly understand the manner in which the Army will be employed and the doctrine under which it will fight. In planning, knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of each type Army unit is critical. The class will discuss the employment capabilities of the different Army divisions using Operation Desert Shield/Storm as a case study.

America's Army is the most potent land combat force in the world. The Army is indispensable to the protection and advancement of our national interests because of its utility across the full range of contingencies. This utility comes from the Army capability for executing a range of operations from nation building and disaster relief to defeating enemies on the battlefield. The Army's most fundamental capability is the exercise of sustained, comprehensive control over people, land, and

natural resources. Putting American soldiers on the ground is a most effective method to shape the international environment in ways favorable to our interests.

The U.S. Army is a doctrinally based service capable of handling large campaigns as well as combat in a variety of scenarios. The 1993 edition of *FM 100-5, Operations*, is the Army's keystone warfighting doctrine that describes how the Army thinks about the conduct of operations.

The Army recently implemented a transformation campaign designed to match its capabilities with the Nation's strategic requirements. Advances in information, materials, and weapon system technologies will enable new organizational concepts that optimize the employment of Army and joint capabilities across the full spectrum of operations.

The point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel J. Anderson, U.S. Army, C-408.

D. Questions:

How does the Army view the battlefield framework at the operational level?

How does the Army envision the use of airpower on the battlefield?

Beyond airpower, how else can the operational commander conduct deep operations as envisioned in Army doctrine?

What are the differences in combat capability between light and heavy forces?

What is the utility of airborne and air assault forces?

Compare the Navy's network centric warfare concept to the Army's information age Objective Force.

Is the Army becoming too heavy and cumbersome to execute its power projection mission?

Is it still valid to categorize conflict as War or Operations Other Than War?

Was DESERT STORM an affirmation of the utility of Army operations?

E. Required Readings:

U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, pp. v through vi, 1-1 through 1-5, 2-0 through 2-15, 3-7 (Force Projection Operations) through 3-12, 6-11 (Battlefield Framework) through 6-15. (Issued).

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress pp. 40-61. (**NWC 1088**) (Issued).

Shinseki, Eric and Caldera, Louis, "Army Vision Statement." (**NWC 2101**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Army Service Background Briefing 2000. (**NWC 2124**) (Issued).

DeGeus, Stan, *Forces/Capabilities Handbook* pp. 18–32. (**NWC 3153F**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Franks, Frederick M. Jr., "Full Dimensional Operations: A Doctrine for an Era of Change." (**NWC 3008**) (Issued).

Holder, L.D., "Offensive Tactical Operations" (**NWC 3009**) (Issued).

Reimer, Dennis J., "Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement" (**NWC 2029**) (Issued).

U.S. AIR FORCE DOCTRINE AND CAPABILITIES (Seminar)

Air power is like poker. A second best hand is like none at all. It will cost you dough and win you nothing.

—General George C. Kenney, USAF

A. Focus:

This session takes a broad look at the doctrine, capabilities and employment of aerospace power. More specifically, it introduces how the Air Force has reorganized itself in preparation for the combat challenges of today's environment, highlights the core competencies of the Air Force, outlines what the Air Force can offer a joint force commander, and discusses how to best employ air and space power.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of deploying, employing, and sustaining aerospace forces and resources in concert with other Services in joint operations and with alliance/coalition forces in combined operations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of aerospace power affect the development and execution of joint military strategy.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how time, coordination, policy, politics, and doctrine affect the use of aerospace power relative to other military forces in the reconciliation and integration of ends, ways, and means.
- Analyze the usage of aerospace power in Operation Desert Storm and apply the lessons learned to subsequent and future operations.
- Understand how the U.S. Air Force has changed its concept of deploying and employing forces through the development of Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEFs).

C. Background:

This material is addressed in seminar format. The Air Force seminar members, under the guidance of the session point of contact, will prepare for and moderate this session.

Since the fall of the iron curtain and the end of Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. Air Force has declined in size by 35 present and reduced its overseas footprint by 65 percent. During the same period, its taskings have increased four-fold. To accommodate these changes, the Air Force has developed a new national deployment mindset, using ten Aerospace Expeditionary Forces or AEFs.

The U.S. Air Force's contributions to Operation Desert Storm and in Kosovo were significant, but costly in terms of resources. To properly employ Air Force assets, one must understand Air Force doctrine; specifically, what the USAF believes is the best way to employ aerospace power. Experience of the past 75 years has shown that the best way to employ air power is through the use of a comprehensive

strategy. America's Air Force 2020 discusses the vision of the Air Force from a total force perspective. It not only looks at capabilities and core competencies, but also ties in the core values of the Air Force people and the cultural mind-set of the Expeditionary Air Force.

This session, and a thorough analysis of the ODS case study, is designed to help you understand how to employ aerospace power effectively.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel R. A. Coe, U.S. Air Force, SP-213.

D. Questions:

The Air Force states that aerospace superiority should be a fundamental priority to enable all other operational concepts and missions to be conducted. Do you agree with this?

How is aerospace power used across the levels of war to address an adversary's center(s) of gravity?

How does an asymmetric strategy provide benefits to a joint force commander?

How does the Air Force support Military Operations Other Than War? Do Air Force core competencies address this area of warfare?

What are the benefits of a JFACC to a joint force commander? What are the traditional duties of the JFACC?

Why is it important to link the target selection process to operational and strategic objectives and the effects to be achieved.

E. Required Readings:

U.S. Department of the Air Force, *America's Air Force Vision 2020*. (**NWC 2140**) (Issued).

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, *Final Report to Congress,* pp. 38-51, 83-84, 90-102, 116-150, 224-247. (**NWC 1088**) (Issued).

Fogleman, Ronald R., "Advantage USAF: Air Power and Asymmetric Force Strategy." (**NWC 2022**) (Issued).

Meilenger, Philip S. "The Future of Airpower—Observations of the Past Decade." (**NWC 2144**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Air Force Base Doctrine, AFDD-1, September 1997. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-56.1, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*. Read pages v-xiv, I-1 - II-4, IV-1 - IV-5. (**NWC 2125**) (Issued).

DeGeus, Stan, *Forces/Capabilities Handbook*. (**NWC 3153F**) (Issued).

Horner, Charles A., "The Air Campaign." (**NWC 3094**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-04, *Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations.* (AIR) (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-09, *Fire Support.* (Seminar Reserve).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Clodfelter, Mark, "The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam."

Joint Pub 3-01.1, *Aerospace Defense of North America.*

Joint Pub 3-01.4, *JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD).*

Joint Pub 3-01.5, *Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense.*

Joint Pub 3-09.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS).*

Joint Pub 3-17, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Airlift Operations.*

Warden, John A., III, *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat.*

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (Lecture)

"A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change and USSOCOM is no exception. Guided by a comprehensive enduring vision and supporting goals, we must constantly reshape ourselves to remain relevant and useful members of the joint team."

—General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA

A. Focus:

This session discusses the organization, force structure, operational capacities, and limitations of special operations forces (SOF). Emphasis will be placed on the comprehension of the relevance of SOF in meeting current and future challenges to national defense objectives.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Understand the historical basis for current U.S. Defense Establishment; its structure, policies and strategies.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the organization, force structure, operational capacity, and limitations of SOF.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the roles and functions assigned to the U.S. active and reserve component SOF.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to appropriately employ SOF within the context of a JTF, interagency, or multinational operation including unique intelligence, coordination, and command and control requirements.

C. Background:

In every conflict since the Revolutionary War, the United States has employed special operations tactics and strategies to exploit an enemy's vulnerabilities. These special operations were carried out by specially trained people with a broad inventory of special skills. Since the establishment of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 1987, SOF have been trained, equipped, and prepared by one commander to conduct unilateral, joint, and combined operations in peace, conflict, and war. These special operations are in support of the regional combatant commanders, U.S. Ambassadors and their country teams, and other government agencies. Each military department has established a major command to serve as the service component of USSOCOM.

The point of contact for this session is Captain P. T. Toohey, U.S. Navy, C-407.

D. Questions:

Why do the characteristics of SOF and their principal mission areas result in an operational capacity-based vice an operational capabilities-based force?

How should SOF be integrated into theater operations in peacetime? Contingencies? What unique command and control considerations apply?

How and why do SOF emphasize the indirect application of military power? Does this require SOF to be more sensitive than general purpose forces to cultural and political considerations?

Why, how, when, and under what conditions should SOF be employed as a force multiplier? In an economy of force role?

What unique roles can SOF perform in coalition warfare?

E. Required Readings:

Downing, Wayne A., USCINCSOC Memo of 9 Aug 93, Subj: SOF Mission Criteria. (**NWC 3061**) (Issued).

U.S. Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, 2000. Read pp. 1-32, 45-57, 59-69. (Issued).

Shelton, Henry H., "Special Operations Forces: Looking Ahead," *Special Warfare*, Spring, 1997. (**NWC 3062**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Extract from FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces.* (**NWC 3010**) (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.* (Issued; Joint Electronic Library, CD-ROM).

Joint Pub 3-05.3, *Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures.* (Issued; Joint Electronic Library, CD-ROM).

Joint Pub 3-05.5, *Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures*. (Issued; Joint Electronic Library, CD-ROM).

U.S. Special Operations Command. Pub 1, *Special Operations in Peace and War*, 25 Jan 96. (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Special Operations Command. *Joint Special Operations Awareness Program* (JSOAP) Reference Manual, Fifth Rev., 15 July 1994. (Seminar Reserve).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Goodman, Glenn W., Jr., "Civil Savvy in Special Ops," *Armed Forces Journal International*, Oct. 94, p. 68.

_____, "Part of the Air Force Team-An Interview With Maj. Gen. James L. Hobson, Jr.," *Armed Forces Journal International*, July 1997.

_____, "Special Ops Afloat," *Armed Forces Journal International*, April 1995, p.18.

Jones, Jeffrey B. and Michael P. Mathews, "PSYOP and the Warfighting CinC," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1995.

Naylor, Sean D., "Night Stalkers Don't Quit," *Army Times*, 10 Jul 95.

Shelton, Henry H., "Coming of Age: Theater Special Operations Commands," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Winter 1996-1997.

STRATEGIC MOBILITY (Seminar)

Victory is the beautiful, bright-colored flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.

—Winston Churchill, The River War, 1899

USTRANSCOM. . . their motto should be "try fighting without us."

—General Henry Shelton, CJCS

A. Focus:

This session emphasizes how the national strategic mobility system works. It addresses the organization and mission of U.S. Transportation Command and its component commands. Finally, it examines the United States' ability to deploy in support of global contingencies.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze the relationships and functions of the NCA, CJCS, CINCs, and the Chiefs of the Services from a transportation supportability standpoint.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of the US force structure affect the development of joint military strategy.
- **PJE**—Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process from a transportation standpoint.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the CINCs.
- Know the role of the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) in working with the regional CINCs on strategic mobility and sustainability.
- Comprehend the elements of the strategic mobility triad: airlift, sealift, and prepositioning support.
- Understand the complexities involved in planning for the deployment of joint forces at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

The ability of the U.S. military to successfully carry out an assigned mission depends greatly on its capability to deploy forces, equipment, and sustainment to the theater within a given period of time. While logistics includes all those supporting activities required to sustain a deployed force, strategic mobility defines that part of the logistics process that transports people, equipment, supplies, and other commodities by land, sea, and air, to enable military power projection. In fact, the

operational commander must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the strategic mobility process if he or she is going to successfully execute a major operation or campaign. Clearly, force selection, phasing of operations, and risk assessment are directly tied to the ability to project forces and support from the United States to the area of responsibility, area of operation, or theater of war.

U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) oversees the strategic mobility process. Actual movement is executed by TRANSCOM component commands: Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC - Army), Military Sealift Command (MSC - Navy), and Air Mobility Command (AMC - Air Force). The Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration (MARAD) bridges MSC, U.S. flag commercial companies, and U.S. unions for sealift procurement and operations.

TRANSCOM's charter is to maintain and operate a deployment system for orchestrating the transportation aspects of world-wide mobility planning, integrate deployment-related information systems, and provide centralized wartime traffic management.

The Strategic Mobility triad consists of prepositioned material, sealift, and airlift. Each triad component has distinct advantages and disadvantages in terms of response time, expense, availability of carrying assets, and carrying capacity. Sealift and airlift have access to only limited U.S. Government-owned assets, and thus are highly reliant on commercial industry under a variety of programs, including the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and Voluntary Intermodel Sealift Agreement (VISA).

Point of contact for this session is Captain R. M. Babb, U.S. Navy, C-415.

D. Questions:

What are the major advantages and disadvantages of each leg of the strategic mobility triad?

How does the CINC or the CJTF interface with U.S. TRANSCOM? What is the supported/supporting commander relationship?

USTRANSCOM's force structure is sized as a one MTW force, but it is tasked with supporting a dual MTW strategy. How is TRANSCOM able to support the dual MTW strategy?

What sustainability and mobility lessons have been learned from Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM? Do these lessons raise concerns for the United States in light of current national security policy for crisis response?

E. Required Readings:

Cohen, William S., Secretary of Defense, *"Annual Report to the President and the Congress 2000,"* pp. 49-52. **(NWC 2104)** (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, *Strategic Mobility and Sealift in Support of Maritime Operations*. **(NWC 4008)** (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-35. *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*. Washington, DC: 7 September 1999. Read Chapter 1: Overview. (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Ackley, Richard T., "Sealift and National Security." **(NWC 3141)** (Issued).

Chilcoat, Robert A., and David S. Henderson, "Army Prepositioning Afloat." **(NWC 3218)** (Issued).

Snyder, Thomas J., and Stella T. Smith, "The War in the Persian Gulf." *Air Force Journal of Logistics,* Summer 1998, pp. 16-28. **(NWC 4010)** (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, *Strategic Mobility Planning Scenario*. **(NWC 2105)** (Issued).

USTRANSCOM Handbook 24-2, *Understanding the Defense Transportation System,* 2nd Edition, Scott AFB , IL: 1 Oct 98, pp. 1-20. **(NWC 4009)** (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

None.

ALLIANCE AND COALITION CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session examines issues facing a commander when conducting military operations as part of an alliance or coalition force. While joint operations are significantly more complex than single Service operations, combined operations add even greater complexities. Some of these additional difficulties include differences in national military doctrines, rules of engagement, languages, cultures, and technologies. To lead a combined force successfully, the operational commander must mitigate the effects of these differences. The session will use NATO as an illustrative alliance and draw on multinational operations up to and including Bosnia, thereby providing a useful lead-in to Joint Warfare Considerations (OPS II-10) which follows.

B. Objectives:

- From an operational commander's viewpoint, understand the practical differences between alliances and coalitions along with associated advantages and disadvantages.
- Understand the unique challenges associated with conducting multinational, combined operations drawing on past personal and documented experience.
- Analyze the organizational options available to the multinational commander for the employment of combined forces.
- Understand the broad obligations of the NATO treaty and have visibility of the forces permanently assigned.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate US military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.

C. Background:

A variety of key planning documents, including the U.S. National Security and National Military Strategies, highlight the U.S. preference for operating with alliance and coalition partners to achieve U.S. national objectives. In fact, key tenets of U.S. military strategy (e.g., forward presence and engagement) depend heavily upon other nations to realize success. Current basic joint doctrine for the conduct of multinational operations is contained in the readings from Joint Pubs 3-0 and 3-16 (3-16 first issued April 2000). Today the U.S. is a member of 5 multinational Alliances and 3 bilateral Alliances; her obligations to each can and do vary.

Multinational operations present a variety of unique operational considerations for the military commander, not least of which is the thorny issue of establishing unity of effort/command. It has become fashionable to take the "Unity of Effort/Parallel Command" architecture, as demonstrated by the DESERT STORM operation, as the norm and to assume that Unity of Command, in its purest sense, will be

unattainable. Alliances, which offer more formal and enduring command relationships, provide a range of capabilities from which the commander may draw. Organizing an allied force, however, can still present significant headaches given potential diplomatic and political sensitivities (the issue of Macedonia during the Kosovo crisis for example). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the best-known of the formal alliances in which the United States participates. The Naumann article (NWC 2019) describes the new NATO Military Command Structure as agreed in Berlin in December 1997 which covers a radical restructuring of the Alliance to meet its new challenges, including a reduction in HQs from 65 to 20; implementation was completed ahead of time. NATO has also adopted the CJTF concept, however, Thomas Cooke (NWC 2052) argues that the CJTF may have too many "moving parts" for it to be a workable and sufficiently reactive option for a political entity such as NATO that is wedded to consensus. Instead, he suggests that the "Lead Nation" concept still has value. It may be significant to note that NATO's latest military actions in the Balkans (Air strikes over Kosovo) were not conducted with a CJTF and, in fact, greatly resembled a "Lead Nation" operation.

Further background information concerning NATO structure, initiatives, and issues is contained in the Reference Readings: NATO's fundamental tasks and force structures are laid out in the NATO Handbook extract (NWC 2097) and the Fact Sheet No. 5 (NWC 2136).

Coalitions, which are normally formed in an ad hoc manner, often represent a disparate group of nation-states responding to a common specific threat at a particular time, thus posing even more demanding challenges to the commander than the more stable alliance. Designing a workable command relationship for coalition forces during Operation DESERT SHIELD was one example of such challenges. Maintaining the integrity of a coalition may become a critical factor/objective in the successful execution of a combined operation. Consequently, any planning must cater for an astute adversary who, recognizing the strategic importance of coalition cohesion, seeks to exploit any perceived weaknesses. The Pudas article (NWC 1121) gives a good illustration of the practical problems and planning considerations that face a prospective coalition commander.

As a practical matter, coalitions are most often composed of United Nations member states from a specific region or localized area. Legitimacy is claimed by invocation of the U.N. Charter, specifically Chapter 1, Article I: "The Purposes of the United Nations are: ...To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace..." The Reference Readings section includes two articles (NWC 2046 and NWC 2259) which provide a detailed look at U.N. considerations and issues.

Finally, much has been written about the advent of the information age causing a technology "gap" between the globally-focused U.S. and the more regionally-focused allied nations. The reasons behind this are clearly outlined in the short extract from the book "Mind the Gap" (NWC 2057). Whether you are pessimistic or optimistic as to the outcome, there is little doubt that degrees of multi-national

interoperability will remain a demanding pre-requisite for success at the Operational level of War.

The point of contact for this session is Commander S. J. Kenny, Royal Navy, C-409.

D. Questions:

What are some of the critical issues an operational commander must consider when planning and executing a combined operation?

Given the long term obligations of an alliance and the turbulent, changeable world we find ourselves in, has the alliance, as a method of binding force effort together, lost out to the seemingly more flexible coalition or are there enduring qualities that can provide operational military benefits?

What factors are relevant in establishing an effective C2 organization within a coalition? Should we still strive for true unity of command? Include consideration of the situation wherein the overall commander may not be a U.S. military officer.

How can we reconcile the United States' steadfast pursuit of advanced (and expensive) technology with the strategic directive to embrace multinational operations as the expected norm and to seek interoperability with our allies? How does this translate down to the Operational Commander in the field? Will a dependence on superior technology be the final straw that breaks the allies' backs?

How might the adoption of network centric warfare by U.S. forces affect our ability to conduct multinational operations? What distinct challenges does this present to the multinational operational commander?

How can a commander ensure that necessary intelligence, some of which may be the product of very sensitive sources, is disseminated and understood by coalition partners, some of whom may be future adversaries?

What can the commander do during peacetime, given a particular area of responsibility (AOR) and range of potential contingencies, to improve the effectiveness of coalition operations in a future crisis?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations,* pp. VI-1 to VI-12. (Issued).

Naumann, Klaus, "NATO's New Military Command Structure." (**NWC 2019**) (Issued).

Pudas, Terry J., "Preparing Future Coalition Commanders." *Joint Force Quarterly,* Winter 93-94. (**NWC 1121**) (Issued).

Gompert, David C, Kugler, Richard L and Libicki, Martin C., "Assessing the Problem," Chapter 1, pp. 3-14, *"Mind the Gap,"* 1999. (**NWC 2057**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Joint Pub 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations,* (Edition 1 issued 5 April 2000), pp. I-9 to I-12 and II-6 to II-112 (Issued).

Cooke, Thomas, “NATO CJTF Doctrine: The Naked Emperor.” *Parameters,* Winter 1998-99. (**NWC 2052**) (Issued).

Extracts from the NATO Handbook 1998. (**NWC 2097**) (Issued).

NATO’s New Force Structures," NATO Fact sheet No. 5 (**NWC 2136**) (Seminar Reserve).

Claude, Inis, L., “Collective Security After the Cold War.” (**NWC 2046**) (Seminar Reserve).

Riggs and Plano, Security Through Collective Action. (**NWC 2259**) (Seminar Reserve).

G. Supplementary Readings:

None.

JOINT WARFARE CONSIDERATIONS (Seminar)

"As we consider the nature of warfare in the modern era, we find that it is synonymous with joint warfare."

Joint Pub 1

"The teams and staffs through which the modern commander absorbs information and exercises his authority must be a beautifully interlocked, smooth-working mechanism. Ideally, the whole should be practically a single mind."

—General Dwight D. Eisenhower

A. Focus:

This seminar addresses the employment of joint forces. It examines and analyzes a Joint Force Commander's organizational options and considerations when standing up a joint force.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the role of joint doctrine with respect to unified command.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the capabilities and limitation of the US force structure affect the development of joint military strategy.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest of the CINCs.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate US military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.
- At the operational level, analyze selected joint military operations and insightfully discuss reasons for their success or failure.

C. Background:

Combatant commanders face the possibility of executing missions across the full range of military operations. They must plan for Major Theater Wars (MTWs) at the high end of the conflict spectrum as well as a variety of military operations at the opposite end of the spectrum. Whatever the scope or intensity of any particular action, the joint force commander must consider how a force is organized in order to achieve the following goals:

- Clarity of Objective
- Unity of Effort
- Centralized Direction
- Decentralized Execution

To address both the mission to be accomplished and the objective to be attained, a wise commander will account for operational functions when structuring a force. Therefore, NWC 4103A is again listed as a required reading to build upon previous seminar discussion of operational functions. To bring the seminar discussion into focus within the framework of joint doctrine, Joint Pub 0-2 is also listed as a required reading. Joint Pub 0-2 is a required reading as it designates the authorized command relationships and authority military commanders can use; provides doctrine, principles, and policy for the exercise of that authority; provides doctrine, principles, and policy for organizing joint forces; and prescribes policy for selected joint activities. In required reading NWC 2042, General Krulak argues for flexibility and simplicity within that framework.

In recent years, Joint Task Forces have been the organizational option of choice. Notionally, three-star major operational commanders of the Services (Army corps commanders, Navy numbered fleet commanders, Marine MEF commanders, and Air Force numbered air force commanders) will be the commanders of choice for JTFs.

The Kosovo case is highlighted by required readings NWC 2102 and NWC 2103. NWC 2102 reviews the organizational command and control relationship options for the 1999 Kosovo Operation. Consider the strengths and weaknesses of organizational structure in relation to the current guidance in Joint Pub 0-2, and weigh how it addresses the operational functions. NWC 2103 points out inconsistencies between the command and control organization used in Kosovo and the spirit of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Finally, this session is intended to build upon the preceding Alliances and Coalition session. Consider how well or poorly the lessons of Bosnia were addressed in the parallel command structure found in Allied Force/Noble Anvil.

The point of contact for this session is Commander J. L. Barker, U.S. Navy, C-409.

D. Questions:

In addition to mission and objective, what other factors might influence the selection of an organizational structure?

What kinds of functional and joint expertise would most likely be required to augment the staff of an operational three-star designated as a Joint Task Force (JTF) commander? How did this play in Kosovo?

In NWC 2042, General Krulak suggests retaining flexibility in order to keep joint doctrine relevant. What does he mean by that?

Compare the relationships and the organizational option chosen for Kosovo with Joint Pub 0-2 doctrine. Will this be the wave of the future?

Did the command relationships and structure used in the Kosovo Operation fully address the operational functions discussed in NWC 4103A?

Some might argue that the underlying rationale for a JTF is to ensure each service will be represented. Is this true?

Is the premise for a JTF budgetary in nature or does the JTF reflect a flexible /useful option?

What role did domestic and international politics play in Allied Force/Noble Anvil task force organization?

Under what conditions will the U.S. use a Joint Task Force without allied or coalition support? What will be the norm?

Why has the approach to organizing a JTF been an evolutionary process? What is so difficult about following doctrine?

E. Required Readings:

Herrly, Peter F, "The Plight of Joint Doctrine after Kosovo." (**NWC 2103**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),* pp. IV-1 through IV-19. (Issued).

Krulak, Charles C, "Doctrine for Joint Force Integration." (**NWC 2042**) (Issued).

U.S. Department of Defense, *Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report: Report to Congress*, pp 1 through 29 and 120 through 122. (**NWC 2102**) (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, JMO Department, "Operational Functions." (**NWC 4103A**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Chelberg, Ellertson, and Shelly, "At the Center of the Vortex." (**NWC 4056**) (Issued).

Owens, Mackubin, "The Use and Abuse of 'Jointness'." (**NWC 2041**) (Issued).

Yakeley and Bullock, "Training the Pacific Warriors." (**NWC 2018**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-00.2, *Procedures for Forming & Operating a Joint Task Force*, Chapters II and III. (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of Defense, HQ USEUCOM. *JTF Help List*, pp. 1-75. (Seminar Reserve).

G. Supplementary Readings:

U.S. Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, Command and Control extract, pp. K-4 through K-8.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/

C4ISR AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session focuses on C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) and IO (Information Operations) support to the Joint Force Commander at the operational level of war. The 1999 U.S./NATO military operation in Yugoslavia is used as the principal case study to elicit current capabilities and limitations of C4ISR and IO in support of a major multinational military operation. The primary objective is to derive insights and lessons learned with respect to C4ISR/IO systems, operational concepts, and organizations.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the value of integrating IO into theater strategies and campaigning.
- **PJE**—Demonstrate a thorough understanding of how IO and C4 are integrated to support the National Military and National Security Strategies and interagency process.
- **PJE**—Understand IO and C4 concepts and how they relate.
- **PJE**—Demonstrate how IO and C4 are integrated into the theater and strategic campaign development process.
- Understand the capabilities and limitations of national and theater-level intelligence assets available to the joint operational commander.
- Understand how C4ISR supports a joint information operations (IO) strategy.
- Comprehend the information requirements for Network Centric Warfare (NCW).

C. Background:

Information superiority (the ability to collect, process, and disseminate information while denying an adversary's ability to do the same) has become recognized as a key enabler in 21st century military operations. Also known as Knowledge Superiority, it is a central aspect of DoD's *Joint Vision 2010* and *2020*, and of the Navy's new *Maritime Concept*. Essential elements of information superiority include robust Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and command, control, communications and computers (C4) systems, and a full spectrum of Information Operations (IO) capabilities.

The 1999 U.S./NATO operation in Yugoslavia (Operation ALLIED FORCE/ NOBLE ANVIL) provides an excellent set of case studies that highlight the capabilities and limitations of our current C4ISR and IO systems, concepts, and organizations. In particular, the Yugoslavia operation was the first concerted effort to unify Information Operations under a multi-service organization in accordance with Joint Doctrine.

Within the context of this case study, this lesson explores three separate, but integrally-related areas of information:

- *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)*: Under the organizational responsibility of the staff J2 (Intelligence), the central focus of ISR is to establish and maintain an accurate picture of the environment and enemy activity in the area of operations. The particular problems posed by mobile targets in a very challenging environment will be explored.
- *Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4)*: Under the organizational responsibility of the staff J6 (C4), the primary focus of C4 is the maintenance of robust information networks to link operational forces for all activities from planning through execution. The particular problems of maintaining adequate information throughput capacity and operational security on very distant battlefields will be explored.
- *Information Operations (IO)*: Under the cognizance of the staff J3 (Operations), IO is emerging as the primary organizational entity for the attainment of information superiority. The over-arching concept of IO presently includes a broad set of information-related functions ranging from electronic warfare to psychological operations. The development of specific IO goals and operational concepts to accomplish the IO mission will be explored.

The principal intent of this lesson is to develop an understanding of existing capabilities and limitations in the areas of C4ISR and IO at the operational level of war, and to explore how our information challenges might better be met in future operations. A central theme throughout the session will be the requirements for C4ISR and IO in order to achieve the goals of Network Centric Warfare.

The point of contact for this session is Captain J. R. FitzSimonds, U.S. Navy, Sims Hall, E-115.

D. Questions:

What were the intelligence requirements to support the operations in Yugoslavia? What national and theater intelligence resources were available to the Joint Force Commanders in the region? What were their principal capabilities and limitations in supporting U.S/NATO operations? How were national and theater intelligence assets organized? Did these organizations meet U.S. and Alliance requirements?

What were the principal command and control requirements to support operations in Yugoslavia? What national and theater C4 assets were available? What were the principal capabilities and limitations of these assets? How effectively did they support the operational commander?

What were the goals for IO in this operation? What were the measures of effectiveness for IO? What principal IO assets were available to the operational commanders? How effective was the theater IO organization in meeting the overall IO goals?

What overall lessons for future operations can be drawn from C4ISR and IO experiences in this case?

What do our experiences from this operation imply for our efforts to achieve Network Centric Warfare?

E. Required Readings:

JMO Department, *C4ISR and Information Operations in Kosovo (1999)*, 2000 (**NWC 02-01**)—Secret NOFORN (Obtain from Pubs, Conolly Hall basement or the Intelligence Division, Sims Hall, SE-117).

F. Reference Readings:

Timothy L. Thomas, "Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority," *Parameters* (Spring 2000), pp. 13-29. (**NWC 2119**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, 9 March 2000. (Issued).

Joint Pub 2-01, *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operation,* 20 November 1996. (Issued).

Joint Pub 6-0, *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations,* 30 May 1995. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations,* 9 Oct 1998. (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After Action Report (Department of Defense, 31 Jan 2000) (Issued).

JOINT SERVICE CAPABILITIES VIGNETTES (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This seminar facilitates an understanding of the strengths and vulnerabilities of the Services in varied situations. Students draw on previous sessions covering individual Service capabilities to discuss options for responding to several scenarios. The session should help the student appreciate the benefits of Service cooperation, and the synergy of joint forces.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the value of integrating joint Information Operations (IO) into theater strategies and campaigning.
- **PJE—**Comprehend how technological change affects the art and science of war and evaluate key ongoing and anticipated technological developments pertinent to the military instrument.
- Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces.
- Examine how the capabilities of each Service can best be employed in several scenarios.
- Examine possible combinations of Service capabilities to assess what advantages various mixes of forces offer.
- Understand how the limitations each Service faces in various scenarios are complemented by capabilities in other services.
- Develop an appreciation of the roles of intelligence and strategic mobility in the global application of military power.
- Summarize the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

Earlier sessions addressed the capabilities of individual Services, and of basic combat support functions, such as intelligence and strategic mobility. This seminar affords students an opportunity to explore their own combinations of Service capabilities for responding to several scenarios. The scenarios are intended to represent circumstances that hypothetically arise within the next two to three years, but are not intended to represent predictions, or even probabilities, regarding potential future U.S. force employment. They are merely a mechanism for structuring discussions about force capabilities. Students are not expected in this session to

examine the likelihood of military force being used in the given scenarios, or the national interests that might be associated with its use.

The points of contact for this session are: Captain J. T. Locks, U.S. Navy, C-413, and Colonel P.C. Sweeney, U.S. Army, C-424.

D. Questions:

How does the maturity of the theater affect your choice of forces?

How does strategic mobility affect your force structure decisions?

Does your choice of forces affect your ability to "disengage" if national policy so dictates?

What is the impact of host nation and coalition participation upon your force structure?

What risks does your introduction of forces carry?

What are the limitations of what you can accomplish?

Are there redundant capabilities in your force package? If so, what are the implications of this?

If more than one Service offers similar capabilities, are there reasons to prefer one instead of the other in a given scenario? Should more than one be utilized?

If one service has limitations in a given scenario, does another service have a complementary capability that compensates for that limitation? As a nation, do we have limitations that cut across all services?

What network centric warfare capabilities would alter your force package choices?

What technological advances would enhance your capabilities in these scenarios?

E. Required Readings:

Force Capabilities Vignettes Package. (**NWC 2073A**) (Issued).

FM 100-5 Operations, Pages 2-15 - 2-24 and Chapter 3 (Force Projection). (Issued).

DeGeus, Stan. *"Forces/Capabilities Handbook"* (**NWC 3153F**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

FM 100-5 Operations, Chapter 5 (Combined Operations).

G. Supplementary Readings:

None.

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) (Seminar)

During the fall of 1989, during DoD's regular planning process, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) recommended and the Secretary approved a shift in the principal U.S. focus in the Persian Gulf. . . . Accordingly, the Secretary directed DoD to sharpen its ability to counter such a regional conflict on the Arabian Peninsula. In turn, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directed CINCCENT to develop war plans consistent with this shift in emphasis.

DoD, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress*

Turbulence is a constant: it is what happens when you have to balance the management requirements to plan an operation with the flexibility needed by those who will soon be carrying it out. While it may have certain flaws, the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the baseline system for all U.S. deployments, including those supporting peace operations.

—Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*

A. Focus:

This session introduces the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). It begins with an overview of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the roles of the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, the Joint Staff, and the Service chiefs and their staffs in translating national policy objectives into definitive planning guidance for the combatant commanders and their Service component commanders. Attention will also be directed toward the guidance contained in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), a CJCS instruction that initiates the deliberate planning cycle conducted by the combatant commanders. One product of the deliberate planning process that will be reviewed in this session is the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP), a recent tasking in the JSCP. The session then describes the deliberate planning process, compares and contrasts it with the time-sensitive crisis action planning process. Emphasis will be on an overview of the five phases of the deliberate planning process and the six phases of the crisis action process. We will also examine the tasking and coordination methodologies, and the relationships between the key elements and products of both processes.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend how national military direction for the combatant commander is developed and disseminated in the context of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and how various components of the planning processes support military force deployment and employment.
- **PJE**—Understand how the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) processes and products are used to prepare joint plans.

- **PJE**—Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process.
- Understand how the NCA performs its crisis action role within the framework of the JOPES processes.
- Understand how the defense planning systems affect joint operational planning.
- Know the purpose, roles, functions, and responsibilities and relationships within the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC).
- Comprehend the role of the JSCP in the Defense Planning System with emphasis on the deliberate and crisis action planning processes.
- Know the five phases of the deliberate planning process and the six phases of the crisis action planning process used within JOPES and the products and their functions derived from these processes.
- Understand how a CINC uses the Theater Engagement Plan to synchronize and unify employment of the military, political, and economic instruments of national power to assist in formulating national security direction and a strategic end state.
- Analyze fundamental challenges, considerations, and design elements of Theater Engagement Planning, including integration of unified, joint, and multinational forces, and non-DoD agencies, into the Theater Engagement Plan.

C. Background:

As mandated by Title 10 USC, the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS are pivotal in translating national security objectives into definitive planning guidance for the combatant commanders. The Service chiefs and their staffs are also involved in the process, both as contributors to the joint planning guidance and in deriving Service plans that provide trained and equipped forces to support that process. The combatant commanders are responsible for the actual development and production of the operation plans (OPLANs), but are dependent on support from the Services, other combatant commanders, and the combat support agencies during the planning and execution process.

JOPES provides the overall framework for the military planning process, both the five-phase deliberate planning process (DPP) and the six-phase crisis action planning (CAP) process. Prior to JOPES, there existed the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) and the Joint Deployment System (JDS). The need for JOPES stemmed from the recognition, based on actual crisis situations, that JOPS and JDS focused primarily on deployment and did not adequately support employment activities. JOPES was therefore developed to give senior level decision-makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and control events during both planning and execution of joint operations.

The JSCP is the vehicle by which the CJCS initiates the deliberate planning cycle. It includes regional objectives and planning assumptions; it specifies the type of plan for each task; and it apportions major combat and strategic lift forces to the

CINCs for their planning. The JSCP also provides the combatant CINCs with a framework for the scope of their plans, plan formats, and the amount of detailed planning that is required. Deliberate planning is a complex and lengthy process, particularly when the CINCs are required to develop Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD).

The six phases of CAP may have to be executed almost instantaneously, and plans may have to be altered substantially once forces are ashore in the crisis area or when strategic objectives change. In certain crises, the phases may be compressed, entirely eliminated, or conducted concurrently. Moreover, the process could terminate during any of the phases should the crisis subside before the execution phase is reached. The 1983 Grenada operation, URGENT FURY, the 1989 Panama operation, JUST CAUSE, and the 1990 South West Asia crisis, DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, stand as examples of such dynamic situations, as well as the latest operations in Kosovo, ALLIED FORCE.

The current SecDef Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) and the JSCP are both based on the assumption that there is utility in developing deliberate plans that may guide the NCA response to crises. If that assumption is true, we must understand how deliberate plans can be used to guide or expedite crisis action planning and execution, and which agencies are responsible for specific portions of the planning process.

Today's geographic CINC has a unique perspective on the current and projected security environment within his theater. His charge is to identify U.S. political and economic, as well as military, interests in the theater. He must focus on identifying opportunities for shaping the environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests. The TEP, as articulated in CJCSM 3113.01, can be described as his "peacetime campaign plan." CJCSM 3113.01, issued in early 1998, mandates a process by which CINCs translate national strategy into strategic and operational concepts for their individual AORs.

Point of contact for this session is Colonel P.C. Sweeney, U.S. Army, C-424.

D. Questions:

What is the basis for the planning tasks assigned in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan?

Why has the CJCS developed the concept of adaptive planning and how does a CINC incorporate that concept into deliberate plans? How does a CINC address the issue of deterrence?

How are limited resources and forces matched to planning requirements necessary to support the national security strategy and objectives? Does the JSCP address combat forces only? How is strategic lift considered during deliberate planning?

Does the CINC need a tasking from the CJCS to initiate deliberate planning? How does the CINC provide guidance to his staff and component commanders?

What types of plans are developed during the deliberate planning process? During CAP?

To what extent are deliberate plans really only deployment plans? How does the CINC express how forces are to be employed?

To what extent is CAP sufficiently flexible for "evolving" crises? What happens when major changes occur? How effective do you think CAP will be in meeting the challenges of the future?

Have recent U.S. military operations validated the hoped-for correlation between deliberate and crisis action planning? If so, what portions of the deliberate plan will normally need to be modified in times of crisis?

Will the TEP gain and maintain viability as a useful planning document?

How does the CINC ensure non-DoD agencies comply with CJCS's direction to integrate all theater activities into a single TEP?

E. Required Readings:

"Instructional JSCP, FY 98," Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 December 1998. Scan Enclosure B (pp. B-1 through B-9), Appendix A to Enclosure C (pp. C-A-1 through C-A-14), Appendix A to Enclosure D (pp. D-A-1 through D-A-9), Appendix B to Enclosure D (pp. D-B-1 through D-B-33); and Enclosure E. (**NWC 1-99**) (**SECRET/NOFORN**) (Classified Issue) (This will be issued in class).

"Extract from PACOM's Theater Engagement Plan," PACOM. (**NWC 01-01**). (**SECRET/NOFORN**) (Classified Issue) (This will be issued in class).

Craft, Douglas W., *An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War,* Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. (**NWC 4051**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine of Planning Joint Operations,* Washington, D.C.: 13 April 1995. Read sections IB through IE (pp. I-4 throughout I-20); section IIA (pp. II-1 through II-7); and sections IIIA through IIID (pp. III-2 through III-17). (Issued).

Steinke, Ralph R. and Tarbet, Brian L., "Theater Engagement Plans: A Strategic Tool or a Waste of Time?" U.S. Army War College, *Parameters*, Spring 2000. (**NWC 2096**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

CJCSM 3122.03A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System,* Vol II (Planning Formats and Guidance), Washington, D.C.: 31 Dec 1999. (Seminar Reserve).

Department of Defense, *Extracts from Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress,* pp. 41-51, 313-318. (**NWC 1088**) (Issued).

Crisis Action Procedures: Tailored Response to Crisis Situations, J-3, Operations Directorate, Joint Staff, 20 September 95. (**NWC 2116**) (Issued).

Vego, Milan, *Force Deployment in U.S. Joint Doctrine and Practice,* Joint Military Operations Department, U.S. Naval War College, April 1998, pp 13-23. (**NWC 2000**) (Issued).

CJCSM 3113.01A, Theater Engagement Planning, Washington, DC: 31 May 2000 (Issued).

User's Guide for JOPES (Joint Operation Planning and Execution System), Washington, D.C.: 1 May 1995. (**NWC 2089**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-03.1, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol I (Planning, Policies, and Procedures),* Washington, D.C.: 4 August 1993. (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

None.

THEATER PLANNING (Seminar)

A robust plan flows best from "plurality of perspective and the resulting competition of ideas.... The process may be somewhat untidy, but it is distinctly American. It works."

—Admiral J. D. Watkins, *The Maritime Strategy*

A. Focus:

This lesson focuses on the implementation of national strategy at the theater CINC level. The first step of the process comes to the CINC as guidance from the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Based on this guidance, the CINC develops his theater strategy by means of a strategic estimate. The CINC's theater strategy produces concepts to both shape the theater and respond to challenges. The final steps are constructing the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) to shape the theater in peacetime and developing campaign plans to respond to regional threats. The JMO course has previously addressed the basic concepts associated with national strategy, campaigns, TEP, and operational art. This session will more closely examine the interrelationship between those concepts and their effect on the geographic CINC's theater planning.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Understand the process by which military advice is provided to the NCA and NSC for development into national strategic direction and endstate for transmission to combatant commanders.
- **PJE**—Translate national security and military direction into development of theater strategies, and strategies of supporting combatant commanders, for use in the geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) identified in the Unified Command Plan (UCP).
- **PJE**—Understand the fundamentals, considerations, and design elements of campaign planning including integration of unified, joint, and multinational forces into theater and subordinate campaign plans.
- **PJE**—Analyze how time, coordination, policy, politics, doctrine, and national power affect the planning process.

C. Background:

Theater strategy is the development of integrated strategic concepts and courses of action to accomplish national and multinational objectives within a theater across a wide range of military operations. The key process in developing a theater strategy and the subsequent campaign plan is the theater commander's estimate of the situation. The guidance provided in the NSS, NMS, and JSCP form the basis for the theater commander's strategy.

Campaign planning bridges both the deliberate and crisis action planning process. Traditionally, campaign plans establish objectives and seek to synchronize

operations within a theater of war. Campaign plans become the basis for subordinate campaign plans by joint forces and supporting plans for component forces. There is a definite art and professional skill in writing a succinct campaign plan that translates the theater commander's strategic vision into a concept of operation and necessary tasks for subordinate forces. Campaign planning is a logical result of the theater commander's estimate process.

This session provides the seminar with an opportunity to analyze two selected World War II campaigns (Central Pacific and Sicily) with an eye towards their linkage to a strategy and the effectiveness of their construct. The seminar will then contrast these historical examples with a more recent illustration, Operation DESERT STORM.

The point of contact for this session is Colonel P.C. Sweeney, U. S. Army, C-424.

D. Questions:

What are the fundamental responsibilities of the theater commander to provide for strategic direction, unified action, and operational focus?

What is theater strategy and how is it related to campaign planning?

What is the campaign planning process and how is it related to JOPES?

What are the concepts and fundamentals applied by the theater commander in developing a strategic concept for a campaign?

Using NWC 4052A and the characteristics of campaigns found in NWC 2109 as guides, analyze and contrast the three campaigns (HUSKY, GRANITE, and DESERT STORM). In your analysis, consider the following additional questions:

- How did the multi-national aspect of each campaign influence the respective strategies?
- How well did the campaigns apply the tenets of Operational Art?

E. Required Readings:

"A Guide for Evaluating Campaign Plans." (**NWC 4052A**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations,* Washington, DC: 13 Apr 1995 (Issued). Read pp. II-14 through II-15 on employment planning and key concepts, and pp. II-16 through II-21 (section F) on Desert Storm and campaign planning.

Extracts from "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War," read pp. 83-102. (**NWC 1088**) (Issued).

"HUSKY—Sicily Campaign." (selected students read) (**NWC 2026**) (Issued).

"GRANITE—Central Pacific Campaign." (selected students read) (**NWC 2030**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Banks, Floyd T. and William E. Mendel, "Campaign Planning: Getting it Straight." (**NWC 4118**) (Issued).

Heredia, Michael D., "Building a Campaign: The Essential Elements of Operational Design," School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, KS., May 1995. (**NWC 2132**)(Issued).

Extract from Joint Pub 5-00.1, *JTTP for Joint Campaign Planning* (Third DRAFT), Washington, D.C.: 1 Feb 2000. (**NWC 2109**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

None.

PLANS, ORDERS, AND PLANNING (Seminar)

A. Focus:

In this session the student will be introduced to the various plans and directives associated with the joint military planning process. The Deliberate Planning Process (DPP) will be thoroughly examined, with emphasis on understanding the functional application of its products. For Crisis Action Planning (CAP), both the requirements and general characteristics of "good" directives, and their prescribed general format, will be discussed in detail. The connection between the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) and the development of directives in both Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning will be discussed and sample directives will be analyzed for their form and substance. The student will be prepared to fully participate in the upcoming joint planning and execution exercises that serve as preparatory precursors to the Multi-crisis War Game in Block IV.

Comprehensive understanding of the CES to CAP to OPORD production and execution will be critical to the student's contributory participation in the remainder of the course.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the CINCs.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Explain how the defense planning systems affect joint operational planning.
- Understand how to prepare plans and orders using Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) processes and products.
- Demonstrate the ability to analyze military directives for their correct format and content.
- Understand the function of the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) in the development of plans and orders for joint military operations.

C. Background:

Both the Deliberate Planning Process (DPP) and Crisis Action Planning (CAP) use various forms of directives to implement military strategy. In DPP, the products are OPLANS, CONPLANS, and Functional Plans. In CAP the product is the OPORD which is finally executed on NCA order after a series of directives have been developed, promulgated, and acted upon. These supporting directives include

the Warning Order, the Planning Order, the Alert Order, the Deployment Order, and the Execute Order. Each of these planning processes and their attendant directives are critically tied to the CES and the development of Courses of Action (COA). An understanding of how the CES is used in the development of planning directives, what is the proper form and substance of the directives, and how the directives are constructed by a staff are critical to an officer's success in the JMO course and in follow-on assignments.

The point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel J. Anderson, U.S. Army, C-408.

D. Questions:

What are the general characteristics and specific requirements of any "good" directive?

What is the standard five-paragraph format for plans and orders? What are the key items in each paragraph, and what are some of the optional parts of the directive not contained in the five paragraphs?

What is the purpose of annexes and how are they used in directives? What is contained in each of the usual annexes?

What are the intended actions of, approval level requirement for, and releasing activity for Warning, Planning, Alert, Deployment, and Execute Orders?

How does the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) and its resultant COA decision begin the OPORD-writing process?

What is the relationship between the DPP products, OPLANs and CONPLANs, and OPORDs?

E. Required Readings:

Naval Warfare Pub 5-01 (Rev. A), *Naval Operational Planning,* (Chapter 5, "Planning"), (Chapter 6, "Directives"), (Chapter 7, "Orders"), (Appendix C, pp.C-1 to C-9), (Appendix D, pp.D-1 to D-9). (Issued).

CJCS, *User's Guide for Joint Operation Planning,* 11 September 1994, pp. 14 to 26.(**NWC 2086**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

JMO Department, *Guidance For Writing A Directive*, January 1996. (**NWC 4067**) (Issued).

JMO Department, *Directives,* January 1996. (**NWC 4069**) (Issued).

CJCS, *Users Guide For JOPES*, 1 May 1995. (**NWC 2089**) (Issued).

AFSC PUB 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000. (Seminar Reserve).*

JMO Department, *Guidance For Operational Sequencing,* September 1998. **(NWC 1008)** (Issued).

JMO Department, *Guidance For Operational Synchronization,* September 1998. **(NWC 1009)** (Issued).

JMO Department, "Sample Planning Documents," September 2000. (**NWC 2110)** (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-03.1, *Joint Operation Planning And Execution System, Volume I (Planning Policies And Procedures),* p. V-4 (chart), Annexes C, E, F, G, H, J). (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

None.

COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION (CES) CONCEPTS (Seminar)

The one who is to draw up a plan of operations must possess a minute knowledge of the power of his adversary and of the help the latter may expect from his allies. He must compare the forces of the enemy with his own numbers and those of his allies so that he can judge which kind of war he is able to lead or to undertake.

—Frederick the Great: Letter 1748

A. Focus:

These seminars will introduce you to one of the most critical aspects of the planning process—the framework and steps involved in making a decision—choosing a Course of Action. We will focus on the Navy's Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) as a model for military decision making. The CES Workbook will be used as an instructional tool and a guide as we illustrate this process using the Desert Shield scenario.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Analyze and apply the joint planning processes and joint operational art.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for and coordinate the employment of joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint and unified operations support national objectives.
- Attain an understanding of the steps involved in the preparation of a Naval CES.

C. Background:

Block II began by introducing the capabilities and doctrine of the various Services and several key operational issues critical to the planning process. The Commander's Estimate of the Situation applies and synthesizes these, and the theory of Block I, for making a sound military decision.

For most of the Twentieth Century, and during all of its major wars, the United States military has used the CES to think through real and potential military situations and myriad influencing factors in order to arrive at decisions. In 1909, the U.S. Army adopted the Estimate of the Situation from the German General Staff; the U.S. Navy followed a year later.

As you will find out, there is a wide variety of CES experience in your seminar, ranging from none to sophisticated use on joint staffs. Also, there are differences in Service perspective in the planning framework as well as ideas from outside the military. The main purpose of the CES, and any planning framework, is to provide a logical sequence of actions in analyzing a military problem and reaching a decision.

Military commanders must continually make decisions, often under unfavorable conditions. The opponent's independent will and actions can considerably affect the execution of one's own plans and actions. Moreover, the physical environment, climate, and weather can significantly interfere with the commander's accomplishment of the assigned mission. The CES is designed to ensure that no matter of importance is omitted by the commander.

These sessions focus on describing the CES planning process utilizing the workbook and readings, and then illustrating the knowledge with the problem of defending Saudi Arabia against potential Iraqi aggression.. By now you should recognize Operational Art and the Four Questions as a foundation to military success.

The first step in the CES is the **mission analysis**. The mission is the single most important element of the CES. It is a simple statement of the task and purpose **("the ends")** assigned by higher authority or deduced by the commander. The mission should be constantly reviewed throughout the entire estimate process. By completing the mission analysis, the commander establishes the criteria for *adequacy* (**"the ways")** i.e., will the **courses of action** (COA) actually accomplish the mission when carried out successfully. Thereafter, the restated mission becomes the basis for the commander's and staff estimates. It is contained in paragraph 1 of the CES and comprises paragraph 2 of the basic plan or operation order.

Following analysis of the mission, we identify those **factors** that might influence the choice of a course of action and draw conclusions about how these factors might favor or hinder own or enemy courses of actions. As established in OPART, the principal factors are **space, forces,** and **time**. The aim here is to develop an understanding of the area in which the upcoming battle will occur, identify and tabulate strengths and weaknesses for own and enemy forces, and analyze how time will affect accomplishment of the mission (primarily through the interactions of space-time and force-time). When this review is completed, we are able to make an initial determination of the *adequacy* of own forces.

The next step is to analyze enemy capabilities (ECs) and develop **enemy courses of action** (ECOAs). The commander must identify what the enemy can do (individual ECs) and then estimate the likelihood of the enemy commander packaging these capabilities into comprehensive ECOAs. These ECOAs are then courses of action which the enemy is physically capable of taking, and which, if adopted by the enemy, would materially affect the accomplishment of the commander's assigned mission. They are generally broad and conclusive actions, such as defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, or delay (DRAW-D), which the opponent's forces can carry out under conditions favorable to the opponent. The aim is to develop a list of distinct, mutually exclusive ECOAs that collectively exhaust the enemy commander's options.

The staff then develops **own COAs** that are critically reviewed to ensure that they represent real choices rather than restatements of a single favored alternative. These COAs are tentative and should provide the commander with distinct choices that are mutually exclusive, yet collectively exhaustive. Each COA developed is checked for *feasibility* **("the means")**—are enough forces available to the

commander to accomplish the COA, and *acceptability* **("the risks")**—is the COA worth the risk/cost. The final list of COAs is checked for variety and completeness. Thereafter, the commander drafts a tentative concept of operations for each COA retained.

An essential element of the commander's estimate process is the **analysis of opposing courses of actions**. This is the first opportunity to determine the probable effect of each ECOA on the chances of success of each COA. The results of this analysis are probable outcomes for each interaction. This allows the commander to assess the feasibility and acceptability of each COA during the next step of the estimate. The analysis of opposing courses of action consists of four principal steps:

- determining measures of effectiveness (MOEs),
- predicting outcomes of each interaction,
- interpreting the results of analysis, and
- listing COAs retained.

The staff then **compares the retained COAs** with each other to help form the basis for the decision. The commander and the staff consider advantages and disadvantages, identify actions to overcome disadvantages, make final tests for feasibility and acceptability, weigh relative merits of the retained COAs, and select one COA that offers the greatest chance of accomplishing the mission. To facilitate comparison between the retained COAs, the staff considers each COA in terms of a few governing factors selected by the commander.

The **decision** is based on both an objective review of the results of the tabulations and calculations of the outcome of each step in the process, as well as upon subjective analysis. The commander must also rely on his professional judgment in making a sound decision.

The point of contact for this session is Captain J. T. DuGene, U.S. Navy, C-411.

D. Questions:

What is the common thread seen throughout the CES?

What are some influences on the superior's mission that you will have to judge?

What tasks must be performed to accomplish a CES, and what organizations are involved?

What are the shortcuts and pitfalls in planning and decision making?

In reaching a decision:

Has the mission analysis resulted in a clear and concisely restated mission?

What are the major issues of the factors of Space? Forces? Time?

What are the enemy's strengths and weaknesses? The center(s) of gravity? The critical vulnerabilities?

What are the enemy's capabilities? How can he put these together as ECOAs?

What are the potential own courses of action? Are they mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive?

Is the course of action recommended for selection adequate (accomplishes the mission), feasible (accomplishes the mission with the assets available), and acceptable (one that is worth the estimated cost or risks)?

What governing factors are used to analyze and compare courses of action?

E. Required Readings:

U.S. Naval War College, "Case Study: DESERT SHIELD." Newport, RI: February 1999. (**NWC 4046B**) (Issued).

Downes, Eric C., and Michael L. Ettore. "The Decline of Mission/The Rise of Intent, The Commander's Estimate Defined." *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 1993, pp. 50-53. (**NWC 4085**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-0. *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Washington, DC: February 1995. Appendix B: The Estimate Process. (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College. "Commander's Estimate of the Situation: Worksheet for In-Class Work and War Gaming." Newport, RI: September 1998. (**NWC 4111C**) (Issued).

U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC: Extracts from *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War; Final Report to Congress,* April 1992. Chapter 1, pp. 2-16; Ch. 2, pp. 17-29; Ch. 3, pp. 30-39; Ch. 4, pp. 48-57; Appendix E, pp. 48-57. Scan. (**NWC 4065**) (Issued).

Battlega, John A., and Judith K. Grange, eds. *The Military Applications of Modeling*. Wright Patterson AFB: Air Force Institute of Technology Press, 1984, pp. 38-49. "The Choices and Uses of Criteria." (read for day two), (**NWC 4093**) (Issued).

Rosenburg, Ralph. "Relative Combat Power." *Military Review,* March 1978. (read for day two) (**NWC 4088**) (Issued).

Naval Warfare Publication NWP 5-01. *Naval Operational Planning (Rev A),* Naval Warfare Development Center, Newport, RI May 1998. (Issued).

Optional history on pp 1-1 to 1-4.

Scan pp 4-1 to 4-22. We'll cover this section from the nearly identical NWC 4111C. Know that it is here when you are back in the fleet.

Read pp. 4-22 to 4-32 with a view to appreciating other staff estimates necessary for the full CES or as separate functional estimates.

Scan Appendices A & B. The NWC 4111C is very similar to Appendix A, so focus on the formats for estimates in Appendix B. Again, review for future reference.

F. Reference Readings:

DeGeus, Stan, Lieutenant Commander, USN. *U.S. Forces/Capabilities Handbook,* Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000. (**NWC 3153F**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-03.1. *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol. I (Planning, Policies and Procedures)*. Washington, DC: July 20000. Scan Annex D. (Issued on Joint Electronic Library CD-Rom).

Dupuy, T.N., Colonel, USA(Ret). *Numbers, Predictions and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles.* Hero Books, Fairfax, VA, 1985 (Library Reserve). This captures many of the force planning issues used in the CES.

Joint Pubs: Many Joint Pubs (Washington, DC) are applicable to aid and support the operational planning process including:

JP 2-0. *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations*. March 2000. (Issued).

JP 4-0. *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations,* April 2000. (Issued).

JP 5-00.2. *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures,* January 1999. (Seminar Reserve).

Snyder, Frank and Robert Rubel. "The Art of Operational Level Military Planning." Newport, RI. (**NWC 4122**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Armour, Michael D. "Decision Making Processes." *Military Review*, April 1994, pp. 70-74.

Buell, Thomas B. "Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus and the Naval Planners' 'Holy Scripture': Sound Military Decision." *Naval War College Review*, May-June 1973, pp. 31-41.

Russo, J. Edward and Paul J. H. Schoemaker, *Decision Traps: The Ten Barriers to Brilliant Decision-Making and How to Overcome Them,* Simon and Schuster, New York, 1989.

Simon, Herbert A., "Background of Decision Making," *Naval War College Review,* November 1957, pp. 1-24.

U.S. Marine Corps, *MCDP 5, Planning*, Quantico, VA. July 1997.

U.S. Marine Corps, *MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process*. Quantico, VA. January 2000.

U.S. Naval War College. *Sound Military Decision*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1942.

PACIFIC TEAK CRISIS PLANNING EXERCISE (Seminar)

Our national strategy calls for the individual Services to operate jointly to ensure both that we can operate successfully in all warfare areas and that we can apply our military power across the spectrum of foreseeable situations . . .

Forward . . . From the Sea

A. Focus:

We began Block II by introducing the capabilities and doctrine of the various Services and several key operational factors critical to the planning process. From there, we examined how to develop a Commander's Estimate of the Situation, reviewed how this fits within JOPES, and then discussed some of the concepts of campaign planning.

In this last portion of Block II we will apply all these concepts to a scenario based on warfare in a littoral region. This exercise will highlight activities at all three levels of war, and will focus on the planning aspects of a crisis.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Summarize the roles, relationships and functions of the NCA, CJCS, JCS, and CINCs in the National Military organization.
- **PJE**—Synthesize joint operational art at the joint task force level.
- **PJE**—Formulate, apply and defend solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.
- **PJE**—Comprehend and summarize the coordination considerations of U.S. plans and actions effectively integrating and employing Service, joint and multinational forces, as well as interagency and non-governmental organizations at the operational level of war.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the value of integrating IO into theater strategies and operational planning.
- **PJE**—-Understand how the joint operational planning and execution system is intergrated in the theater and operational IO campaign planning and execution to support theater and national strategic sustainment and warfighting efforts.
- **PJE**—-Comprehend and apply technological changes in the 21st century battlespace.
- Apply the steps involved in the preparation of a CES.
- Demonstrate the ability to write an Operation Order based on the selected course of action developed in the CES.
- Apply Operational Law in operational planning and execution.

C. Background:

This exercise focuses on the planning aspects of how to use forces during a crisis that develops in a littoral region. The seminar will act as members of a Joint Task Force. As such, the group will develop a CES based on the intelligence assessment and information provided in the reading. The group will brief its CES with a recommended course of action to the moderators. This will be followed by a discussion and approval of the course of action to be used. Then, the group will develop and brief an OPORDER that will outline the specific actions and forces that are planned for this situation. On the final day of the exercise, the moderators will review the OPORDER with the group and provide overall feedback on the conduct of the exercise.

During the exercise, each seminar will be visited by a Law Moderator for discussions concerning operational law issues relevant to the situation.

The point of contact for this session is Captain J. T. DuGene, U.S. Navy, C-411.

D. Questions:

What is the overall situation that the CINC is facing? What is the purpose of the mission that the CINC has been assigned? What tasks must be performed to accomplish the mission? What are the restrictions on the mission?

What are the considerations for command and control of the assigned forces?

Where will CJTF be located? How will the JTF be organized? Will Network Centric Operations influence or impact the JTF command and control? If so, how?

What are the enemy capabilities and courses of action that the CINC might confront?

What are the potential own courses of action that the CINC can select?

Is the recommended course of action adequate (accomplishes the mission), feasible (accomplishes the mission with the assets available), and acceptable (accomplishes the mission within the estimated cost)?

Does the OPORDER provide sufficient details for the forces to accomplish their mission? Are actions of all participants synchronized towards this end? Will the proposed military condition lead to achievement of the political objective?

E. Required Readings:

Naval Warfare Publication 5-01 (Rev. A), *Naval Operational Planning*, May 1998. (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, "A Borneo Case Study for Expeditionary Warfare," August 2000. (**NWC 2095**) (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, "Commander's Estimate of the Situation: Worksheet for In-Class Work and War Gaming," September 1998, (**NWC 4111C**) (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, "Guidance for Writing a Directive" Newport, RI, January 1996. (**NWC 4067**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

DeGeus, Stan, *U.S. Forces/Capabilities Handbook*, Newport, RI; Naval War College, 2000. (**NWC 3153F**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, February 1995. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-04, *Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations (AIR).* (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,* April 1998, (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-05.3, *Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures,* April 1993, (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations,* July 1996, (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-56.1, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations* (**NWC 2125**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations,* April 1995, (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.* January 1999. (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Pub 5-03.1, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol. I (Planning, Policies, and Procedures)*. Washington, DC; July 2000. (Issued on Joint Electronic Library CD-Rom).

Schmitt, Maj John F., USMCR and Gary Klein. "How We Plan." *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1999, pp 18 – 26. (**NWC 2130**) (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, "Directives," Newport, RI. January 1996. (**NWC 4069**) (Issued).

[Note: Doctrinal Publications and concept papers are grouped under the following sections—U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Naval War College].

Ackley, Richard T. "Sealift and National Security." *Proceedings*, U.S. Naval Institute, July 1992, pp. 41-47. Discusses lessons learned from DESERT STORM and sealift requirements for the future. (NWC 3141) (Issued).

Armed Forces Staff College. *Joint Staff Officers Guide-1997*, AFSC Pub. 1. Norfolk, VA: Armed Forces Staff College, pp. 2-2 through 2-43. Provides a history of the Department of Defense and the origins of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Describes the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff. (NWC 2075) (Issued).

Armour, Michael D. "Decision Making Processes." *Military Review*, April 1994, pp. 70-74. A brief analysis of several decision making approaches.

Banks, Floyd T. and William E. Mendel, "Campaign Planning: Getting in Straight." (NWC 4118) (Issued). A good review of the requirements for a campaign plan. This article preceded current joint writings. An interesting contrast.

Battlega, John A., and Judith K. Grange, eds. *The Military Applications of Modeling*. Wright Patterson AFB: Air Force Institute of Technology Press, 1984, pp. 38-49. "The Choices and Uses of Criteria." (NWC 4093) (Issued).

Buell, Thomas B., "Admiral Edward C. Kalfbus and the Naval Planners' 'Holy Scripture': Sound Military Decision." *Naval War College Review,* May-June 1973, pp 31-41.

Chelberg, Robert D., Jack W. Ellertson, and David H. Shelly. "At the Center of the Vortex." *Field Artillery*, HQDA PB6-93-5, October 1993, pp. 12-16. A discussion of JTF organizational structure in modern CINC usage. (NWC 4056) (Issued).

Chiarelli, Peter W. "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols." *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn 1993, pp. 71-81. A thought provoking article that proposes replacing the Joint Chiefs with a National Military Advisory Council, and the Joint Staff with a General Staff. Although written before many changes mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act were fully carried out, it causes one to question whether the G-N Act went far enough in empowering the CINCs and the Chairman. Intent of the author's proposals for further reform is to eliminate service parochialism; improve operational advice to civilian decision makers; and better coordinate the fiscal resourcing of our national military strategy. (NWC 4055) (Issued).

Chilcoat, Robert A. and David S. Henderson. "Army Prepositioning Afloat." *Joint Force Quarterly*, Spring 1994, pp. 51-57. Details the Army's response to the Mobility Requirements Study. (NWC 3218) (Issued).

Claude, Inis L. *Collective Security After the Cold War*. Strategic Studies Institute, 1992. Analysis of alternatives for alliance and coalition members' security in post-Cold War environment. (NWC 2046) (Seminar Reserve).

Clodfelter, Mark. *The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam*. New York: Free Press, 1989. Excellent reading on the importance of matching bombing objectives to national policy goals, and the need to ensure Air Force doctrine reflects this in the future. (DS 558.8.C56).

Cohen, William S., Secretary of Defense, *"Annual Report to the President and the Congress 2000*" (NWC 2104) (Issued).

Cooke, Thomas, "The Naked Emperor" (NWC 2052)(Issued). NATO has formally adopted the CTFJ concept but the author debates whether this is rational for an alliance, or even relevant for today's varied operations.

Craft, Douglas W. *An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 31 August 1992. Pages 16 - 19 discuss the relationship between CENTCOM's deliberate plan for the defense of the Arabian peninsula and the crisis action plan that was initiated by General Schwartzkopf. It is interesting to note the demonstrated utility of a deliberate planning effort, even though the OPLAN 1002-90 existed only in draft format when the Iraqis invaded Kuwait. (NWC 4051) (Issued).

Crisis Action Procedures: Tailored Response to Crisis Situations. Operations Directorate (J3) Joint Staff, Washington DC, 20 September 1995. Provides a laydown of Joint Staff crisis action organizations and procedures, and how the Joint Staff interfaces with other agencies in such situations. (NWC 2116) (Issued).

DeGeus, Stan. *Forces/Capabilities Handbook*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000. A guide to the capabilities and organization of U.S. armed forces. (NWC 3153F) (Issued).

Downing, Wayne A. General, USA. USCINCSOC memo to geographic SOC commanders of 9 August 1993, Subj: SOF Mission Criteria. In this short memo, the CINC provides clear, concise guidance on the five criteria and how best to employ SOF. (NWC 3061) (Issued).

Downes, Eric C., and Michael L. Ettore. "The Decline of Mission/The Rise of Intent, The Commander's Estimate Defined." *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 1993., pp. 50-53. (NWC 4085) (Issued).

Dupuy, T. N., Colonel, USA (Ret). *Numbers, Predictions and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles*. Hero Books, Fairfax, VA, 1985 (Library Reserve). This captures many of the force planning issues used in the CES.

Fogelman, Ronald R., General, USAF. "Advantage USA: Air Power and Asymmetric Force Strategy." *Air Power History*, Summer 1996, pp. 6-13. This article by the former Air Force Chief of Staff describes the benefits of using U.S. strengths such as air power, precision guided munitions, and space in an asymmetric strategy. He argues that this approach will ultimately save American lives. (NWC 2022) (Issued).

Franks, Fredrick M., Jr., General USA. "Full Dimension Operations." *Military Review*, December 1993. This article explains some of the factors in the development of the

new FM 100-5 and explains the critical changes from the previous manual. (NWC 3008) (Issued).

Gompert, David, "Assessing the problem—Mind the Gap" (NWC 2057)(Issued). Looks not only at the widening technology gap between the US and her alliance/coalition partners the gap in the approach to military problems. Thought provoking views on Network Centric Warfare add an interesting twist.

Goodman, Glenn W. Jr., "Civil Savvy in Special Ops." *Armed Forces Journal International*, October 1994, p. 68. Brief discussion of the exploits and successes of the Civil Affairs (CA) personnel from the Army's Special Operations Command.

_____, "Part of the Air Force Team—An Interview with Major General James L. Hobson, Jr." *Armed Force Journal International*, July 1997, pp. 44-45. Discussion of USAF special operations capabilities.

_____, "Special Ops Afloat." *Armed Forces Journal International*, April 1995, p. 18. Forward deployed Marines cover the spectrum of crisis missions. (NWC 3053) (Issued).

Grossman, Larry, "A Joint Venture." *Government Executive*, July 1991. An interesting analysis of the impact of the new joint command structure mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act on the conduct of Operation DESERT STORM. Includes comments from the Service chiefs about the impact of dual chains of command—operational and administrative—on the conduct of the war. (NWC 4101) (Issued).

Halsey, Fleet Admiral William F. Jr., "The Battle for Leyte Gulf." *The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings,* September 1997. (NWC 1034A, pp. 387-395). Reprinted from *Proceedings,* May 1952.

Heredia, Michael D., "Building a Campaign: The Essential Elements of Operational Design," School of Advanced Military Studies, FT Leavenworth, KS, May 1995. (NWC 2132) (Issued).

Herrly, Peter F., "The Plight of Joint Doctrine after Kosovo" *Joint Force Quarterly,* Summer 1999. The Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington D.C. (NWC 2103) (Issued).

Holder, L. D., Major General, USA. "Offensive Tactical Operations." *Military Review*, December 1993. Articulates the use of Army forces in offensive operations and explains some of the doctrinal terms used in the new FM 100-5. (NWC 3009) (Issued).

Horner, Charles A., General USAF , "The Air Campaign." *Military Review*, September 1991, pp. 16-26. A view of the Desert Storm "air campaign" from the Commander, U.S. Central Command Air Forces, who served as the Joint Force Air Component Commander during the war. (NWC 3094) (Issued).

Jones, Jeffrey B. and Michael P. Mathews, "PSYOP and the Warfighting CinC." *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1995, pp. 28-33. A PSYOP Group Commander (Airborne) and his deputy discuss the capabilities and appropriate missions of PSYOPS teams.

Krulak, Charles C., "Doctrine for Joint Force Integration" *Joint Force Quarterly,* Winter 1996/97. The institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington DC (NWC 2042) (Issued).

Lovelace, Douglas C., Jr., *Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, August 1996. Assessment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act's major provisions, Congressional motivation underlying the Act, impact on DoD, and recommendations for further achieving the purposes of the original legislation. (NWC 2081A) (Issued).

Lovelace, Douglas C., Jr., and Young, Thomas-Durell, *U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1 September 1995. A thought provoking discussion of the current Joint Strategic Planning System. Raises questions concerning the evaluation & assessment portion of the JSPS. Specifically, this book recommends changes to the Joint Strategy Review that are intended to provide the CJCS with a mid-and long-range strategic planning vision, and increased influence on the preparation of Service POMs.

Loy, James M., "The United States Coast Guard: A Unique Instrument of National Security," *Sea Power,* December 1999, pp. 8-13. (NWC 2078) (Issued).

Loy, James M., "Shaping America's Joint Maritime Forces: The Coast Guard in the 21st Century," *Joint Force Quarterly,* Spring 1998, pp. 9-16. (NWC 2077) (Issued).

Meilinger, Philip S., Colonel, USAF, "The Future of Airpower—Observations of the Past Decade." *The Royal Air Force Air Power Review*, Spring 2000, pp. 48-68. (NWC 2144)(Issued): One of the world's leading air power authors, Col Meilinger succinctly analyzes the impact of the use of air power in the Gulf and the Balkans and postulates its meaning toward future applications.

Mundy, Carl E. Jr., General, USMC, "Reflections on the Corps: Some Thoughts on Expeditionary Warfare." *Marine Corps Gazette*, March 1995, pp. 26-29. The 30th Commandant of the Marine Corps provides a perspective on expeditionary warfare and discusses the major operational challenges it poses for the Navy-Marine Corps team.

NATO Handbook, extracts. Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999. "What is NATO: Core Functions". (NWC 2097) (Issued).

Naumann, Klaus, "NATO's New Military Command Structure." *NATO Review*, Spring 1998, pp. 10-14. A brief description of 1998 NATO command structure revisions. (NWC 2019) (Issued).

Navy League of the United States. *The Almanac of Seapower 2001*. Arlington, VA: Describes Navy and Coast Guard ships, aircraft, and weapon systems. Also presents an overview of USMC organization and capabilities. Offers photos and information on amphibious ships and strategic mobility assets. (Seminar Reserve).

Naylor, Sean D., "Night Stalkers Don't Quit." *Army Times*, July 10, 1995, pp. 12-17. A rare look at the Army's 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne).

Payne, Keith B., "Deterring the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Lessons from History," *Comparative Strategy* (Vol. 14 No. 4, 1995) pp. 347-359. (NWC 3028) (Issued).

Pudas, Terry J., "Preparing Future Coalition Commanders." *Joint Force Quarterly*, Winter 1993-94/Number 3, pp. 40-46. A rehearsal of recognized principles for planning and executing coalition warfare that may benefit future commanders. (NWC 1121) (Issued).

Reimer, Dennis J., "Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement." *Joint Force Quarterly*, Winter 1996/97, pp 13-16. The author addresses the danger of over reliance on precision engagement and unproven "silver bullets" derived from dominant maneuver, two concepts contained in Joint Vision 2010. (NWC 2029) (Issued).

Riggs, Robert E. and Jack C. Plano, "Security Through Collective Action." Chapter 5 extract (pp. 122-131) in *The United Nations International Organization and World Politics*. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1988. A brief description of the theory behind U.N. Collective Security. (NWC 2259) (Seminar Reserve).

Rosenburg, Ralph, "Relative Combat Power." *Military Review*, March 1978. Provides a good discussion about the use of quantitative and qualitative comparisons of opposing forces. Should be read prior to devising measure of effectiveness for comparing enemy capabilities to friendly courses of action. (NWC 4088) (Issued).

Rubel, Robert C., CAPT, USN, "A Guide For Evaluating Campaign Plans," An unpublished article that provides some good ideas on what to look for when analyzing campaign plans. (NWC 4052A) (Issued).

Rubel, Robert C., CAPT., USN, "Naval Operational Concepts," Newport, R.I., August 1998. A summary of operational concepts navies have adopted since the advent of steam power. Concludes with an assessment of "Forward from the Sea: the Navy Operational Concept." (NWC 2004) (Issued).

Russo, J. Edward and Paul J. H. Schoemaker, *"Ddecision Traps: The Ten Barriers to Brilliant Decision-Making and How to Overcome Them,"* Simon and Schuster, New York, 1989.

Shalikashvili, John M., *"Goldwater-Nichols: Ten Years from Now."* The former CJCS evaluates the impact of G. N. Act and makes recommendations for the future of DoD. (NWC 2113) (Issued).

Schmitt, Maj John F., USMCR and Gary Klein, "How We Plan." *Marine Corps Gazzette,* October 1999, pp. 18-26. (NWC 2130) (Issued).

Schneider, Dr. Barry R., "Srategies for Coping with Enemy Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Airpower Journal* (Special Edition 1996) pp. 36-47. (NWC 2068) (Issued).

Shelton, Henry H., "Special Operations Forces: Looking Ahead." *Special Warfare*, Spring 1997, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 2-11. CINCSOC reviews U.S. SOF current capabilities and maps out SOF's future based on evolving global trends and flashpoints. (NWC 3062) (Issued).

Shelton, Henry H., "Coming of Age: Theater Special Operations Commands." *Joint Force Quarterly*. Winter 1996-97, pp. 50-52. CINCSOC discusses the role of the theater special operations commands (SOCEUR, SOCPAC, etc.) in directing SOF missions from peace operations to conflict.

Simon, Herbert A., "Background of Decision Making," *Naval War College Review*, November 1957, pp. 1-24.

Snyder, Frank, and Robert E. Rubel, "The Art of Operational Level Military Planning." Newport, RI: Naval War College,. Examines the military planning process and describes some of the attendant pitfalls. (NWC 4010) (Issued).

Snyder, Thomas J., and Stella T. Smith, "The War in the Persian Gulf," *Air Force Journal of Logistics,* Summer 1998. (NWC 4122) (Issued).

Steinke, Ralph R. and Tarbel, Brian L., "Theater Engagement Plans: A Strategic Tool or a Waste of Time?" 2000 (NWC 2096) (Issued). The authors take a contrary view on TEP. Without a full interagency involvement, TEPs can become simply and administrative drill.

Strasser, Joseph C., "The Role of Naval Forces in Combat." *Naval Forward Presence and the National Military Strategy*. Boston, MA: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1993. Describes the utility of naval forces to the post-Cold War strategy. (NWC 3211) (Issued).

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Stubbs, Bruce B., Captain, USCG, and Truver, Scott C., "America's Coast Guard: Safeguarding U.S. Maritime Safety and Security in the 21st Century," pp. i-iii, 53-81, 131-132, 139-140, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters (G-O), January 2000. A comprehensive look at the ever-changing national and maritime security environment and the increasingly important role the Coast Guard is playing in this dynamic arena. (NWC 2134) (Issued).

"Summary of Major Provisions of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986." Provides an overview of the major provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. (NWC 4022) (Issued).

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Timothy L. Thomas, Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority," *Parameters* (Spring 2000), pp. 13-29. (NWC 2119).

Unified Command Plan, "Extract from the UCP." Issued by the President every two years. Mandated by Title 10, U.S. Code, it establishes the authority and

responsibilities of the unified commanders. Additionally, it delineates the geographic areas of responsibility for the geographic CINCs. (NWC 2021A) (Issued).

Warden, John A. III, Colonel USAF. *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988. The architect for the initial air operation against Iraq in Desert Storm outlines his initial views on employment of air power in this short, easy to read book.

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Yakeley, Jay B. III, and Harold E. Bullock, "Training the Pacific Warriors." *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1996, pp. 16-21. Authors describe how USCINCPAC organizes and trains his joint task forces. (NWC 2018) (Issued).

U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC:

_____CJCSM 3113.01, *Theater Engagement Planning*, Washington, D.C.: 1 Feb 1998 (Issued).

_____, CJCSM 3113.01A, *Theater Engagement Planning*, Washington, D.C.: 31 May 2000 (Issued). This is an update to the annexes of CJCSM 3113.01, providing guidance for the format for a TEP.

_____, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War; Final Report to Congress*, April 1992. 38-57, 83-84, 90-102, 116-150, 224-247 (NWC 1088)(Issued): excerpts of the complete report that serve to illustrate the contributions of aerospace power to the conduct of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

_____, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War; Final Report to Congress*, April 1992. 48-57.

_____, *"Conduct of the Persian Gulf War; Final Report to Congress," Appendix J Special Operations Forces*. April 1992, pp. J-1 to J-28. Provides an unclassified summary of all SOF activities during the Gulf War. (Library Reserve). Also Appendix O "The Role of the Law of War" (NWC 1031) (Seminar Reserve): principal author is Colonel W. Hays Parks, USMC (Ret), Special Assistant for Law of War Matters, Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army. Also "Extracts" of pp. 37-150, 244-340, 410-417, H-18 to H-23, (NWC 1088) (Issued): A good discussion of the situation and planning responses during Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Excellent source for a discussion of U.S. national and military objectives, and C2 concerns. Also pp. K-4 through K-8 (NWC 4029) (Issued): Describes the joint force organizational structure used during the Operations.

_____, *Kosovo/OPERATION Allied Force after Action Report: Report to Congress* (NWC 2103) (Issued).

_____, DOD Directive 5100.1 of 25 September 1987, Subj: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.

_____, HQ U.S. European Command. *JTF Help List*. 7 December 1993. This document provides a planning guide for the CJTF and staff. (Seminar Reserve).

Instructional JSCP. Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 December 1998. An instructional version of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) issued to the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). While excluding some sensitive and highly classified taskings, it provides excellent insight into how the CJCS translates the dictates of the SecDef's Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) into specific deliberate planning tasks for the combatant commanders. Included are discussions concerning adaptive planning, apportionment of forces, and strategic lift. (NWC 1-99 SECRET/NOFORN) (Classified Issue).

_____, Reserve Forces Policy Board, Washington, D.C., 2000. *Reserve Component Programs: FY 2000 Report*. The annual report from SecDef to the President as required by Title X USC 113 (c) (3). (Seminar Reserve).

_____, Joint Pub 0-2. *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Washington, D.C.: January 1996. A "capstone" joint doctrine publication that establishes the principles, guidelines, and conceptual framework for the exercise of authority by commanders of the combatant commands and other commanders. Addresses the principles governing unified direction of forces, the functions of DOD and its major components, the functions of combatant commands, and command relationships. A must read for those who want to understand how U.S. military forces are organized in peace and war. Included is the former USMC/USAF Omnibus Agreement incorporated into joint doctrine. (Issued).

_____, Joint Pub 1. *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*. Washington, D.C.: 10 January 1995. A "capstone" joint doctrine publication. Discusses why we fight, the nature of modern war, and how our current doctrinal concepts relate to examples from past joint operations. (Issued).

_____, Joint Pub 2-0. *Doctrine For Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*. Washington, 9 March 2000. The basic doctrinal publication on intelligence support. (Issued).

_____, Joint Pub 2-01. *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations*. Washington, DC: 20 November 1996. Implementation of the basics in Joint Pub 2-0.

_____, Joint Pub 3-0. *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Washington, D.C.: 1 February 1995. An excellent overview of doctrinal considerations in the planning and employment of joint and multinational forces. (Issued).

_____, Joint Pub 3-01.1, *Aerospace Defense of North America*. 4 November 1996.

_____, Joint Pub 3-01.4, *JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD)*. 25 July 1995.

_____, Joint Pub 3-01.5, *Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense*, 22 February 1996. (Issued).

_____, Joint Pub 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*. Washington, D.C.: 8 October 1992, Chapters 1 and 2. This is the basic doctrinal publication for amphibious warfare. (Seminar Reserve).

_____, Joint Pub 3-04, *Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations (AIR).* Washington, D.C.: 31 July 1991. Addresses how joint air power should be applied in support of maritime operations. (Seminar Reserve).

_____, Joint Pub 3-05. *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*. Washington, D.C.: 17 April 1998. Describes special operations missions, forces, characteristics, and capabilities across the operational continuum. (Issued).

_____, Joint Pub 3-05.3. *Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures*. Washington, D.C.: 25 August 1993. Provides doctrine to govern joint activities and performance in joint operations, multinational, and interagency operations. (Issued).

_____, Joint Pub 3-05.5. *Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures*. 10 August 1993. Provides guidance and doctrine on the targeting procedures for special operations in a joint force. (Issued).

_____, Joint Pub 3-09, Fire Support: Doctrine that covers control and execution of joint fires, particularly in the deep battle. Controversial nature of the document led to a long coordination time prior to fielding, which eventually occurred without full USAF approval (Seminar Reserve).

_____, Joint Pub 3-09.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS).* 1 December 1995.

_____, Joint Pub 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical* (NBC) Defense (July 2000) (Issued).

_____, Joint Pub 3-16. Extracts from *Joint Doctrine for Multi-National Operations* (final coord draft).5 April 2000. pp. I-9 to I-12 & II-6 to II-15.

_____, Joint Pub 3-17. *JTTP for Theater Airlift Operations*, 18 July 1995. This pub describes theater airlift operations and covers responsibilities/procedures for the movement, command and control of airlift assets.

_____,Joint Pub 3-35. *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations.* Washington, D.C.: 7 September 1999. Describes the transportation system, including deployment, sustainment, and redeployment operations. (Issued).

_____, Joint Pub 3-53. *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*. Washington, D.C.: 10 July 1996. Publication provides guidance for planning joint psychological operations. (Seminar Reserve).

_____, Joint Pub 3-56.1. *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*. Washington, D.C.: 14 November 1994. Joint doctrine for command and control of joint air operations. Includes planning considerations, targeting, tasking guidance. Document contains the joint doctrinal foundation for the JFACC concept. (NWC 2125) (Issued).

_____, Joint Pub 4-0. *Doctrine For Logistics Support of Joint Operations*. Washington, D.C.: April 2000. (Issued).

_____, Joint Pub 5-0. *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*. Washington, D.C.: 13 April 1995. Presents the doctrinal foundation for planning the employment of joint forces. Excellent discussion of the relationship between the NCA and the JPEC. Outlines responsibilities, principles, concepts, and the integrated national process through which planning for joint operations is accomplished. Emphasizes the mechanisms that give strategic direction to joint operation planning, and integrate the appropriate functions of the Military Departments and Services. Provides a good overview of both JOPES process and the Joint Strategic Planning System. (Issued).

_____, Joint Pub 5-00.1 JTTP for Joint Campaign Planning (Third Draft) Washington DC: 1 Feb 2000 (extract). (NWC 2109) (Issued). Provides a draft view of the characteristics of a campaign plan.

_____, Joint Pub 5-00.2. *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*. Washington, D.C.:13 January 1999. Guidelines to forming, staffing, and employing a joint task force for short-notice contingency operations. The appendices provide specific staff guidance and a series of checklists to assist forming headquarters and crystallizing primary staff functions. (Seminar Reserve).

_____, Joint Pub 5-03.1, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol 1 (Planning, Policies, and Procedures) Washington DC: 4 August, 1993 (Issued).

_____, CJCSM 3122.03A. *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Vol. I (Planning, Policies and Procedures).* Washington, D.C.: 14 July 2000. Provides an overview of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and its use in the joint planning process. It describes how the basic deliberate planning process is adapted and employed to plan and execute joint operations in crisis situations. (Seminar Reserve).

_____, Joint Pub 6-0. *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C^4) Systems Support to Joint Operations*. Washington, D.C.: 30 May 1995. Overall joint guidance for C4I. (Issued).

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Secretariat, Historical Division, *A Concise History of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1942-1979*. This document traces the history of the JCS from World War II to 1979. Provides an excellent discussion of the origin of JCS. (UA 23.7.C663, 1980).

Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation on the use of U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in support of the National Military Strategy, October 3, 1995. (NWC 2138) (Issued).

_____, The Joint Staff. *User's Guide for Joint Operation Planning*. Washington, D.C.: 11 September 1994. Quick overview of campaign planning principles, the deliberate and crisis action planning processes, and how deliberate plans are reviewed and approved. (NWC 2086) (Issued).

Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After Action Report (Department of Defense, 31 Jan 2000) (Issued).

_____, *User's Guide for JOPES (Joint Operation Planning and Execution System).* Washington, D.C.: 1 May 1995. A good, quick overview of the JOPES process and associated ADP support. (NWC 2089) (Issued).

USTRANSCOM Handbook 24-2, *Understanding the Defense Transportation System,* 2nd Edition, Scott AFB, IL: 1 October 1998. (NWC 4009) (Issued).

U.S. Air Force

_____, AFDD-1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, September 1997 (Issued).

U.S. Department of the Air Force, *America's Air Force Vision 2020* (NWC 2140) (Issued)

U.S. Army

_____, FM 100-5, *Operations*. Washington, D.C.: HQ, Department of the Army, 14 June 1993. This is the keystone doctrinal manual for the United States Army. It addresses the doctrine on how the Army intends to fight in both war and operations other than war. (Issued).

_____, FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces*. Washington, DC: HQ, Department of the Army. Discusses role of SOF in peacetime engagement and application of Principles of War to Special Operations. Also discusses Special Operations imperatives, and how examining these imperatives and the Principles of War might explain failure of the raid to free hostages in Iran in 1980. (NWC 3010) (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Coast Guard

_____, Commandant Instruction M3000.3A (COMDTINST M3000.3A), *Coast Guard Capabilities Manual, (CAPMAN).* This manual describes Coast Guard capabilities for readers inside and outside the Coast Guard. It also establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for Coast Guard participation in the Department of Defense deliberate planning and deployment systems. (Library Reserve).

U.S. Marine Corps

_____, MCDP 1, *Warfighting*. 6 March 1989. (Chapter 4, "The Conduct of War"). This is the basic doctrine manual for the USMC. (NWC 2006) (Issued).

_____, MCDP 3, *Expeditionary Operations*. 16 April 1998. Chapters 3 and 4, pp 61-94. Marine Corps doctrine for the conduct of military operations. (NWC 2008) (Issued).

_____, U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 5, *Planning*, Quantico, VA. July 1997.

_____, U.S. Marine Corps, MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process.* Quantico, VA. January 2000.

_____, FMFMRP 2-12, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A Global Capability*. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy. Overview of USMC organization for combat. NOTE: Be aware that some of the information contained in this reference has been overcome by force structure decisions, (i.e., Marine Expeditionary

Brigades (MEBs) no longer exist as standing MAGTFs). Don't be daunted by the number of pages. Familiarize yourself with the various MAGTFs and their notional organization. This pub should be skimmed. (NWC 3057) (Issued).

_____, *Operational Maneuver from the Sea,* January 1996. Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Washington D.C. The White Paper outlining the Marine Corps vision and operational concept of how it will fight. (NWC 3022) (Issued).

_____, "Seabased Logistics: A 21st Century Warfighting Concept." 12 May 1998. Marine Corps Combat Development Command and Naval Doctrine Command jointly issued concept paper in support of *Forward . . . from the Sea*, and *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*. (NWC 2009) (Issued).

_____, "Ship-To-Objective Maneuver." 25 July 1997. Marine Corps Combat Development Command concept paper in support of *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*. Focuses at the tactical level of war and describes how we can leverage the advantages of emerging technologies to develop greater capabilities for our amphibious operations. (NWC 2011) (Issued).

_____, "MPF 2010 and Beyond." 30 December 1997. Marine Corps Combat Development Command concept paper in support of *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*. A concept for the conduct of Maritime Prepositioning Operations in the 21st century. (NWC 2013) (Issued).

U.S. Navy

_____, *. . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*. September 1992. Sets out new direction for U.S. naval forces. (NWC 3125) (Issued).

_____, *Forward . . . From the Sea*. September 1994. Expands and updates . . . *From the Sea*. (NWC 3236) (Issued).

_____, *Forward . . . From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept*. March 1997. Detailed discussion of naval operations appropriate to implementing the strategic blueprint. (NWC 2028) (Issued).

_____, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, NDP-1, *Naval Warfare*. Norfolk, VA.: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, March 1994. First in a series of six documents intended to translate maritime strategy into doctrinal reality. (Issued).

_____, Naval Doctrine Publication 2, NDP-2, *Naval Intelligence*. Norfolk, VA: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, 1994. Capstone doctrinal statement applicable to naval service operations. (Seminar Reserve).

_____, Naval Doctrine Publication 4, NDP-4, *Naval Logistics*, Norfolk, VA.: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, 1995. The key doctrinal document relating to naval logistics matters. (Seminar Reserve).

_____, Naval Doctrine Publication 5, NDP-5, *Naval Planning*. Norfolk, VA.: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, 1996. Capstone document for relating national operational planning efforts to those of the naval components. Discusses how the service specific planning and execution systems of the two Naval Service

components are applied to execute operations in support of national military objectives. (Seminar Reserve).

_____, Naval Doctrine Publication 6, NDP-6, *Naval Command and Control*. Norfolk, VA.: U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, 1996. Fundamental naval service C2 doctrine. (Seminar Reserve).

_____, Naval Warfare Publication 5-01, *Naval Operational Planning (Rev. A)* Naval Warfare Development Center, Newport RI, May 1998 (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College,

_____, U.S. Naval War College, A Borneo Case Study for Expedtionary Warfare," August 2000 (NWC 2095) (Issued).

_____, "*CES Concepts - the Decision to go North: What Halsey Knew on 24 October 1944,"* Newport RI, December 2000. (NWC 2147) (Issued).

"GRANITE—Central Pacific Campaign." (NWC 2030) (Issued). A review of the strategic situation that influenced the development of GRANITE. Also reviews the plan itself, and includes a copy of the original outline plan.

_____, "Husky-Sicily Campaign." (NWC 2026) (Issued). A review of the strategic situation that influenced the development of HUSKY. Also Reviews the plan and aftermath.

C4ISR and Information Operations in Kosovo (1999) 2000 (NWC 02-01) (S/NF) (Obtain from Pubs, Conolly Hall basement or the Intelligence Division, Sims Hall).

_____, "Commander's Estimate of the Situation: Worksheet for In-Class Work and War Gaming." Newport, RI: September 1998. Worksheet provides guidance on the step by step procedures to develop a CES. (NWC 4111C) (Issued).

_____, "Directives." Newport, RI: January 1996. Article covers the background and importance of writing operational directives. (NWC 4069) (Issued).

_____, "Extract from PACOM's Theater Engagement Plan." SECRET/NOFORN. (NWC 01-01) (Classified Issue—issued in class). Provides an insight into PACOM's current TEP as an example of the detailed thought process required for theater engagement.

_____, "Extract from Joint Pub 5-00.1, "JTTP for Joint Campaign Planning (Third Draft)." Feb 2000. (NWC 2019) (Issued).

_____, "Guidance for Operational Sequencing." September 1998. (NWC 1008) (Issued).

_____, "Guidance for Operational Synchronization." September 1998. (NWC 1009) (Issued).

_____, "Guidance for Writing a Directive." Newport, RI: January 1996. Guidance, factors, and considerations for directive preparation. (NWC 4067) (Issued).

_____, "Operational Functions." (NWC 4103A) (Issued).

"Force Capabilities Vignettes Package" 2000 (NWC 2073A) (Issued). Provides three hypothetical vignettes for force employment considerations.

"Weapons of Mass Destruction: Considerations for the Operational Commander, 2000." (NWC 2115) (Issued).

"U.S. Special Operations Command History." The third addition of USSOCOM history covering SOP history from 1980 to present. A concise summary of SOP operations and units. (Seminar Reserve)

_____, Pub 1: *Special Operations in Peace and War*. 25 January 1996. Introductory overview of the fundamental principles which guide SOF. Intended to provide special operators and potential joint force commanders (and their staffs) with a framework for proper SOF employment. (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, 2000. MacDill AFB, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command. Provides description and discussion of the role, missions, organization, and current operations of SOF. Also offers numerous examples of how SOF are currently employed in the various theaters. Provides description of equipment, budget, force structure, and programs. (Issued).

_____, Strategic Mmobility and Sealift in Support of Mmaritime Operations. (NWC 4008) (Issued).

_____, Strategic Mobility Planning Scenario. Provides basic information about mobility planning for an operation. Includes a manual method of determining strategic lift requirements. (NWC 2105) (Issued).

Vego, Milan, "Force Deployment in U.S. Joint Doctrine and Practice, April 1998. Provides a review of some of the deployment operations required in support of Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning.

Vego, Milan, The Leyte Operation: A Book of Readings, September 1997 (**NWC 1034A**) (Issued).

Seminar #_____
CNW/NCC 2001 JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS COURSE

CRITIQUE OF BLOCK TWO: MILITARY ORGANIZATION & PLANNING CONCEPTS

The overall objective of Block Two was to afford you a basic understanding of, and ability to apply, a formal planning and decision making process (and associated principles) in the proper employment of forces (selection, allocation, and tasking) to accomplish assigned missions in joint operating environments. This critique solicits your opinions, while the experience is still fresh in mind, of how successful Block Two sessions were in achieving this objective, and to ask for your suggestions on improving Block Two for the future. The best recommendations for improvement almost always come from students. Please take the time to give us your thoughts.

INSTRUCTIONS: For each question, excepting those which request only a written answer, circle the scale number which best describes your degree of agreement or disagreement with the statement above the scale. Space has been provided beneath each scale item for you to provide written comments. These comments are optional but would be of significant assistance to course improvement, particularly if you disagree with a positive statement or agree with a negative statement. If insufficient space has been provided for your written comments, continue on a loose-leaf page and attach it to this critique. You may use pen or pencil to complete the critique.

1. Block Two was successful in providing me with a basic understanding of the U.S. military organization and service components, and the U.S. military planning process.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

2. Block Two was successful in providing me with a basic ability to apply a formal planning process to the accomplishment of assigned missions.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

3. Block Two was successful in relating Block Two material to the Operational Art framework and components covered in Block I.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

4. Block Two maximized my learning through an appropriate mix of faculty-moderated sessions, student-moderated sessions, Spruance lectures, and practical problem-solving sessions.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

_____

5. Evaluate each of the following sessions on its value to you in allowing you to understand the steps involved in the formal planning and decision making processes, the employment of forces, and how to accomplish joint missions. (Use the following scale: 1 = Low Value, 7 = High Value.) *DO NOT RANK ORDER THE SESSIONS—ASSIGN A NUMERICAL VALUE FROM 1-7 FOR EACH SESSION*

_____OPS II-1 National Military Organization

_____OPS II-2 Weapons of Mass Destruction Considerations

_____OPS II-3 U.S. Maritime Forces (Navy and Marine Corps) Doctrine and Capabilities

_____OPS II-4 U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities

_____OPS II-5 U.S. Army Doctrine and Capabilities

_____OPS II-6 U.S. Air Force Doctrine and Capabilities

_____OPS II-7 Special Operations Forces

_____OPS II-8 Strategic Mobility

_____OPS II-9 Alliance and Coalition Considerations

_____OPS II-10 Joint Warfare Considerations

_____OPS II-11 C4ISR and Information Operations

_____OPS II-12 Joint Service Capabilities Vignettes

_____OPS II-13 Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES)

_____OPS II-14 Theatre Planning

_____OPS II-15 Plans, Orders, and Planning

_____OPS II-16 The Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) Concepts

_____OPS II-17 PACIFIC TEAK Crisis Planning Exercise

6. The sessions of Block Two were in the proper sequence to maximize my understanding of the material presented.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

_____

7. The Block Two sessions on C4ISR and Information Operations and Strategic Mobility provided me with sufficient basic information on these foundational supporting systems.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

_____

8. A sufficient amount of time was allocated to the concept and application of the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (Sessions II-16 and II-17).

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

_____

9. Are there specific readings you believe should be deleted from, or replaced in, any of the Block Two sessions? If so, please list below those readings by NWC number, author, and title.

_____
_____
_____
_____

10. Are there any concepts and/or readings you believe should be added to Block II? If so, please list them below.

_____
_____
_____
_____

11. Do you believe that the Military Organization and Planning Concepts block of instruction provided a worthwhile contribution to your overall professional military education? Please feel free to elaborate on your YES or NO answer.

_____
_____
_____
_____

12. In addition to my responses to the above, I also want to provide the following opinions concerning Block Two:

_____
_____
_____
_____

Block Three
Military Operations Other Than War

Listing of Military Operations Other Than War Sessions 183
Introduction to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) 184
OPS-III-1 Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) (Lecture) 185
OPS-III-2 The Interagency Process (Seminar) 187
OPS-III-3 Combating Terrorism (Seminar) 191
OPS-III-4 Planning for Post-conflict Operations (Seminar) 193
OPS-III-5 Foreign Internal Defense (Lecture) 196
OPS-III-6 Failed States (Seminar) 198
OPS-III-7 Foreign Internal Defense: Case Study (Seminar) 200
OPS-III-8 Peace Operations (Lecture) 202
OPS-III-9 Peace Operations—Case Studies (Seminar) 204
OPS-III-10 Operation CONDOR RESCUE (Seminar) 207
Block Three Bibliography 210
Block Three Critique 217

BLOCK THREE

INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

A. Focus:

This portion of the JMO Course focuses on the lower end of the range of military operations. The tools provided will assist you to develop your skills in an area of military activity likely to occupy your talents and efforts to a larger degree. Upon completion of Block Three, you should be comfortable in a role that requires you to translate strategic goals into feasible military objectives for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

B. Objectives:

- Understand joint and multinational operations in support of the National Military Strategy (NMS) at the lower end of the range of military operations.
- **PJE**—Demonstrate a grasp of force capabilities and limitations in MOOTW.
- Apply joint doctrine to MOOTW.
- Understand the effect of political factors on the selection of military objectives.
- **PJE**—Translate political objectives into military objectives for MOOTW.
- Analyze the reasons for the success or failure of selected MOOTW cases.
- Apply the Principles of War to MOOTW.
- Apply MOOTW to an interagency exercise.

C. Guidance:

Military officers focus their careers on mastering the application of combat power. Not surprisingly, the Services focus on training and education on the high end of the operational continuum or range of military operations. This block of instruction provides you an opportunity to sharpen your skills in a generally less familiar environment. You will focus on the lower end of the violence curve in order to develop an understanding of MOOTW and to delve into the interagency, regional, diplomatic and other less obvious applications of military power used to achieve national objectives short of war.

Block Three is designed to provide you with the tools, concepts, principles and doctrine (including interagency issues) required for the tasks to follow. During this block you will examine a number of MOOTW situations including insurgency and peacekeeping operations. You will also be required you to translate National Command Authorities' guidance into a Theater Commander's Strategic Plan to support an Ally under seige.

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (Lecture)

A. Focus:

This session introduces the array of military operations loosely described as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Understand the range of military operations.
- Understand the various types of operations short of war that the armed forces may be called upon to conduct in pursuit of national objectives.
- Understand and apply the Principles of War that have been adapted to MOOTW.
- **PJE**—Apply the elements of operational art to MOOTW.

C. Background:

Current doctrine describes MOOTW as a "wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale operations usually associated with war." (Joint Pub 3-0, p. V-1). Those activities include such actions as: Presence; Coercive Diplomacy; Security Assistance; Insurgency/Counterinsurgency; Humanitarian Assistance; Combating Terrorism; Peace Operations; Peacetime Contingencies; Counterdrug Operations; and Support of U.S. Civil Authorities.

This session consists of a lecture by Professor John Waghelstein in which various categories of MOOTW and the Principles for Joint Operations in MOOTW are examined. Subsequent Block Three sessions will delve more deeply into various types of MOOTW.

Point of Contact for this session is Professor J. D. Waghelstein, C-421.

D. Questions:

Are MOOTW a new mission?

The American view is to distinguish between war and all that other unpleasantness. How useful is the distinction?

How do political objectives differ in MOOTW from those in "traditional" large-scale conflicts?

What effects do political objectives have on the selection of military objectives?

What is meant by "a more fragile battlefield" in the MOOTW environment?

Is there really a difference between the Principles of War and Principles of Military Operations Other Than War?

Is there a substantive difference in training for war and for MOOTW?

Is there a valid argument for a different set of principles to deal with MOOTW?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-07, *MOOTW,* Chapters I-IV and Glossary. (Issued).

Fishel, John T., "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, The GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night." (**NWC 3077**) (Issued).

NPD-1, *Naval Warfare*...pp. 21-23. (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

White, "Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare." (**NWC 3060**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-07.2, *Antiterrorism,* Chapter I. (Seminar Reserve).

Joint Pub 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations,* Chapter I. (Seminar Reserve).

Murl D. Munger and William W. Mendel, *Campaign Planning and the Drug War*. (Seminar Reserve).

G. Supplementary Readings:

None.

THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS (Seminar)

"Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political and/ or diplomatic, and informational entities of the U.S. Government (USG) as well as nongovernmental agencies. The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint planners consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective. Success in operations will depend, to a large extent, on the ability to blend and engage all elements of national power effectively."

Joint Pub 3-08

A. Focus:

Modern military operations require the proper application of all elements of national power, yet commanders frequently state that interagency coordination is one of their biggest challenges. With this thought in mind, students must understand the key principles associated with the interagency process (both in Washington and abroad) in order to enhance the prospects for success during joint operations. This session will address: joint doctrine for interagency coordination, Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), the basic roles and authorities vested in a U.S. Ambassador and country team, and with the concepts associated with Security Assistance.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the impact of interagency coordination on strategic, operational and tactical military activities.
- Comprehend the interagency coordination process and the impact of Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56).
- Understand the role of the U.S. Ambassador and the organization and functions of a Country Team in U.S. embassies abroad as they may impact on military planning.
- **PJE—**Comprehend current joint doctrine with respect to the interagency coordination process as described in Joint Pub 3-08, Volumes I and II.
- **PJE—**Examine Security Assistance (SA) concepts, terminology, and programs and analyze how SA functions overseas at the operational level of war.
- **PJE—**Analyze the kinds of resources available for military operations from other government agencies, from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and from private volunteer organizations (PVOs); and apply this understanding to current operational requirements.

C. Background:

Military commanders need to understand how military advice is formulated at the strategic level through the Washington interagency process and how government agencies contribute to the successful prosecution of the modern joint campaign.

Key to success at the operational level is the relationship between affected U.S. Ambassadors, the theater commander and their staffs. Modern operations also require a practical understanding of methods for developing unity of effort among the large number of supra-national organizations (the United Nations and regional bodies such as the Organization of American States), government agencies and even non-governmental agencies (including PVOs) that may be operating within the battlespace. PDD-56 is the Clinton Administration's policy to develop unity of effort for complex contingency operations. Understanding these principles will assist the students in coordinating across the full spectrum of military operations.

A key to this session is knowledge of the range of resources available to military commanders and recent lessons learned in developing successful coordination. NGOs (including —PVOs) often have links with local populations unreachable in any other way. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) acts as the lead federal agency for foreign disaster assistance. There are many circumstances when the Department of State, in the person of the in-country ambassador (the President's direct representative), is the lead agency for dealing with a situation. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) can provide a range of information relevant to both military and political success, either via the in-country Chief of Station, via the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) representative to the CINC, or (along with other members of the intelligence community) as part of a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST).

Apart from civilian resources, the military commander has military assets particularly well suited to accomplishing MOOTW tasks. For example, civil affairs units and SOF are useful both in their "traditional" roles and as liaison officers between the military and external agencies or other military forces. In the latter case, liaison officers have been effective in establishing and maintaining unity of effort in a multilateral environment. The civil-military operations center (CMOC) is a proven method of improving coordination during operations.

Security Assistance (SA) applies across the conflict continuum. SA programs often attempt to address the root-causes of the problems facing a nation by helping in the development of host nation internal defense and development plans. Although SA is the responsibility of the State Department, DoD is the executive agent for a number of SA programs. DoD executes its SA mission through an array of organizations operating in CONUS. Within a host nation, the responsibilities of SA are carried out by organizations within the local U.S. mission which go by a variety of titles, e.g., Military Assistance and Advisory Groups (MAAGs) and Military Groups (MilGps). At the Unified Command level, the CINCs provide the means for SA organizations to render that support and provide regional coordination.

The point of contact for this session is Professor J. R. Ballard, C-411.

D. Questions:

What do we mean by "interagency coordination" and why is it important?

Describe the characteristics of the interagency working environment.

What is PDD-56? What role does it play in the interagency management of complex contingency operations?

How does the interagency process function in Washington? What do we mean by the term "lead agency"?

How does the NSC system work; what are the roles played by Interagency Working Groups (IWGs)?

What is the responsibility of the U.S. Ambassador in terms of interagency coordination?

Why might the operational commander be concerned with the interagency process and non-DoD resources?

Provide examples of non-governmental agencies (NGOs), private volunteer organizations (PVOs), and regional and international organizations that may play roles within the modern battlespace.

How may we organize best for success for interagency operations at the operational level?

What are some organizational tools JTFs may employ to enhance prospects for success in interagency operations?

What do we mean by the term "Security Assistance"? Who supervises SA? Who administers SA?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Cooperation during Joint Operations*, Vol. I, Chapters I-III). (Issued).

PDD-56, *National Security Council White Paper on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*. (**NWC 3072**) (Issued).

Raach & Kass, "National Power and the Interagency Process." *Joint Force Quarterly*. (**NWC 2044**) (Issued).

Clinton, William J., "President's Letter to Ambassadors." (**NWC 2106**) (Issued).

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM). *The Management of Security Assistance*. Chapter Two. (**NWC 2016**) (Issued).

Joint Warfighting Center, *JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, 16 July 1997, pp. i-v, I-6 to I-12 (Sect.5), II-1 to II-11. (Issued).

Simmons, "Executing Foreign Policy Through the Country Team Concept." (**NWC 2010**) (Issued).

National Defense University, Extracts on Security Assistance from Strategic Assessment 1996, pp. 97-102, 107, 52-56. (**NWC 3050**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Cooperation during Joint Operations*, Vol. II. (Issued).

Dearfield, Mark, "The CJTF and NGOs—One Team, One Mission?" (**NWC 3006**) (Issued).

Sorenson, Robert "Operational Leadership Challenges in Emergency Humanitarian Assistance Operations," unpublished student paper, Naval War College, June 1997. (**NWC 3085**) (Issued).

Fishel, "War's End: A Strategic Concept for Post-Conflict Operations." (**NWC 2007**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Bentley, David, "Operation Sea Signal: U.S. Military Support for Caribbean Migration Emergencies, May 1994 to February 1996," *Strategic Forum*, No. 73, May 1996.

COMBATING TERRORISM

"US forces will act unilaterally and in concert with security partners, using all means authorized by the President and the Congress to counter international terrorism at home and abroad."

National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1997

A. Focus:

This session focuses on the role of the operational commander with respect to the challenges and complexities of combating terrorism. Students should understand the respective roles of the DoD organizations and other federal agencies—the interagency approach—to combating terrorism. Additionally, this session will examine the emergent role of DoD forces in the support of combating *domestic* terrorism.

B. Objectives:

- Understand U.S. national policy and general objectives with regard to combating terrorism.
- **PJE**—Understand how to formulate national security direction and strategic endstate, in terms of the instruments of national power, so the combatant commanders can determine the military endstate to achieve the national security objectives.
- Understand the role of the lead agencies in combating terrorism.
- Understand the relevant issues of international and domestic law regarding combating terrorism.
- **PJE**—Understand the historical basis for the current U.S. Defense Establishment; its structure, policies, and strategies.
- **PJE**—Understand how the NCA performs its crisis action role of coordinating U.S. Interagency and multinational participation in support of a crisis situation.
- **PJE**—Translate national security objectives, guidance and strategic endstate into national military objectives, guidance, and endstate.

C. Background:

Combating terrorism encompasses two activities: counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism. Counter-terrorism activities within the U.S. military are the purview of USSOCOM and as such are highly specialized, resource-intensive missions. Anti-terrorism activities represent an integrated, comprehensive, approach within combatant commands and the Services to counter the terrorist threat to military installations, bases, facilities, equipment, and personnel.

In today's environment of MOOTW and asymmetric warfare, a military commander must be cognizant of the political and military objectives of terrorism and the consequent threat posed to his operations and the protection of his forces and

facilities. The trend in terrorism is a movement from state sponsored terrorist organizations to networks of international terrorists. The lack of political sponsorship and funding has caused terrorists to seek financial support from criminal organizations more often symbiotic than sympathetic to their radical religious and ideological convictions. The United States' efforts in combating terrorism over the past 20 years have been largely successful. However, terrorism will remain a "continuation of war by other means" and the tactics of terrorism will, while continuing in the traditional vein of bombing and murder, most certainly evolve to the employment of weapons of mass destruction and "cyber-terrorism" against America's people and interests abroad and at home. The principal objective of this session is raise the student's awareness of terrorism and the challenges combating terrorism present the joint force commander.

Point of contact for this session is Captain P. T. Toohey, U.S. Navy, C-407

D. Questions:

Who are the lead U.S. Agencies for combating terrorism within the United States? OCONUS?

What distinguishes terrorism from the legitimate use of force by nations or groups?

What are the Joint Force Commander's responsibilities regarding combating terrorism?

What is the military's role in combating terrorism within the United States? What are the attendant legal considerations?

What impact will "Warfare in the Information Age" have on the United States' capacity to combat terrorism?

How might terrorists leverage the "Warfare in the Information Age" to their advantage?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-07.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism,* Chapter I-III (Joint Electronic Library, CD-ROM) (Seminar Reserve).

U.S. Department of the Army, Judge Advocate General's School. *Operational Law Handbook, 2001*. Chapter 24. (Issued).

Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999. Department of State. April 2000, pp. iii-ix. (Issued).

Martin, David C. and Walcott, John. "A Most Ridiculous Thing," and "El Dorado Canyon," Chapters 9 and 10 in *Best Laid Plans: The Inside War Against Terrorism*. (**NWC 2027**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Current History April 2000, Vol. 99, NO. 636. (Seminar Reserve).

G. Supplementary Readings:

None.

PLANNING FOR POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS (Seminar)

A. Focus:

In this session we focus on the planning for the post-conflict (or post-hostilities) operations which follow the use of military force. Having briefly examined the difficulties of the interagency process and the combating of terrorism, we now examine the special challenges to the military commander of planning for what comes "after the shooting stops."

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Understand how the NCA perform their crisis action role of coordinating U.S. interagency and multinational participation in support of a crisis situation.
- **PJE**—Translate national security objectives, guidance, and the desired endstate into national military objectives, guidance, and endstate.
- **PJE**—Understand the impact of political, economic, and information factors on the selection of national military objectives.

C. Background:

Although we have witnessed many examples of MOOTW which are of a supportive nature (disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, etc.), others may be coercive in nature (raids, NEOs, etc.), involving the use of force. The problem of how to achieve U.S. objectives in an unclear and often undefined situation affects the response of the regional CINC and the JTF commander. This is especially so when the U.S. must "go it alone." Further, it is a reality that the NCA and JCS are often more than passive observers in these types of operations, and may on occasion be dominant players. The prudent course, therefore, is for the joint staff officer to have an awareness of the dynamics at the national level that may have an impact on the operational commander.

Although one might wish that another agency (like State) would assume the role of "campaign planner" for the period *following* hostilities, the lead role has in the past—more often than not—initially fallen to the military. Joint doctrine, therefore, includes the basic elements of "post-conflict activities" and the essential planning involved for them. Not surprisingly, however, the CINC's planners are often inclined to emphasize the planning for hostilities over the need to look at how stability is restored "when the shooting stops." Such was the case in Panama in 1989 and 1990. Much can be gained by examining what went right and what went wrong in this first post-Goldwater-Nichols use of military force.

In early 1989 President George Bush was facing a dilemma in Panama. He had, during his victorious campaign for president, argued for a tough stand against General Manuel Noriega. Despite economic, political and diplomatic efforts, Noriega not only remained in control, but increasingly challenged U.S. policy in the region. By the fall of 1989, as General Colin Powell assumed the position of CJCS and a new CINC took over U.S. Southern Command with its headquarters still at Quarry

Heights in Panama, the situation had reached the crisis stage. American lives and interests, the integrity of the Panama Canal, the quest of the Panamanian people for democracy, and the U.S. fight against illegal drug trafficking all were being threatened by the Noriega regime.

During this session, we will look briefly at the nature of the crisis and the planning that was done to resolve it. Attention will focus, however, on the way the U.S. dealt with the post-hostilities challenges in Panama. The time devoted to analysis of these two phases, JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY, will offer opportunities to see historic "illustrations" of "theory and doctrine" we have studied throughout the trimester: the Principles of War, the Principles of MOOTW, the challenges of interagency planning, and the selection of DoD assets during operational planning. Few examples of military planning in recent history better illustrate the crucial need for timely, thorough planning for what comes after the cessation of hostilities.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. F. Chandler, C-425.

D. Questions:

In defining the breadth of operational options at the CINC's disposal in MOOTW, which specific actions would best complement the economic and diplomatic FDOs being employed?

As a theater CINC witnesses the progressive failure of economic and political measures being taken by the President to deter military conflict, to what extent can he and should he proceed with plans for dealing with the ultimate failure?

In planning for post-hostilities operations what agencies are available to assist? Which can you turn to for optimizing planning? From the vantage point of the operational commander, what are the "pros and cons" of interagency involvement?

When the helm is finally turned over to a non-DoD agency, how can *military* assets best be used to support interagency efforts in assisting a democratic government?

E. Required Readings:

Shultz, Richard H. Jr. "In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause," Air University Press, 1993, pp. 1-65. (**NWC 2175A**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Donnelly, Thomas, Margaret Roth and Caleb Baker, *"Operation Just Cause: the Storming of Panama,"* Lexington Books, 1991, pp. 20-35; 57-69; 70-87. (Seminar Reserve).

Woodward, Bob, *"The Commanders,"* Simon & Schuster, 1991, pp. 82-196. (**NWC 3058**) (Issued).

Joint History Office (Cole, Ronald H.), *Operation Just Cause—The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama—February 1988—January 1990.* Washington D.C.: November 1995. (Seminar Reserve).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Joint Pub 3-07, MOOTW, Chapter IV. (Issued).

Terry, James P. "The Panama Intervention: Law in Support of Policy," *Naval Law Review,* Volume 39, 1990.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID): (Lecture)

A. Focus:

This session analyzes insurgency and the techniques for countering the threat.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate US military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.

C. Background:

U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine approaches the problem of insurgency by focusing on both the causes and the symptoms of the malady. The approach uses varying mixes of Balanced Development, Mobilization, and Neutralization in assisting nations besieged by insurgent forces.

This session consists of a lecture by Professor John Waghelstein, which examines the recent evolution of revolutionary methodology and techniques from the insurgents' perspective. Leninist, Maoist, and Cuban models together with their latest mutations will be examined. Additionally, the lecture will examine counterinsurgency doctrine with an eye toward providing appropriate advice at the country team and unified command levels. This session will be followed by a session dealing with "failed states" or those countries in the process of disintegration, not necessarily due to communist inspired insurgencies.

The Reference Reading (NWC 2228) should be scanned as a guide with an eye to how the various generic forms of assistance can be orchestrated into a suitable response. The other Reference Readings provide a sampling of some recent thinking on the subject.

Point of Contact for this lesson is Professor J. D. Waghelstein, C-421.

D. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-07.1 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense.* Chapters I-III. (Issued).

FM 100-20/AFP 3-20 *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict.* Chapter 2. (Issued).

E. Reference Readings:

Franz, Dale V., and Jensen, John L. "Insurgent Strategies." (**NWC 2256**) (Issued).

Waghelstein, John D. "Post-Vietnam Counterinsurgency Doctrine." (**NWC 2071**) (Issued).

"Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency." (**NWC 2228**) (Issued).

FAILED STATES (Seminar)

The fundamental problem of failed states is that they do not simply go away, they linger; the longer they persist, the greater the potential challenges to neighboring states, regional stability, and international peace.

—Robert H. Dorff
Parameters, Summer 1996

A. Focus:

This session will focus on the Failed State phenomenon and examine the degree to which the U.S. military may effectively address the problem.

B. Objectives:

- Introduce the concept of Failed (or Failing) States.
- Analyze the pathology of the degeneration of states.
- Assess the impact of Failed States upon U.S. national interests.
- **PJE**—Translate national security objectives, guidance, and strategic endstate into national military objectives, guidance, and endstate.
- **PJE**—Understand how to formulate national security direction and a strategic endstate, in terms of the instruments of national power, so that combatant commander can determine the military endstate to achieve the national security objectives.
- Assess the efficacy of various military measures.

C. Background:

The phenomenon of the Failed State was born of the post-World War II process of great power decolonization. Former colonies, often lacking the political and economic wherewithal to prosper on their own as independent nation states, were kept viable by either the East or the West, eagerly competing for their loyalty in the Cold War struggle. The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed a growing number of states unable to survive the loss of their superpower benefactors. The resulting deterioration of governance in these states seems to be characterized by serious problems, all of which bear the seeds of crisis. These range from economic collapse to widespread hunger, population dislocation and migration, insurgencies, terrorist acts, human rights abuses, and internal instability affecting neighboring states and the region in general. Our national leadership may be confronted by difficult policy decisions concerning U.S. ability to intervene, the appropriateness of intervention, and the options available for the application of military resources.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. F. Chandler, C-425.

D. Questions:

What are the characteristics of a state described as “failed” or “failing”?

What are the causes?

Are there problems common to all, or is each unique?

If the states are outside our region, should the U.S. care?

What are the "danger signs" that should forewarn of failure?

Should U.N.-led intervention be the preferred option of choice?

What are the risks of acting unilaterally?

How can military resources be applied most effectively or *can* they be?

E. Required Readings:

Dearth, "Failed State: an International Conundrum." (**NWC 3029**) (Issued).

Helman & Ratner, "Saving Failed States." (**NWC 3026**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Miskel, "Are We Learning the Right Lessons from Africa's Humanitarian Crises." (**NWC 3039**) (Issued).

Otis, "Ethnic Conflict: What Kind of War Is This?" (**NWC 3031**) (Issued).

National Security Strategy (December 1999), p. 2 (Issued).

Bunker, "Failed-State Operational Environment Concepts." (**NWC 3034**) (Issued).

Jones, "A Case of State Survival: Macedonia in the 1990s." (**NWC 3025**) (Issued).

Woodward, "Failed States: Warlordism and 'Tribal' Warfare." (**NWC 3033**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Manwaring, Max G. ed., *Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder*. Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1993.

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID)—CASE STUDY (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session examines Counterinsurgency (CI), a specific type of MOOTW. It focuses on the U.S. supporting role in El Salvador. The seminar will examine the case using elements of operational art and the Principles of MOOTW.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Understand how national security objectives and guidance are translated into theater objectives and counterinsurgency campaign plans. Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- **PJE**—Explain how the Principles of MOOTW and concepts of operational art apply to FID Operations. Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with the other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Understand how a "net assessment" is a prerequisite to successful operational planning in any military operation. Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Apply campaign-planning techniques to a situation involving political and economic issues as well as military issues. Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the CINCs.
- **PJE**—Demonstrate and understanding of how CI doctrine and practice operated in El Salvador and the soundness of projecting that experience into future insurgency situations.Comprehend how to coordinate US military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.

C. Background:

In many ways it is easier for the U.S. military to conduct war on a grand scale than at the lower end of the spectrum. The applicability of conventional force in the CI arena is often non-existent, and counter-productive. Additionally, many of the war-fighting concepts that you have studied thus far may have far less relevance.

Of the various types of MOOTW, counterinsurgency is likely to be the most challenging, the most often misunderstood, and the least likely to respond to the application of conventional military force. Assuming insurgencies will continue, military officers need an appreciation of an environment where there is no single solution, only examples of previously successful counter-insurgency campaigns.

Despite their similarity with other insurgency examples, *all insurgencies are unique.* In conducting the analysis you are reminded that other nations, especially those of the “Third World,” are not sandboxes where the U.S. military can design counterinsurgency campaigns in a vacuum. More often than not, the Department

of Defense will not be the leading player. Consequently, any advice from a U.S. military officer and the role the U.S. may play must be compatible with U.S. policy objectives. This assumes, of course, that U.S. strategy is clearly defined.

Point of contact for this session is Professor J. D. Waghelstein, C-421.

D. Questions:

What were the U.S. national interests involved in El Salvador?

How does this case compare with what you know of other insurgencies? (e. g., Malaya, Algeria, Greece and the Philippines).

How do the FMLN's organization, objectives and strategy compare with other models?

How did the Principles of MOOTW apply to the El Salvador case?

Consider the advice offered to the U.S. ambassador to El Salvador and, subsequently, the advice offered to the host government and to its armed forces in devising a counterinsurgency campaign strategy.

Why was the problem approached via the ambassador and couched in the form of advice?

Assess the success of the campaign.

E. Required Readings:

Waghelstein's "El Salvador: Observations and Experiences..." (**NWC 3014**) (Issued).

CIA, "Guide to Analysis..." (**NWC 2228**) (Issued).

Evans, Ernest, "El Salvador Lessons for Future U S Interventions." (**NWC 3004**) (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Hamilton's unpublished draft. (**NWC 2059**) (Issued).

Waghelstein's "Ruminations...." (**NWC 2090**) (Issued).

Abrams' "American Victory." (**NWC 2076**) (Issued).

Karl's "....Negotiated Revolution." (**NWC 2098**) (Issued).

White, "Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare."(**NWC 3060**) (Issued).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Waghelstein's "El Salvador and the Press," *Parameters,* Fall 1985. (Complete Article in Library. Portions Issued).

PEACE OPERATIONS (Lecture)

A. Focus:

This lecture will introduce another specific type of MOOTW: Peace Operations. Multinational structure, peacekeeping process, and military command and control capabilities will be discussed. The session will focus on those aspects which would be important to a U.S. military commander or staff officer operating with the UN or in UN sanctioned operations.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Analyze operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate US military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how technological change affects the art and science of war and evaluate key ongoing and anticipated technological developments pertinent to the military instrument.

C. Background:

There is no standard Peace Operations mission. Each Peace Operation is conducted in a unique setting with its own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics. U.S. military participation in Peace Operations may involve peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or other military operations in support of diplomatic actions to establish and maintain peace.

Although the United States may participate in Peace Operations unilaterally, in ad hoc cooperation with other countries, or with regional organizations (e.g., the Organization of American States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organization of African Unity, etc.), it usually operates under some type of UN umbrella.

The founders of the UN did not specifically address Peace Operations. However, Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter describe procedures for addressing threats to peace and for reversing acts of aggression. Chapter VI discusses peaceful solutions to international problems; Chapter VII discusses the use of UN military force. These chapters form the basis for modern Peace Operations within the UN framework.

The point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel J. Anderson, U.S. Army, C-408.

D. Questions:

What should a JFC consider when assigned a peace operation mission in a multinational environment?

E. Required Readings:

Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-07.3, Chapters III, IV, and GL1 to GL10. (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

"Clinton Policy on Multinational Peace Operations." (**NWC 2187**) (Issued).

FM 100-23, Chapter 1. (Issued).

G. Supplemental Readings:

None.

PEACE OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES (Seminar)

A. Focus:

This session continues the examination of Peace Operations. It uses two historical examples to illustrate the use of military force and emerging doctrine (to include conflict termination) in Peace Operations. The seminar will conduct a critical analysis of U.S. Peace Operations in Somalia and Haiti. The seminar will compare and contrast the two operations and discuss the operational lessons learned from them. Specific briefing requirements will be discussed in seminar.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the art and science of developing, deploying, employing, and sustaining the military resources of the nation, in concert with the other instruments of national power, to attain national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how joint, unified, and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role and perspective of the unified commander and staff in developing various theater plans, policies, and strategies, including current issues of interest to the CINCs.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how to coordinate US military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.
- **PJE**—Analyze joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- **PJE**—Comprehend the role of joint doctrine with respect to unified command.

C. Background:

U.S. military involvement in Peace Operations has increased dramatically in the past decade. Current world events point to continued involvement in the foreseeable future. Peace operations present a new challenge to those who spent years preparing to fight conventional wars. Peace Operations may take place in environments far less defined than combat, where combat power may be less important than non-combat power. The political and cultural dimensions may become central to the conflict, and force may be needed to compel, not destroy. As discussed in the first session of this block, there are even new principles (The Principles of MOOTW—SLURPO) that supplement the Principles of War and guide our training and mission execution.

Additionally, the terminology of Peace Operations can be confusing. The subtle differences that characterize almost every mission have created a broad range of definitions to describe them. Joint Doctrine correctly defines the terms associated with

Peace Operations. The student must be comfortable with these definitions, be able to analyze, to discuss, and—most importantly—to conduct Peace Operations in concert with other military leaders, interagency officials, the media, and non-governmental and private voluntary organizations.

The two cases provide the student with a wide variety of political, economic, cultural, legal, and military challenges that faced both the United States and the United Nations in Somalia and Haiti. The student should be prepared to discuss the major lessons learned from each of these cases, analyze their possible impact on current and future peace operations, and recommend viable courses of action.

The point of contact for this session is Lieutenant Colonel J. Anderson, U.S. Army, C-408.

D. Questions:

What are the distinctive characteristics of the following terms: Peace Operations, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Aggravated Peacekeeping, Peace Building, and Peace Enforcement?

Which governmental agency will likely take the lead in each specific type of peace operation?

What is/should be the role of the military commander in planning conflict termination in peace operations?

How effectively were the Principles of MOOTW applied in Somalia and Haiti?

What lessons from Somalia and Haiti might we apply to future peace operations?

E. Required Readings:

Bentley & Oakley, "Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti." (**NWC 3083**) (Issued).

Strednansky, "Balancing The Trinity." (**NWC 3013**) (Issued).

Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned.* (Issued).

Brennan & Ellis, "Information Warfare in Multinational Peace Operations." (**NWC 2038**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-07. (Issued).

F. Reference Readings:

Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations (Issued).

Alberts, "Coalition Command and Control: Peace Operations" (**NWC 3082**) (Issued).

Army/Air Force White Paper, "Analysis of Principles of MOOTW in Somalia." (**NWC 2243**) (Issued).

G. Supplemental Readings:

Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security. Oakley, Dziedzic, & Goldberg. http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/policing/cont.html.

Hayes and Wheatley, Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study. (Seminar Reserve).

Niblack, "The United Nations Mission in Haiti." (**NWC 2053**) (Seminar Reserve).

THE INTERAGENCY EXERCISE ON COLOMBIA

"Joint force commanders frequently state that interagency coordination is one of their biggest challenges."

Joint Pub 3-08

A. Focus:

The Interagency Exercise on Colombia (IEOC) is intended to synthesize and reinforce the instruction in Block III by challenging the student to analyze the current situation in Colombia and to apply military planning logic in preparation of draft input to an interagency Political-Military Implementation Plan (Pol-Mil Plan) in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56). In the years ahead, DOD officers will be called upon ever more frequently to demonstrate their familiarity with the PDD-56 process in preparing for or managing complex contingency situations. Facing threats from insurgency, international narcotics trafficking and illegal paramilitary organizations, Colombia poses what many argue is the greatest concern for U.S. national security interests in the Western Hemisphere.

B. Objectives:

- Apply national strategic guidance in the process of planning for a MOOTW situation in an interagency environment.
- Demonstrate students' ability to prepare draft input to an interagency Pol-Mil Plan in accordance with PDD-56.
- Comprehend the considerations associated with employing joint forces in an interagency environment in a military operation other than war.
- Demonstrate students' ability to analyze an insurgency and to make recommendations for foreign internal defense programs.
- **PJE**—Comprehend current joint doctrine related to interagency operations.
- **PJE**—Develop an ability to plan for employment of joint forces in an interagency environment.
- **PJE**—Understand joint and interagency operations in support of the National Security Strategy at the lower end of the range of military operations.
- **PJE**—Apply joint doctrine to MOOTW situations.
- **PJE**—Understand the impact of political factors on the selection of military objectives.
- **PJE**—Translate political objectives into military objectives for MOOTW.
- **PJE**—Apply the principles of MOOTW.

C. Background:

The U.S. has a keen interest in helping the Government of Colombia (GOC) to achieve a peace agreement with insurgent forces, to fight narcotics trafficking organizations, to promote prosperity and to improve governance throughout Colombia.

Eighty per cent of the cocaine coming into the U.S. either comes from Colombia or is transported through it. About fifty per cent of the heroine sold in the U.S. is illegally exported from Colombia. The GOC is combating the longest running insurgency movements in Latin America: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) while also dealing with right wing paramilitary organizations which finance the operations in part through association with narcotics trafficking cartels. Colombia is currently regarded as the greatest threat to U.S. national security in the Western Hemisphere. This exercise will deal with the manner in which the U.S. coordinates interagency efforts to assist the GOC in dealing with these threats.

The Colombia exercise will be the synthesizing event for Block Three and will encompass a brief introduction session (15 minutes) and two three-hour morning sessions.

Following the brief introduction session, students will come to the first session prepared to conduct an analysis of the current situation in Colombia and to prepare draft DOD input to the PDD–56 Pol-Mil Plan in accordance with the required readings. In the second session, students will role play as SOUTHCOM J-3 planners tasked to prepare draft input to assist JCS J-3 planners in their participation in the NSC planning process. Students may discuss how their plan may interface with other agencies' planning and how other agencies may impact on DOD's role in dealing with Colombia. Clearly, the National Security Council, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration and other agencies will be involved. The main objective of this exercise is not to produce a finished Pol-Mil Plan to deal with Colombia, but rather to reinforce students' ability to analyze such situations as Colombia's and to familiarize the students with the PDD-56 interagency planning process. Students will not be required to play interagency roles per se, but a thorough review of Joint Pub 3-08, Volume II, will acquaint the students with the functions of the various agency roles in such situations. Students should come to class prepared to discuss interagency functions and points of view.

In Washington, the Department of State (DOS) will have the lead in the interagency process on such matters. DOS will probably work through an ad hoc interagency working group within the National Security Council system. In Colombia, the U.S. Ambassador will supervise all interagency efforts as the direct representative of the President. He will probably work through an ad hoc interagency narcotics coordinating committee within the embassy.

Clearly, MOOTW is what most students will be involved with in the years ahead and is in many ways more complex than conventional warfare. The Colombia exercise certainly offers many challenges. The issues involved should lead to ample discussion during both sessions.

The point of contact for this session is Professor J. R. Ballard, C-407.

D. Required Readings:

Gabriel Marcella and Donald Schulz. "Colombia's Three Wars: U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads," 1999. (**NWC 3016**) (Issued).

"White Paper on Presidential Decision Directive 56: Managing Complex Contingency Operations", 1998. (**NWC 3017**) (Issued).

E. Reference Readings:

Pastrana, President of the Republic of Colombia, "Plan Colombia", 1999. (**NWC 3024**) (Issued).

CIA, "Guide to Analysis of Insurgency" (**NWC 2228**) (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-08 Volumes I and II, The Interagency Process. (Issued).

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Bentley, David and Robert Oakley. "Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti," *Strategic Forum* 1995. pp. 1-4. (NWC 3083) (Issued).

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Cable, Sir James. *Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1979, Political Applications of Limited Naval Force*. New York: St. Martins Press, 1982. This is an excellent source of information on the application of limited naval force in the pursuit of national objectives. It provides a wide range of examples and demonstrates that many nations have used this avenue to achieve their objectives. (Seminar Reserve).

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Clinton, William J. *National Security Strategy for a New Century*. The White House 1999. This is the latest NSS for the United States, spelling out the major interests

of the United States and the regional approach that will be used to protect and foster those interests. (Issued).

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Dearfield, Mark G. The CJTF and NGOs—One Team, One Mission? Naval War College. 15 May 1998 (NWC 3006) (Issued).

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Joint Pub 3-07. *Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War*. Washington: JCS, June 1995. This is the basic joint publication for dealing with the many varieties of military action in operations other than war. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-07.1 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*. Washington: JCS, 26 June 1996. (Issued).

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Joint Pub 3-07.3 *Peacekeeping Operations*. Washington: JCS, February 1999. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-07.4 *Joint Counterdrug Operations*. Washington: JCS, February 1998. (Seminar Reserve).

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Joint Warfighting Center, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*. Ft. Monroe: JWC, 1997. (Issued).

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Komer, R.W. Extracts from *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1972. This case examines the role of the military in support of the counterinsurgency campaign.

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Nathan, James, "The Rise and Decline of Coercive Statecraft," *Proceedings*, October 1995, pp. 59-65. The author argues that the art of using credible military power in support of the diplomatic measures used in pursuing national objectives is misused in the United States. In particular, the Cheney Doctrine and Powell Corollary undermine the credibility of use military threats and limits the options available to our national leaders. (NWC 3027) (Issued).

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Niblack, Preston, "The United Nations Mission in Haiti: A Trip Report." RAND, June 1995. A trip report based on a 19-23 May 1995 visit to Haiti which focuses on the United Nations Peacekeeping mission and it's role in the restoration of Haiti. (NWC 2053) (Seminar Reserve).

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SEMINAR _____
CNW/NCC JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS COURSE

STUDENT CRITIQUE OF BLOCK THREE: MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

The MOOTW sessions of the JMO course were designed to provide you with a basic understanding of the wide array of missions the Defense Department may be called upon to reform, either as the lead agency or in support of another agency. This critique seeks to capture your impressions while the experience is still fresh in mind, of how successful Block Three instruction was in achieving those aims, and to solicit your suggestions on how to improve operational concepts instruction in the future. Please take the time to give us your thoughts.

INSTRUCTIONS: For each question, excepting those which request only written answer, circle the scale number which best describes your degree of agreement or disagreement with the statement above the scale. Space has been provided beneath each scale item for you to provide written comments. These comments are optional but would be of significant assistance to course improvement. If insufficient space has been provided for your written comments, continue on a loose-leaf page and attach to this critique.

1. Block Three was successful in providing me with a basic understanding of MOOTW.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

_____

2. The aspect(s) of MOOTW with which I am ***most comfortable*** is/are:

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
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_____

3. The aspect(s) of MOOTW with which I am ***least comfortable*** is/are:

_____
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_____
_____

4. The MOOTW block adequately prepared me for the COLOMBIA INTERAGENCY EXERCISE (III-10)

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

_____

5. Are there specific readings you believe should be deleted or replaced? If so, please list them by title and author.

_____
_____
_____
_____

6. Are there any other types of MOOTW you believe should be added? Please elaborate as necessary.

_____
_____
_____
_____

7. Rate each of the sessions as they contributed to your understanding of the operational art as it is practiced at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict? (Rate from 1 (low) to 7 (high). DO NOT RANK ORDER THE SESSIONS—ASSIGN A NUMERICAL VALUE FROM 1-7 FOR EACH SESSION

_____ OPS III-1 MOOTW and OPERATIONAL ART (Lecture)

_____ OPS III-2 INTERAGENCY PROCESS (Seminar)

_____ OPS III-3 COMBATING TERRORISM (Seminar)

_____ OPS III-4 POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS–PANAMA (Seminar

_____ OPS III-5 FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID) (Lecture)

_____ OPS III-6 FAILED STATES (Seminar)

_____ OPS III-7 FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID) (Seminar)

_____ OPS III-8 PEACE OPERATIONS (Lecture)

_____ OPS III-9 PEACE OPERATIONS (Seminar)

_____ OPS III- 10 OPERATION CONDOR RESCUE (Seminar)

8. Do you believe the MOOTW block of instruction was a worthwhile contribution to your overall professional military education? Please feel free to elaborate.

_____
_____
_____
_____

9. Here are things I want to tell you about the block in addition to my responses to the previous questions.

Block Four
Regional Contingency Planning And Warfighting

Listing of Multi-crisis War Game 221
OPS-IV-1 Multi-crisis War Game 222
Block Four Critique 226

MULTI-CRISIS WAR GAME

The war with Japan had been re-enacted in the game rooms at the War College by so many people and in so many ways, that nothing that happened during the war was a surprise—absolutely nothing except the kamikaze tactics towards the end of the war . . .

—Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, 1960

A. Focus:

Block Four of the JMO curriculum consists of the Multi-crisis War Game (MCWG). The purpose of the MCWG is to synthesize and reinforce the instruction from this trimester through practical application in a realistic staff environment. This is an educational, planning exercise, designed to provide students with an opportunity to apply the principles and concepts studied throughout the trimester. While the issues students confront in this exercise are realistic ones, the situations used to highlight these issues and the solutions students select are only hypothetical.

B. Objectives:

- **PJE**—Distinguish how organizational and political influences, including national policy, the media, and public opinion, influence the development of national strategic decision making.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how the NCA performs its crisis action role of coordinating U.S. interagency and multinational participation in support of crises.
- **PJE**—Understand how national security and military strategic direction are integrated into defense policy.
- **PJE**—Comprehend how combatant commanders determine the Desired Endstate in the context of all instruments of national power in achieving national security objectives.
- **PJE**—Prepare joint plans using the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) processes and products.
- **PJE**—Analyze the relationships and functions of the NCA, NSC, CJCS, CINCs, Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs, and component commanders.
- **PJE**—Interpret national and coalition security objectives, guidance, and Desired Endstate into national and coalition military objectives.
- **PJE**—Illustrate effective coordination of U.S. and coalition military force structure, capabilities, limitations, and required theater coordination through wargaming.
- **PJE**—Apply national security and military direction in developing theater and supporting strategies by combatant and joint/combined force commanders.
- **PJE**—Compile national and coalition military objectives, guidance, and theater strategies into theater strategic guidance, objectives, and operational focus in developing theater campaign plans and operational orders.

- **PJE**—Devise combatant commander strategic concepts of operations and logistics for a theater campaign plan.
- **PJE**—Illustrate the fundamentals of joint operational art in developing joint/combined theater and subordinate campaign plans and orders.
- **PJE**—Organize theater command and control relationships to support planning and execution of theater and subordinate campaign plans.
- **PJE**—Interpret current joint and Service doctrine in developing and exercising the execution of joint and combined theater and subordinate campaign plans in coordination with U.S. interagency and various NGO/PVOs.
- **PJE**—Analyze the challenges facing joint/combined commanders in capitalizing upon and countering adversarial use of 21st century battlespace and commercial systems throughout the range of military operations..
- **PJE**—Demonstrate how Information Operations are integrated into military plans and operations.

C. Background:

The MCWG will be conducted over two weeks, scheduled generally from 0830-1630 each day. While some seminars may find it necessary to devote additional time, the schedule as published in the CNW/NCC MCWG Book (NWC 4019) also includes times when students are not required to be present while the control staff is preparing assessments. Students must read the short article, *It's Time to Train for War* (NWC 4000), the MCWG Book and the Blue ROE (NWC 1139) prior to the start of the exercise, but there will be no outside reading requirements assigned during the two weeks. However, some research may be helpful to students to enhance their MCWG roles.

Student seminars will be assigned roles as staffs at the strategic, operational and operational-tactical levels of war. Seminar moderators will make assignments to specific billets prior to the exercise. Certain billet holders will be scheduled to receive orientation on specific tools and/or procedures unique to their assigned billets; however, all students will receive a Public Affairs orientation and War Gaming Network training. While moderators will assign billets, students will be left to organize the flow of information and tasks within and among staffs.

The exercise will be played in four phases: pre-crisis and deployment, halting, offensive, and post-hostilities.

In the pre-crisis phase, staffs will be given time to organize and familiarize themselves with the communications system and to read information concerning a developing crisis.

As the developing situation moves into crisis, staffs will begin the process of crisis action planning. The exercise is designed to highlight the realities of concurrent and parallel planning in a networked environment. In other words, all staffs will have to conduct their own estimates, make recommendations up the chain-of-command, and respond to tasking from their superiors. Similarly, the flow of

information and events will challenge staffs to deal with immediate events while planning for future operations.

The halting and offensive phases present the staffs with the opportunity to respond to new and unexpected situations that may require new planning or execution of various branches or sequels within the original plan.

Issues of how to terminate hostilities and how to deal with the situation after hostilities comprise the post-hostilities phase of the conflict and relate to the Desired End State, as defined by the political objective(s).

The Control Team for the exercise will be comprised of the seminar moderators, a War Gaming Department representative, a representative from the Office of Naval Intelligence Detachment, and the faculty members on your game's National Security Council. They will assist you in organization, exercise mechanics, intelligence/information, and assessment. This last point is very important: controllers will provide their respective student staffs feedback in the form of an assessment, enabling them to adjust their estimates and orders for subsequent moves.

Throughout the exercise, several issues will recur and have to be dealt with, such as: staff processes that integrate political, military, informational and diplomatic factors; information operations; mine warfare; weapons of mass destruction; strategic mobility; and war termination.

The point of contact for this session is Professor D. N. Hime, C-423.

D. Required Readings:

Morgan, Thomas D., "It's Time to Train for War" *Proceedings*, December 1997. **(NWC 4000)** (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, "Commander's Estimate of the Situation Worksheet." **(NWC 4111C)** (Issued).

"Blue's War Game Rules of Engagement." **(NWC 1139)** (Issued).

U.S. Naval War College, *CNW/NCC Multi-Crisis War Game Book*, Newport, RI, May 2001. **(NWC 4019)** (Issued separately).

E. Reference Readings:

Since the MCWG involves application of material covered throughout the War College curriculum, students will have to make individual decisions regarding references needed based on the role assigned and individual knowledge and experience. The documents listed below may be helpful.

CJCSM 3122.01, (JOPES Vol.1), Planning Policies and Procedures, 14 July 2000.

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 1 February 1995. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, 17 April 1998. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-12, *Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations*, 15 December 1995. (Issued).

Joint Pub 3-12.1, *Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations*, 9 February 1996. (Issued).

Joint Pub 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support for Joint Operations*, 6 April 2000. (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, 13 April 1995. (Issued).

Joint Pub 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures*, 13 January 1999. (Issued).

DeGeus, Stan, *Forces/Capabilities Handbook*, Newport, RI: Naval War College, September 2000. **(NWC 3153F)** (Issued).

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*, Chapters 5-10. (Issued).

Naval Warfare Publication 5-01 (Rev. A), *Naval Operational Planning*, May 1998. (Issued).

F. Supplementary Readings:

None.

Seminar #_____
CNW/NCC 2001 JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS COURSE

Critique of Block Four: Multi-Crisis War Game

Please answer the following questions to the best of your knowledge as they relate to a Multi-crisis War Game's support of the Joint Military Operations Course.

1. To what degree did the Multi-crisis War Game contribute to your cell's understanding of the purpose, roles, functions and relationships of the National Command Authorities (NCA), National Security Council (NSC), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Combatant Commanders (CINCs), Service Chiefs and Joint Force Commanders (JFCs)? (circle one)

Inadequate			Adequate			Highly Adequate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Remark:_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

2. To what degree did the Multi-crisis War Game contribute to your cell's understanding of the relationship between and among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war? (circle one)

Inadequate			Adequate			Highly Adequate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Remark:_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

3. To what degree did the Multi-crisis War Game contribute to your cell's understanding of the relationship between current joint doctrine and service doctrine, the capabilities and limitations of the Services and the military organizations that plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint and multi-national operations? (circle one)

Inadequate			Adequate			Highly Adequate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Remark:_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

4. To what degree did the Multi-crisis War Game contribute to your cell's ability to manage the organizational framework within which joint and multi-national forces are employed at the operational level of war? (circle one)

Inadequate			Adequate			Highly Adequate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Remark:_____

_____

_____

_____

5. To what degree did the Multi-crisis War Game contribute to your cell's ability to synthesize the linkage between national security objectives and supporting military objectives, the relationship between national objectives and means availability, and your cell's ability to understand the importance of defined conflict termination? (circle one)

Inadequate			Adequate			Highly Adequate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Remark:_____

_____

_____

_____

6. To what degree did the Multi-crisis War Game contribute to your cell's understanding of the application of current Joint Doctrine and International Law in solving operational problems? (circle one)

Inadequate			Adequate			Highly Adequate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Remark:_____

_____

_____

_____

7. To what degree did the Multi-crisis War Game contribute to your cell's understanding of network centric and information operations?

Inadequate			Adequate			Highly Adequate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Remark:_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

8. To what degree did the Multi-crisis War Game contribute to your cell's understanding of the fundamentals of campaign planning and the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process? (circle one)

Inadequate			Adequate			Highly Adequate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Remark:_____
_____
_____
_____

9. To what degree did the Multi-crisis War Game contribute to your cell's knowledge and comprehension of the opportunities and vulnerabilities created by increased reliance on technology throughout the range of military operations? (circle one)

Inadequate			Adequate			Highly Adequate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Remark:_____
_____
_____
_____

B. Specific Elements Of The Exercise.

10. To what degree did the staffs of the Naval War College and the War Gaming Center support your game play with pre-exercise briefings and training (Media, J-2 Intelligence, J-4/5 Mobility, PAO, etc.), as applicable? (circle one)

Inadequate			Adequate			Highly Adequate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Remark:_____
_____
_____
_____

11. To what degree did the staff of the Naval War College and the War Gaming Center support your game play with Game Books, force lists, work spaces, maps, charts, and related game aids? (circle one)

Inadequate			Adequate			Highly Adequate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Remark:_____
_____
_____
_____

12. To what degree did the staffs of the Naval War College and the War Gaming Center support your game play with sufficient and functional computers, and collaborative-distributive tools, such as: the Game Web, Microsoft Net Meeting, teleconferencing capabilities, and personnel to assist you in their operation? (circle one)

Inadequate			Adequate			Highly Adequate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Remark:_____

_____

_____

_____

13. To what degree did the staff of the Naval War College and the War Gaming Center support your game play with Game move assessments and moderator feedback? (circle one)

Inadequate			Adequate			Highly Adequate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Remark:_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

14. To what extent did the organization of exercise play, length and pace allow objectives to be met? (circle one)

Inadequate			Adequate			Highly Adequate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Remark:_____

_____

_____

_____

15. How effective were the Collaborative-Distributive Planning tools in supporting the exercise?

Inadequate			Adequate			Highly Adequate
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Remark:_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

ENRICHMENT OPPORTUNITIES (EO)

A. Focus:

The Enrichment Opportunities section of the syllabus serves to list those opportunities that occur during the academic year that allow NCC students to observe various U.S. operating forces, facilities, shore stations, and supporting civilian institutions firsthand, and to hear from distinguished military and civilian lecturers on topics related to the Joint Military Operations course. The visits are accomplished during scheduled field trips (FTs) in concert with selected Informational Program Visits (IPVs). These visits and lectures serve an important purpose in enhancing the students' appreciation and understanding of the concepts developed during the entire academic year.

B. Objectives:

- To visit selected operating units, shore stations, and civilian institutions that support the U.S. defense effort.
- To gain firsthand exposure to U.S. operating forces, research and development facilities, and senior military and civilian leaders.
- To understand the perspective of major U.S. commanders on issues in their areas.
- To gain an appreciation for subjects presented during lectures of opportunity.

C. Guidance:

1. Students should read any assigned material prior to the scheduled lectures or visits, and be prepared to take maximum advantage of the opportunity to learn firsthand the mission and capabilities of the unit or facility visited. Be prepared with questions related to the topic under consideration.
2. Lectures of opportunity will be scheduled on an "as available basis."

Enrichment Opportunities

1. Field Trips:

EO-1 Maritime Patrol Air Capabilities (NAS Brunswick).

EO-2 U.S. Space Systems, Advanced Aviation, and Civilian Aviation Capabilities (Boston/Houston/San Francisco/Seattle/St. Louis/Monterey/Orlando).

EO-3 Drug Interdiction and Law Enforcement (New York City/ San Francisco/ Phoenix).

EO-4 Military Helicopter Aviation (Phoenix/Norfolk).

EO-5 Total Quality Leadership/Business Leadership (Phoenix/ Salt Lake City/ Seattle).

EO-6 U.S. Coast Guard Operations (San Francisco/Groton).

EO-7 U.S. Service Academies (Annapolis/Groton).

EO-8 Maritime Research and Development (Woods Hole).

EO-9 ASW Sonar Development (Newport).

EO-10 Naval Training (Newport/Annapolis).

EO-11 Naval ASW Research and Development (Newport).

EO-12 Technology Transfer (Salt Lake City/Newport).

EO-13 Submarine Force Capabilities (Seattle/Norfolk).

EO-14 U.S. Military Logistic Movement (St. Louis).

EO-15 U.S. Navy Headquarters Briefings (Washington DC/ Norfolk).

EO-16 Surface Force Capabilities (Newport/Brunswick/Norfolk).

EO-17 Amphibious Force/USMC Capabilities (Norfolk/Camp Lejune).

EO-18 Carrier Aviation (East/West Coast OPAREA)

2. Major U.S. Command Briefings:

EO-19 (Scheduled throughout the Academic Year).

3. Lectures of Opportunity:

EO-20 (Scheduled as available).

COURSE FOUNDATIONS CRITIQUE NOTES

Note: These note pages are provided for the convenience of the student in order to keep a running record of impressions of the course as it progresses. These will be useful when—at the end of the course—the student must complete the End of Course Questionnaire.

General Comments:

CF-1 Course Overview
Comments:

CF-2 Introductory Seminar
Comments:

CF-3 The American Way of War (Lecture)
Comments:

CF-4 The Naval Way of War (Lecture)
Comments:

CF-5 The Strategic Objective
Comments:

CF-6 Diplomacy and Military Force
Comments:

CF-7 Introduction to Network Centric Warfare
Comments:

CF-8 Operations Research Paper- Review (Seminar)
Comments:

CF-9 Course Conclusion
Comments:

COURSE SESSION CRITIQUE NOTES

General Comments:

OPS-I-1 Introduction to Operational Art
Comments:

OPS-I-2 "The Battle for Leyte Gulf" (Film)
Comments:

OPS-I-3 Operational Factors
Comments:

OPS-I-4 Operational Art – Development to Doctrine
Comments:

OPS-I-5 Levels of War
Comments:

OPS-I-6 Theater Elements
Comments:

OPS-I-7 Principles of War
Comments:

OPS-I-8 Operational Functions
Comments:

OPS-I-9 Elements of Operational Warfare
Comments:

OPS-I-10 Methods of Combat Force Employment
Comments:

OPS-I-11 Operational Planning and Leadership
Comments:

OPS-I-12 Falklands/Malvinas Case Study
Comments:

OPS I-13 Introduction to International Law
Comments:

OPS-I-14 Law of Sea and Airspace (Lecture)
Comments:

OPS I-15 Law of Armed Conflict
Comments:

OPS I-16 Rules of Engagement - Part I
Comments:

OPS I-16 Rules of Engagement - Part II
Comments:

OPS I-17 Operational Concepts Exam
Comments:

OPS I-18 Operational Concepts Exam
Comments:

OPS I-19 Operational Law Case Study
Comments:

Military Organization and Planning Concepts Sessions

General Comments:

Introduction to Military Organization and Planning Concepts

OPS-II-1	U. S. National Military Organization (Seminar)
OPS-II-2	Weapons of Mass Destruction Considerations (Seminar)
OPS-II-3	U. S. Maritime Forces (Navy and Marine Corps) Doctrine and Capabilities (Seminar)
OPS-II-4	U. S. Coast Guard Capabilities (Lecture)
OPS-II-5	U. S. Army Doctrine and Capabilities (Seminar)
OPS-II-6	U. S. Air Force Doctrine and Capabilities (Seminar)
OPS-II-7	Special Operations Forces (Lecture)
OPS-II-8	Strategic Mobility (Seminar)
OPS-II-9	Alliance and Coalition Considerations (Seminar)
OPS-II-10	Joint Warfare Considerations (Seminar)
OPS-II-11	C4ISR and Information Operation (Seminar)

OPS-II-12	Service Capabilities Vignettes/Case Studies (Seminar)
OPS-II-13	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) (Seminar)
OPS-II-14	Theater Planning (Seminar)
OPS-II-15	Plans and Orders & Planning (Seminar)
OPS-II-16	The Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) (Seminar)
OPS-II-17	Naval Expeditionary Warfare Problem (NEWP)

Military Operations Other Than War

General Comments:

Introduction to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

OPS-III-1	Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) (Lecture)
OPS-III-2	The Interagency Process (Seminar)
OPS-III-3	Combating Terrorism (Seminar)
OPS-III-4	Planning for Post-conflict Operations (Seminar)
OPS-III-5	Foreign Internal Defense (Lecture)
OPS-III-6	Failed States (Seminar)
OPS-III-7	Foreign Internal Defense: Case Study
OPS-III-8	Peace Operations (Lecture)
OPS-III-9	Peace Operations—Case Studies (Seminar)
OPS-III-10	Operation CONDOR RESCUE (Seminar)

Regional Contingency Planning And Warfighting

General comments:

OPS-IV-1 Multi-crisis War Game

COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE/ NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE
JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT
JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS COURSE

END OF COURSE QUESTIONNAIRE

We solicit your honest and thoughtful responses to this questionnaire in order to help us make the JMO Course even better. Please take the time to closely read the instructions. Answer each of the questions with the most objective response you can, based on your experience in the course to date. Each section of this questionnaire has somewhat different rating parameters, so please pay close attention so that you do not inadvertently provide misleading data.

Please work through the form sequentially, answering each question in turn on the questionnaire with your considered response. You will note that each response has a number 1 through 7 associated with it. Then mark the number of your response on the answer form attached to this questionnaire. This will permit more rapid entry and analysis of data. Your comments will be transcribed and collated providing the key insights to accurate data interpretation, so please take the time to write comments on this question sheet, using the backs of pages or additional sheets as necessary. It is important to get 100% participation so that the department gets a clear picture of the student body course assessment. The questionnaires will be completed and turned in to moderators during Session CF-9, Course Conclusion, on Friday, 8 June. Responses to the questionnaire will not be released to the faculty until grades are posted.

Thank you for your help.

William R. Spain
Colonel, USMC
Chairman,
Joint Military Operations Department

OVERALL EVALUATION
Seminar #_____

1. The ***knowledge*** I gained from the Joint Military Operations Course will be valuable to me in future ***joint*** assignments.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

_____

2. The ***knowledge*** I gained from the Joint Military Operations Course will be valuable to me in future assignments ***in my own Service.***

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

_____

3. The organization of the course made sense to me.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

_____

4. Rate the pace at which new material was presented in the course.

(way too slow) (about right) (way too fast)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Comments: _____

5. The difficulty of the Joint Military Operations Course is appropriate considering the complexity of the subject matter.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

_____

6. The other students in my seminar contributed to the creation of an effective seminar social and learning environment.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

_____

7. The moderator team created an environment in which worthwhile discussions could take place.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

_____

8. The moderators respected my opinions.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

_____

9. (IF APPLICABLE) The substitute moderator was effective in replacing the regular moderator.

(strongly disagree) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (strongly agree)

Comments: _____

_____

Mark the boxes for your previous duty experience:

10. CINC staff assignment: ❑Yes ❑No

11. Fleet/Corps/Air Force staff: ❑Yes ❑No

12. Unit Command: ❑Yes ❑No

13. Multinational operations: ❑Yes ❑No

14. Washington duty: ❑Yes ❑No

15. Joint Duty: ❑Yes ❑No

Grade the JMO Course in terms of how well you think it prepared you for the following types of duty:

	Little Value					Excellent Preparation	
16. CINC staff assignment:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. Fleet/Corps/Air Force staff:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
18. Unit Command:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19. Multinational operations:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20. Washington duty:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

COMMENTS: _____

_____

Grade the JMO Course in terms of the degree to which the course **enhanced your understanding** *of the following subject areas:*

		Very Little						Very Much
21.	Forces Capabilities and Limitations:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
22.	Operational Art Concepts:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
23.	National Military Strategy:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
24.	Joint Doctrine:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
25.	The Potential Impact of Network Centric Warfare:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
26.	Multinational Operations:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
27.	Planning Process:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
28.	Service Doctrine:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
29.	Military Operations Other Than War:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
30.	International Law/ROE:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

COMMENTS:_____

Grade the value of each of the following in **helping you to learn** *in this course.*

31.	Seminar discussion:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
32.	RCWG:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
33.	Class-wide lectures by the Faculty:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
34.	Operational Concepts Exam:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
35.	Research Paper:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
36.	Discussions outside of class:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
37.	Student classroom presentations:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
38.	Cases:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
39.	Moderator team:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
40.	International Law Moderator:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
41.	Required readings:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
42.	Reference readings:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

COMMENTS:_____

43. Rate the quality of moderator feedback:

Low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High

COMMENTS_____

_____

_____

Rate the JMO Course in the following areas:

	Not Enough			About Right		Too Much	
44. Amount of reading:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
45. Amount of writing:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
46. Amount of class time per week:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
47. Number of tests:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

COMMENTS:_____

_____

_____

Rate the overall atmosphere in your seminar:

48. Boring	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Stimulating
49. Threatening	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Supportive
50. Dominated by a few	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Equal contributions by all
51. Divisive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Team concept

COMMENTS:_____

_____

_____

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA (Circle pertinent number)

52. Service/Org:	USN/USCG	OTHER U.S. MILITARY	CIVILIAN	NCC
	1	2	3	4

53. Component:	Regular	Reserve
	1	2
54. Previous PME:	Resident	Non-resident
	1	2

55. Seminar number: _____

56. Considering study and participation ***inside and outside*** of the classroom, I devoted about _____ hours ***per week*** to the Joint Military Operations Course ***and*** the Electives Program.

COMMENTS:_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

57. Are there any ***additions*** to the JMO Course you can suggest?

_____

_____

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_____

_____

58. Are there any sessions that could be ***deleted*** from the JMO Course?

_____

_____

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_____

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_____

59. What did you like ***most*** about the JMO Course?

_____

_____

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60. JMO is striving to enhance students' understanding of Network Centric Warfare. Do you have any suggestions on how the curriculum could better achieve that goal?

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

61. What did you like ***least*** about the JMO Course?

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

62. Please provide any comments you have on any aspect of the course that has not otherwise been covered by this questionnaire. (Use the back or additional sheets if necessary.)

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Name (optional_____

ANSWER SHEET

1.	11.	21.	31.	41.	51.
2.	12.	22.	32.	42.	52.
3.	13.	23.	33.	43.	53.
4.	14.	24.	34.	44.	54.
5.	15.	25.	35.	45.	55.
6.	16.	26.	36.	46.	56.
7.	17.	27.	37.	47.	
8.	18.	28.	38.	48.	
9.	19.	29.	39.	49.	
10.	20.	30.	40.	50.	

March 2001 CNW/NCC

March 2001						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31

April 2001						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30					

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
			1	2
5	6	7	8	9
12	13	14	15	16
0845 - 0945† CF - 1 Course Overview 1000 - 1200* CF - 2 Introductory Seminar	0830 - 1000† CF – 3 The American Way of War (lecture) 1015 - 1145† CF – 4 The Naval Way of War (lecture)	0830 - 1000* CF – 5 The Strategic Objective 1015 - 1145* CF – 6 Diplomacy & Military Force **Electives**	0830 – 1020* CF - 7 Introduction to Network Centric Warfare 1030 – 1130* OPS I-3 "The Battle of Leyte Gulf" (Film) 1130 – 1200* CF-8 Operations Research Paper - Review **Electives**	**Student Research**
19	20	21	22	23
0830 – 1000* OPS - I-1 Introduction to Operational Art 1015 – 1145* OPS I-2 Operational Art and Doctrine	0830 - 1000* OPS I-4 Operational Factors 1015 – 1145* OPS I-5 Theater Elements	0830 - 0945* OPS-I-6 Levels of War 1000 - 1145* OPS I-7 Operational Functions **Electives**	0800 - 0930* OPS I-8 Elements of Operational Warfare 0945 - 1100* OPS I-9 Methods of Combat Force Employment 1115 – 1200* OPS I-10 Principles of War **Electives**	**Student Research**
26	27	28	29	30
0830 – 1000* OPS I-11 Operational Planning 1015 – 1145* OPS I-12 Operational Leadership	0830 – 1630‡ * OPS I-13 The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict: A Case Study The Strategic Setting Falklands Film	0830 – 1145* OPS I-13 Falklands/Malvinas Conflict Case Presentations Preparations **Exam Read-ahead Distributed** **Electives**	0830 - 1145* OPS I-13 Falklands/Malvinas Conflict: Presentations **Electives**	0800 – 1200* OPS I-14 Operational Concepts Exam **Paper Topics Due** **NCC IPV** **30 Mar-6 Apr**

* Seminar Room † Spruance Auditorium ‡ Pringle Auditorium # Location TBA

April 2001 CNW/NCC

April 2001

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
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29	30					

May 2001

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27	28	29	30	31		

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
2	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
0830 –1000† OPS I-15 Use of Force Under International Law (lecture) 1015 – 1145† OPS I-16 Operational Law and Factor Space (lecture) 1300 - 1630# Tutorials **NCC IPV** **30 Mar-6 Apr** **Electives**	**Even Seminars** 0830–1000* OPS I-17 Law of Armed Conflict 1015–1145* OPS I-18 Rules of Engagement **Odd Seminars** 0830 - 1000* OPS II-1 National Military Organization 1015 – 1145* OPS II-2 Weapons of Mass Destruction Considerations **All Seminars** 1300 - 1630# Student Prep/Tutorials **Electives**	**Odd Seminars** 0830–1000* OPS I-17 Law of Armed Conflict 1015–1145* OPS I-18 Rules of Engagement 1300–1445* OPS I-19 Operational Law Case Study **Even Seminars** 0830—1000* OPS II-1 U.S. National Military Organization 1030 – 1200* OPS II-2 Weapons of Mass Destruction Considerations 1300—1445* OPS I-19 Operational Law Case Study **All Seminars#** 1500–1630# Tutorials	**Jim Thorpe Sports** **Army War College** **Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania** **Student Research** **NCC IPV** **30 Mar-6 Apr**	**Jim Thorpe Sports** **Army War College** **Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania** **Student Research**
9	**10**	**11**	**12**	**13**
0830 - 1145* OPS II-3 U.S. Maritime Forces (Navy & Marine Corps) Doctrine & Capabilities	0830 – 1000* OPS II-3 U.S. Maritime Forces (Navy & Marine Corps) Doctrine & Capabilities 1015 – 1145† OPS II-4 USCG Capabilities (lecture)	0830 – 1000* OPS II-5 U.S. Army Doctrine & Capabilities 1015 – 1145* OPS II-6 U.S. Air Force Doctrine & Capabilities **Electives**	0830 – 1000† OPS II-7 Special Operations Forces (lecture) 1015 – 1145* OPS II-8 Strategic Mobility **Operational Concepts Exam Returned (Noon)** **Electives**	**Spring** **Break** **Note: Easter Sunday is 15 April**
16	**17**	**18**	**19**	**20**
Spring **Break**	**Spring** **Break**	0830 – 1000* OPS II-9 Alliance & Coalition Considerations 1015-1145* OPS II-10 Joint Warfare Considerations **Electives**	0830 – 1145* OPS II-11 C4ISR and Information Operations **Electives**	0830 – 1145* OPS II-12 Service Capabilities Vignettes
23	**24**	**25**	**26**	**27**
0830 – 1145* OPS II-13 Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES)	0830 – 1000* OPS II-14 Theater Planning 1015-1145* OPS II-15 Plans, Orders & Planning	0830 – 1145* OPS II-16 CES Concepts **Electives**	0830 – 1145* OPS II-16 CES Concepts **Electives**	**Student** **Research**
30				
0830 – 1000* OPS II-16 CES Concepts 1015 – 1145* OPS II-17 Operation PACIFIC TEAK Crisis Planning Exercise				

* Seminar Room † Spruance Auditorium ‡ Pringle Auditorium # Location TBA

May 2001 CNW/NCC

May 2001							June 2001						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
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7	8	9	10	11	12	13	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
14	15	16	17	18	19	20	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
28	29	30	31				24	25	26	27	28	29	30

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**
	0830 – 1600* OPS II-17 Operation PACIFIC TEAK Crisis Planning Exercise	0830 – 1145* OPS II-17 Operation PACIFIC TEAK Crisis Planning Exercise **Electives**	0830 – 1145* OPS II-17 Operation PACIFIC TEAK Crisis Planning Exercise **Electives**	**Student Research**
7	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**
0830 – 1145* OPS II-17 Operation PACIFIC TEAK Crisis Planning Exercise	0800 – 0900† OPS III-1 Introduction to MOOTW (lecture) 0915 – 1145* OPS III-2 The Interagency Process	0830 – 1145* OPS III-3 Combating Terrorism **NCC IPV 7-16 May** **Electives**	0830 – 1145* OPS III-4 Planning for Post-conflict Operations **Electives**	**Student Research**
14	**15**	**16**	**17**	**18**
0830 – 1000† OPS III-5 Foreign Internal Defense (lecture) 1015 – 1145* OPS III-6 Failed States	0830 – 1145* OPS III-7 Foreign Internal Defense - Case Study Preparation **NCC IPV 7-16 May**	0830 – 1100* OPS III-7 Foreign Internal Defense – Case Study Presentation 1100 – 1145* MOOTW Film **Electives End**	0830 – 1000† OPS III-8 Peace Operations (lecture) 1015 – 1115* Film: "Ambush in Mogadishu" **Electives End**	**Student Research** **CNW OPS Paper Due (1630)**
21	**22**	**23**	**24**	**25**
0830 – 1130* OPS III-9 Peace Operations – Case Studies 11:30–1145* OPS III-10 Operation CONDOR RESCUE Introduction	0830 – 1145* OPS III-10 Operation CONDOR RESCUE Preparation 1330-1600† MCWG Introduction (Lecture) and Media Training	0830 – 1145* OPS III-10 Operation CONDOR RESCUE – Preparation 1330-1500# MCWG Training	0830 – 1145* OPS III-10 Operation CONDOR RESCUE – Presentations 1330-1500# MCWG Training	0830-1145 MCWG **NCC OPS Paper Due (1630)**
28	**29**	**30**	**31**	
Holiday	0830–1630* MCWG	0830–1630* MCWG	0830–1630* MCWG **CNW OPS Paper Returned**	

* Seminar Room † Spruance Auditorium ‡ Pringle Auditorium # Location TBA

June 2001 CNW/NCC

June 2001

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July 2001

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22	23	24	25	26	27	28
30	31					

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
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				0830–1145* MCWG
4	5	6	7	8
0830–1630* MCWG	0830–1630* MCWG **NCC OPS Paper Returned**	0830–1145* MCWG	0830* Final Exam	0830–1300* Final Exam (cont'd) 1300–1430* CF-9 Course Conclusion End of Course Questionnaire turned into moderator
11	12	13	14	15
Student Admin	←	**Current Strategy Forum** **12–14 June 2001** (Uniform: Summer White or Service Equivalent)	→	**Graduation** (Uniform: Service Dress White or Service Equivalent)
18	19	20	21	22
25	26	27	28	29

* Seminar Room † Spruance Auditorium ‡ Pringle Auditorium # Location TBA