Series III
Speeches and Writings, 1942-1967

Box 18, Folder 2

Unpublished writings on naval strategy

0707

Halsey Fought Own War In Leyte Gulf, Says Leahy

WASHINGTON (AP)—Adm. William D. Leahy says that, in the 1944 battle of Leyte Gulf, Adm. William (Bull) Halsey "got off on a little war of his own."

"We didn't lose the war for that but I don't know why we didn't. I was afraid we were going to," Leahy, who was personal chief of staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, told newsmen after a White House visit yesterday.

He did so in response to requests for his views on the crucial naval battle of the Philippine invasion. The questions were prompted by British Prime Minister Churchill's version, given in his memoirs appearing serially in the New York Times.

Churchill said Halsey was lured away from protecting American invasion forces by a Japanese decoy force. The day was saved, Churchill said, when the main Japanese force for some reason did not strike at Leyte Gulf.

Naval Strategy

Both Naval Strategy and Tactics have to do with the conduct of war at sea and embrace operations in the air, on the sea, and under the sea. They are inseparable. Strategy is the employment of the means available to gain further aims, in contradistinction to the immediate or local aims of tactics. It sets tactical objectives and allots the means which under existing conditions are considered adequate to ensure that tactics can accomplish its assigned task. Fundamentally, this basic definition will never change. However, the procedure necessary to accomplish the strategical aims will vary considerably with the development of new weapons and new degrees of mobility. These variations do not affect the basic considerations of strategy but do affect their application.

Every naval situation has both strategical and tactical aspects. The nature of the objectives to be attained at a particular time and the action to be taken to that end, may be governed chiefly by strategical or tactical considerations. Strategical considerations do not end when battle is joined, for tactics unguided by strategy might blindly make sacrifices merely to remain victor on the field of battle. But strategy looks beyond, in order to make gains of tactics accord with the strategic aim.

Modern war between great powers is total war and requires the mobilization of the entire manpower and industrial resources of the opposing belligerents as dictated by National strategy.

0709

Naval strategy is so closely related to national strategy that a definition of the one is not complete without the accompanying definition of the other.

National strategy is the art and science of developing and employing the political economic and psychological powers of a nation with its armed forces, during peace as well as during war, to implement the national policies. It is essential, in this connection, that there be understanding between the civil authorities of the state and the leaders of the armed forces, in order that the national power may be properly coordinated with the power to enforce it. It is also essential, insofar as is practicable, consistent with security, that the general public be kept informed as to the demands of national policy in the line of naval strategy.

Naval strategy is that part of military strategy applied by the naval command, and is the art and science of employing the naval forces of the nation to secure the objectives of the war at sea by the successful application of force or threat of force, in order to reduce the will of the enemy to resist.

The ultimate objective of naval strategy is to defeat the enemy by denying him the use of the sea while, at the same time, preserving it for use by own or friendly forces. This is accomplished by gaining and maintaining "command of the Sea". Command of the sea obtains when a belligerent is able to carry on freely the operations of its naval and air forces and the movement of its

0710

air and seaborne traffic and when the enemy is unable to carry out similar undertaking except at considerable risk of serious consequences. Command of the sea does not generally mean command of the entire sea, but only of important sea areas. The degree of interest in command of any particular part of the sea will depend upon the influence their transit will have in promoting the attainment of the objectives as a whole. However, in global warfare, with its employment in vast scale of personnel, material and equipment, this limitation of command to important sea areas requires considerable extension and, with a world-wide combination of powers, it might be necessary to gain command of ~~the sur-rounding medium of mass movement in~~ both sea and air.

Although Naval Strategy is normally thought of in its relation to war, any great maritime power carries out a naval strategic policy during peace. A well designed peacetime naval strategy will have as its objective the prevention of armed conflict or failing that, the acquisition and development of such positions and resources as will facilitate the execution of its wartime Naval Strategy.

It is important to realize in this connection that modern warfare requires strategic materials in such enormous quantities that no single nation appears to possess all it needs within its boundaries. Therfore the belligerent who gains Command of the Sea will be in a favorable position to isolate, occupy or otherwise

0711

control the territory of his enemies and thereby reduce the enemy's will to resist.

All naval operations are projected from land positions, ~~and~~ The ultimate objective of naval warfare is therefore the seizure of land "for land is the natural habitat of man". This means then, that in global warfare there must be land positions available for the projection of such operations. The need for naval and air bases throughout the world is acute, and it is part of peacetime naval strategy to obtain such bases and to fit them for their war responsibilities.

The results of World War II have shown that despite the long distances aircraft can cover and despite the increased speed and cruising radius of both surface and undersea craft, the need for fleet and air bases throughout the world from which these units can operate, remains a "must" in the province of naval strategy for the major maritime powers. The upkeep of such bases, however, requires a large amount of equipment, supplies, and personnel which must be provided by both air and sea transportation. Therefore long supply lines must be maintained to provide the bases with the facilities necessary for continued operations and to handle the logistical requirements of the air, surface and underwater units operating in the vicinity of the bases.

Bases can no longer be closely grouped together. This is because modern weapons such as atomic bombs, guided missiles and

0712

other total warfare weapons are so destructive that it should be readily practicable to isolate such a base or group of bases. Therefore, the inconvenience of "dispersion" is a necessity. However, this dispersion should not be so great as to deny the bases air support from neighboring bases. This supports Napoleon's dictum that "the art of war consists in the dissemination of force in order to subsist, with due regard to concentration in order to fight".

These requirements broaden the scope of naval strategy and ultimately affect national strategy, even tho' national strategy is actually determined by national policy. It behooves national policy to ensure not only that naval strategy pursue appropriate aims, but that naval strategy be allowed adequate means and be undertaken under the most favorable conditions. It should be apparent that national policy and naval strategy are bound together in one indestructible link. The sphere of naval strategy is international. Its perplexities are accentuated by international commitments made as a result of national policy, which commitments may exert such a drain on the available naval forces as to seriously affect the national safety.

0713

The general method for determining the strategy for a given situation is normally developed through a well established mental process which weighs all of the pertinent factors. The first step is to determine the objective and to insure that it is clearly understood; the second step is to determine the relative fighting strengths through the study of many factors such as relative position of naval and air forces and bases, air and naval strength, psychological factors; the third step is to envisage the enemy operations which presumably can materially affect one's own plans adversely. These are enemy capabilities; the fourth step is to determine tentative solutions for accomplishing one's objective despite enemy opposition, as indicated by the enemy capabilities; and the final step is to determine the best solution of the problem. This is termed the "Decision". Objectives in this procedure may be physical, in which case they are termed an objective in space, such as a ship, or enemy trade, or even a geographical point; or they may be "ends in view" in which case they are objectives in the mind, such as the destruction of the enemy air force.

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There are two general types of naval strategy--offensive and defensive. Offensive naval strategy is that which exerts a pressure on the enemy in order to gain further naval objectives; defensive naval strategy is that which resists enemy pressure in order to prevent loss of naval objectives. Sometimes offensive and defensive naval strategy can be mutually supporting, as was evidenced in 1942 when the Allies fought an offensive war in the Atlantic and a defensive war in the Pacific; sometimes it can be jointly offensive-defensive in character as was evidenced by the American ~~Allied~~ air attacks on the Japanese home islands ~~the Marshall Islands in 1944~~ by the American fast carrier task force operating as a covering force in order to neutralize them while offensive action was being taken to capture Leyte. ~~Makin and Tarawa.~~

Many ~~authorities~~ consider that the destruction of the enemy fleet is the overall objective of naval warfare, but this is almost impossible of accomplishment because the enemy, unless confident of victory, would hardly cooperate to the extent of permitting his forces to be destroyed either by decisive naval battle, or by attrition, or by capture by land operations. Instead, he would probably remain in adequately defended ports and await the time when he would be able to justify his existence by striking an offensive blow. Of course in the case of the possibility of capture by land operations, the enemy fleet might choose to sortie rather than surrender, in which case a decisive naval battle might develop.

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As a matter of interest, there are several stratagems which may be effective in forcing a weaker enemy into a vulnerable position. Something he values must be threatened and he must feel compelled to expose himself in order to protect it; or an opportunity must appear to be presented to a weaker adversary to inflict a relatively greater loss on the stronger, than he expects to suffer himself. An example of the former was the Battle of Midway, brought on thru an attempt by the Japanese to capture Midway atoll. The Japanese had hoped to draw the United States fleet into decisive action in which surface ships and aircraft would be joined, as occurred later at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Instead, an air action developed between carrier forces which resulted in a decisive victory for the United States. As an example of the situation where an opportunity appears to present itself to the weaker force to inflict a relatively greater loss on a stronger opponent, there is the action off Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War 1905, where Togo vigorously attacked the Russian light forces near the port. The Russian fleet came out and was suddenly attacked by the Japanese fleet under Admiral Togo. No decisive action occurred, but the Russians suffered severe losses through attrition by mine fields. However, except on rare occasions, such stratagems have proven ineffective. The weaker enemy fleet has refused to be drawn out. So long as this occurs, the equivalent of command of the sea remains in the hands of the stronger opponent.

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In conclusion, it must be stressed again that naval strategy and tactics are inseparable. It is the duty of tactics to insure that its results are appropriate to the strategic aim and the duty of strategy to place at the disposal of tactics, the power appropriate to the results demanded. The latter consideration imposes on strategy the requirement that the prescribed aim be possible of attainment with the power that can be made available.

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Suggested Changes
Naval Strategy

Par.1. Strategy is employment of force to gain further aims in contradistinction to the immediate or local aims of tactics. Strategy sets a series of tactical objectives, and so proportions the available means that proper tactical employment can accomplish the tasks which have been set. Fundamentally, this basic definition will never change. However, tactical methods will vary considerably with the development of new weapons and new degrees of mobility. These, in turn, are reflected in the character of the strategy which is adopted. These variations do not affect the basic considerations of strategy but do affect their application.

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Add between paragraph 1 and 2.

Logistics is the handmaiden of strategy. In its relation to strategy it assumes the character of a dynamic force, without which, the strategic conception has little real significance. Therefore, strategy which does not consider the logistics problem will necessarily be ineffective.

Naval Strategy

Strategy is the employment of the means available to gain further aims, in contradistinction to the immediate or local aims of tactics. It sets tactical objectives and allots the means which under existing conditions are considered adequate to ensure that tactics can accomplish its assigned task. Fundamentally, this basic definition will never change. However, the procedure necessary to accomplish the strategical aims will vary considerably with the development of new weapons and new degrees of mobility. These variations do not affect the basic considerations of strategy but do affect their application.

Modern war between great powers is total war and requires the mobilization of the entire manpower and industrial resources of the opposing belligerents as dictated by National strategy. Naval strategy is so closely related to national strategy that a definition of the one is not complete without the accompanying definition of the other.

National strategy is the art and science of developing and employing the political economic and psychological powers of a nation with its armed forces, during peace as well as during war, to implement the national policies. It is essential, in this connection, that there be understanding between the civil authorities of the state and the leaders of the armed forces, in order that the national power may be properly coordinated with the power to enforce it. It is also essential, insofar as is practi-

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Every naval situation has both strategical and tactical aspects. The nature of the objectives to be attained at a particular time and the action to be taken to that end, may be governed chiefly by strategical or tactical considerations. Strategical considerations do not end when battle is joined, for tactics unguided by strategy might blindly make sacrifices merely to remain victor on the field of battle. But strategy looks beyond, in order to make gains of tactics accord with the strategic aim.

The chief objective of naval strategy is the keeping open of sea communications for one's own benefit on the one hand, and their suppression to the detriment of the enemy on the other. A nation is able to have control of the sea when it possesses and can exercise the power to move surface traffic as desired while, necessarily, being also able to prevent the enemy from so doing. The overall situation here depicted is known as command of the sea; and such command may require surface, subsurface and air operations of a variety of types. The sea, however, has vast

0720

expanse and it is not likely that either belligerent can possess sufficient strength everywhere to assure the successful movement of surface traffic. Nor is it likely that the full naval strength of a nation could be devoted to obtaining complete command of the sea.

It seems more likely that the situation desired to be attained will be to control certain particular areas of the sea. Thus the term command of the sea is not intended to convey the meaning of permanent undisputed control, nor area to mean a sea expanse beyond that necessary. The size or extent of the area or the degree to which control is exercised are dependent upon the objectives to be attained. Thus it is possible to consider several situations with respect to sea areas as a subdivision of the general concept of the command of the sea. There are three general situations which are: sea areas not under own command, sea areas in dispute and sea areas under own command.

However, in global warfare with its employment in vast scale of personnel, material andequipment, this limitation of command to certain particular areas of the sea, requires considerable extension, and with a world-wide combination of powers it might be necessary to gain command of entire oceans. Such command would normally be obtained by first gaining air superiority as surface

0721

ships, as a general thing, cannot operate in sea areas where such air superiority has not been obtained. If the air power required to gain this superiority cannot be brought into action from land bases, then sea power must provide it.

Although Naval Strategy is normally thought of in its relation to war, any great maritime power carries out a naval strategic policy during peace. A well designed peacetime naval strategy will have as its objective, the acquisition and development of such positions and resources as will facilitate the execution of its wartime Naval Strategy.

It is important to realize in this connection that modern warfare requires strategic materials in such enormous quantities that no single nation appears to possess all it needs within its boundaries. Therefore the belligerent who gains Command of the Sea will be in a favorable position to isolate, occupy or otherwise control the territory of his enemies and thereby reduce the enemy's will to resist.

All naval operations are projected from land positions. The ultimate objective of naval warfare is, therefore, the seizure of land "for land is the natural habitat of man". This means then that in global warfare there must be land positions available for the projection of such operations. Mahan stressed long ago, the naval strategic consideration that fighting strength was naval forces plus bases and that it was imperative to take possession of such maritime positions.

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*B In this connection air and sea power are mutually supporting. Air power operating from other than continental bases requires support from ~~the fleet~~ sea power in the form of logistics which includes transport and maintenance from the fleet and from the base, and ~~not~~ often requires support from sea power when it is necessary to ~~to~~ capture and develop shore bases for air power in disputed areas. Sea power, on the other hand, requires support from air power in those areas where the bases of sea power must be maintained in the presence of strong enemy air power. It also requires support from air power for logistical reasons.

0723

The results of World War II have shown that despite the long distances aircraft can cover and despite the increased speed and cruising radius of both surface and undersea craft, the need for fleet and air bases throughout the world from which these units can operate, remains a "must" in the province of naval strategy for the major maritime powers. The upkeep of such bases, however, requires a large amount of equipment, supplies and personnel which must be provided by both air and sea transportation. Therefore long lines of communication must be maintained to provide the bases with the facilities necessary for continued operations and to handle the logistical requirements of the air, surface and underwater units operating in the vicinity of the bases.

Bases can no longer be closely grouped together because modern weapons such as atomic bombs, guided missiles and other total warfare weapons make it readily practicable to isolate such a base or group of bases. The inconvenience of "dispersion" therefore becomes a necessity.

The requirements of modern warfare broaden the scope of naval strategy and ultimately affect national strategy, even though national strategy is actually determined by national policy. It behooves national policy to ensure not only that naval strategy pursues appropriate aims, but that naval strategy be allowed adequate means and be

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undertaken under the most favorable conditions. It should be apparent that national policy and naval strategy are bound together in one indestructible link.

The sphere of naval strategy is international. Its perplexities are accentuated by international commitments made as a result of national policy, which commitments may exert such a drain on the available naval forces as to seriously affect the national safety.

A general method for determining the strategy for a given situation is normally developed through a well established mental process which weighs all of the pertinent factors. This process first determines the objective and insures that it is clearly understood; it then determines the relative fighting strengths through the study of many factors such as the naval and air forces and bases, their naval and air strength, weather, psychological factors; then it envisages the enemy operations which presumably can materially affect its own plans adversely. These are enemy capabilities. After this, it selects tentative solutions for accomplishing its objective despite enemy opposition, as indicated by the enemy capabilities; and finally, it determines the best solution of the problem. This is termed the "Decision". Objectives in this procedure may be physical, in which case they are termed an objective in space, such as a ship, or enemy trade, or even a geographical point; or they may be "ends in view" in which

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There are two general types of naval strategy-offensive and defensive. Offensive naval strategy is that which exerts a pressure on the enemy in order to gain further naval objectives; defensive naval strategy is that which resists enemy pressure in order to prevent loss of naval objectives. Sometimes offensive and defensive naval strategy can be mutually supporting, as was evidenced in 1942 when the Allies fought an offensive war in the Atlantic and a defensive war in the Pacific; sometimes it can be jointly offensive-defensive in character as was evidenced by the Allied air attacks on the southern Japanese Islands in October 1944 by the American fast carrier task forces operating as a covering force, in order to neutralize them while offensive action was being taken to capture Leyte.

The method by which naval effort is made effective is by destruction or damage of the enemy forces, by containing them or diverting them. The first named method is of general and universal application in all types of operations. The means available for these methods is as diversified as the entire range of naval weapons and their individual and combined use.

Many authorities consider that the destruction of the enemy fleet is the overall objective of naval warfare, but this is almost impossible of accomplishment because a weaker enemy, unless

0726

confident of victory, would hardly cooperate to the extent of permitting his forces to be destroyed either by decisive naval battle, or by attrition, or by capture by land operations. Instead, he would probably remain in adequately defended ports and await the time when he would be able to justify his existence by striking an offensive blow. This is especially so when he anticipates becoming stronger later through the arrival of reinforcements or the rapid development by the nation's economic forces of additional sea power. Of course the airplane, the atomic bomb and the guided missile make the decision as to whether to retire a weaker fleet to a defended port or to sortie it, a most serious one. Should a fleet be so retired and should the enemy gain superiority in the air, a fleet based in a defended harbor might suffer heavily. In such case, the destruction of the enemy fleet would probably be effected by attrition. In the case of possibility of capture by land operations, the enemy fleet might choose to sortie rather than surrender, in which case a decisive naval battle might develop.

In this connection there are several examples of naval strategy which are occasionaly effective in forcing a weaker enemy to sortie from a defended harbor into a vulnerable position. One of these examples is based on the theory that something the enemy values must be threatened and he must feel compelled to expose himself in order to protect it; the other, on the theory

0727

that an opportunity must appear to be presented to a weaker adversary to inflict a relatively greater loss on the stronger, than he expects to suffer himself. An example of the former in World War II was the Battle of Midway, brought on through an attempt of the Japanese to capture Midway Atoll. The Japanese had hoped to draw the United States fleet into decisive action in which surface ships and aircraft would be joined, as occurred later at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Instead, an air action developed between carrier forces which resulted in a decisive victory for the United States. An example of the latter, also in World War II, was the operation in the Western Pacific in October 1944 when, in a carrier attack on Formosa, two American cruisers were torpedoed. These two cruisers, escorted by several destroyers, were then used as a decoy and were placed on a southerly course to convince the Japanese that they were remnants of the American Fleet and could easily be destroyed. The covering carrier task groups were directed to take station about 235 miles to the eastward. The Japanese were completely fooled and sortied from their harbors to destroy the damaged ships. They did not accomplish this, however, for one of their planes discovered the American carrier forces to the eastward; the Japanese saw the trap and immediately retired.

In conclusion, it must be stressed that naval strategy and tactics are inseparable. It is the duty of tactics to insure that its results are appropriate to the strategic aim and the duty

0728

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0729

Naval Strategy

~~There are three types of strategy;~~ national, military and ~~naval~~. Although this discussion is on naval strategy, it appears necessary to explain both national and military strategy in order that the manner in which naval strategy flows from them may be apparent. In the first place, National strategy is defined as the art and science of developing and employing the political, economic and psychological power of a nation with its armed forces during peace as well as during war to implement the national policies.

Prior to and during World War II, both the Germans and the Japanese understood that the old definition of strategy "the science and art of employing the armed forces of a belligerent to secure the objects of a war" was incomplete. To them, strategy was global in scope, long range in point of time, and employed as its instruments during peace as well as during war, all forces which could be developed by the entire population and resources of their nations. They therefore built up their war capabilities by the planned coordinated development of their political, economic, psychological and armed forces with the end in view of accomplishing definite political objectives. This was accomplished by increasing their war potential, by building up stock piles of strategic materials, by building factories readily convertible to war use, by testing new developments of weapons and tactics on the battlefields of Spain and China as well as at sea, by building

0730

up the psychological forces of their nations by master race propaganda, by fifth column activities, and by their subjection of the individual to the State. On the other hand, the United States did not realize the new national strategy, and failed to establish stock piles of strategic materials, or to otherwise prepare the Nation for war. It did not appear to realize that in selling great quantities of petroleum products and scrap iron to the Japanese in particular and in failing to fortify Guam and the Philippines,it was building up Japanese war potential at the expense of its own.

After the United States entered World War II, its national strategy became firmed. It was decided, on the premise that Germany was a more dangerous enemy than Japan, that the European war would have priority over the Japanese war. This decision placed the United States in an unfavorable strategic position, in that the American naval forces were not adequate to meet the demands in both oceans. It became the function of national strategy then, to build up the economic resources of the Nation to support this kind of war; to fulfill the strategic requirements for the transportation and support of Allied forces overseas; to conduct psychological warfare and, finally, to build up the armed forces to their maximum. Naturally, vast logistics requirements were made necessary by such tremendous commitments, for without such logistics the strategic conception has little real significance.

0731

Military strategy is the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the object of a war by the successful application of force or a threat of force. It is by the correct application of this strategy that victory in war is won. That portion of the military strategy applied by the naval command is called naval strategy. There are two general types of naval strategy--offensive and defensive. Offensive naval strategy is that which exerts a pressure on the enemy in order to gain further objectives; defensive naval strategy is that which resists enemy pressure in order to prevent loss of naval objectives. ~~Sometimes offensive and defensive naval strategy can be mutually supporting; sometimes it can be jointly defensive-offensive and offensive-defensive in character.~~ ~~The operations by the United States Navy in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans were the result of naval strategy. What did this strategy consist?~~

The United States naval strategy in the Atlantic against the German submarine, ~~which was originally defensive-offensive~~, involved maintaining its lines of communications to Great Britain and to future bases of operations against its enemies in Europe, in addition to insuring the security of the Western Hemisphere. This is the chief objective of naval strategy and is attained by offensive operations to gain command of the sea, which is defined as "the keeping open of sea communications on the one hand and their suppression to the detriment of the enemy on the other." Without command of the sea it is not possible to move own surface traffic

0732

as desired, while, at the same time preventing the enemy from so doing. To gain and maintain such command may require the employment of a variety of types of surface, subsurface and air operations. Command of the sea does not mean command over the entire sea, but only over those vital sea areas necessary to accomplish the objectives to be attained. By the spring of 1943 the United States offensive against German submarines had succeeded, and the United States was everywhere on the offensive in the Atlantic, which offensive was maintained until the end of the European war.

The United States naval strategy in the Pacific involved a three-year struggle for command of vital sea areas of that ocean. During the first six months of the war there, the Japanese, owing to the heavy damage to the United States Fleet by a Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, and owing to the United States failure to appreciate national strategy, were on the strategic offensive, and rapidly expanded their area of command until it embraced most of the Western Pacific as far as the Solomon Sea and the Aleutians. In endeavoring to expand their command of the sea farther, in order to increase their perimeter of defense, they moved south and east. They were turned back at the Battle of the Coral Sea in the south, and at the Battle of Midway in the east and remained on the defensive thereafter.

The United States, on the other hand, for the first ~~six~~ WINF months of the war and until the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942, was totally on the defensive. After the Coral Sea ~~and until the Battle~~

0733

~~of Midway in June 1942,~~ the United States ~~was on the~~ gradually assumed the strategic ~~defensive~~ offensive. This was because although her operations were chiefly defensive in character, she was nevertheless enabled to take some offensive measures. Among these offensive measures were the seizing of certain islands such as Efate and Espiritu Santo, for the establishment of advance bases which were necessary as links in her lines of communications to Australia; and the offensive operations of United States submarines against Japanese lines of communication. These operations were the result of the directive to the CinC Pacific Fleet, which directed that he "protect the essential sea and air communications."

After the Battle of Midway, the United States ~~assumed the~~ initiated ~~offensive-defensive~~ operations, ~~in order~~ to further protect her lines of communication to Australia and New Zealand. During this phase she assumed the offensive in the southwestern Pacific, while she remained on the defensive elsewhere. She assumed this offensive to counter the Japanese seizure of Guadalcanal Island from which Japanese land based planes would imperil her lines of communications.

From now on, until victory was achieved in August 1945, the United States was generally on the offensive. The strategy of the Pacific was to advance to the Philippines from two directions, one from Hawaii and thru the Central Pacific, the other from Australia and thru the Solomons, of which Guadalcanal was the spearhead. These formed a pair of gigantic nutcrackers, with

0734

the Philippines as the nut. ~~Under General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur, a combined Army-Navy force moved north from the Australian region. Under Fleet Admiral, Chester Nimitz, a United States Army-Navy-Marine force moved westward from Hawaii.~~ Both of these pincers moved steadily and inexorably across the Pacific. The Southern ~~MacArthur~~'s pincer, composed of a combined army-Navy force, took, among other places, Hollandia, ~~[illegible]~~, the Solomon Islands Morotai, Leyte, Lingayen, while ~~Nimitz~~'s pincer, the Central Pacific, composed of a combined army-Navy-Marine force, took Tarawa, Eniwetok, Kwajalein, Saipan, Guam, PALAU, IWO JIMA and Okinawa. At this point the Japanese Empire on 10 August surrended unconditionally, and the war was at an end.

These successful movements of United States power were heavily supported by the strategic employment of ~~the~~ submarines which methodically destroyed the Japanese merchant marine. They accomplished this by operating far in advance of the United States expanding area of surface and air command, and by there cutting the Japanese lines of communication.

The success of United States strategy in the Pacific war, and especially that followed ~~by Fleet Admiral Nimitz~~ in the Central Pacific, was based entirely on his success in gaining command of the sea. This command of the sea was achieved by the employment of new strategical considerations and new tactics which employed both carrier based aircraft and land based aircraft operating in large numbers from island bases, in coordination with powerful amphibious forces. In this connection it is important to note that as all naval operations are projected from land positions, ~~the ultimate objective of naval warfare is seizure of land, for land is the natural habitat of man. Fleet Admiral Nimitz, therefore,~~

0735

it became necessary

in executing the naval strategy of the Central Pacific [redacted] to seize any land positions available for the projection of his necessary operations for gaining command of the sea.

~~It was the responsibility of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance to capture these land positions.~~ It was not necessary to occupy every atoll to insure that the lines of communication from Hawaii thru the Central Pacific were secure. It was, instead, solely necessary to pursue a "leap frog" strategy masked by coordinated assaults on the land positions which it was essential to capture either as air or fleet bases, whereas many strong island positions which were not necessary for the accomplishment of the task, were by-passed. This strategy was made possible because the industrial capacity of the United States implementing the national strategy, supplied the ships and planes and the vast logistics requirements in ever increasing volume, so that the United States fleet became increasingly superior to the Japanese fleet. The Japanese were therefore unable to maintain their lines of communication to these island positions, and the latter became innocuous.

As the United States forces moved across the Pacific, the Japanese fleet retired behind the defenses of their ever shrinking defense perimeter. Their naval strategy was to prepare their naval strength so as to be able to envelop and destroy the United States fleet in decisive action any time after 20 May 1944, but, until ready, to avoid decisive action. The Japanese fleet thereby became a "fleet in being" which is defined by Mahan as "one the

0736