



NATIONAL SECURITY SYMPOSIUM

2004

**TAKING STOCK:
PROGRESS & CHALLENGES
FOR
DoD & THE U.S. MILITARY**

Professor Rich Lloyd



The Challenges of Strategy and Force Planning

BUSH ADMINISTRATION

- The Goals
- The Strategies
- The Resources
- The Force for the Future



STRATEGY AND FORCE PLANNING





TOP TWELVE DEFENSE STRATEGY DECISIONS

NDU QDR 2001 WORKING GROUP

- How should the US **define** its **national interests**?
- What are the **most significant threats** to these interests, and what are the most significant **opportunities** for advancing them?
- What should our **primary national security objectives** be?
- What **kinds of wars** should the US military be prepared to **deter** and, if necessary, **fight and win** over the next **10-20 years**?
- What are the **appropriate uses** of the US military **short of major war**?
- What are the **appropriate roles** and **missions** for DOD in support of **homeland security**?



TOP TWELVE DEFENSE STRATEGY DECISIONS

NDU QDR 2001 WORKING GROUP

- What should the **objectives of military transformation** be and **how urgently** should they be **pursued**?
- What should the **overseas presence posture** of the US military be?
- What is the **appropriate role of nuclear weapons**? And what **mix** of strategic **offenses** and **defenses** should be pursued?
- What **roles** should we **expect allies** and **partners** to play across the spectrum of operations?
- **How** should these **strategy elements** be **prioritized**?
- What **strategy – based criteria** should be used to **size the force**? And what should the associated declaratory policy be?

National Security Strategy



NATIONAL INTEREST MATRIX

BASIC NATIONAL INTEREST

INTENSITY OF INTEREST

**SURVIVAL
(CRITICAL)**

**VITAL
(DANGEROUS)**

**MAJOR
(SERIOUS)**


**PERIPHERAL
(BOTHERSOME)**

DEFENSE OF HOMELAND

ECONOMIC WELL-BEING

FAVORABLE WORLD ORDER

PROMOTION OF VALUES





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BASIC NATIONAL INTEREST

INTENSITY OF INTEREST


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COMPETING NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES

- **NEO-ISOLATIONISM**
- **COOPERATIVE SECURITY**
- **SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT**
- **PRIMACY**



NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

GOALS

**“Our Nation’s cause has always been larger than our Nation’s defense.
We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty.
We will **defend** the peace **against** the threats of **terrorists and tyrants**.
We will preserve the peace by **building good relations among the great powers**.
And we will extend the peace by **encouraging free and open societies** on every continent.”**

President Bush West Point, New York June 1. 2002

GOALS

Translate this moment of influence into decades of peace, prosperity and liberty

Distinctly **American internationalism that reflects the**

****union of our values and our national interests****

****Political and economic freedom, peaceful relations among states,****

****and respect for human dignity****



NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

OVERVIEW

TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS, THE UNITED STATES WILL:

- CHAMPION ASPIRATIONS OF HUMAN DIGNITY**
- STRENGTHEN ALLIANCES TO DEFEAT GLOBAL TERRORISM AND WORK TO PREVENT ATTACKS AGAINST US AND OUR FRIENDS**
- WORK WITH OTHERS TO DEFUSE REGIONAL CONFLICTS**
- PREVENT OUR ENEMIES FROM THREATENING US, OUR ALLIES, AND OUR FRIENDS, WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**
- IGNITE A NEW ERA OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH THROUGH FREE MARKETS AND FREE TRADE**
- EXPAND THE CIRCLE OF DEVELOPMENT BY OPENING SOCIETIES AND BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF DEMOCRACY**
- DEVELOP AGENDAS FOR COOPERATIVE ACTION WITH OTHER MAIN CENTERS OF GLOBAL POWER**
- TRANSFORM AMERICA'S NATIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS TO MEET THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**




NATIONAL STRATEGY

- **POLITICAL**
- **ECONOMIC**
- **MILITARY**

Defense Strategy & Force Planning



THE LEADERSHIP'S DILEMMA





JOINT ISSUES

- **WIN THE WAR ON TERRORISM**
- **POST-CONFLICT WITH IRAQ AND RECONSTRUCTION**
- **IMPLEMENT THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW**
- **NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY**
- **TRANSFORMATION GOALS AND STRATEGY**
- **NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW**
- **SPACE**
- **MISSILE DEFENSE**
- **EMERGING OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS**
- **FORCE STRUCTURE AND END STRENGTH**
- **ACTIVE AND RESERVE REALIGNMENT**
- **PROCUREMENT BOWWAVES**
- **OPTEMPO & READINESS**
- **QUALITY OF LIFE**
- **C4ISR**
- **U.S. GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE**
- **STRATEGIC MOBILITY**
- **BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS**
- **TRANSFORMING THE BUSINESS OF DEFENSE**



Defense Strategy

Defense Policy Goals & Strategic Tenets

- **Defense Policy Goals:**
 - **Assuring allies & friends**
 - **Dissuading future military competition**
 - **Deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests**
 - **If deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary**
- **Strategic Tenets:**
 - **Managing risks**
 - **A capabilities-based approach**
 - **Defending the United States and projecting U.S. military power**
 - **Strengthening alliances and partnerships**
 - **Maintaining favorable regional balances**
 - **Developing a broad portfolio of military capabilities**
 - **Transforming defense**



Managing Risks

How should we manage risks?

- **Force Management Risks**
 - How we sustain our people, equipment and infrastructure
- **Operational Risks**
 - Ability of our forces to accomplish their warfighting missions in the near-term
- **Future Challenges Risks**
 - Investments and changes needed today to permit us to deal effectively with military challenges in the future
- **Institutional Risks**
 - Remedying inefficient processes and excessive support requirements that jeopardize our ability to use resources efficiently



THE ASYMMETRIC THREAT

National Defense Panel 1997

An adaptive adversary:

exploiting his strengths-attacking our weaknesses

- **Attack our will to fight**
- **Employ imaginative tactics and techniques**
- **Deny access to forward locations**
- **Exploit WMD technology**
- **Target fixed installations and massed formations**
- **Move the fight to urban areas**
- **Combine approaches for even greater synergy**




SPECTRUM OF MILITARY MISSIONS AND CONFLICT SCENARIOS

Nuclear War – Near-Peer Competitor
Bio, Chemical, Nuclear Weapons Use – Rogue States or Terrorists
Major War – Near-Peer Competitor
Cyber and Other Attacks on U.S. Homeland
Two Major Theater Wars – Nearly Simultaneous
One Major Theater War
Smaller Scale Contingency
Counter-Insurgency
Peace Enforcement
Counter-Terrorism
Counter-Drug
Foreign Internal Defense
Peacekeeping
Security Assistance
Evacuation Assistance
Humanitarian Assistance
Overseas Presence




CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?

What is the Force Mix?



How Much is Enough?





ON MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
31 January 2002 National Defense University

“Our Challenge in the 21st century is to defend our cities and our infrastructure from new forms of attack while projecting our forces over long distances to fight new adversaries”

SIX TRANSFORMATIONAL GOALS OF U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY

- Protect the U.S. homeland and our bases overseas.**
- Project and sustain U.S. military power in distant anti-access environments.**
- Deny enemies sanctuary.**
- Protect information networks from attack.**
- Use American information superiority to seamlessly weld the U.S. armed forces as a joint force.**
- Maintain unhindered access to space and protect U.S. space assets.**



Paradigm Shift in Force Planning

- **Defend the United States**
- **Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions**
- **Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts- including the possibility of regime change or occupation; and**
- **Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations**



Operation Iraqi Freedom A First-Blush Assessment

Andrew F. Krepinevich Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 2003

- **United States is in the Regime-Change Business**
- **Divergence, Not Convergence-other militaries must move to extremes along the spectrum of conflict**
- **Anti-access challenge is real and growing**
- **Precision warfare comes of age**
 - **Compressing the engagement cycle**
 - **Precision Strike**
 - **Joint integration**
 - **Progress in minimizing friendly fire**
- **Battle over the lessons of Iraq** **Which would you increase or decrease?**
 - **Low-Density, High-Demand**
 - » **Persistent surveillance: UAVs and SOF**
 - » **Bombers and Tankers**
 - » **Stability Operations**
 - **High-Density, Low-Demand**
 - » **Tactical Aircraft**
 - » **Heavy Ground Formations**



Joint Operations Concepts

Department of Defense November 2003

- Achieve **common understanding** of all dimensions of the **battlespace** throughout the joint force
- Make **joint decisions** and take action **throughout the joint force faster** than the opponent
- **Adapt in scope, scale, and method** as the situation requires
- Rapidly deploy selected portions of the Joint Force that can **immediately transition to execution**, even in the **absence of developed infrastructure**
- Create and sustain **continuous pressure** throughout the battlespace for as little or as long as it takes to accomplish strategic or operational aims
- **Disintegrate, disorient, dislocate, or destroy** any opponent with a combination of lethal and non-lethal means
- Conduct deployment and sustainment activities in support of **multiple simultaneous, distributed, decentralized battles and campaigns**
- Accomplish all of the above in an **inter-agency and multi-national context**



Joint Operations Concepts

Department of Defense November 2003

Force Attributes

- **Fully integrated**
- **Expeditionary**
- **Networked**
- **Decentralized**
- **Adaptable**
- **Decisions superiority**
- **Lethality**



Joint Operations Concepts

Department of Defense November 2003

Categories

Joint Operating Concepts

Major Combat Operations

Stability Operations

Homeland Security

Strategic Deterrence

Joint Functional Concepts

Joint Command and Control

Battlespace Awareness

Force Application

Focused Logistics

Protection


Defense Budgets



DOWNSIZING & CHANGING STRATEGIC DIRECTION

THE 1990s



		Actual Force 1991	Base Force 1991	BUR Force 1993	QDR Force 1997
Total					
Uniformed	Active	2.13M	1.64M	1.45M	1.36M
Personnel	Reserve	1.17M	920K	900K	835K



**Real Purchasing Power
Bottoms Out in 1998**

DoD Historical Funding


Procurement is the Bill Payer






Investment Rate Not Keeping Pace with Steady State Requirement in the 1990s


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
Helicopters



Ships



Armored Vehicles



* FY01-07 Includes estimate of IAV quantities




ESTIMATE OF SUSTAINING DEFENSE BUDGET CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (IN BILLIONS OF 2000 DOLLARS OF BUDGET AUTHORITY)

	Appropriation for Fiscal year 2000		Sustaining-Budget Estimate
Department of Defense (Budget 051)		\$50b Gap for 15 Years	
Military Personnel	74		82
Operation and Maintenance	102		107
Procurement	53		90
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation	38		40
Military Construction	5		5
Family Housing	<u>4</u>		<u>4</u>
Subtotal	276		327
Other Agencies (Budgets 053 and 054)	<u>13</u>		<u>13</u>
Total National Defense (Budget 050)	289		340



DoD Topline Benefited From Cong/OMB Adds in Recent Years





\$30 BILLION OVER FY 2002-07

A STRATEGY FOR A LONG PEACE

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS
JANUARY 2001

- **SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY-\$11 BILLION**
 - **20% MORE THAN PLANNED**
- **TRIDENT SSGN CONVERSIONS-\$5 BILLION**
 - **CONVERT FOUR TO SSGNs**
 - **REFUEL LOS ANGELES CLASS SSNs**
- **STREETFIGHTER SHIP-\$750 MILLION**
 - **CONSTRUCT AND TEST SEVERAL PROTOTYPES**
- **JOINT MOBILE OFFSHORE BASE-\$1.5 BILLION**
 - **SINGLE MODULE AND TEST IN POWER PROJECTION**
- **UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES-\$3.5 BILLION**
 - **DOUBLES UAV FUNDING**
 - **UCAV SQUADRON FOR TESTING BY FY 2005**
 - **ACCELERATES UAV FOR OTHER ROLES**
- **DISCOVERER II SPACE-BASED RADAR-\$600 MILLION**
 - **TWO PROTOTYPES LAUNCHED BY FY 2003**
- **ARMY INITIATIVES-\$1.5 BILLION**
 - **HIMARS LIGHT WEIGHT MISSILE ARTILLERY AND ATACMS BLOCK IIA EXTENDED RANGE MISSILES**
 - **ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE COMBAT VEHICLE IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FUNDING**
- **OPERATIONAL EXPERIMENTATION-\$7 BILLION**
 - **CREATE AND ENHANCE SITES TO EXPERIMENT**
 - **STANDUP AND OPERATE JOINT ANTI-ACCESS/AREA-DENIAL NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER, JOINT URBAN WARFARE TRAINING CENTER AND JOINT OPPOSING FORCE**



\$30 BILLION OVER FY 2002-07
A STRATEGY FOR A LONG PEACE
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- BILL PAYERS**
- CANCEL JSF, BUY BLOCK 60 F-16, F-15E,F-18E/F**
- CUT F-22 TO ONE WING**
- CANCEL CRUSADER, BUY BRITISH AS-90 OR GERMAN PzH 2000**
- CUT ONE ARMY DIVISION OR ONE TO TWO CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS OR THREE AIR FORCE FIGHTER WINGS**



\$120 BILLION EXISTING PLANS-FUNDING MISMATCH

**A STRATEGY FOR A LONG PEACE
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS
JANUARY 2001**

Force-Budget Mismatch

EXISTING PLANS-FUNDING MISMATCH	\$120 BILLION
TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVES	<u>30 BILLION</u>
TOTAL REQUIRED	\$150 BILLION

OPTIONS

1) RAISE DOD TOPLINE

**2) DO ADJUSTMENTS UNDER \$30 BILLION OPTION AND
TOTAL CUT OF:**

TWO ARMY DIVISIONS


TWO CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS

TWO AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUPS

A MARINE CORPS REGIMENT

THREE AIR FORCE FIGHTER WINGS

DoD Topline





DEFENSE BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS FY 2002-2004

FY 2002

- **\$32.6b increase over enacted FY 01**
- **Restore military morale –pay, housing and health**
- **Bolster readiness – increase O&M**
- **Increase RDT&E and missile defense**

FY 2003

- **Adds \$120b over FYDP**
- **Procurement \$99b in 2007**
- **Must pay bills and realistic costing**
- **Cuts \$9.3b in legacy systems**
- **Adds \$9.8b new requirements**
- **Emphasis on Trident conversions, UAVs, precision munitions, missile defense**
- **Increase military pay, housing and health**
- **Sustains higher O&M funding**

FY 2004

- **\$15.3 b increase over enacted FY 03**
- **Budget roughly at 1980s level, 17% above cold war average**
- **13% increase from FY 03 to FY 09**
- **Increases procurement**
- **\$24.3b for transformation, \$239b over FYDP**
- **50% increase in SOF (\$1.5b)**
- **Missile defense to \$9.1b**
- **Targeted pay increases**
- **Sustains higher O&M funding**

Department of Defense Topline

(Discretionary budget authority \$ in Billions)



	<u>FY 04</u>	<u>FY 05</u>	<u>FY 06</u>	<u>FY 07</u>	<u>FY 08</u>	<u>FY 09</u>
DoD Budget	381.4	401.7	422.7	443.9	465.7	487.7
Rescissions	<u>-6.1</u>					
TOTAL	375.3	401.7	422.7	443.9	465.7	487.7

**Is \$20b per year ramp
sustainable?**

7% change from FY 04 to FY 05

33% higher than Clinton FY2001 Request



FUNDING FOR DEFENSE, MILITARY OPERATIONS, HOMELAND SECURITY, AND RELATED ACTIVITIES SINCE 9-11

(in billions of dollars)

STEVEN KOSIAK, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS

JANUARY 21, 2004

Response to and Recovery from 9-11 Terrorist Attacks		167
Military Operations related to Combating Terrorism, including operations in Afghanistan, and Homeland Security	83	
Reconstruction and Related Aid to Afghanistan	3	
Non-DoD Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism	65	
Victim Relief and Recovery from 911 attacks	16	
War In Iraq and Aftermath		128
Military Operations (DoD)	105	
Reconstruction and Related Aid to Iraq	23	
Other		10
Foreign Aid (primarily to states supporting US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq)	7	
Aviation Industry Relief	2	
Other	1	
Defense Programs and Activities Unrelated to Combating Terrorism, HLS or Iraq		101
Total:		407
In annual appropriations	167	
In supplemental appropriations	239	

FY 2005 DEFENSE BUDGET



FY 2005 DEFENSE BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS

STEVEN KOSIAK, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS
JANUARY 30, 2004

- **DoD topline \$401.7, does not include DoE**
- **7% increase over FY 04**
- **Does not include funds for military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan or elsewhere; CSBA estimates these costs at \$30-50 billion next year**
- **10% higher than cold war average in real terms; 20% higher by FY 2009**
- **Cost implications of Army end strength increase of 30,000 is unclear; compensation of active duty troop averages \$100,000**
- **\$75 billion for weapons procurement, need \$100 billion by end of decade to sustain program**
- **\$69 billion for R&D, highest level ever**
- **Increased personnel costs and operations and maintenance cost could divert funds from procurement**

FY 2005 Defense Budget Themes



- Successfully pursue the global war on terrorism
- Doing right by our military people
- Managing demand on the force
- Transforming military capabilities
- Improve and integrate intelligence capabilities
- Further streamline DoD management processes

Successfully Pursue the Global War on Terrorism



FY 2005 budget:

- Robustly funds force readiness requirements
- Funds immediate acquisition needs, e.g., missile defense, UAVs, up-armored Humvees, Stryker vehicles, advanced ships
- Funds future acquisition, e.g., laser satellite system, space based radar, joint tactical radio, cruise missile defense
- Requests legislative authorities for support to other nations fighting terrorism and helping US operations
- Supports improvement/integration of intelligence capabilities

Managing the Force

Doing Right by our Military People

(Discretionary budget authority \$ in Billions)



Military Personnel

(excluding FY 04 supplemental)

FY 04

97.9

FY 05

104.8

- Base pay raise: 3.5% (Employment cost index plus 0.5%)
- Average out-of-pocket housing costs drop to 0 from 3.5% for military personnel living in private housing

Active military personnel (in thousands)

	<u>FY 03</u>	<u>FY 04</u>	<u>FY 05</u>
End strength*	1,390	1,391	1,383
Actual strength	1,434	**1,423	
Emergency authorities	44	**32	

*Budgeted level excluding supplementals; does not include reserve mobilization

**As of January 1, 2004

Managing Demand on the Force



- Expanding capabilities: Fulfilling missions with smaller forces
- Rebalancing forces: Reducing need for Reserve mobilization
- Personnel management: Flexibility to retain critical skills
- Temporary authorities: Higher personnel levels for peak demands
- Military-to-civilian conversion:
 - FY 04: 10,000 positions
 - FY 05: 10,070 positions


Rebalancing Forces



- Reduce need for Reserve mobilization in first 15 days of operations
- Limit involuntary Reserve mobilization
- Active: Increase early response support functions, such as logistics, transportation, and medical
- Reserve: Phase out some artillery/air defense/other units –
Add military police/transportation/medical/civil affairs
- Progress in rebalancing within/between Active & Reserve
 - FY 03: 10,000 military positions
 - FY 04: 20,000 military positions
 - FY 05: 20,000 military positions

Transforming Future Forces

Our Progress




Mid-Course Review

Objective Force Transformation Ongoing Now!



EVOLVING ARMY TRANSFORMATION

Fully Networked Battle Command capabilities bridge from the Current to Future Force and enable interdependent network-centric warfare



Enhanced Capabilities

Increasingly:

- *Integrated*
- *Expeditionary*
- *Networked*
- *Decentralized*
- *Adaptable*
- *Decision Superior*
- *Lethal*

Accelerated Development and Fielding of DOTMLPF Solutions

Characteristics of Army Transformation: *Responsiveness, Deployability, Agility, Versatility, Lethality, Survivability, and Sustainability fully support Future Joint Force Attributes*

Adapting Army Structure

□ *Restructuring the Force*

100K+ of change... divesting Cold War headquarters and structure to enhance Global War on Terrorism capability

□ *Creating a Modular Army*

“Brigade based”...more responsive, enables Joint and expeditionary capabilities

□ *Stabilizing the Force*

Increases unit cohesion & stability, and provides predictability for Soldiers & families

Most Significant Army Restructuring in the Past 50 Years

CSA Strategic Vision


- **Main elements of CSA reorganization**
 - **Increase the number of brigades**
 - » **Take the Army's 33 maneuver brigades and spread their personnel across 48 brigades**
 - **Push support roles down to the brigade level**
 - » **Take the support brigades -- those that do artillery, supply and maintenance, for the most part -- and sprinkle their personnel across the 48 as well**
 - **New “brigade based” structure will replace the current arrangement, designed for the Cold War when the Army was prepared to fight giant set-piece battles on European soil, where the support roles were organized at the division level**
 - **Improve the deployment ratio so that there can be two brigades at home for every one deployed overseas**

CSA Strategic Vision

- **Make every soldier a rifleman**: The support troops in the new brigades will have to be more versatile as soldiers
 - » Where under the current structure troops have completed basic training then gone immediately into their specialized fields of logistics, etc., the new structure will require a higher level of combat proficiency from each soldier
 - » **Draws on the traditions of the Marine Corps**, where every soldier is an Infantryman first, and **on his own experience in the Special Forces**, where every member of a 12-man "A" team is a special operator first, and a communications expert or medic second
- CSA is putting into wider practice the analysis that **smaller units make better and faster combat forces**, which are better suited for the conflicts of our age, than do bigger, lumbering Cold War-style units
- Reorganization **increases the mixture of weapons and functions at a lower level of the force**

Adapting Army Structure

Restructuring the Force



- Divesting Cold War structure to enable GWOT capability
- Relieve stress on High Demand / Low Density units
- Improve readiness and deployability of units
- Execute Military to Civilian Conversions

Most Significant Army Restructuring in the Past 50 Years

Small Wars



Small Wars Center of Excellence



www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil

"...small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation."

such operations are defined by their purpose, and not by their scope and scale

W. Maximo Cooper
SMALL WARS MANUAL
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
1940

INDEX



~~RESTRICTED~~

*11 Feb 1972 - Declassified, Auth
DOD Directive 5200.9 of 27 Sep 88.*

*J. Kelly
Maj USMC
Maj USMC TSCO*

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1940

"Between these extremes may be found an infinite number of forms of friendly assistance or intervention which it is almost impossible to classify under a limited number of individual types of operations."

Small Wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small Wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions.

At the beginning of the last century, the Marine Corps had fewer than 300 officers and less than 8,000 enlisted. Today, the Corps has 80 active duty general officers overseeing roughly 175,000 officers and Marines. Given the constant commitments throughout the early 20th century and the very small size of the Corps, a high percentage of officers had small wars experience.

SMALL WARS

- DRAFT -

JANUARY 2004



CENTER FOR EMERGING THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES
MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

WWW.SMALLWARS.QUANTICO.USMC.MIL

...in certain respects, the U.S. military may be less well suited for small wars today than it was in the early 20th century. With all the important technological and educational advances over the past century this might seem impossible; but experience, character, common sense, flexibility, creativity, and cultural awareness count more than technology in the prosecution of small wars.

In short, solid historical education, extensive cultural study, and rigorous training are essential correctives to the challenges presented by an increasingly bureaucratized and less culturally and socially

A New Global Defense Posture

Reshaping US Global Posture and Basing



2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission

- Streamline facilities to be more efficient
- Will help DoD facilities stay modernized and productive
- Commission meets in FY 05, implementation begins in FY 06

Global Defense Posture Review

- Global analysis of personnel, infrastructure, equipment, surge capabilities, and how forces are provided
- Full participation of U.S. allies and global partners
- Consultation with Congress
- Changes will be considered in conjunction with 2005 BRAC



Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture

Defense Department background brief on Global Defense Posture, November 25, 2003


Develop flexibility
to contend with
uncertainty

Expand allied roles,
build new
partnerships

Focus within and
across regions

Develop rapidly
deployable
capabilities

Focus on
capabilities, not
numbers





Strategic Mobility

New Requirements Study Needed

What has changed?

- MRS 2005 OBE
- Total global air, land, sea assets
- New Defense Strategy
- New force planning paradigm
- Global War on Terrorism
- U.S. Global Defense Posture
- Tyranny of distance
- Force structure changes
- Aging air fleets
- Access to bases, over flight rights politically denied
- Anti-access threats
- Intra-theater lift
- Sea Basing Concept
- TRANSCOM assumes supply distribution role
- U.S. Northern Command



Future Investments

Transforming Systems

(Procurement and RDT&E total obligational authority \$ in millions)



	<u>FY 05</u>
• Joint-Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS)	710
• Other Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)	1,153
• Transformational Satellite Communications (TSAT)	775
• Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)	600
• Space-Based Radar	408
• SSGN Conversions	658
• Cruise Missile Defense – accelerated development	239

Transforming Operations



- Army: Restructure to create a more agile, deployable modular force
 - More brigades – convert to brigade combat teams
- Navy/USMC: Fleet Response Plan
 - Increased range of tasks--more ships & power projection force
- USAF: Capabilities-based air & space expeditionary force
- Special Ops Forces. Expanded SOCOM role
- Joint Forces Command: Operationalizing jointness

Science & Technology (S&T)

(RDT&E total obligational authority \$ in billions)



S&T funding	<u>FY 04 Request</u>	<u>FY 04 Enacted</u>	<u>FY 05 Request*</u>
	10.2	12.1	10.5

\$1.3 Basic Research

\$3.8 Applied Research

\$5.3 Advanced Technology Development

- \$650M National Aerospace Initiative – hypersonic & space systems
- \$560M Future Combat Systems technologies
- \$492M Future Naval Capabilities – e.g., advanced propulsion
- \$80M High efficiency, lightweight power sources for frontline troops
- \$168M Joint Forces Command's Joint Experimentation program

*1.6% real growth over FY 04 request. Totals may not add due to rounding.

Land Forces Programs

(Procurement and RDT&E total obligational authority \$ in billions)



Highlights

FY 05

<u>Future Combat Systems</u> -- Increased funding On track to initial operational capability in 2010	3.2
<u>Stryker Brigade Combat Teams:</u> Procure vehicles for 5 th SBCT and RDT&E	1.0
<u>V-22:</u> Ongoing development & procurement of 11 aircraft	1.7

Commanche Cancelled
\$39b \$59m per bird

Tactical and Mobility Aircraft

(Procurement and RDT&E total obligational authority \$ in billions)



Highlights

	<u>Qty</u>	<u>\$</u>
F/A-22: Continue program stability	24	4.7
JSF: Restructure to cover cost growth	-	4.6
C-17: Sustain quantity/procure new variants	14	4.1
F/A-18E/F: Procure to replace A-1	42	3.1
E-2C Advanced Hawkeye: Sustain development	-	0.6
EA-18G: Advanced electronic capabilities	-	0.4
Precision munitions*	**	1.6

\$350 Billion?

*Includes non-aircraft systems such as Tactical Tomahawk

**Over 46,000 including nearly 15,000 laser guided bombs and 30,000 JDAMs

New Strategic Triad for 21st Century



- Pursue further unilateral reductions to 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads in next decade
- Retire Peacekeeper missile
- Enhance conventional capabilities, including active defenses, and C4ISR capabilities to serve as new strategic legs
 - Convert four Trident submarines to SSGNs - (\$1,018 million)
 - Modernize strategic command and control - (\$154 million)
 - Enhance DoD strategic systems infrastructure - (\$89 million)

New Strategic Triad

Strategic Nuclear/Conventional Forces

Strategic Defense Forces

Strategic Systems Infrastructure

Missile Defense Agency

(Total obligational authority \$ in billions)



	<u>FY 04</u>	<u>FY 05</u>
Missile Defense Agency	7.7	9.2

Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)

- Initial capability operational by the end of 2004
- By the end of 2005:
 - 20 Ground-based interceptors
 - Up to 10 sea-based interceptors
 - Upgraded radars and command and control
- Follow-on enhancements to be fielded as soon as available
- Focus on most promising technologies, e.g., kinetic & directed energy

Midcourse Defense Segment

Ground-based Midcourse



Sea-based Midcourse




Budget Risks

The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: Detailed Update for Fiscal Year 2004, CBO February 2004

Figure 1-1 Updated.
Past and Projected Resources for Defense

(Billions of 2004 Dollars of Obligational Authority)





BUDGET RISKS

- **WIN THE WAR ON TERRORISM**
- **POST CONFLICT IN IRAQ**
- **UNEXPECTED CONTINGENCIES**
- **PROCUREMENT BOW WAVES**
- **BASE REALIGNMENTS AND CLOSURES**
- **TRANSFORM DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**
- **RETENTION AND QUALITY OF LIFE**
- **INCREASING, FLAT OR DECREASING BUDGET**
- **SURPLUS OR DEFICITS, TAX CUTS AND SPENDING INCREASES**
- **SUSTAINABLE SOCIAL SECURITY & MEDICARE**
- **FUTURE ECONOMIC CRISES**
- **EMERGING THREATS**

Operational Risks



NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

MOBILIZED AS OF JANUARY 21 2004

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE	165,086
AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR FORCE RESERVE	19,383
NAVAL RESERVE	1,918
MARINE CORPS RESERVE	6,790
COAST GUARD RESERVE	<u>1,057</u>
TOTAL	194,234

TROOPS IN IRAQ

40% GUARD & RESERVE

USS GONZALEZ & USS PHILIPPINE SEA OPERATION ALLIED FORCE





F-15 OPERATION NORTHERN WATCH

**OPTEMPO & PERSTEMPO
NO MORE**





F-18s OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH



**Goodbye
Southern Watch**



KOSOVO

**Get some help
from our friends**





OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM






OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE



Ongoing





OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM




A Long Time?





STRATEGY AND FORCE PLANNING





BACKUPS

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Strategy and Force Planning

Fourth Edition

Edited by
SECURITY, STRATEGY, and FORCES
FACULTY



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<http://bookstore.gpo.gov>


ISBN 1-884733-31-X



STRATEGY AND FORCE PLANNING

- **WHAT WE WANT TO DO (OBJECTIVES)**
- **HOW WE PLAN TO DO IT (STRATEGY)**
- **WHAT WE ARE UP AGAINST (THREATS AND CHALLENGES)**
- **WHAT IS AVAILABLE TO DO IT (FORCES)**
- **WHAT ARE THE MISMATCHES (RISKS)**

Graph 1
National Defense Budget Authority FY 1946-



Source: CSBA, February 2009. Based on OMB, DoD and CBO data.
 *Excludes funding for the 1991 Gulf War and related allied cash contributions.



FUNDAMENTAL TRADEOFFS

- **FORCE STRUCTURE**
- **MODERNIZATION**
- **READINESS & OPTEMPO**
- **SUPPORT INFRASTRUCTURE**



ACHIEVING BALANCE

- **ENDS-STRATEGY MISMATCH**
- **THREATS-STRATEGY MISMATCH**
- **STRATEGY-FORCES MISMATCH**
- **FORCES-BUDGET MISMATCH**
- **RISKS OVER TIME**

Quadrennial Defense Review

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000

PRESIDENT

**National
Security
Strategy**

June 2001

*“150 days after new
President takes office”*

SECDEF

“In consultation with CJCS”

Conduct a **Review** so as to:

- Delineate a **National Defense Strategy**
- Define: - **Force Structure**
 - **Modernization**
 - **Infrastructure**
 - **Other Elements** of Program & Policy
- Identify a **Budget Plan**
- Assess Political, Strategic & Military **Risk**


Sep 2001

**QDR
Report**

CJCS

Prepare and Submit:

- **Assessment of Review**
- **Assessment of Risk**





POST WAR DEFENSE ASSESSMENT LESSONS LEARNED WHAT ARE THE IMPORTANT ISSUES?





POTENTIAL COSTS OF WAR WITH IRAQ

ESTIMATES BY CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE SEPT 30 2002

	<u>\$ BILLION</u>		
	<u>LOW</u>	<u>HIGH</u>	
• DEPLOY FORCES	9	13	
• PROSECUTE WAR	6	9	PER MONTH
• RETURN FORCES	5	7	
• OCCUPATION*	1	4	PER MONTH
• 3 MONTH WAR + 12 MONTH OCCUPATION	44	95	

OPTION 1: HEAVY GROUND FORCE – 5 ARMY DIVISIONS

5 AIR FORCE TACTICAL FIGHTER WINGS

OPTION 2: HEAVY AIR OPTION –

2 1/3 ARMY DIVISIONS

10 AIR FORCE TACTICAL FIGHTER WINGS

***DOES NOT INCLUDE COSTS FOR RECONSTRUCTION OR FOREIGN AID**



FY 2005 Defense Budget

FY 2005 Budget by Title

(Discretionary budget authority \$ in Billions)



	<u>FY 04</u>	<u>FY 05</u>	<u>FY 06</u>	<u>FY 07</u>	<u>FY 08</u>	<u>FY 09</u>
Military Personnel	97.9	104.8	109.4	113.1	116.8	120.4
O&M	127.6*	140.6	146.1	151.2	156.3	163.9
Procurement	75.3	74.9	80.4	90.6	105.1	114.0
RDT&E	64.3	68.9	71.0	70.7	71.6	70.7
Military Construction	5.5	5.3	8.8	12.1	10.8	10.2
Family Housing	3.8	4.2	4.6	4.5	3.6	3.5
Other	<u>0.8**</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>4.9</u>
TOTAL	375.3***	401.7	422.7	443.9	465.7	487.7

* Includes \$3.5B rescission to FY03 Iraq Freedom Fund; 2-year spending account rescinded in FY04

** Includes \$1.8B rescission to DoD appropriations in the FY04 Omnibus Appropriations Act

*** Also includes \$0.8B in prior-year program rescissions to Procurement, RDT&E, Military Construction, Family Housing, and National Defense Sealift Fund. Totals may not add due to rounding.

DoD Budget by Service

(Discretionary budget authority, \$ in Billions)



	<u>FY 04</u>	<u>FY 05</u>	<u>Change</u>
• Army	95.4	97.2	+1.8
• Navy/Marine Corps	115.1	119.3	+4.2
• Air Force	110.9	120.5	+9.6
• Defense Wide	<u>53.9*</u>	<u>64.7</u>	<u>+10.8</u>
Total	375.3**	401.7	+26.4

* Includes \$3.5B rescission to the FY03 Iraq Freedom Fund and \$1.8B rescission to DoD appropriations in the FY04 Omnibus Appropriations Act

** Also Includes \$0.8B in prior-year program rescissions

Totals may not add due to rounding

Critical Legislative Authorities



- Train and equip support: Up to \$500M to military and security forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and friendly nearby regional nations
- Commanders Emergency Response Program: Up to \$300M for urgent humanitarian/reconstruction needs in Iraq and Afghanistan
- Increased drawdown authority: \$200M under Afghanistan Freedom Support Act

FY 04 Supplemental Appropriations



DoD: \$65.1B Iraq assistance: \$18.4B Afghan assistance: \$1.2B

- Upcoming operational challenges affecting execution of FY 04 supplemental:
 - Rotate troops & equipment in and out of theater
 - Reconstitute forces at home station
 - Increase reconstruction progress in Iraq and Afghanistan
 - Return the governing of Iraq to Iraqi people
- DoD does not anticipate another supplemental in CY 2004
- For FY 05, DoD expects to need a supplemental to finance its incremental costs for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan

Shipbuilding

(Total obligational authority \$ in millions)



	<u>FY 2004</u>		<u>FY 2005</u>	
	<u>Qty</u>	<u>\$</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>\$</u>
Carrier Replacement	-	1,177	-	626
Virginia Class Submarine	1	2,370	1	2,453
SSGN Conversions (SCN portion)	-	1,158	-	517
DDG-51	3	3,193	3	3,445
LHD-1 Amphibious Assault Ship	-	352	-	236
LPD-17	1	1,317	1	967
Completion of Prior Year ships	-	636	-	484
Refuelings, Outfitting & Other	-	1,199	-	1,234
T-AKE Dry Cargo Ship*	2	722	2	768
DD(X)**	-	-	1	221
Littoral Combat Ship**	-	-	1	108
Total	7	12,124	9	11,059

Programs are budgeted in Shipbuilding & Conversion, Navy (SCN), except:

*National Defense Sealift Fund

**RDT&E, Navy

Further Streamline DoD Management Processes



- National Security Personnel System implementation
- Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP)
 - Overhaul DoD management processes
 - Consolidate and integrate information systems
 - Facilitate auditable financial statements
- Better budget execution
 - Increase General Transfer Authority to \$4 billion
 - O&M funds available for 2 years
- Metrics: to measure and improve performance
- Two-year internal DoD budget process
 - Greater focus on joint capabilities and metrics

Operation & Maintenance (O&M)

(Discretionary budget authority \$ in Billions)



	<u>*FY 04</u>	<u>FY 05</u>
Operation & Maintenance	127.6	140.6

- All FY 05 readiness indicators meet DoD goals:
 - Army tank miles: 899
 - Army flying hours: 13.1 hours/crew/month
 - Navy flying hours: 19.2 hours/crew/month
 - Navy ship operations/deployed: 51 days/quarter
 - AF flying hours: 16.8 hours/crew/month
- Facilities sustainment: 95% of requirements (up from 94%)
- Defense Readiness Reporting System will adopt new metrics

*Excludes supplemental appropriations

Defense Health Program

(Discretionary budget authority \$ Billions)



	<u>*FY 03</u>	<u>*FY 04</u>	<u>FY 05</u>
Defense Health Program (DHP)	14.8	16.6	17.6
DoD payment into Accrual Fund**	8.0	8.1	10.3

- Funding for military treatment facility seeks optimum balance between direct care and private sector health care
- DHP increase from FY 03 to FY 04 includes \$400 M for expanded TRICARE benefit for reservists and their families
- DoD Accrual payment is based on projected costs for future retirees
- Accrual Fund supports the 1.7 million currently eligible military retirees

*Excludes supplemental appropriations

**Medicare-Eligible Retiree Accrual Fund

Military Construction/Family Housing

(Discretionary budget authority \$ in Billions)




	<u>Request</u> <u>FY 04</u>	<u>*Enacted</u> <u>FY 04</u>	<u>Request</u> <u>FY 05</u>
Military Construction	5.2	5.5	5.3
Family Housing	4.0	3.8	4.2
Total	9.2	9.3	9.5


- Global Posture Review may affect future budgets
- Facilities recapitalization: 107 years in FY 05, 138 years in FY 04
Achieve 67 years by FY 08
- Budget eliminates nearly all inadequate family housing by FY 07 --
Complete elimination by FY 09
- Family Housing privatization: FY 04: \$241 million for 13,800 units
FY 05: \$275 million for 21,200 units
- BRAC 2005 implementation funding starts in FY 06

*Excludes supplemental appropriations

DoD Outlays as Percent of GDP



DoD Outlays as Percent of Federal Budget



Shipbuilding FY 2004-2009

(Total obligational authority \$ in billions)



	<u>FY 04</u>	<u>FY 05</u>	<u>FY 06</u>	<u>FY 07</u>	<u>FY 08</u>	<u>FY 09</u>
SCN	11.4	10.0	8.4	12.7	16.1	16.5
NDSF	.7	.8	.8	.5	.1	4.0
RDT&E construction	=	<u>.3</u>	<u>.9</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>1.1</u>	<u>.5</u>
Total Shipbuilding	12.1	11.1	10.1	14.3	17.3	21.0
Quantity of ships	7	9	6	8	8	17

- Battle force ships: 296 at end of FY 03
- FY 05-09 average of 9.6 ships/year will maintain a 300-ship force
- Key: Superior, efficient ships replacing older, expensive ships

FY 2005 RDT&E includes \$1.6 billion for new ship classes: DD(X) destroyer, littoral combat ship, CG(X) cruiser, and Maritime Preposition Force (Future) ship.

Improve and Integrate Intelligence Capabilities



- Improve information sharing and horizontal integration of organizations producing and using intelligence
- Improve human intelligence collection worldwide
- Increase the development and use of promising technologies
- Enhance the effectiveness and coherence of signal intelligence systems' focus on terrorism

Special Operations Forces (SOF)

(Total obligational authority \$ in millions)



	<u>FY 03</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>FY 04</u>
O&M, Defense-Wide	1,615	+391	2,006
Procurement, Defense-Wide	863	+1,115	1,978
Military Construction, Defense-Wide	72	+27	99
RDT&E, Defense-Wide	<u>512</u>	<u>-71</u>	<u>441</u>
Total	3,062	+1,462	4,524

- Add SOCOM role as a supported combatant command
- Add planning capability at SOCOM and theater SOF commands
- Transfer 1890 personnel billets to SOCOM in FY 04
- Relieve low density/high demand pressure thru CH-47 upgrades, MH-60 helicopter SLEP, and MC-130H increases



SPECIAL OPERATING FORCES





SPACE


RUMSFELD SPACE COMMISSION

- IF THE U.S. IS TO AVOID A **“SPACE PEARL HARBOR”** IT NEEDS TO TAKE SERIOUSLY THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ATTACK ON U.S. SPACE SYSTEMS.
- **RECOGNIZE SPACE INTERESTS** AS TOP NATIONAL PRIORITY
- DOD AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY NOT FOCUSED OR ARRANGED FOR 21ST CENTURY SPACE NEEDS.
- **SECDEF AND DCI MUST WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER**
- U.S. MUST DEVELOP THE **MEANS BOTH TO DETER AND TO DEFEND AGAINST HOSTILE ACTS IN AND FROM SPACE.**
- **INVESTMENT IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RESOURCES – NOT JUST FACILITIES, BUT PEOPLE – IS ESSENTIAL**

The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: Detailed Update for Fiscal Year 2004, CBO February 2004

Figure 2-1 Updated.
Spending for Operation and Support


(Billions of 2004 Dollars of Obligational Authority)



The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: Detailed Update for Fiscal Year 2004, CBO February 2004

Figure 3-2 Updated.
Projected Funding for Top Investment Programs

(Billions of 2004 Dollars of Obligational Authority)



Small Wars Manual 1940

Nature of Operations

Irregular troops may disregard...International Law and the Rules of Land Warfare

Frequently irregulars kill and rob peaceful citizens in order to obtain supplies

National policy and the precepts of civilized procedure demand that our dealings with other peoples be maintained on a high-moral plan.

...in small wars no defined battle front exists...While operations are carried out in one area, other hostile elements may be causing serious havoc in another...Thus the regular forces may be widely dispersed and probably will be outnumbered....This requires that the Forces be organized with a view to mobility and flexibility...highly trained in the use of their special weapons as well as proper utilization of terrain

Accounts of recent revolutionary movements...indicate that young men of 18 or 20 years of age take active parts as organizers...the Force will be handicapped by partisans, who constantly and accurately inform native forces of our movements

...difficult to procure reliable information...result(s) either from deceit...or from the intimidation of friendly natives

The application of purely military measures may not, by itself restore peace and orderly government because the fundamental causes of the condition of unrest may be economic, political, or social

The initial problem is to restore peace. There may be many economic and social factors involved, pertaining to the administrative, executive, and judicial functions of the government. These are completely beyond military power as such unless some form of military government is included in the campaign plan...the plan of action states...the part the forces of occupation will play in the economic and social solution...the part played by local government and the civil population...efforts of the different agencies must be cooperative and coordinated to the attainment of the common end.

Small Wars Manual 1940

Psychology

Psychology has always played an important part in war.

This difficulty of immediate control and personal influence is even more pronounced and important in small wars, on account of the decentralized nature of these operations...we are dealing not only with our own forces, but also with the civil population which frequently contains elements of doubtful or antagonistic sentiments.

The aim is not to develop a belligerent spirit in our men but rather one of caution and steadiness. Instead of employing force, one strives to accomplish the purpose by diplomacy...While endeavoring to avoid...physical harm to any native, there is always the necessity of preventing...casualties among our own troops...This mixture of combined peaceful and warlike temperament, where adapted to any single operation, demands an application of psychology beyond the requirements of regular warfare.

The motive in small wars is not material destruction. It is usually a project dealing with the social, economic, and political development of the people...implies a serious study of the people

The great importance of psychology in small wars must be appreciated...It cannot be stated in rules and learned like mathematics. Human reactions cannot be reduced to an exact science, but there are certain principles which should guide our conduct.

It is perfectly natural that the instinct of self-preservation should be constantly at work...Fear is one of the strongest natural emotions in man...not far removed from an oppressed...existence, it is easy to understand the people's fear of being again enslaved...Another basic instinct is self-assertion...also peoples...too ready to let others shoulder the responsibilities for restoring...order and normalcy...States are naturally very proud of their sovereignty...resort may be had to sabotage

Propaganda plays its part in approach to the people in small wars...Propaganda at home also plays its part in the public support of small wars.

Often the military find themselves in the position of arbiters in differences between rival political factions. This is common in serving on electoral missions.

The purpose should always be to restore normal government or give the people a better government...establish peace, order, and security on as permanent a basis as practicable...The practical application of psychology is largely a matter of common sense.



DoD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security

Defense Science Board Summer Study November 2003

“The study concludes that maturing the conceptual framework and capabilities related to homeland protection will require a holistic approach”

Global situation awareness

Information is vital to homeland security. *Yet improvements are needed in many areas of information sharing, assurance, and collection.*

Protect DoD mission-critical infrastructure

DoD’s ability to fulfill its missions—notably force projection—is dependent on an intricate infrastructure in the United States. *DoD is not doing enough to address vulnerabilities of mission critical infrastructure and services, particularly in areas outside its direct control.*

Deter and prevent attack

Ocean vessels, cruise missiles, and low-flying aircraft are credible delivery systems available to adversaries. DoD needs to take steps to counter these threats as a complement to ongoing initiatives to defend against ballistic missiles.



DoD Roles and Missions in Homeland Security

Defense Science Board Summer Study November 2003

Emergency preparedness and incident response

Should the U.S. homeland be attacked, DoD could be called on to assist with incident response. Execution of this mission could require capabilities in areas where the Department is deficient (mitigation of WMD effects, surge medical capabilities, communication operability among first responders, federal, state, and local agencies)

Exporting DoD core competencies

DoD can enhance homeland security by “exporting” relevant core competencies that match the needs of other organizations that have homeland security responsibilities (training, experimentation, and operational-level planning and execution)

Empowering U.S. Northern Command

U.S. Northern Command must be empowered for the nation to achieve its homeland security and homeland defense goals (12 tasks, Top 4: roadmap for maritime surveillance, roadmap for low-altitude air threat, assume operational lead for DoD mission-critical infrastructure protection in CONUS, lead for exercises, training, experiments, and standards related to homeland defense and military assistance to civil authorities)



FY 2004 DEFENSE BUDGET TOPLINE

**STEVEN KOSIAK, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS
JANUARY 31, 2003**

- **DOD \$379.9B + DOE \$19.3B = NATIONAL DEFENSE \$399.1B**
- **DOD INCREASES \$15.3B OVER ENACTED FY 2003 LEVEL OF \$364.6B**
- **HIGHEST LEVEL SINCE EARLY 1990s**
- **8% HIGHER THAN COLD WAR AVERAGE**
- **TOTAL INCREASE FROM FY 2003 TO FY 2009 IS 13%**
- **THIS BRINGS BUDGET ROUGHLY TO 1980s LEVELS, 17% ABOVE COLD WAR AVERAGE**
- **\$23B IN FY 2004 FOR TRANSFORMATION**
- **BY FY 2009 DOD BUDGET REACHES \$415B (FY 2004 DOLLARS)**
- **CBO WITH COST RISK ESTIMATED AVERAGE FOR FY 2008-20 PERIOD IS \$490B IN FY 2004 DOLLARS (\$471B IN FY 2002 DOLLARS)**
- **THIS IS AN ANNUAL SHORTFALL OF \$75B**



Defend the United States

“The highest priority of the U.S. military is to defend the Nation from all enemies. The United States will maintain sufficient military forces to protect the U.S. domestic population, its territory, and its critical defense-related infrastructure against attacks emanating from outside U.S. borders, as appropriate under U.S. law...provide strategic deterrence and air and missile defense...as specified in U.S. law, to support civil authorities...in managing the consequences of natural and man-made disasters and CBRNE-related events...respond in decisive manner to acts of international terrorism committed on U.S. territory or the territory of an ally.”

“Sept 11th taught us that the future holds many unknown dangers and that we fail to prepare for them at our own peril. Future threats may come from terrorists but they also could be in the form of cyber-war, a traditional state-on-state conflict or something different.”

“We must transform not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also the way we think, we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight. We must transform not only our armed forces, but also the Department that serves them by encouraging a culture of creativity and prudent risk-taking.”



T R A N S F O R M A T I O N P L A N N I N G G U I D A N C E

**APRIL
2003**

“...the outcome we must achieve: fundamentally joint, network-centric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across the battlespace.”

“There will be no moment at which the Department is ‘transformed.’ Rather, we are building a culture of continual transformation, so that our armed forces are always several steps ahead of any potential adversaries.”

**Donald H. Rumsfeld
*Secretary of Defense***

WHY TRANSFORM?

- Difficulty with the **status quo**
- Growing **Asymmetric Threats**
- Rising **Force-on-Force Challenges**
- Historic **Opportunity**
- High **Stakes**

SCOPE OF TRANSFORMATION

- Transforming **how we fight**
- Transforming **how we do business**
- Transforming **how we work with others**



TRANSFORMATION PLANNING GUIDANCE

APRIL
2003

TRANSFORMATION DILEMMAS

- Balance near-term **operational risk against future risk in investment decisions**
- Invest now in **specific technologies and concepts... deemed transformational, while remaining open to other paths towards transformation.**



TRANSFORMATION PLANNING GUIDANCE FORCE CAPABILITIES BY END OF DECADE

- **Standing joint force headquarters will conduct effects-based, adaptive planning...defeating enemy threats using networked, modular forces capable of distributed, seamlessly joint and combined operations**
- **...defeat the most potent of enemy anti-access and area denial capabilities through combination of more robust contamination avoidance measures, mobile basing and priority time critical counterforce targeting**
- **...leverage asymmetric advantages to fullest extent possible...C4ISR...that provide joint common relevant operational situational awareness...rapid and robust sensor-to-shooter targeting, reachback and other necessary prerequisites for network-centric warfare**
- **Combined arms forces armed with superior situational awareness will maneuver more easily around the battlefield and force the enemy to mass where precision engagement capabilities may be used to maximum effect**

Appendix Two: TPG Integrated with PPBS Timeline

