THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE
AND
NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE

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SYLLABUS

FOR

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING

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College of Naval Warfare
and
Naval Command College

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING STUDY

SYLLABUS

FOREWORD

This syllabus and study guide contains both an overview and detailed description of the National Security Decision Making Study. Prepared for the College of Naval Warfare and the Naval Command College, it provides detailed session-by-session assignments and study guide material for daily class preparation. Administrative information is also included.

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NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING STUDY

1. Overview. The National Security Decision Making (NSDM) Department educates military officers and U.S. government civilians in effective decision making and leadership on security issues, particularly those involving force selection and planning challenges, within national resource constraints. The Department provides instruction in: the strategic planning and selection of future military forces and their potential use as a tool of national power; the nature of economic, political, organizational, and behavioral factors affecting selection and command of military forces; and in using expanded critical thinking skills to formulate and execute strategy to achieve desired outcomes within complex national security organizations. The NSDM Study is an executive development course designed for the College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College. Major emphasis is placed on the preparation of officers and civilians for high-level command and staff assignments. Selection of concepts and materials is predicated on the belief that an effective career executive does not apply discrete disciplines, but rather is required to synthesize many disciplines relevant to different situations. Moreover, the appropriate point of view is an integrative one that seeks a balanced use of reasoning based on both an academic and professional foundation. For this reason, the NSDM Study employs a multi-discipline approach, synthesizing selected concepts from economics, political science, strategy, leadership, psychology, management, and other related disciplines. All instruction seeks to utilize the broad experience of the student body and focuses on making and implementing critical decisions within the national security environment. Areas selected for special attention are:

- The changing domestic and international economic, political and military environments affecting national security.
- Major joint military force planning concepts, issues and choices.
- The structure and process for planning and programming joint military forces and the interface of that process with the federal budgeting process.
- A conceptual understanding of the tools for critical thinking and deciding among complex defense issue alternatives.
- The context of and political, organizational, and behavioral influences on national security decision making and implementation.
- Selecting strategies to achieve key goals from a position of leadership within complex national security organizations.

The principal methodology of the NSDM Study emphasizes active learning in a seminar environment. Concepts are studied and applied to cases representing real and complex issues. Cases offer a unique opportunity for parallel learning. A single case can explore a critical issue or concept and, at the same time, allow application of appropriate decision-making frameworks.

2. Objectives. Our goal is to provide the student with a highly professional and useful learning experience. The intent of the NSDM Study is not the mastery of particular techniques, but rather it is the expansion of the student's personal philosophy of what constitutes an integrative, balanced, executive point of view. Our joint learning objectives are to:

a. Increase understanding of the context and domestic and international political, organizational, and behavioral phenomena that influence national security decision making and implementation.

b. Increase ability to perform effectively as a senior-level decision maker, commander, or member of a staff in the national security decision making structure.

c. Apply the results of critical thinking and analysis to decisions and implementation involving complex, resource-constrained national security issues.

d. Increase understanding of key concepts and issues that impact on, and are useful in making strategy, choosing and programming future joint military force structure, and addressing planning challenges.

3. Course Frameworks. The NSDM Study encourages the student to develop three general and related frameworks:

- The first conceptual framework involves assessment of the complex factors critical to development of strategy, the sizing and structuring of future forces, and the allocation of scarce defense resources.

- The second conceptual framework provides a systematic approach to decision making and to formulating a strategy for implementation of decisions in a large organization within the national security environment.

- The third conceptual framework identifies the context and political, organizational, and behavioral influences that shape decision making in large, complex national security organizations.

4. Organization of the Study. In pursuit of these objectives, the NSDM Study is divided into the following three major courses, which are taught in parallel fashion during the trimester; followed by the Planning Challenges module and the National Security Decision Making exercise:

a.	Decision Making and Implementation Course	23 Sessions
b.	Policy Making and Process Course	23 Sessions
c.	Security, Strategy, and Forces Course	24 Sessions
d.	Planning Challenges Module	9 Sessions
e.	National Security Decision Making Exercise Module	9 Sessions

Specific focus, objectives, guidance, and reading assignments for all sessions in the NSDM Study are contained in Annexes A through E of this Syllabus. These Annexes provide the basis for programming daily course work and should be read before the introductory session of each course and module. The National Security Decision Making Box (banker box) and issued textbooks contain all of the required readings for the course.

5. Requirements

a. *Individual Student Responsibilities.* Students are expected to prepare fully for each instructional session and to participate actively and positively in classroom discussions. Learning requires the students' active involvement. A tough-minded, questioning attitude and a willingness to vigorously enter into discussion are central to the Department's learning method.

b. *Workload.* Study requirements have been structured to provide for a generally even workload throughout the trimester. Some peaks will naturally occur, and students are urged to discuss any perceived overloads with the appropriate instructor. Advanced planning and careful allocation of a scarce resource—time—will help mitigate these peak workloads. Past experience has indicated that the total course requirements will involve a weekly average workload of about 45 hours of in-class and out-of-class work, as reported by students in past end-of-course questionnaires.

c. *Required Readings.* All required readings listed in the Annexes are important to the development of course concepts and to the quality of seminar discussion. Supplementary readings provide additional material for a more in-depth development of specific topics but are not expected to be read for the seminar session. Required readings are all provided in the banker box. Supplementary readings are available through the College library.

d. *Case Preparation.* Cases identified in the Annexes should be prepared for seminar discussion in accordance with instructions by individual faculty members. Assessments should be completed in advance so that the discussion can focus on the concepts involved and the potential solutions of the issues in the cases.

e. *Verbal and Written Assignments.* Each course has verbal and written requirements that provide the opportunity for feedback and interaction among faculty and members of the class. Some of these assignments are not assigned a grade, but give individuals the ability to assess their comprehension of course material and assess progress in the NSDM Study. The following is a composite listing of the <u>ungraded</u> course requirements:

Course	**Requirement**	**Type Effort**	**Due Date**
DMI	Student Reflection Paper	Written/Individual	19 Aug
SSF	Paper Topic	Written/Individual	1 Sep

NSDM	NSDM Exercise	Oral/Group	27 Sep, 12, 19 Oct, 1-8 Nov
NSDM	End-of-Course Questionnaire	Written/Individual	3 Nov

f. *Graded Activities.* An overall grade will be assigned to CNC&S students for the NSDM Study based on graded requirements for each of the three courses. The activities and weights assigned are as follows:

Course	**Requirement**	**Type/Basis of Evaluation**	**Date**	**Weight**
PMP	Midterm Examination	Individual. Ability to demonstrate mastery of course concepts in a logical and concise way. Completed in class.	9 Sep	11%
DMI	Midterm Examination	Explain a case study in U.S. decision making. Take-home exam.	17 Sep	13%
SSF	Security, Strategy, and Forces Paper	Individual. Ability to rationally analyze a major strategy and/or force planning issue and suggest a solution. This is the major paper of the NSDM Study. Topic submitted by 1 September.	14 Oct	22%
PMP	Final Examination	Individual. Ability to apply course concepts in a logical and concise way to a case study. Completed in class.	20 Oct	22%
SSF	Final Examination	Individual. Ability to use course concepts in an organized, concise, and logical way to analyze one of three caselets. Completed in class.	9 Nov	11%
DMI	Final Examination	Individual. Ability to apply the Decision Making and Implementation framework to a contemporary case study and evaluate its quality and usefulness in terms of course concepts. Take home exam.	10 Nov	20%
NSDM	End-of-Course Questionnaire	Individual. Students provide their assessment of the NSDM course and faculty.	3 Nov	1%

g. *Exam/Paper Return Dates.* The exams and paper will be graded and returned to students by close of business on the following dates:

PMP Midterm Examination	20 September
DMI Midterm Examination	28 September

SSF Paper	25 October
PMP Final Examination	1 November
SSF Final Examination	19 November
DMI Final Examination	22 November

h. *Grading Criteria*. The overall policy for grading students at the Naval War College is contained in Naval War College Instruction 1520.2M (with Change #1). The most salient point in this instruction is:

> "Historical evidence indicates that a grade distribution of 35%-45% 'A's' and 55%-65% 'B's' and 'C's' can be expected from the overall War College student population. While variations from this norm might occur from seminar to seminar and subject to subject, it would rarely if ever be expected to reach an overall 'A' to 'B/C' ratio of greater than or equal to an even 50/50 distribution."

Grading of the NSDM examinations will be consistent with the following standards:

A+ (97-100):	Completely addresses the question. Covers all applicable major and minor points. Demonstrates total grasp of the topic. A brilliant treatment.
A (94-<97):	Addresses all major considerations. Demonstrates excellent graduate-level grasp of the topic. Offers significant original insight.
A- (90-<94):	Very good graduate work. Demonstrates a comprehensive grasp of the topic. Addresses all of the major and most of the minor points.
B+ (87-<90):	Solid graduate-level work. Demonstrates comprehension of the topic and addresses most of the major and minor points.
B (84-<87):	Satisfactory graduate-level performance. Demonstrates comprehension of many of the major and minor points.
B- (80-<84):	Satisfactory graduate performance. Demonstrates comprehension of some of the major and minor points.
C+ (77-<80):	Addresses the topic, but does not demonstrate a clear grasp of the major points. Does not merit graduate-level.
C (74-<77):	Demonstrates a poor understanding of the topic. Does not address some major points.
C- (70-<74):	Addresses the topic, but does not provide sufficient discussion to demonstrate understanding of the topic. Misses several major elements or concepts.
F (0-<70):	Fails to address the question and/or misapplies course concepts.

Grading of the Security, Strategy, and Forces Paper will be consistent with the following standards:

A+ (97-100):	Offers a genuinely new understanding of the topic. Indicates brilliance.
A (94-<97):	Work of superior quality which is at least in part original.

A- (90-<94): Well above expected graduate work. An insightful paper.

B+ (87-<90): A sound paper which has a clearly stated thesis, marshals evidence to support that thesis, addresses counterarguments to or weaknesses in the thesis in supporting evidence, and does so in a well-organized fashion. A well-executed paper.

B (84-<87): Expected graduate performance. A solid paper which is, on the whole, a successful consideration of the topic.

B- (80-<84): A paper that addresses the topic, has a thesis clearly stated but not fully supported, and which either does not treat counterarguments thoroughly or has structural flaws.

C+ (77-<80): Sufficiently analytical to distinguish it from a C, but still lacks the support, structure, or clarity to merit graduate credit.

C (74-<77): Indicates that the work is barely adequate and fails to meet the standards of graduate work. Expresses a defensible opinion but makes inadequate use of evidence, has little coherent structure, is critically unclear, or lacks the quality of insight deemed sufficient to adequately explore the issue at hand.

C- (70-<74): Indicates that the paper discusses the thesis, but does not come to defensible conclusions to merit serious attention.

F (0-<70): Paper fails to address the thesis.

In all grading decisions, each student has the right to appeal a grade, first to the instructors, then to the Course Directors, and finally to the Department Chair. This appeal procedure must begin within one week of receipt of the grade from the instructor. Such a review may either sustain the grade, lower it, or raise it.

6. Plagiarism. Occasional incidents of plagiarism require that we bring this matter to your attention. Plagiarism is defined in NWC Instruction 5370.A as:

a. Duplication of an author's words without *both* quotation marks *and* accurate references or footnotes.

b. The use of an author's ideas in paraphrase without accurate references or footnotes.

Students are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when borrowing another's words *or* ideas. Failure to do so will lead to severe disciplinary action. It is the *student's* responsibility to resolve any questions regarding the use of another's words or ideas *prior* to submitting written products. The use of your own ideas and words from a previous paper must also be fully footnoted. When in doubt, confer with your instructor *prior* to submission of your work.

7. Seminar Assignments. Each student is assigned to a seminar group representing a balanced distribution of services/agencies and functional expertise. Three faculty members are assigned to each seminar, one for each of the three courses of the NSDM Study. Student seminar, classroom, and faculty assignments are published separately.

8. General Schedule of Seminar Meetings. Seminars generally meet in the morning on Mondays through Fridays. Classes are normally 90 minutes long, except on days when

selected topics require an extension of class time. A course planning schedule containing meeting dates and times is contained in Annex F of the syllabus. A weekly schedule is promulgated as well, and reflects schedule revisions made necessary because of late changes, such as additional visiting speakers, etc.

9. Faculty Office Hours. The faculty will be available to assist in mastering the course material, to review progress, and for counseling as required. Faculty office hours also provide an excellent opportunity to review assigned tasks, to discuss general problems, and to make recommendations for improvement of the course. Students are urged to use this opportunity. Faculty members are generally available throughout the week when not teaching, however, many also teach electives, participate in war games, instruct groups outside the War College, and travel for course development purposes. To ensure most efficient use of limited student time, it is suggested that a mutually agreeable time be arranged beforehand.

10. Key Personnel Contacts. If you require additional information in your studies or if interpersonal problems develop in a course that cannot be dealt with to your satisfaction by your instructor, please contact one of the following individuals:

Chair of the Department	PROF Joan Johnson-Freese Room: C-206 Tel: 1-3540
Executive Assistant of the Department	PROF Kevin P. Kelley Room: C-206 Tel: 1-3540
Security, Strategy, and Forces Course Director	PROF Timothy N. Castle Room: C-311 Tel: 1-6429
Policy Making and Process Course Director	PROF Richard J. Norton Room: C-307 Tel: 1-6442
Decision Making and Implementation Course Director	CAPT Rand D. LeBouvier, USN Room: C-313 Tel: 1-6450
Academic Coordinator	Mrs. Margaret B. Jones Room: C-206 Tel: 1-4746

ANNEX A
DECISION MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION
Leading Change in Large, Complex Organizations
STUDY GUIDE

1. Scope. The Decision Making and Implementation course is about making choices and getting things done in large, complex national security organizations. The course emphasizes the study and use of critical thinking in the *formulation and execution of strategy* to lead change to achieve desired organizational outcomes. A fundamental premise of the course is that the range of leadership skills needed in more senior positions are noticeably expanded and *different* from those used in direct leadership positions. The course will cover concepts and cases that complement SSF, PMP, PC, and the NSDM Exercise, and will be presented at the executive multidisciplinary leadership level. However, DMI will differ in that it will stress *your* role as a senior decision maker.

The DMI course begins by considering decision making at the higher echelons of military organizations. In the first four sessions we explore the profession of arms, civil-military affairs, and what is different about leading in large organizations. These initial sessions are intended to provide professional context for all that follows. Subsequent sessions explore complex decision-making processes over a wide range of situations. Exposure to these concepts and case studies will aid future leaders as they face the change, innovation, and transformation processes that are part of the current national security environment.

We present a framework that helps organizational leaders make and execute decisions. The framework incorporates two interwoven perspectives on decision making; one based on experience and *intuition*, and the other on *analytical* processes that stress clear issue (problems or opportunities) definition and the evaluation of alternatives based on relevant criteria.

The framework will be addressed in five sections. Each examines a basic question that is crucial in leading large, complex organizations:

- Who am I?
- Where are we?
- Where should we go?
- How do we get there?
- Are we getting there?

Part I of the course will cover the first three questions that focus on formulating strategy. Part II of the course deals with the last two questions. Once a strategy has been *formulated*, it must be *executed*. We will examine how a leader can lead change to accomplish the strategy and determine whether supporting objectives and outcomes are being achieved.

2. Course Objectives. The objectives of the DMI course are to enhance the professional abilities of future leaders in the national security environment by increasing their competence to:

- Make informed, analytically supported decisions using critical thinking skills.
- Select strategies to achieve key goals and lead change from a position of leadership within a complex organization.
- Challenge assumptions.

In that regard, our objective is to enhance the skills of leaders to better:

- Assess a military organization's current environment and the issues pertinent to complex decisions.
- Employ flexible, critical thinking skills sufficient to set organizational direction and decide upon a strategy for decision implementation.
- Apply resources and processes to implement decisions.
- Develop and use measurements and controls to assure lasting change.

In short, our goal is to help develop leaders who can make the "best possible" decisions and responsibly implement those decisions to achieve results consistent with the security needs of an uncertain future that is replete with risks and constrained by limited resources.

3. Course Structure. DMI will meet in seminar two to four times weekly. DMI assignments will include basic concepts and readings that reflect current thinking about decision making and implementation. We will use case studies that challenge students to make practical use of those readings in analyzing defense or national security related issues or subjects. The case study methodology demands active participation of all students in order to develop a firm grasp of course concepts and practical tools for use in positions of greater responsibility and accountability.

4. Course Study Guide. This DMI Study Guide is the primary planning document that describes how the course will unfold. For each seminar session it identifies the focus and objectives of that particular session. Reading assignments and general questions highlight key concepts or ideas presented in the readings. Supplementary readings, where provided, are intended to be a starting point for students who wish to explore a particular subject in greater depth. Students are not required to read supplementary material.

5. Course Requirements. A brief, non-graded, written reflection paper will be assigned in NSDM-2 and handed in and discussed during DMI-2. A midterm examination will be administered at the completion of Part I. The final examination will be given after completion of the NSDM Exercise and will require students to synthesize and present course material in response to an appropriate case study.

6. Course Material. All course material is distributed and organized in a "bankers' box." Course materials include a syllabus and study guide, selected readings, case studies, and the following publications:

- Forester, C. S. *The General.*
- Rumsfeld, Donald M., *Transformation Planning Guidance.*
- Cebrowski, Arthur K., *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*.

DECISION MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION
Leading Change in Large, Complex Organizations
COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE/NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE—2004

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PART I: FORMULATING STRATEGY

DMI-1 INTRODUCTION TO DMI—A BASIC FRAMEWORK AND PROFESSIONAL CONTEXT

A. Focus. This session will introduce a basic framework that will be used and expanded upon during the DMI course to guide seminar discussion and analysis of case studies illustrating the decision-making and implementation process. It also seeks to introduce this framework while reminding us of the higher contexts of working in our national security profession. Making and implementing decisions in a large, complex national security organization is a qualitatively different task than the direct leadership that many of us have experienced in previous jobs. The focus of DMI is to examine these differences and to assist students in thinking through and forming a professional and personal strategy for making such decisions and then getting them implemented.

DMI does not concentrate just on the single leader at the very apex of the organizational pyramid, but also on subordinate leaders and individuals in key staff positions. DMI will examine the decision-making process and generally how both an analytical and an intuitive approach are indispensable elements to understanding issues and problems that confront leaders in a complex and uncertain security environment. Once decisions are made, they must be implemented, and this is often where major problems arise. Too frequently good or seemingly rational decisions fail to achieve the intended goals because the implementation of the decision was overcome by resistance or friction from the organization itself or its external environment. The DMI framework presents a straightforward way of posing and answering five key questions for the leader within the context of their organization: *Who am I? Where are we? Where should we go? How do we get there?* and *Are we getting there?*

This basic framework will be introduced in the context of the profession of arms and civil-military affairs. Professionalism includes an appreciation and acceptance of the need for continual study and is a part of the response to the "*Who am I?*" query. Professionalism also includes the development of greater expertise and the ability to use increased critical thinking skills to make difficult decisions. As we fulfill our oaths of office as commissioned officers, what standards might we keep in mind as we work to "bear true faith and allegiance" to the Constitution? Polls indicate the American people today hold the military in high regard. At the same time, some analysts contend today's military is more isolated, alienated, and less representative of the society it protects. Civil-military relations include civilian attitudes towards the military, uniformed military attitudes towards civilian leadership and society, and civilian control over the military. It is incumbent upon military professionals to comprehend, the character of civilian-military relations established by the authors of the Constitution, and the changes in civil-military relations that may affect our nation in the future, as they make and implement important national security related decisions.

B. Objectives

- Describe the flow of the DMI material that will be presented in the course.

- Examine briefly the issues and challenges that complicate making and implementing decisions in large, complex national security organizations.

- Present a basic framework to guide the process of making and implementing decisions.

- Identify concepts of professionalism and their meaning for military officers.

- Examine the relationship, both historically and presently, between the U.S. military and the nation's civilian leadership. Examine the importance of civilian control of the military.

- Assess the requirement for effective senior military officers to develop abilities that identify and articulate military requirements and implement programs to ensure military capabilities needed for national security.

C. Guidance

1. The "Introduction to DMI" reading discusses a general approach for making and implementing decisions at mid- and senior levels in the national security profession. Reflect on your professional experiences and the growth of your decision-making and implementation skills as you have progressed in seniority. What additional decision making or organizational implementation skills could prove useful to you?

2. The introductory reading also suggests that there are important differences between making and implementing decisions in large and small organizations, and that some type of strategy is helpful to the leader when working in large organizations. Although this issue will be explored much more fully in DMI-2, briefly consider if these points are valid.

3. General George Washington's leadership at the end of the War of Independence set a standard for American military professionals committed to selfless subordination and service to the nation. Is the first commander-in-chief's example a realistic and pertinent standard for today? Can the military leader still be subordinate to civilian authority without being "politicized?"

4. Huntington's thesis is that: "The modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional . . ." What are the distinguishing characteristics of any profession, and do you think they help to define military officers today, particularly in terms of service to society? What are your reasons? Beyond those general characteristics, what specialized knowledge and ability distinguishes military officers as professionals? Is Huntington's evaluation correct? If not, what has changed?

5. Higginbotham's presentation highlights the many similarities between George Washington and General George C. Marshall, particularly their similar deep appreciation for the unique relationship of the American populace to its military. How did these two leaders gain experience in civil-military relations, and what impact did that experience have on their dealings with their civilian political superiors? Can Washington and Marshall serve as appropriate role models for military officers today in terms of professionalism and civil-military relations?

D. Required Readings. NOTE: If you have not already done so, please read pages A-1 through A-3 of this study guide before the readings assigned below.

1. DMI Faculty. "Introduction to Decision Making and Implementation," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004. (A general framework that should be personalized and adapted by students to assist them as they move on to progressively more responsible positions in national security organizations.)

2. Calhoun, William M. "George Washington and Civil-Military Relations," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004. (Focuses on key aspects of General Washington's professionalism and his respect for and deference to civilian leadership during and after the War of Independence.)

3. Huntington, Samuel P. "Officership as a Profession," in *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Chapter 1 (Extract). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957, 7–17. (A classic piece dealing with military officers as professionals serving society.)

E. Case

1. Higginbotham, Don. "George Washington and George Marshall: Some Reflections on the American Military Tradition." Redacted by Professor William M. Calhoun. USAFA Harmon Memorial Lecture #26, 1984.

2. Stoler, Mark A. "Chronology," in *George C. Marshall, Soldier Statesman of the American Century*. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1989, 197–201.

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Kouzes, James M. and Barry Z. Posner. *The Leadership Challenge: How to Keep Getting Extraordinary Things Done in Organizations*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1995. (A practical book on the fundamentals of leadership based on an impressive body of field research. Available NWC library—HD57.7 .K68 1995.)

2. Bellman, Geoffrey M. *Getting Things Done When You Are Not in Charge*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993. (A discussion of the strategies and techniques for leadership when you do not have positional power. Available NWC library—HD57.7.B454 1993.)

3. Feaver, Peter D. *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. (Proposes a new theory of civil-military relations based on principal-agent concepts. Available NWC library—JK330 .F43 2003.)

4. Stockdale, James Bond. "The World of Epictetus: Reflections on Survival and Leadership," in *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986. (Admiral Stockdale explains how critical personal integrity was in surviving as a prisoner of war. He argues that military professionals require a sound classical education, an understanding of history, and a strong moral philosophy. Available NWC library—U22 .W36 1986.)

5. Hackett, Sir John. *The Profession of Arms*. London: Times Publishing Co., 1963. (Traces the history of the profession of arms from its origins to modern times, with a particularly excellent last chapter on combat leadership. Available NWC Library—UB147 .H33 1983.)

6. Fogleman, Ronald R. "The Profession of Arms," *Airpower Journal*, October 1995, pp. 4–5. (Discusses the core values of the U.S. Air Force and how they relate to the overall profession of arms. Available in the NWC library periodical collection.)

7. Pogue, Forrest C. *George C. Marshall,* Vol. I, *Education of a General, 1888–1939;* Vol. II, *Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942*. New York: The Viking Press, 1963 and 1966. (Two of the five volumes by Pogue on one of America's most exceptional military leaders. Available NWC library—E745 .M37 .P6 1963.)

8. Higginbotham, Don. *George Washington and the American Military Tradition*. Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1985. (Explores the legacy of Washington's achievements and the crucial blend of civil and military concerns which governed his conduct of the Revolutionary War. Available NWC library—E332.17 .H63 1985.)

9. Harvard Business School Press website at: http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu. This website has executive summaries of various management and leadership articles.

DMI-2 LEADING LARGE, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS—IS IT DIFFERENT?

A. Focus. Leading large, complex organizations requires additional and sometimes different skills "to get the job done." The environment is different: you will lead and affect significantly more people; you will have a larger role in determining organization priorities and where resources will be applied; and you will help choose the future direction, missions, goals, and objectives that will define organization purpose and endeavor. As a leader in this environment, you might ask yourself: "Will the things that have made successful to this point work at the next level? Will I need to lead differently? If so, what must change? And, if not, why not?"

B. Objectives

- Examine the unique issues of leading large, complex organizations.
- Discuss the differences between leading and managing and how both roles influence a senior official's approach to guiding a large, complex organization.
- Reflect on the specific skills or new knowledge needed to lead a large organization.

C. Guidance

1. Ratcliff asks what is different between leading at the lower, more direct levels and the higher levels? How does the leadership and managerial environment change and what is the impact on your personal leadership approach? Do you need to change your leadership style? If so, why?

2. Zaleznik asks a fundamental question about the role of leaders and managers: "Are they different?" He examines the way leaders and managers approach the process of directing and guiding their subordinates. Do you agree with his distinctions? What lessons or advice might you take from Zaleznik?

3. To what extent are Field Marshal Slim's recommendations for command consistent with the concepts presented in the other readings? Is Slim's advice consistent with your own beliefs on the subject? What, if anything, has Slim missed?

D. Required Readings

1. Ratcliff, Ronald E. "Is It Different?" Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty reading, June 2004. (The author briefly examines some of the issues or circumstances that differentiate the leadership environment of large, complex organizations from smaller ones.)

2. Zaleznik, Abraham. "Managers and Leaders—Are They Different?" *Harvard Business Review*, 1977, republished in *Harvard Business Review*, January 2004, 74–81. (The author discusses the differences between the way leaders and managers approach their jobs.)

3. Slim, William. "Higher Command in War," excerpt of a transcript of an address delivered at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1970. (British Field Marshall Sir William Slim discusses elements of a successful, personal leadership strategy.)

E. Case

Student Reflection Papers that answer the question, "Is It Different?" (Tasking assigned during NSDM-2 Introductory Session).

- Do you believe there is a marked difference between leading large, complex organizations and ones where you have more direct contact with your followers?
- What new skills or knowledge are necessary to be successful at the next level?
- What does your personal leadership framework or approach include?

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Bennis, Warren G. "Seven Ages of the Leader," *Harvard Business Review*, January 2004. (Author examines the progression of necessary leadership skills as a leader grows in stature and responsibility. Available NWC library periodical collection.)

2. Turcotte, William E. "Executive Strategy Issues for Very Large Organizations," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Reading, available at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au-24/turcotte.pdf. (Author evaluates how leading a large, complex organization is markedly different than smaller ones.)

3. Kouzes, James M. and Barry Z. Posner. "What Constituents Expect of Leaders," in *The Leadership Challenge*, Chapter 2. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1995, 19–31. (Survey of the characteristics that subordinates want their leaders to have. Available NWC library—HD57.7 .K68 1995.)

4. Smith, Perry M., Major General, USAF. "Leadership at the Top—Insights for Aspiring Leaders," *Marine Corps Gazette* 74, no. 11 (November 1990): 33–39, available at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au-24/smith.pdf. (Discusses necessary skills required of senior leaders and examines how ethics should influence leaders as they become more senior.)

5. Bennis, Warren and Burt Nanus. *Leaders: The Strategies for Taking Charge*. New York: Harper & Row, 1985. (A discussion of leadership competencies required to "take charge" of a large organization. Available NWC library—HD57.7 .B46 1985.)

DMI-3 INTRODUCTORY CASE STUDY: *THE GENERAL*

A. Focus. The case study for this session describes a British Army officer's rapid ascent from a relatively junior officer to one of the more senior positions of leadership during World War I. *The General* by C. S. Forester is a work of fiction, but is based upon the author's observations of actual British military leaders. In fact, the protagonist General Curzon is thought to represent a composite portrait of Generals French and Haig who were widely criticized well after the war by their contemporaries and historians for their unimaginative leadership in the trench warfare that characterized the Western Front in World War I. There are several themes that will be addressed in the seminar discussions of this case study. One is the changing nature of the protagonist's responsibilities as he rose to a strategic leadership position. Another is the wisdom of the general's instinctive reliance—even after he had arrived at the most senior levels—upon the same decision-making and implementation skills that brought him success in the early stages of his military career.

Note on *The General*. Forester's characterization of the flawed personality of General Curzon is candid. With a fine ear for the vernacular of the day, he accurately portrays the attitudes, prejudices and speech used by British officers and political leaders, who had been raised and trained in the late Victorian period. Thus, Curzon sometimes expresses racial stereotypes and uses terms that are offensive and clearly not endorsed by the Naval War College. Specifically, such terms are found in Chapter 10 and Chapter 13 in the edition of *The General* issued to students. Students may omit pages 95 and 130 from the required reading. Those who choose to do so will not find the value of the book or this session diminished.

B. Objectives

- Identify the types of internal and external factors that influenced General Curzon and that might influence today and tomorrow's senior decision makers.

- Describe how the nature and demands of effective decision making changed as General Curzon ascended the organizational ladder.

C. Guidance

1. How would you describe Curzon's decision-making style in his early years? What elements of this style did he retain throughout his career? What new characteristics had he developed by the time he was in command of the Forty-Fourth Corps?

2. What were the differences between decision making and leadership at the direct or tactical level and at senior or strategic levels in *The General*? Which of these differences did Curzon appreciate?

3. What changes or innovations did Curzon accept willingly or even advocate? Which did he oppose? Would you characterize Curzon as an innovator?

4. How would you describe Curzon's strategy for leading a small organization versus a large organization? Was there any difference? Should there be? (NOTE: This theme will be examined again from the German perspective during DMI-11.)

5. How was British policy and strategy formulated? What impact did winning and losing on the battlefield have on shaping this policy? What role did Curzon play in shaping strategic policy?

D. Required Readings

1. Curry, Peter E. and Jeffrey H. Norwitz. "Background on C. S. Forester's *The General*," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004. (Provides a broad, historic foundation for the book as well as character and terminology lists.)

E. Case

1. Forester, C. S. (Cecil Scott). *The General*. Annapolis, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1987.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Dixon, Norman F. *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence.* New York: Basic Books, 1976, 52–94. (Describes and offers psychological explanations for incompetent British generalship during the Boer War and World War I. Valuable background to *The General.* Available NWC library—U22.3 .D59 1976.)

2. Myrer, Anton. *Once an Eagle*. New York: Berkley Pub. Corp. 1976. (A study of both good and bad leadership and command styles. The study covers campaigns from the expeditions into Mexico to Vietnam. Available NWC library—PZ4 .M9)

3. Nye, Roger H. *The Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence.* Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing, 1986. (An analysis of the duties and requirements of commanding troops and a useful guide to the best reading on the subject of leadership. Available NWC library—UB210 .N94 1986.)

4. Winter, Denis. *Haig's Command: A Reassessment.* New York: Viking, 1991. (An in-depth account of Haig's central and controversial leadership role in World War I. Available NWC library—D544 .H29 W56 1991.)

5. Information on World War I may be found at: http://www.worldwar1.com.

DMI-4 PERSONALITY TYPE: THE MBTI (LECTURE)

A. Focus. Henry Ford was reputed to have complained of having to deal with an entire human being when all he really wanted was a "set of hands." Understanding "entire human beings" is no easy task, but this session aims at improving your abilities in that important endeavor. That understanding is critical to answering the question: *"Who am I"* as well as developing the skills to foster constructive human relationships in any large organization.

This session focuses on one psychological instrument that measures individual preferences by classifying them into various types. The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) assesses the primary personality functions of perceiving and judging. Succeeding at anything takes both perception and judgment; you have to determine what the problem or situation is, and then you have to decide what to do about it. You determine the problem or situation through your senses or by intuitive processes. In order to decide on a course of action, you apply some form of logic to judge the situation. Everyone uses some combination of these preferences in their daily lives. Additionally, your own combination of perception and judgment impacts how you relate to others, where you start in developing a solution to a problem, and the kind of work and environment you enjoy best. This session begins with the aim of getting to know yourself better, with the belief that this will also help you understand others.

B. Objectives

- Examine your own MBTI preference type and interpret/verify the results.
- Explain how type theory can aid interpersonal communication.

C. Guidance

1. The Banker and Buckwalter reading provides an overview of the four dichotomous scales that make up the sixteen personality preferences described by the MBTI. The authors also discuss the relationships between the various elements that make up the MBTI personality types. What are the basic elements of the MBTI?

2. Professor Buckwalter's lecture will highlight the important relationship between a person's perception and judgment preferences, and identify how people with different combinations of Sensing (S), iNtuiting (N), Thinking (T), and Feeling (F) tend to approach a situation. How do they differ in their handling of facts and possibilities in their dealings with other people? How can you help others who may not share your preferences perform better? How can others' dissimilar preferences help you do your job better?

D. Required Reading

1. Buckwalter, David T., and Joe Dan Banker. "The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator: A Primer," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004. (A brief description of the MBTI and outline of the various preferences that are assessed by the instrument.)

E. Required Lecture. Professor David T. Buckwalter will present a lecture on interpreting the results of your MBTI. Spouses and teenage children are encouraged to attend.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Jeffries, William C. "What It Is and What It Isn't," in *True to Type: Answers to the Most Commonly Asked Questions About Interpreting the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator*, 81–97. Norfolk, VA: Hampton Roads Publishing Co. 1990. (A concise summary of the MBTI that parallels the lecture. Available NWC library—BF698.8 .M94 .J44 1990.)

2. Jeffries, William C. *Taming the Scorpion: Preparing American Business For the Third Millennium*. Chapel Hill NC: Professional Press, 1996. (Easy reading synopsis of uses for the MBTI and personality preferences in business relations and competitiveness. Provides concrete methods for improving effectiveness of your organizational output; applicable to both national security organizations as well as profit-oriented businesses. Available NWC library—HD 58.8 .J444 1996.)

3. Kroeger, Otto, and Janet Thuesen. *Type Talk*. New York: Delacorte Press, 1988. (A comprehensive and enjoyable presentation of the psychological theory, research results, and practical applications associated with the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Available NWC library—BF698.3 .K76 1988.)

4. Keirsey, David, and Marilyn Bates. *Please Understand Me: Character and Temperament Types*. Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis, 1978. (Provides insight into the interactions of the various MBTI personality type indicators. Some job-specific relations are discussed. Available from the DMI faculty.)

5. Briggs-Myers, Isabel and Peter B. Myers. *Gifts Differing: Understanding Personality Type*. Palo Alto, CA: Davies-Black Publishing, 1980. (This description of the instrument and type is by the daughter of the original mother-daughter team that developed the MBTI. Available from the DMI faculty.)

6. Useful web sites for the MBTI include: http://www1.vmi.edu/ir/mbti.htm, http://www .keirsey.com/, and http://www.pendulum.org/misc/mb.htm.

DMI-5 ASSESSMENT

A. Focus. Assessment is the critical point of departure for making and implementing complex decisions; it is the process of conducting a comprehensive appraisal of the current situation. When assessing an organization, leadership must develop a clear understanding of the missions, strategic issues and challenges involved. They must also have a clear understanding of the organization's culture, its strengths and weaknesses, and the threats and opportunities that define its environment. It is also imperative to grasp the expectations of major stakeholders who will influence the organization's success or failure. Answering: "*Where are we?*" is a demanding undertaking, especially in a large, complex organization experiencing change.

The *Challenger* case study reflects a mosaic of missions, issues, problems, stakeholder expectations, and challenges, plus organizational strengths and weaknesses that must be considered in developing the answer to "Where are we?" Misdirected initiatives, based upon inadequate assessment, can result in lost opportunities through wasted resources or potentially negative impacts on the culture and behavior of the organization.

B. Objectives

- Identify key elements of organizational assessment.
- Develop an approach for conducting an organizational assessment.
- Apply your approach to conducting an organizational assessment to a case study.

C. Guidance

1. The required reading explores fundamentals of assessment. What are some of the key factors used in determining: "Where are we?" Does the reading suggest a specific sequence for assessing factors? Based on your own experience, are there additional factors or insights about the assessment process you would add or change? Why?

2. What are the missions of NASA? Have the missions changed? Are all stakeholders in agreement on the mission of NASA? How do stakeholder expectations of NASA differ? Does NASA have sufficient resources? What external and internal factors are influencing NASA? Do NASA administrators and leadership have an accurate assessment of their environment and organization? Is NASA's vision clear, and has leadership defined or identified alternatives for achieving it? How does NASA's culture influence the organization? What are the strengths and weaknesses of NASA's measurement and control systems?

D. Required Reading

1. Buzzell, Robert C., and Marshall Hoyler. "Assessment," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004. (Examines elements of assessment process to support decision making and implementation.)

E. Case

1. Phillips, Duane. "The Decision to Launch *Challenger*," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Oster, Sharon M. *Strategic Management For Nonprofit Organizations*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. (Author's view on the role of the mission statement; see especially pages 22–28. Available NWC library—HD62.6.087)

2. Wilson, James Q. *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*. New York: Basic Books, 1989. (A description of the government bureaucracy from a "bottom-up" perspective, with an excellent chapter (six) on organizational culture. Available NWC library—JK421.W522.)

3. Gardner, James R. *Handbook of Strategic Planning*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1986. (Detailed explanation of the strategic planning process. Available in NWC library—HD30.28.H3665 1986.)

4. Wall, Bob, Mark R. Sobol, and Robert S. Solum. *The Mission Driven Organization*. Rocklin, CA: Prima Publishing, 1992. (Practical advice on developing an organizational vision statement. Available from the DMI faculty.)

5. Harrison, Michael I. *Diagnosing Organizations: Methods, Models, and Processes*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1994. (Contains background and applications for assessing an organization. Available from the DMI faculty.)

6. Burton, Richard M, and Obel Borg. *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design*. Boston: Kluwer Publications, 1998. (Authors describe many factors of organizations including leadership, structure, culture, climate, the environment and organizational strategies. Available from the DMI faculty.)

7. Lusthaus, Charles, et al. *Organizational Assessment*. Washington, D.C.: International Development Research Center, 2002. (A very practical overview with detailed processes on organizational assessment. Available from the DMI faculty.)

DMI-6 STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES, THREATS (SWOT)

A. Focus. In continuing the process of assessment and answering the question, "*Where are we*?" leaders must develop a clear understanding of the organization's culture, its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats, and core competencies that define its environment. This understanding is the first step in enabling the development or restatement of an organization's mission and the creation of vision and strategic goals.

B. Objectives

- Identify the internal strengths and weaknesses of an organization.
- Identify the external opportunities and threats impacting on an organization.
- Apply the SWOT analysis to facilitate creation of a mission statement and later development of strategic goals.

C. Guidance

1. SWOT asks several questions that guide analysis:

- Strengths—What do you do well? What makes your organization unique? Why is your organization chosen over another? What service do you provide that no other can? What are your advantages?
- Weaknesses—What do you do badly? What can you do better? Does another organization operate more effectively than yours? What things do your organization avoid?
- Opportunities—What are the opportunities available to your organization? What are new trends of which you can take advantage? What does the future hold?
- Threats—What challenges do you face from outside the organization? What are you not doing that your stakeholders expect you to do? Are you keeping pace with technology and changing requirements? What could put you out of competition?

2. The SWOT analysis should lead you logically to a restatement of your mission. The Niven reading says your mission statement should require you to know the answers to the following questions:

- Who are we? This question goes a long to determine why your organization is different and what your stakeholders expect of you.
- What basic social or political needs or problems do we exist to meet? The answer to this provides a justification for your existence.
- How do we recognize, anticipate, and respond to these problems or needs? This forces your organization to look outside itself.

- How should we respond to our key stakeholders? This addresses your stakeholders' needs.

- What is our guiding philosophy and culture? Niven states: "To successfully implement the strategy, it should be consistent with your guiding philosophy and culture."

- What makes us distinctive or unique? This helps you identify your core competencies.

3. The QDR provides some insight as to the state of DoD today. What external and internal factors are influencing DoD? Does the DoD leadership have an accurate assessment of their environment and organization? How does DoD's culture influence the organization? What are DoD's internal strengths and weaknesses? What external opportunities and threats does DoD now face?

D. Required Readings

1. LeBouvier, Rand D., and Robert C. Buzzell. "Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats: Knowing Your Organization," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004. (Article focuses on assessing your organization using SWOT analysis)

2. Niven, Paul R. Extract from *Balanced Scorecard; Step by Step for Government and Non-profit Agencies*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2003, 136–138, and 104–109. (A discussion of how SWOT links to mission, vision, objectives, and strategy)

E. Case

1. Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2001, 3–11.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Lee, S. F. and Andrew Sai On Ko. "Building Balanced Scorecard with SWOT Analysis, and Implementing 'Sun Tzu's the Art of Business Management Strategies' on QFD Methodology," *Managerial Auditing Journal*, 15 January 2002, 68–76. (Article showing how to use SWOT to develop strategies. Available from DMI faculty.)

2. Kaplan, Robert S. and David P. Norton. *The Strategy-Focused Organization: How Balanced Scorecard Companies Thrive in the New Environment*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2001. (Expands the "balanced scorecard" management technique into a system for generating "strategy maps" for the organization. Available NWC library—HD30.28 .K3544 2001.)

DMI-7 ISSUE DEFINITION AND ALTERNATIVES

A. Focus. Good decisions are good choices among alternatives. But you cannot make good choices unless those alternatives address the issue that concerns you, or can help solve the problem you face. That is why we consider issue definition and alternatives together.

Analysis is a process for making a sound decision. Because the same issues arise again and again in Washington, in somewhat different guises, analysis is also part of an ongoing debate. To drive up the quality of that debate, you should define your problem as broadly as practicable. And you should propose alternatives as imaginatively as you can.

Analysts often say: "Tell me your assumptions, and I will tell you your conclusions." For this reason, you need to think carefully about the way you "frame" an issue. In addition, you should identify your driving assumptions and state them explicitly.

B. Objectives

- Describe how to bound or "frame" an issue.
- Understand the importance of the issue statement, decision objective, and analytic objective in defining an issue.
- Explain breadth, neutrality, and viability in evaluating alternatives.
- Apply these concepts to a current case study.

C. Guidance

1. In "Issue Definition and Alternatives," Hoyler provides an introduction to dealing with challenges by first defining an issue and then assessing alternative options for dealing with the issue.

- In what ways is a sound organizational assessment a prerequisite to doing a good job of issue definition?
- Why is bounding the issue or problem important?
- What are the advantages and drawbacks of trying to involve senior leaders in the process of issue definition and setting bounds?

2. The LCS case readings provide background information and introduce some of the challenges the Navy is facing in littoral operations. In reading the case consider the following:

- How would you define the issue?
- Are there other alternatives to LCS, or is LCS a "solution looking for a problem"?
- Assess the LCS and other alternatives in terms of breadth, neutrality, and viability?

D. Required Reading

1. Hoyler, Marshall. "Issue Definition and Alternatives," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004. (Describes considerations for determining salient issues and evaluating alternatives.)

E. Case

1. Calhoun, William M., ed. "The Littoral Combat Ship and Sea Power 21," Newport, RI: Navy Warfare Development Command paper, February 2003.

2. Kelley, Stephen H. "Small Ships and Future Missions," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings* 128, no. 9 (September 2002): 42–44.

3. O'Neil, William D. Extract from "Technical and Operational Prospects for a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) (Revised)," Washington, D.C.: Center for Naval Analyses, July 2002.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Bazerman, Max. *Judgment in Managerial Decision Making*, 4th ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1998. (Illustrates how peoples' judgments tend to be biased in predictable ways. Available NWC library—HD30.23 .B38 1994.)

DMI-8 CRITERIA

A. Focus. To choose wisely between alternatives, we need to consider three things. First, effectiveness: how well does each alternative give us what we want? Second, cost: what does each alternative require us to give up? Third, uncertainty: how much confidence can we have in our estimates of effectiveness and cost? We address effectiveness and cost in this session, and uncertainty in DMI-9.

Alternatives always embody a mix of characteristics, or *attributes*. To compare alternatives, we have to choose the cost and effectiveness attributes that we will use as a basis for comparison (i.e., our *criteria*). We also have to choose evidence to determine, for each criterion, how much each alternative differs from the others (i.e., our *measures*).

We evaluate our criteria and measures against standards for which we use the labels validity, reliability, and practicality. Validity is the degree to which criteria identify things worth worrying about in choosing between alternatives. Reliability refers to the extent to which a measure will give you the same answer, no matter who does the measuring and no matter how often. Practicality refers to whether the knowledge gained from using a particular measure justifies the cost of doing so. Selection of criteria and measures requires judgment about the appropriate balance of validity, reliability, and practicality, given the context of the problem.

B. Objectives

- Discuss the importance of criteria and measures for cost and effectiveness.
- Review the most important types of cost and the most important types of "dollars."
- Examine the concepts of validity, reliability, and practicality when evaluating criteria and measures.
- Discuss the differences between effectiveness and efficiency when comparing alternatives.
- Apply these concepts to a case study.

C. Guidance

1. As you read DMI 8-1, "Criteria," think about the basis on which you have made choices in your own recent decisions, professionally or personally. How did you compare alternatives and what were your criteria for effectiveness? For cost? How did you measure each? How would you rate your criteria and measures in terms of validity, reliability, and practicality?

2. In the case study, Hoyler examines how the United States is progressing in achieving its war aims in Iraq. He starts with a simple question: "Are we making progress in Iraq?" He presents a series of observations from a variety of sources giving individual perceptions of progress in recent months. He also includes a briefing from the Joint Staff and the Coalition Provisional Authority that depicts progress in restoring various public services (electricity, education, health, etc.) As you read "Measuring Progress in Iraq," consider these questions:

- What criteria and measures are used in the case?
- How would you rate those criteria in terms of validity, reliability, and practicality?
- Can you imagine measures that would provide a more complete and accurate picture?
- How would *you* evaluate the progress being made in Iraq, and what criteria did you use to make *your* assessment?

D. Required Reading

1. Hoyler, Marshall. "Criteria," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004. (Hoyler examines how to compare competing alternatives using criteria and explores the key concepts of validity, reliability and practicality as they apply to criteria.)

E. Case

1. Hoyler, Marshall. "Measuring Progress in Iraq," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, August 2004. (This case will be distributed in class prior to the session.)

F. Supplementary Readings.

1. Byman, Daniel L. "Are We Winning the War on Terrorism?" The Brookings Institution, *Middle East Memo #1*, 23 May 2003. (A critical view of progress in Iraq shortly after the end of major hostilities from a leading think tank. Available at: http://brookings.edu/views/op-ed/byman/20030523.htm.)

2. Bush, George W. "Text of President Bush's Address to the Heritage Foundation on Veterans' Day," *New York Times*, 11 November 2003. (The president's views on progress being made in Iraq. Available at: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/vet.htm.)

3. Hammond, John, Ralph Keeney, and Howard Raiffa. *Smart Choices*. New York: Broadway Books, 2002. (Note that these authors talk about "objectives" and "consequences" instead of "criteria" and "measures," but their application to the DMI concepts is useful. Available NWC library—BF448 .H35 1999

DMI-9 UNCERTAINTY AND RISK MANAGEMENT

A. Focus. The future is unknown. That is to say, no one can ever know, with absolute certainty, what is going to happen in the next instant, let alone the next hour, day, week or any other future time. This single immutable fact affects the plans and activity of every single individual and every individual organization. *Uncertainty* about the future is more than an element for speculation. It is a chronic problem that invades and influences every aspect of individual and collective endeavor. Yet, to be successful, individuals and organizations must be proactive if they are to survive, not just thrive, in their chosen competitive environments.

Uncertainty and risk management is comprised of the activities, judgments and choices we make about how we, as an organization, are going to handle uncertain future events that potentially have negative or harmful consequences in areas where the organization is vulnerable. Risk management is first and foremost about *judgment*. Individual and collective judgment must be used to examine three essential elements: *uncertainty*, *vulnerability* and *risk*, when attempting to identify and prepare for the unknown future. Although uncertainty and risk are addressed as we ask the question, "*Where are we*?" it should be understood that they pervade the entire decision making and implementation process. The purpose of this session is to examine closely the terminology used to explain uncertainty and risk and the processes used to cope with those elements.

B. Objectives

- Examine the characteristics of uncertainty and risk.
- Discuss the interrelationships among uncertainty, threats, vulnerability and risk.
- Explore the nature of risk propensity and its components (risk aversion and tolerance).
- Examine a case study using a basic framework to manage uncertainty and risk.

C. Guidance

1. "Thinking About Uncertainty and Risk" examines the meaning and context of commonly used, but often poorly understood concepts of uncertainty and risk. It also presents a basic approach to organize one's comprehension of the various elements that comprise an uncertainty and risk management approach for dealing with an unknown future. How does the author differentiate between uncertainty and risk? What role does judgment play in determining the nature and character of risk that an organization's faces? What is the relationship among uncertainty, threat and vulnerability and the identification of relevant risk?

2. "Risk Management Processes for Strategic Decision Making" expands on the better-known concept of Operational Risk Management. What are the substantive differences in the two frameworks? What are the key components that comprise the Risk Management framework?

3. "QDR Chapter 7—Managing Risk" presents the current Department of Defense concept for managing risk. How does DoD characterize risk? How is DoD's characterization different from or similar to the previous two readings? How can you use DoD's guidance to better articulate and handle risk?

D. Required Readings

1. Ratcliff, Ronald E. "Thinking About Uncertainty and Risk," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004. (Describes the terms and offers an approach to the subject.)

2. Ratcliff, Ronald E. "Risk Management Processes for Strategic Decision Making," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004. (Relates traditional Operational Risk Management to a broader Uncertainty and Risk Management framework.)

3. Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Chapter VII, "Managing Risk," 30 September 2001, 57–65. (Describes the Department's approach to the subject.)

E. Case.

1. Kimery, Anthony. "Difficult Vigil," *Homeland Defense Journal*, November 2003, 23–29. Examines the current issues of uncertainty, threat, vulnerability and risk that characterize U.S. port security concerns about possible terrorist attacks. Using the concepts presented in the three previous readings, apply your interpretation of the Uncertainty and Risk Management (URM) framework to understand the uncertainty that surrounds U.S. port security:

- Identify the key areas where you would focus your efforts in *managing* the uncertainty and risk currently challenging U.S. efforts to assure port security;

- Identify key threats and dangerous U.S. vulnerabilities and articulate the relevant risk that America faces from its widespread maritime port system.

- What critical problems do you see and what would you recommend be done to minimize or eliminate the risks you've identified?

F. Supplementary Readings.

1. Hartley, Jean. "Chapter 8: Leading and Managing the Uncertainty of Strategic Change," in Flood, Gorman, Carroll and Dromgoole, eds. *Managing Strategy Implementation* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 109–122. (Available from DMI faculty)

2. Department of Defense. *Risk Management Guide for DOD Acquisition*. Defense Acquisition University, Defense Systems Management College, February 2001. (Available at: http//www.meicompany.com/text/tutorials/Risk_management_guide .pdf.)

3. U.S. General Accounting Office. Port Security—Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making Initiatives Successful (GAO-02-993T, 5 August 2002). Maritime Security—Progress Made in Implementing Maritime Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain (GAO-03-1155T 9 September 2003). Container Security—Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New Initiatives and Challenges (GAO-03-297T, 18 November 2003) (A series of GAO reports outlining the risks to U.S. port security. Available at: http://www.gao.gov.)

DMI-10 DECIDE AND SET FUTURE DIRECTION

A. Focus. One of a leader's primary functions in formulating strategy is to make decisions that set future direction for the organization. Decisions must be made about what the organization will and will not do, and also about what role it should play in the future. Those decisions answer the question: "*Where should we go?*" With a vision in hand, day-to-day problems and opportunities can be addressed. Today's session will describe the key characteristics of an effective vision statement and explain the benefits of developing a vision story. Future choices affecting the organization must be consistent with the vision. The vision is the mechanism that assures alignment of efforts to achieve the desired outcome. Choices can be made through a combination of analytical and intuitive decision making. The better our decision making process is, the more likely we will achieve success.

B. Objectives

- Discuss how vision provides alignment to the decision-making process.
- Describe how a leader can implement a new future direction.
- Apply these concepts to the case.

C. Guidance

1. Perrotti addresses the central role of an organization's vision statement or story. It is the ultimate benchmark or reference line for future choices that deal with organizational transformation. In preparing for the session, it may be helpful for you to articulate a vision for an organization of which you are familiar. Lastly, the author describes a way to evaluate alternatives by assessing the outcome or what the consequences will be. Are there foolproof ways to assess outcomes?

2. "How to Think with Your Gut" offers practical advice on intuitive decision making. When does intuition help the strategic decision maker? How can NYSE traders be superior decision makers to USMC officers in war gaming? What lessons can be gleaned from Lieutenant General (ret.) Van Riper's experiment? When can intuition fail?

3. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Vern Clark, in a 12 June 2002 speech at the Naval War College, shared his operational vision for the Navy in the 21st Century. Entitled "Sea Power 21," it focuses on the issue of future readiness and the three capabilities needed to achieve this readiness: Sea Strike, the ability to project offensive power; Sea Shield, the ability to project defensive power; and Sea Basing, the ability to project the sovereignty of the U.S. around the world through sea-based forces. In preparing the case, focus on the following:

- Is Admiral Clark's vision clear and compelling and is it consistent with the Navy's values?
- Or, is it just "old wine in new bottles," that is, has he really articulated a new and compelling vision for the future?

- In your opinion, are there alternative visions that are viable?
- Is the CNO getting the U.S. Navy to buy into Sea Power 21? If not, what are the principle problems?
- What key, critical decisions lay ahead for the CNO to make Sea Power 21 work?

D. Required Readings

1. Perrotti, Cynthia S. "Making a Choice Consistent with the Organization's Vision," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004. (Describes how to develop a vision and make decisions consistent with the future direction set by that vision.)

2. Stewart, Thomas A. "How to Think with Your Gut," *Business 2.0*, November 2002, 98–104. (Examines the value of intuitive decision making and suggests how decision makers can improve their intuitive abilities.)

E. Case

1. Clark, ADM Vern. "Sea Power 21: Operational Concepts for a New Era," Newport, RI: Naval War College reprinted excerpt from a 12 Jun 2002 address. (A speech given during the Current Strategy Forum that outlines the CNO's vision for the Navy.)

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Senge, Peter. *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*. New York: Doubleday/Currency, 1990. (Discusses role of vision in strategic leadership. Available NWC library—HD58.9 .S46 1990.)

2. Boar, Bernard H. *The Art of Strategic Planning For Information Technology*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1993. (Describes in detail the strategic planning process with an AT&T flavor. Available NWC library—HD30.28.B63 1993.)

3. Covey, Stephen R. *Principle-Centered Leadership*. New York: Summit Books, 1990. (Focuses on implementation of principle-centered leadership in organizations. Available NWC library—BF637.S8.C67 1992.)

DMI-11 STRATEGY AS A GUIDE

A. Focus. Strategy as a guide is a recurring, central theme in DMI. It serves as a thread for all aspects of critical decision making and implementation. When we think of strategy, we should think of it as a dynamic hypothesis that must be tested against the realities of the operational environment. Once the strategy interacts with the environment, the organization assesses the outcome, modifies its approach or approaches, and "retests" the more informed hypothesis. This is a dynamic, iterative, cause-and-effect process. When deciding where to go, we must also have a good idea of how we are going to execute the strategy and how we will know when our objectives are being met. Strategy guides the organization through all phases of a decision cycle, from assessment through assurance.

B. Objectives

- Describe how organizations use the concept of cause and effect to help align their organizational activities**.**
- Discuss methods of blending the formal strategy approach with the emergent approach to strategy formulation and implementation.
- Discuss some of the higher and lower level strategic approaches the German Army used in 1917–1918.

C. Guidance

1. How do you define strategy? What considerations go into formulating an effective strategy? How important is considering the ability of the organization to implement a given approach? What impact does a selected strategy have on other aspects of organizational behavior?

2. What were the approaches to strategy used by the German Army in mid-1917? How well did the German Army evaluate cause and effect to align their organizational activities?

3. What were some of the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats of the German Army of 1917? How did they affect strategy development within the organization? How did the German assessment and response to these factors compare to the conclusions reached by the British as described in *The General*?

4. What were some of the operational goals that the German Army was trying to achieve? Was their overarching strategy thoroughly communicated and did it provide a guide for action for achieving these goals?

5. The German Army in mid-1917 had been fighting a defensive war for a significant period of time. In order to achieve their desired outcome of winning the war, the German command felt they needed to transform at least part of its army to formations capable of conducting more offensive operations. What insights about current DoD transformation strategies, if any, does this historical example give us as the U.S. military transforms to a future force while simultaneously executing an offensive strategy in the Global War on Terrorism?

D. Required Readings

1. Curry, Peter E., and William M. Calhoun. "Strategy as a Guide," Newport, RI: Naval War College Faculty Paper, June 2004. (Describes the necessary elements that comprise an actionable strategic direction for an organization.)

E. Case

1. Lupfer, Timothy T. *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, July 1981, vii–ix and 37–58.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Westmoreland, William. *A Soldier Reports*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc. 1976, 144–161. (Discusses his thought processes when developing a strategy to fight the war in Vietnam. It is an excellent example of the narrative technique to provide context to the formal approach. Available NWC library—DS559.5 .W47.)

2. Betts, Richard K. "Is Strategy an Illusion?" *International Security*, 25 (Fall 2000): 5–50. (An excellent critique of the value and purpose of strategy. Available NWC library periodical collection.)

3. The U.S. Army Center for Strategic Leadership home page: http://www.ndu.edu/library/pubs/stratlead.html. (The National War College Library's bibliography on strategic leadership.)

4. Mintzberg, Henry, James B. Quinn, and Sumantra Ghoshal. *The Strategy Process*, Revised European edition, Chapter 1, "The Strategy Concept," 3–21. New York: Prentice Hall, 1998. (This work provides useful definitions and a discussion of a classical approach to strategy. Available from DMI faculty.)

DMI-12 FORMULATING STRATEGY—CULMINATING CASE

A. Focus. Deciding on the way ahead for an organization is what many of us think of when we first think of the responsibilities of a leader. We expect our leaders to accurately assess their organization, create a vision for the future, and articulate a strategy to get the organization to this desired destination. Even in a relatively stable environment for an organization with a clearly defined mission, setting and communicating a compelling future direction can be a difficult task. In a dynamic environment that imposes new missions and the need for large-scale innovation on an existing organization, the process of assessment and crafting a new direction is even more complicated.

The case study that culminates Part I of DMI describes an organization that is working hard to rethink its activities and to find a way to adapt to significant change in its mission. It is expending huge effort to prepare for its future, develop forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and to unexpected circumstances. It has, in its leader's view, provided a "clear, concise approach" for this transformation and described how it will organize to implement transformational capabilities. The organization is, of course, the Department of Defense. The focus for today's session is on careful consideration of the DoD effort to formulate a transformation strategy, reflected primarily in portions of the *Transformation Planning Guidance* of April 2003, and in segments of *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach* of Fall 2003.

B. Objectives

- Discuss the overall DoD strategy for transformation.
- Discuss DoD organizational assessment, future direction, and use of strategy as a guide for transformation.

C. Guidance

1. The *Transformation Planning Guidance* and the *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach* documents formulate a strategy for transforming the Department of Defense. Is there clear evidence of adequate organizational assessment noted in the selected portions of these documents?

    - Are there key strengths and weaknesses of DoD noted in this assessment?
    - Are there key external opportunities and threats noted?
    - Are issues and criteria well defined in developing and choosing among alternatives?

2. Is there a clear future direction and vision evident for DoD?

    - What are elements of this future direction?

3. Concerning strategy:

- Is there an evident overarching strategy?
- Does the strategy clearly link ends and means?
- Does the strategy align organizational activity by demanding a rigorous evaluation of cause and effect?
- Be prepared to discuss the strong points and possible shortcomings of the overall strategy from your perspective. What changes would you recommend to improve the strategy?

D. Required Readings. Read case only.

E. Case (Both documents available in NSDM banker's box, general section.)

1. Rumsfeld, Donald M. *Transformation Planning Guidance*. April 2003, pp.1–14, scan Appendix One, 23–26.

2. Cebrowski, Arthur K. *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*. Fall 2003, 2–11.

F. Supplementary Reading

1. *Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003: Assured Access & Power Projection . . . From the Sea*

2. *The USAF Transformation Flight Plan: FY03-07*

3. *Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities* (2004)

(These documents are available at: http://www.oft.osd.mil.)

DMI MIDTERM EXAMINATION

A. Focus. This examination covers Part I, "Formulating Strategy," of the Decision Making and Implementation course and will be prepared outside of class. Your DMI instructor will provide further guidance.

The criteria for evaluating students' written responses are as printed in the NSDM syllabus and additionally include the ability to craft a convincing argument, in writing, using concepts drawn from the DMI course, concerning the future direction and strategy a national security organization should pursue. The paper should convey the desired direction with sufficient clarity to serve as a foundation for the implementation of those decisions.

B. Objective

- Assess a situation involving a large, complex national security organization and decide upon a viable future direction and strategy to demonstrate mastery of Part I course concepts and theories.

PART II: EXECUTING STRATEGY—LEADING CHANGE

DMI-13 PRINCIPLES OF RECONCILIATION AND NEGOTIATION

A. Focus. Reconciliation can be an important next step toward implementing a decision. Until now, we have focused on individual and organizational perspectives in choosing from among alternatives. In dealing with a complex national security issue, many other organizations will also be going through decision-making processes. They may prefer other alternatives based on different yet reasonable assumptions, criteria, or weights. Reconciliation is the process of building consensus and getting the various stakeholders moving toward a collective resolution of the problem—two skills that are an essential part of good leadership.

B. Objectives

- Understand the importance and difficulties of achieving consensus and the value of analysis in dealing with these difficulties.
- Recognize and apply basic negotiation strategies and techniques in a series of brief exercises.
- Establish the foundation for the negotiation exercise in DMI-14.

C. Guidance

1. The first reading addresses the conceptual and practical aspects of negotiation. As you read, consider professional or personal negotiations you have witnessed. Were the guidelines offered in the reading applied in those situations? If not, would some of these points have been helpful in reaching a better conclusion?

2. The second reading offers insights to some common problems faced by decision makers. While many executives know a great deal about negotiations, this article discusses some common errors and occasional losses of focus that render decision makers less effective.

3. The third reading is a fictitious scenario that represents the exercise background for DMI-14. At the end of the DMI-13 session, you will be assigned to a negotiating team and provided with role instructions to prepare for the exercise. Please do not share your confidential color-coded role instructions or scorecard with anyone outside your negotiating team.

D. Required Readings

1. Neff, Alan J., ed. "Reconciliation Principles," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004. (Discusses some of the considerations and techniques for successful reconciliation through negotiation.)

2. Sebenius, James K. "Six Habits of Merely Effective Negotiators," *Harvard Business Review*, April 2001, 87–95. (A classic discussion of the essentials for a successful negotiation.)

E. Case

1. Murray, Charles H. and Douglas G. Hancher. "Vieques Island Training Range Re-Utilization Negotiation Exercise," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Fisher, Roger, William Ury, and Bruce Patton. *Getting to Yes*, 2d ed. New York: Penguin Books, 1991. (Covers examples of negotiations ranging from those between neighbors to international situations, and a set of rules for principled negotiation. Available NWC library—BF637 .N4 .F57 1991.)

2. Ury, William. *Getting Past No*. New York: Bantam Books, 1993. (Offers a five-step method for negotiation and strategies for turning confrontation into cooperation. Available NWC library—BF637 .N4 .U79 1993.)

DMI-14 NEGOTIATION EXERCISE

A. Focus. Negotiations may take many forms. The most common negotiations are informal and usually include only two parties. There are also situations that involve numerous interests, which are more complex and difficult to resolve. This exercise requires you to apply the negotiation concepts from the previous session and provides insight into the more difficult aspects of multi-party, multi-issue negotiations.

B. Objective

- Apply the principles of reconciliation to a complex case.

C. Guidance. (*This session is two hours long*).

1. In this session, you will participate in a negotiation involving multiple parties with many overlapping and conflicting interests. Your preparation prior to this session includes getting your negotiating team together to think through the issues for your role as well as the likely positions and interests of the other parties. Together, you should identify your objectives and develop a strategy for achieving them. Prior to beginning negotiations, a spokesman from each team will make a short introductory statement.

2. Please do not share your confidential color-coded role instructions or scorecard with anyone outside your negotiating team.

3. Be prepared to discuss your strategy at the conclusion of the exercise. Did it work as planned or did you change your approach as the negotiation progressed?

D. Required Reading

1. Individual instructions and scorecard for the exercise (distributed in class during DMI-13).

E. Supplementary Readings. (See DMI-13.)

DMI-15 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES: STRUCTURAL

A. Focus. During Part I, "Formulating Strategy," we emphasized the complexity in making wise decisions in an uncertain environment. The strategy that was formulated sets the direction for an organization and emphasizes the Strategy as a Guide course theme. Through reconciliation, that strategy was further refined as a result of negotiations with other concerned parties. While arriving at a proper direction is critically important, research indicates that most programs and organizational changes do not fail because the desired destination was flawed. To the contrary, most of these efforts meet their demise because the implementation was poorly planned or leadership failed to assure that the organization continued in the desired direction. Thus, in this part of the DMI course, "Executing Strategy," we will progress from making choices to getting things done.

We continue this part of DMI by considering *implementation*—the question is: "*How do we get there?*" Today's session will cover some fundamental concepts dealing with subjects such as intended and emergent strategies, the who/what/when/where/how parts of the implementation plan, sources of resistance and ways to overcome resistance, change agents, and aligning the organization's resources with the strategy. More specifically, the session then focuses on the structural reorganization change options and tools. We will use the CNO reorganization case to refine our thinking about structural options and tools as well as touch upon previous themes in DMI.

Subsequent lessons in this phase will focus on other specific techniques and issues involved in implementation (e.g., policy, human capital and technology). While all of the phases of the DMI framework are interrelated and continuous, we will see that these final two phases of our framework, implement strategy, and assuring performance, are truly inseparable. There will be aspects of an implementation plan that deal with techniques to assure performance, and control and performance measurement systems will be shown to be among the most powerful of implementation tools. By the end of this part of DMI you should have a more sophisticated appreciation for the importance and difficulty of implementation and assurance—both are essential to *getting things done*!

B. Objectives

- Explain and discuss structural reconfiguration strategies for achieving the organization's desired outcomes.
- Apply this approach to the situation described in the case study.

C. Guidance.

1. Buckwalter asserts that most program and organizational change efforts fail due to poor implementation or follow-up. Has this been your experience thus far in your career? Why would this observation be even more accurate in cases of larger, more complex organizations? This reading asserts that, at least for significant change, implementation *never* proceeds according to planned strategy. Why or how could this be a good thing?

2. The Norton, Buckwalter, and Perrotti reading offers a number of elements that any implementation plan should consider. Among these, which do you consider the most important? Can any be safely ignored? How important are earlier efforts in defining problems and making assumptions about risk and uncertainty to formulating elements of the implementation plan? How important is being able to measure performance and accomplishments to arriving at a suitable implementation plan?

3. Putting an organization through a reorganization can redistribute or shift the resources and power. Does the organization's structure still matter in the age of virtual organizations and networks? What are the limits of structural change?

4. In the "CNO and OPNAV Reorganization" case study, why did the CNO decide to reorganize the OPNAV staff, and what were the key elements affecting his decisions? To what extent were alternatives developed? What is your assessment of the criteria used to choose among the alternatives? If you were Captain Aubrey, what would be your recommended strategy for getting "this process working the way that the CNO originally intended?"

D. Required Readings

1. Buckwalter, David T. "Executing Strategy," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004. (Introduces this subject and offers a perspective for considering implementation and performance assurance issues.)

2. Norton, Richard J., David T. Buckwalter, and Cynthia S. Perrotti. "Implementation Strategies," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004. (Discusses implementing change in large, complex organizations and offers a number of considerations when dealing with the process.)

3. Perrotti, Cynthia S. "Implementation: Structural Reconfiguration," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004. (Discusses implementing change in large, complex organizations with a focus on the structural approach.)

E. Case Readings

1. Ratcliff, Ronald E., Rand D. LeBouvier. "In Pursuit of Alignment: The CNO and the OPNAV Reorganization," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Kotter, John P. *Leading Change*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996. (Kotter discusses the change problem, why firms fail, and provides an eight-stage process for effecting organizational change. Available NWC library—HD58.8 .K65 1996)

2. Kanter, Rosabeth Moss, Barry A. Stein, and Todd D. Jick. *The Challenge of Organizational Change, How Companies Experience It and Leaders Guide It.* New York: Macmillan, 1992. (A readable, scholarly book that explores the four basic questions contained within the DMI framework. Chapters 10 and 11 are especially useful for this session. Available NWC library—HD 58.8 .C43 1992.)

DMI-16 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES: POLICY

A. Focus. Providing guidance, or making policy, is a concrete act of implementation. After developing a strategy with a plan for implementation, an organization's leader must take defined actions that communicate the processes, boundaries, responsibilities, and criteria for executing the organizations strategy. Leadership must communicate detailed implementation guidance about "what," "who," "when," "where," and "how" actions that must be taken to accomplish objectives. The most enduring aspects and keystones of that guidance will be communicated in policy by leadership. The ability of an organization's leader to develop clear and effective guidance to facilitate the execution of strategy is vital.

B. Objectives

- Identify alternative strategies for communicating policy.
- Evaluate policy guidance for the CNI case study.

C. Guidance

1. Pascale et al. recommend three interventions to take when an organization's vital signs indicate the organization is not well. What areas do the authors consider vital? The authors also identify how and why "organizational drift" occurs and examine three interventions that leaders can take to restore corporate agility: incorporate employees; lead from a different place; and instill mental disciplines. How can these concepts be used to communicate policy and aid in executing strategy? How can policy help to institutionalize these "interventions?"

2. The "Streamlining Shore Installation Management" case involves implementation guidance to align a large, complex Navy organization to better support operational requirements. The case involves the consolidation of Navy installation management from eight regional claimants to one command. As stated in the implementing message, the "CNI will be a singly focused installation management organization with core responsibility to provide unified programs, policy and funding to manage and oversee shore installation support to the fleet." How did the CNO communicate his guidance and what policies were stated to execute his strategy for consolidating shore installation management? In examining the case, focus on how, and to what extent, the CNO provides detailed guidance about actions ("what," "who," "when," "where," and "how") that must be taken to accomplish objectives. Identify and elaborate on the strengths and weaknesses of specific mechanisms such as the Executive Oversight Group (EOG) and how they relate to bridging gaps from vision to execution.

D. Required Readings

1. Buzzell, Robert C. "Implementation Strategies: Policy," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004. (Defines the terms and examines aspects of implementing changes through policy.)

2. Pascale, Richard, Mark Millemann, and Linda Gioja. "Changing the Way We Change," *Harvard Business Review*, December 1997. (Using three vignettes on the U.S. Army, Sears, and

Shell Oil, the authors describe how each of the organizations dealt with organizational drift or change and actions taken to execute their strategy.)

E. Case

1. Buzzell, Robert C. "Streamlining Shore Installation Management," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004. (The case involves the CNO's implementation guidance for consolidating Navy installation management under one command reporting directly to the CNO.)

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Mintzberg, Henry. *Mintzberg on Management: Inside Our Strange World of Organizations*. New York: Free Press, 1989. (A comprehensive treatise reflecting Mintzberg's somewhat "iconoclastic" views on management. For designing organizational structure to fit the nature of the organization, see Part II, 93-300. Available NWC library—HD31 .M4568 1989).

2. Bruce, Andy, and Ken Langdon. *Strategic Thinking*. New York: Dorling Kindersley, 2000. (Includes a comprehensive section on implementing a transformational strategy. Available from the DMI faculty.)

3. Naval Studies Board and National Research Council. *Recapitalizing the Navy: A Strategy for Managing the Infrastructure.* Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1998. (A comprehensive analysis of Navy infrastructure. Available NWC library—VA58.4 .R43 1998.)

4. Secretary of the Navy Facilities Management Panel. *Status Update for The Honorable Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy*. Washington, D.C.: Pentagon, 13 November 2002. (Covers seven focus areas of concern such as "Facilities Management, Purpose, Mission." Available at http://www.navfac.navy.mil/pw/support/fac_mgmt/panel/files/SECNAVInterimBriefFinal.ppt.)

5. Smith, Douglas K. *Taking Charge of Change: Ten Principles for Managing People and Performance.* Reading, MA: Perseus Books, 1996. (Provides guidance for implementing organizational change. Available from the DMI faculty.)

6. Wall, Bob, Mark R. Sobol, and Robert S. Solum. *The Mission-Driven Organization: From Mission Statement to a Thriving Enterprise, Here's Your Blueprint for Building an Inspired, Cohesive, Customer-Oriented Team*. Rocklin, CA: Prima Publishing, 1999. (Going from vision to mission to execution. Available from the DMI faculty.)

7. Yukl, Gary A. *Leadership In Organizations*, 2d ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989. (Addresses transformational leadership. Available NWC library—HM141 .Y84.)

DMI-17 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES: TECHNOLOGY

A. Focus. This session will explore another of our "*How do we get there?"* strategies, implementing change through technological innovation. While new technology can spur profound change, the second and third-order effects of insertion of a new technology may go well beyond the "technology will fix it" level that most Americans embrace. We will argue that technological change is "subtle" and produces more effects than a strictly "instrumental view" of technology would predict. The session offers practical recommendations for anticipating (or at least, coping with) technological changes and emphasizes that major technological change is inseparable from the other change strategies we have discussed in DMI.

B. Objectives

- Identify key organizational systems and functions potentially impacted by the insertion of new technology into a large, complex organization.
- Develop a sensible approach to aligning technological change with other organizational strategies to enhance overall performance.
- Apply your approach to a case study.

C. Guidance

1. The first reading defines technology and sketches broad impacts of two landmark technologies in history. Is the definition of technology provided in the reading useful? What elements would you add or subtract? The author asserts some sweeping effects for the two technologies discussed. Are these asserted effects plausible? Has he understated or overstated his case? What is a primary "lesson learned" from this perspective?

2. In introducing any new technology into an organization, what do you believe to be the most important factor that should be taken into consideration? What important lessons can be learned from previous attempts to initiate technological change? How can one anticipate unexpected effects that the introduction of a new technology might produce?

3. Cebrowski and Garstka outline what some consider to be a "radical" new approach to war. What is different about NCW? Are there any "constants" that NCW will not change? What unexpected effects might arise in future NCW? Was Operation Iraqi Freedom a "network-centric" war? What overall lessons concerning technological change could be gleaned from the case study?

D. Required Reading

1. Buckwalter, David T. "Technology in History," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004. (This paper provides a brief discussion of the broad impact on society of two landmark technologies in modern history.)

2. Buckwalter, David T. "Implementation Strategies: Technology," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004. (The reading discusses pertinent considerations when

instituting technological change. The paper concludes that major technological innovation will actually impact all of the other "implementation strategies" discussed in DMI.)

E. Case

1. Cebrowski, Arthur K., and John J. Garstka. "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 124, no. 1 (January 1998): 28–35.

2. Buckwalter, David T. "A Network-Centric War?" Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Castells, Manuel. *The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business, and Society*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. (A broad overview of the potential impacts of the Internet across society. Available from the DMI Faculty.)

2. Avolio, Bruce J., and Surinder S. Kahai. "Adding the 'E' to E-Leadership: How it May Impact Your Leadership." *Organizational Dynamics* 31, no. 4 (2003): 325–338. (An introduction to a special issue of *Organizational Dynamics* that explores a number of ways the rise of the network organization may impact leadership in the future. Available NWC library periodical collection.)

3. Holland, W. J., Jr., "What Really Lies Behind the Screen?" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 129, no. 4 (April 2003): 73–75. (Admiral Holland offers some cautions to over-estimating our capabilities in a future "net-centric" war and argues that experience and intuition will continue to play important roles in war. Available NWC library periodical collection.)

4. Scully, Megan. "Iraq War Proves Power of Net-Centric Vision." *Defense News*, 26 January 2004, 1. (Report on presenters at an Institute of Defense Analysis-sponsored conference argues that network technology gave the U.S. "unprecedented battlefield advantages" during OIF. Available NWC library periodical collection.)

DMI-18 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES: HUMAN CAPITAL

A. Focus. Human capital is widely acknowledged as the federal government's most important resource in the Information Age. The federal workforce may be most accurately viewed as a source of strategic value in which to invest, rather than simply an operating expense. Effectively formulating, integrating, and implementing a human capital strategy can make the difference between an organization reaching or falling short of the results it strives to achieve.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) has been underscoring the importance of strategic human capital management since 1999, picking up on a theme that has held the interest of management specialists in the corporate world. In fact, GAO has had a long-standing interest in improving government management through the use of strategic planning and performance, of which human capital management is a critical component. This session will look at some of the human aspects of strategy formulation and ways to integrate these considerations into a plan for implementation. It will address the questions: "What *is* strategic human capital management," and "What do I need to know about it to effectively lead at a higher level?"

B. Objectives

- Examine strategic human capital management approaches for achieving desired outcomes in a complex national security organization.

- Evaluate the human capital strategy illustrated in the case study.

C. Guidance

1. GAO describes strategic workforce planning as aligning a human capital program with overall strategic goals and developing long-term strategies for recruiting, developing, utilizing, and retaining the organization's workforce. How does your organization treat its people—like an expense, or like a capital asset in which to invest? Does your organization utilize processes for the strategic management of human capital beyond just hiring, compensating, promoting, disciplining, and handling grievances? If so, do these processes consistently function as a means to achieve the organization's desired results?

2. Peter Drucker asserts: "The most valuable asset of a 2lst-Century institution . . . will be its *knowledge workers* and their *productivity*." Do you believe him? Will the advent of information technologies accelerate the trend toward making those of us in military organizations less like manual workers and more like knowledge workers and technologists? If we are the latter, how should we implement change? How should we structure our organizations? How must we lead our organizations?

3. Ratcliff examines how the Department of Defense is beginning to take larger note of the knowledge its workers bring to DoD, especially as it takes steps to reduce the size of the force. What are the implications for future DoD force structure and policies as the force becomes smaller? How should DoD leverage its knowledge workers to compensate for a smaller force, and what major challenges will confront military leaders as they do so? What problems will DoD face in recruiting, training, retaining and leading the "right" kind of people for the future force?

D. Required Readings

1. Excerpt: U.S. General Accounting Office. *Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Workforce Planning*, GAO-04-39. Washington, D.C.: GAO, December 2003. Available online at: http://www.gao.gov.

2. Drucker, Peter F. "Knowledge-Worker Productivity: The Biggest Challenge," *California Management Review* 41, no. 2 (Winter 1999), 79–94. (Drucker argues that the productivity growths over the past century stem from a "scientific" approach to management of the manual worker, but that future productivity will depend on effective management of the "knowledge worker"—and the required techniques are nearly opposite those pertinent to manual workers!)

E. Case

1. Ratcliff, Ronald E. "Human Capital in the Department of Defense," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Bush, George W. *The President's Management Agenda FY 2002*. Washington D.C.: Office of Management and Budget, July 2001. Available online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf. (Guidance for the U.S. executive branch, describing five "government-wide initiatives" and nine "agency-specific reforms" to enhance the performance of the federal government.)

2. U.S. General Accounting Office. *Managing for Results: Using Strategic Human Capital Management to Drive Transformational Change*, GAO-02-940T. Washington, D.C.: GAO, 15 July 2002. Available online at: http://www.gao.gov. (Describes the importance of incorporating human capital strategies into an overall strategic plans to enhance agency performance.)

3. U.S. Office of Management and Budget. *Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget, Circular No. A-11*, Part 6, "Preparation and Submission of Strategic Plans, Annual Performance Plans, and Annual Program Performance." Washington D.C.: OMB, June 2002. Available online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a11/2002/part6.pdf. (Authoritative guidance for U.S. executive branch agencies on, among other things, the requirement to prepare a performance plan that ties detailed performance measures to strategic goals.)

DMI-19 ASSURING PERFORMANCE

A. Focus. The session begins our consideration of "*Are we getting there*?" It also continues to explore major DMI themes like the profession of arms, strategy as a guide, human relationships, and resources aligned to strategy. The first reading provides a relatively "high-level" look at the functions of measurement and control systems in any organization. A central assumption of this section (and indeed, the entire DMI course) is that one of the most powerful influences on behavior in the workforce is the measurement and control system—leaders really do get what they measure! Thus, designing and using any measurement and control system is a critical part of leading change in large, complex organizations. The second reading takes a more specific look at four potential levers (or tools) of control termed belief systems, boundary systems, diagnostic control systems, and interactive control systems. The "Corps Commander" is the case. It includes all aspects of DMI. However, particular attention will be placed on the "Assure" phase.

B. Objectives

- Discuss factors that may confound full-fidelity feedback and the intended strategy message.
- Examine alternative approaches of measurement and control, such as organizational structure, Simon's levers of control, employment and promotion decisions, culture, and intrinsic needs.
- Using the Corps Commander case, discuss and explain the impact of measurement and control systems in changing a large, complex organization.

C. Guidance

1. Buckwalter suggests that "full fidelity" feedback is difficult to obtain in any large, complex organization. Why is this so? What are the challenges to measuring performance in any government organization? How do perceptions of fairness and equity affect individual performance? Has the author made too much of formal systems as a motivator for personnel? What other intangible factors motivate people to perform their jobs? How can these "intangibles" be reinforced or inhibited by the formal systems?

2. Simons' article addresses the balance between control and empowerment. In your opinion, what is the proper balance for large national security organizations? How can you ensure that a proper balance is reached? How would you correct an imbalance without adversely affecting the organization? Is there a realistic way to orchestrate a control system without stifling innovation and initiative? What does Simons mean by diagnostic, belief, boundary and interactive control systems?

3. Malone presents the session's case. The post-Vietnam Army of the 1970s was an organization in crisis. The effects of Vietnam, the switch to an All-Volunteer Force, and draconian budget cuts left the Army as a truly hollow-force facing a superpower Soviet Union opponent. The Army's answer was the Air-Land Battle (ALB) doctrine that fundamentally shifted from a focus on defensive warfare to an offensive, maneuver, and distributed battlefield perspective. The new doctrine was published in Field Manual (FM) 100-5 in the summer of

1982. LTG Walter F. Ulmer, Jr. took command of III Corps, headquartered in Ft. Hood, Texas, in spring 1982. He would remain the Corps' Commanding General until his retirement in 1985. The Corps was one of the first to transition to ALB, and General Ulmer was given the job of making the transformation happen. To prepare for the case, concentrate on the following:

- How did the author of the case describe the "integration of internal operating systems" domain?
- What was the Corps Commander's vision and how would you describe his overall strategy for achieving it?
- What specific or implied cause and effect hypotheses established criteria that supported his "leadership-based measurement system"?
- Based on the nine general principles of that system (page 233), how would you describe Ulmer's personal philosophy of leadership?
- How important are Ulmer's belief and boundary systems?

D. Required Readings

1. Buckwalter, David T. "Assure Performance," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004. (A concise description of some considerations germane to assuring the performance of any large organization.)

2. Simons, Robert. "Control in the Age of Empowerment," *Harvard Business Review*, March–April 1995. (Addresses the natural tensions inherent in controlling an organization while attempting to empower it.)

E. Case (The Corps Commander)

1. Malone, Dandridge M. "The Integration of Internal Operating Systems: An Application of Systems Leadership," in *Strategic Leadership: A Multi-organizational-Level Perspective*, Chapter 13. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 1992, 219–236.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Ulmer, Walter F. Jr. "Notes on Leadership for the 1980s," *Military Review*, July 1980, 10–12. (Then-Major General Ulmer provides his views and philosophy on leading large organizations. Available NWC library periodical collection.)

2. de Czege, Huba Wass, and L. D. Holder. "The New FM 100-5," *Military Review*, July 1982, 53–70. (Two drafters of AirLand Battle doctrine provide a rationale for the change. They argue in the article "the human element . . . figures more heavily than any other single element in the picture of battle. . . ." Available NWC library periodical collection.)

3. Mintzberg, Henry. *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, Planners*. New York: The Free Press, 1994. (The author asserts that strategic

planning, so in vogue in the 1970s, failed to deliver on its promises due to fundamental misunderstandings about what it could accomplish. Mintzberg does not recommend doing away with strategic planning, but rather, "reconceiving" the purposes it actually serves. Available NWC library—HD30.28 .M56.)

4. Kaplan, Sarah, and Eric D. Beinhocker. "The Real Value of Strategic Planning." *MIT Sloan Management Review* 44, no. 2 (Winter 2003): 71–76. (The authors argue that the real value of strategic planning lies not so much in making actual strategic decisions as "preparing the mind" for the day-to-day strategic decisions that must be made in a dynamic environment. Available NWC library periodical collection.)

5. Anthony, Robert, and David Young. *Management Control in Non-Profit Organizations*, 4th ed. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1988, 3–77. (A basic discussion of the nature and content of control systems in non-profit organizations. Available in NWC library—HF5685 .N56 .A57 1988.)

DMI-20 MEASURING PERFORMANCE

A. Focus. Measuring performance is obviously critical to providing guidance or exerting leadership over anything. For the private sector CEO, measuring organizational performance might be equated with reading the financial statement or stock price, but even the private sector has found in recent years that the task is much more than that. Obviously the chore is even harder in organizations where there is no "bottom line." There are two fundamental reasons why measuring performance is so difficult. First, many of the most important things one would like to measure are not associated with any easily quantifiable or even specifiable variables, thus some substitute or "surrogate" must be found. Perhaps even more important, measurement in any human system does not simply extract data from the system, rather it also affects profoundly how members of the system behave! This session will look at measurement in general and then apply it to a case where measuring traditional variables may not answer the most important questions of concern to the leader in the case.

B. Objectives

- Illustrate how practical techniques of performance measurement can create dysfunctional effects or be a force for organizational alignment in a large, complex organization.

- Apply these practical techniques to a situation described in the case study.

C. Guidance

1. Buckwalter attempts to describe the difficulties in measuring performance. The article also discusses some uses and abuses of measurement systems. What are the differences between outcomes and outputs? Between effectiveness and efficiency? What dangers do you see in using various forms of output measures? How prevalent are these kinds of problems?

2. Shaffer and Thompson distinguish between "activity-centered" and "results-driven" programs. What are the key differences and why are they important? What approach is most applicable to change in large national security organizations? Why? What examples of activity-centered and results-driven programs have you experienced? Is it possible for any program to be purely "activity-centered" or "results-driven"?

3. If you were the Adjutant General of the Rhode Island National Guard, what would be your number one concern in each of your primary responsibilities (military readiness and emergency management)? What information do you need to accomplish these missions? How can you control a host of diverse players who, for most of their lives, are not under your direct authority? What measures will indicate the true health of the organizations for which you are responsible? Are all these measures valid and practical? Are the most important things even measurable?

D. Required Readings

1. Buckwalter, David T. "Measuring Performance," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004. (A brief discussion of the complexities of measuring performance and possible dysfunctional effects of measurement systems.)

2. Shaffer, Robert H., and Harvey A. Thomson. "Successful Change Programs Begin with Results," *Harvard Business Review*, February 1995. (This article proposes that a clear focus on results versus process activities leads to successful change.)

E. Case

1. Buckwalter, David T. "Changing the Guard," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. U.S. Office of Management and Budget. "Budget Procedures Memorandum No. 861, Completing the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) for the FY 2005 Review Process." Washington D.C.: OMB, 5 May 2003. (Authoritative guidance for U.S. executive branch agencies on the requirement to prepare a performance assessment tying detailed performance measures to strategic goals. Available online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/part/bpm861.pdf.)

2. U.S. Office of Management and Budget. "Performance Measurement Challenges and Strategies." Washington D.C.: OMB, 18 June 2003. (Discusses various techniques and challenges for measuring program performance in government. Available online at: http:// www.whitehouse.gov/omb/part/challenges_strategies.html#iii.)

3. Behn, Robert D. "Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require Different Measures," *Public Administration Review* 63, no. 5 (September/October 2003): 586–606. (Behn argues there are at least eight different reasons to measure performance in a public sector organization and that measurement is even more complicated in this realm than in the for-profit sector. He claims public sector leaders should not expect to find "one magic performance measure," but rather should balance a variety of measures with their purposes for measuring in the first place. Available NWC library periodical collection.)

4. Laurent, Anne. "Extreme Measures." *GovExec.com*, 1 February 1999. (Argues that the government has gone "measurement crazy," but many agencies have yet to master the process. Available at: http//www.govexec.com.)

5. Weinstock, Matthew. "Managing for Results: Perfecting Performance," *GovExec.com*, 15 May 2002. (Highlights improvement in some agencies' measurement-based performance monitoring, but notes continuing difficulty in establishing valid measures and tying performance to budgets. Available at: http//www.govexec.com.)

DMI-21 INTEGRATING CONTROL AND MEASUREMENT

A. Focus. Perhaps the most powerful influence on behavior in the workforce is the measurement and control system—leaders really do get what they measure! Because of this, designing and using any measurement and control system is a critical part of leading change in large, complex organizations. In previous sessions we have looked at some of the issues and problems with control and measurement systems. Today's session will offer some practical techniques for constructing systems that can become tools for organizational alignment as opposed to stumbling blocks to innovation and performance.

B. Objectives

- Illustrate how organizational policies and measurement and control systems can be a powerful force for organizational alignment.

- Apply these practical techniques to a situation described in the case study.

C. Guidance

1. The "Balanced Scorecard" articles describe a measurement system that is purported to have value as a tool for managerial control. What advantages could this system have over traditional measurement systems? What problems or limitations might there be with this approach? Could you imagine a "balanced scorecard" causing dysfunctional behavior in an organization? How might that occur?

2. What are the things that DoD must do well? At which functions must DoD excel? Are all of these variables amenable to quantitative measurement?

3. What would be logical elements to incorporate into the various balanced scorecard perspectives for DoD? Can you use your seminar's previously discussed DoD SWOT analysis, mission, vision and objectives to estimate how the services might achieve their core performance requirements?

D. Required Readings

1. Niven, Paul R. *Balanced Scorecard: Step by Step for Government and Non-profit Agencies*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003, 13–19, 32, 156–160, and 170–171. (A discussion of BSC, the perspectives, and translating strategy into action.)

2. Buckwalter, David T., and Rand D. LeBouvier. "Integrating Control and Measurement: Building a Balanced Scorecard." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004. (A brief discussion of how BSC might be applied in DoD.)

3. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget. *The President's Management Agenda: Fiscal Year 2002*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2002. (Introduction to the document in which the Presidents describes his direction for performance and results oriented management.)

E. Case

1. LeBouvier, Rand D. "DoD and *The President's Management Agenda*," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Kaplan, Robert S., and David P. Norton. *The Strategy-Focused Organization: How Balanced Scorecard Companies Thrive in the New Environment*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2001. (Expands the "balanced scorecard" management technique into a system for generating "strategy maps" for the organization. Available NWC library—HD30.28 .K3544 2001.)

2. Kaplan, Robert S., and David P. Norton. *The Balanced Scorecard*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996. (The original book on Balanced Scorecard. Available NWC library—HD56 .K35 1996)

3. Brennan, James E. *Performance Management Workbook*. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989. (A discussion of how to develop effective performance management techniques. Available NWC library—HF5549 .B798 1989.)

DMI-22 SYNTHESIS CASE

A. Focus. The DMI course introduced a framework and themes focused on critical thinking, decision making, and effective implementation within large, complex organizations. By now, each of you should have internalized and adapted them to your own personal framework for formulating and executing strategy "to make it happen." This session will provide an opportunity to further consolidate and synthesize your thinking by examining Secretary of State Colin Powell's strategy for reinvigorating the Department of State.

B. Objective

- Synthesize the various concepts presented in DMI into a framework for decision making and implementation.

C. Guidance

1. Before reading the two case articles, reflect on course concepts first addressed in the DMI 1-1 reading. Concentrate on key themes:

- Leading a large and complex organization is different.
- Strategy should guide actions.
- The profession of arms demands a sense of stewardship.
- Sound human relations and the ability to think critically are imperative.
- Resources must be aligned with the strategy.

2. Gingrich provides an extensive critique of the Department of State. Is his assessment of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats balanced? Does he provide a sense of mission and vision? Are alternative choices presented in terms of clear, critical thinking? What criteria would he use to measure success?

3. Harris examines Secretary of State Colin Powell's strategy for transforming the State Department. To prepare for the case, concentrate on the following:

- How would you describe Secretary Powell's overarching strategy for transforming the State Department?
- How did he address structural challenges, policy issues, human capital management, and technology? Can you identify cause and effect hypotheses implied within each of these areas?
- How might your personal framework help him?
- Describe Secretary Powell's philosophy and measurement system?

D. Reading

1. DMI Faculty. "Introduction to Decision Making and Implementation," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004 (DMI-1-1). (The reading provides an overview of the course. Review prior to case readings.)

E. Case

1. Gingrich, Newt. "Rogue State Department," *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2003, 42–48. (A critique of the State Department with a focus on weaknesses and lost opportunities.)

2. Harris, Shane. "Powell's Army," *Government Executive*, November 2003, 18–28. (The article examines Secretary of State Colin Powell's strategy for transforming the State Department.)

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Foreign Affairs Council, Task Force Report. *Secretary Colin Powell's State Department: An Independent Assessment*. Washington, D.C.: Foreign Affairs Council, March 2003. (Provides a comprehensive assessment of leadership, resource, human capital, and information technology initiatives by Secretary of State Colin Powell to transform the State Department. Available at: http://www.academyofdiplomacy.org/publications/FACAssessment .doc.)

2. Powell, Colin L. "A Strategy of Partnerships," *Foreign Affairs*, January/ February 2004, 22–34. (Explains the U.S. foreign policy strategy. Available NWC library periodical collection.)

DMI-23 REVIEW AND REFLECTION

A. Focus. This session is an opportunity to both reflect on the DMI lessons learned through the experience of the NSDM Exercise and answer any questions/concerns regarding the final examination requirement.

B. Objective

- Review and reflect upon the course material presented in DMI and prepare for the course final examination.

C. Guidance

1. Carefully review the DMI readings noted below prior to the session. Concentrate on key themes for the implementation of strategy, for instance: leading a large, complex organization is different, strategy should guide actions, the profession of arms demands a sense of stewardship, sound human relations and the ability to think critically are imperative, and resources must be aligned with the strategy. Use this final session to refine your personal framework so you are prepared for the challenges and opportunities ahead.

D. Readings. Review key DMI readings that include:

1. DMI Faculty. "Introduction to Decision Making and Implementation," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004 (DMI-1-1). (Introduces the course.)

2. Buckwalter, David T. "Executing Strategy," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004 (DMI 15-1). (Introduces Part II of the course and offers a perspective for considering implementation and performance assurance issues.)

3. Norton Richard J., David T. Buckwalter, and Cynthia S. Perrotti. "Implementation Strategies," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2004 (DMI 15-2). (Discusses implementing change in large, complex organizations and offers a number of considerations when dealing with the process.)

4. Buckwalter, David T. "Assure Performance," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004 (DMI 19-1). (A concise description of some considerations germane to assuring the performance of any large organization.)

E. Case. None.

F. Supplementary Readings. None.

DMI FINAL EXAMINATION

A. Focus. The final examination covers Part II of the DMI course and will be an out-of-class evolution concentrating on the implementation and assuring performance phases of your DMI framework. Your deliberations during the NSDM Exercise will be useful in responding to the examination requirement.

The criteria for evaluating students' written responses are as printed in the NSDM syllabus and include the application of the student's framework as developed using the DMI Part II course concepts and theories.

B. Objective

- Evaluate a situation requiring implementation of a significant change to a U.S. national security organization from the perspective of a senior cognizant leader to demonstrate mastery of course concepts and theories.

ANNEX B
POLICY MAKING AND PROCESS
STUDY GUIDE

1. Scope. The Policy Making and Process (PMP) course is designed to increase the students' understanding of the political, organizational, and behavioral phenomena that are relevant to national security decision making at the national level, at major headquarters units, and joint operational commands. This understanding will increase the students' future professional competence as senior-level participants in the national security community. The PMP course is presented in two major parts: the International and Domestic Environments and the National Security System and Process.

The first part of the course is intended to provide a more thorough understanding of the complex environment within which national security policy is made. The initial sessions introduce a model that can be used to understand and evaluate the factors that influence national security policy making and the processes through which the government makes national security policy. This is followed by lessons on international actors, the tools they use to exert influence on the United States and the constraints that may be imposed upon the United States by the nature and distribution of military, political and economic power in the world. The next lessons focus on the main actors in the domestic political system: the Congress, interest groups, the news media and public opinion. These sessions address the roles of the actors in the U.S. system of government and the various ways in which these actors strive to influence national security policy decisions.

The second part of the course examines formal policy processes inside the executive branch of government with particular emphasis on the National Security Council system and the various policy, planning, and resource allocation systems used in the Department of Defense. During this part of the course, each of four perspectives (or ways of looking at and analyzing the decision making process) will be examined in considerable detail because of the insight they provide. There will be separate sessions on the rational, organizational behavior, governmental politics, and cognitive perspectives. These perspectives will also be applied to the formal policy processes that shape national security decision making.

The course will conclude with a "current policy analysis" which provides an opportunity to use the model and perspectives to improve the students' understanding of the material and ability to identify key influences on a future policy matter. The final exam will require students to apply course concepts in analyzing a case that will be similar in content and complexity to the current policy analysis case in the preceding session.

Case studies are used throughout the course as a vehicle for applying the model and associated course concepts to real world situations.

As students enter the Planning Challenge and NSDM exercise modules, they should have a clear understanding of the various actors and influences in the policy making process that will affect decisions made about strategy and force planning. Students should be able to anticipate how theses actors and influences will affect the strategies and force structure recommendations that they will make as a seminar in the exercise.

2. Course Objectives. The objectives of the PMP Course are to enhance the students' future professional competence as participants in the national security environment by increasing their understanding of:

- The context of the decision-making process and the organizational, political, and behavioral influences on national security decisions, and

- The formal processes through which significant national security policy decisions are made.

3. Course Structure. The PMP Course will meet two to four times each week in a seminar format. Seminars require the active participation of all class members. Maximum learning during the trimester depends upon the sharing of expertise and experiences by all members of the seminar.

4. Course Study Guide. This PMP Study Guide is the primary planning document for the course. For each session it identifies the focus, objectives, guidance questions, reading assignments, and cases. Guidance questions should be used as an aid in preparing for class. Supplementary readings are listed for use by those students who desire to explore a particular topic in greater depth.

5. Course Requirements. Each student is expected to complete all required readings prior to each session. There will be two exams: a mid-term essay and a final analysis of a case which involves situations drawn from the national security environment in which the typical graduate will be expected to perform.

POLICY MAKING AND PROCESS
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PMP-1 INTRODUCTION TO POLICY MAKING AND PROCESS

A. Focus. With all national security organizations facing important questions about their roles and missions, as well as force size and composition, it is important that key participants in those organizations understand the environment in which these issues will be addressed. The Policy Making and Process (PMP) course is designed to increase the students' understanding of the major political, organizational, and behavioral phenomena that are relevant both to national security decision making at the national level and at major military commands. Knowledge of these phenomena will increase a student's ability to continue to develop as an effective leader, staff officer, and participant in this vital process.

B. Objectives

- Describe the general requirements and content of the PMP course.
- Identify the elements of an input-output model for use as a tool for case analysis.

C. Guidance

1. Analysts build models to help them analyze and understand complex issues. The PMP input-output model seeks to do the same for national security decisions. How might such a model be helpful to you as a participant in the national security decision-making process?

2. The Powell speech describes the "political" aspects of decision making at the national security level. What new skills and perspectives does the Powell speech imply that you will need as you move up the triangle?

3. What are the responsibilities of the various elements in our government as articulated in the *Constitution of the United States*? How do the principles established in this document affect the national security decision-making process? How do they affect the organizations in which you serve?

4. What are the key decisions in the video, "Retreat from Beirut?" Who were the key actors? What factors affected the decision-making process? At what point was a massive failure of U.S. policy inevitable?

D. Required Readings

1. PMP Faculty. "An Introduction to Policy Making and Process," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2002. (Introduces the input-output model and provides general guidance concerning the PMP course.)

2. Powell, Colin S. "The Triangle Analogy," Newport, RI: Naval War College reprinted excerpt from a 6 June 1990 address. (A speech to NWC students discussing the role of politics from the point of view of former CJCS, General Powell.)

3. United States. *The Constitution of the United States of America* and *The Declaration of Independence.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. (Scan and retain. Distributed as a small pamphlet in banker box.)

E. Case

1. "Retreat from Beirut." During the second half of this session, a Public Broadcasting System documentary entitled "Retreat from Beirut" will be shown in class. This video and the required reading on Lebanon for PMP-2 will be the basis for classroom discussion during PMP-2.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Hilsman, Roger. *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992. (Describes the "political process" of decision making and provides a realistic description of how Washington actually works in making defense and foreign policy. Available NWC library—JX1417.H54 1992.)

2. Duncan, W. Raymond, Barbara Jancar-Webster, and Bob Switky. *World Politics in the 21st Century.* New York: Longman, 2001. (This text provides a good overview of many of the factors and issues that will be examined in the PMP course. It offers a decision making model that is similar to the PMP model. One of the authors was on the NSDM faculty during the early 1990s. Available NWC Library—JZ1305 .D83 2004.)

3. Wittkopf, Eugene R., ed. *The Future of American Foreign Policy*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. (Collection of essays on domestic and international influences on U.S. foreign policy. Available NWC library—JX1417.F88 1994.)

4. *The Federalist Papers*. James Madison, John Jay and Alexander Hamilton wrote these commentaries in 1787–8. The articles were published in New York newspapers in a successful attempt to sway the voters of the Empire State to ratify the Constitution. The Federalist Papers can be accessed over the internet at http://lcweb2.loc.gov./const/fed.

PMP-2 INTRODUCTORY CASE STUDY: "LEBANON REVISITED"

A. Focus. One of the principal objectives of the PMP course is to increase awareness of relevant political, organizational, and behavioral concepts useful in the analysis of national security cases. An example of such a case was the Reagan administration's responses to the growing violence in Lebanon in the early 1980s. To dampen continuing conflict and increase the chances for an overall Arab-Israeli peace settlement in the Middle East, the Reagan administration actively employed the diplomatic and military resources of the United States Government during 1981-83, but was ultimately unable to control events in Lebanon. When American military forces were withdrawn in February 1984, many wondered how the Reagan administration had become so deeply involved in the Lebanon crisis.

B. Objectives

- Explain a complex national security case using the input-output model.
- Describe the major factors that influenced the decision(s) in this case.

C. Guidance

1. Which international and domestic factors affected the president's decisions? Did any of these factors change over time?

2. What were the dominant factors that drove the decision to redeploy the Marines?

3. Did actions taken in Washington constrain the performance of military officers at the operational level? If so, in what ways?

4. Should military officers consider political, social, and economic factors when advising their military and civilian superiors?

5. How can a systems model assist in understanding national security decision making?

D. Required Readings. Read case only.

E. Case

1. Hall, David K., and William R. Farrell. "Lebanon Revisited," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, March 1997, with excerpt from: *Foreign Service Journal* (June 1984).

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Friedman, Thomas L. *From Beirut to Jerusalem*. New York: Doubleday, 1989. (This New York Times reporter gives a very readable personal account of the Middle East, including the tragedy of Beirut. Available NWC library—DS119.7.F736 1989.)

2. U.S. House Committee on Armed Services. *Adequacy of U.S. Marine Corps Security in Beirut*, Hearings. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983. (The report of the Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on the Armed Services, on their investigation into the

bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut on 23 October 1983. Available NWC library—UG432.L4.A33 1983.)

3. Hammel, Eric. *The Root Redux: The Marines in Beirut, August 1982-February 1984*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985. (A story of the Marines involved in Beirut between August 1982 and February 1984, with emphasis on the August–October 1983 period and based upon participants' viewpoints. Available NWC library—DS87.H335 1985.)

4. Frank, Benis M. *U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982-1984*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987. (Account of the deployment of Marines to Lebanon during the period 1982–1984, focusing on presence and operations conducted versus analyzing policy. Available NWC library—VE23.F73 1987.)

5. *Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983* (The Long Commission). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984. (The report of the Long Commission on the investigation into the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut on 23 October 1983. Available NWC library—UG432.L4.D62 1983.)

6. Esposito, John. *Islam and Politics*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987. (An overview of contemporary politics in Islamic states. Available NWC library—BP63.A4.N423.)

7. Pintak, Larry. *Beirut Outtakes*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988. (A correspondent's experiences in Lebanon during the crisis. Available NWC library—DS87.53.P56 1988.)

8. For a number of links that provide an overview of Lebanon today see: http://www .columbia.edu/cu/libraries/indiv/area/MiddleEast/Lebanon.html.

PMP-3 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM (PART I)

A. Focus. Despite the considerable military, economic, and diplomatic power of the United States, its national security process and policies are often shaped by the actions of other actors such as states, nations, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations in a constantly changing international system. Current trends toward greater and more complex economic, political, and military interdependence within the international political system suggest that international actors may gain even greater influence in future US policy making. For effective participation in the international political system, U.S. policy-makers must understand the full range of instruments available to influence international behavior, and that these same instruments can be used by others to influence our will. By studying the distribution of power in the international political system and the tools and rules used to translate that power in international relations, we can gain insight, and perhaps foresight, that can contribute to both better policy and more successful policy process.

B. Objectives

- Identify concepts and organizations useful for analyzing the international political system.
- Analyze the current international political environment and some of its trends.
- Discuss how the international political system influences the U.S. national security decision-making process.

C. Guidance

1. The Teague reading provides a framework for analyzing the international political system. The author identifies four areas of emphasis: principal actors in international politics, various forms of action available to actors, some rules that apply in the international political system, and current trends. With these concepts in mind, how can we use them as a guide for analyzing the international political system? What has changed in this system in recent years? Each student should be able to identify the "actors, rules, and tools" commonly found within the contemporary international political system and how they interact with each other.

2. This article gives a brief history and discussion of the structure of the UN. It introduces the four main purposes of the UN Charter: to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations. Also it discusses the six main bodies of the UN: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Secretariat and the International Court of Justice. How could the rotational membership of the Security Council affect decisions made in various overseas U.S. military operations? How does the UN coordinate NGO participation in areas of peacekeeping operations? What are some of the "specialized agencies" that are linked to the UN through cooperative agreements?

3. Farah and Ottaway describe the development of a multi-billion dollar oil project agreement between multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental

organizations, and the government of Chad. This article illustrates many of the concepts discussed in the other readings. Who were the major actors in this situation? What were their sources of power and/or influence? What tools were employed by various actors? What international rules were involved? Did some rules or issues take precedence over others? If so, why? How did all this affect the outcome of the situation? What does this portend for future international economic development plans or agreements?

D. Required Readings

1. Teague, George E. "The International Political System," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, March 2002. (Provides a basic framework for understanding the principal actors, the rules that they operate under, and how they interact within the international political system.)

2. Little, Kevin L. "Introduction to the United Nations," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004. (Provides a discussion of the history, organization and structure of the UN.)

3. Farah, Douglas, and David B. Ottaway. "Watchdog Groups Rein in Chad Oil Deal," *Washington Post*, January 4, 2001, p. A14. (Illustrates the growing influence of nongovernmental organizations and the complex interaction of multiple international actors in the development of an oil pipeline in Chad.)

E. Case. None.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Krut, Riva. *Globalization and Civil Society: NGO Influence in International Decision-Making*. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Discussion Paper No. 83, April 1997, available from: http://www.unrisd.org/engindex/publ/list/dp/dp83/dp83.htm [accessed 6 February 2002]. (Extensive overview of NGOs and their emergence as an important force in international politics.)

2. Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, Issue 5, Sep/Oct 1998, pp. 81–89. (The authors contend that states are resilient, states continue to command the loyalties of the vast majority of the world's people and states continue to maintain control over material resources in this era of interdependence during the information age. Available NWC library periodical collection. ISSN 0015-7120.)

3. Walt, Stephen M. "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1998, pp. 29–46. (A discussion about the study of international affairs as a competition between realist, liberal, and radical traditions. The author contends that there is a continuing clash between two post–Cold War camps: those who believe that world politics has been fundamentally changed and those who believe that the future will mirror the past. Includes a wonderful listing of articles by numerous authors who examine realism, liberal approaches, radical approaches, or constructivist approaches to international affairs. Available NWC library periodical collection. ISSN 0015-7120.)

4. Libicki, Martin. “Rethinking War: The Mouse’s New Roar?” *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1999, pp. 30–43. (The author discusses the extent to which globalization has increased the ability of smaller countries to acquire various elements of power and influence the behavior of larger countries. Available in the NWC library periodical collection. ISSN 0015-7228.)

5. Interview with Kofi A. Annan, U.N. secretary-general, *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol. 21: 2, Summer/Fall 1997. (Elected U.N. secretary-general on 17 December 1996 to serve a five-year term, Annan provides his perspective on emerging security trends that UN and world leaders must confront. Available NWC library periodical collection. ISSN 1046-1868.)

6. Strange, Susan. “The Erosion of the State,” *Current History*, Vol. 96, No. 613: November 1997, pp. 365–369. (Strange argues that the long struggle for liberty made at least some states accountable to the people, but globalization, by shifting power from states to firms, has allowed international bureaucracies to undermine that accountability. Available NWC library periodical collection. http://www.nwc.navy.mil/library/7Journals&Newspapers/NWCLibrary PeriodicalHoldingsList6.htm#F [27 January 2004].)

7. Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. “Globalization: What’s New What’s Not? (And So What?),” *Foreign Policy*, Spring 2000, pp 104–119. (The authors distinguish between globalization and interdependence and then define the concept of globalism to describe the state of today’s world. They discuss four dimensions of globalism: economic, military, environmental, and social/cultural, and use the concept of “thickness” to describe the degree of globalism that exists in each dimension at any given time. Finally, they discuss factors that affect the thickness of globalism and how this phenomenon affects international politics. Available NWC Library ISSN 1015-7120.)

8. The UN IN-BRIEF. From the web site http://www.un.org. (An overview is presented including the six main bodies that make up the UN structure.)

PMP-4 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM (PART II)

A. Focus. In the previous lesson we discussed several important actors and rules in the international system. In this lesson we note that since 1989-90 a number of new actors, rules and trends have appeared on the international scene and that these factors present major challenges to policymakers.

International terrorism is as old as world politics but terrorists are now using new tools, organizational networks, recruitment techniques, and methods of execution. Economic interdependence has slowly deepened since the end of the nineteenth century but has today reached a level that is qualitatively different, with implications for economic health and for tools such as sanctions. Religion, long considered the domain of individuals or communities, has become a global force to be reckoned with on issues ranging from national identity to terrorism. Technological change will make possible both longer life and the spread of terrible weapons and disease. Economic and population growth will further strain the system by which scarce natural resources are shared and marketed. And in part as a result of globalization, international norms—ideas about how states should behave on topics such as feeding the hungry and stopping ethnic conflict—can now powerfully shape the options available to foreign policy officials.

Each of these developments has major implications for the making and conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Terrorists and international criminals use networks and institutions the disruption of which requires new levels of cooperation and patience, frequently while dealing with new actors. Economic interdependence makes sanctions both more risky to one's own economic health and potentially more effective. It also increasingly affects the costs of buying certain weapons. Religion introduces new actors and new emotions requiring difficult decisions about the kind of world we want to shape and what forms of statecraft we will use to do the shaping. Similarly, the spread of norms and developments in international law may require a concerted effort at shaping the marketplace of ideas. As the world becomes more complex, so must our understanding of the tools available for exerting influence.

B. Objectives

- Identify post-cold war concepts and organizations critical for analyzing the international political system.
- Analyze new trends, actors and rules in the evolving international political environment.
- Discuss how these factors influence the U.S. national security decision-making process and how that process should adapt.

C. Guidance

1. Garofano describes a series of developments bearing on the making of U.S. foreign policy. What are international norms? How are they created, and what is their life cycle? How should the United States deal with this phenomenon? What recent developments in international law could have a major impact on U.S. foreign policy and defense policy? Does international law merely reflect the norms of the most powerful states? Is religion becoming more important in international politics? If so, how might the United States respond and participate? Terrorism

presents a host of challenges. Which of these challenges can be dealt with by the United States alone, and which require cooperation or coalition action? What is the relationship, if any, between religion and terrorism and what can we do about it? Finally, is al Qaeda a new kind of transnational organization? How must the United States respond?

2. Crenshaw describes the globalization of civil war and terrorism. What are the major milestones in the globalization of terror? What defines, in her view, the "new" terrorism? How has U.S. policy responded, and why? Relate your answer to the I/O Model, which considers inputs from both domestic and international variables. Which are most important to explaining U.S. vulnerability to terrorism? Crenshaw describes the ideas that underlie the strategies of both sides. Where do these ideas come from and what is the likelihood that they might change?

D. Required Readings

1. Garofano, John. "Actors, Rules and Trends in International Politics since 1989," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, February 2004. (We are accustomed to thinking about international relations in terms of large states, fixed national interests, and power relations. Ideas and internationally accepted norms, however, may be growing in importance. In addition, bad transnational actors like al Qaeda, trends in economic globalization, and trends in international law will all affect the constraints within which leaders make national security policy.)

2. Crenshaw, Martha. "Why America? The Globalization of Civil War," *Current History* 100 (December 2001), pp. 425–432. (The September 11 attacks were the culmination of years of growing anti-Americanism that has become increasingly globalized. Terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens result from a combination of the channeling of religious feelings and ideas and strategic, instrumental logic. The United States needs to consider both of these in combating terrorism.)

E. Case. Mini-cases included in Reading 1.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Jurgensmeyer, Mark. *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001. BL 65 .V55 J84 2001

2. Crenshaw, Martha, ed. *Terrorism in Context*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001. (Available NWC Library—HV 6431 .T4665 1995.)

3. Lennon, Alexander T. J. *The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003. Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

4. Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. (Available NWC Library—HV6431 .H626 1998.)

5. Kirshner, Jonathan. "Political Economy in Security Studies after the Cold War," *Review of International Political Economy* 5:1 (Spring 1998): pp. 64–91. (Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

6. Rowe, David M. “World Economic Expansion and National Security in Pre–World War I Europe,” *International Organization* 53:2 (Spring 1999), pp. 195–231. (Available http://ejournals.ebsco.com/Article.asp?ContributionID=1006937 [30 January 2004.])

7. Davenport, David. “The New Diplomacy,” *Policy Review* 116 (December 2002/January 2003), pp. 17–31. (Available NWC Library Periodicals Collection ISSN 0146-5945.)

8. Godson, Roy, and Phil Williams. “Strengthening Cooperation against Transnational Crime,” *Survival* 40:3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 66–89. (Available NWC Library Periodicals Collection—ISSN 0039-6338.)

9. Dragnich, Alyssa K. “Jurisdictional Wrangling: U.S. Military Troops Overseas and the Death Penalty,” *Chicago Journal of International Law* 4:2 (Fall 2003), pp. 571–580. (Available from NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

10. Abbott, Kenneth W. “International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts,” *The American Journal of International Law* 93:2 (April 1999), pp. 361–379. (Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

11. Stromseth, Jane E. “Law and Force after Iraq: A Transitional Moment,” *The American Journal of International Law* 97:3 (July 2003), pp. 628–52. (Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

12. Zacher, Mark W. “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force,” *International Organization* 55:2 (Spring 2001), pp. 215–50. (Available NWC Library Periodicals Collection—ISSN 0020-8183.)

PMP-5 CASE: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM—LANDMINES

A. Focus. For nearly a decade, an organization known as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines has spearheaded an international movement to eliminate the production and use of antipersonnel landmines (APLs) anywhere in the world. Supported by hundreds of states, IGOs, and NGOs, this movement led to the development of an international treaty commonly known as the Ottawa Treaty. The case study discusses this movement and demonstrates how this and other events in the International Political System influenced the establishment of U.S. APL policy during the Clinton Administration, as well as identifying some of the issues and events that may have influenced the Bush Administration's decision concerning modification of this policy. Afghanistan and the landmine issue provide a regional focus and discussion issues to be considered while we fight the war against terrorism.

B. Objectives

- Illustrate the relationship between the international political system, domestic political system, and the national security system in national security decision-making.

- Apply the South Asian and Afghanistan regional perspective to the landmine issue while the war against terrorism continues.

C. Guidance

1. Using the case study, the addendum, and the input-output model, analyze President Clinton's decisions to not sign the Ottawa Treaty and to announce a new U.S. APL policy.

2. Which specific events or changes in the international political system shaped President Clinton's decisions? What major IPS actors, rules and tools were involved?

3. How did the domestic political system affect President Clinton's decision to not sign the Ottawa Treaty? To implement his own APL policy? What was the role that DoD, DoS and the NSA played in shaping the president's decisions?

4. What insights into the decision-making process are gained by looking at the South Asia and Afghanistan regional perspective?

5. What has changed within the IPS since the 1997 policy announcement that influenced the Bush Administration's decisions concerning APL policy? Which actors to influence the process, and how will they do so?

6. What changes or events in the IPS might lead to a major shift in U.S. policy toward landmines?

D. Required Readings

1. Teague, George E. "Anti-Personnel Landmines: A U.S. Policy-Making Minefield," in Policy Making and Process Faculty, eds., *Case Studies in Policy Making and Process*, 8th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, pp. 121–142.

2. Little, Kevin L. "Landmines Case Addendum and Afghanistan," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004. (Provides additional information for the landmines case to expand upon the State department perspective and considerations involving the South Asia and Afghanistan regional perspective.)

E. Case. None.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. International Campaign to Ban Landmines Website, at: http://www.icbl.org. (Website provides information about the organization, on-going initiatives, and status of the Landmine Ban Treaty, as well as a number of recent newspaper and journal articles related to the organization or the treaty and a list of related sites.)

2. Human Rights Watch, "U.S. Antipersonnel Landmine Policy," available from: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/uslm/USALM007-01.htm [accessed 10 January 2001]. (Article reviews Presidential Decision Directive 64 issued on 23 June 1998, summarizes U.S. policy activity since that date, and provides updates on the Landmine Ban Treaty and the Conference on Disarmament.)

PMP-6 CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET

A. Focus. In this seminar we will discuss the important role played by Congress in the legislation and budgeting process. We will discuss the importance of Congress and the critical role that it plays with respect to the military services. We will then review some fundamental aspects of Congress, learning how Congress works. Finally, we will review the complex steps of compiling the federal budget, the different Congressional roles with respect to the budget, and how the enactment phase of the budget process uses the products of Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process to return a series of laws to DoD that appropriate and direct our expenditures. Finally, the KC-767 Tanker Lease case brings together the importance of military interaction with the legislature, budgeting, and politics.

B. Objectives

- Understand the important role of the legislature, its different parts, and the processes that allow Congress to introduce, develop, enact, and oversee legislation.

- Understand how the budget process (and pressures external to DoD reflected in that process) affects resource allocation for DoD in particular and the country more generally.

- Understand a variety of related concepts (deficit vs. debt, on budget and off budget, GDP, etc.) that help place the budget in context as a significant statement of national priorities.

C. Guidance

1. The first reading by ADM Crowe reviews the importance of Congress and the necessity of working with the legislative. The author describes the necessity and difficulty of the service's relationship with Congress. He introduces the criticality of understanding how Congress works, plus the advantageous nature of personal relationships with different lawmakers. In very candid remarks, ADM Crowe grants the reader insight towards the differences between the military officer and the lawmaker, and the effect this has in the complex world of turning policy and preference into laws and budgets.

2. The second required reading briefly describes the powers of Congress relative to national security as provided for in the Constitution. It also discusses some of the legislative dynamics relevant to the 108th Congress. This reading is one of the most important during your year at the College of Naval Command and Staff. When the planning, programming, and budgeting is complete in the Pentagon, after the DoD budget is reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget and integrated with the budgets of other Executive Branch agencies, and after the President's Budget is submitted to the Congress, it still represents a proposal for spending in the next fiscal year. It is predominantly the prerogative of Congress, not the Executive Branch, to determine how taxpayers' money is spent. Just as force planners attempt to answer the question of how much is enough, Congress answers the question of how much is authorized (given permission) and appropriated (actual dollars). These goals, which often conflict, are accomplished through the federal budget process. Some knowledge of this process is central to complete your understanding of how we allocate defense resources. When involved in

any part of the defense resource allocation process, you should be sensitive to the needs and peculiarities of the Congressional process. It is, after all, the culmination of the entire effort that confirms or changes all that has gone before. Some issues to consider in this session include:

- Why is enacting the federal budget so contentious and time-consuming?
- What are some of the national priorities that compete with defense?
- What factors and contexts make defense funding unevenly vulnerable, i.e., easy to cut in some ways and difficult to cut in others?
- What methods are appropriate to determine the adequacy of the defense budget?

3. The KC-767 Tanker Lease case highlights the nexus of budgeting and politics. The practice of sharing federal powers among three branches of government has purposefully created the inter-branch political tension desired by the founders. This tension is particularly evident between the executive and the legislative branches in matters of acquisition and budgets. DoD, being an executive agency, has requirements that it needs to fill in order to present a viable deterrent to future threats, and if the threats surface, then to defeat them quickly and decisively. Purchasing the right weapons and systems to accomplish these goals is shared between the executive and the legislative. Each must play their role in a legal manner, in order to obtain the necessary system. The development of weapons systems, primarily aircraft, has become a highly politicized contest. This case study is about understanding the requirements, their relationship on the policy, and the necessity to turn policy into budget resources.

D. Required Readings

1. Crowe, William J. "Congress and Defense," *The Line of Fire*, Chapter 13. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993. (Discusses personal perceptions of practicing the "political arts" in dealing with the Congress on national security matters.)

2. Turregano, LTC Clemson G., and LtCol Doug Mason, "The Constitution, the Congress, and the Federal Budget." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2002. (Briefly discusses the origins of the Constitution and democratic thought and the role of Congress in the national security policy process.)

E. Case

1. Ducey, Roger H. "The Next Tanker," in Policy Making and Process Faculty, eds., *Case Studies in Policy Making and Process*, 8th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, pp. 269–290.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Davidson, Roger, and Walter Oleszek. *Congress and Its Members*, 5th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000. (A comprehensive analysis of the functions, procedures, norms, and external relations of the U.S. Congress. Available NWC library—JK.1061.D29 2000.)

2. Keefe, William J. *Congress and the American People*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall Inc, 1980. (A very thorough discussion of Congressional procedure and similarities between the chambers. Available NWC Library—JK1061 .K39.)

3. Harris, Fred. *In Defense of Congress*. NY: St. Martin's Press, 1995. (This work provides unique insights into Congress as an organization, and thoughts on improving Congressional accountability and process. Available NWC Library—JK1021 .H37 1995.)

4. Dodd, Lawrence C., and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. *Congress Reconsidered*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993. (Superb anthology of articles describing the challenges facing Congress today. Available NWC Library—JK1061 .C587 1993.)

5. Davidson, Roger H., ed. *The Post-Reform Congress*. NY: St Martin's Press, 1992. (A very thorough discussion of the influence of the dramatic changes in the 1970s on Congressional leadership, procedures, and process. Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

6. Smith, Hedrick. *The Power Game*. NY: Basic Books, 1988. (This is an easy to read, basic and accurate, synopsis of the political process. Available NWC Library—JK271 .S577 1988.)

7. Cigler, Allan J., and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. *Interest Group Politics*, 6th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2002. (Well-regarded compilation of essays that covers the main aspects of interest groups and their ability to influence policy. Available NWC library—JK.1118.I565 2002.)

8. Snow, Donald M., and Eugene Brown. *United States Foreign Policy: Politics Beyond the Water's Edge*, 2d edition. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martins Press, 2000. (A good single volume on foreign policy and the decision-making process by an author {Snow} who has served on the faculties of the Naval, Army and Air War Colleges. Chapter 8, "Outside Influences I: Interest Groups and Think Tanks," is particularly relevant. Available NWC library—JZ.1480.S55 2000.)

9. Hinckley, Barbara. *Less Than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. (Hinckley argues that the conventional wisdom that Congress and the executive branch are continually at odds with each other over foreign policy is largely a myth. She notes that despite flurries of activity, both branches benefit from the appearance of conflict, but in reality, Congress usually votes with the president in the end. Available NWC library—JK1081.H56 1994.)

10. Navarro, Peter. *The Policy Game*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984. (Navarro's premise is that contained in every governmental policy are winners and losers of what he terms is the Washington "policy game." He argues that the use of policy by private constituencies or interest groups is ultimately harmful to the national public interest. The author urges his readers to become more aware of how and why policy is made in the Washington environment. Available NWC library—JK1118.N38 1984.)

11. Phillips, Kevin. *Arrogant Capital: Washington, Wall Street, and the Frustration of American Politics*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1994. (A scathing attack on the failure

of politics in Washington and how the government has seemingly lost touch with the American electorate. Phillips is a former Reagan Administration official who is described by *Time* as "the Nostradamus of Washington." Available NWC Library—JK2249 .P48 1994.)

12. Robinson, William H., and Clay H. Wellborn. *Knowledge, Power, and the Congress*. Washington, D.C.: The Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991. (Robinson and Wellborn argue that the historical overriding concern in Congress is how to be informed on issues of increasing complexity. The authors note that this has been a major problem for Congress since 1789 and one which has been exacerbated in modern times to the larger number of complex issues faced by Congress and the vast array of voices–both public and private–contending for influence. Available NWC library—JK1067.K64 1991).

13. Both the House and Senate have official websites at: http://www.house.gov and http://www.senate.gov. A good site for general information on interest groups is: http://www.opensecrets.org/lobbyists/ and links to most of the prominent think tanks are at: http://www.lib.umich.edu/libhome/Documents.center/psthink.html.

PMP-7 INSIDE THE CONGRESSIONAL PROCESS (PRESENTATION)

A. Focus. "There are two things you never want to see being made: sausage, and politics." Or at least that is the old adage often used by many who do not understand the necessity, complexity, and procedure involved with the legislative process. Members of Congress serve two masters in their desire to enact legislation. They are ambassadors from the state or district at the same time they are lawmakers for the nation. They must simultaneously serve their constituency at home, their allegiance to the party, and their oath to the nation. While doing this, they must participate in a process to enact laws that are equitable, efficient, and effective. The most important of the laws being passed are those that surround the budget. Helping the Members weave their way through this process is a coterie of personal and professional staffers. Each semester a speaker is selected to address the class and discuss the policy and budget process. To the uninitiated, it may look like sausage making, but to those intimate with the process, it is nothing less than democracy at work.

B. Objective

- Examine the primary functions of the legislature in the creation of laws, budgets, and national security policy.
- Review the critical role played by Congressional support staff, interest groups, and the military liaison offices in providing information to Members of Congress.
- Discuss the importance of civil-military interaction between lawmakers and military officers.

C. Guidance

Many military officers do not fully appreciate the importance of the legislature in carrying out national security policies. Approach this presentation with an eye on how Members of Congress introduce and influence legislation in an attempt to sustain national security, while still serving their interests in their home state or district. Before the lecture, prepare several questions for the speaker based on your experience with the legislature, the Congressional staff or the budget process in your previous jobs.

D. Required Reading. None.

E. Case. None.

F. Supplementary Readings. None.

PMP-8 INTEREST GROUPS, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE NEWS MEDIA

A. Focus. Public opinion represents one of the most potent forces found in the U.S. political landscape, yet it is not easy to energize or control. In many ways public opinion is the prize fought over by numerous actors in both the domestic political system and national security system. No leader, including senior military leaders, can simply dismiss public opinion as irrelevant. The majority of the U.S. public gets its knowledge of domestic and international events from mass media sources. Leaders in government and of an ever increasing number of special interest groups are well aware of this fact and seek to use the media as a conduit to communicate and gain support for their agendas. This is not to imply the media is solely a passive participant in the process of forming public opinion. Great debates have raged regarding the role of the media in this process. The age old, often uneasy, relationship between the media and the military also bears on the formulation of public opinion. Recently, the Department of Defense initiated a bold new policy of embedding reporters with combat units in the forefront of conflict. This has added another dimension to the public opinion arena. This session focuses on public opinion, interest groups, the news media and the complex ways in which they can interact.

B. Objectives

- Analyze and discuss the strengths and dangers of public opinion, how public opinion is formed and how it can impact the national security decision making process.
- Analyze and discuss how interest groups, think tanks and public opinion influence national security decision making.
- Discuss how the national and international media may influence public opinion.
- Discuss the policy of embedding reporters with combat units, challenges associated with this policy and what embedding may portend for the creation of public opinion in the future.

C. Guidance

1. Norton provides a broad look at the formulation and power of public opinion. How is public opinion formed? How powerful a force is public opinion? Is it a positive or negative force? Is the U.S. public sufficiently well-informed and wise to have a say in national security policies? In what ways is the U.S. public consistent? In what ways is it volatile? What are the implications of this article for political and military leaders?

2. Calhoun provides an overview of interest groups and think tanks. What are some examples of interest groups active in U.S. politics today? Describe the various methods used by interest groups to influence policy making. Which portion of the U.S. public are they most likely to influence? What are some of the checks on the influence of these groups?

3. Turregano discusses the history of the U.S. military-media relationship and takes a close look at the recent policy of embedding reporters with combat units on the front line. Why is there tension between the media and the military? What constant themes are parts of this uneasy partnership? Has embedding reporters been a success? Have there been unexpected problems

with this policy? What issues will future military and media leaders have to deal with if embedding remains a U.S. policy?

D. Required Readings

1. Norton, Richard J. "Public Opinion," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004. (Examines the sources, formulation and aspect of public opinion.)

2. Calhoun, William M. "Interest Groups," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2002. (Briefly discusses organized interest groups and their role in influencing decision makers and the formulation of U.S. policy.)

3. Turregano, Clemson G. "Insights on the Military-Media Relationship: Past, Present and . . . Future?" Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004. (Examines the uneasy historical relationship between the U.S. military and the U.S. media, and takes a closer look at the recent policy of embedding reporters with front-line units in combat.)

E. Case. None.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Erikson, Robert S., and Kent L. Tedin. *American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content and Impact.* New York: Longman, 2001. (Discusses the make-up of the U.S. public, how public opinion is formed, and trends in public opinion analyses. Available as an Inter-library loan through the Naval War College library)

2. Yankelovich, Daniel, and I. M. Destler. *Beyond the Beltway: Engaging the Public in U.S. Foreign Policy.* New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1994. (Examines post–Cold War developments in U.S. and the significant increase in the importance of economic issues in the mind of the American people. Available NWC library—E885.B49 1994.)

3. Graber, Doris A. *Media Power in Politics,* 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 2000. (Reviews different manners in which media influences U.S. public perceptions and national policies. Available NWC library—HN90.m3 M43 2000.)

PMP-9 CASE STUDY: HAITI

A. Focus. As previous sessions have demonstrated, the Domestic Political System (DPS) can exert significant influence upon the U.S. national security decision-making process. At times this influence comes in the shape of overwhelming public opinion. In other instances Congress may enact legislation, which, in turn, compels the Executive Branch to take certain action. At still other moments a judicial decision can have an impact that reaches far beyond the narrow confines of the courtroom. Recognizing the potential power of these various actors, it is not surprising that interest groups have developed tactics and techniques to ensure their concerns are protected and their agendas advanced. The result is the DPS often resembles a kaleidoscope of competing and supporting interests, actors and issues. As with the International Political System (IPS) the actors of the DPS do not act in isolation. Their actions and inputs frequently impact one another. The end result is that domestic politics, once thought by some scholars to have little or no impact on state decisions of national interest and security, impact all three of the systems depicted in the Input-Output Model. Few cases demonstrate the potential power of the DPS better than that of Haiti, where, in the summer of 1994, President Clinton decided to forcibly restore the exiled Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide to power.

B. Objectives.

- Understand how special interest groups seek to influence policy decisions.
- Understand how Congress can impact national security decision making.
- Understand the role and power of media in during the debate of policy options involving the potential use of force.
- Understand how the various actors in a complex national security decision making case seek to shape public opinion.

C. Guidance

The Haiti case serves as an outstanding illustration of how the various actors of the DPS interact and use a variety of tools in order to shape the outcome of the national security making process. This case demonstrates how a relatively small group of actors can, with proper knowledge of the tools and rules of the DPS influence such critical issue as state to state relations, international agreements, and, ultimately, the decision to commit the men and women of the U. S. armed forces to combat operations. As you read the case take note of the inputs from the various actors and those input's impact on the decision making process. Also note how situational factors can dramatically impact national security decision making.

D. Required Readings. Read the case only.

E. Case. Norton, Richard J. "Haiti," in Policy Making and Process Faculty, eds., *Case Studies in Policy Making and Process*, 8th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, pp 101–120.

F. Supplementary readings. None.

PMP-10 PMP MIDTERM EXAMINATION

A. Focus. This in-class examination of Part I of the Policy Making and Process course requires the student demonstrate mastery of the concepts of policy making relating to the international political system and domestic political system and the various tools and rules associated with them.

The criteria for evaluating students' written responses are as printed in the NSDM syllabus.

B. Objective. To evaluate student understanding of the course material.

PMP-11 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES

A. Focus. There are a variety of different ways to explain how national security decisions are made. One perspective is that national security decision making is a rational process. From this perspective, policy choices are made by decision makers who carefully evaluate all the possible options, understand the consequences of each option relative to well-defined national interests, and choose the option that best promotes those national interests. Other perspectives emphasize the different interests, experiences and analytical capabilities of the various organizations and individuals involved in the decision-making process. These perspectives see decisions as resulting from organizational processes, imperatives, and pressures; from the interpersonal dynamics among key advisors; or from the personal convictions, values, or cognitive limitations of the decision-maker. The Cuban Missile Crisis is used mainly to illustrate the usefulness of the four perspectives in analyzing policy choices, but also is an example of a major Cold War confrontation involving the risk of nuclear escalation.

B. Objective

- Illustrate the analytical elements and assumptions in the Rational Actor, Organizational Behavior, Governmental-Politics and Cognitive perspectives on the decision making process.

C. Guidance

1. What are the essential elements and assumptions in the Rational Actor perspective? Does the Rational Actor model fully explain the decisions in the Cuban Missile Crisis?

2. What are the essential elements and assumptions in the Organizational Behavior, Governmental-Politics and Cognitive perspectives? What insights into the Cuban Missile Crisis can be gained through these perspectives?

3. How can analytical perspectives be used by someone working within the national security arena?

4. In its ultimate approach to the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis, did the United States choose the most appropriate policy?

D. Required Readings

1. Miskel, James F. "Four Perspectives on Decision Making," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2001. (An overview of four different ways of analyzing a national security decision and the relationship of these perspectives to the Naval War College input-output model. This reading draws heavily upon a recently updated classic political science text, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2d ed. by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow.)

2. Norton, Richard J., James F. Miskel, and Keith Duncan. "The Cuban Missile Crisis," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2001. (A concise summary of the Cuban Missile Crisis.)

3. Stigler, Andrew. "Kennedy's Blunder? Reappraising America's Options in the Cuban Missile Crisis," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, February 2004.

E. Case. None.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2d ed. New York: Longman, 1999. (The Cuban missile crisis is analyzed from the perspectives of three different decision-making models. Available NWC library—E841.A44 1999.)

2. Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Jr., and Jacquelyn K. Davis, eds. *National Security Decisions—The Participants Speak*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990. (Oral history interviews with numerous participants in contemporary national security decision making. Available NWC library—UA23.N2485 1990.)

3. Brugioni, Dino A. *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: Random House, 1993. (A detailed account of the Cuban missile crisis. Available NWC library—E8841.876 1991.)

4. Wyden, Peter H. *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979. (An account, drawn heavily from survivors' narratives, of the CIA-backed invasion that helped set the stage for the missile crisis. Available NWC library—F1788.W9.)

5. May, Earnest R., and Philip Zelikow. *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1997. (Transcripts of the audio tapes of EXCOM meetings during the Cuban missile crisis. Available NWC library—E841 K4655 1997.)

6. Kagan, Donald. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. New York: Doubleday, 1995. (Contains a chapter on the Cuban missile crisis critically analyzing the Kennedy administration's policies before and during the crisis. Available NWC library—D25.5 K27 1995.)

7. McMaster, H. R. *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that Led to Vietnam.* New York: Harper Collins, 1997. (Chapter on Cuban missile crisis summarizes the crisis and suggests how the lessons learned from the crisis may have affected policy towards Vietnam. Available NWC library—D8558 M43 1997.)

8. There are a number of extensive websites on the crisis, including: http://library .thinkquest.org/11046/; http://gwis.circ.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/index.html; and http:// lcweb.loc.gov/ exhibits/archives/x2jfk.html.

PMP-12 THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, AND THE RATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

A. Focus. There is an art to policy making in the national security system. Various actors use a variety of rules and specific tools to influence or make necessary national security decisions that form United States national security policy. This session discusses the role of the president in national security decision making, the responsibilities of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) and relationship with the president, and the mission and function of the National Security Council staff.

The Constitution provides the foundation for the president's responsibility for national security and foreign policy. During the last two centuries, the power of the president in national security decision making has grown significantly as the president exercised the tools provided in the Constitution. As the influence and power of the United States grew in the international community, the United States ascended to a leadership position in the world. The president, as the decision maker in the U.S. national security decision making process, and his decisions, make a broad impact on the international community. The complexity of these issues requires the president to engage a wide variety of advisors and experts in the analysis of policy options. The actors and organizations within the Executive Branch perform an important function in the development of policy and their influence on policy decisions can be significant.

The National Security Act of 1947 established a formal body of advisors called the National Security Council. This law provides the president with an organization that provides advice, analysis, and interagency coordination on national security issues and policy formulation. The president maintains the ability to determine how the formal processes and principal advisors are utilized within his administration. Also, he possesses the ability to establish informal processes based on his leadership style and personality. The law also provides the president with an APNSA. Selected by the president, the APNSA works as his personal advisor on national security policy. The president's professional and personal relationship with the APNSA and the role the APNSA played in the decision making process has been different among presidential administrations.

Since the end of World War II, some presidents have relied heavily upon the interagency process of the NSC to frame the discussion by providing analysis and coordination of the issues and policy recommendations. Other presidents have made their decisions alone or after consultation with a small group of trusted advisors. Finally, some presidents have taken inputs and been directly influenced by personal contacts and international or domestic events that are seemingly unrelated or not directed related to the national security issue. Should national security decisions be the result of a rational process? Is a rational decision making process the guarantor of effective policy?

B. Objectives

- Analyze the role of the president in formulating national security policy.
- Evaluate the interrelationships between the key decision making actors as they operate within the formal and informal structures of the National Security System.

- Understand the role of the National Security Council Staff and the intended and unintended effect they can have on the decision making process.

- Contrast the rational perspective with the other perspectives in analyzing a case study.

C. Guidance

1. Sullivan discusses the role of the president in the national security decision making process and the responsibilities and function of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. What tools and rules in the national security decision making process are available to the president? What is the function of the APNSA? Does the APNSA function as intended by the National Security Act of 1947?

2. Shoemaker describes an NSC staff structure and then discusses the different functions that the staff performs. How valuable is this to your professional expertise in gaining a greater understanding of the interagency process?

3. The North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, pressured the United States and other regional actors with nuclear blackmail in an effort to force the world towards a solution to his country's ongoing problems. Here is a case study which studies the policy options and the decision made by President Bush. To what extent does the rational perspective tell the whole story and what lessons can be learned?

D. Required Readings

1. Sullivan, Sean C. "The President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, July 2004. (A discussion on the president and the APNSA and their roles and responsibilities in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.)

2. Shoemaker, Christopher C. "The Functional Requisites." Chapter 3 in *Structure, Function and the NSC Staff: An Officer's Guide to the National Security Council.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1989. (Based on his experiences on the Carter and Reagan National Security Council staffs, the author presents an architecture for analyzing policy making inside the NSC staff.)

E. Case

1. Norton, Richard, "North Korea." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, July 2004. (A look at the rational actor perspective and alternative courses of action in combating a rogue state in terms of the war on terrorism.)

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Pika, Joseph A., John Anthony Maltese, and Norman C. Thomas. *The Politics of the Presidency,* 5th edition. Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 2002. (A comprehensive book on presidential politics, the influences on the president (such as congress, the public and the media), and how

Presidential character and performance are measured. Includes a look at President George W. Bush's first 180 days in office. Available NWC library—JK516 .P53 2002.)

2. Snow, Donald M., and Eugene Brown. *United States Foreign Policy: Politics Beyond the Water's Edge*, 2d edition. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's Press, 2000. (A good single volume on foreign policy and the decision-making process by an author (Snow) who has served on the faculties of the Naval, Army, and Air War Colleges. Available NWC Library—JZ1480 .S55 2000.)

3. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "NSC's Midlife Crisis." *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1987–88, pp. 80–89. (An evaluation of the major phases of the NSC current history, and general lessons drawn from its use by the president. Available in the NWC library periodical collection—ISSN: 0015 7228.)

4. Inderfurth, Karl F., and Loch K. Johnson. *Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council.* CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1988. (A definitive book covering the origins, personalities, problems, and remedies up through the Bush administration. Available in the NWC library—UA23.D4145 1988.)

5. Lord, Carnes. *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*. New York: The Free Press, 1988. (A former NCS staffer's analysis of the functions of the NSC staff and the obstacles that presidents have faced in making policy and having the policies implemented. Available in the NWC library—UA23.L7 1988.)

6. Crabb, Cecil. *American National Security: A Presidential Perspective*. New York: 1991. (A comprehensive text on how presidents have worked through the national security issues of their time. Available in the NWC library—E744.C795 1991.)

7. United States, President's Special Review Board, *Report of the President's Special Review Board*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987. (A critical look at the failure of the NSC on the Iran-Contra issue during the Reagan presidency. Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

8. Lowenthal, Mark M., and Richard A. Best Jr. *The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment.* Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1993. (A summary review of the pre-NSC conditions that caused its creation, a review of the modern presidents, and a concluding section on major trends. Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

9. White House Home Page: http://www.whitehouse.gov. (A great web site containing the latest national security policy statements.)

10. Daalder, Ivo H., and I. M. Destler. *A New NSC for a New Administration*. The National Security Council Project, Policy Brief #68, Brookings Institution, available at: http://www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb068/pb68.htm.

11. White House National Security Presidential Directive-1 website: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm. (Describes the makeup and responsibilities of President George W.

Bush's National Security Council, as well as provides links to other Presidential Decision Directives and Executive Orders.)

12. PRG Report: A newsletter of the Presidency Research Group of the American Political Science Association (Spring 2003). (Discusses the evolution of the Bush approach to foreign policy making, written by David Clinton, associate professor of political science at Tulane University.

PMP-13 THE DEFENSE RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS: LECTURE

A. Focus. The defense resource allocation process is the means by which the U.S. government decides "who gets what" in funding national security requirements. The decisions made in this process govern the activities of every individual associated with the Department of Defense and affect the future capabilities of the U.S. armed forces. Therefore, it is important that you, as future leaders in the national security arena, understand at least the general structure and objectives of the process. This lecture provides an overview of the process for identifying requirements, developing programs responsive to those requirements, funding the programs in DoD's budget, and supporting the programs through Congressional budget decisions.

B. Objective

- Analyze the policymaking process that is used by the U.S. government to devise strategy, identify requirements, develop programs, and provide resources for the nation's defense.

C. Guidance

1. During the PMP course you will become familiar with the policymaking processes that govern how governments operate. This lecture will examine the components of DoD's resource allocation process and focus on the functional aspects of the process as the foundation for subsequent discussions in the seminar. We ask that you:

- Keep focused on the strategic picture that organizes how the DoD allocates resources using various mechanisms.
- Note where, and how, the components of the process interconnect.
- Note the key organizational players and the role each plays.

D. Required Readings

1. Martel, William C. "Defense Resource Allocation." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper.

E. Case. None.

F. Supplementary Readings. See the bibliography at the end of Chapter 1, *Resource Allocation: The Formal Process* at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/nsdm/pubs.htm.

PMP-14 THE INTERAGENCY COMMUNITY

A. Focus. National Security Policy is formulated in an interagency setting. This is because there are a large number of departments and agencies beyond the Defense and State Departments that have important national security-related responsibilities. Understanding the roles and responsibilities of these other departments and agencies is important because they have formal voices in the decision-making process, their leaders can exert influence informally, and also because the outcome of a particular policy decision—even a decision that is primarily military in nature—can be directly affected by non-military agencies.

B. Objectives

- Describe the general interagency structures and processes of the federal government.
- Identify the authorities and roles of the key federal departments and agencies with respect to national security policy making.

C. Guidance

1. The Miskel reading identifies a number of federal departments and agencies whose charters involve them in homeland security. Which of these departments and agencies have you interacted with in the past? Which can you realistically expect to work with in your next job(s)?

2. Congressional agencies are discussed by the readings as if they should be considered differently than executive branch agencies. What are the reasons for this distinction? How can military participation be better incorporated into the interagency decision making process?

3. Were the stands taken by the departments and agencies in "The Steel Trap" case consistent with what you expected based on the PMP 14-1 reading? Which agencies had the most influence?

D. Required Readings

1. Miskel, James F. "The Interagency Community." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2003. (Snapshots of many of the key federal departments and agencies with which DoD interacts on national policy matters.)

2. Turregano, Clemson G. "Defining, Understanding, and Operating in the Interagency: A Modern Dilemma." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004. (The revolution and evolution of the interagency phenomena.)

3. McCabe, Laurence, and Clemson G. Turregano. "The Steel Trap," in Policy Making and Process Faculty, eds., *Case Studies in Policy Making and Process*, 8th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, pp. 195–208.

E. Case. None.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Each of the government agencies has an official website on the internet. A good site with links to many of these is: http://www.firstgov.gov/.

2. Adkins, Amee, et al., eds, *Working Together?: Grounded Perspectives on Interagency Collaboration*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1998. (Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

3. Linden, Russell M. *Working Across Boundaries: Making Collaboration Work in Government and NonProfit Organizations*. NY: Jossey Bass, 2002. (Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

4. Mandall, Myrna. *Getting Results through Collaborative Networks and Network Structures for Public Policy and Management.* Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 2001. (Available NWC Library through inter-library loan.)

PMP-15 THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM (JSPS)

A. Focus. As the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) shoulders a significant portion of the responsibility to develop strategic direction, strategic plans, and resource requirements for our national defense. The JSPS is the rational planning system used by CJCS to achieve these objectives. This session focuses on the JSPS and provides the opportunity to further examine issues from PMP-6 and PMP-13 and see how the JSPS works to shape the National Military Strategy, operational plans, and programming advice to the SecDef's Planning, Programming Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) and the resource allocation process.

B. Objectives

- Comprehend the purpose of the JSPS and how it contributes to the resource allocation process.

C. Guidance

1. PMP-13 described the resource allocation process in broad functional terms. With this background, you are ready for a more detailed look at the major components of the process. In the first reading, you have the opportunity to delve into as much of the detailed information as you desire. As you work your way through this reading keep in mind the Chairman's Title 10 responsibilities: performing **strategic assessments**, providing **strategic direction**, preparing **strategic plans**, and providing **programming advice**. The people and organizations that participate, the documents produced, and the procedures and events that occur in the JSPS function together to assist the Chairman. You should understand how the JSPS interacts with other components of the process, especially the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution Process (PPBE).

2. Your study goal for the JSPS reading is to become familiar with this planning system, not in intricate detail, but enough to enable you to evaluate the effectiveness of the system. This familiarity is necessary for you to think critically about the rationality of the process. You should consider these questions as you read about the JSPS and each of the other components of the resource allocation process.

- Are the right people participating and do they have the appropriate level of influence on the decision maker?
- Does the process require more or less centralization?
- Does the contribution of each document justify the level of effort made to produce it? Are the documents relevant, tightly connected to the process, and timely?
- Are feasible alternatives assessed and compared on the basis of cost-benefit?
- Are risks assessed and prudently distributed?
- Is feedback provided and considered in subsequent planning?

- How effectively do the various aspects of the system interact?
- Is the process well directed? Does the decision maker provide appropriate guidance?
- Can the process anticipate change and respond appropriately?

3. The second reading, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), provides you with a very recent example of a new rational process developed to identify joint capability requirements and to provide decision support for transforming the current military force to the force of the future. As you read this DoD instruction, think about how strategic planning documents are used in the JCIDS process and how this process fits into the overall strategic assessment requirements of the CJCS.

D. Required Readings

1. Sullivan, Raymond E. Jr. "Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004. This paper introduces the mechanics of the JSPS process. (Note: Concentrate on the "Process" section of this reading and use "People" and "Products" sections as a reference guide.)

2. Sullivan, Raymond E. Jr. CJCS, "Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)," CJCSI 3170.01C, Washington, DC, 24 June 2003.

E. Case. None.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. National Defense University. "Joint Forces Staff College Pub 1: The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000." Norfolk, VA, 2000, http://jfsc.ndu.edu. This document (also known as the Purple Book") is the basic textbook used by the Joint Forces Staff College. It presents the "big picture" of the complex system of joint planning and execution used by the U.S. military. Additionally it describes joint and combined organizations and their command relationships: outlines the tools and responsibilities of action officers on a joint staff; and provides reference to additional materials useful to a joint staff officer.

2. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America." Washington, D.C.: 17 September 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America provides a strategic assessment of the world and describes U.S. national interests and objectives, threats to U.S. national interests, and provides a security strategy that protects U.S. interests and achieves U.S. national objectives.

3. Secretary of Defense. "Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)." Washington, D.C.: September 2001. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 defined the requirement for the QDR. The Department of Defense designed the QDR to be a fundamental and comprehensive examination of America's defense needs: potential threats, strategy, force structure, readiness posture, military modernization programs, defense infrastructure, and other elements of the defense

program. The QDR Report is intended to provide a blueprint for a strategy-based balanced, and affordable defense program.

4. National Defense Panel. "Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century." Washington, D.C.: December 1997. http://www.dtic.mil/ndp/FullDoc2.pdf. This report was required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. In addition to conducting a comprehensive assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Defense panel was required to submit an independent assessment of alternative force structures for U.S. armed forces. This report provides recommendations to SecDef and Congress regarding the optimal force structure to meet anticipated threats to U.S. national security through the year 2010 and beyond.

5. CJCS. "Joint Vision 2020." Washington, D.C: May 2000. http://dtic.mil/jv2020/jvpub2 .htm. This document provides the conceptual template for how the U.S. armed forces will apply its resources and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.

6. CJCS. "Concept for Future Joint Operations." Washington, D.C.: May 1997. http://www .dtic.mil/jv2010/cfjoprn1.pdf. This document expands the new concepts presented in Joint Vision 2010 to provide a more detailed foundation for the follow-up capabilities assessments that are a part of the implementation process.

7. CJCS. "Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan." CJCSI 3010.02A. Washington, D.C.: 15 April 2001. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3010_2a.pdf. This instruction provides joint policy and guidance for implementation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's long-range vision document, JV2020, and subsequent Joint Vision documents.

8. CINCUSJFCOM. "Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan 2000." Norfolk, VA: 30 September 1999. http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020/cplan00.pdf. This document describes the concepts, activities, and resources required to conduct Joint Experimentation in fiscal years 2000–2005.

9. CJCS. "Joint Strategic Planning System." CJCSI 3100.01A Washington, D.C.: 1 September 1999. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3100_01a.pdf. This instruction provides joint policy and guidance fort he function of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). It describes the process governing the operation of the JSPS and the documents that constitute the system. The instruction assigns responsibility for preparing and issuing these documents.

10. CJCS. "Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Theater Engagement Plans." CJCSI 3113.01. Washington, D.C.: 1 April 1998. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/ cjcsi/3113_01.pdf. This instruction establishes responsibilities and procedures for the management and review of Theater Engagement Plans submitted by regional Combatant Commanders to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for integration into the global family of engagement plans.

11. CJCS. "Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Process." CJCSI 3137.01B. Washington, D.C.: 15 April 2002. http://dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3137_01.pdf. This

instruction provides joint policy and guidance on the role, organization, process interrelationships, management, and operation of the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Process.

12. CJCS. "Chairman's Readiness System." CJCSI 3401.01B CH-1. Washington, D.C.: 1 October 2002. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3401_01b.pdf. This instruction establishes uniform policy and procedures for assessing and reporting the current readiness of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Joint Quarterly readiness Review.

13. CJCS. "Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council." CJCSI 5123.01A. Washington, D.C.: 8 March 2001. http://www.dtic/mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/5123.01.pdf. This instruction establishes the Joint requirements Oversight Council (JROC) as an advisory council to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It delineates JROC composition and responsibilities and further defines the JROC role in the requirements and acquisition process.

14. CJCS. "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander in Chiefs of the Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System." CJCSI 8501.01. Washington, D.C.: 1 April 1999. http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/8501_01.pdf. This instruction describes participation by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders of the combatant commands, and the Joint Staff in the DOD PPBS process.

15. CJCS. "CJCS Guide to the Chairman's Readiness System." CJCSn3401B. Washington, D.C.: 1 December 2001. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsm/g3401b.pdf. This guide examines how the Chairman's Readiness System (CRS) defines readiness, assesses readiness, addresses readiness concerns and maintains military readiness. (Note: CRS is also the Current Readiness System.)

16. CJCS. Joint Pub 5-0, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations." Washington, D.C.: 13 April 1995. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf. This publication is the keystone document of the joint planning series. It sets forth fundamental principles and doctrine that guide planning by U.S. armed forces in joint and multinational operations.

17. U.S. Code. http://www4.law.cornell.edu.uscode. This website lists the laws in force as of December 20 2003. Those that pertain to the U.S. Armed Forces are found under Title 10 and those that pertain to National Defense are found under Title 50.

PMP-16 THE ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR PERSPECTIVE

A. Focus. Government policy and behavior are often summarized as action chosen by a unitary, rational decision maker. Governments, however, are not individuals but large and complex organizations that dominate the national security environment. Political scientist Graham Allison describes governments as "a vast conglomerate of loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own." Governments perceive issues through the sensors of component organizations, and those organizations define their alternatives on particular issues according to predetermined standard operating procedures and organizational biases. Government organizations tend to be bureaucratic and are characterized by hierarchical structure, formal lines of authority, degrees of specialization, and systems of standard operating procedures. Like all large organizations, government agencies develop their own unique culture. Culture has many positive influences including the development of a strong sense of mission among organization members. Yet, culture also presents significant challenges including selective attention towards tasks that are part of the culture at the expense of other tasks. Culture also causes organizations to employ informal and unofficial processes. Understanding how organizations behave in general, and how they respond to change and crises in their environment, is essential for the military executive. Translating that understanding to success in effective policy making will remain a continuous challenge for the organization's leadership.

B. Objective

- Examine the behavioral characteristics and limitations of large national security organizations in formulating and implementing effective policies.

- Examine the behavioral characteristics and competing cultures inside the Department of Defense, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Joint Chiefs, Joint Staff, the staffs of the service secretaries, and the individual services.

C. Guidance

1. Allison notes several reasons why the Rational Actor Model is insufficient to understand why governments make the national security decisions they make. What are the primary reasons for this lack according to Allison? How does the Organizational Behavior perspective differ from the Rational Actor Model? What are the implications of viewing government decisions from this perspective?

2. Wilson addresses the effects of organizational culture on the performance of government agencies. How do these tendencies affect the national security decision making process?

3. The dynamics of the U.S. bureaucracy are briefly described by Carnes Lord with particular emphasis on political executives (un-elected political appointees) who influence and carry out the Administration's policy. In general, how can these factors influence national security policies and decisions? When considered in concert with organizational culture, what are the implications for crisis response?

4. Do you have any personal insight into the culture of the organizations discussed in this session?

D. Required Readings

1. Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. "Model II: Organizational Behavior," excerpt from Chapter Three in *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. New York: Longman, 1999. (The authors provide an overview of organizational behavior and its impact on decision-making processes.)

2. Wilson, James Q. *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It.* New York: Basic Books, 1989. See especially Chapter 6. (Wilson discusses the nature and effects of organizational culture and relates its relative strength to a sense of mission.)

3. Lord, Carnes. "The President and the Problem of Bureaucracy," Chapter 1 in *The Presidency and the Management of National Security*. New York: The Free Press, 1988. (A discussion of the Presidency and the problem of bureaucracy in the decision making process.)

E. Case. None.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Goodsell, Charles T. *The Case for Bureaucracy, Third Edition*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1994. (Provides an interesting counter-argument to the negative views of public bureaucracies that are usually expressed. Available NWC library—JK421.G64 1994.)

2. Bolman, Lee G., and Terrence E. Deal. *Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice and Leadership*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997. (Presents a large complex body of theory, research and practice on organizations and leadership. Available NWC Library—HD31 .B6135 2003.)

3. U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, Staff Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985, pp. 354–370. (The "Locher Report," which criticized organization and decision-making procedures of DoD. Cited pages highlight organizational problems seen during contingencies including USS *Pueblo*, Iran hostage rescue, and Grenada. Available NWC library—UA23.3.D42 1985.)

4. Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration. *The United States Government Manual 1999/2000*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999. (The official handbook of the Federal Government. Provides comprehensive information on the agencies of he legislative, judicial and executive branches. Available NWC library—JK421.A3 1999-2000.)

PMP-17: PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND EXECUTION (PPBE)

A. Focus. How does the Department of Defense make the decisions that sustain the forces and capabilities we need to meet the near-term demands of our National Military Strategy, while undertaking efforts to transform our forces so we are prepared for the future? The Secretary of Defense uses PPBE to develop and integrate defense policy, military strategy, service programs, and the DoD budget with the ultimate objective of allocating resources to meet the near-term and future warfighting needs of the combatant commanders. This session focuses on PPBE, and provides you the opportunity to review and discuss information presented in the PMP-13 lecture and in the assigned readings.

B. Objectives

- Understand the purpose of PPBE and how it contributes to the resource allocation process.
- Examine to what extent each player has the ability to exert power and influence in the PPBE process.

C. Guidance

1. The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System reading presents an executive-level overview of PPBE in the context of the overall resource allocation process. PPBE is SecDef's strategic planning and resource management system. It reviews the National Military Strategy (NMS) and recommended forces developed in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and combines them with OSD analysis of defense requirements to develop the DoD's annual budget request submitted for inclusion in the President's budget proposal. PPBE is a complex, highly interactive process that depends on an extensive, collaborative effort from virtually every organization and agency within DoD.

2. Your challenge is to examine this planning system with a critical eye. Think beyond the details of the process and look at the behavioral characteristics and limitations of DoD in the resource allocation process. PPBE is a rational process developed by an organization as a response to a perceived problem. What was that perceived problem? Is the process really rational or has the organization developed systems of SOPs, degrees of specialization, cultural nuances, etc. that precludes a rational decision on how to allocated resource? How do the sub-cultures, organizational structures, systems of SOPs of the services interact with the PPBE process?

3. Examine the following broader questions and issues of power and influence that you will look at in PMP-18. Is personal power decisive in the PPBE environment? How does it affect decision making? Should its use be confined to the civilian leadership or should military officers be included in the "game" of power politics? What are the rules of the game? How can determination of sources of power and knowledge about their use assist you in accomplishing your job? Is it right to play such "games" when national defense policy is at stake? How does political play in one organization affect the organizational effectiveness in the interagency process? How much influence, relative to that of CJCS, CINCs, and SecDef's staff, should the services have on resource allocation decisions?

D. Required Readings

1. Sullivan, Raymond E. Jr. "Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBE)." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004. (This paper introduces the mechanics of the PPBE process.)

2. Sullivan, Raymond E. Jr. "The Players in the PPBE." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004. (This paper introduces the students to the players associated with the PPBE process.)

E. Case. None.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. National Defense University. *Joint Forces Staff College Pub 1: The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000*. Norfolk, VA, 2000, http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu (click on the Joint Staff Officer's Guide link to gain access to JFSC Pub 1.) (This document (also known as the "Purple Book") is the basic textbook used by the Joint Forces Staff College. It presents the "big picture" of the complex system of joint planning and execution used by the U.S. military. It describes joint and combined organizations and their command relationships, outlines the tools and responsibilities of action officers on a joint staff, and provides reference to additional materials useful to a joint staff officer.)

2. The White House. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, D.C.: September 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. (This document describes U.S. national interests and objectives; the threats to those interests and opportunities presented by a dynamic and uncertain security environment; and the security strategy to protect U.S. interests and achieve U.S. national objectives into the 21st century.)

3. Secretary of Defense. *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*. Washington, D.C.: September 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf. (The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 defined the requirement for the QDR. The Department of Defense designed the QDR to be a fundamental and comprehensive examination of America's defense needs: potential threats, strategy, force structure, readiness posture, military modernization programs, defense infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program. The QDR Report is intended to provide a blueprint for a strategy-based, balanced, and affordable defense program.)

4. National Defense Panel. *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*. Washington, D.C.: December 1997, http://www.dtic.mil/ndp/FullDoc2.pdf, this web address is case sensitive. (This report was required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. In addition to conducting a comprehensive assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Defense Panel was required to submit an independent assessment of alternative force structures for U.S. armed forces. This report provides recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and Congress regarding the optimal force structure to meet anticipated threats to U.S. national security through the year 2010 and beyond.)

5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). *National Military Strategy—Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era*. Washington, D.C.: 1997, http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/nms.html. (This document conveys the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the strategic direction of U.S. armed forces in implementing the guidance in the President's National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review Report.)

6. CJCS. *Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Process*. CJCSI 3137.01A. Washington, D.C.: 22 Jan 1999, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3137_01a.pdf. (This instruction provides joint policy and guidance on the role, organization, process interrelationships, management, and operation of the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Process.)

7. CJCS. *Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council*. CJCSI 5123.01A. Washington, D.C.: 8 March 2001, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/5123_01a.pdf. (This instruction establishes the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) as an advisory council to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It delineates JROC composition and responsibilities and further defines the JROC role in the requirements and acquisition process.)

8. CJCS. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander in Chiefs of the Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. CJCSI 8501.01. Washington, DC: 1 April 1999. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/8501_01.pdf. (This instruction identifies the functions and responsibilities for the CJCS, CINCs, and Joint Staff involvement in each phase of the Planning, Program, and Budgeting System. It also describes the Congressional budget process.)

9. CJCS. *Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*. Washington, D.C.: 13 April 1995, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf. (This publication is the keystone document of the joint planning series. It sets forth fundamental principles and doctrine that guide planning by U.S. armed forces in joint or multinational operations.)

10. *U.S. Code*, http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode. (This website lists the laws in force, based on the most recent version made available by the U.S. House of Representatives, that pertain to the U.S. Armed Forces (Title 10) and National Defense (Title 50)).

11. Davis, Thomas M. *Managing Defense After the Cold War*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, June 1997. (This document critiques the current planning and budgeting process. Mr. Davis argues that, properly modified and better implemented, the PPBE could be made more effective than it is today. Available NWC Library—UA23. D38.)

12. Business Executives for National Security (BENS) Tooth-to-Tail Commission Report "Framing the Problems of PPBE," Jan 2000, http://www.bens.org/images/PPBE2000-Framing.pdf and its companion, http://www.bens.org/pubs_report2000.html. (This report examines DoD's PPBE in comparison with strategic planning approaches used by other public and private organizations. The report suggests that the PPBE, having served DoD well, has become bureaucratized to the point where it can no longer perform its intended purpose. It begins with a

short history and an overview of the current process. The author refers to the basic ideas that underpin the original intention of those who developed the process. The author proceeds to compare these basic ideas with the current reality and points out areas where PPBE has strayed from what it was originally designed to achieve. He goes on to suggest the DoD staffs are large and cumbersome, their planning and guidance are vague, and waste time boring into small issues that should be left to the purview of the services. The second site is the final report where recommendations are made.)

13. Department of Defense. *The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBE*). DoDD 7045.14. Washington, D.C.: 22 May 1984, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d704514wch1_052284/d704514p.pdf. (This DoD Directive is a six-page document that establishes the basic policy, procedures, and responsibilities for the PPBE.)

14. Department of Defense. *Implementation of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBE*). DoDI 7045.7. Washington, D.C.: 23 May 1984, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/i70457wch1_052384/i70457p.pdf. (This DoD Instruction establishes more detailed procedural guidance for the formulation, submission, analysis, review and approval of DoD plans, programs and budgets. Although this is an older document and contains some dated information, it serves as a reference source for the PPBE.)

15. *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook (2001–2002)*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 15 May 2001, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/dclm/, click on "How the Army Runs" link. (This handbook (also known as the "Green Book") is used to support the curriculum at the Army War College. It explains the relationship of numerous DoD, Joint, and U.S. Army planning systems and processes that determine the allocation of defense resources.)

16. Davis, M. Thomas. "The JROC: Doing What? Going Where?" *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Summer 1998. (This article is a critique of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. In developing his case, Davis offers specific criticism of PPBE. Available NWC Library Periodicals Collection—ISSN 1082-5444.)

17. Neal, Richard. "The JROC: A Return to the Basics," *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Winter 1999. (This article is a rebuttal to the previous piece by Davis. Available NWC Library Periodicals Collection—ISSN 1082-5444.)

18. Davis, M. Thomas, "The JROC Revisited," *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Winter 1999. (This is a follow-on article to the previous rebuttal. Available NWC Library Periodicals Collection—ISSN 1082-5444.)

PMP-18 THE GOVERNMENTAL-POLITICS PERSPECTIVE

A. Focus. In any environment where important decisions must be made and rigorous analytical solutions are difficult to obtain, *politics* will necessarily enter into selection of alternatives. Moreover, power and influence are the language in which political discourse takes place. The unique characteristics of the national security bureaucracy dictate that participants must understand and exercise personal power and influence to be effective. In the policy arena, success usually depends upon the assistance or at least the cooperation of others. With many advocates competing for limited resources, formal authority alone is not always adequate to accomplish one's mission, and issues seldom have a course of action so clearly superior that reasonable people could not disagree upon actions to be taken. The most effective individuals in this environment are those who understand the tools of power and influence; how these tools are acquired, and how they are used effectively. In this session, we discuss the tools of power and influence and analyze their sources and use.

B. Objectives

- Describe the nature of power and illustrate the ways power and influence are applied on a situational basis to shape the national security decision making process.

- Contrast the governmental-politics perspective with the other perspectives in analyzing a case study.

C. Guidance

1. Turcotte provides several definitions of power and illustrates how such power may be applied. How can this knowledge be applied? Is there an ethical dimension to the application of such power?

2. Jefferies describes the play of governmental politics within the Pentagon. Do his "rules of the game" seem logical? What other "rules" can you imagine? How does political play within one organization affect organizational effectiveness in the interagency process?

3. In what ways do you see power and influence being used in the U.S. decision to use force against Serbia? Was there a dominant wielder of power and influence in the Clinton cabinet? How did shifting power bases and influence affect the decision? Were there winners and losers?

D. Required Readings

1. Turcotte, William. "Power and Influence." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2001. (Professor Turcotte identifies nine distinct sources of power and seven techniques to apply power effectively.)

2. Jefferies, Chris. "Bureaucratic Politics in the Department of Defense: A Practitioner's Perspective." Chapter 5.3 in David C. Kozak and James M. Keagle, eds. *Bureaucratic Politics and National Security: Theory and Practice.* Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 1988. (Jefferies describes

the players and rules of the game within the DoD. He concludes that, regardless of the formal structure, decision making is driven by the realities of governmental politics.)

E. Case

1. Garofano, John. "Governmental Politics in the Bosnia Decisions?" Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Smith, Perry M. *Assignment Pentagon*. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1993. (A guide to the organizational culture and governmental politics of the Pentagon by an Air Force veteran of that institution. Available NWC library—UA26.A745.S55 1993.)

2. Cohen, Allan R., and David L. Bradford. *Influence Without Authority*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990. (A detailed handbook on the application of personal power in everyday business situations. Available NWC library—HD58.9.C64 1990.)

3. Powell, Colin L. *My American Journey*. New York: Random House, 1995. (An autobiography by the former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell. Available NWC library - E840.5.P68.A3 1995.)

4. Smith, Hendrick. T*he Power Game: How Washington Works*. New York: Random House, 1988. (Available NWC Library - JK271 .S577 1988.)

PMP-19 CASE STUDY: KOSOVO

A. Focus. This session explores how the governmental-politics perspective can illuminate foreign policy decisions. The case study, Operation Allied Force, involved the use of NATO air power to convince Slobodan Milosevic to discontinue the Serbian military's attacks on the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. After deciding to use air power, the United States and NATO found that events did not play out in the fashion that they had expected, and consideration was given to escalating to a ground war. In this seminar we examine two policy decisions related to the operation. The first is the initial decision to apply military force, and the second is the issue of NATO escalating to a ground campaign. Both decisions involved complicated assessments of the stakes involved, a discussion of what measures were appropriate, and whether those measures were likely to succeed. The roles of the key players in the National Security System, and the sources of their influence, should be a major focus of your examination of the case. In addition, look at the conduct of alliance decision-making, the caliber of U.S. predictions as to how the confrontation would unfold, and the respective roles of military force and diplomacy in bringing the conflict to a conclusion.

B. Objective

- Explore the importance of the interaction of the president and his advisors in the formulation of foreign policy.
- Contrast the governmental-politics perspective with the other perspectives in analyzing a case study.
- Examine the role of outside influences (domestic and international) on politicians' perspectives.

C. Guidance

1. What were the arguments in favor of taking action in Kosovo in 1999? What was the NSS consensus?

2. Was the policy successful?

3. What role did governmental politics play in the two decisions? Were other factors more important?

4. What role did NATO play in the unfolding of events?

5. Did a NATO ground threat play a role in the conclusion of the conflict?

D. Required Readings. Case Only.

E. Case

1. Stigler, Andrew L. "The War Over Kosovo," in Policy Making and Process Faculty, eds., *Case Studies in Policy Making and Process*, 8th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, pp. 161–172.

F. Supplemental Reading. None.

PMP-20 THE COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE

A. Focus. We have suggested that complex national security decisions may be fully understood only after viewing them from several different perspectives. One of those is the *cognitive* perspective, which concerns such things as the decision maker's own beliefs, biases, ethical values, emotions, personal experiences, and memories. These things naturally affect the decision making process. Sometimes the effect is obvious—as when the decision maker's emotions or impatience might short-circuit the evaluation of all options. In other instances the effect may be subtle--as when a decision maker's preconceptions or biases cause a personal predisposition towards one option or another; or excess skepticism about estimated costs and benefits of particular options. In still other cases a decision maker may be emotionally involved in a way that hinders clear thought and action. This lesson examines the cognitive perspective and expands the discussion to consider how individuals gather and evaluate data, deal with uncertainty and information overload, and make decisions that would not be predicted by the rational actor model.

B. Objectives

- Explain the impact of the decision maker's personal values, beliefs and other cognitive and emotive elements on national security decisions.

- Contrast the cognitive perspective with the other perspectives in analyzing decision making examples.

C. Guidance

1. Norton and Teague provide an overview of common cognitive factors and their impact on decision making. How can an increased awareness of cognitive factors be of value to decision makers and their staffs? What are "heuristics?" Are using such "cognitive shortcuts" harmful or beneficial? What actions can be taken to reduce or eliminate potential problems associated with some cognitive factors that influence the decision-making process?

2. Garofano distinguishes between purely mental, or information-processing, functions and emotional, or "hot" processes that skew decisions. What is the difference? Which kind of cognitive experience best explains, for example, Washington's inability to acknowledge possible Chinese intervention in the Korean war in 1950, President George H.W. Bush's decisions to terminate the conflict in Iraq in 1991 and to send troops to Somalia in 1992, and the other cases discussed in the paper? Can you find examples of both types of cognitive behavior in previous PMP cases? Finally, how could these dynamics have been avoided, if at all?

3. The Janis reading describes the failed Bay of Pigs operation as a "perfect failure" resulting from "groupthink" among the key decision makers. What were the major miscalculations made by President Kennedy's advisors? What were the more general symptoms of groupthink in this case? What were the structural, cognitive and other causes of groupthink? Can the causes and symptoms be addressed and corrected?

D. Required Readings

1. Norton, Richard J., and George E. Teague. "Cognitive Factors in National Security Decision Making." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, March 2002. (Describes cognitive factors that affect decision making and provides an overview of this increasingly recognized area of inquiry in studies of decision making.)

2. Garofano, John. "Cognition, Motivation, and Prospect Theory in Foreign Policy Making." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004.

3. Janis, Irving L. "A Perfect Failure: Group Think and the Bay of Pigs," excerpts from *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982, pp. 14–30, 35–47. (Explains a number of U.S. foreign policy successes and failures according to the groupthink syndrome).

E. Case. None.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Hammond, John S., Ralph L. Keeney, and Howard Raiffa. "The Hidden Traps In Decision Making," *Harvard Business Review*, September–October 1998. (Discusses unconscious traps that mentally affect decision making and provides possible solutions to working around these traps. Available NWC library periodical collection—HD58.8 H369)

2. Guilmartin, John F. Jr. *A Very Short War.* College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. (A concise and readable account of the military action involved in the recovery of the SS *Mayaguez* in 1975. Available NWC library—E865.G85 1995.)

3. Hudson, Valerie M., and Eric Singer. *Political Psychology and Foreign Policy.* Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1992. (Psychological aspects of international relations and group decision making. Available NWC library—JX1255.P64 1992.)

4. The National Security Archive of Georgetown University and the CIA have released internal probes by the administration and by the CIA Inspector General's following the Bay of Pigs fiasco. See http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/winter98-99/art08.html, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB.

5. Vertzberger, Yaacov Y. I. *The World in Their Minds*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990. (Text addresses the issues of information processing, cognition, and perception as related to international relations and decision making. Available NWC library—JX1291.V47 1990.)

6. Wetterhahn, Ralph. "Left Behind on Koh Tang," *The Retired Officer Magazine*, August 1996. (In November 1995, a United States recovery team is allowed to search the waters and land of the island of Koh Tang, in Cambodian waters, as part of Joint Task Force for Full Accounting [JTF-FA] and write the final chapter on the *Mayaguez* incident of May 1975. Available NWC Library—E865 .W48 2001.)

8. Goldgeier, James. “Psychology and Security,” *Security Studies* 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 137–166. (An overview survey of cognition and national security decisions and values. Available NWC Library through inter library loan.)

9. Mullen, John D., and Byron M. Roth. “Psychological Impediments to Sound Decision-Making,” Chapter 2 in *Decision-Making: Its Logic and Practice*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1991, pp. 19–53. (Expands the discussion on cognitive traps that decision makers may fall into and various methods for recognizing and dealing with these factors. Available NWC library—BF 448.M84.)

10. Heuer, Richards J. Jr. *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*. Washington, D.C.: CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999. Available at: http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/19104/index.html.

PMP-21 CASE STUDY: THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

A. Focus. In PMP-11 we examined the *cognitive* perspective, which concerns such things as the decision maker's own beliefs, biases, ethical values, emotions, personal experiences, and memories. This lesson provides a closer examination of the cognitive perspective and evaluates, for the first time, a case featuring non-U.S. decision makers.

B. Objectives

- Explain the impact of the decision maker's personal values, beliefs and other cognitive elements on national security decisions.
- Contrast the cognitive perspective with the other perspectives in analyzing a case study.

C. Guidance

1. Buckwalter provides case information on the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict. How did cognitive factors affect decisions in the war? Could any of the "solutions" suggested in this lesson have been used by the leaders of either side to improve their understanding of the situation and thus improve their decisions?

D. Required Readings. None.

E. Case

1. Buckwalter, David T. "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War," in Policy Making and Process Faculty, eds., *Case Studies in Policy Making and Process*, 8th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, pp. 7–24.

F. Supplementary Readings

1. Norton, Richard J., and George E. Teague. "Cognitive Factors in National Security Decision Making." Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, March 2002. (Describes cognitive factors that affect decision making and provides an overview of this increasingly recognized area of inquiry in studies of decision making. Available from Professor Richard Norton, PMP Course Director.)

2. Janis, Irving L. "A Perfect Failure: Group Think and the Bay of Pigs," excerpts from *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982, pp. 14–30, 35–47. (Explains a number of U.S. foreign policy successes and failures according to the groupthink syndrome).

3. Hammond, John S., Ralph L. Keeney, and Howard Raiffa. "The Hidden Traps In Decision Making," *Harvard Business Review*, September–October 1998. (Discusses unconscious traps that mentally affect decision making and provides possible solutions to working around and with these traps. Available NWC library periodical collection.—ISSN 0017-8012.)

4. Guilmartin, John F. Jr. *A Very Short War*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. (A concise and readable account of the military action involved in the recovery of the SS *Mayaguez* in 1975. Available NWC library—E865.G85 1995.)

5. Hudson, Valerie M. and Eric Singer. *Political Psychology and Foreign Policy*. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1992. (Psychological aspects of international relations and group decision making. Available NWC library—JX1255.P64 1992.)

6. The National Security Archive of Georgetown University and the CIA have released internal probes by the administration and by the CIA Inspector General's following the Bay of Pigs fiasco. See http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/winter98-99/art08.html, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB.

7. Keegan, Warren J. *Judgment, Choices, and Decisions: Effective Management Through Self-knowledge*. New York: Wiley, 1984. (Psychological aspects of management, problem solving, decision making, and strategic thinking. Available NWC library—HD58.7.K42 1984.)

8. Vertzberger, Yaacov Y. I. *The World in Their Minds*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990. (Text addresses the issues of information processing, cognition, and perception as related to international relations and decision making. Available NWC library—JX1291.V47 1990.)

9. Wetterhahn, Ralph. "Left Behind on Koh Tang," *The Retired Officer Magazine*, August 1996. (In November 1995, a United States recovery team is allowed to search the waters and land of the island of Koh Tang, in Cambodian waters, as part of Joint Task Force for Full Accounting [JTF-FA] and write the final chapter on the *Mayaguez* incident of May 1975. Available NWC library periodical collection—ISSN 1061-3102.)

10. Zeckhauser, Richard. *Strategy and Choice*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. (A compendium on the strategy of choice, coping with common errors in rational decision making and the strategic and ethical issues in the valuation of life. Available NWC library—HD30.23.877 1991.)

11. Goldgeier, James. "Psychology and Security," *Security Studies* 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 137–166. (An overview survey of cognition and national security decisions and values. Available NWC Library Periodicals Collection—ISSN 0963-6412.)

12. Mullen, John D., and Byron M. Roth. "Psychological Impediments to Sound Decision-Making." Chapter 2 in *Decision-Making: Its Logic and Practice*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1991, pp. 19–53. (Expands the discussion on cognitive traps that decision makers may fall into and various methods for recognizing and dealing with these factors. Available NWC library—BF 448.M84.)

13. Heuer, Richards J. Jr. *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*. Washington, D.C.: CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999. Available at: http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/19104/index.html.

PMP-22 CURRENT POLICY ANALYSIS

A. Focus. Previous PMP case studies demonstrated that it is possible to use PMP principles to answer historical policy making questions. Questions, such as, why did President Reagan send Marines into Beirut the second time, or why did President Clinton decline to sign the Ottawa landmine treaty? The ability to perform such analysis is quite useful for gaining insight into the interactions among the elements of the input-output model, and also useful for determining recurring patterns, strengths and weaknesses in policy making. However, as has additionally been demonstrated, the principles of PMP allow national security practitioners to also more accurately understand the forces at work in *current* decision making issues and to better weigh the probability that a given course of action may be selected over others. Feedback from our graduates confirms that these skills are required by the national security practitioner to deal with current issues in follow-on assignments. This session will present a contemporary issue facing U.S. policy makers, and provide some techniques for organizing an analysis and determining likely courses of action and potential decisions. The current policy analysis seeks to provide an opportunity to discuss current actors and influences, and the relationships among them. The session also provides the opportunity to explore the genesis and context of contemporary influences and pressures. Related topics such as the difficulty of prioritizing national interests and developing realistic policy objectives may also be discussed. Students will apply fully developed course concepts to evaluate the issues and suggest possible policy choices and outcomes.

B. Objectives

- Identify and discuss the multiple and often competing influences that affect national security decision making on a contemporary policy issue.
- Identify realistic policy objectives and evaluate the likelihood of various policy decisions using the tools provided in the PMP course.
- Provide a final opportunity to apply PMP skills in the seminar environment prior to the PMP final exam.

C. Guidance

1. For this particular case, what are the most important domestic and international influences on U.S. national security leaders? Why are these influences important?

2. Do the international and domestic pressures affect all the actors in the national security system equally? What evidence do you find when you apply each of the four perspectives on national security decision making?

3. What insights do you gain from each of the perspectives?

4. Having identified several possible alternative decisions that could be reached in the case, which do you think are the most likely to be selected? Be prepared to defend your answer in terms of the tools, techniques and concepts we have examined in PMP.

D. Required Readings. None.

E. Case

1. A case will be distributed in class prior to this session.

F. Supplementary Readings. None.

PMP-23 FINAL EXAMINATION

A. Focus. This four-hour session provides an opportunity for students to demonstrate their comprehension of the material presented in the PMP course. Students are provided a case involving an ongoing U.S. Government national security decision to be analyzed.

B. Objective

- Synthesize the various concepts and theories presented in PMP Part I and Part II into an analysis of an ongoing national security policy decision.

C. Case

1. A case will be distributed to the class prior to the final exam.

ANNEX C
SECURITY, STRATEGY, AND FORCES
STUDY GUIDE

1. Scope. The Security, Strategy, and Forces course focuses on gaining a wider grasp of the various levels and aspects of security, developing coherent guidelines for the formulation of national and military strategy, and examining the dynamic challenges that affect the selection of future defense forces. Before anything else, understanding the complex meanings of security and the environment in which we do and will operate is essential to making strategy. As such, linking understanding to the instruments and limitations of power is essential to what we do. Finally, and before we begin the Planning Challenges module, students should appreciate, if not fully comprehend, operational challenges, operational concepts, and necessary capabilities while looking strategically to the future. Our bottom line is simple: developing strategy is key to the creation of forces.

The Security, Strategy, and Forces course concentrates on:

- Security and Strategic Alternatives
- Geostrategic Challenges
- Translating Strategy to Forces

Part I of the course, Strategic Planning, begins with an introduction to basic security concepts, offers alternative frameworks for strategic planning, and emphasizes the necessity to systematically link viable means to achievable ends in often uncertain environments. We continue to rely on these concepts and frameworks throughout the course. We then examine the principal analytical perspectives generally used to organize thinking about international relations. These perspectives influence not only assessments of the international security environment but also the efforts of decision makers to react to and shape that environment as they attempt to safeguard and advance U.S. national interests and objectives. Our concepts of national security, national interests, objectives, and specific goals provide the foundation upon which decisions about strategy and future force levels and mix are built. This examination is done within the context of our resource constraints, particularly the role of government in pursuing economic growth, productivity, and stability while supporting competing national priorities. Further, as we continue to focus on future threats, challenges, opportunities, and vulnerabilities, we grapple with the broader canvas of trends and challenges of globalization.

Next, we focus on U.S. grand strategy with particular emphasis on its economic and political components. Strategy links ends and means; it is a “game plan” that tells us how resources, or means, will be employed to accomplish our ends. Grand strategy, the broadest level of national strategy, focuses on how all instruments of national power—economic, political, cultural, informational, technological, as well as military—will be used to ensure security during both peace and war. We systematically compare and contrast the benefits and costs of four alternative post–Cold War grand strategies for the United States: neo-isolationism, primacy, cooperative security and selective engagement.

We then consider strategic choices and tools of statecraft. Initially we examine forms and methodologies of diplomacy including normal, preventive, and coercive diplomacy. Next we focus on the arrangements and institutions by which we relate to the international community. Some of our emphasis areas include the future of NATO, NATO expansion and its strategic implications, the challenges of regional blocs, such as the European Union (EU) or MERCOSUR in the Western Hemisphere, and coalition building to fight the war on terrorism. Our examination is also done in the context of the ever-present international economic framework, through which we focus on the relationship between politics and economics. We examine the strengths and weaknesses of free trade and neo-mercantilism, the increasing importance of the international financial system, and the tools of economic statecraft in the context of international economic relations among advanced and developing nations.

Building upon the foundation of security, strategic concepts and alternatives, the international community, and diplomatic and economic tools of statecraft, we transition to an examination of how the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape may shift in the first quarter of the twenty-first century. First, we consider how strategies—to achieve their objectives in the real world of risk, threats, vulnerabilities, and resource constraints—must address the interests and capabilities of major powers, "pivotal states," and emerging realities in the so-called "developing" world. We next look at radically different interpretations of the world as we attempt to assess the overall security environment. Finally, we survey and assess potential sources of conflict and cooperation in specific regions: Asia and the Pacific; the Greater Near East; Greater Europe; the Americas; and Africa. Throughout, we emphasize the interdependence of global transnational driving forces and what that means not only for the United States but those who live in these regions as well.

Part II of the Security, Strategy, and Forces course is "Translating Strategy To Forces." We examine more specifically the military component of grand strategy, and methodologies and force alternatives required to support that strategy. We study current military strategy, assess defense force alternatives, and provide a foundation for future force planning cases in the Planning Challenges module that follows SSF. The emphasis throughout is on the role of strategy as a guide to planning joint and combined forces for the future. We thus examine the future of war and alternative approaches to force planning. We then explore the many operational challenges, acknowledging the opportunities that technology and new operational concepts can offer as well as addressing the difficulties of organizational adaptation.

We then turn to a comprehensive examination of alternative strategies and force structures for the future. Each of the alternative total force postures is intended to support particular visions of the future security environment, as well as different military and grand strategies, shaped by different perspectives of the likely fiscal constraints.

Finally, we examine the major components of the total force structure within a joint planning context. We wrap up this final block of the course by synthesizing the linkages down the chain of security, strategy, forces, and alternatives with "The Baseline Strategy, Forces, and Alternatives."

Before we begin the Planning Challenges module, students should appreciate, if not fully understand operational challenges, operational concepts, and necessary capabilities while

looking strategically to the future. Thus, we expect you to assess critically the alternatives presented and formulate your own approach to strategic planning and force planning. This sets the stage for assessing force planning alternatives during the Planning Challenges module.

NSDM concludes with the NSDM exercise. This exercise provides an opportunity to both synthesize and apply NSDM course concepts to the complex problems of developing national strategy and determining the size and mix of future forces. Each seminar develops a national security strategy, a national military strategy, and a comprehensive force structure. Seminars present their findings to a faculty review board, and two *representative* briefings will be presented to a panel of senior defense oriented experts. The exercise concludes with the perspectives of these defense experts on the strategy and force planning process, current controversies, and the future structure of the armed forces that you will one day command.

2. Course Objectives. The overall objectives of the Security, Strategy, and Forces course are to:

- Assess complex factors critical to making strategy and selecting future forces.
- Comprehend the geostrategic landscape and international security environment for the development of strategy.
- Apply frameworks to guide the development of strategy, the sizing and structuring of future forces, and the allocation of scarce defense resources.

3. Course Guidance. Annex C is the primary planning document for the Security, Strategy, and Forces course. It provides the focus, objectives, general guidance for student preparation, and the required reading for each session. The diversity of the Security, Strategy, and Forces readings and cases provides not only an opportunity to examine concepts, but also an overview of current issues and alternative perspectives. Readings should be approached in the order listed, using the session guidance as an aid to drawing out the desired session objectives.

4. Course Requirements

a. *The Security, Strategy, and Forces Paper*. Each student will prepare a thoughtful, well-developed, and well-written paper that applies course concepts to a major strategy and/or force planning issue. For detailed guidance, see the Security, Strategy, and Forces Paper Instruction distributed during the early part of the course. The paper is due 14 October. It should be of publishable quality, suitable for a professional journal.

b. *Final Examination*. A comprehensive written examination will be given at the end of the course during SSF-24. This is a three-hour, closed-book exam. It consists of three short cases, one of which the student uses to demonstrate expected mastery of course concepts. The Study Guide provides further guidance for Session SSF-24.

5. Course Materials

a. Primary:

Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed., 2004.

Security, Strategy, and Forces Paper Instruction (Issued in class in SSF-1).

Selected Readings in Security, Strategy, and Forces.

Bush, George W. *National Security Strategy*, 2002.

Rumsfeld, Donald H., Secretary of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, September 30, 2001.

Meyers, Richard B., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004.

Rumsfeld, Donald H. *Transformation Planning Guidance*, April 2003.

Cebrowski, Arthur. *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*, December 2003

Joint Staff. *Joint Operations Concepts*, Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Vision and Transformation Division, Pentagon, Washington D.C., November 2003.

Krepinevich, Andrew F. *Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment*. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003.

b. Reference Documents on Library Reserve:

Flournoy, Michèle A. *QDR 2001*, *Strategy-Driven Choices for America's Security*. NDU QDR 2001 Working Group, April 2001.

Tangredi, Captain Sam J. *All Possible Wars? Towards a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment, 2001–2025* (McNair Paper 63). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University.

SECURITY, STRATEGY, AND FORCES
COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE/NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE

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PART I
STRATEGIC PLANNING

A. STRATEGIC THINKING

SSF-1 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY, STRATEGY, AND FORCES

A. Focus. The Security, Strategy, and Forces course focuses on gaining a wider grasp of the various levels and aspects of security, developing coherent guidelines for the formulation of national and military strategy, and examining the dynamic challenges that affect the selection of future defense forces. Before anything else, understanding the complex meanings of security and the environment in which we do and will operate is essential to making strategy. As such, linking understanding to the instruments and limitations of power is essential to what we do. Finally, and before we begin the Planning Challenges module, students should appreciate, if not fully comprehend, operational challenges, operational concepts, and necessary capabilities while looking strategically to the future. Our bottom line is simple: developing strategy is key to the creation of forces. This session introduces various conceptual frameworks and concepts that will be developed and applied throughout the Security, Strategy, and Forces course.

B. Objectives

- Introduce the objectives and scope of the Security, Strategy, and Forces course.
- Examine alternative frameworks for developing strategies and future forces.
- Understand the relationships and tradeoffs among objectives, strategies, forces, and risks.

C. Guidance

1. Liotta and Lloyd present a conceptual framework for organizing and evaluating the essential factors involved in making future strategy and force planning decisions. The framework begins with national interests and objectives and proceeds through national security strategy to detailed assessments and choices. They suggest that the framework can be used as (1) a guide to developing alternative strategies and future forces, (2) an aid to evaluating the arguments of strategists or force planners, and (3) a starting point for developing alternative approaches to structuring major force planning decisions. Some people prefer to use the framework to ensure that important factors are considered in the planning process. Others like its step-by-step approach, beginning with higher order concepts and moving through progressive levels of strategy. Still others prefer to adjust or rearrange it. What are the most important factors? How are they interrelated? What is your evaluation of the framework? What would you change?

2. Bartlett, Holman, and Somes describe a simple model which can help strategists and force planners make decisions. It includes ends, strategy, means, the security environment, resource constraints, and risks. What are the important relationships highlighted by their model? What are the possible mismatches that can occur? How would you modify Bartlett's model to help you formulate strategy and plan future forces? Note: The second half of this article, which deals with alternative approaches to force planning, will be read for SSF-20.

3. Owens suggests that ". . . strategy often refers not only to the direct application of military force in wartime, but also to the use of all aspects of national power during peacetime to deter war by shaping the security environment." How does strategy serve as a guide for force planning? What are the distinctions among the levels of strategy? What purposes do they serve? What factors influence strategic choices? The second half of this article, which deals with the logic of force planning, will be read in SSF-20.

4. In preparation for the 2001 QDR, a DOD working group laid out twelve questions they believed planners need to address to make necessary strategic decisions. These questions illustrate how the issues and concepts introduced throughout the Security, Strategy, and Forces course should influence efforts by the U.S. military to develop an appropriate strategy and force structure for the future. These strategic decisions include: what kinds of wars should the U.S. military be prepared to deter and fight over the next 10–20 years; what are the appropriate uses of the U.S. military in situations short of major war; what is the role of the U.S. military in homeland security; what overseas posture should the U.S. military adopt; what is the appropriate role of nuclear weapons; what are the roles of allies and coalition partners across the spectrum of operations; and what strategy-based criteria should be used to size the force for the future? How would you answer each of Flournoy's twelve questions? As you read this article, reflect on what you feel are the most important issues that today's strategists and force planners must confront especially given the events of the last three years? Are there strategic decision issues that you would add or substitute for Flournoy's if you were advising the administration as they assess their plans for the future?

5. Courtney, Kirkland, and Viguerie ask, "What makes for a good strategy in highly uncertain [times]?" They identify four levels of uncertainty and suggest possible strategies to deal with each. Although their article is written for business managers, their strategic principles seem equally valid for the security planner. At what level of uncertainty do you think the U.S. finds itself in the twenty-first century? What are the implications for the strategist and force planner?

D. Required Readings

1. Liotta, P. H., and Richmond M. Lloyd. "The Strategy and Force Planning Framework," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 1, pp. 1–16. (This article suggests a framework for organizing and evaluating the essential factors involved in making future strategy and force planning decisions.)

2. Bartlett, Henry C., G. Paul Holman Jr., and Timothy E. Somes. "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 2. Only read pp. 17–23. (This reading presents a model for strategists and force planners. The second half of this reading will be read later in the course.)

3. Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "Strategy and the Logic of Force Planning," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 33. Only read pp. 483–487. (The author discusses the

importance of strategy in peace and war and defines different levels of strategy. The second half of this reading will be read later in the course.)

4. Flournoy, Michèle A. "Twelve Strategy Decisions for the Next Administration," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 3, pp. 34–45. (Strategic decisions for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review that mirror issues that the SSF course will highlight.)

5. Courtney, Hugh, Jane Kirkland, and Patrick Viguerie. "Strategy under Uncertainty," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 9. Read only from page 124 (Four Levels of Uncertainty) to page 128 (end of second paragraph) and Figures 3 and 4 on p. 131 and p. 132. (Alternative strategies for dealing with uncertainty.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. The following are earlier editions of the Strategy and Force Planning textbook. They are available in the Security, Strategy, and Forces Reserve Section in the library.

- Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds. *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000.
- Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds. *Strategy and Force Planning*, 2nd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1997.
- Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds. *Strategy and Force Planning*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1995.
- Force Planning Faculty, eds. *Fundamentals of Force Planning, Vol. III, Strategy and Resources*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1992.
- Force Planning Faculty, eds. *Fundamentals of Force Planning, Vol. II, Defense Planning Cases*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1991.
- Force Planning Faculty, eds. *Fundamentals of Force Planning, Vol. I, Concepts*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1990.
- Force Planning Faculty, eds. *Foundations of Force Planning, Vol. II, Resources for Defense*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1988.
- Force Planning Faculty, eds. Foundations of Force Planning: Concepts and Issues. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1986.

2. Flournoy, Michèle A. *Report of the National Defense University Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, November 2000. (This report provides an overview of the concepts and issues that the working group recommended should be addressed during the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.)

3. Tangredi, Captain Sam J. *All Possible Wars? Towards a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment, 2001–2025* (McNair Paper 63). Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2000. Available on-line at www.ndu.edu; click on Institute for National Strategic Studies, Publication, McNair Papers, Paper 63. (This report compares a large number of assessments of the security environment. It identifies areas of agreement and disagreement and then proposes a consensus scenario.)

4. Davis, Paul K. *Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation*. Santa Monica: RAND National Defense Research Institute, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1513/MR1513.pdf, 2002. (The author provides a definition of capabilities-based planning, puts it in the larger context of defense activities generally, and sketches an analytic architecture for carrying it out.)

5. Khalilzad, Zalmay M., and David A. Ochmanek, eds. *Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st Century*. Prepared for U.S. Air Force by Rand's Project AIR FORCE, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997. (This is a comprehensive collection of articles on various defense planning methodologies and their application to current strategic and force planning issues.)

6. Troxell, John F. *Force Planning in an Era of Uncertainty: Two MRC's as a Force Sizing Framework*. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 15, 1997. (In this monograph, the author compares threat-based and capabilities-based force planning methodologies and offers a force planning framework.)

7. Haffa, Robert P., Jr. *Rational Methods, Prudent Choices: Planning U.S. Forces*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988. (This is a classic primer on force planning.)

8. Bartlett, Henry C. "Approaches to Force Planning," in Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Fundamentals of Force Planning, Vol. I, Concepts*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1990, Chapter 3.C.1, pp. 443–453. (This article, which first introduced the Bartlett model in 1985, was the author's original effort to consider the merits and limitations of various approaches or emphases encountered in planning future military capabilities.)

9. Staudenmaier, William O. "Strategic Concepts of the 1980s: Part I," in Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Fundamentals of Force Planning, Vol. I, Concepts*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1990, Chapter 1.C.2, pp. 127–141. (This article examines the interrelated concepts of national purpose, interests, objectives, and military strategy. It also discusses the fundamental elements of military planning and develops strategic guidelines that should be useful in developing a military strategy and supporting force structure.)

10. Wack, Pierre. "Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead," *Harvard Business Review*, September–October, 1985, pp. 73–89, and "Scenarios: Shooting the Rapids," *Harvard Business Review*, November–December, 1985, pp. 139–150. (These are two classic articles in which one of the original developers of scenario planning at the Royal Dutch/Shell Group provides an in-depth explanation of the methodology and how to apply it.)

11. Nye, Joseph S., Jr. "Peering into the Future," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1994, pp. 82–93. (The former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council emphasizes the need for alternative scenarios in assessing the evolving security environment.)

12. Christensen, Clayton M. "Making Strategy: Learning by Doing," *Harvard Business Review*, November–December 1997, pp. 141–156. (The author explains how to increase an organization's core competence in strategic thinking through a three-step process which identifies driving forces, formulates strategy that addresses the driving forces, and creates projects to implement the strategy.)

SSF-2 CONTENDING ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES

A. Focus. Three analytical perspectives—realism, liberalism (sometimes called pluralism or idealism), and radicalism (most commonly represented by Marxism)—are generally used to organize thinking about international relations. These perspectives are based on theories about how the international political system works. A theory purports to do three things: to describe the world, to predict how it might change, and to prescribe a response to the world. Thus, these three theoretical perspectives influence the ways in which policy makers look at the evolving international security environment as well as their efforts to develop an overall U.S. grand strategy prescription. The significance of such phenomena as international anarchy, system structure, nuclear weapons, economic interdependence, the spread of democracy, and the end of the Cold War as well as proposals for how the U.S. should react to and attempt to shape such international phenomena are largely determined by the analytical perspective of the strategist. As John Maynard Keynes put it, "Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct . . . academic scribbler of a few years back." It is important, therefore, to develop an understanding of and appreciation for the contending analytical perspectives in international relations at the outset of our effort to grapple with alternative grand strategies. It is also important to recognize that these three analytical perspectives—or the way we view the world—should not be confused with political perspectives.

B. Objectives

- Assess alternative analytical perspectives in international relations.
- Examine linkages among analytical perspectives, diagnoses of international phenomena, and prescriptions for U.S. strategy.

C. Guidance

1. Ross provides a brief overview of the three analytical perspectives that inform the work of international relations theorists. What are the key concepts and assumptions of the three approaches? Are realism, liberalism (idealism), and radicalism (represented by Marxism) mutually exclusive approaches to the understanding of international relations? Which of the three perspectives have most influenced U.S. decision makers? Which should most influence U.S. policy?

2. John Mearsheimer is perhaps today's most consistent advocate of realist analysis. He begins his piece with a description (some would say a caricature) of liberalism. He then lays out four fundamental tenets of realism: 1) states are the principal actors in world politics; 2) the behavior of states is determined primarily by the external environment, not the characteristics of the regime or domestic politics; 3) states act according to rational calculations about the relative balance of powers; and 4) international politics is a zero-sum game. Mearsheimer goes on to distinguish between two forms of realism, "human nature (or classical) realism" and "defensive (or structural) realism." Against these forms of realism he posits "offensive realism," which is based on the idea that the international political system provides powerful incentives for states to gain power at the expense of rivals in a quest for hegemony. He contends that states, especially democracies, seek to obscure this unpleasant truth by employing liberal rhetoric. Leaders "tend

to portray war as a moral crusade or an ideological contest, rather than as a struggle for power." What do you make of Mearsheimer's argument? What would offensive realism say about Hitler or communism? What are the strengths and weaknesses of realism in general as well as its particular manifestations?

3. Ikenberry describes a set of liberal assumptions about how the world works. The cornerstones of the liberal paradigm he lays out are: 1) that democracies tend not to fight among themselves; 2) that free trade leads to free countries; 3) that interdependence underpins a peaceful liberal world order; 4) that international institutions have an important role in maintaining a peaceful world order and that they are actually a useful tool for U.S. foreign policy; and 5) that there can be a liberal international society in the absence of world government. How do you assess the validity of these assumptions? How does Ikenberry's description of liberalism compare to Mearsheimer's?

4. Lynch discusses radicalism, an approach to understanding international relations which commonly demands violent and sweeping change. Variants of radicalism include anarchism, nihilism, terrorism and religious fundamentalism, in addition to Marxism. His focus is on Marxism since it has historically had the most impact on the understanding of international relations. He acknowledges that Marxism originally addressed domestic relations between "classes" of people within states, rather than international relations. The 20th century witnessed a number of powerful states adhering (at least nominally) to Marxist principles in the conduct of their foreign relations. Today, however, even as the Marxist experiments in Russia and Eastern Europe have crumbled, much of the underdeveloped world continues to view international politics through a Marxist prism. Many in the Third World believe that a capitalist, industrialized conspiracy has impoverished them and made them economic dependencies. How does this "Dependency Theory" contrast with your understanding of "globalization"? Can democracy and prosperity develop in this atmosphere? What impact does this attitude have on international violence and instability?

D. Required Readings

1. Ross, Andrew L. "The Theory & Practice of International Relations: Contending Analytical Perspectives," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 4, pp. 49–70. (A concise summary of the realist, liberal, and Marxist perspectives.)

2. Mearsheimer, John. "Liberal Talk, Realist Thinking," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 5, pp. 71–78. (A brief description of realism by one of its most influential advocates.)

3. Ikenberry, G. John. "Why Export Democracy?" in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 6, pp. 79–87. (A discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of a proposed "liberal" grand strategy.)

4. Lynch, Thomas F. III, "Foundations of Radicalism," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport RI: Naval War College Press, 2004,

Chapter 7, pp. 88–89, 95–105. (A discussion of how Marxism acts as the foundation for dependency theory and its impact on contemporary international relations.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Buzan, Barry, and Richard Little. *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. (A useful survey of the influence of alternative forces and perspectives in the shaping of the international system.)

2. Buzan, Barry, Charles Jones, and Richard Little. *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. (An effort to further develop realist thinking.)

3. Doyle, Michael W., and G. John Ikenberry. *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*. Boulder: Westview, 1997. (An exploration of new approaches to thinking about international relations.)

4. Doyle, Michael W. *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997. (A masterful examination of the three analytical perspectives that shape thinking about international relations.)

5. Gilpin, Robert. *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. (A masterful effort to employ all three perspectives in an analysis of international economic relations.)

6. Harries, Owen. "Fourteen Points for Realists," *The National Interest*, No. 30, Winter 1992/93, pp. 109–112. (Realist "principles" that should guide the formulation of post-Cold War American foreign policy.)

7. Holsti, Ole R. "International Relations Models," in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 57–88. (An extremely useful assessment of the three analytical approaches upon which international relations theorists draw.)

8. Jervis, Robert. "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation," *International Security*, Vol. 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999) pp. 42–63. (Discussion of those areas in which defensive realists and neoliberals find common ground.)

9. Kapstein, Ethan B., and Michael Mastanduno. *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. (A case for the continued relevance of realism.)

10. Kegley, Charles W., ed. *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. (Proponents of the realist and liberal perspectives develop their approaches to the analysis of international relations.)

11. Keohane, Robert O., ed. *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. (Critical evaluations of realist theories of international relations.)

12. Latham, Robert. “Getting Out From Under: Rethinking Security Beyond Liberalism and the Levels-of-Analysis Problem,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 77–108. (A skeptical appraisal of liberalism’s contribution to security debates.)

13. Lebow, Richard Ned, and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds. *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. (A reexamination of realism and liberalism in light of the end of the Cold War.)

14. Lenin, V. I. *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. New York: International Publishers, 1939. (A work that strongly influenced the development of Marxist thinking.)

15. McKinlay, R. D., and R. Little. *Global Problems and World Order*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1986. (A comprehensive review and assessment of the three competing perspectives.)

16. Mingst, Karen. *Essentials of International Relations*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1999. (A recent text that utilizes the three analytical perspectives.)

17. Moravcsik, Andrew. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4, Autumn 1997, pp. 513–553. (An attempt to systematize the liberal analytical perspective.)

18. Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed., revised. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1978. (A classic realist text.)

19. Nye, Joseph S., Jr. *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*. New York: Harper Collins, 1993. (An international relations text informed by the realist and liberal approaches.)

20. Packenham, Robert A. *The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and Politics in Development Studies*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992. (A comprehensive assessment of dependency theory, one of the most prominent recent outgrowths of the Marxist perspective.)

21. Paul, T. V., and John A. Hall. *International Order and the Future of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. (Alternative perspectives on the evolving international order.)

22. Rothstein, Robert L. *The Evolution of Theory in International Relations*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. (A useful survey of the development of international relations thinking.)

23. Schroeder, Paul. “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer 1994, pp. 108–148. (A searching historical critique of realism.)

24. Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979. (An influential realist theory of relations among states.)

SSF-3 NATIONAL INTERESTS AND STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTIES

A. Focus. The interests of the United States—to provide for the security and prosperity of its citizens, territory, and way of life—set the foundation for national strategy. In theory, all strategists would agree that if interests are in jeopardy, a response that employs the appropriate instruments of power is necessary. In reality, the complex interdependence of competing interests, objectives, and priorities can often make decision making and strategic planning extraordinarily complicated. This lesson offers ways to think about strategic interests, objectives, and priorities; the evolving nature of security; as well as methodologies with which future uncertainties may be addressed.

B. Objectives

- Consider how U.S. interests and objectives are fundamental to strategic planning.
- Introduce and begin examining the central concept and key interest of security.
- Examine ways to assess and address the level of uncertainty in the evolving security environment.
- Consider the multiple meanings of globalization, both as a concept and a process.

C. Guidance

1. Liotta, proposes that, at their most abstract level, U.S. national interests are simple: to ensure the security and prosperity of the American people in the global environment. But distinguishing core strategic interests—those which Americans would be willing to die for—from significant interests that *might* require commitment of treasure, blood, time, and energy is almost never easy. Moreover, the evolving nature of security, a concept understood a century ago as meaning territorial integrity and preservation of government, and one that today must encompass challenges of population growth, resource scarcity, and disease, to name only a few, is creating a critical need for a "fundamental rethinking of interests." Do you agree with Liotta's position that, on a basic level "national interests are enduring and unlikely to change" in the future? Is it important to understand the hierarchy of interests and their relationship to values and objectives? What challenges can the U.S. anticipate in communicating national interests as a basis for action, whether diplomatic, economic, or military, on the world scene?

2. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* presents the central security goals of the United States in the emerging security environment. Specifically, the strategy emphasizes enhancing security, bolstering America's economic prosperity, promoting democracy, and upholding "human dignity." Are U.S. interests and objectives sufficiently well defined? Are priorities established?

3. Liotta examines the increasingly complex concept of security. He challenges us to examine the possible "need to worry less about focusing on protecting the state and more about protecting individual citizens." Certainly, to the extent we ignore requirements of providing for the population, we threaten sustainment of peace, stability, and prosperity. Similarly, most scholars now agree that a broader view of security, which incorporates elements of human

security, is prudent, but there's little consensus on how to go about ameliorating the challenges this perspective brings to light. Is the traditional state-centric meaning of security sufficient for the "12 September Era," as some would call it? What implications does the broadening requirement of security have on the hierarchy of U.S. national security interests and related strategies?

4. Liotta and Somes focus on the future. Primarily drawing on the work of Pierre Wack and Peter Schwartz, they describe a scenario process that helps decision makers consider alternative courses of action through identification and exploration of driving forces, predetermined elements, and critical uncertainties. What do they mean by these terms? Is their methodology useful to strategists and force planners in making decisions about military requirements for the twenty-first century? Do the concepts of driving forces, predetermined elements, and critical uncertainties help you recognize interests, objectives, and priorities, assess levels of uncertainty, and provide a means for making future choices?

5. Flanagan argues, in the 21st century, matters of war and peace will increasingly be influenced by events in many disparate places. One of the primary engines behind this transformation in international relations is the process of globalization. What does the term globalization mean? How does globalization impact and shape the security environment? Is globalization only about economics or is about more? How does globalization impact the nature of relations between states and non-state entities?

D. Required Readings

1. Liotta, P. H. "To Die For: National Interests and the Nature of Strategy," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 8, 111–121. (An examination of the complex relationship of a nation's interests, a nation's security strategy, and the decision making process guiding military intervention.)

2. Bush, George W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002. Read Section I, "Overview of America's International Strategy," pp. 1–2. (Attempts to define the goals of the United States in the new security environment.)

3. Liotta, P. H. "Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 30, 445–460. (Discussion of the evolving complexities of security and ascendancy of the importance of the human element in the overall security equation.)

4. Liotta, P. H. and Timothy E. Somes. "The Art of Reperceiving: Scenarios and the Future," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 10, pp. 139–150. (A scenario-based approach for addressing strategic uncertainty.)

5. Flanagan, Stephen J. "Meeting the Challenges of the Global Century," in Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost, eds., *The Global Century: Globalization and National Security*

Volume I. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001, Chapter 1. Read only from p. 7 to the top of p. 13 and the conclusion on p. 30–31. Scan the rest of the article.

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Lovins, Amory B., L. Hunter Lovins, and Paul Hawken. "A Road Map for Natural Capitalism," *Harvard Business Review* (May–June 1999), pp. 145–158. (MacArthur "genius" fellow and Rocky Mountain Institute president Amory Lovins, and others, illustrate how strategies built around productive uses of natural resources can solve multiple problem sets.)

2. Hart, Stuart L., and Clayton M. Christensen. "The Great Leap, Driving Innovation from the Base of the Pyramid, *MIT Sloan Management Review*, Fall 2002, pp. 51–56. (Illustrates how "disruptive innovation" can help sustain international growth.)

3. Ferguson, Niall. "2011," *New York Times Magazine*, 2 December 2001, pp. 76–83. (The controversial Oxford historian offers five predictions of the future.)

4. Huffman, Brian. "What Makes A Strategy Brilliant?" *Business Horizons*, July–August 2001, pp. 13–20. (Ideas on the relevance of strategy.)

5. *The Commission on America's National Interests*, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, July 2000. See http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/nationalinterests.pdf.

6. Brandenburger, Adam, and Barry J. Nalebuff. "The Right Game: Use Game Theory to Shape Strategy," *Harvard Business Review*, November–December 1997, pp. 67–79. (Why John Nash's "Game Theory" remains relevant.)

7. Hamel, G. "Strategy as Revolution," *Harvard Business Review*, July–August 1996, pp. 69–82. (The evolving nature of strategy.)

8. Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 3rd edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. (The classical text on thinking differently in times of change.)

9. Bartlett, Ruhl J. "The Principles of National Interest," *American Perspective*, Fall 1950, pp. 373–382. (Attempts to address the principles and usefulness of national interests.)

10. Beard, Charles. *The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy*. New York, 1934. (Traces the historical tradition of national interests and new conceptions of interests during the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.)

11. Blackwill, Robert D. "A Taxonomy for Defining U.S. National Security Interests in the 1990s and Beyond," in Werner Weidenfeld and Josef Jannings, eds., *Europe and Global Change*. Gütersloh, Germany: Bertlesmann Foundation, 1993, pp. 103–119. (An essay on interests and objectives.)

12. Brands, H. W. “The Idea of the National Interest,” *Diplomatic History*, Spring 1999, pp. 239–261. (Provides a broad historical canvassing of the national interest as driving force in diplomacy, policy, and national strategy.)

13. Brodie, Bernard. *War & Politics*. New York: McMillian Publishing, 1973, pp. 341–374. (Excellent discussion of vital interests and security.)

14. Buzan, Barry, and Gerry Segal. *Anticipating the Future*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000. (An excellent assessment of alternative futures and their meanings for future strategy and forces.)

15. Buzan, Barry, Charles Jones, and Richard Little. *The Logic of Anarchy: New Directions in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. (A neorealist approach to international relations, incorporating “old” and “new” ideas of security.)

16. Clinton, W. David. *The Two Faces of National Interest*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994. (An attempt to define and analyze national interest both as domestic necessity and external reality in the development of foreign policy.)

17. *Economist.* “Where Do American Interests Lie?” 18 September 1999, pp. 29–30. (Suggests that recent American actions reveal a backlash against “values-based” foreign policy.)

18. Hamilton, Lee H. “Defining National Interest,” *Christian Science Monitor*, 30 March 1998, p. 11. (Thoughts on national interests, objectives, and priorities.)

19. Hirsh, Michael. *At War with Ourselves*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 15–22. (Discusses what should constitute the U.S. national interest and the resulting strategy.)

20. Huntington, Samuel P. “Robust Nationalism,” *National Interest*, Winter 1999–2000, pp. 31–40. (Examines the conflicts between internal and external pressures in determining policy.)

21. Huntington, Samuel P. “The Erosion of American National Interests,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1997, pp. 28–49. (Why U.S. national interests seem to be eroding.)

22. Jervis, Robert. *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. (A fascinating application of chaos theory to the study of international relations.)

23. Kitfield, James. “The Folk Who Live on the Hill,” *National Interest*, Winter 1999–2000, pp. 48–55. (Suggests that the use of the term “vital interest” is for convenience more than precise definition among policy makers and legislators.)

24. Morgenthau, Hans J. “Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States,” *American Political Science Review*, December 1952, pp. 971–988. (A prominent traditional realist’s ideas on U.S. national interest.)

25. Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.* New York, 1948. (The original classic work on diplomacy and policy.)

26. Nye, Joseph S., Jr. "Redefining the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1999, pp. 22–35. (How strategic, economic, and humanitarian interests can be melded into an effective foreign policy.)

27. Wolfers, Arnold. "'National Security' As an Ambiguous Symbol," *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume LXVII, Number 4, December 1952, pp. 481–502. (A classic essay on the ambiguity inherent in the concepts of "national security" and "national interest.") (available on microfiche in the NWC Library)

28. Friedman, Thomas and Robert Kaplan. "States of Discord," *Foreign Policy*, March/April 2002, pp. 64–70. (This discourse offers strongly differing views on globalization. Friedman is the Foreign Affairs columnist for *The New York Times*. Kaplan, a well regarded author of numerous books on international affairs, is a senior Fellow at the New America Foundation.)

29. Friedman, Thomas. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York: Anchor Books, 2000. (He draws on his long and extensive international experience to write a treatise concerning globalization as the new international system and subsequently the force which is, in his view, shaping world affairs today. He argues that globalization is not just a phenomenon or passing trend, it has replaced the Cold War system. It is the integration of capital, technology and information across national borders in a manner that creates a single global market and, to some degree, a global village.)

30. Naim, Moises. "The Five Wars of Globalization," *Foreign Policy*, January/ February 2003, pp. 29–36. (Dr. Naim, editor of *Foreign Policy*, examines the "dark side" of globalization: illegal trade in drugs, arms, intellectual property, people, and money. Naim, trained at M.I.T., suggests the same forces that support positive international networking further criminal acts. He also considers what governments must do to counteract their effectiveness.)

31. Stiglitz, Joseph E. *Globalization and its Discontents*. New York: Norton & Co., 2002. (Joseph Stiglitz, winner of the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics, provides readers a rare glimpse behind the closed doors of global financial institutions. The author served seven years in Washington, as chairman of President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers and as chief economist at the World Bank. In this book, he suggests that repeatedly the International Monetary Fund puts the interests of its "largest shareholder," the United States, above those of the poorer nations it was designed to serve. Further, while acknowledging that there is no simple answer to the dilemmas posed by globalization, the author provides a provocative reform agenda.)

32. Kaplan, Robert. *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War*. New York, Vintage Books, 2001. (Using history as a guide to the future, Kaplan suggests that fragmentation will prevail over integration.)

33. Singer, Peter. *One World: The Ethics of Globalization*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002. (Singer specifically focuses on four global issues: climate change, the role of the World Trade Organization, human rights and humanitarian intervention, and foreign aid. The author, a renowned ethicist, addresses each from an ethical perspective and offers alternatives to the state-centric approach which he feels still characterizes international theory and relations today.)

34. Rothschild, Emma. "*The Last Empire: Security and Globalization in Historical Perspective*," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 48, pp. 657–675. (Dr. Rothschild is Director of the Centre for History and Economics and A Fellow at King's College, Cambridge University. Rothschild provides a historical review—beginning with the American and French revolutions—in which she details centuries of global connectivity. Drawing upon the lessons of history, she considers the "relationship between military and non-military or extended security in an interconnected world.")

35. Berger, Peter L. and Samuel P. Huntington. *Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. (Berger is a professor of Sociology and Theology at Boston University and Huntington is a political scientist at Harvard. This book is the result of a three-year field study on globalization, carried out in ten countries. It seeks to go beyond the stereotypes and general assumptions about globalization and begin to analyze how globalization impacts individuals in specific countries in specific situations. The authors find, as one can see from the title, that globalization means different things to different people.)

36. Cha, Victor D. "Globalization and the Study of International Security," in *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 3, May 2000, pp. 391–403. (Dr. Cha explores how the processes of globalization have fundamentally changed the way we think about security.)

36. "The Drivers and Trends" and "Four Alternative Global Futures" from *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernment Experts*. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2001. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/global trends2015/index.html (Various "experts" assess the trends and indicators for the future.)

SSF-4 DOMESTIC POLITICAL ECONOMY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

A. Focus. The Nobel Prize-winning economist Friedrich von Hayek once defined economics as "the study of the unintended consequences of human action." All economic actors face the problem of *scarcity*, which requires them to make *choices*. What they must forgo as a result of their choice is called cost, more specifically *opportunity cost*. National security choices are explicitly economic choices. The political economy of a state strongly influences its strategic choices, including its overall economic policy. Market-oriented economies tend to emphasize *absolute* wealth and power, while those that rely more on government guidance of the economy emphasize *relative* wealth and power. The traditional goal of U.S. economic policy is to maximize prosperity—non-inflationary economic growth. This session looks at the "economic problem" (scarcity) in general, contrasts the ability of various systems of political economy to deal with scarcity and achieve wealth and power, and assesses the national security implications of the various approaches. To illustrate aspects of the economic problem and how they influence national wealth and power, we explore alternative economic strategies for adequately funding defense and other competing government programs in light of such institutional constraints as the aging of the population, which will affect such entitlements as Medicare and Social Security.

B. Objectives

- Understand the relationship between a strong economy and the availability of resources for national defense.

- Assess the ability of the various systems of political economy adequately to answer the *three fundamental economic questions*: *what* to produce, *how* to produce, and *for whom* to produce.

- Understand the differences between the two fundamental processes of allocating resources—the market and the collective decision-making process—and assess the implications of each approach for national security.

- Examine alternative economic strategies for ensuring that resources are available to meet national priorities.

C. Guidance

1. The essay by Owens lays out the scope of political economy and its relationship to national security. The political economy of national security can be analyzed on three levels: (1) How do various systems of political economy seek to achieve and maintain wealth and power? (2) How does a given system allocate scarce resources in order to provide for the common defense? (3) How do players in the international system relate to others in economic terms? We will address the first two levels in this session. We will address the third in SSF-11. At the first level, which system of political economy best achieves the state's twin goals of prosperity and security? At the second level, how do we determine the allocation of the resources necessary to produce goods for competing ends, both private and public? What do we give up when we choose among ends? How do the answers to such questions affect defense planners?

2. Stiglitz discusses the role of government or the public sector in a "mixed economy." What role should government play in allocating resources? What are "market failures"? Are they offset by "government failures"? What criteria should be used to determine the relative weight of government or the market in the allocation of resources? What are the pros and cons of government's role in the economy?

3. The Budget Act of 1974 requires Congress to adopt a budget resolution each year and then vote on it. Since the recent recession means that deficits are projected to increase, Congress will have to choose between deficits on the one hand and programs on the other. Meanwhile, the Congress passed and the president signed legislation approving further tax cuts. Also, large budget supplementals have been passed to pay for the costs of the war on terrorism and stability operations in Iraq. In testimony before a Senate committee, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) presents a Ten-Year Baseline Forecast. This forecast initiates the budget process for the upcoming fiscal year by examining spending and revenue trends. What are the uncertainties in the Baseline Forecast? What assumptions would you change? Take special note of the last chart which shows the effects of policy alternatives not included in the forecast. How will tax cuts and additional budget supplementals affect this forecast? What are the consequences of a return to larger deficits?

4. While the comparison of a country to a company is not always valid, Updegrave assesses the economic health of the U.S. and its prospects for the future. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. economy? What do you consider to be the most important challenges in the future? As a strategist, what would be the elements of your economic strategy to ensure attention to today's realities and the challenges in the future?

5. Prior to class, you will be issued a worksheet that lays out several spending and revenue options. During class, the seminar will identify national priorities, develop the domestic component of its economic strategy, and provide a general plan for reshaping the federal budget to support its overall plan. The development of an economic strategy to support defense expenditures and other national priorities should consider: (1) measures to stimulate *economic growth*; (2) the *federal share* of the nation's output; (3) *defense vs. non-defense shares* of the federal budget; and (4) measures to ensure that defense and non-defense expenditures are *efficient and effective*. What do you feel can be done in each of these areas? What are your short- and long-term goals? What priority would you give to consumption and investment, both private and public? Which federal programs require a fundamental restructuring to make them more effective or efficient in dealing with the nation's problems? What is your overall economic strategy for 2005 to 2014?

D. Required Readings

1. Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "The Political Economy of National Defense," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 16. Read only pp. 247–256. (An overview of the "economic way of thinking" and its relationship to national defense. The second part of the essay on the international political economy is assigned for SSF-11.)

2. Stiglitz, Joseph E. "The Public Sector in a Mixed Economy," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 17, pp. 275–295. (A discussion of the role of government in a mixed economy.)

3. Holtz-Eakin, Douglas. Extracts from "Testimony by Director, Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook, Fiscal Years 2005–2014, before the Committee on the Budget, United States Senate," Washington, D.C., January 27, 2004. (This summarizes one of several annual reports that provide projections for federal spending and revenue and their implications.)

4. Updegrave, Walter. "Would You Buy this Stock?" *Money*, July 2004, pp. 71–76. (The author uses the analogy of a corporation to assess U.S. economic prospects.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Gwartney, James D. and Richard L. Stroup. *Economics: Private and Public Choice*, 9th Edition. Fort Worth: Dryden Press, 1999. (A well-regarded economics text book written from the perspective of "public choice" theory.)

2. Kapstein, Ethan Barnaby. *The Political Economy of National Security*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992. (A text that examines all aspects of the interaction between political economy and the requirements of national defense.)

3. Henderson, David R., ed. *The Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics*. New York: Warner Books, 1993. (A series of short essays on the theories, mechanics, and institutions of money, trade and markets, and all other aspects of economics.)

4. Stiglitz, Joseph E. *Economics of the Public Sector*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2000. (A balanced assessment of the respective roles of government and the market in a mixed economy.)

5. Earle, Edward Mead. "Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic Foundation of Military Power," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 217–261. (The classic discussion of the relationship between economic power and national security.)

Note: The most recent versions of the following publications are available at the Congressional Budget Office's web site (*www.cbo.gov*). Additional publications are available on a wide range of government programs including national defense.

6. Congressional Budget Office. *Budget Options*. Washington, D.C.: Congress of the United States, February 2003. (This report contains detailed analysis of spending and revenue alternatives to maintain budgetary discipline.)

7. Congressional Budget Office. *The Economic and Budget Outlook, Fiscal Years 2005–2014*. Washington, D.C.: Congress of the United States, January 2004. (This is one of several annual reports that provide projections for federal spending and revenue and their implications.)

8. Congressional Budget Office. *An Analysis of the President's Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2005*. Washington, D.C.: Congress of the United States, March 2004. (An annual report that describes the president's budget and estimates its effects on future revenues, spending, deficits/surpluses, and national debt.)

B. COMPETING GRAND STRATEGIES

SSF-5 NEO-ISOLATIONISM AND PRIMACY

A. Focus. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism have transformed the international environment, confronting the United States with many difficult choices. The American leadership must decide not only what it wants the world to look like, but also how much the United States will be involved in global conflicts. Similar questions have been asked since the founding of the American Republic.

This session explores two options for American grand strategy. Advocates for each option contend that they are motivated by achieving security for America; however, their responses reflect significantly different notions of how to define "security." Those who support neo-isolationism (sometimes called strategic independence) contend that the United States has a remarkable opportunity to cut back its overseas commitments and concentrate on pressing problems at home. They do not reject political and economic involvement in world affairs, and they disagree among themselves on many issues. As a group, they oppose military involvement in foreign conflicts, warning that the American people have no desire whatever to have the United States act as the world's policeman. The recent spate on global terrorism, they would argue, has been incited by a ubiquitous and arrogant flaunting of American power throughout the world, making America the principal target of the terror movement. This "strict" construction of security, they would argue, is in line with the philosophy, developed by the Founding Fathers, that the nation is secure as long as its boundaries cannot be transgressed.

Proponents of primacy argue that the U.S. must maintain its dominant position in the international system. Their motivations stem from both the "liberal" as well as the "realist" views of the world. "Liberal" primacists contend that the liberal world order that so many take for granted exists only because the United States underwrites the security of this order. They condemn disengagement as little more than the abdication of global responsibilities. In fact, American primacy is the world's best hope to spread democracy, self-determination and human dignity. "Realist" primacists want to exploit the relative U.S. advantage in all elements of power. The foremost strategic challenge, as they see it, is to prevent the emergence of a peer competitor on the order of the former Soviet Union, be it China, Russia, Japan, Germany, or a united Europe. This school of thought sees the war on terror as a threat to our security which must be addressed at every turn, preferably as far away from American shores as possible. Both groups view security in an "expansive" sense, whereby America needs to export either its power or values abroad in order to be completely secure.

B. Objectives

- Understand and assess the premises, concepts, objectives, and requirements of the strategies of strategic independence and primacy.
- Determine and evaluate the costs and benefits of the strategies of strategic independence and primacy.

C. Guidance

1. Posen and Ross critique four basic alternatives for U.S. grand strategy. Their discussions of cooperative security and selective engagement will be read for the next session. The portion of their article assigned for this class examines neo-isolationism (strategic independence) and primacy. Posen and Ross examine both in terms of U.S. national interests, the threats to those interests, and the appropriate responses to those threats. From their perspective, how does the new isolationism differ from the isolationism of the 1920s and 1930s? What is the meaning of primacy, now that the decades-long effort to contain communism is over? How do the existence and proliferation of nuclear weapons affect each of these strategies? How would acceptance of one or the other influence U.S. foreign policy? What are the force planning implications?

2. Carpenter contends that since the United States may be the most "geostrategically secure great power" in history that we should take advantage of the opportunity to be more selective in our political and military commitments. The American response to 9-11, he contends, should result in an increased focus on the American homeland, rather than our current response of "promiscuous intervention." This policy of "world policeman" is not only alienating most of the world, it is also reducing the incentive to empower regional leaders to provide for their own security. What does Carpenter mean by America's "smothering strategy?" How would Carpenter define U.S. vital interests? Does he see a multipolar world as inherently stable? Does America improve its security as we fight terrorism abroad?

3. Kagan asserts that "the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world's population." Is that indeed the case? Is U.S. hegemony, or primacy, good for the United States? Do U.S. national interests require the maintenance of U.S. primacy? Does U.S. security depend on U.S. hegemony? Is the United States really the indispensable nation? For how long will the rest of the world tolerate U.S. hegemony? For how long will it be regarded as benevolent? Should Kagan's argument be regarded as anything more than a self-serving American claim?

4. Boot does not shrink from the word "empire" in describing American foreign policy. Compared to European imperial achievements, he defends the historical American Empire as "decidedly idealistic" and having improved the lives of the colonial peoples. He notes, however, that today's "liberal imperialism" pursues additional and more ambitious goals such as short circuiting terrorism, military aggression and weapons proliferation. Such a "primacist-plus" strategy should be adopted with eyes wide open. State building is extremely difficult, costly and time consuming; transfixing on an "exit strategy" immediately after an intervention is likely to be self-defeating. Boot notes that in any occupation, "some unpleasant episodes are likely to occur." Why does Boot feel that "nation building is too ambitious, but state building is not?" Does he see a role for international institutions in this primacy strategy? Is his analysis informed by a realist or liberal perspective?

D. Required Readings

1. Posen, Barry R. and Andrew L. Ross. "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategies," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport,

RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 11. Read only pp. 153–160 and pp. 171–185 (Two analysts examine alternative grand strategies.)

2. Carpenter, Ted Galen. "Introduction: U.S. Security Strategy after 9-11," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 12, pp. 186–195. (A proposal to focus on the American homeland, calling for the reduction of American political and military commitments abroad.)

3. Kagan, Robert. "The Benevolent Empire," in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000, Chapter 12, pp. 177–183. (The case for American altruistic hegemony as today's preferred foreign policy.)

4. Boot, Max. "Neither New nor Nefarious: The Liberal Empire Strikes Back," in Security, Strategy, and Forces, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 13, pp. 196–205. (A defense of American Empire along with a recognition of its contemporary difficulties.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Mearsheimer, John J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: Norton, 2001. (A critique of U.S. foreign policy by the quintessential realist writer in the United States today.)

2. Krauthammer, Charles. "The Bush Doctrine: ABM, Kyoto, and the New American Unilateralism," *The Weekly Standard*, June 4, 2001, pp. 21–24. (An assessment of the Bush foreign policy by an advocate of primacy).

3. Kagan, Robert. "The World and President Bush," *Survival*, Spring 2001. (A warning for the new administration from an advocate of American primacy.)

4. Ikenberry, G. John. *After Victory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. (A description of how victorious powers seek to shape the international order).

5. Johnson, Chalmers. *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*. New York: Metropolitan Book, 2000. (A critique of U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War).

6. Buchanan, Patrick. *A Republic, Not an Empire*. Chicago: Regnery, 1999. (A call for strategic disengagement by a failed presidential candidate).

7. Hutchings, Robert L., ed. *At the End of the American Century: America's Role in the Post–Cold War World*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center Press, 1998. (An examination of options for the U.S. role in the post–cold war world.)

8. Gholz, Eugene, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky. "Come Home America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 4, Spring 1997, pp. 5–48. (The authors call for disengaging U.S. military forces from around the world.)

9. Olsen, Edward A. "In Defense of International Abstention," *Strategic Review*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2 Spring, 1996, pp. 58–63. (A call for U.S. abstention and benign neglect.)

10. Krauthammer, Charles. “The Unipolar Moment,” *Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1990/91*, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1990/91, pp. 23–33. (A watershed article, written shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, that was the first to make the case that the U.S. must maintain the strength and will to lead in a unipolar world.)

11. Jervis, Robert. “International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?” *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 52–67. (A Columbia University political scientist argues that since war among the major powers is unlikely, the pursuit of primacy is unnecessary.)

12. Huntington, Samuel P. “Why International Primacy Matters,” *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 68–83. (The Harvard University political scientist further develops the case for maintaining U.S. primacy.)

13. Huntington, Samuel P. “The Lonely Superpower,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 2, March/April 1999, pp. 35–49. (According to the author, a former advocate of U.S. primacy, the unipolar moment is over.)

14. Khalilzad, Zalmay. “Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War,” in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 2nd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1997, Chapter 10, pp. 151–174. (A call for indefinitely maintaining the unilateral moment.)

15. Layne, Christopher. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 5–51. (A sophisticated realist critique of the notion that unipolarity is anything more than a passing phenomenon.)

16. Layne, Christopher. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy,” *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 1, Summer 1997, pp. 86–124. (A critique of the strategy of preponderance and a call for disengagement in the form of “offshore balancing.”)

17. Kupchan, Charles A. “After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity,” *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 2, Fall 1998, pp. 40–79. (The author argues that “To assume that international order can indefinitely rest on American hegemony is both illusory and dangerous.”)

18. Maynes, Charles William. “The Perils of (and for) an Imperial America,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 111, Summer 1998, pp. 36–48. (A critique of Kagan.)

19. Kagan, Robert and William Kristol. “The Present Danger,” *The National Interest*, No. 59, Spring 2000, pp. 57–69. (A call for a strategy of primacy by two advocates of a “neo-Reaganist” foreign policy of “national greatness.”)

20. Maynes, Charles William. “Contending Schools,” *The National Interest*, No. 63, Spring 2001, pp. 49–58. (A slightly different taxonomy of grand strategy alternatives that discusses “controllers” [primacists], “shapers,” [selective engagers], and “abstainers,” [advocates of strategic disengagement]).

21. Mearsheimer, John J. “The Future of the American Pacifier,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 5, September/October 2001, pp. 46–61. (A summary of his book, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.)

SSF-6 COOPERATIVE SECURITY AND SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT

A. Focus. The growing number of references to common security (alternatively labeled "security partnership," "mutual security," "reciprocal security," or "cooperative security") often involves "cooperation among adversaries" through multilateralism and various forms of international "regimes" that embrace expected norms and behaviors among actors. While states remain the main referent of security and the focus remains on threats from other states, including (or perhaps even primarily) military threats, this strategy emphasizes the need for broader concepts of security, including the blurring of distinctions between national and human security. Cooperative security has roots in the broader concepts of multilateralism and strategic interdependence. Collectively, these strategic concepts seek to "bind and tie" the political and economic world order that the United States and its partners have attempted to construct in the post–Cold War era.

Advocates of a strategy of selective engagement argue that the most fundamental objective of U.S. involvement abroad should be to prevent conflict among the "great powers" in Eurasia. These are the countries that possess the most substantial economic and military capabilities, and it is conflict among these powers that poses the greatest threat to America's national interests. Supporters of selective engagement hold that U.S. resources are scarce and that we should be discriminating in their allocation. Most proponents also argue that international organizations should not be accorded prominence in U.S. strategy.

B. Objectives

- Understand and assess the premises, concepts, objectives, and requirements of the strategies of cooperative security and selective engagement.
- Determine and evaluate the costs and benefits of the strategies of cooperative security and selective engagement.
- Compare and contrast cooperative security and selective engagement with other strategic alternatives.

C. Guidance

1. In this excerpt from "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," Posen and Ross note that cooperative security subscribes to a unique premise, which they term "Strategic Interdependence." They point out that proponents of cooperative security concentrate on peace rather than power, aiming to remove military force from *the* predominant focus in international politics. Yet, in the most ideal sense, aggression anywhere, by anyone, cannot be allowed to stand. Wars in one place are likely to spread, the use of weapons of mass destruction will likely lead to their use elsewhere, refugee flows impact the security of regions rather than individual nations, and the "insecurity" of one state may well affect the security of all. Thus, in an effort to overcome the perceived shortcomings of collective security, cooperative security goes beyond it by attempting to ensure that the means of aggression are not assembled. What other premises are associated with cooperative security? Does the high level of strategic interdependence postulated by proponents of this strategy exist? How does this strategy compare with neo-isolationism and primacy?

2. G. John Ikenberry asserts that American foreign policy making since World War II has been in a dynamic of tension between unilateralism and multilateralism. He argues that the two impulses are likely to increase as the causes of each become more profound. America's status as the sole superpower enhances the tendency toward unilateralism, making it disinclined to bear the preponderance of burdens inherent in international agreements today. The trend toward shaping the international order through multilateralism, on the other hand, is grounded in American national identity and its tradition of the rule of law, and will likely increase as Americans realize that influence by power alone is too costly. Ikenberry believes that presidential administrations of both parties have pursued unilateralism despite a multilateralist public mood, and that while an "imperial temptation lurks," the United States must act multilaterally since it depends upon a cooperative international order to promote its interests. Is American foreign policy predominantly unilateral or multilateral? Why should the United States employ more of one or the other approach in pursuit of current policy goals?

3. Posen and Ross examine the basic concepts and characteristics of a selective engagement grand strategy. They observe that "selective engagement emerges from the realist tradition of international politics" and that it "endeavors to ensure peace among powers that have substantial industrial and military potential—the great powers." What specific countries and parts of the world concern proponents of selective engagement? How important is a balance of power concept to the strategy? To what extent should the United States take a leadership position? What are the military force structure implications of selective engagement? What do you think is the most important criticism raised by the authors?

4. Art advocates a U.S. grand strategy of selective engagement. Does his concept differ from that of Posen and Ross? If so, how? How selective is his list of national interests? What is the difference between those interests he claims are vital and those that are desirable? What would you add to or delete from his list? What are the key elements of selective engagement that support each of his interests? What are the implications for force planners looking forward in the twenty-first century? Having studied the competing grand strategies of neo-isolationism, primacy, and cooperative security, as well as selective engagement, which do you favor for the future? Why?

D. Required Readings

1. Posen, Barry R. and Andrew L. Ross. "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning,* 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 11. Read only pp. 166–171 (up to "Primacy"). (This excerpt examines the grand strategy of cooperative security.)

2. Ikenberry, G. John. "America and the Ambivalence of Power," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning,* 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 14, pp. 206–215. (How unilateralism and multilateralism compete for the new American grand strategy.)

3. Posen, Barry R., and Andrew L. Ross. "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning,* 4th ed. Newport, RI:

Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 11. Read only pp. 161–165. (Examines the concepts and characteristics of a selective engagement grand strategy.)

4. Art, Robert J. "Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 15, pp. 216–244. (An example of a selective engagement strategy, albeit of a very robust sort.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Ikenberry, G. John. "Getting Hegemony Right," *National Interest*, No. 63, Spring 2001, pp. 17–24. (How America can preserve its relative power through strategic interdependence.)

2. Annan, Kofi. Nobel Lecture 2001, Delivered in Oslo, Norway, 10 December 2001. http://www.nobel.no/eng_lect_2001b.html (The United Nations Secretary-General lays out the principles of a cooperative security framework.)

3. Steinbruner, John D. *Principles of Global Security*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2000. (Examines the principles of strategic interdependence in the future security environment.)

4. Chace, James, and Nicholas X. Rizopoulos. "Toward a New Concert of Nations: An American Perspective," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 3, Fall 1999, pp. 2–10. (A call for "the pursuit of a global power system through a new concert of nations that seeks cooperative norms of behavior.")

5. Kupchan, Charles A. "Life After Pax Americana," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 3, Fall 1999, pp. 20–27. (A proposal for the establishment of "a concert-like directorate of the major powers" in preparation for the coming multipolarity.)

6. Ikenberry, G. John. "The Myth of Post–Cold War Chaos," in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 2nd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1997, Chapter 13, pp. 202–211. (How and why the cooperative international order the liberal powers established during World War II has endured.)

7. Nolan, Janne E., ed. *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994. (An extended exploration of the concept of cooperative security.)

8. Carter, Ashton B. and William J. Perry. *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1999. (The authors argue that a preventive defense strategy must focus on preventing a set of five major dangers from becoming major threats.)

9. Finel, Bernard I. and Kristin M. Lord. *Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency*. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Publishers, 2000. (Useful essays on the meaning and proliferation of "transparency" in international security.)

10. Ruggie, John Gerard. *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*. London and New York: Routledge, 1998. (A leading theorist argues that institutionalization is "what makes the world hang together.")

11. Evans, Gareth. "Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict." *Foreign Policy*, No. 96, Fall 1994, pp. 3–20. (An exploration of the role of cooperative security in intrastate conflict.)

12. Art, Robert J. "A U.S. Military Strategy for the 1990s: Reassurance Without Dominance," *Survival*, Winter 1992–93, pp. 3–23. (A blueprint for a post–Cold War strategy through which the U.S. can lead without dominating.)

13. Kagan, Robert. "The Case for Global Activism," *Commentary*, September 1994, pp. 40–44. (A critique of selective engagement.)

14. Kissinger, Henry. "How to Achieve the New World Order," in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1995, Chapter 12, pp. 158–168. (A former Secretary of State provides his preferred post–Cold War course of action for the U.S.)

15. Rice, Condoleezza. "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, January/ February 2000, pp. 45–62. (An example of a realist/selective engagement perspective.)

16. Steel, Ronald. *Temptations of a Superpower*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995. (The author, examining America's foreign policy after the Cold War, provides a perspective influenced by selective engagement.)

17. Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," *International Security*, Winter 2000/01, pp. 128–161. (The article examines difference between the concepts of defensive and offensive realism that have implications for a selective engagement strategy.)

18. Waltz, Kenneth N. "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security*, Summer 2000, pp. 5–41. (The article reviews realism and the implications for a strategy of selective engagement.)

19. Zoellick, Robert B. "A Republican Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, January/ February 2000, pp. 63–78. (The author takes a selective approach to foreign policy.)

SSF-7 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND ALTERNATIVES

A. Focus. The national security strategy (NSS) of the United States is a linchpin document that should incorporate well-discussed and debated concepts of what constitutes national security; what are U.S. national interests, objectives, and goals; and what characterizes the future international security environment. The latest U.S. NSS, released in September 2002 by the Bush administration, was arguably an extreme departure from the previous two NSS (released by the Clinton administration) in form and intent, but much less in its foreign policy focus. It was clear from the extensive media coverage, however, that many in the international community felt there was a great shift in U.S. policy. This lesson will explore aspects of the latest NSS, provide contending reviews of the strengths and weaknesses of the strategy, and provide a forum for seminar analysis and critique.

B. Objectives

- Understand the major elements of the national security strategy of the United States and contending viewpoints.
- Accomplish a critical analysis of the national security strategy, to include proposing changes.

C. Guidance

1. The national security strategy released by President Bush outlines strategic pillars of enhancing security, bolstering America's economic prosperity, and promoting democracy and human dignity abroad. It defines eight goals: strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against the United States and its friends; work with others to defuse regional conflicts; prevent enemies from threatening the United States, its allies, and its friends with weapons of mass destruction; ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and transform U.S. national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century. Does the administration capture completely the goals of the nation? Does the NSS give goals appropriate priority? Are there sufficiently clear roadmaps detailed for each goal by which the U.S. and international community can achieve them? Are there items you would change? Are there aspects upon which you would provide less focus? More focus?

2. Ivo Daalder, James Lindsay, and James Steinberg of the Brookings Institution critique the NSS by detailing several weaknesses: (1) the dichotomy of the goal of global freedom and heavy reliance on countries of different interests than the U.S., (2) the lack of recognition of the limitations of preemption when dealing with rogue states, (3) the underestimation of contributions possible by alliances and institutions, and (4) the dilemma of the security threat of failed states and the unsuccessful assistance programs attempting to prevent their failures. The authors assert that the strategy does not sufficiently address the challenges of Russia and China and explain that their "integration . . . into the west" is key to global peace preserved by a "great power concert." The authors further specify that fighting terrorism and encouraging free and

open societies are conflicting goals. Do you think these contradictions are insurmountable? Does the NSS sufficiently guide us to understand within which circumstances openness would be a priority against fighting terrorism or vice versa? Do you think stating both openness and counter-terrorism as goals hypocritical, as the authors do? Are Russia and China key to future peace and security? What do you think are the proper priorities and methods by which the U.S. and the international community can successfully defeat terrorism?

3. John Lewis Gaddis offers a positive view of the national security strategy, stating that the NSS is "right on target with respect to the new circumstances confronting the United States and its allies in the wake of September 11." He identifies strengths of this latest NSS as "more forceful, more carefully crafted, and—unexpectedly—more multilateral than its immediate predecessor." He further details what he calls several "innovations" as (1) "Bush's equation of terrorists with tyrants as sources of danger," (2) emphasizing the "acceptability" of U.S. hegemony, based upon great powers preferring a benign hegemon and that U.S. hegemony is "linked with certain values that all states and cultures—if not all terrorists and tyrants—share," and (3) Bush's emphasis that poverty does not beget terrorists and that representative and ethical governance prevents the growing resentment of state populations. He summarizes this strategy as a departure from most recent strategies; as proactive; as coherent; and as synchronized with recent academic conclusions on how hegemony works and terrorism occurs. Do you agree that the world is ready to accept the U.S. as the "benign hegemon"? Do you agree that the international community understands that the U.S. is linked with a shared set of values and interests? What are some of the competing interests that challenge the successful execution of this strategy?

4. The Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) examines arguments against the Bush strategy's controversial policy of pre-emption and makes a case for the policy in the current security environment. IISS then points out the practical problems of implementing a pre-emptive policy. Is the Bush policy of pre-emption a wise foreign policy? Which of the strengths and weaknesses of the policy are most important?

D. Required Readings

1. Bush, George W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002. Read only pp. 3–31. (The nation's current "grand strategy.")

2. Daalder, Ivo H., James M. Lindsay, and James B. Steinberg. *The Bush National Security Strategy: An Evaluation*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, Policy Brief # 109, October 2002. (The authors criticize the Bush national security strategy as full of shortcomings and dubious assumptions.)

3. Gaddis, John L. "A Grand Strategy," *Foreign Policy*, November/December 2002, pp. 50–57. (Gaddis argues that the Bush national security strategy is innovative and appropriate for today's security environment.)

4. The Institute for International Security, "The Bush National Security Strategy: What does 'pre-emption' mean?" *Strategic Comments*, Volume 8 Issue 8, October 2002. (IISS examines the positive and negative aspects of the Bush policy of pre-emption.)

E. Supplemental Readings

1. Corbin, Marcus. *The Bush National Security Strategy: A First Step*. Washington, D.C.: The Center for Defense Information, 26 September 2002. (A short analysis of strengths and weaknesses of the new National Security Strategy.)

2. Bin, Li. *The New U.S. National Security Strategy: Positives and Negatives for China*. Washington, D.C.: The Center for Defense Information, 26 September 2002. (The author provides an assessment of the current U.S. National Security Strategy, noting that its frankness is appreciated, but suggesting that the emphasis on preemption and the defense of Taiwan are two major concerns for China.)

3. Safranchuk, Ivan. *The U.S. National Security Strategy: A Russian Perspective*. Washington, D.C.: The Center for Defense Information, 26 September 2002. (A Russian view of the current National Security Strategy, suggesting that it is primarily a strategy of unilateralism and warning that it may offer a green light to similar Russian actions.)

4. Knight, Charles. *Essential Elements Missing in the National Security Strategy of 2002*. Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute Project on Defense Alternatives Commentary, http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0211nss2002.pdf, November 2002. (Adapted from a presentation at the Center for International Relations, Boston University, 9 October 2002. The author is critical of the current National Security Strategy, calling it "disturbingly insubstantial, ideological, and, at times, disingenuous.")

5. Daalder, Ivo H., James M. Lindsay, and James B. Steinberg, "Hard Choices: National Security and the War on Terrorism." Philadelphia, PA: *Current History*, December 2002. (Another version of these Brookings Institute authors' views of the Bush National Security Strategy.)

6. O'Hanlon, Michael E., Susan E. Rice, James B. Steinberg. *The New National Security Strategy and Preemption*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, Policy Brief #113, December 2002. (The authors caution that a preemption strategy carries grave risks, arguing that deterrence can still work for most objectives while preemption legitimizes use of force by other nations.)

7. Clinton, William J. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2000.

8. Clinton, William J. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.* Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 1999.

9. Lemann, Nicolas. "The War on What?" *New Yorker*, 16 September 2002. (Lemann argues that the realist camp disagrees over calling the present war on "terrorism" vice Al Qaeda.)

10. Lemann, Nicolas. "The Next World Order," *New Yorker*, 1 April 2002. (The author suggests that President Bush, with assistance from administration "hawks," is ushering in a new doctrine of power for the U.S.)

11. Ikenberry, G. John. "America's Imperial Ambition," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2002. (The author argues that the strategy of the new administration hypocritically proposes a more absolute sovereignty for America while questioning the sovereignty of other states that act against U.S. interests.)

12. Hirsh, Michael. "Bush and the World," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2002. (The author argues for a new "Wilsonian" approach to foreign policy.)

13. Mandelbaum, Michael. "The Inadequacy of American Power," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2002. (Author argues that U.S. supremacy is a situation where the U.S. must carry the extra costs of providing public goods.)

14. Barnett, Thomas P. M. *The Global Transaction Strategy*. Washington, D.C.: The Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, December, 2002. (The author offers an alternative strategy focused on shaping security, resources, and people from the "core great powers" to and from the "non-integrating gap of developing nations.")

15. Nye, Joseph S., Jr. *The Paradox of American Power*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002. (A study of how America's use of its "hard" power negatively detracts from its "soft" power, greatly reducing its international influence.)

16. Slevin, Peter. "Analysts: New Strategy Courts Unseen Dangers," *Washington Post*, http://ebird.dtic.mil/Sep2002/e20020923anaylysts.htm, 22 September 2002. (Author argues that a strategy of preemption leads to increased use of force by all.)

17. Eland, Ivan. *The Empire Strikes Out: The 'New Imperialism' and Its Fatal Flaws*, CATO Institute Policy Brief No. 459, Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 26 November 2002. (Author states that today's security environment is unlike that following World War II, asserting that embracing a U.S. "strategy of empire" is doomed to fail.)

18. Center for Defense Intelligence, *The Bush National Security Strategy: A First Step*, http://www.cdi.org/national-security-strategy/washington.cfm 26 September 2002. (A critical examination of the policy of preventive war implied in the Bush strategy and a look at the tradeoffs of its implementation.)

19. Bacevich, Andrew J. "Bush's Grand Strategy," *The American Conservative*, November 4, 2002, http://www.amconmag.com/11_4/bushs_grand_strategy.html. (Bacevich argues that the Bush national security strategy threatens to outrun resources and overextend capabilities.)

20. Berman, Ilan. "The Bush Strategy at War," *The National Interest* (Winter 2003), available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns. (Berman sees in the NSS three revolutions in American strategy.)

SSF-8 FORMS OF DIPLOMACY

A. Focus. There are many tools of statecraft that states use to implement grand strategy. The diplomatic spectrum includes international institutions such as the United Nations, formal alliances such as NATO, coalitions of the willing, economic policies and many other means. In this block we will look at some of these tools of statecraft to better understand their value and limitations and decide how the United States should employ them.

This session examines some of the major foreign policy challenges facing diplomacy as an instrument of power to pursue national objectives in the twenty-first century. The ambitious foreign policy agenda in the President's national security strategy may require a transformation of our national security institutions to address these challenges and opportunities. After assessing the dimensions of diplomacy, we look at the nature and methods of preventive, coercive and public diplomacy as tools for practitioners.

B. Objectives

- Examine the nature of diplomacy, particularly recent trends.
- Assess the characteristics and limitations of preventive diplomacy as one aspect of diplomacy.
- Consider the merits of coercive diplomacy—including the use of sanctions—and its compatibility with military strategy.
- Evaluate the enhanced role of public diplomacy and its effectiveness in influencing the behavior and opinions of both allies and adversaries.

C. Guidance

1. Tom Fedyszyn addresses the evolution of the diplomatic art and the many forms of diplomacy, while also recognizing its changing nature. As the United States maneuvers during the global war on terror, national leadership must especially take into account the growing importance of public diplomacy and the necessity to deal with non-national entities. Has the phenomenon of globalization made the life of ambassadors more difficult? Do instantaneous global communications reduce the likelihood of international violence? Do Americans conduct diplomacy different than other world actors?

2. Susan Fink argues that diplomacy benefits when decision makers resolve three contending influences in foreign policy: the political, legal and moral. While *realpolitik* is persistent in international affairs, the cooperative imperative has become increasingly institutionalized through international law. Both of these influences on diplomacy, leading to tendencies of unilateralism on one hand and multilateralism on the other, are increasingly challenged by the rise of a third imperative: the normative influences on decision making. By examining trans-Atlantic decision making in two recent crises in Kosovo and Iraq, Fink finds the need for a new, three-tiered, diplomacy that integrates, by addressing simultaneously, the persistence of power, embedded nature of cooperation, and the surging influence of the moral dimension that emphasizes human solidarity. Do you agree that the United States should work

with other nations to codify moral influences on diplomacy into international law? In the mean time, should the United States use a more multilateral approach in the world? What are the costs and benefits of couching the war on terror in moral terms? Of putting humanitarian and human rights issues at the forefront of decision making about intervention?

3. Michael Lund examines the concepts, tools, and targets of preventive diplomacy that are defined as "action taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat of use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political, and international change." Does this represent a radical departure from the tenets of traditional diplomacy or is it a restatement of diplomacy's basic objective to promote peace and stability? What implications would a vigorous application of this concept pose for our national security apparatus? Do you agree that predictive measures of human behavior are too unreliable to allow for the kind of early warning tripwires preventive diplomacy depends on?

4. Alexander George suggests that coercive diplomacy is "an alternative to military strategy." Can it be a complement to military strategy? How does George define coercive diplomacy and what are its objectives? Can you think of any current examples of the successful employment of a coercive diplomacy strategy? Is coercive diplomacy working in the current crisis with North Korea? Was coercive diplomacy used in Iraq? Can coercive diplomacy lead to regime change absent the introduction of force?

5. Daniel Drezner presents arguments in support of economic sanctions that may appear counterintuitive at first. He claims that the pessimists use four flawed arguments against the use of sanctions: sanctions rarely work; unilateral sanctions never work; sanctions hurt U.S. trade; and sanctions are immoral because they hurt ordinary citizens more than elites. Conversely, Drezner argues that optimists have it wrong when they insist that: sanctions are a costless and harmless alternative to force; and congressional mandates will lead to an effective sanctions policy. Do you agree that sanctions are more likely to succeed when imposed on an ally rather than an adversary? Can sanctions ever be successful in counter-terrorism?

6. Peter Peterson reports on the findings of a task force assigned to chart a course for American public diplomacy, specifically to counter terrorism. They recommend "a new paradigm" that develops a coherent strategic and coordinating framework, increases customized, two-way dialogue in place of conventional one-way, push down mass communication, expands private-sector involvement, improves the effectiveness of public diplomacy resources, and enlarges the assets devoted to public diplomacy. Are their recommendations feasible? Are they comprehensive? If not, what is a better approach?

D. Required Readings

1. Fedyszyn, Thomas R. "Implementing Strategy: Diplomatic Tools," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 20. Read pp. 311–315 ("Recent Trends in Diplomacy") and pp. 318–323. (Fedyszyn provides a survey of the non-coercive, or diplomatic, means with which states can use to influence or persuade others.)

2. Fink, Susan D. "The Trouble with Mixed Motives: Debating the Political, Legal, and Moral Dimensions of Intervention," *Naval War College Review* 57, no. 3 (Summer 2004). Read either the section entitled "What happened in Kosovo" or the section "What happened in Iraq." (The three contending influences on diplomacy in two recent international crises.)

3. Lund, Michael S. "Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 23, pp. 350–360. Scan figure 1 on p. 353 and read pp. 356–360. (A comprehensive examination of preventive diplomacy.)

4. George, Alexander L. "The General Theory and Logic of Coercive Diplomacy," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 24, pp. 361–369. Read pp. 362–368. (The theory and practice of coercive diplomacy.)

5. Drezner, Daniel W. "Serious About Sanctions," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 19, pp. 296–307. Read pp. 296–297 (through first paragraph in the section entitled "The Poverty of the Pessimists") and pp. 302–303 (the paragraph under the section entitled "Deflating the Optimists"). (A counterintuitive appraisal of arguments in support of economic sanctions.)

6. Peterson, Peter G. "Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 25, pp. 370–385. Read pp. 372–385. (Recommendations for a U.S. policy of public diplomacy.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Pillar, Paul R. "Dealing with Terrorists," in Robert J. Art and Kenneth Neal Waltz, eds., *The Use of Force*, 6th ed. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004, Chapter 32. (Recommendations for a U.S. policy of counter-terrorism.)

2. http://www.state.gov. (The official website of the State Department includes recent speeches, policy documents, mission statements, information on employment and links to embassies.)

3. Schelling, Thomas C. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966. (In a recognized classic, political scientist Schelling examines the nexus between diplomacy and the actual or potential use of force to achieve political objectives.)

4. Craig, Gordon A. and Alexander L. George, eds. *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of our Time*, 3rd ed.. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. (A history of American diplomacy and selected 20th century diplomatic challenges.)

5. Brodie, Bernard, *War and Politics*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973. (The relations between military affairs and statecraft.)

6. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, eds. *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999. (Multiparty mediation strategy and actors, conflict prevention and management, settlement and implementation.)

7. Hampson, Fen Osler. *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996. (Analysis of selected cases of successful and failed peace settlements.)

8. Bercovitch, Jacob, ed. *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996. (Concepts of power, culture, bias and neutrality in the practice of international mediation.)

9. Eizenstat, Stuart. *Imperfect Justice: Looted Assets, Slave Labor, and the Unfinished Business of World War II*. New York: Public Affairs, 2003. (A first hand account by the lead American negotiator of the delicate diplomatic efforts by the United States and its allies to recover and distribute looted assets to Holocaust survivors.)

10. Barston, R. P. *Modern Diplomacy*. New York: Longman, 1988. (An examination of the basic principles of diplomacy.)

11. Freeman, Chas. W. *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997. (A diplomat describes the fundamentals of statecraft and diplomacy.)

12. Evans, Gareth, and Mohammed Sahnoun. "The Responsibility to Protect: Revisiting Humanitarian Intervention," *Foreign Affairs,* November/December 2002, pp. 99–110. (A thoughtful look at the criteria used after 11 September 2001 for humanitarian intervention.)

13. Galbraith, Peter. "Reinventing Diplomacy, Again," *Foreign Service Journal,* February 1999. (A former Ambassador defends the State Department and argues for more resources instead of revised practices.)

14. Gurr, Ted Robert. "Attaining Peace in Divided Societies: Five Principles of Emerging Doctrine," *International Journal on World Peace,* Winter 2002, pp. 3–27. (University of Maryland professor proposes strategies for conflict resolution in multi-ethnic societies.)

15. Merrills, J. G. *International Dispute Settlement*. Cambridge, MA: Grotius Publications, 1991. (An examination of approaches to settling international disputes.)

16. O'Brien, Sean P. "Anticipating the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: An Early Warning Approach to Conflict and Instability Analysis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* December 2002, pp. 791–811. (An analyst looks at the potential for greater accuracy in the field of conflict prediction.)

17. Talbott, Strobe. "Globalization and Diplomacy: A Practitioner's Perspective," *Foreign Policy,* No. 108, Fall 1997, pp. 69–83. (The former deputy secretary of state considers the impact of globalization upon diplomacy.)

18. Gardner, Richard, "The One Percent Solution," *Foreign Affairs* volume 79 (4). New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000, pp. 2–11. (A critique of the U.S. budget for non-military international aid.)

19. Bauwens, Werner, and Luc Reychler, eds. *The Art of Conflict Prevention*. London and New York: Brassey's, 1994. (An exploration of conflict prevention.)

20. Rubin, Barnett R. *Blood on the Doorstep: The Politics of Preventive Action*. New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2002. (A post–11 September 2001 assessment from the Council on Foreign Relations of the imperatives and risks of preventive diplomacy.)

21. Vasquez, John A., James Turner Johnson, Sanford Jaffe, and Linda Stamato eds. *Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post–Cold War Era*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995. (A useful exploration of the possibilities of conflict resolution.)

22. Freedman, Lawrence. *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. (In-depth treatment of the theory and practice of "strategic coercion.")

23. Stephenson, Alan J. "Shades of Gray: Gradual Escalation and Coercive Diplomacy," in *Essays 2002*. Washington, D.C: National Defense University Press, 2002. (A Canadian military perspective on the risks and opportunities of coercive diplomacy.)

24. http://www.usip.org/. (The official website for the United States Institute of Peace offers recent articles and reports on diplomatic challenges and personalities.)

25. Ignatieff, Michael. "The Burden: The American Empire (Get Used To It)," *New York Times Magazine*, 5 January 2003. (The Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights at the Kennedy School examines America's new international profile and what that entails for the practice of diplomacy.)

SSF-9 ALLIANCES, COALITIONS, AND ALIGNMENTS

A. Focus. In this session we will examine alliances, coalitions, and alignments. Knowing their strengths and weaknesses is fundamental to understanding how they can support a nation's grand strategy and influence our choice of other tools of statecraft and future military forces. This session considers the trend toward coalitions of the willing as well as specific reasons why alliances tend to end or persist. The future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its continuing evolution as part of the European and U.S. defense structure acts as a specific case study in this lesson. We also consider the implications for the more informal coalitions and their importance in dealing with the terrorist war and other challenges facing the U.S.

B. Objectives

- Assess the strengths and weaknesses of alliances, coalitions, and alignments.
- Examine the NATO alliance and its relationship with the evolving defense structure of Europe and the United States.

C. Guidance

1. Nation states have at their disposal a wide range of tools available to them as they implement their grand strategies. In this section of his article, Thomas R. Fedyszyn provides a survey of the unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral forms of diplomacy. He states that there is no general rule as to which of these various tools of statecraft is more effective than another. Rather, whatever means best serves the achievement of national interests and goals is the correct option. He also addresses the growing importance of non-national entities as well as the relatively new variant of multilateralism, "coalitions of the willing". Are alliances now best suited for reasons other than national survival and security? Has the United Nations been effective in safeguarding its members against foreign aggression? What is the proper role of nongovernmental organizations in international diplomacy?

2. Stephen Walt provides insights on the rise and fall of alliances. In the context of examining why they endure or collapse, he examines the purposes of alliances, their varying levels of institutionalization, the functions they perform, and how they differ from other forms of security cooperation, particularly collective security arrangements. Walt argues that alliances tend to disintegrate in response to changing threat perceptions, declining credibility, and domestic politics. Alliances endure when they are based on hegemonic leadership and shared values and are highly institutionalized. Is his analysis informed primarily by realism or liberalism? What implications does Walt's analysis have on the future of NATO? How does the emergence of non-national threats in the terror war affect the future of the U.S. system of alliances?

3. Asmus argues that despite the myriad setbacks of recent months, the U.S.-European alliance is not doomed. Repairing it, however, will require a strategic overhaul no less bold than that which followed the end of the Cold War. The key to today's transatlantic divide is not power but purpose. To revive and revamp the alliance, therefore, the United States and the European Union must forge a new grand strategy capable of meeting the great challenges of the era: expanding the Euro-Atlantic community and stabilizing the greater Middle East. Are the

differences between the U.S. and Europe due to a growing asymmetry in power or is the crisis largely the result of diplomatic ineptness on one or both sides of the Atlantic? What strategy should the West pursue vis-à-vis countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia? What role should NATO play in stabilization efforts outside of the Euro-Atlantic region? Is the current administration in the U.S. pursuing the correct policies to strengthen the transatlantic alliance?

4. Lord Robertson, former Secretary General of NATO, writes that the impulse to transform the Alliance came from 9/11, but the process rapidly became deeper and wider. He asserts that the Prague Summit of November 2002, encompassed transformation across the whole spectrum of Alliance business from new members and new partnerships, through new capabilities and new missions to the restructuring of NATO's internal processes. Acknowledging that the challenges are enormous, he is nonetheless optimistic for the future because of NATO's track record and, in particular, the Alliance's performance in the Balkans. He is confident that NATO will continue doing what it has done best since 1949: delivering safety and security where and when it matters. Do you concur with his assessment that in the past two years, NATO has been truly transformed? What is the right mix of roles and missions between NATO and the European Security and Defense Policy? Was the decision to admit seven new members from the Baltic to the Black Sea a practical strategic maneuver or was it more likely political symbolism?

5. Stewart Patrick provides an overview of aims and goals from the Nationalist, Internationalist, and Cosmopolitan perspectives. He then examines the role of Multilateralism and Unilateralism within each of these perspectives. Do you agree, as a nationalist, that the highest duty of a statesman is to ensure the physical security and well-being of the nation and its citizens? Or do you advocate the internationalist view that one should seek to advance objectives that are sought not only by the nation and its citizens but more broadly by all states? Should U.S. foreign policy recognize the cosmopolitan perspective that human beings are the fundamental agents and holders of rights in world politics?

D. Required Readings

1. Fedyszyn, Thomas R. "Implementing Strategy: Diplomatic Tools," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 20, Read only pp. 315–318. (Fedyszyn provides a survey of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral forms of diplomacy.)

2. Walt, Stephen M. "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 21. Read only from p. 325 ("Introduction") to p. 328 (up to "Why Alliances End") and p. 333 ("Summary") to p. 343. (The author provides an overview of what defines formal and informal alliances, their purposes, how they function, what causes most to deteriorate or dissolve, and why some persist, occasionally for long periods of time.)

3. Asmus, Ronald D. "Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2003, pp. 20–31. (The author asserts that the U.S.-European Alliance is not doomed, but that repairing it will require a strategic overhaul no less bold than that which followed the end of the Cold War.)

4. Robertson, Lord. "Change and Continuity," *NATO Review*, Winter 2003. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue4/english/art-1prs.html (The former Secretary General of NATO looks back on his time as Secretary General and reflects on alliance history, transformation and prospects.)

5. Patrick, Stewart. "Beyond Coalitions of the Willing: Assessing U.S. Multilateralism," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 43. Read only from p. 589 to p. 591 (stop at "Only when we Must?") and p. 592 (last paragraph) to p. 594 (stop at "Better to be Feared"). (The author provides an overview of aims and goals from the Nationalist, Internationalist, and Cosmopolitan perspectives and examines the appropriate balance between unilateralism and multilateralism in U.S. global engagements.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Patrick, Stewart. "Beyond Coalitions of the Willing: Assessing U.S. Multilateralism," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 43, pp. 589–601. (The author provides an overview of aims and goals from the Nationalist, Internationalist, and Cosmopolitan perspectives and examines the appropriate balance between unilateralism and multilateralism in U.S. global engagements.)

2. Haass, Richard N. "Foreign Policy by Posse," in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000, Chapter 21, pp. 306–314. (The author outlines three forms that a multilateral foreign policy can assume: formal alliances, supranational institutions, and informal ad hoc coalitions.)

3. Talbott, Strobe. "From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2002, pp. 46–57. (The author outlines his reasons for feeling that NATO is, and will continue to be, a key tool of U.S. statecraft.)

4. Bellany, Ian. "Uncertain Allies," *The World Today*, August/September 2002, pp. 31–32. (The author contends that it is not clear why the U.S. should have any interest in assembling an alliance to fight terrorism, or why any other state should be interested in joining it.)

5. McDougall, Derek. "Asia-Pacific Security Regionalism: The Impact of Post–1997 Developments," *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 23, No. 2, August 2002, pp. 113–119. (The author provides a review of the security alignments or "security regionalism" that exist in the Asia/Pacific region.)

6. Wallender, Celeste A. "NATO's Price: Shape Up or Ship Out," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2002, pp. 2–8. (Author argues for a mechanism for sanctioning, suspending or expelling unqualified members if NATO is to remain an effective political and military alliance.)

7. Binnendijk, Hans, and Richard Kugler. "Transforming European Forces," *Survival*, Vol. 44, No. 3, Autumn 2002, pp. 117–132. (The authors suggest the creation of a "Spearhead

Response Force" that they feel would greatly enhance Europe's capacity to contribute to new-era missions.)

8. Gaddis, John Lewis. "History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement," *Survival*, Spring 1998, pp. 145–151. (Contends that the decision to expand NATO has violated every basic strategic principle that should be considered in making major policy decisions.)

9. Joffe, Josef. "How America Does It," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1997, pp. 13–27. (Joffe presents the most significant counterintuitive and counter-historical reality of the post–Cold war era: until now, no alliance in history has ever survived victory. The U.S. may be proving both history and intuition wrong.)

10. Green, Michael J. and Patrick M. Cronin, eds. *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*. New York: Council On Foreign Relations Press, 1999. (Includes an extensive range of articles dealing with the U.S.-Japan alliance.)

11. Blair, Dennis C. and John T. Hanley, Jr. "From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements," *Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2001, pp. 7–17. (Former USCINCPAC outlines a U.S. regional security strategy that builds on the hub-and-spoke arrangement of bilateral alliances to form loosely aligned *security communities* of states with shared interests.)

12. Acharya, Amitav. *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*. New York: Routledge, 2001. (Comprehensive and critical account of the evolution of The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) combined with a serious investigation into the prospects for a security community in Asia.)

13. Nischalke, Tobias Ingo. "Insights from ASEAN's Foreign Policy Cooperation: The 'ASEAN' Way, A Real Spirit or a Phantom?" *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, April 2000, pp. 89–112. (Examines the future of ASEAN suggesting it will be ineffective.)

14. http://www.nato.int/. (NATO's official website including recent speeches and other information, as well as more information on the Prague conference.)

15. http://www.aseansec.org/. (ASEAN's official website providing more information on its history and current initiatives.)

16. http://www.gcc-sg.org/Foundations.html. (An official website for the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC]: an alignment of Arabian Gulf nations that provides a forum for dealing with common economic and security issues in the region.)

17. http://www.oas.org/. (The official website for the Organization of American States [OAS]: an alignment of the western hemisphere's nation-states to enhance the region's ability to strengthen democracy and respond when the region is under threat.)

SSF-10 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND INSTITUTIONS

A. Focus. International community and institutions are important but often-controversial instruments in the conduct of diplomacy, as evidenced by the difficulties the current Administration had in the months preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom. The importance of the role of international institutions is evident in the various ways and varying degrees these institutions—such as the United Nations and regional organizations—are involved in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and nation building. Questions arise frequently over the relationship between the use of diplomatic tools, the role of the approval or disapproval by the International Community through the UN and regional institutions and the use of military forces in executing U.S. foreign policy. This session provides various perspectives on the international community suggesting that the world is becoming increasingly interdependent due to globalization. The benefits and shortfalls of multilateral organizations as they relate to decision-making and consensus maintenance is another theme. A further focus is the issue of peacekeeping, nation building, and the United States role in this international community. What is evident is that the importance of the international community, and international institutions demands the continued attention of a nation's strategists and military planners.

B. Objectives

- Evaluate various descriptions of the international community and this community's potential for impact on a nation's strategy.
- Consider the importance of international organizations and institutions as instruments of diplomacy and their impact on a nation's strategy formulation and execution.
- Analyze the relationship between the United States and United Nations.
- Examine the role of international institutions and communities in humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and nation building.

C. Guidance

1. Annan's Nobel Prize acceptance speech provides various descriptions of the "international community." He states that no country exists in isolation since we are all consumers in the same global economy. Annan also challenges the concept of national sovereignty when it comes to a state's oppression of its people. He points out that international communities are bound by concepts such as faith, defense of an idea, democracy, homogeneity, multiculturalism, and virtual shared values that are promoted through the latest communication and information technologies. Tony Blair's speech lays out a quasi-Weinberger doctrine for the intervention by the international community in the affairs of a sovereign state. His speech was given in the defense of the intervention in Kosovo. Are there problems associated with the five tests that Blair outlines to justify international intervention? How does a nation's perceptions of the international community impact its strategy and military force planning?

2. Crossette suggests that the United States ambivalent attitude toward the United Nations is vested in the minds of politicians concerned that meddling foreigners will compromise U.S. sovereignty. The handling of UN issues dealing with Iraq, U.S. dues to the UN, peacekeeping

efforts in Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia are examples used to illuminate the U.S. relationship with the UN. Do you believe the U.S. remains ambivalent toward the UN? If this perception was true in the past, is it still today? What should be the U.S. role with respect to this international institution? Should the United States, as world leader, accept the unpleasant compromises that may come with dealing with the international community?

3. Secretary Albright's article was written as a defense of the United Nations role in the international community at a time that the U.S. had failed to gain a resolution for the invasion of Iraq. Albright addresses many of what she sees as misconceptions regarding the United Nations? Are her answers valid? What other issues are there concerning the United Nations? Should the U.S. treat the UN with the deference that Albright suggests? Can the UN succeed in the areas that she examines?

4. The Glennon article, "Why the Security Council Failed," deals with the question of how should the world sanction and subject the use of force by states to the rule of law. The author argues that the rise of American power has challenged the structure of the Security Council in a manner for which it was not designed and that the advancement of American unipolarity will challenge the ability of the United Nations to function as founded. He also argues that this American hegemony will not last forever and cautions U.S. leaders not to destroy the framework, which has been so successful in preventing major wars over the past half-century. Can the U.S. and the UN coexist? What other means are there available for the U.S. to pursue its national interests without destroying the viability of the Security Council? Should the U.S. allow its sovereignty to be impinged upon by the Council?

5. United Nations, "UN in Brief," lays out all of the functions of the United Nations, how it is organized and what it does around the globe.

D. Required Readings

1. Annan,Kofi. "Kofi Annan—Nobel Lecture," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 22, pp. 344–349. (The acceptance speech made by the Secretary General of the United Nations upon being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. He speaks to the role of the international community in supporting human rights, preventing war and curbing the power of sovereign states to oppress and kill their own people.)

2. Blair, Tony. "Doctrine of the International Community," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 41. Read only the section on international security, pp. 574–576. (Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, describes the role of the international community and how it can intervene in the affairs of sovereign states.)

3. Crossette, Barbara. "Killing One's Progeny: America and the United Nations," *World Policy Journal*, Fall 2002, pp. 54–59. (Former *New York Times* correspondent in Asia and UN bureau chief from 1994 to 2001 outlines America's ambivalent role in international institutions.)

4. Albright, Madeleine. "United Nations," *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2003, pp. 16–24. (Albright, former Ambassador to the UN and Secretary of State in the Clinton Administration, defends the role of the UN as a force of good in the international community.)

5. Glennon, Michael J. "Why the Security Council Failed," *Foreign Affairs*, May/Jun 2003, pp. 16–35. (A professor of Law at Tufts University Fletcher School of Diplomacy examines how the world sanctions the use of force and asks if the current organization of the Security Council is the most appropriate for the post–Cold War world.)

6. United Nations, "UN in Brief," http://www.un.org/Overview/brief1.html. Read only as interested. (Briefing outlines how the UN works and what it does.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Appadurai, Arjun. "Broken Promises," *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2002, pp. 42–44. (The author argues that the international community is neither international nor a community with its existence merely a moral promise and a wish.)

2. Bello, Walden. "Battling Barbarism," *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2002, pp. 41–42. (Provides an assessment of the emerging new international community in response to the overreach of global capitalism.)

3. Chesterman, Simon. "Walking Softly in Afghanistan: The Future of UN State Building," *Survival*, Autumn 2002, pp. 37–45. (The author suggests that the UN is taking a new and different approach to the post-war Afghanistan as it engages with a "lighter footprint," substantially reducing all UN personnel and resources, while relying heavily on locals to fill many UN positions.)

4. Gowers, Andrew. "The Power of Two," *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2002, pp. 32–33. (The author proposes that the international community focus on the practical task of bringing the U.S. and Europe back to a shared global understanding.)

5. Halliday, Denis J. "The United Nations: The Embarrassment of International Law," *Medicine, Conflict and Survival*, October–December 2002, pp. 346–354. (The author details the inequalities between nations and their peoples suggesting that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are guilty of double standards in enforcing international law.)

6. Hirsh, Michael. "Calling All Regio-Cops," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2000, pp. 2–8. (Hirsh explores the possibility of a regional approach to peacekeeping and peace enforcement sanctioned by the United Nations.)

7. Leonard, Mark. "Diplomacy by Other Means," *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2002, pp. 48–56. (Leonard stresses that communications is key to winning hearts and minds through the use of public diplomacy.)

8. Martin, David A. and T. Alexander Aleinikoff. "Double Ties," *Foreign Policy*, November/December 2002, pp. 80–81. (The authors suggest why nations should learn to love dual nationality.)

9. McGuire, Stryker. “Onward, Christian Soldier,” *Newsweek*, December 2001, p. 44. (Author suggests that Tony Blair has emerged as “evangelist-in-chief” for the war in Afghanistan, and may be changing the nature of international relations.)

10. Miskel, James F. “Better Tools for Humanitarian Missions,” *Orbis*, Vol. 44, No. 2, Spring 2000, pp. 295–305. (Addresses ways to help humanitarian missions.)

11. Ogata, Sadako. “Guilty Parties,” *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2002, pp. 39–40. (The author contends that the international community only emerges when scenes of misery are flashed across living room television screens in the developed world.)

12. Ottaway, Marina. “Nation Building,” *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2002, pp. 16–24. (The author, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, states that the international community has to set modest goals and tailor those goals for nation building to each country’s unique reality.)

13. Payne, Donald M. and Ted Dagne. “Rwanda: Seven Years after the Genocide,” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Winter 2002, pp. 38–43. (Provides a brief history of events of the genocide and the relatively stable condition of Rwanda today.)

14. Rogers, Paul. “If It’s Good for America, It’s Good for the World,” *The World Today*, February 2002. pp. 13–15. (After the traumatic events of September 2001, critics hoped that international cooperation would be renewed, but have since been disappointed.)

15. Wedgwood, Ruth. “Gallant Delusions,” *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2002, pp. 44–46. (Discussion of the view that it is unwise to rely on the international community, that nations must ultimately fend for themselves because international assistance may not materialize.)

16. Union of International Associations. *Yearbook of International Organizations*. Munich, Germany: K. G. Saur. (A comprehensive source on international organizational charters and memberships.)

17. www.foreignpolicy.com. (A comprehensive index of articles on international institutions and related foreign policy issues.)

18. Hirsh, Michael. *At War with Ourselves*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. (In Chapter 3, Hirsh discusses what is the international community and how the U.S. should interact with it.)

SSF-11 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

A. Focus. Economic objectives always have been an important part of U.S. foreign policy. At the end of World War II, the United States and its allies set out to restructure the international economy in the wake of the war and the Great Depression. In international finance, trade, and development, U.S. leadership and the institutions it helped create were responsible for unparalleled growth and transformation. With the end of the Cold War, the concept of "economic security," harnessing America's international efforts to the creation of domestic jobs, has gained prominence. Although progress has been uneven, many countries have experienced greater economic prosperity as they moved toward greater reliance on free trade and market-based economies. Globalization, open international trade, rapidly increasing capital flows, and new technologies have created new challenges. Groups resisting the forces of globalization have become more commonplace including not only radical, disparate groups associated with anarchy, imperialism and Marxism, but also mainstream groups and organizations that believe the current globalization process is fatally flawed. A recent change to the manner in which the United States distributes foreign aid is the new Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) program which alters significantly the way the United States distributes foreign aid to developing countries. The collapse of developing economies in the 1990's such as the meltdown of Asian financial markets provided a severe shock to the world economy and raised serious concerns about the adequacy of existing economic policies, institutions, and governance. This session looks at the full range of trade, investment, and development issues facing the nations of the world and explores alternative policy objectives and international economic strategies.

B. Objectives

- Explore the impact of globalization on both domestic and international economic policy and performance.
- Examine the efficacy of the various tools of economic strategy available to the United States and other countries: international trade; investment, both private and public; foreign assistance; and economic reform.
- Evaluate alternative economic strategies for developing nations including economic and political reform.

C. Guidance

1. Owens provides a comparison of three alternative conceptions of the international political economy—Liberalism, Marxism, and Mercantilism—and their relationship to the three analytical perspectives considered in SSF-2. How do these three conceptions differ? How would the advocates of each assess the phenomenon of globalization? What are the pros and cons of applying the international instruments of economic power as either a "carrot" or a "stick"? What are the merits of "hegemonic stability," which is a realist theory of international trade?

2. Sachs suggests globalization is "a dynamic process of the economic integration of virtually the entire world." He examines globalization in terms of four aspects: increased international trade, increased capital flows, globalization of economic production, and increased harmonization of national and international institutions. What lessons have we learned? Why is it

that openness to trade has led to increased productivity and economic growth? What are the strengths and weaknesses of trade strategies based upon free trade versus mercantilism? In terms of the potential for market failures, how do international capital markets differ from international markets for goods and can lead to financial crises? Why have some nations prospered so well while others have failed? What is your overall evaluation of the different strategies that nations have followed in the past? What are the implications for the domestic and international economic components of the National Security Strategy? Keep these themes in mind as you review the follow-on readings.

3. Radelet claims one of the great surprises of the George W. Bush administration is the apparent commitment to significantly increasing U.S. foreign aid. Considering the 2003 National Security Strategy however, this should not be a surprise. What is different is the unique program being implemented to distribute the foreign aid: The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). This program carefully selects "qualified" countries to receive U.S. foreign aid—those countries that meet certain criteria, such as "ruling justly, investing in their people, and establishing economic freedom." While Radelet supports the MCA concept, he is concerned that the more restrictive policy will fail to achieve the U.S. goal of global prosperity by disqualifying those problematic states that are most in need of financial assistance. The dilemma for marginal states is this: the state needs MCA assistance to meet the minimum requirement to be eligible for MCA assistance—quite a conundrum. Will the MCA program create unintended consequences (good or bad)? What criteria should the U.S. use to determine which states receive foreign aid?

4. While the globalization of the world's financial markets has created many economic winners, Poitras reminds us that it has also created a significant number of economic losers. The groups of people who feel victimized by economic globalization often respond with both violent and peaceful protest. As a group, they believe that globalization has gone so wrong and is so flawed that the process must be altered or completely reversed. Do these various protest groups (NGO's, Social Movement Organizations) have the right to represent the billions of people struggling in the developing world? To what extent do you believe the economic globalization process is flawed? Can economic globalization be reversed? Modified? How should the "globalizers" respond to the protests?

5. Created in 1989 by the Institute for International Economics, the World Bank, and the IMF, the "Washington Consensus" provided economic policy remedies for failing Latin American economies to help create economic growth and wealth for the state by encouraging open, transparent economic systems and opening—some say exposing—developing economies to global markets. Generally speaking, the Washington Consensus requires developing economies to lower tariffs, increase transparency and reduce government spending. After fifteen years, the jury is still out as to whether the prescriptive economic policy has hurt or helped those states that elected to implement the restrictive policy. William Finnegan believes the policies dictated by the IMF and the World Bank are fatally flawed and only serve to keep the powerful, industrialized states in a dominant position over developing states. Is Finnegan correct in his views on free trade? How responsible should industrialized economies be to assist less developed economies grow and prosper? What affect will global free trade and lower tariffs have on the U.S. domestic economy? Will global free trade impact the national security of the United States? If so, how?

D. Required Readings

1. Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "The Political Economy of National Defense," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 16. Read pp. 256–261 (starting at "The Economic Instrument and Economic Strategy"). (The author compares alternative conceptions of the international political economy and describes the primary instruments of international economic power.)

2. Sachs, Jeffrey. "The Geography of Economic Development," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds. *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 18, pp. 262–274. (Note Sachs and Stiglitz reading in Table of Contents are reversed—Sachs explains four aspects of globalization and then explores why some nations prosper while others remain poor.)

3. Radelet, Steven. "Bush and Foreign Aid," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2003, pp. 104–117. (Radelet analyzes U.S. foreign aid and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) program and the impact this new approach might have on U.S. foreign policy.)

4. Poitras, Guy E. "Resisting Globalization: The Politics of Protest in the Global Political Economy," *International Politics*, September 2003, Volume 40, Number 3. Read the Introduction, pp. 409–413, and The Resistance after September 11, bottom of p. 421 to p. 423. (Poitras looks at the efforts of those resisting the economic gobalization phenomena and the troubled nexus of the anti-globalization movement and terrorism.)

5. Finnegan, William. "The Economics of Empire," *Harper's Magazine*, May 2003. (Finnegan believes free trade and the Washington Consensus—as promoted by the WTO and the industrialized states—is a bad deal for the developing world.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Gilpin, Robert. *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. (A comprehensive treatment of international political economy and globalization.)

2. Gilpin, Robert. "The Nature of Political Economy," in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 2nd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1997, Chapter 16, pp. 243–253. (The author relates three approaches to international political economy to the three contending analytical perspectives on international relations introduced in SSF-2.)

3. Mankiw, N. Gregory. *Principles of Economics*. New York: The Dryden Press, Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1998. (A new textbook on basic economic theory and practice with short sections on international trade.)

4. Yergin, Daniel, and Joseph Stanislaw. *The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1998. (The Pulitzer Prize-winning author of *The Prize* and his colleague provide a comprehensive and fascinating discussion of "the epic struggle between government and the

marketplace . . . over the last twenty years. . . .” Their discussion ranges across the globe with numerous country-specific cases.)

5. Cohen, Benjamin J. “‘Return to Normalcy’? Global Economic Policy at the End of the Century,” in Robert J. Lieber, ed., *Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy of the End of the Century*. New York: Longman, 1997. (A review of the evolution of the international economic system since World War II and future policy options.)

6. Kenan, Peter B., ed. *Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years After Bretton Woods*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994. (Essays and commentary by noted scholars and practitioners on all three aspects of international economic management: monetary, trade, and development.)

7. Institute for National Strategic Studies. “Financial and Microeconomic Policy and Foreign Aid,” in *Strategic Assessment 1996: Instruments of U.S. Power*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1996, pp. 50–56. (A review of financial and monetary policy options and the foreign assistance performance of the United States.)

8. Kapstein, Ethan B. “Workers and the World Economy,” *Foreign Affairs,* May/June 1996, pp. 16–37. (Kapstein argues that the employment and income consequences of the new international system must be countered.)

9. Krugman, Paul. *The Age of Diminished Expectations*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, rev. ed., 1997. (A noted economist clearly discusses the economic issues of the day with an emphasis on international trade and finance.)

10. Krugman, Paul. “Depression Economics Returns,” *Foreign Affairs,* January/ February, 1999, pp. 56–74. (Krugman explains what has gone wrong with the international monetary system and then makes his recommendations on how to better manage the international monetary system in the future.)

11. Rosecrance, Richard. “The Rise of the Virtual State,” in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning,* 2nd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1997, Chapter 17, pp. 254–266. (Rosecrance posits that increasing privatization and internationalization are eroding the authority of the state.)

12. The following are selected web sites for various U.S. and international organizations that provide extensive coverage of international economic issues:

The World Bank Group ..... www.worldbank.org
International Monetary Fund ..... www.imf.org
World Trade Organization ..... www.wto.org
U.S. State Department ..... www.state.gov
U.S. Department of Commerce ..... www.doc.gov
U.S. Trade Representative ..... www.ustr.gov
U.S. Census Bureau ..... www.census.gov
Institute for International Economics ..... www.iie.com
Latin American Network Information Center ..... www.lanic.utexas.edu

The Policy. Community online..... http://policy.com
Foreign Policy..... www.foreignpolicy.com
Europa (European Union)..... http://europa.eu.int
Central Intelligence Agency ..... www.odci.gov/cia

13. Landes, David S. *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor*. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998. (Professor emeritus of history and economics at Harvard University provides a history of the "long fascinating story of wealth and power throughout the world . . . the paths of winners and losers, the rise and fall of nations.")

14. Freidman, Thomas L. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999. (Journalist provides a thorough and very readable discussion of the many facets of globalization and their implications.)

15. Sachs, Jeffrey. "International Economics: Unlocking the Mysteries of Globalization," in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000, Chapter 17, pp. 260–270. (Sachs discusses the implications of globalization for both developed and developing countries, the state of current research findings, and the issues to be explored further.)

16. Sachs, Jeffrey. "What's Good for the Poor Is Good for America," *Economist*, July 14, 2001, pp. 32–33. (Sachs examines how poor nations can fail and the spillover effects on U.S. interests and values, and he offers guidelines to reshape and expand U.S. foreign assistance.)

D. GEOSTRATEGIC CHALLENGES

SSF-12 RETHINKING SECURITY IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

A. Focus. As part of a first-order assessment of the security environment, strategists should consider how the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape will shift in the first quarter of the twenty-first century. While fundamentally acknowledging that uncertainty is more prevalent and choice more complex, decision makers need flexible strategies to achieve their objectives in the real world. Strategists must thus recognize and deal with three essential truths. First, while military officers tend to define security as a direct function of threat, it seems just as important to understand vulnerabilities as a critical aspect of security as well as to appreciate the many contending views of the concept of security. Secondly, strategists should recognize the importance of geography to geopolitical considerations. Geopolitics, in short, represents the study of the geographical dimensions (physical, cultural, political, and economic) of world politics. Finally, understanding security and geopolitics affects valid geostrategic decisions. Geostrategy relates the implications of geopolitical factors to the formulation, articulation, and application of strategy. In short,

> . . . the information revolution and globalization [as Joseph Nye argues] have empowered transnational networks to wreak destruction on a scale once associated only with governments. That was the lesson of 11 September. Rome was not destroyed by the rise of a superior power. Foreign policy analysts should focus more on how the new Rome will deal with the new barbarians.

The challenge for the strategist is to give the policymaker a coherent way to understand the changing conditions that could generate the need to revise strategy, policy, methods of operation, and force structure.

B. Objectives

- Determine what security means to you as well as appreciate the complex dynamics of security to include the distinction between threat and vulnerability and their relationship to risk.

- Examine emerging geostrategic challenges and what that means for the interests and capabilities of major powers, “pivotal states,” and the so-called emerging world.

- Apply the results of your analysis as we examine specific regions in the sessions to follow.

C. Guidance

1. Liotta and Miskel suggest that, despite all the struggles to come up with operative theories for how the world in the future will work, “the future is pretty much up for grabs.” The sheer complexity of events in the first decade of the twenty-first century show, nonetheless, that there are troubling trends and effects that, if left unchecked, will come to haunt us in the coming decades in specific places, in specific ways. These trends and effects, broadly considered, are the changing demographic landscape of urbanization, particularly in what they term the Lagos-Cairo-Karachi-Jakarta Arc; the increased possibility of failing regions within functioning but

troubled states; the rise of the "feral city," within states and regions that are inextricably linked to—not separated from—the process known as globalization; and the troubling suggestions that displaced populations, ignored over time, will come back with vengeance to haunt even the best original intentions. Are Liotta and Miskel's assessments correct? How would you distinguish between issues of national, human, or environmental security in their arguments? What, specifically, do Liotta and Miskel's arguments mean for the interests and capabilities of major powers, "pivotal states," and the so-called "developing" world?

2. Finnegan presents a bleak scenario of water depletion and its intersection with the forces of globalization in Bolivia where a private, foreign controlled corporation has assumed control of the water system. Do you agree with the author's claim about the larger implications of this "strange, passionate clash" for water as an exhaustible resource? What should the role of government be in guaranteeing citizen's access to clean, fresh water? Is water, as the author argues, a social good or an ordinary commodity?

3. HIV/AIDS is one example of a security issue that can profoundly affect the future. Indeed, since disease knows no borders, this epidemic could reasonably be presented as one of the negative consequences of increased globalization. A recent CIA National Intelligence Council report titled "The Next Wave of HIV/AIDS: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, India, and China" (http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs) estimates that by the year 2010, as many as 100 million people will be infected in these five countries alone. The death toll in three pivotal states—Russia, China, and India—could be staggering. Aside from the humanitarian tragedy, there may well be enormous impact on future security. The disease will alter the economic potential of the region's major states and the global balance of power. Moscow, New Delhi, and Beijing could take steps to mitigate the disaster but so far have not. Do you agree that HIV/AIDS constitutes a significant human security and national security vulnerability—if not direct threat? If you disagree, how would you disregard its almost inevitable impact on the global economic landscape and the balance of power? What influence, if any, does this security issue have on the future of war?

4. Collier draws ammunition from a groundbreaking new study of civil conflict over the last 40 years that reveals that economic forces such as chronic poverty and the destabilizing effects of the trade in natural resources such as "conflict diamonds" are more directly responsible for civil wars than ethnic tensions and old political feuds. According to the author, democracy does not necessarily reduce the risk of civil war, especially in low-income countries? Do you agree? Can you think of any examples to the contrary? Can the international community do anything to stabilize the process of extracting resources from fragile regions in order to help safeguard precious national assets? Can sanctions be employed in this context as a punitive measure?

5. In what became a controversial report that stirred global debate, futurologists Schwartz and Randall imagine the unthinkable: rapid climate change and its impact on international security. Although their methodology may at times be questionable, the authors illustrate the value of non-conventional thinking when considering plausible futures. What is your assessment of the report, particularly the linkage between environmental security and war?

D. Required Readings

1. Liotta, P. H., and James F. Miskel. "Redrawing the Map of the Future," *World Policy Journal*, Spring 2004, pp. 15–21.

2. Finnegan, William. "Leasing the Rain," *New Yorker*, 8 April 2002, pp. 43–53. (Using Bolivia as a compelling example, the author presents an apocalyptic vision of a water-deprived future.)

3. Hansen, Keith. "A Plague's Bottom Line," *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2003, pp. 26–27. (How one aspect of "non-traditional" security may come to affect all future aspects of security.)

4. Collier, Paul. "The Market for Civil War," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 31, pp. 461–468. (Groundbreaking study of civil conflict over the last forty years suggests that economic forces exacerbate other tensions such as intrastate violence and examines possible remedies.)

5. Schwartz, Peter, and Doug Randall. "An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implication for United States National Security," a report written for the Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Read "Executive Summary" pp. 1–3 and section titled "The Regions: 2010 to 2020" onward, pp. 12–22.

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Liotta, P. H. "Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security," *Security Dialogue*, Volume 33, Number 4, pp. 473–488; Smith-Windsor, Brooke A. "Terrorism, Individual Security, and the Role of the Military: A Reply to Liotta," *Security Dialogue*, Volume 33, Number 4, pp. 489–494; Liotta, P. H. "Converging Interests and Agendas: The Boomerang Returns," *Security Dialogue*, Volume 33, Number 4, pp. 495–498. (In an essay adapted from an address originally given at a conference at the Jaipur Peace Institute, Rajasthan, India, Liotta examines the blurring of state-centric security and human security.)

2. Atlantic Monthly, "Headlines over the Horizon," July/August 2003, pp. 84–90. (RAND analysts describe scenarios they claim do not receive sufficient security attention.)

3. Alibek, Ken, with Stephen Handelman. *Biohazard*. New York: Random House, 1999. (Authoritative examination of the former Soviet Union's biological weapons program.)

4. Barnaby, Wendy. *The Plague Makers, The Secret World of Biological Warfare*. New York: Continuum Publishing Group, 2000. (Examines the former Soviet government's development of a combination of smallpox and Ebola, and how South Africa has funded BW research.

5. Hoffer, Eric. *The True Believer*. New York: Harper and Row, 1951. (Classic account of fanaticism; unusually insightful.)

6. Eberstadt, Nicholas. “The Future of AIDS: Grim Toll in Russia, China, and India,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 81, Number 6 (November/December 2002), pp. 22–45. (How one aspect of “non-traditional” security may come to affect all future aspects of security.)

7. Juergensmeyer, Mark. *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000. (Argues that terrorism has shifted from violence committed for political aims to killing that finds its cause and justification in religion.)

8. Renner, Michael. “Alternative Futures in War and Conflict,” *Naval War College Review* 53, no. 4 (Autumn 2000), pp. 45–56. (Examines the idea that the health of societies—their economic well-being, their ability to assure a reasonable degree of social justice, their ability to preserve their natural environments—is ultimately the most important issue in their security calculus.)

9. Kristof, Ladis K. D. “The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, April 1960, pp. 15–51. (Dated but nonetheless incisive analysis of the development of the basic concepts of classic geopolitics.)

10. L’Eslie, Jacques. “Running Dry: What Happens When the World No Longer Has Enough Freshwater?” *Harper’s Magazine*, July 2000, pp. 37–52. (Examines the consequences of the scarcity of fresh water.)

11. Luke, Timothy W., and Gearöid Ó Tuathail. “The Fraying Modern Map: Failed States and Contraband Capitalism,” *Geopolitics*, March 2000, pp. (Argues that, in certain ‘twilight zones’ of the world, state failure and illegal exchange are the prevalent processes conditioning civil and nationalist wars.)

12. Newman, David, ed. *Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity*. London: Frank Cass and Co., 2000. (Ben Gurion University professor examines the significance of boundaries and the nation state in the evolving security environment.)

13. Nunn, Sam, and James Schlesinger. *The Geopolitics of Energy in the 21st Century*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000. (Broad-based analysis of the emerging challenges to the global energy markets.)

14. Polelle, Mark Robert. *Raising Cartographic Consciousness: The Social and Foreign Policy Vision of Geopolitics in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Lexington Books, 1999. (Comprehensive review of contending geopolitical perspectives.)

15. Rosenberger, Leif R. “The Strategic Importance of the World Food Supply,” *Parameters*, Spring 1997, pp. 84–105. (Discusses the issue of the production and distribution of food and the potential destabilization of the international security environment.)

16. Strausz-Hupé, Robert. *Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power*. New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1942. (Introduction of geopolitics to the American public.)

17. U.S. Director of Central Intelligence. National Intelligence Council. *Global Trends 2015*, Washington, D.C.: National Foreign Intelligence Board, 2000.

18. National Intelligence Council 2020 Project. http://www.cia.gov/nic/ NIC_2020_project .html (The follow-on work in progress to *Global Trends 2015*.

19. Van der Heijden, Kees. *Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation*. Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 1996. (Discusses how leaders can negotiate a successful course into the future in the face of significant uncertainty.)

20. Weigand, Hans W. et al. *Principles of Political Geography*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1957. (Dated but nonetheless first-rate analytical text on the blending of political and geographic factors in power relations.)

21. Wohlstetter, Albert. "Illusions of Distance," *Foreign Affairs*, 1968, pp. 242–255. (Over 30 years ago, Wohlstetter argued that the impending revolution in communications produced a condition in which there would be no "far-away countries" any more.)

22. Dodds, Klaus and David Atkinson, eds. *Geopolitical Traditions: Critical Histories of a Century of Political Thought*. London: Routledge, 2000. (Interdisciplinary analysis of one hundred years of geopolitical thought.)

23. Glassner, Martin Ira, and Harm J. DeBlij. *Systematic Political Geography*, 3rd ed. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1980. (Excellent basic text on political geography, geopolitics and geostrategy.)

24. http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk. (Website of the International Boundaries Research Unit at the University of Durham in the UK. Offers a unique insight into one set of classic geopolitical issues—boundaries on land and at sea—including their demarcation.)

25. http://www.gsfc.nasa.gov/topstory/archives.html. (Website of the Goddard Space flight Center offers excellent graphics on short readings on various aspects of climate change in its "Top Story Archive.")

SSF-13 ASSESSING THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

A. Focus. Before a strategist can adequately employ the instruments of power necessary for the execution of strategy, there must be a security assessment. Yet in today's security environment, uncertainty is more prevalent, choice is more complex, and decision makers demand flexible strategies to achieve their objectives in the real world of risk, threats, vulnerabilities, and resource constraints. The choices available involve the interests and capabilities of major powers, "pivotal states," and emerging realities in the so-called "developing" world. Thus, sharply contrasting perspectives on what future security storylines are plausible, not to mention probable, have entered the calculus of security environment assessment. The challenge for the strategist is to give the policymaker a coherent way to understand the changing conditions that could generate the need to revise strategy, policy, methods of operation, and force structure.

B. Objectives

- Consider plausible scenarios that describe the world in which people may live in the first quarter of the twenty-first century.

- Assess the strategic implications and challenges that these scenarios suggest, to include recognizing specific levels of risk, threat, vulnerability, and uncertainty inherent in each alternative.

C. Guidance

1. Huntington argues that conflicts will occur along the cultural fault lines separating seven or eight major civilizations—not among states and ideologies—and will dominate the security environment of the future. Is his scenario plausible? What level of risk and uncertainty do you assign to your assessment of Huntington's analysis? What are the strategic implications and challenges for the future suggested in this scenario?

2. Kaplan addresses the geopolitical forces and uncertainties that will fundamentally influence U.S. strategic choice in the next fifteen years. What does Kaplan mean by "A Sense of the Tragic"? Is his assessment correct? If so, what new emphases must be made for strategy and action? If not, what better alternatives exist? What, specifically, do Kaplan's arguments mean for the interests and capabilities of major powers, "pivotal states," and the so-called "developing" world?

3. In this United Nations Development Programme-sponsored study, Arab scholars and opinion leaders review the state of the Arab world and consider the region's most important development challenges. The authors then discuss what they believe are the most important impediments to closing the knowledge gap between the Arab and non-Arab world. These factors include the conceptual basis of an Arab knowledge society and the cultural, economic, societal, and political issues that influence knowledge acquisition. The report concludes by suggesting a strategic vision for the successful transition of the Arab world to a knowledge-based society. What are the consequences for U.S. security and regional stability if the Arab world remains "disconnected" from the rapidly developing information-based world? Can the Arab world accept and undertake the report's recommendations for social and cultural change? What specific benefits would such change have on the role of women in the Arab world?

4. The basic thesis on which Barnett's "Pentagon's New Map" pivots is simple: *"A country's potential to warrant a U.S. military response is inversely related to its globalization connectivity"* [emphases in the original] (p. 228). Thus, drawing on themes and concepts Thomas Friedman developed in his book on globalization, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, Barnett's brief essay is touted as a "leading contender" to "come up with an operating theory of the world." Is Barnett correct? If so, what new emphases must be made for strategy and action? If not, what better alternatives exist? What, specifically, do his arguments mean for the interests and capabilities of major powers, "pivotal states," and the so-called "developing" world?

5. Klare challenges the fundamental premises of most of the authors that precede him in this session. He contends that competition over resources will provide a guide to the likely zones of conflict rather than political, ideological, or cultural fault lines. Do you agree with Klare's general assessment? If so, what does that mean for future strategic implications and challenges, for alliances, for wars, and for aspirations to achieve future security for major powers, "pivotal states," and those in the so-called "developing" world? If not, what levels of risk, threat, vulnerability, and uncertainty must you still acknowledge for a valid assessment of the security environment?

D. Required Readings

1. Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 26, pp. 389–409. Read pp. 389–399, up to the section titled "Civilization Rallying: The Kin-Country Syndrome." The remainder of the essay is optional reading. (Argues that the basic cause of conflict will be neither ideological nor economic but cultural.)

2. Kaplan, Robert D. "A Sense of the Tragic: Developmental Dangers in the Twenty-first Century," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 27, 410–418. (Are we on the verge of a golden age or at the brink of the apocalypse?)

3. United Nations Development Programme. *Arab Human Development Report 2003. Building a Knowledge Society.* Executive Summary. http://www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/ahdr2/presskit/6_AHDR03ExSum_E.pdf (In this second of a projected four-part series, Arab scholars and specialists consider the state of the Arab world. In an effort to compete economically with the non-Arab world and improve contact with other nations, societies, and cultures, the authors suggest actions to "reclaim Arab knowledge." Specifically, they believe, "Openness, interaction, assimilation, absorption, revision, criticism and examination cannot but prompt creative knowledge production in Arab societies." In a time of rapid globalization and thirst for instant communications, only 1.6 percent of the Arab population has Internet access.)

4. Barnett, Thomas P. "The Pentagon's New Map," *Esquire*, March 2003, pp. 174–178 and pp. 227–228. (A proposed assessment of the new security environment and a solution to fix, or destroy, the international order.)

5. Klare, Michael T. "The New Geography of Conflict," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press,

2004, Chapter 28, pp. 419–426. (Arguments that suggest that both physical geography and natural resources are critical security issues many are still willing to die for.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Rothschild, Emma. "The Last Empire: Security and Globalization in Historical Perspective," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds. *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 48, pp. 657–675. (Drawing upon the lessons of history, Dr. Rothschild considers the "relationship between military and non-military or extended security in an interconnected world." Globalization, she asserts, is not a new phenomenon.)

2. Baroudi, Sami E. "The 2002 Arab Human Development Report: Implications for Democracy." *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XI, No. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 132–141. (Dr. Baroudi casts a critical eye at this detailed study of the Arab world—see next entry—judging that the report's assertions on the status of women, the knowledge deficit, the need for good governance, and the link between development and individual freedom has hit a raw nerve in the Arab world. He contrasts this negative view with the generally positive reaction of Western academics.)

3. United Nations Development Programme and Arab Human Fund for Economic and Social Development, *Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations*. New York, United Nations Publication, 2002. (A ground-breaking study of economic growth, income distribution, demographic trends, poverty, access to education, and health care undertaken by leading Arab academics and specialists. The report considers all these developmental factors and provides suggestions for improvement in this critical area of the world.)

4. Fukuyama, Francis. "The End of History?" *National Interest*, Summer 1989, pp. 3–18. (Why liberal democracy and a market-oriented economy are the only viable choices for the future of modern society.)

5. Fukuyama, Francis. "The West May Be Cracking: Europe and America," *International Herald Tribune*, 9 August 2002. http://www.iht.com (Fukuyama asks if both "the West" as a coherent concept and United States foreign policy have fundamental flaws.)

6. Fukuyama, Francis. "Second Thoughts: The Last Man in a Bottle," *National Interest*, Summer 1999, pp. 16–33. (The author reflects back on his essay "The End of History?" a decade after it was originally written; first in a series of articles on "The End of History?")

7. Agnew, John. *Geopolitics: Revisioning World Politics*. New York: Routledge, 1998. (Examines four key concepts of the "modern geopolitical imagination": visualization of the world as a whole; the concept of areas as "advanced" or "primitive"; the notion that the state is the highest form of political organization; and the pursuit of primacy by competing states.)

8. Bennett, Bruce W., Christopher P. Twomey, and Gregory F. Treverton. *Future Warfare Scenarios and Asymmetric Threats*. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2000. (Describes asymmetric strategies, why they matter in national security planning, and how they may affect future U.S. military operations.)

9. Blouet, Brian. *Geopolitics and Globalization in the Twentieth Century*. London: Reaktion Books, Ltd., 2001. (Examines the conflict to open up national space to the free flow of goods, capital, and ideas—globalization—and the tendency to establish controls over territory, resources, and populations—classic geopolitics.)

10. Butts, Kent Hughes. "The Strategic Importance of Water," *Parameters*, Spring 1997, pp. 65–83. (Discusses the issue of the demand for water and its potential to destabilize the international security environment.)

11. Buzan, Barry, and Gerald Segal. *Anticipating the Future*. New York: Simon and Schuster International, 2000. (Analysis of current trends with a look backwards from several plausible points in the future.)

12. Ó Tuathail, Gearöid, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge, eds. *The Geopolitics Reader*. London: Routledge, 1998. (Arguments for the "new" geopolitics.)

13. Gurr, Ted Robert. "Ethnic Warfare on the Wane," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2000, pp. 52–64. (Challenges Huntington's thesis by arguing that ethnic warfare may belong to the last century.)

SSF-14 ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

A. Focus. Asia-Pacific, which this course divides into Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania, have long been areas of critical importance to the United States. Encompassing some 43 countries, nearly 60 percent of the world's population, the region accounts for more than $500 billion a year in U.S. trade. Over the past fifty years America has committed vast resources, blood and treasure, to protect and expand political freedom and economic prosperity in the region. Indeed, five of the seven U.S. mutual defense treaties are rooted in Asia-Pacific. And, while the area has suffered devastating wars on the Korean peninsula and in Indochina, Asia-Pacific abounds with economic and human potential and the promise of greater political freedoms. Today, relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) are considered at a highpoint after several regrettable incidents (the accidental U.S. bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3 and a PRC fighter aircraft in 2001). Japan, despite a nagging economic slump, continues to produce the world's second largest gross domestic output. South Korea is one of the world's great success stories and Vietnam is gradually dropping the failed trappings of communism and emerging as a potential Asian economic "tiger." Potential security flashpoints remain, however. North Korea cannot feed its people and unsettles the world with its of nuclear arsenal. Taiwan's status, with the current government pushing for independence, threatens to bring about a renewed crisis in the cross-strait relationship. Nonetheless, China's recent diplomatic initiatives with Pyongyang have been quite helpful in bringing about multi-party security discussions and, so far, Beijing has declined to rise to Taipei's rhetoric.

In the midst of longstanding Asia-Pacific security challenges, the U.S. must now also contend with the region's vast terrorist networks and the concerns that fuel radical actions. While no part of Asia-Pacific is immune from terrorism, three countries require special attention. Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country, is beset by serious economic, religious, and political problems. The Philippine government, always in rocky economic shape, continues to battle criminal elements and religious separatists in the southern part of the country. Thailand, a Buddhist kingdom with a small Muslim population in the southern provinces bordering Malaysia, has recently endured unparalleled terrorist violence by Islamic fundamentalists. During October 2003 security discussions with his counterparts in Bangkok, Manila, and Bali, President Bush offered U.S. assistance in the global war on terrorism. American forces have joined with Philippine troops in a series of successful military operations, but anti-U.S. sentiment in Indonesia, exacerbated by the war in Iraq, has complicated and precluded an enhanced security relationship. In Thailand the government prefers that American assistance be low-key and tied to the larger security relationship.

B. Objectives

- Identify U.S. security interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Identify the primary security interests of each sub-region.
- Analyze potential areas of U.S. and regional shared interests and competition within the region generally and specifically by sub-region.

C. Guidance

1. U.S. policy in Asia-Pacific under the current Bush Administration has evolved greatly from its initial set of judgments. Relations with Beijing were initially strained, with many in Washington believing that China was the inevitable "next enemy" of the United States, a sentiment exacerbated by the EP–3 incident in 2001. After the horrific events of 9/11, however, relationships, priorities and U.S. posturing were significantly redefined. In the near-term, it is clear that the U.S. seeks Chinese cooperation on issues such as the war on terror. Nevertheless, the long-term question of what is essentially best for U.S. interests—a strong and dynamic China or a weakened China—remain. Pollack examines the basis for this shift in attitudes. He provides three examples of areas where the U.S. and China share mutual interests: 1) the global war on terrorism; 2) North Korea; and 3) Taiwan. He concludes with the following important questions: how can the United States ensure a viable U.S. regional role as Chinese power continues to grow? In particular, how might the United States respond to fuller realization of a Chinese anti-access capability? Does the current Sino-American accommodation largely reflect more immediate U.S. preoccupations with international terrorism that may ultimately recede from view?

2. Sachs challenges the assumption that the United States will continue for the foreseeable future to be the undisputed world leader in technology. China, and perhaps India, says Sachs, will by 2050 overtake the American economy in size. What are the ramifications of such a shift in productivity and power? How might such change impact the reality and perception of American military might?

3. North Korea, by any measure, is an extraordinary enigma. In recent years ten percent of the country's population—some 2–3 million people—have perished from lack of food and proper shelter. Meanwhile, a million North Korean troops are aimed at South Korea and President Kim Jong Il pursues the development and production of nuclear weapons. Philip Gourevitch, an award-winning writer, provides a chilling survey of life in this cruel and soulless society where Potemkin-like buildings belie the increasingly desperate nature of North Korean life. What are the U.S. options in dealing with such a "failing state?" How does the U.S. relationship with China figure into a positive resolution of North Korea's nuclear weapon's program? Given the virtual collapse of North Korea, what are the security and economic implications for a reunified North and South Korea?

4. The post–September 11 era has brought Asia-Pacific back into the forefront of America's security strategy. While longstanding concerns like the future of Taiwan and the probability of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in North Korea have figured most prominently in U.S. security thinking, the president's declaration of a global war on terror (GWOT) has already resulted in American forces attacking terror cells in the southern Philippines. Special U.S. funding has been allocated to Indonesia, a new regional terrorism intelligence center founded in Malaysia, and Thailand has provided crucial assistance with the capture and interrogation of at least one senior terrorist leader. America's new interest in Asia-Pacific seems clear enough, but what are the regional and country-specific security concerns? Castle provides a survey of their individual and regional security challenges, as well as any efforts to combat terrorism.

D. Required Readings

1. Pollack, Jonathan D. "China and the United States Post–9/11," *Orbis*, Fall 2003, pp. 617–627. (An insightful analysis of America's much improved relationship with the People's Republic of China.)

2. Sachs, Jeffrey D. "Welcome to the Asian Century," *Fortune*, January 12, 2004, pp. 53–54. (Using economic and demographic projections, the author posits that by 2050 China is likely to overtake and India will equal the size of the U.S. economy.)

3. Gourevitch, Philip. Excerpts from "Alone in the Dark: Letter From North Korea," *The New Yorker*, September 8, 2003, pp. 55–73. (A detailed exploration of the world's most dangerous and little understood communist regime.)

4. Castle, Timothy N. "America Joins the Neighborhood: The Asia-Pacific Perspective." Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, December 2003. (A survey of Asia-Pacific security concerns.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. FY04 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power: Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/d20040528PRC.pdf. (A comprehensive DoD review of the PRC military which identifies improvements in a significant number of areas.)

2. Acharya, Amitav, ed. *Regionalism and Multilateralism: Essays on Cooperative Security in the Asia Pacific*. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2002. (Discusses the role of cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific region.)

3. Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001. (Examines the changing nature of civil-military relations in Asia.)

4. Abuza, Zachary. "Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Volume 25, Number 2, August 2003, pp. 169–199. (A comprehensive analysis of the Southeast Asia terrorist money trail.)

5. Hund, Markus. "ASEAN Plus Three: Towards a New Age of Pan-East Asian Regionalism? A Skeptic's Appraisal," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2003, pp. 383–417. (An assessment of the relationship between ASEAN and Japan, China, and South Korea—the "Plus Three.")

6. Dickens, David, ed. *The Human Face of Security: Asia-Pacific Perspectives*. Canberra, AS: Australian National University, 2002. (Collection of papers from a Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) conference on the subject of human security.)

7. Friedberg, Aaron L. “United States,” *Strategic Asia 2002–2003*, National Bureau on Asian Research, 2002, pp. 17–44. (Offers a preliminary assessment of America’s post–9/11 strategic goals in Asia.)

8. Hsiung, James C, ed. *Twenty First Century World Order and the Asia-Pacific*. New York: Palgrave Global Publishing, 2002. (Examines the region in the context of the emerging world order.)

9. Kurlantzick, Joshua. “Is East Asia Integrating?” *Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2001, pp. 19–28. (Argues that East Asia is developing closer economic, security, and political ties.)

10. Overholt, William. “Asia’s Continuing Crisis,” *Survival*, Spring 2002, pp. 97–114. (Analyzes the effects of the economic structure of Asia on the older, more traditional style of Asian national leadership and the opportunities for new ones.)

SSF-15 GREATER NEAR EAST (PART I) RADICALIZED ISLAMIC TERROR, IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

A. Focus. Currently the U.S. is involved in ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and is also in constant conflict with Radicalized Islamist terrorists throughout the world. In the near-term, U.S. security concerns remain focused on the war on terrorism, the direction of Islamic influence on states in the region, the future of Afghanistan, and the future government of Iraq. The military operations and their strategic impacts can not be assessed outside the view of how the Global War on Terror is progressing against Radicalized Islam. These operations and their future demand the strategist's closest attention to reconcile objectives, strategy, forces, and focus.

B. Objectives

- Identify what factors in the security environment are driving and impacting upon U.S. security interests in the current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
- Analyze the potential effects of current U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- Analyze the impact of Radicalized Islam on U.S. and regional shared interests in the Greater Near East.

C. Guidance

1. With the occupation of Iraq and our continuing involvement in Afghanistan, American presence in the region has proved both volatile and crucial. Examining the day-to-day challenges of this presence, Packer presents the perspectives and the influences of various actors in Iraq that are shaping the future of the region. The U.S. is actively attempting to *shape* relations in the Greater Near East. What do these trends and shifts in the Greater Near East mean for future U.S. strategy? What do these trends and shifts imply for the employment of future forces in the region?

2. Seymour Hersh's "The Other War" questions the direction of American policy in Afghanistan. Almost two years have passed since the installation of Hamid Karzai in Kabul by the U.S. as the new leader of Afghanistan. The Taliban continue to control large areas of the countryside and U.S. and coalition forces, including some Afghan forces still engage Taliban, local warlords and al Qaeda remnants throughout the country. The U.S. has been able to coordinate some military actions with Pakistan to attempt to control the Hindu Kush and to root out these forces. What is the future of Afghanistan? Karzai seems to be more the Mayor of Kabul than the leader of Afghanistan. The greatest economic revival in Afghanistan has been the heroin trade rather than other economic pursuits. American policy seems more focused on Iraq than Afghanistan and the International Security Afghanistan Force in Kabul is a NATO operation rather than an American one. Can the U.S. and its allies stabilize Afghanistan? What are the ramifications of increased "warlordism" in Afghanistan? Does the U.S. have the capability to prevail in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Global War on Terror?

3. The war against Radicalized Islamic terror is at the heart of President Bush's Global War on Terror. Corine Hegland argues in "Global Jihad" that the battles of the past two years have effectively destroyed Al Qaeda, but that victory has unleashed a hydra-headed monster of

Islamist terror groups that is globally engaged with the forces of the West. Al Zarqawi's "In the Name of God" is an intercepted communiqué between one of al Qaeda's leaders and his followers. Can the U.S. and the West prevail in this conflict with Islamic terror? Is this a war between civilization in the vein of Samuel Huntington? Does the U.S. have the capability to wage this war? Is the West, with its openness, its large Muslim immigrant populations, uniquely vulnerable to this warfare and this ideology? Was the invasion of Iraq part of the GWOT or a diversion from it? Has the defeat of the Taliban and al Qaeda and the occupation of Iraq made the U.S. more secure or has it just fanned the flames of this Radicalized movement?

D. Required Readings

1. Packer, George. "Letter from Baghdad: War after the War. What Washington Doesn't See in Iraq," *New Yorker*, 24 November 2003, excerpts from pp. 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 67, 73–76, 77–78, 80, 81, 83–85. (The driving forces and critical uncertainties behind the occupation of Iraq.)

2. Hersh, Seymour. "The Other War," *New Yorker*, 12 May 2004. (An assessment of the current operation in Afghanistan.)

3. Hegland, Corine. "Global Jihad: No End in Sight," *National Journal*, 8 May 2004, pp. 1396–1401. (The driving forces behind global radicalized Islam.)

4. Al Zarqawi, Abu Mus'ab. "In the Name of God," www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/200040212_zarqawi_full.html (The thoughts of an al Qaeda leader giving his strategic and tactical direction to his followers.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Chalk, Peter. "Non-Military Security in the Wider Middle East," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Volume 26, pp. 197–214. ("Soft" security issues and their importance in the region.)

2. Hersh, Seymour M. "Manhunt: The Bush Administration's New Strategy in the War against Terrorism," *New Yorker*, 23 and 30 December 2002, pp. 66–74.

3. Kaplan, Robert D. "A Post–Saddam Scenario: Iraq Could Become America's Primary Staging Ground in the Middle East. And the Greatest Beneficial Effect Could Come Next Door, in Iran," *Atlantic Monthly*, November 2002, pp. 88–90. (The driving forces and the critical uncertainties at the very heart of the Greater Near East.)

4. Lewis, Bernard. "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *Atlantic Monthly*, September 1990. http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/90sep/rage.htm

SSF-16 GREATER NEAR EAST (PART II) STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

A. Focus. The Greater Near East includes the Arab world, Israel, Turkey, Iran, the Caspian Region, and the Subcontinent of India and Pakistan, and geographically embodies the intersection of religion, culture, changing demographics, and emerging resources. With a reputation for volatility, the region also offers the world's largest supply of oil and natural gas reserves. In the near-term, U.S. security concerns remain focused on the war on terrorism; access to oil and gas; furthering the Arab-Israeli peace process; the direction of Islamic influence on states in the region; and the futures of Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, India, and the emerging Caspian states. This vital area demands the strategist's closest attention to reconcile objectives, strategy, forces, and focus.

B. Objectives

- Identify U.S. security interests in the Greater Near East region.
- Identify the primary security interests of each sub-region.
- Analyze potential areas of U.S. and regional shared interests and competition within the region generally and specifically by sub-region.

C. Guidance

1. Liotta and Miskel examine the wisdom of attempting to promote democracy in locations such as the Greater Near East—an area broadly defined as the Arab world, Israel, Turkey, Iran, Central Asia, and the Subcontinent. In the broadest of terms, this region is in a period of transition in which the tradition of non-democratic identity will inevitably continue to come into conflict with some form of transitioning identity and governance. They address whether such identity and governance will, or even should, resemble American or Western forms, and whether any external entity has the authority to demand or even actively promote change in the governance of another state. How effective can we expect the promotion of "American internationalism" and democracy to be, especially in the world's unstable regions? Should the United States, with its virtually unlimited power, be attempting to stabilize states by spreading its values, under the banner of "securing its interests"? Is democracy indeed the best solution, or can it be just as dangerous as less desirable forms of governance?

2. Driving forces suggest that while unrest and uncertainty will continue to haunt the Greater Near East, it seems unlikely that the U.S. will be able to strategically disengage from the region. Indeed, with the occupation of Iraq, American presence in the region has proved both volatile and crucial. Hersh points to some thorny complexities in the region that have crucial significance on the global stage: Iran's emerging nuclear potential and the admitted complicity of Pakistani scientists in the proliferation of nuclear technologies. Given Pakistan's crucial role in the war on terrorism, these new realities further complicate the security dilemma of the Greater Near East. What do these trends and shifts in the Greater Near East mean for future U.S. strategy? What do these trends and shifts imply for the employment of future forces in the region?

3. The Caspian basin (located both in the Transcaucasians and Central Asia) is a tempting future energy source. With huge potential reserves of oil (with some value estimates as high as $4 trillion) and among the world's largest natural gas deposits, the region is an acknowledged resource-rich environment. Yet the region is torn by ethnic and civil unrest; further, standards of living for individual citizens have plummeted in the region since the end of the Soviet empire. Repressive and authoritarian rulers in each Central Asian state, as well as the struggle for control of and access to water resources, suggest little improvement in the near- to long-term future. Each of these states faces difficult choices in the next ten years, and even the most optimistic estimates suggest that economic benefits from oil and gas resources will not be realized until 2010. By insisting on the reality of a "Greater Central Asia"—one which includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Russia, and China—Menon effectively illustrates the vast dynamics of the Greater Near East. How do you view the region and its significance for the future of the Greater Near East? What strategic choices and force planning considerations would you make?

4. India is a growing power that the United States cannot afford to ignore. Pakistan, by contrast, is a state on the edge of economic collapse, governed by a military leader, and vulnerable to negative Islamist influences. Yet, in the wake of both the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States and the 1998 nuclear tests, as well as simmering tensions over Kashmir, both nations have become crucial—not only in the Greater Near East, but also in the world. Huang and Khanna suggest the vast, untapped potential of India has yet to be realized, and examine economic and security implications. What are the implications of these issues regarding interests, objectives, and strategy? Is India truly an emerging major power?

D. Required Readings

1. Liotta, P. H., and James F. Miskel. "Dangerous Democracy? American Internationalism and the Greater Near East," *Orbis*, Summer 2004, pp. 437–449. (Democracy as driving force and critical uncertainty in the Greater Near East.)

2. Hersh, Seymour. "Annals of National Security: The Deal. Why is Washington Going Easy on Pakistan's Nuclear Black Marketers?" *New Yorker*, 8 March, 2004, p. 32. (The security dilemma of the Greater Near East widens.)

3. Menon, Rajan. "The New Great Game in Central Asia," *Survival*, Volume 45, Number 2, Summer 2003, pp. 187–204. This reading also includes a map of the region from the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection. http://www.lib.Utexas.edu /maps/index.html (A portrait of the geopolitical and geostrategic challenges of the Greater East.)

4. Huang, Yasheng, and Tarun Khanna. "Can India Overtake China?" *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2003, pp. 74–81. (India's enormous potential and enormous challenges.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Packer, George. "Letter from Baghdad: War after the War. What Washington Doesn't See in Iraq," *New Yorker*, 24 November 2003, pp. 59–85. (The driving forces and critical uncertainties behind the occupation of Iraq.)

2. Baer, Robert. “The Fall of the House of Saud,” *Atlantic Monthly*, May 2003, pp. 53–62. (The uncertain future of the kingdom.)

3. Khan, Zillur R. “Civil-Military Relations and Nuclearization of India and Pakistan,” *World Affairs*, Volume 166, Number 1, Summer 2003, pg. 24–25. (Nuclear policy and civilian control.)

4. Chalk, Peter. “Non-Military Security in the Wider Middle East,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Volume 26, pp. 197–214. (“Soft” security issues and their importance in the region.)

5. Olcott, Martha Brill. “U.S. Policy in the South Caucasus,” *The Quarterly Journal*, Number 3, Summer 2002, pp. 59–66. Olcott, Martha Brill. “Taking Stock of Central Asia,” *Journal of International Affairs,”* Volume 56, Issue 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 3–17. Olcott, Martha Brill. “The Caspian’s False Promise,” *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1998, pp. 95–112. (Assessment of regional promise and peril.)

6. Hersh, Seymour M. “Manhunt: The Bush Administration’s New Strategy in the War against Terrorism,” *New Yorker*, 23 and 30 December 2002, pp. 66–74.

7. Maynes, Charles William. “America Discovers Central Asia,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 82, Number 2, March/April 2003, pp. 120–132. (The challenges, the opportunities, and the dangers in Central Asia.)

8. Bajpai, K. Shankar. “Untangling India and Pakistan,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 82, Number 3, May/June 2003, pp. 112–126. (India’s former ambassador to Pakistan, India, and China attempts an honest assessment of the driving forces between India and Pakistan.)

9. Kaplan, Robert D. “A Post–Saddam Scenario: Iraq Could Become America’s Primary Staging Ground in the Middle East. And the Greatest Beneficial Effect Could Come Next Door, in Iran,” *Atlantic Monthly*, November 2002, pp. 88–90. (The driving forces and the critical uncertainties at the very heart of the Greater Near East.)

10. Schmid, Peter. “Expect the Unexpected: A Religious Democracy in Iran,” *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Winter/Spring 2003, Volume IV, Issue 2, pp. 181–196. (An insightful, articulate examination of identity and governance within the Islamic world—with special focus on Iran—written as a Security, Strategy, and Forces paper and expanded into an advanced research project.)

11. Rashid, Ahmed. “They’re Only Sleeping: Why Militant Islamicists in Central Asia Aren’t Going to Go Away,” *New Yorker*, 14 January 2002, pp. 34–41. (Why taking down the Taliban doesn’t mean that those trained by the Taliban in Central Asia no longer pose a threat.)

12. Telhami, Shibley. *The Stakes: America and the Middle East*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2002. (Frequent media commentator and NWC visitor offers his thoughts on the prospects for security.)

13. Thomas, Raju G. C. and Amit Gupta. *India’s Nuclear Security*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. (Two regional authorities offer sobering assessments.)

14. Kux, Dennis. “India’s Fine Balance,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 81, Number 3, May/June 2002, pp. 93–106. (While India *is* on the way to great-power status, it must learn strategic balance over issues of terrorism, intercommunal violence, and a faltering economy as well as seize the opportunity to outmaneuver Pakistan while improving its relationship with the United States.)

15. Spechler, Martin C. “Allies and Adversaries: Regional Coöperation in Central Asia,” *Problems of Post-Communism*, November/December 2002, pp. 42–47. (Incisive assessment of trade disputes, water conflicts, defense alignments, and non-coöperation in Central Asia.)

16. Amuzegar, Jahangir. “Iran’s Crumbling Revolution,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 82, Number 2, January/February 2003, pp. 44–57. (One of the few truly insightful examinations to explain why U.S. policy has consistently failed to change or influence Iran, focusing on Iran’s fierce sense of national independence, the free-wheeling nature of Shi’a theocracy and theology, the Byzantine nature of Iranian domestic politics, and the emergence of the “Third Force”—a disaffected youth population that will eventually topple the regime.)

17. Cohen, Stephen P. “India Rising,” *Wilson Quarterly*, Summer 2000, pp. 32–39; 42–43; 46–53. (The rise of India as a major power.)

18. Edwards, Mike. “Central Asia Unveiled,” *National Geographic*, February 2002, pp. 109–125. (Useful background to the personalities and players in the region.)

19. Kaplan, Robert D. *Eastward to Tartary: Travels in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus*. New York: Random House, 2000.

20. Wright, Robin. *The Last Great Revolution*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000. (Excellent resource for examining the revolutionary internal changes occurring inside Iran.)

21. Karaosmanoğlu, Ali. “The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 1, Fall 2000, pp. 199–216. (A Turkish perspective on the evolution of Turkey’s foreign and security policy.)

22. Scully, Malcolm G. “The Politics of Running Out of Water,” *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 17 November 2000, pp. 18–19. (Useful survey of recent books and articles that deal with water as critical uncertainty in the Greater Near East.)

23. Kaplan, Robert D. “The Lawless Frontier,” *Atlantic Monthly*, September 2000, pp. 66–80. (Suggests that Pakistan today is on the verge of becoming “Yugoslavia with nuclear weapons.”)

24. Lewis, Bernard. “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” *Atlantic Monthly*, September 1990. http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/90sep/rage.htm (The original essay that proposed the notion of a “Clash of Civilizations.”)

Additional references relevant to the Greater Near East can be found in the Levy Book Collection on Economic Geography and World Order, in the Naval War College Library. A partial review of available texts is online at the NWC Library website, listed under “Collections.”

SSF-17 GREATER EUROPE

A. Focus. "Eurasia" is home to the world's most politically assertive and dynamic states. Six of the world's seven largest defense spenders and economies, 75 percent of the world's populations, 67 percent of its GDP, and 75 percent of all energy resources, as well the most likely contenders to American primacy, reside in Eurasia. (The European Union alone has a larger population than the U.S., a larger percentage of world trade, larger foreign reserves, and a near equivalent gross domestic product of more than $10 trillion dollars.) Within Eurasia, the enlarging EU, Russia, the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia represent both a counter-balance to the ascendancy of China and India as well as areas of vital interest for security strategists and force planners. This session focuses on constants, trends, and shifts—both common and divergent—among various regional actors as well as the critical uncertainties that will define and link this most vital of regions to the United States.

B. Objectives

- Identify U.S. security interests in the Greater Europe region.
- Identify the primary security interests of each sub-region.
- Analyze potential areas of U.S. and regional shared interests and competition within the region generally and specifically by sub-region.

C. Guidance

1. How we view a place—in essence, how we draw our "mental map"—subtly but distinctly affects how we act towards it. Liotta examines various mental maps of Greater Europe, from American and European perspectives. These maps include the following identities: institutional, security, economic, cultural, religious, physical geography, and political. The overall mental map of Greater Europe is only just emerging, even as aspects of it have been forming for millennia. The conflict and the blending of these various perspectives, therefore, represent the symbolic geography of Greater Europe. As Maria Todorova states it, "Europe ends where politicians want it to end." Inevitably, the mental maps that decision makers use have *everything* to do with how and where they draw the line. What are some specific strategic goals you would set in mapping out common security interests in an age of change? How would development of a larger and more focused common European security and defense policy affect more traditional alliance relationships such as NATO? Are we witnessing the dawn of Greater Europe?

2. Kupchan claims that America is squandering its opportunity to shape the future of world politics. As a result, American and European interests are diverging on any number of issues. Addressing U.S. and European security interests, Kupchan argues that the best we can hope for is a "managed" return to multipolarity—and Greater Europe has a major role to play in re-shaping the future security and political architecture. Do you agree that Europe and the U.S. are heading in opposite directions on any number of global issues that affect respective interests, objectives, and strategy? Is Europe correctly shaping its own future?

3. The European Union is commonly compared to the United States because of its comparable size and wealth. However, Rakove compares the proposed European constitution (The Convention on the Future of Europe) with the American Constitution and notes some striking disparities. Most significantly, he notes that the European *Constitution* can be more correctly viewed as a "*treaty* among nation-states" since it does not strip member nations of their residual sovereign authority. The European "Bill of Rights" emphasize entitlements rather than freedoms and sets up only weak barriers to the centralizing tendencies that Euroskeptics routinely ascribe to Brussels. In sum, he sees European constitutionalism developing along distinctly non-American lines. Many Europeans favor the adoption of this constitution because it is their best hope to counterbalance the United States. Is this a plausible goal? If not, what will have to change in Europe to allow it to develop a unified and centralized common foreign and defense policy? What steps could America take to forestall this from happening?

D. Required Readings

1. Liotta, P. H. "Revisiting the Mental Maps of Greater Europe," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 29, pp. 427–444. (The changing face of Trans-Eurasia.)

2. Kupchan, Charles A. "The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy," *Political Science Quarterly,* Volume 118, Number 2 (2003), pp. 205-213 and 225–231.

3. Rakove, Jack. "Europe's Floundering Fathers," *Foreign Policy*, September-October 2003, pp. 28–38.

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Schweiss, Christina M. "Sharing Hegemony: The Future of Transatlantic Security," *Cooperation and Conflict,* Volume 38, Number 3, September 2003, pp. 211–234. (A West Point professor ably defines the necessities of Transatlantic Security.)

2. Kagan, Robert. "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," *Foreign Affairs,* Volume 83, Number 2, March/April 2004. (Why Europe and America still need, and still misinterpret, each other.)

3. Remnick, David. "Letter from Moscow: Post-Imperial Blues," *New Yorker,* 13 October 2003. pp. 78–89. (Solid analysis on Putin's grab for power in the Russian Federation.)

4. Teitelbaum, Michael S., and Philip L. Martin. "Is Turkey Ready for Europe?" *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2003, Volume 82, Number 3, pp. 97–111. (The demographic challenges in, and the inevitability of, Turkey's entry into Europe.)

5. Gordon, Philip H. "Bridging the Atlantic Divide," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2003, Volume 82, Number 1, pp. 70–83. (Why Europe and America are better served united, not divided.)

6. Victor, David G., and Nadejda M. Victor, "Axis of Oil?" *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 82, Number 2, March/April 2003, pp. 47–61. (Russia's challenge to control energy markets.)

7. Morse, Edward L., and James Richard. "The Battle for Energy Dominance," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 81, Number 2, March/April 2002, pp. 16–31. (Russia's challenge to control energy markets; a useful—and contradictory—piece to the "Axis of Oil" essay.)

8. Stevenson, Jonathan. "How Europe and America Defend Themselves," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 82, Number 2, March/April 2003, pp. 75–90. (The umbilical cord that links European and American homeland security.)

9. Powell, David E. "Death as a Way of Life: Russia's Demographic Decline," *Current History*, October 2002, pp. 344–348.

10. Remnick, David. "The Experiment: Will Turkey Be the Model for Islamic Democracy?" *New Yorker*, 18 November 2002, pp. 50–55. (The tests for Turkey in Europe.)

11. Verdun, Amy, ed. *The Euro: European Integration Theory and Economic and Monetary Union*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. (Essays on European Monetary Union.)

12. Åslund, Anders. *Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. (An optimistic though thorough assessment.)

13. McFaul, Michael. *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2001. (A broad assessment of the changes taking over the Russian Federation.)

14. Trenin, Dimitri. *The End of Eurasia: Russian on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002. (A noted regional authority's intriguing analysis of old and new geopolitics, and Russia's place in the world.)

15. Walker, Martin. "Europe's Existential Crisis," *Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 30–53. (An examination of the difficulties in reconciling the dream of a unified Europe with reality of a Europe that is large and diverse.)

16. Triantaphyllou, Dimitrios, ed. *The Southern Balkans: Perspectives from the Region*. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Papers 46, April 2001. (A monograph on Balkan perspectives written by leaders from the region.)

17. Tayler, Jeffrey. "Another French Revolution: In Marseilles, Europe Confronts Its North African Future," *Harper's*, November 2000, pp. 58–66. (Xenophobia and the changing face of Greater Europe.)

18. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "Living with Europe," *National Interest*, Fall 2000, pp. 5–16. (A hardcore realist's surprisingly open assessment that engaging Russia is the only logical choice for the U.S.)

19. Ignatieff, Michael. *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000. (A journalist's unique perspective on the Kosovo intervention.)

20. Liotta, P. H. *Dismembering the State: The Death of Yugoslavia and Why It Matters*. Oxford: Lexington Books, 2001. (The causes for the collapse of Yugoslavia and their implications for European security.)

21. Liotta, P. H. *The Uncertain Certainty: Human Security, Environmental Change, and the Future Euro-Mediterranean.* Oxford: Lexington Books, 2003. (A survey of the driving forces and critical uncertainties that will shape southern Europe, the Maghreb, the Levant, the Mashrik, and the Caspian region over the next five decades.)

The following web sites provide useful information about Greater Europe:

Russia and the Caspian Region
Institute for War & Peace Reporting ..... info@iwpr.net
Peace Research and European Security Studies (Germany).....http://www.afes-press.de
International Institute for Strategic Studies (UK).....http://www.isn.ethz.ch/iiss
Research Institute for European
and American Studies (Greece).....http://www.itel.gr/riies
NATO's Washington Summit http://www.nato50.gov
North Atlantic Treaty Organization..... …http://www.nato.int
Western European Union..... …http://www.weu.int
European Union Security Institute (France) .....http://www.iss-eu.org
European Union (Belgium)..... http://www.europa.int
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Austria).....http://www.osce.org
Helsinki Commission: Security and Cooperation in Europe.....http://www.house.gov/csce/

Additional references relevant to Greater Europe can be found in the Levy Book Collection on Economic Geography and World Order in the Naval War College Library. A partial review of available texts is online at the NWC Library website, listed under "Collections."

SSF-18 THE AMERICAS AND AFRICA

A. Focus. Separated by a common ocean, the continents of South America and Africa represent two enormously complex regions rich in cultural diversity, struggling to develop civil societies with good governance and stable economies to better compete in the increasingly globalized world. Africa is the second largest continent with 12.4% of the global population. Of the twenty states with the fastest growing population, sixteen are in Africa. Niger has the world's lowest median age at 20—compare to Japan with a median age of 53.2. Close to 50% of Uganda's population is under the age of 14. The entire continent of Africa exports only 1.9% of all global goods and services. The continent is in need of attention. Conversely, the areas known as the Americas extends from the Artic north to the Straits of Magellan at the southern tip of South America. The region includes Canada, a state with much in common (social and economic) with the United States, as well as the sub-region of Latin America that includes Central America and the Caribbean Basin. While Latin American states generally have more sophisticated political systems, economies and social structures than their Atlantic Basin neighbors in Africa, the region is experiencing significant economic and political strain from transnational threats such as corruption, poverty, narco-trafficking, and populist Marxist movements. While the global war on terror and domestic economic concerns have recently diverted the attention of the United States to Europe, Asia and the Greater Near East, the continent of Africa and our neighbors in Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, and South America have become more and more important to the economic well being and the physical security of the United States. It is in these regions where more traditional, transnational challenges such as disease, trafficking of illegal drugs, political corruption, illegal immigration, money laundering and extreme, wide-spread poverty become even more relevant—and dangerous—in the war against global terrorism. The political stability of both regions is in flux. In Africa, tribal conflict and disease continue to wreck havoc on large population groups while recent election of populist nationalist presidents in Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Argentina and Bolivia greatly concern Washington foreign policy makers. It remains to be seen how the political rhetoric in Washington impacts the complex realities of foreign policy and economic development in these two important regions of the world. What is certain is that the United States must work harder to better understand the extraordinary people and culture that makes up the complex regions of the world we call Africa and the Americas.

B. Objectives

- Identify U.S. security interests in the Americas and Africa.
- Identify the primary security interests of the Americas and Africa.
- Analyze potential areas of U.S. and regional shared interests and competition within the Americas and Africa.

C. Guidance

1. General James T. Hill, in remarks prepared for the North-South Center's Conference on Building Regional Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere, presents a concise but thorough summary of the issues and challenges facing military forces in Latin America today. General Hill cites Colombia as an example where transnational criminals such as terrorists,

narco-traffickers, and money launderers have thrived and are having an extremely corrosive effect on a free, democratic country. General Hill emphasizes that the people of Latin America deserve to have a strong sense of personal security—and this security can most easily be attained through joint cooperation among the branches of the armed forces within each country.

2. For years, the U.S. government has been assisting the Colombian government fight the production and transportation of illegal drugs. Some estimates have Colombia producing up to 90% of the world's cocaine and 70% of the U.S. heroin market. The United States currently has more than 2,000 personnel from 17 government agencies providing intelligence and training to the Colombian military and police. Whenever Colombian security forces (with U.S. help) begin to slow the illegal drug trade, it seems the problem only shifts to other Andean Ridge countries such as Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador. Virginia Bouvier suggests it is time to alter the direction of U.S. Colombian policy to focus more on initiatives that will lead to a peace settlement between the warring factions—initiatives that consider socioeconomic needs, democratization, and support for the rule of law. Bouvier suggests U.S. policy should emphasize providing human security for the people of Colombia and work to alleviate the desperate poverty, severe economic inequities and exclusionary political institutions. She suggests a military solution is not the answer to what is essentially an economic problem. Does Bouvier place too much faith in negotiating with the narco-trafficker? Does the U.S. have a consistent, logical policy in Colombia? How has the threat of terrorism affected the U.S. policy toward narco-trafficking?

3. Often lost in the rush to define security relationships in the Americas is the question of the role of Canada. Though Canada's foreign policy, economy, culture and security interests are inextricably linked to those of the United States, many Canadians have expressed concern with the close relationship, particularly in a post–Cold War environment with the United States as the lone global superpower. In March 2003, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs conducted a conference in Toronto to discuss the future of Canadian foreign policy in a post 9/11 world. Provided in the handout are executive summaries of two panel discussions: *Canadian Foreign Policy and the Changing Geopolitical Landscape* and *How is Canada Perceived Abroad?* It is revealing to study the Canadian perspective on relations with the world's only superpower. What might be the impact on Canadian-U.S. relations if Canada decides to de-link its foreign policy and national security from that of the United States? Should the United States assume all security responsibility for Canada and develop a policy of "fortress North America?" Has this already been done? If so, at what cost?

4. With so many countries in the world now benefiting from the process of globalization, why have so many Latin American countries fallen further and further behind other developing countries? Mario Vargas Llosa provides a regional perspective in his excellent article entitled "Why Does Latin America Fail?" from the CATO Institute. A Peruvian novelist by trade, Vargas Llosa cites incomplete and insincere reform initiatives by the elite ruling classes and pervasive political and social corruption as two culprits preventing Latin American countries from achieving their full potential in the globalization process. Vargas Llosa also emphasizes the importance of culture in a country's development and the role it plays in defining the right environment for progress. He concludes by citing the importance of liberalism in moving third world countries towards the more developed, globalized family of nations. Vargas Llosa warns Latin Americans not to use the Chilean "Pinochet" experience as a model for development. Dictatorships, according to Vargas Llosa are not the model by which to achieve prosperity. How

should Latin Americans modify their political, social, and cultural behavior to avoid the pitfalls noted by Vargas Llosa? What is the best way to integrate a country's culture into its political and economic development? To what extent has the history of Latin America contributed to its relatively slow political and economic development?

5. Almost all national security professionals believe Africa will significantly impact global security and stability in the 21st century. Where opinions differ however is whether or not Africa will be a threat to global security as a breeding ground for terrorists or will it provide a stabilizing influence as a continent of growing democracies and open markets tapping its enormous potential as an alternative source of oil to a global economy with a seemingly unquenchable thirst for energy? The answer is probably mixed. Certain states and regions will develop stable governments, institutions and become part of the global community of nations. Others will probably take a different more menacing route as suggested in the reading "The Terrorist Threat in Africa." What action should the United States take now to influence Africa's development? What action should the United States take to ensure Africa develops into a reliable supplier of oil to the global/U.S. economy? What action should the global community take?

D. Required Readings

1. Hill, James T., General, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, *Report on the Conference on Building Regional Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere,* Preface, March 2003, pp.1–3. (Proposes goals and objectives of the United States in improving security in the Western hemisphere and how the U.S. military can help achieve these goals.)

2. Bouvier, Virginia M. "Colombia Quagmire: Time for U.S. Policy Overhaul," *Americas Program, Interhemispheric Resource Center,* http://www.americaspolicy.org September 2003, pp. 1–7. (Reviews U.S. policy in Colombia and proposes alternative approaches to achieve U.S. goals and objectives).

3. *National* [Canadian] *Foreign Policy Conference*, Toronto, "Canada Now, Fading Power or Future Power?" Executive Summary of two panel discussions, March 2003, pp. 1–4. (Summary of discussion of Canada by Canadians regarding foreign policy and relations with the United States.)

4. Vargas, Mario Llosa. "Why Does Latin America Fail?" *CATO Policy Report*, Vol. XXV No. 1, January/February 2003, CATO Institute, pp. 1–4. (Author questions why Latin American countries have been slow to benefit from the globalization process.)

5. Lyman, Princeton N. and F. Stephen Morrison. "The Terrorist Threat in Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2004, Volume 83, No. 1, pp. 75–86. (Discusses the potential threat Africa presents as a future breeding ground for terrorist.)

6. Klare, Michael T. and Damiel Volman. "Africa's Oil and America's National Security," *Current History*, May 2004, pp. 226–231. (Discusses the role Africa might play as a source of energy for the United States and the global economy in the 21st century.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Franko, Patrice M. *The Puzzle of Latin American Economic Development*. New York, NY: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999. (Analyzes the unique history, culture, and geography of Latin America as it relates to challenges associated with stable economic development.)

2. Buckman, Robert T. *Latin America 2002*, 36th Edition. Harpers Ferry, WV: Stryker-Post Publications, 2002. (Excellent overview of Latin America today and future challenges for the region.)

3. Peeler, John. *Building Democracy in Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. (Provides a history of democracy in Latin America and the unique obstacles to democratization presented by culture and history.)

4. Fitch, J. Samuel. *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998. (Explores the history of the military in Latin American politics as well as the effectiveness and impact of the authoritative military regimes on regional political development.)

5. Dominguez, Jorge I., ed. *International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post–Cold War Era*. Pittsburgh, PA: University Press, 1998. (Unique perspective of the vulnerabilities of Latin America and the Caribbean to the new threats of global transnational crime.)

6. Fishlow, Albert, ed. *The United States and the Americas: A Twenty-First Century View*. New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1999. (Provides an excellent view of the current relationship between the United States and Latin America and challenges of the 21st century.)

7. Jordan, David C. *Drug Politics: Dirty Money and Democracies*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. (Inside perspective of the role drug money plays in Latin America politics and the devastating impact of corruption and violent crime on struggling democracies.)

8. Skidmore, Thomas E., and Peter H. Smith. *Modern Latin America*, 5th Ed. Oxford University Press, 2000. (An excellent overview of Latin America focusing more on the unique sub-regional cultural and social aspects of the region.)

9. Keen, Benjamin, ed. *Latin American Civilization*. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 2000. (Provides superb analysis of the native Indian and colonial influence on Latin American civilization development.)

10. Booth, John A. and Thomas W. Walker. *Understanding Central America*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999. (Excellent overview of the interesting sub-region of Central America and the unique role it has played as the bridge between North and South America.)

11. Easterly, William. *The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures & Misadventures in the Tropics*. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2001. (An entertaining look at the extraordinary successes and failures of market capitalism in Latin

America and the Caribbean and the unique challenges to U.S. businesses when operating in a culture very different from the United States.)

12. Chasteen, John Charles. *Born in Blood and Fire: A Concise History of Latin America*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2001. (Provides an historical look at Lain America and the impact of numerous armed conflicts on political and cultural development.)

13. Nossal, John Charles. *Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*. Toronto: Prentice Hall of Canada Ltd, 1996. (Provides a unique analysis of Canadian foreign policy and how it has mirrored and differed from that of its colossal neighbor to the south—and the cost and benefits of each.)

SSF-19 THE FUTURE OF WAR

A. Focus. Part II of the Security, Strategy, and Forces course concentrates on concepts, issues, and methodologies related to the development of future military strategy and force structure. War is a loaded subject; those who study it often fight about it. This lesson seeks to explore, through vigorous debate, the nature and style of future warfare—to examine contrasting notions of conflict that might cause the U.S. to rethink its military strategy and force structure. Key elements of this debate include technology and conflict trends, that many argue help characterize future war; recent operational lessons, which others proclaim definitive when examining views of future war; and the evolving nature of threats likely to challenge U.S. interests across the globe. What will future war be? What parts of war and conflict have changed and what has remained the same? Are there new demands in warfare that require us to change the way we do business? What are the implications for how we plan forces and employ them in conjunction with other instruments of power?

B. Objectives

- Consider alternative views of future war and examine their strategic assumptions.
- Assess the relevance of these views to strategy.
- Evaluate how these views should determine selection of future military forces.

C. Guidance

1. Practitioners of fourth-generation warfare, or "4GW," seek to bypass an opposing (and often overwhelming) military force and strike directly at cultural, political, or population targets. Thus, Liotta argues that future "chaos" strategists may target the American national security decision-making process—and the American people—rather than challenge American military forces. He suggests that such strategists, recognizing unchallenged American military supremacy, will aim for *decision paralysis* while continuing to wreak havoc in their own spheres of influence. New modes of conflict may change organizations, strategy, technology, and doctrine. New "warriors" may also emerge: ethno-nationalists, terrorists, and criminals who will attack our vulnerabilities and create a new form of enemy. Have recent events proven this reasoning accurate? What is the relevance of these arguments to the selection and employment of future military forces? Should the U.S. Department of Defense change to address the environment that Liotta describes—*or not*? Should special operations or covert actions be emphasized at the expense of traditional military employment and what some term "legacy systems?"

2. As in many assessments which grapple with the uncertainty of the future, one can generate insight by both questioning past examinations and looking towards the enduring aspects of present challenges. In somewhat contrasting views, Van Creveld and Kagan explore what's in store just beyond the horizon. Van Creveld comes to grips with his lack of prescience in his 1991 book, *The Transformation of War*, pertaining to the ascendancy of information warfare, alleged by some to be the central challenge for the future. Kagan critiques what is seemingly a "target-set"

mentality in the new American way of war, projects the enduring nature of stabilization operations, and emphasizes the requirement for the human element to ensure success in future war. What does the divergence of these perspectives say about what we know about future war? Is information warfare the central challenge of future war? Do you agree with Kagan that ignoring the human element will continue to threaten ability to gain success in war?

3. Bartlett, Holman, and Somes offer one way of examining future war and force planning implications. While noting that planning future forces is "an arduous task," they employ a well-known depiction, the spectrum of conflict, to capture a methodology by which strategists can examine future war and future resources requirements. Do you agree with the authors that this methodology is useful for determining aspects of future war and future force requirements? While understandably not a precise science, can this methodology also help explore uncertainty about future warfare and help guide our allocation of resources to deal with it?

4. Nadia Schadlow argues that the establishment of political and economic order is integral to war, not adjunct to it. Military and political leaders need to distinguish between governance operations and activities such as peace operations and peacekeeping that may occur independently of war. Schadlow argues that labeling political and economic reconstruction as a postwar problem muddles the fact that central to strategic victory in all wars fought by the United States has been the creation of a favorable political order which can only be overseen and administered by U.S. military forces. Schadlow points out that while the United States has historically been wary of the military conducting governance operations, no other organization has the capability to succeed at these operations. Finally, Schadlow challenges the U.S. Army to reconsider its doctrine and organization with respect to political and economic reconstruction efforts and she looks to Joint Forces Command to revaluate the way the Joint Force approaches conflict termination. What are the implications for force planning if Schadlow is correct? Should the United States have standing forces to conduct governance operations and what are the implications of this approach? What are the roles of the State Department and the Department of Defense and how should these roles be assigned and supervised?

D. Required Readings

1. Liotta, P. H. "Chaos as Strategy," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 44, pp. 603–612. (How future adversaries may target the American decision making process—and the American people—rather than the American military, and thus challenge traditional hierarchies and organizations.).

2. Van Creveld, Martin, "*The Transformation of War* Revisited," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 45. Read from "To Generalize" to the end, pp. 615–622. Kagan, Frederick W., "War and Aftermath," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 46. Read only the first two pages, pp. 623–624, and the last two sections, "Long Distance Strategy" and "Back to Clausewitz," pp. 644–645.

3. Bartlett, Henry C., G. Paul Holman Jr., and Timothy E. Somes. "The Spectrum of Conflict: What Can it Do For Force Planners?" in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 34, pp. 497–505. (Presents a new look at a familiar construct for exploring future war and associated challenges).

4. Schadlow, Nadia. "War and the Art of Governance," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 47, pp. 646–656. (Schadlow argues that governance operations are part of warfare not adjunct to it and therefore should be planned as part of military campaigns.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Grau, Lester W., and Timothy L. Thomas. "Russian Lessons Learned from the Battles for Grozny," *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 2000. http://call.army.mil/fmso/FMSOPUBS/ISSUES/ Rusn-leslrn.htm (Mistakes made and applications learned from the Chechnya interventions of 1995 to 2000.)

2. Homer-Dixon, Thomas. "The Rise of Complex Terrorism," *Foreign Policy*, January–February 2002, pp. 52–62.

3. Lukasik, Stephen J., Seymour E. Goodman, and David W. Longhurst. *Protecting Critical Infrastructure Against Cyber-Attack*, Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, August 2003.

4. Blank, Stephen J. *Rethinking Asymmetric Threats*, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2003.

5. Vest, Jason. "Fourth-generation Warfare." *Atlantic Monthly*, December 2001. http:// www.theatlantic.com/issues/ 2001/12/vest.htm.

6. O'Hanlon, Michael. "Coming Conflicts: Interstate War in the New Millennium," *Harvard International Review*, Summer 2001, pp. 42–46.

7. Klein, Joe. "Closework: Why We Couldn't See What Was Right in Front of Us," *New Yorker*, 1 October 2001, pp. 44–49.

8. Stevenson, Jonathan. "Pragmatic Counter-terrorism," *Survival*, Volume 43, Number 4, Winter 2001–2002, pp. 35–48.

9. Freedman, Lawrence. "The Third World War?" *Survival*, Volume 43, Number 4, Winter 2001–2002, pp. 61–88. (The implications of the Terror War.)

10. Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt. *Networks and Netwars*. Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2001.

11. Postel, Sandra L., and Aaron T. Wolf. “Dehydrating Conflict,” *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2001, pp. 60–67. (Why conflict over water is not as likely a cause for war as some suggest.)

12. Renner, Michael. “Alternative Futures in War and Conflict,” *Naval War College Review*52, no. 4 (Autumn 2000), pp. 45–56.

13. Van Creveld, Martin. “Through a Glass, Darkly: Some Reflections on the Future of War,” *Naval War College Review*52, no. 4 (Autumn 2000), pp. 24–42.

14. Steinberg, James B., Mary Graham, and Andrew Eggers. *Building Intelligence to Fight Terrorism*. The Brookings Institute, September 2003.

15. “Future Conflict,” from *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernment Experts*, Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2001, pp. 30–31; 32; 33–34; 35. http://www.cia.gov.cia/publications/globaltrends2015/index.html (Reviews trends in through 2015 creating challenges for national security.)

16. Luttwak, Edward N. “Toward Post-Heroic Warfare,” in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000, Chapter 42, pp. 629–637.

17. Thomas, Timothy L. “The Mind Has No Firewall,” *Parameters*, Volume 28, Number 1, Spring 1998, excerpts from pp. 84–92. (Examines the limitations of the human element in rapid, IT-centric operations.)

18. Seaquist, Larry. “Community War,” U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, August 2000, pp. 56–59. (Why the Marines may be on to something with their focus on urban warfare and why we should stop “swooning over technology.”)

19. Dunlap, Charles J., Jr. “How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007: A Warning From the Future,” *The Weekly Standard*, January 29, 1996, pp. 22–28. (A scenario describing how a future “streetfighter” might defeat the United States.)

20. Friedman, George, and Meredith Friedman. *The Future of War: Power, Technology & American World Dominance in the 21st Century*. New York: Crown Publishers, 1996. (Argues for American dominance in future warfare.)

21. Nye, Joseph S., Jr. “Conflicts After the Cold War,” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter 1996, pp. 5–24. (An article contending that although the world is not well prepared for the most prevalent type of post–Cold War conflict, those of an internal communal type, the U.S.-led alliance system is in a strong position to prevent regional and great power wars.)

22. Gurr, Ted Robert. “Ethnic Warfare on the Wane,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2000, pp. 52–64. (Challenges Huntington’s thesis by arguing that ethnic warfare may belong to the last century.)

23. *Survival*. “Is Major War Obsolete? An Exchange,” Summer 1999, pp. 139–52. (Various experts weigh in on the issue of future war and large-scale conflict.)

24. Szafranski, Richard. “When Waves Collide: Future Conflict,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Spring 1995, pp. 77–83. (An attempt to describe the eventualities that await the U.S. armed forces now that “myriad dangers have replaced a monolithic threat.”)

25. Toffler, Alvin, and Heidi Toffler. *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1993. (A “futuristic” look at conflict in the twenty-first century.)

SSF-20 APPROACHES TO FORCE PLANNING

A. Focus. This session reviews the strengths and weaknesses of approaches or methodologies for planning future military capabilities. We introduce the session with an overview of the alternative force planning approaches that compete with each other. We then offer several specific methodologies, illustrated by example force planning cases, for defining and sizing military forces. These include a classic case illustrating the use of threat-based scenarios, a new approach to capabilities-based planning, a force planning methodology focused on the demanding peacetime presence requirements, and finally a short article suggesting the blending of approaches.

B. Objectives

- Assess the strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches to force planning.
- Evaluate specific force planning methodologies and illustrative cases.

C. Guidance

1. In the second part of "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning," Bartlett, Holman, and Somes discuss various approaches to force planning. These approaches range from capabilities-based planning to fiscally-based planning. For most of the past decade the U.S. Department of Defense has emphasized the use of scenarios and potential threats as the basis for planning. The Bush administration has shifted from threat-based to capabilities-based planning. The emphasis on transformation suggests that technology may also be a significant driver. The services have long stressed core competencies and missions as major force planning drivers. Cynics invariably argue that, in the end, all force planning is fiscally driven. Based on your military experience, do you believe that a single approach tends to dominate the others? Are sound force planning decisions most often the result of incorporating more than one approach?

2. Davis provides a methodology for capabilities-based force planning, the approach favored by the current Secretary of Defense and his team. While pointing out that capabilities-based planning is not new and includes elements evident in threat-based planning, he offers a conceptual framework that he argues goes beyond the constraints of that approach. His methodology includes an approach to assessing the challenging security environment that he suggests offers a more relevant set of operational challenges that future forces will face. His approach includes looking at attributes within the design space of different scenarios to establish the validity of various requirements. Among other conclusions he states that many capabilities need to be specified in "continuous spaces" in terms of capability "envelopes." Do you agree with the analogy he uses between the designer of a building working with a customer to determine the general attributes of the building, and what force planners must do to assess general broad needs for the future military? Will his approach lead to forces that are characterized by increased levels of flexibility, robustness, and adaptability as he suggests?

3. Owens outlines an overall "logic" for generating a future force structure that attempts to answer the two central questions of force planning: what capabilities are necessary to ensure that our force structure can do what we ask it to in the future; and "how much is enough"? Does the "logic of force planning" that Owens describes here make sense? Is Owens correct in suggesting

that the range of desired capabilities should be determined first, and only then should scenarios be used to decide how much of each capability is needed? Is there a danger with this approach that the military will be always looking for more capabilities than it can afford?

4. In preparation for the 2001 QDR, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff established a QDR working group at National Defense University, the purpose of which was to build intellectual capital for the forthcoming review. In its preliminary report, this working group under the direction of Michele Flournoy developed four defense strategies that illustrated a methodology for prioritizing strategic requirements in order to properly size a force structure. Although written before 9/11, the methodology remains relevant. The chapter demonstrates that different prioritizations of requirements among, e.g. Small Scale Contingencies (SSCs), Major Theater Wars (MTWs), and Homeland Security (HLS), results in different force structures. By establishing relative priorities among strategic requirements, the force planner can see that "lesser included missions" may not be adequately funded especially if they are part of the lowest priority categories.

5. Flournoy et al. outline a methodology for assessing risk. In general, strategic military risk is the overall probability that a state's military forces will be unable to achieve the objectives of its defense strategy. Measuring risk is a function of assessing two variables: the likelihood that an event will occur; and the magnitude of the undesired consequences. As the consequences of failure increase, the degree of risk that can be tolerated decreases. Strategic risk comprises 1) operational risk (which includes force performance risk and sustainability risk), 2) force preparation risk (do planners hedge or transform), and 3) affordability risk. How does the strategist and force planner assess trade-offs among these categories?

D. Required Readings

1. Bartlett, Henry C., G. Paul Holman, Jr., and Timothy E. Somes. "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 2. Read only second half of chapter pp. 23–33 (starting at "Alternative Approaches to Force Planning"). (This reading examines the various approaches to planning future military forces.)

2. Davis, Paul K. "Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 36, pp. 512–527. (The author provides a definition of capabilities-based planning, puts it in the larger context of defense activities generally, and sketches an analytic architecture for carrying it out).

3. Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "Strategy and the Logic of Force Planning," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 33. Read the second part of the chapter, pp. 488–496. (Methodology for determining both the characteristics of a future force as well as "how much is enough.")

4. Flournoy, Michèle A. "Alternative Approaches to Force Sizing," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College

Press, 2004, Chapter 35, pp. 506–511. (A methodology for prioritizing strategic requirements in order to properly size a force structure.)

5. Flournoy, Michelè A. "Assessing Risk in the QDR," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 40, pp. 562–566. (A methodology for measuring risk as a function of two variables: the likelihood that an event will occur; and the magnitude of the undesired consequences.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "How Much Is Enough?" *Armed Forces Journal International*, June 2001, pp. 71 and 73. (The author provides an approach to force planning that advocates blending the best aspects of capabilities and scenario/threat-based planning.)

2. Flournory, Michèle A., ed. *QDR 2001*: *Strategy-Driven Choices for America's Security*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001. (The editors provide guidance on an array of the specific aspects of strategy and force planning including a chapter on risk assessment.)

3. Aspin, Les. "Extracts from An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces . . . Four Illustrative Options," extracted from Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000, Chapter 30. (A classic case study, by a former Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, providing a detailed methodology using the threat/scenario approach for sizing future U.S. military forces.)

4. Dur, Philip A. "Extracts from Presence: Forward, Ready, Engaged," extracted from Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000, Chapter 31, pp. 469–479. (The article outlines a force sizing methodology that outlines how the services can meet demanding peacetime presence requirements.)

5. Rudman, Warren and Gary Hart. Seeking *A New National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom*. Washington D.C.: The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Phase II Report, April 15, 2000. (This Phase II report includes a conclusion that "the 'two major theater wars' yardstick for sizing U.S. forces is not producing the capabilities needed for the varied and complex contingencies now occurring and likely to increase in the years ahead.")

6. Krepinevich, Andrew F., Michael G. Vickers, and Steven M. Kosiak. "Hart-Rudman Commission Report—A Critique." Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, Backgrounder Paper, April 19, 2000. (The authors suggest that the Hart-Rudman Commission's significant reservations regarding the two major theater war standard "may have more to do with outdated operational approaches and metrics than it does with an excessive standard.")

7. Rudman, Warren and Gary Hart. *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century: Supporting Research and Analysis*. Washington, D.C.: The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Phase I, September 15, 1999. (This Phase I report on the

emerging security environment for the first quarter of the twenty-first century provides four alternative scenarios and some possible military implications.)

8. Troxell, John F. *Force Planning in An Era of Uncertainty: Two MRCs as a Force Sizing Framework*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 15 September 1997. (A discussion of threat-based, capabilities-based and mission-focused force planning with a specific defense of the 2 MRC scenario basis for sizing the current U.S. military force structure.)

9. Courtney, Hugh, Jane Kirkland, and Patrick Viguerie. "Strategy under Uncertainty," *Harvard Business Review*, November–December 1997, pp. 67–79. (The authors discuss strategic planning when the future is highly uncertain, perhaps even truly ambiguous; a position some suggest is facing the U.S. military as it enters the twenty-first century.)

10. Khalilzad, Zalmay M., and David A. Ochmanek, eds. *Strategic Appraisal 1997: Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st Century*. Santa Monica: CA, RAND, 1997. (Ten articles by RAND analysts on an array of strategy and defense planning issues, approaches and ideas.)

11. Davis, Paul K., David Gompert, and Richard Kugler. "Adaptiveness in National Defense: The Basis of a New Framework," *Issue Paper: Rand National Defense Research Institute*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, August 1996. (This paper describes a framework for defense planning.)

12. Haffa, Robert P., Jr. "Planning U.S. Conventional Forces for a Post–Cold War World," *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Autumn 1996, pp. 55–67. (The author provides a framework for testing whether or not force structure recommendations of the Department of Defense show any evidence of escaping the planning paradigms of the past.)

13. Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. *The Conflict Environment of 2016: A Scenario-Based Approach*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, October 1996. (The author develops a diverse set of scenarios to guide force planning.)

14. Kaufmann, William W. "Excerpts from Planning Conventional Forces 1950–80," in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1995, Chapter 35, pp. 446–459. (The author provides a concise case study of conventional military force planning during the era of flexible response.)

15. Davis, Paul K., ed. *New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much Is Enough*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994. (A volume of 23 papers that comprehensively explores the concept of defense planning in the early post–Cold War era.)

16. Winnefeld, James A. *The Post–Cold War Force-Sizing Debate: Paradigms, Metaphors, and Disconnects*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND R-4243-JS, 1992. (This study incorporates several alternative approaches to force planning.)

17. Bartlett, Henry C., and G. Paul Holman, Jr. "Grand Strategy and the Structure of U.S. Military Forces," *Strategic Review*, Spring 1992, pp. 39–51. (The authors use a top-down approach for planning future military forces.)

SSF-21 OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES AND CONCEPTS

A. Focus. The current administration asserts that to achieve the objectives of its defense strategy requires the U.S. Armed Forces to develop operational concepts to meet the foreseeable operational challenges in the security environment. These will be accomplished within the current DoD modernization plan termed "Transformation." What this transformation constitutes, and how it should be achieved, have become fundamental issues for force planners. Additionally, the tension between resourcing ongoing operations while trying to fund the procurement, experimentation and development of future forces is a fundamental concern for force planners. The thrust continues to be the need to couple technological change and systems development on the one hand with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation on the other in order to realize large gains in military effectiveness.

B. Objectives

- Examine contending operational challenges and concepts.
- Assess the potential force planning implications of transformation in the context of fighting the Global War on Terrorism while attempting to resource transformation.
- Examine what constitutes transformation of the military and how it can be achieved.

C. Guidance

1. The Department of Defense Office of Transformation, headed by retired Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski has published *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach* as a follow-on, more detailed, analysis to the *Transformation Planning Guidance* (TPG). The document lays out what Cebrowski sees as the critical underpinnings to successful modernization of the Armed Forces.

2. Max Boot addresses the apparent changes in "The American Way of War" from one of the grinding strategy of attrition that U.S. generals traditionally employed to prevail in combat to an emerging method of quickness and versatility. Spurred by dramatic advances in information technology, the new American way of war relies on speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise. This approach was put on display in the invasion of Iraq and should reshape what the military looks like. Frederick Kagan's article "The Art of War" is a pointed critique of the transformation efforts. Kagan examines the tension of trying to transform the military while it is extremely challenged, "stretched," in his words, by ongoing operations. He is a professor at West Point and his view is surely ground centric, but is his argument that war can not be solely about target sets and omnipotent intelligence systems valid? Both authors have important insights into the emerging methods and techniques of combat; compare and contrast the arguments made by Boot and Kagan.

3. In *Joint Operating Concepts*, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld outlines the attributes for our future forces. All forces are to be fully integrated in the Joint Force, expeditionary, networked, able to operate in a decentralized environment, adaptable to the changing threat and missions, gains and maintains decision superiority over its opponents and retains its lethality. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have identified four broad initial joint operations

categories: major combat operations, stability operations, homeland security and strategic deterrence. Will adoption of these categories for future operating concepts and the building of forces with the above listed attributes better enable U.S. forces to prevail in future conflicts? Will these be effective across the spectrum of conflict or are these attributes better suited for one end of the spectrum or another? One of the categories of Joint Operations Concepts is stability operations. Has DoD invested enough in this category given ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq?

D. Required Readings

1. Cebrowski, Arthur. *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, December 2003. Read only the Executive Summary, pp. 2–3. Scan remainder. (The Director of the Office of Transformation provides details to the TPG for the nuts and bolts of transforming the Department of Defense.)

2. Boot, Max. "The New American Way of War," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2003, pp. 41–58,. (The author argues that through the use of high technology and modern information and communications systems the U.S. has revolutionized warfighting as evidenced by the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.)

3. Kagan, Frederick W. "The Art of War," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 38, pp. 535–551. (A critique of the current transformation process and goals.)

4. Rumsfeld, Donald, *Joint Operations Concepts*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, November 2003. Read only, sections 3B-4A pp. 14–19. Scan remainder. (DoD outlines the attributes and the categories of future joint operating concepts.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Ross, Andrew L., Michèle A. Flournoy, Cindy Williams, and David Mosher. "What Do We Mean by 'Transformation?'" *Naval War College Review* 55, no. 1 (Winter 2002), pp. 27–42. (The authors exchange views on what "defense transformation" might be, and how it might affect future defense strategy.)

2. Binnendijk, Hans, and Richard L. Kugler. "Adapting Forces to a New Era: Ten Transforming Concepts," *Defense Horizons*, November 2001, pp. 1–13. (The authors offer ten concepts that should be embedded in a sound overall transformation strategy.)

3. MacGregor, Douglas A. "Resurrecting Transformation for the Post–Industrial Era," *Defense Horizons*, September 2001, at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/nduphp.html. (The author argues for the need to better understand ground combat in the current push for transformation.)

4. Work, Robert O. *The Challenge of Maritime Transformation: Is Bigger Better?* Washington: D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002. (The author provides an extensive array of ideas on how he believes the Navy should transform.)

5. Owens, William A., with Edward Offley. *Lifting the Fog of War*. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2000. (The former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stresses the need for the U.S. military to aggressively pursue his vision in order to transform.)

6. Toffler, Alvin, and Heidi Toffler. *War and Anti-War*. Boston: MA, Little, Brown and Company, 1993. (Early proponents of the idea that war will be transformed. Included are the concepts of "Third Wave War" and "Knowledge Warriors.")

7. Marshall, A. W. "Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions—Second Version," Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Record, August 23, 1993. (A core memorandum by the head of the Office of Net Assessment, which set the frame of reference for much of the work within the Pentagon on, what was then called the revolution in military affairs and is now refocused on transformation.)

8. Krepinevich, Andrew F. "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions," in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000, Chapter 32. (The author provides background and several lessons derived from his study of historical military revolutions, which he argues led to major military transformations in the past.)

9. Van Tol, Jan M. "Military Innovation and Carrier Aviation: The Relevant History," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1997, pp. 77–87. (An interesting case study on innovation linked to the carrier revolution with a focus on the divergent paths the British and the American navies pursued in the 1920s and 1930s.)

10. Goldman, Emily O., and Richard B. Andres. "Systemic Effects of Military Innovation and Diffusion," University of California, Davis, http://jciss.llnl.gov/syst.html, 2002. (A systemic review of many of the factors that have influenced military change and transformation throughout history.)

11. Cebrowski, Arthur K., and John J. Garstka. "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000, Chapter 33. (The article that first introduced the concept of network centric warfare, a concept increasingly a part of the transformation initiative.)

12. Alberts, David S., John J Garska, and Frederick P Stein. *Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority*, 2nd Edition (Revised). Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, August 1999. (This book expands on the ideas on network centric warfare that first appeared in the article by Cebrowski and Garska.)

13. Deptula, David A. "Firing for Effect: Change in the Nature of Warfare," in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000, Chapter 34. (The author's concept of parallel warfare raises the question of how and whether it is affecting the U.S. military's efforts at transformation.)

14. Adams, Thomas K. "The Real Military Revolution," *Parameters*, Autumn 2000, pp. 54–65. (The author suggests that the enormous increase in dynamic complexity associated with

widely distributed information systems will have profound—indeed revolutionary—effects on military organizations, an effect that some suggest can be seen in the current war on terrorism.)

15. Bartlett, Henry C., Paul G. Holman Jr., and Timothy E. Somes. "Force Planning, Military Revolutions and the Tyranny of Technology," in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 2nd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1997, Chapter 32. (The authors, after arguing that technology is fundamental to creating military revolutions, suggest several different ways to pursue technological innovation, which in turn may lead to a transformed military.)

16. Biddle, Stephen. "The Past as Prologue: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare," *Security Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Autumn 1998, pp. 1–74. (The author attempts to convince the U.S. military that their pursuit of transformation through technology is misguided.)

17. *Transformation Trends*, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, issued periodically on the Department of Defense Internet by the Outreach Director, Office of Force Transformation. (This newsletter provides some thoughts concerning what the Pentagon is currently thinking with respect to transformation of the U.S. military.)

18. Biddle, Stephen. *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002. (The author concludes from his analysis that the Afghan campaign of 2001–2 was a surprisingly orthodox air-ground theater campaign in which heavy fire support decided a contest between two significant land armies. This war, he argues, was not the transformation that many have concluded, and should be viewed with caution as the new "model" for conducting wars in the future.)

SSF-22 BASELINE STRATEGY AND FORCES AND ALTERNATIVES

A. Focus. Just after the attacks of September 11, the Pentagon issued the second report of the *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) mandated by the 104th Congress in 1996, which is now the strategy and force planning base case for the U.S. Highlights of the 2001 QDR include an increased emphasis on homeland defense, a shift from "threat-based" to "capabilities-based" planning, replacement of the requirement to prevail in two "nearly-simultaneous" major theater wars with the requirement to "decisively [defeat] an adversary in one of the two theaters in which U.S. forces are conducting major combat operations," and an enhanced focus on transforming the U.S. military to a twenty-first century force capable of responding to a variety of threats across the spectrum of conflict. Since the release of the 2001 QDR, the United States has employed its forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. By examining the 2001 QDR and its underlying assumptions, we get to the very heart of force planning.

B. Objectives

- Explore the role of a national military strategy as a guide to force planning.
- Identify and understand the strategic assumptions and force planning principles that underlie various proposals for future U.S. military force structure.
- Identify and assess likely strategy-force mismatches, risks and opportunity costs associated with the various alternatives.

C. Guidance

1. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld states that the strategy that underpins the 2001 QDR seeks to achieve four key goals: to reassure allies, to dissuade adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten U.S. or allied interests, to deter aggression through forward deployment, and to decisively defeat an adversary should deterrence fail. Although there is no statutory obligation for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to issue a National Military Strategy, it has been customary for him to do so since the early 1990s. How useful is the recently released National Military Strategy as an additional guide for transforming the U.S. military into a more flexible and capable force? Are there potential mismatches between national goals, strategy, resources, and forces that could result if the guidance contained in the 2001 QDR is not followed? If it is followed? What are the risks? Are they manageable? What impact have the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had on the 2001 QDR and its underlying assumptions?

2. Before the release of the 2001 QDR, a Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) study proposed a "strategy for a long peace" as well as a set of recommendations for "transforming" the military from today's force into one that can address the uncertainties of tomorrow's security environment. The authors discussed America's role in a changing security environment, arguing that efforts such as the 1997 QDR were flawed. They proposed a strategy that "employs a range of means to support transformation within projected constraints, while also incurring minimal increased risk to near-term U.S. security interests, and addressing the substantial mismatch between the 1997 QDR defense program and the budgets projected to sustain it." While the CSBA strategy recognized the inter-temporal character of force planning, acknowledging that the U.S. must achieve future transformation while still meeting the

requirements of near-term security, the authors contended that these near-term requirements could be met by rethinking aspects of defense strategy. How do you assess CSBA's approach to strategy? How about the specific proposals for transforming the military? What are the opportunity costs and risks associated with the CSBA strategy? How valid were the study's assumptions in light of 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq?

3. Owens looks at some of the force-planning implications of the war in Iraq. He contends that the criticisms of the conduct of the war are in reality reflections of a broader debate over what the U.S. military will look like in the future. Decisions based on the perceived successes or failures of the various military components will have a major impact on resource allocation among the services. He then offers some preliminary judgments about the lessons of the conflict, which, he argues, will inform decisions regarding the defense budget. Among other things, he suggests that Operation Iraqi Freedom disproved some elements of the pre-war conventional wisdom, especially with regard to air power, heavy land forces, and naval power. He also argues that military transformation is not an "all-or-nothing" proposition. What does this mean? Is he right? What are some of the strengths and weaknesses of his argument here?

4. Krepinevich assesses the implications of Operation Iraqi Freedom for military transformation. He claims that if the United States is to be in the business of regime change, it must overcome its preference for crafting quick "exit strategies." Krepinevich also argues that there are sure to be budgetary and therefore bureaucratic battles over the lessons of the conflict. Some of these will involve a debate over the relative utility of low-density/high demand capabilities and high-density/low demand capabilities. Given the challenges that the United States has faced in stabilizing Iraq, do you agree with Krepinevich that heavy ground forces are high-density/low demand? To what extent do Krepinevich and Owens agree or disagree on the issues? How do you assess their respective arguments?

D. Required Readings

1. Rumsfeld, Donald. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 30 September 2001, pp. 11–24. (The second iteration of the congressionally-mandated report that serves as the U.S. strategy and force planning "base case.")

2 Meyers, Richard B., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004. Scan all.

3. Kosiak, Steven, Andrew Krepinevich, and Michael Vickers. "Executive Summary: A Strategy for a Long Peace," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th edition. Newport: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 39, pp. 552–561. (An outline for a future strategy and transformation of the military.)

4. Owens, Mackubin Thomas, "Transforming Transformation: Some Force Planning Implications of the War in Iraq," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th edition. Newport: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 37, pp. 528–534. (An examination of how the "lessons" of Operation Iraqi Freedom might apply to decisions about a future U.S. force structure.)

5. Krepinevich, Andrew. *Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003. Read the Executive Summary, pp. i–v, and one other chapter of your choice. (Another assessment of lessoned learned of Operation Iraqi Freedom.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Cordesman, Anthony H. *The Instant Lessons of the Iraq War*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 14 April 2003, pp. 3–14. Can be accessed at http://www.csis.org/features/iraq.cfm. (Author raises some "instant lessons" from the Iraq war that reiterate the importance of military fundamentals in force planning.).

2. Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "Oops! Maybe the Two-War Standard Made Sense After All," *National Review Online*, 10 January 2003. (A short history of the two-MTW controversy suggesting that the hedging that it represented might have been warranted.)

3. Helprin, Mark. "Phony War," *National Review*, April 22, 2002. (A call for a substantially larger military force than the one mandated by the 2001 QDR.)

4. Vickers, Michael. "The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the FY 2003 Defense Budget and the Way Ahead for Transformation: Meeting the 'Rumsfeld Test,'" Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 19 June. (An assessment of the FY 2003 Defense Budget request in light of criteria laid out in the 2001 QDR.)

5. Flournoy, Michèle A., ed. *QDR 2001: Strategy Driven Choices for America's Security*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001. (The report of CJCS-mandated QDR working group established at NDU.)

6. Cohen, Eliot A. "Defending America in the Twenty-first Century," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2000, pp. 40–56. (A critique of current strategy, force structure and organization, with recommendations for the future.)

7. Haffa, Robert P., Jr. "Planning U.S. Forces to Fight Two Wars: Right Number, Wrong Forces," in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed. Newport: Naval War College Press, 2000 Chapter 37, pp. 564–571. (A critique of the current analytical models of warfare used to plan U.S. force structure and the bureaucratic inertia that inhibits the radical restructuring of forces required by technological change.)

8. Cohen, William S. *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, May 1997. (The first iteration of the QDR, which lays out the current force structure "base case.")

9. Odeen, Philip A. *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense Panel, December 1997, (The NDP discusses future operational challenges to the military and recommends force capabilities and characteristics.)

10. Blaker, James. "The American RMA Force," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1997. (A critique of the QDR based on the claim that it missed the opportunity to exploit the RMA.)

11. O'Hanlon, Michael. *Technological Change and the Future of Warfare*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2000. (An argument that technological change is more evolutionary than revolutionary.)

12. Goure, Daniel and Jeffrey Ranney. *Averting the Defense Train Wreck in the New Millennium*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999. (An analysis of the balance among strategy, forces and budgets that concludes the U.S. is facing a de facto demobilization unless defense budgets are increased.)

13. Kosiak, Steven M. *CSIS "Train Wreck" Analysis of Defense Department's Plans-Funding Mismatch is Off Track*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Mar 2000. (A critical analysis of the CSIS report cited above.)

14. Freedberg, Sydney J. "Over There," *National Journal*, April 17, 1999, pp. 1026–1030. (An examination of the problem faced by the U.S. military in overcoming the "tyranny of distance.")

15. Ochmanek, David, et al. *To Find, and Not to Yield*. Santa Monica: RAND, 1998. (An approach to sizing forces based on when they can deploy to a theater war.)

16. Kagan, Fredrick W. "Wishful Thinking on War: The National Defense Panel Gets It Wrong," *The Weekly Standard*, December 15, 1997, pp. 27–29. (A critique of the NDP report on the QDR.)

17. Bandow, Doug. "The Case for a *Much* Smaller Military," *Fortune*, June 23, 1997, pp. 25–26. (A proposal to reduce substantially U.S. world commitments and thus U.S. military force structure.)

18. Blechman, Barry M. and Paul N. Nagy. *U.S. Military Strategy in the 21st Century*. Arlington, VA: IRIS Independent Research, 1997. (A strategy and force structure analysis that stresses long-range air power.)

19. Ullman, Harlan and Warren Getler. "Common Sense Defense," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1996–97, pp. 21–36. (A recommendation that the U.S. shift from a strategy based on forward presence and forward deployment to one based on access to critical regions.)

20. Blaker, James R. *Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Guide to America's 21st Century Defense*. Washington, D.C.: The Progressive Policy Institute, Defense Working Paper No. 3, January 1997. (A full discussion of the RMA and its possible impact on strategy and forces.)

21. Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "The QDR and Future U.S. Security," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1997. (An assessment of the QDR that concludes the review accomplished what it was intended to, given budgetary constraints.)

22. Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "How To Think About the QDR," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1997. (A defense of "strategic pluralism" in U.S. defense planning as opposed to "strategic monism" and the arguments pushed by the "technophiles.")

23. Vickers, Michael G. and Steven M Kosiak. *The Quadrennial Defense Review: An Assessment*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, December 1997. (The authors detail what they consider serious strategic flaws in the 1997 QDR.)

24. Haffa, Robert P., Jr. "A 'New Look' At the Bottom-Up Review: Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces For a New Century," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1996, pp. 21–29. (A proposal to build future U.S. force structure around the capabilities of long-range air power.)

SSF-23 REVIEW AND REFLECTION

A. Focus. The primary purpose of the Strategy, Security and Forces course has been to provide a comprehensive strategy and force planning framework and to develop, apply, and refine concepts useful for allocating resources to total defense forces. We have repeatedly emphasized the importance of viewing decisions from national and joint/combined military perspectives rather than from a single service vantage point. This session provides the opportunity to review course concepts and to reflect upon questions raised throughout the course. What truly are the nation's interests? What should the nation's objectives be for the future? What is the best national strategy to ensure the objectives are met? What is the meaning of security and what will the security environment look like in the future? Are military planners developing the right strategy and force structure to protect the American people and defend their interests in the future?

B. Objectives

- Review and reflect on major course concepts.
- Reflect on the fundamental trade-offs required among interests, objectives, strategies, forces, and various levels of risk in developing national strategies and military forces.

C. Guidance

1. When President Bush spoke at Whitehall Palace on 19 November 2003 he reminded his British audience that their country was America's "closest friend in the world," united in an "alliance of values." He argued that the peace and security of free nations now rests on three pillars: international organizations, the use of force as a last resort, and the spread of democracy. The president cautioned against allowing the United Nations (UN) to slip into the irrelevance of the League of Nations by refusing to back up UN resolutions with resolve, including force when diplomatic means fail. In his speech, the president focused upon the humanitarian aims of the use of force in the Balkans, Iran and Iraq, and the promotion of human rights and human dignity. Addressing his critics, he argued that Islam and democracy are compatible, saying, "It is not realism to suppose that one-fifth of humanity is unsuited to liberty." Do you agree with the three pillars the president selected? Is his approach essentially realist, liberalist or idealist or some combination?

2. Emma Rothschild considers the question of the relationship between military and non-military security in a world of interconnectedness. She argues that the preoccupation with defining security is typical in a post-war phase of reconstruction, such as the decade of the 1990s, but that in the era of the "new war" on terrorism, defining security is still in work. To help the discussion, she takes the historical approach, with particular emphasis on the British Empire and the limits of military security. She traces the origins of our current concepts of order, globalization, international law, human rights, power, interdependence, and the idea of security through constitutionalism. Ultimately, she finds that there is not sufficient evidence to support the idea that democratization brings peace and security, but neither will military means ever bring absolute security. Military means will be less and less useful in the "new wars," she argues, and so imperial power will be less effective as well. For this reason, the United States should be

the last empire. Do you find the historical approach helpful in assessing the prospects for military and "extended" security? Why or why not? Do you agree with Rothschild's conclusion?

3. Jessica Stern describes the various manifestations of al Qaeda and other forms of radical transnational Islam as they have adapted to the new security environment arising in the wake of the events of 11 September 2001. Like Proteus, the Greek sea-god who could assume different forms, al Qaeda has evolved and adapted to change, making it more difficult to detect and destroy. Stern discusses the goals, motivations, and strategies of al Qaeda and like-minded organizations. Al Qaeda has changed its mission over time, changed its recruiting focus, and adapted its organization to the circumstances of the time. Al Qaeda and other organizations constitute non-hierarchical networks and may be morphing further into "virtual networks" that include groups that do not share al Qaeda's ideology but agree with its ends. What can liberal states such as the United States do to counter such an enemy?

4. Phillip Longman proposes that the global balance of power will shift in the coming years due to dramatic demographic trends. He critiques as false the notion of overpopulation and finds the opposite is true: the rate of world population growth has fallen by more than 40 percent since the 1960s, and total world population is expected to peak at 9 billion in 2070 and then decline. As countries grow richer, populations grow older and birthrates plummet. Both rich and developing nations are affected. Public policies that increase birth rates are essential if a social and economic disaster is to be averted. What does Longman's scenario mean for U.S. security interests and what grand strategy and foreign policy tools can be used to avert it?

D. Required Readings

1. Bush, George W. "Remarks by the President at Whitehall Palace," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 42, pp. 580–588.

2. Rothschild, Emma. "The Last Empire: Security and Globalization in Historical Perspective," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 48. Read only p. 657 to the top of p. 659 and pp. 667–674. Skim remainder.

3. Stern, Jessica. "The Protean Enemy," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 32, pp. 469–479.

4. Longman, Phillip. "The Global Baby Bust," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2004. (The world—rich and poor countries alike—will pay economic and social prices for aging populations and plummeting birthrates that are far too steep. Public policy to turn the tide is essential before it is too late.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Bush, George W. Remarks at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 6 November 2003

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/print/20031106-3.html. (President argues that the advance of liberty is achieved the "willingness to sacrifice.")

2. Brooks, David. "Bigger than the Nobel," *The New York Times*, 11 October 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/11/opinion/11BROO.html. (A *New York Times* columnist proposes that one of Pope John Paul II's international contributions has been to remind people that the human person's quest for truth cannot be "pared down" by ideologies such as socialism or capitalism, and that democracy and human rights are not ends in themselves but means to attaining the ultimate end.)

3. Copley, Gregory R. "Looking to History in a New, Pivotal Time," *Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, Volume 8, 2003. (An historian argues that the current watershed era in which Western civilization is made difficult by a consistent failure, especially by self-effacing Westerners, to understand and apply the lessons of history.)

4. Broad, Robin. *Global Backlash: Citizen Initiatives for a Just World Economy*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002. (The way in which tens of millions of activists across the globe are organizing and "amplifying" various alternative proposals for a just world economy.)

5. Kasun, Jaqueline. *The War Against Population: the Economics and Ideology of World Population Control*. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999. (Empirical analysis of the influence of the population control agenda in U.S. foreign and domestic policy, and the resulting rise in diplomatic tensions with Muslim countries in the last thirty years.)

6. Uvin, Peter. *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda*. West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1998. (A case study of the reasons why international aid programs sometimes perpetuate structural violence, causing "development success stories" like Rwanda to revert into humanitarian crises.)

7. Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso, 1991. (An anthropologist addresses the underlying reason why people are attached to social groups, and argues that because of cognitions and feelings people who have never met one another share "imagined communities" that can give rise to nationalism and international movements.)

8. Juergensmeyer, Mark. *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. (An explanation of why this version of terrorism is on the rise.)

9. Roberts, Brad. *Weapons Proliferation and World Order after the Cold War*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Kluwer Law International, 1996. (Proposes that weapons proliferation is a "window through which to examine the sources of order and disorder.")

10. Nye, Joseph. "U.S. Power and Strategy after Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2003, pp. 60–73. (The dean of the Kennedy School argues that Americans are overestimating the value of their military primacy and must put more emphasis on "soft power.")

11. Smith, Anthony. *America's Mission*: *The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. (A history of U.S. democracy promotion abroad from 1898 to the present and a consideration of the reasons behind resurgent "Wilsonianism.")

12. Glendon, Mary Ann. *A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. New York: Random House, 2001. (Learned Hand Professor of International Law at Harvard finds that human rights were from the beginning considered to be universal despite the diversity of opinion about their source.)

13. Hathaway, Oona A. "Two Cheers for International Law," *The Wilson Quarterly*, Washington, D.C., Autumn 2003. (Argues that human rights treaties have effects different from what either advocates or detractors of international law expect.)

14. Power, Samantha. *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Harper Collins, 2003. (The Pulitzer Prize winning book that tells the story of the genocide convention and examines the U.S. track record in abiding by it.)

15. Wheeler, Nicholas J. *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. (The author argues for a "third way" between unilateralism and strict UN-approved multilateralism that would allow timely intervention to stop humanitarian debacles.)

16. Berman, Eric G. and Katie E. Sams. "The Peacekeeping Capacities of African Regional Organizations," *Conflict, Security and Development*, Volume 2, No. 1, 2002, pp. 31–55. (The authors address the inner workings of African regional organizations and find that they are not yet ready to take on the responsibilities that the international community would like them to assume.)

17. Singer, P. W. *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003. (Addresses the emerging pattern of increasing reliance on private military firms by individuals, corporations, humanitarian groups, governments and international organizations.)

18. Rieff, David. "Blueprint for a Mess: How the Bush administration's prewar planners bungled postwar Iraq," *The New York Times Magazine*, 2 November 2003. (The author argues that the American plan for dealing with postwar Iraq was flawed in its conception.)

19. Schell, Jonathan. "America's Vulnerable Imperialism," *YaleGlobal*, 24 November 2003. (The author cautions that due to anti-colonialist movements in the 20th century, the United States will not be able to achieve the necessary acquiescence from other countries that previous empires were able maintain.)

SSF-24 FINAL EXAMINATION

A. Focus. The Security, Strategy, and Forces examination is designed to consolidate student-learning experiences during the course. Students are required to integrate and apply course concepts in a concise and coherent essay.

B. Objectives

- Reinforce the learning process by encouraging a course review and synthesis of ideas.
- Evaluate student performance.
- Provide feedback on student's understanding of course material.

C. Guidance

1. The final examination is a three-hour, closed-book exercise. No books, notes, computer files, or other reference materials are allowed.

2. The basis of evaluation for the examination is:

- Development of a complete and logical approach to the topic.
- Application of appropriate course concepts to the specific question chosen.
- Brevity, clarity, and specificity in communication of ideas.

3. The students will prepare an essay response to one of three short cases. The examination does not require recall of specific facts or facets of the assigned readings. Rather, it requires the integration and application of the major concepts addressed in the course.

D. Required Reading

1. "Security, Strategy, and Forces Final Examination, College of Naval Warfare, Fall 2003." (This is a copy of the final examination administered to CNW students last year.)

ANNEX D
PLANNING CHALLENGES
STUDY GUIDE

1. Scope. The Planning Challenges (PC) Module of the course in National Security Decision Making (NSDM) is designed to integrate the concepts mastered in the three sub-courses and to provide a bridge between these courses and the National Security Decision Making Exercise (NSDMEX). Each of the three sub-courses' perspectives is important as the students learn both the art and science of making national security decisions. Upon completion of this module, students will be expected to grasp the principal challenges faced by the major national security organizations and their roles in the determination and execution of National Security Strategy. Clearly, this includes an initial appreciation of the types of forces and weapons systems best suited to address requisite operational challenges, operational concepts and required capabilities. Additionally, students will be expected to possess a good understanding of how organizational cultures and ways of doing business, governmental politics, domestic and international environments, budgetary constraints, professional experience, and analytical thinking shape national security decisions and their implementation.

This module will examine all areas that must be understood when fashioning strategies for the NSDMEX: homeland security, space, nuclear, air, land, maritime, reserves and strategic mobility. In each area, subject area experts will provide presentations that address pertinent facts, including current capabilities, resource constraints, and future requirements. They will also address the complexities of interagency coordination, the friction within the decision making milieu and the challenges of fashioning realistic implementation plans. In addition to being provided the "tools" to develop defense and military strategies, the students will also be exposed to non-military tools (political, diplomatic, economic) available to the grand strategist. Each expert briefing will be complemented by seminar discussion designed to use the briefing material in the development of the seminar NSDMEX presentation.

The opening PC session—the Integration Panel—will demonstrate the necessity to comprehend all three elements of the NSDM Course to fully appreciate the entire package of national security decision making. Transformation, as characterized by the Rumsfeld Pentagon, will be used to illustrate this point because it is an extremely challenging and complex process, requiring an appreciation of concepts addressed throughout the NSDM course of study. It will also be the underlying theme of the innovative strategies set forth in each seminar's NSDMEX presentation.

Upon completion of this module, students will have been exposed to the factors and forces shaping the national security decision making process in the major components of the Department of Defense. They will be exposed to all the capabilities resident in the Department of Defense and be asked to apply this expertise in the development of their seminar NSDMEX strategies, in which each seminar will fashion its own national security and military strategy, determine the appropriate military forces to support this strategy, and discuss the challenges of its implementation.

2. Module Objectives. The Planning Challenges Module is designed to provide optimum preparation for the National Security Decision Making Exercise (NSDMEX) where students will be required to utilize all aspects of the NSDM course content in devising force structures, organizations, and implementation plans as members of the national security community. This goal is supported by the Planning Challenge module objectives so that students:

- Have a greater understanding of the processes of government and of the complexity of national security decision-making

- Have the ability to apply and integrate strategic concepts to the selection of the forces and weapons systems in the development of innovative as well as achievable National Security Strategies.

3. Course Structure. The PC module will be conducted over five days, with most sessions in the mornings. Each of nine sessions will be introduced by faculty presentations led by a subject matter expert. These expository sessions, normally held in Spruance Auditorium, are designed to provide a knowledge base on the subject area as well as an introduction to the principal challenges facing national security decision makers in each area. These faculty-led sessions will be followed directly by seminar meetings designed to incorporate this knowledge into the seminar's nascent grand strategies. This way, each seminar can address each important facet of its own NSDMEX strategy using a well-informed information source. At the completion of the PC Module, the students will have been exposed to all the required elements they need to develop their seminar's national military strategy in support of the NSDMEX. Readings will be assigned to allow the students to understand the session's challenge from this multiplicity of perspectives. Similar to the three sub-courses, seminar participation is central to the learning process.

4. Course Study Guide. This PC Study Guide is the primary planning tool for the module. For each session it identifies the focus, objectives, guidance questions and reading assignments. Guidance questions should be used as an aid in preparing for class. A list of supplementary readings and websites is provided for those students planning to conduct further research on the topic.

5. Course Requirements. All students will have substantially completed the three sub-courses of SSF, DMI and PMP. These courses provide the concepts to be integrated and applied during this course module. The first session—the Integration Panel—is a prerequisite for eight substantive presentations and seminar sessions. Although there is no formal examination at the end of this module, the PC Module should be viewed as a bridge between the three major sub-courses and the NSDMEX.

6. Course Material. In addition to the Course Syllabus and the PC Study Guide, the following texts and readings are employed in the module:

- *National Security Decision Making Exercise (NSDMEX) Programming Guidance and Resource Summary Memorandum* (A compilation of resource summaries for all DoD Services and Agencies. It addresses all major service programs and provides cost and funding profiles, allowing students to develop budgetary perspective. Enclosures within this reference address each of the Planning Challenges sessions).

PLANNING CHALLENGES
COLLEGE OF NAVAL COMMAND & STAFF—2004

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PC-1 INTEGRATION (TRANSFORMATION PANEL)

A. Focus. Over the past generation, the global security environment has changed dramatically, moving from one marked by a bipolar Cold War and arriving at an uncertain world marked by increasing globalization as well as a global war on terror. The overwhelming power of the United States faces military challenges as varied as the transnational terror networks of Al-Qaeda and nuclear-capable rogue states like North Korea. The Department of Defense (DoD) recognized, even before the attack on the World Trade Center, that all the principal elements of our defense structure had to be radically transformed to adjust to these revolutionary changes in the global security environment. Thus, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld embarked on an ambitious scheme to "transform" the Pentagon.

To some extent, "transformation" is always at work in the Department of Defense. The success of the ongoing transformation, however, is determined by more than the new technologies, weapons systems and forces chosen to support this change. Equally important are all the intangibles: How does DoD get buy-in from its stakeholders? Does DoD recognize the frictions and impediments posed by the domestic and international political systems? Does DoD have a workable implementation plan? The seminar challenge for the NSDMEX is to produce a comparable "transformation" plan, and, like today's Pentagon, to answer the above questions in an integrated and coherent manner.

B. Objectives

- Determine the military capabilities required by the U.S. military in the future security environment, along with key characteristics of a transformed future military forces (SSF).

- Appreciate the challenges posed by the international and domestic political systems as well as key governmental institutions making Defense Transformation difficult (PMP).

- Examine the issues related to the implementation of Transformation, including techniques and strategies to improve its chance for success (DMI).

- Appreciate that a true understanding of Transformation must address the three challenges above in an integrated form. For our purposes, that the focus of NSDM's three sub-courses must be considered and coordinated every time we make bold, innovative proposals to change any element of the Department of Defense—as we will do in the forthcoming NSDMEX.

C. Guidance

1. The aphorism that "If you don't know where you're going, any road will take you there," is particularly true when we discuss DoD Transformation. Strategists and force planners must understand both the security environment as well as national security strategy to determine not only the size and shape of the future U.S. military, but also how we intend to fight. In turn, this makes clearer the kind of required capabilities this force must possess. Although U.S. defense budgets are significant, they are not limitless. Force planners must determine today the technologies and weapons systems which best suit a "transformed" military and provide its

desired characteristics. Is redundancy always important in a military force? That is, we need to know the "what" of Transformation.

2. Organizations as large as the U.S. Department of Defense do not change in a vacuum. They operate within political systems—international, governmental and domestic—each with its own rules, prohibitions and quirks. It is necessary to examine the interrelationships and impacts of these forces at all levels. Some of these organizations will support Secretary Rumsfeld's efforts at DoD Transformation, some will not. There are also key individuals in various organizations whose support cannot be taken for granted. Thus, the Department must understand the fog and friction of the milieu in which it aspires to Transform as well as identify and court the principal players. That is, we need to know the "where" and "who" of Transformation.

3. Transformation is not a vague goal for tomorrow, but rather a unified plan that must be acted on today. Thus, one must understand the actions that will guide, enable, coordinate and cause the desired results of DoD Transformation. If Transformation is at core a strategy for large-scale innovation of DoD's culture, processes and capabilities, we must comprehend the standards used to measure its success. The national leadership must ensure that the new combination of concepts, capabilities and people are actually producing the desired result. They must ensure that DoD policies are aligned and linked to joint and service roadmaps. That is, we need to know the "how" and "when" of Transformation.

D. Required Readings

1. Huber, Jeff. "Invasion of the Transformers," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, October 2003, pp. 74–76. (The article suggests that Secretary Rumsfeld's transformation is just old wine in new bottles—that transformation is mere talk.)

2. Hone, Thomas C. "We Have a Process for Transformation," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, January 2004, pp. 24–25. (In response to the first reading, the author provides a summary of how the Navy successfully determined required capabilities for a previous transformation 80 years ago. Transformation is real.)

3. Combs, Douglas and Fred Kacher. "Learning From the Masters," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, January 2004, pp. 46–48. (An examination of the successful methods used to transform large organizations in business, sports and the military.)

4. Hone, Thomas C. "Understanding Transformation," *Transformation Trends*, Arlington VA: Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation, January 16, 2004, pp. 1–6. (The article refutes an earlier SSF reading by arguing that prior military systems redundancies were both inefficient and accidental.)

PC-2 CHALLENGES IN HOMELAND SECURITY

A. Focus. Homeland Security is the most pressing challenge faced by the federal government in the last 50 years. The problems are immense and the answers are hazy. This session should help the seminar gain an appreciation for the tremendous complexity involved in defending the world's most accessible democracy. The session also highlights the requirement to create synergy between agencies and governments to build a unified response. The lesson begins with the question of whether a secure homeland is a real possibility. Can we actually close off the borders? Defend the skies? Adding to this concern is a discussion of the development and problems of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its interagency and intergovernmental difficulties. Hoping to offset and answer some of these problems, the President has addressed certain challenges with a focus on policy, resources, and dedicated funding. But is that enough for the future? 9-11 revealed the risk of placing homeland security on the back burner of agency importance for so long. One of the results of 9-11 is the American people's demand for a secure homeland, and whether they will tolerate any expense to enable the government to achieve this goal. They daily demonstrate their support for domestic security programs by suffering silently through long security lines at airports, and support of terror alert messages on the news. This session will enable you with the information necessary to help strategically review the past, present and future of homeland security—perhaps establishing a system where the long lines and terror alerts are nothing but a memory.

B. Objectives

- Asses homeland security threats to the United States and develop a comprehensive strategy to defeat, respond, or counteract those threats.
- Understand the interagency and intergovernmental challenges involved with the forming and operation of a Department of Homeland Security.
- Examine and critically assess DoD current and future homeland security operational concepts and for planning initiatives.
- Review the budget figures for homeland security in order to develop an innovative approach towards homeland security in future years.

C. Guidance

1. Carr clearly argues that homeland security is a lost cause—is this an accurate assessment? He argues that an open society cannot adequately defend itself against an enemy determined on a terrorist act—is he correct? He addresses the argument (recently renewed by Professor Jeffery Record) that a war on terrorism is analogous to war on crime or the war on drugs. Is this an accurate analogy? Given that the author wrote immediately following 9-11, were his short-term projections accurate? Will his long-term projections be accurate?

2. The second reading briefly reviews the internal, interagency, and intergovernmental problems with forming and operating the Department of Homeland Security. Which of these problems do you think is the most important? Can you see any solutions towards addressing the internal organizational problems of the DHS? Do you think one agency will arise and become

the first among equals? Is information technology (IT) the key to collaboration, coordination, and possible departmental synergy? What about the fight between DoD and DHS—is that a fight waiting to happen or will DoD always come out better than the newly formed DHS? What about the intergovernmental problem? Will state and local governments, with their political strength, dictate how the department will operate?

3. The final readings outline the current strategy and spending priorities of the DHS. What do you think might be the outcome of these priorities in 25 years? What external events might occur that affect this spending focus? What factors and contexts make homeland defense funding unevenly vulnerable, i.e., easy to cut in some ways and difficult to cut in others? What are some of the national priorities that compete with homeland security? How might the DHS become even more relevant and increase its posture within the federal government?

D. Required Readings

1. Carr, David. "The Futility of Homeland Defense," Reprinted by permission from *The Atlantic Monthly*, January 2002 issue, pp. 53–55.

2. Turregano, Clemson, Jeff Norwitz, and Tim Castle. "Creating a Legacy: The Challenges of the Department of Homeland Security," Naval War College, 2003.

3. "Securing the Homeland," extracted from *Progress Report on the Global War on* Terrorism (Extract), The White House, September 2003.

4. Testimony by Secretary Tom Ridge on FY05 Budget Before the Senate Appropriations Committee, 10 February 2004.

E. Supplementary Readings

1. *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, The White House, Government Printing Office, 2002.

2. *National Security Strategy*, The White House, Government Printing Office, 2002.

3. *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, The White House, Government Printing Office, 2002.

PC-3 SPACE AND NUCLEAR PLANNING CHALLENGES

A. Focus. This session will consider the planning challenges and opportunities posed by nuclear weapons and space. First, U.S. nuclear strategy and force structures were shaped almost exclusively by the perceived need to deter Soviet aggression against the U.S. and its allies. Deterrence theory and nuclear strategy based on the principle of "assured destruction" (threat of retaliation in kind) in which offensive capabilities dominated many aspects of U.S. defense policy. Later, the United States stressed arms control as the primary means for limiting nuclear arms. These nuclear systems and strategies have evolved rapidly in view of the proliferation and evolution of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Critical developments today include the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), renewed development of nuclear weapons (low-yield), withdrawal from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, abrogation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with Russia. Collectively, changes in U.S. nuclear strategy and arms control agreements permit greater flexibility in how states use and deploy nuclear weapons as well as conventional capabilities that are based on enhanced information and communications systems. And much of this infrastructure is based on space systems.

Second, space systems are crucial for U.S. global military operations in terms of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); command, control, and communications (C^3); ballistic missile launch warning and tracking; and the sensor-to-shooter kill chain that was used in Afghanistan and Iraq to destroy time-critical targets. On some levels, space is militarized and will become increasingly so in the future; and on other levels, commercial forces are playing an important role. Planning challenges for the future are likely to focus on how military and commercial systems improve the ability of space to support U.S. military capabilities as well as overcome potential threats and vulnerabilities. In broad terms, the planning challenges involve three related considerations. The first are questions about how space supports U.S. military and commercial capabilities and the implications for future planning challenges. The second focuses on how international factors influence the use of space for military and commercial purposes. And the third examines how ongoing organizational reform (who is in charge for space planning, policy, and operations) affects US space activity.

B. Objectives

- Examine and critically assess current and possible future nuclear strategies, operational concepts, and force planning initiatives.
- Examine how space systems, concepts, and technologies support U.S. military capabilities and future planning challenges.

C. Guidance

1. The Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was briefed to Congress on December 31, 2001, calls for substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenal—from 7,000 warheads today to around 3,800 in five years and 1,700–2,200 within ten years. According to the NPR, nuclear planning, like conventional planning per the QDR, will shift from a threat-based to a capabilities-based approach. The old offensive nuclear triad will be replaced with a

new one, consisting of offensive, defensive, and infrastructure legs. In addition, the US nuclear arsenal would be augmented by missile defense and precision-guided conventional weapons. These developments raise several questions: Should the United States resume nuclear testing and develop new weapons? Are the proposed strategies politically sustainable? What is the effect of acquiring defensive capabilities on nuclear strategy? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the administration's new strategic nuclear framework? What are the risks?

2. The RAND study—*Space Weapons, Earth Wars*—discusses the motivations that may influence the decision of the United States and other states to develop and deploy weapons in space over the next decade or longer. An important consideration is the general factors that influence U.S. decisions, the deliberations of the other states, and the extent to which the actions of other states influence the decision of the United States.

D. Required Readings

1. Buchan, Glenn. "Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security Strategy for a New Century," in Zalmay Khalilzad and Jeremy Shapiro, eds., *Strategic Appraisal: United States Air and Space Power in the 21st Century*. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, September 2002, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1314/ (Extracts from a study that reviews the history/evolution of nuclear strategies, arguments for and against nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy options, force reductions and dealerting, changes in nuclear use options, proliferation, nuclear infrastructure, and strategy recommendations.)

2. Preston, Bob, and John Baker. "Space Challenges," in Zalmay Khalilzad and Jeremy Shapiro, eds., *Strategic Appraisal: United States Air and Space Power in the 21st Century*. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, September 2002, pp. 143–159. (Discusses the key issues and challenges that U.S. planners face over the issue of space activities in both the military and commercial sectors.)

3. Wirtz, James J., and James A. Russell. "A Quiet Revolution: Nuclear Strategy for the 21st Century," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Winter 2002/2003, pp. 9–15. (Discusses the ongoing revolution in nuclear strategy given the global war on terrorism, homeland security, and uncertainty in international politics. It argues that there are new threats that must be managed and, accordingly, new opportunities to be considered in nuclear strategy.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2001. Chapter 8, pp. 107–132. (An explanation of DoD's emphasis on space forces and national defense, warfighter enhancements, space missions, and funding and modernization programs.)

2. Behrens, Carl E. *Nuclear Nonproliferation Issues*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, November 19, 2002. (Study looks nonproliferation policy, organizations, programs and regional nonproliferation issues.)

3. Bush, George W. *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2002. (National strategy on WMD.)

4. Crouch, J. D. *Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review*. DoD Briefing, 9 January 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html. (DoD briefing on NPR with J.D. Crouch (ASD ISP) and Rear Adm. Barry M. Costello, (deputy director for Strategy and Policy, Joint Staff) and John Harvey (director, Office of Policy, Planning, Assessment and Analysis, Department of Energy). Slides used in briefing, *Findings of the Nuclear Posture Review* (020109-D-6570C-001), are available at http://www.defenselink .mil/news/Jan2002/020109-D-6570C-001.pdf.

5. "Executive Summary," in James A. Lewis, *Preserving America's Strength in Satellite Technology: A Report of the CSIS Satellite Commission*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2002, pp. vii–xvi. (Provides a discussion of the challenges faced by the United States in the arena of commercial satellite technology.)

6. Fisher, Rand H. and Kent B. Pelot. "The Navy Has a Stake in Space," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, October 2001, pp. 58–62. (Provides an overview of the U.S. Navy's role and interest in space.)

7. Florini, Ann M., and Yahya Dehqanzada. "Commercial Satellite Imagery Comes of Age," *Issues in Science and Technology*, Fall 1999, pp. 45–52. (A look at commercial satellite proliferation and how to deal with increasing transparency.)

8. Hays, Peter, and Karl Mueller. "Going Boldly—Where?" *Aerospace Power Journal*, Spring 2001, pp. 34–49. (Discusses aerospace integration, the Space Commission, and the USAF's vision for space.)

9. Hitt, Jack. "The Next Battlefield May Be In Outer Space," *New York Times Magazine*, August 5, 2001, pp. 30–35, 55–56, and 62–63. (A survey of future military space capabilities.)

10. Johnson-Freese, Joan, and Roger Handberg. "Searching for Policy Coherence: The DoD Space Architect as an Experiment," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1997, p. 92. (Provides background on previous space organizational reforms.)

11. Krepon, Michael. "Lost in Space," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2001, pp. 2–8. (Provides a detailed critique of the report by the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization and warns of a weapons race in space if the Commission's recommendations are implemented.)

12. Martel, William C. and Toshi Yoshihara. "Averting Sino-U.S. Space Race," *The Washington Quarterly*, Fall 2003, pp. 19–36. (Discusses the nature of U.S.-Chinese competition in space and the prospects for an arms race in space.)

13. *Nuclear Posture Review Report* [Excerpts], 8 January, 2002. http://www .globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm

14. Oberg, James E. *Space Power Theory*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 1999, pp. 146–152. (Addresses space as another environment for conflict.)

15. *Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization*, January 11, 2001, Figures 1 and 2, page xix and xxxi. (Recommends a new and comprehensive national security space management and organizational approach to promote and protect US interests in space.)

PC-4 AIR PLANNING CHALLENGES

A. Focus. Airpower has become a progressively more important instrument of warfare from Desert Storm (Iraq), through Allied Force (Serbia/Kosovo), and most recently in Afghanistan (Enduring Freedom) and Iraq (Iraqi Freedom). Airpower supports a maneuver and firepower-intensive style of warfare that may be well suited to winning conflicts with limited objectives. It is based on the concept that information and precision strike can defeat an enemy before the adversary can react to advanced technology and the speed of operational maneuver forces. The session considers the concept of using maneuver forces whenever possible to set up adversaries for timely, precise, persistent, and lethal engagement by air. The session also considers the role of airpower in overcoming evolving anti-access (AA) and area denial (AD) challenges that could preclude such precise and persistent fire support. Both considerations are used as a point of departure for analyzing future air capabilities and the role of operational, technical, and fiscal risk as well as opportunity costs.

B. Objectives

- Examine and critically assess operational concepts that drive airpower force planning.
- Assess current force structure initiatives and refine your thinking about future requirements to meet emerging operational challenges. Consider risks and opportunity costs.
- Develop an appreciation of how service cultures, Congress, the defense industrial base, and the international environment impact joint force planning and the DoD acquisition process.

C. Guidance

1. Scales suggests that the Air Force and Navy have perfected a firepower-focused doctrine tailored to fighting limited wars like Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Iraqi Freedom. He states that, "This new American way of war was born on the premise that technology could kill the enemy faster than the enemy could find the means to offset the overwhelming advantages of information and precision strike." Do you agree or disagree with his firepower intensive concept? Why? What are the force planning implications and how could land-based operational maneuver forces be structured and integrated to support the doctrine?

2. Krepinevich provides an initial assessment of lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Based on his analysis, what do you think are the force planning implications for unmanned systems, long-range/long-endurance bombers, air refueling tankers, and tactical aircraft.

3. Watts explains the USAF Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) concept of operations (CONOPS) for dealing with the evolving anti-access (AA) and area denial (AD) challenges. To what extent does the CONOPS support Scales' limited war doctrine and how is it related to maritime and land force CONOPS for dealing with the same AA/AD threats? Do you agree or disagree with the author's assessment concerning the political and military vulnerabilities of U.S. forward bases? Why? Also, what are the key operational, path, technical, and fiscal risks of the

CONOPS and to what extent would they influence your choice of future joint air capabilities? As an example, would you shift the focus to long-range systems that integrate USAF, USN, USMC, USA capabilities for precise and persistent fire support, change the balance between manned and unmanned systems, accelerate the integration C4ISR systems, or enhance modernization of refueling and strategic airlift forces? What airpower capabilities do you think are most important for the future and where would you spend the next available dollar?

4. The *Unmanned and Rotary Wing Planning Challenges Package* addresses current capabilities and evolving requirements for unmanned airborne systems and adjustments to current USA and USN helicopter programs. What operational challenges are involved and what choices would you make about the level and mix of those systems? As an example, how heavily would your force structure depend on unmanned systems for C4ISR, fire support of ground forces, and long-range strikes? If your decision is to accelerate the ratio of unmanned to manned systems, what mechanisms would you recommend to assure the decision is implemented?

5. The *Manned Airframe Planning Challenges Package* deals with current capabilities and evolving requirements for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), close air support, long-range strike platforms, and the ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to support future air programs. As a future force planner, what would you do about those programs to support your seminar's NSDM exercise?

D. Required Readings

1. Scales, Robert L. "Checkmate By Operational Maneuver," *Armed Forces Journal International*, October 2001, pp. 38 and 40–42. (Suggests a new American style of firepower and maneuver intensive warfare.)

2. Krepinevich, Andrew F. "The Battle Over The Lessons Of Iraq," *Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003, pp. 25–27, 29–30. (Examines initial lessons learned for UAVs, bombers, tankers, and tactical aircraft.)

3. Krepinevich, Andrew, Barry Watts, and Robert Work. *Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003. Read pp. 1–18. (Examines the USAF concept of operations and associated risk for dealing with the evolving Anti-Access (AA) and Area Denial (AD) challenge.)

4. *Unmanned and Rotary Wing Planning Challenges Package*. Polmar, Norman. "Unmanned and Unafraid," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 2003, pp. 42–43. Hancock, John A. "Submarine-Launched Vehicles: Time to Walk the Talk," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, September 2003, pp. 43–46; Tunick, Wayne A. and Michael J. Weaver. "Arm All Navy Helicopters," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, December 2003, pp. 37–39. (Provides a range of force planning issues.)

5. *Manned Airframe Planning Challenges Package*. Robinson, David A. "TACAIR Integration: Must Optimize JSFs," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, December 2003, pp. 52–55; Wall, Robert. "Navy Commitment," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 5 January 2004, p. 28; Fulghum, David A. "Taking A Chance," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 31 May 2004,

p. 28; Sirak, Michael. "USAF Focuses on Future Long-Range Strike Plans," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, p. 28, January 2004; Fulghum, David A. "New Threat, New Defense," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 31 May 2004, pp. 46–48. (Provides a range of force planning considerations.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Biddle, Stephen. *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002, pp. 1–58. (A detailed field analysis that concludes it is a mistake to see Afghanistan as a radical break with prior military experience. It suggests that an unbalanced U.S. military dependent on standoff precision engagement would be a high-risk posture. Complements required reading number one.)

2. Birkler, John, et al. *Assessing Competitive Strategies for the Joint Strike Fighter: Opportunities and Options*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001. http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1362/ (Provides the background and description of the JSF program to include an analysis of costs.)

3. Coram, Robert. "The Hog That Saves The Grunts," *New York Times*, 27 May 2003. http://ebird.dtic.mil/May2003/e20030527188276.html (Covers the role of the A-10 in Close Air Support during Operation Iraqi Freedom.)

4. Department of the Air Force. *U.S. Air Force White Paper on Long Range Bombers*, March 1, 1999. (Articulates Air Force vision of long-range bomber employment in support of national security and military strategy.)

5. Deptula, David A. "Air Force Transformation," *Aerospace Power Journal*, Fall 2001, pp. 85–91. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/fal01/fal01.html (Provides an excellent summary of USAF transformation to include history, modernization, critical capabilities, technology, operational concepts, and organization.)

6. Fulghum, David A., and Robert Wall. "Heavy Bomb Attacks Dominate Afghan War," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 3 December 2001, pp. 22 and 23. (Stresses the role of manned bombers.)

7. Gordon, John. "The U.S. Army and Naval Aviation: Partners In Power Projection," *Army*, September 2001, pp. 60–70. (Considers the growing importance of USN aviation in support of ground maneuver forces.)

8. Grant, Rebecca. "The Clash About CAS," *AIR FORCE Magazine*, January 2003, pp. 54–59. (Addresses current close air support issues based on operations in Afghanistan.)

9. Jumper, John P. "Global Strike Task Force," *Aerospace Power Journal*, Spring 2001, pp. 24–25 and 27–33. (Explains the Global Strike Task Force concept.)

10. Keaney, Thomas A., and Eliot A. Cohen. *Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report*. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1993, pp. 235–251. (Examines the lessons learned and implications of the 1991 war against Iraq.)

11. Khalilzad, Zalmay, and Jeremy Shapiro, eds. *Strategic Appraisal: United States Air and Space Power in the 21st Century*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002. http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1314/index.html (This twelve chapter publication is divided into parts. They are the geopolitical context for aerospace power, where does the USAF need to go, and supporting future forces. Chapter four, "Modernizing The Combat Forces: Near-Term Options" is an excellent example of a force planning defense analysis case.)

12. Kreisher, Otto. "Air Wings Built for Two," *AIR FORCE Magazine*, December 2002, pp. 68–73. (Details the proposed integration of Navy and Marine Corps fighter/attack squadrons.)

13. McVety, Pete. "An Unmanned Revolution," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, March 2000, pp. 88–92. (Discussion of future maritime operational concepts for UCAVs.)

14. Moore, Dan, and Jim Perkaus. "A Top Gun for Air-Ground Ops," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, October 2002, pp. 42–44. (Addresses the need to conduct field experiments to improve U.S. air-ground cooperation and combat capabilities to defeat decentralized terrorist networks.)

15. Moseley, T. Michael. *Operation IRAQI FREEDOM—By The Numbers*. 9AF, Shaw AFB, S.C.: Commander's Action Group, 30 April 2003. http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/OIFreport.pdf (Establishes a single source of aggregated facts about Operation Iraqi Freedom from the Combined Forces Air Component Commander's perspective.)

16. Preble, Christopher. "Joint Strike Fighter: Can a Multiservice Fighter Program Succeed?" CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 460, 5 December 2002, pp. 1–19. (This case dealing with the future of the JSF program considers factors from all three NSDM sub courses.)

17. Tirpak, John A. "The Force Seeks a New Baseline," *AIR FORCE Magazine*, January 2003, pp. 36–40. (An analysis of USAF operational requirements/tempo on which to base future manning and equipage.)

18. Tomassetti, Arthur. "A Leatherneck JSF Is Just Right," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, September 2002, pp. 32–33. (The lead government test pilot for the X-35B STOVL Joint Strike Fighter explains its capabilities in support of USMC operational requirements.)

19. U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. *New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century: Summary Volume*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1996, pp. 1–7. (Findings and recommendations on future technologies and capabilities.)

20. Yates, Patrick. "UCAVs Can Improve Surface Ships," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, October 2002, pp. 73–75. (Explores the advantages of UCAVs for maritime surface forces.)

PC-5 LAND PLANNING CHALLENGES

A. Focus. In the last decade, the proliferation of global forces of disintegration has increased the number and scope of potential threats to the security of the United States. The most dangerous threats are now merging with the most likely threats. Land forces must adapt to this emerging reality and develop the capability to meet this "full spectrum" challenge. While all of our armed forces must be ready to deal with these threats, only land forces have the ability to place "boots on the ground" and interact with populations, directly and continuously. Increasingly, this requirement to intervene with ground forces must be accomplished quickly over vast distances. Although the United States is unique among the states of the world in possessing the means to project a full array of overwhelming and sustainable military power over such distances, the fact remains that land forces are the most difficult element of power to project. Both the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps are capable of conducting ground combat operations. During the Cold War, the Marines were able to distinguish themselves from the Army as an expeditionary "force in readiness," capable of responding to short-fuse contingencies while the Army helped to deter major war by stationing units in or near the most likely theaters of war. But now the whole US military is seeking to acquire an expeditionary capability. At the same time, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have become a major source of combat power over the last decade. In addition, the Secretary of Defense (SEECDEF) recently expanded the authority of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to conduct the ongoing war against worldwide terrorist networks. How do we differentiate the roles and missions of the Army and the Marine Corps today? What about Special Operations Forces (SOF)? Some have predicted that in the future, all land forces will operate as SOF has in Afghanistan—in small, mobile, dispersed teams that call in fires from out of theater. What are the implications of such changes?

B. Objective

- Discuss the analytical and intuitive complexities of transforming a strategic vision into implementation plans, policy, and programs.

- Examine and critically assess the current and future strategic concepts, operational concepts, and force structures and acquisition plans of the Marines, the Army, and Special Operations Forces in light of the requirement to provide an expeditionary capability.

- Assess the practicality, affordability, and capability of these forces to meet the challenges of 21st century war, including the war against terrorist organizations.

C. Guidance

1. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, recently asked retired General Peter Schoomaker, to return to active duty as the Chief of Staff, Army, in order to lead the Army into the future. General Schoomaker quickly assessed the situation and published, "Relevant and Ready." This document contends that the Army constantly evolves, especially in times of war: indeed in such times as these, decision makers must review every facet of the Army. According to Gen. Schoomaker, the Army must embrace Joint operations, be more expeditionary while

maintaining its core competency in sustained land combat, and maintain a war fighting ethos. Are these concepts complementary, redundant, or in competition with the Marine Corps and/or Special Forces? In what direction should the Army evolve?

2. Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) is the new operational concept of the Marine Corps, subsuming Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS). According to news accounts, EMW is much broader than "operational maneuver from the sea" (OMFTS), and has as its goal the capability of deploying two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) anywhere in the world, regardless of available infrastructure, ready to operate in a week or less; or withdrawing two brigades from combat operations and redirecting them to an unrelated operation, without any retraining, reorganization, or reequipping. Sea-based operations are only one component of EMW, albeit an extremely important one. How do you assess EMW? Does the shift in focus away from OMFTS and sea-based operations, blur the line between the Marines and the Army's emerging force? What are the pros and cons of EMW?

3. Owens examines the competing strategic concepts of the Army and the Marine Corps. In the past, the differences between them seemed clear. But this has changed since the end of the Cold War as the Army seeks to become more "expeditionary." Are the strategic concepts of the two services redundant or complementary? Why or why not? What are the implications for planning future land forces?

4. After the war in Afghanistan, some writers advanced the idea that SOF in conjunction with airpower and allies on the ground provided the model for future conflict, indeed that SOF would displace conventional ground forces in the future. Some service innovations, e.g., the Marine Corps' "Hunter-Warrior" concept envisioned a more SOF-like force. Stephen Biddle cautions against an over-reliance on precision weapons at the expense of land forces. Using what he describes as "the Afghan Model," Biddle discusses the issues still facing land forces in our time. What are the risks of relying on air-delivered, precision weapons? Was the war in Afghanistan a harbinger for the end of conventional ground forces as we know them? Why or why not? Are ground forces undergoing a revolution or an evolution?

5. Rowan Scarborough outlines last year's changes in Defense Department policy designed to enable U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to plan and fight the global war against terrorist networks. One important change makes USSOCOM a "supported" command under certain circumstances. What does this expansion of responsibility mean for U.S. forces in general and USSOCOM in particular? Is USSOCOM being stretched too thin? Are more SOF necessary?

D. Required Readings

1. Department of the Army, "Our Army at War: Relevant and Ready," http://www.army .mil/thewayahead/ (The new Army vision.)

2. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. "Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Concept," *Inside the Navy*, 10 December 2001, pp. 11–15. (The official description of the Marines' new operational concept.)

3. Owens, Mackubin Thomas. “America’s Land Forces and the Requirement for an Expeditionary Capability.” Faculty Paper, January, 2003. (A discussion of the respective roles and missions of the Marines and the Army in light of the requirement to provide an expeditionary capability.)

4. Biddle, Stephen, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare,” *Foreign Affairs*, Mar/Apr 2003. Vol. 82, Issue 2, pp. 31–39

5. Scarborough, Rowan. “Rumsfeld Bolsters Special Forces: Expands Powers in War on Terror,” *Washington Times*, 6 January, 2003. (An account of the decision to expand the authority of USSOCOM to conduct the war against terrorist networks.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Scales, Robert H., Jr., Major General, U.S. Army (Ret). *Yellow Smoke: The Future of Land Warfare for America’s Military*. Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2003.

2. Headquarters, Department of the Army, “The Army” *Field Manual Number 1*, Washington, D.C., 14 June 2001. (Chapter 3, pp. 21–32)

3. Riggs, John M. “The Objective Force in 2015.” White Paper (Final Draft), From the Director, Objective Task Force, Alexandria, VA, 8 December 2002. Edited by LTC Peter Curry.

4. Boyle, Peter J. “A Different War: Is the Army Becoming Irrelevant?” *The New Yorker*, 1 July 2002, pp. 54–67.

5. Work, Robert O. “From Amphibious Assault to Operational Maneuver from the Sea: Charting the Ongoing (R)evolution in Littoral Maneuver,” Chapter V of *The Challenge of Maritime Transformation: Is Bigger Better?* Washington D.C.: CSBA, 2002, pp. 85–103. (An examination of Marine Corps innovation within the context of transforming maritime forces in general.)

6. Gordon, Michael R. “‘New’ U.S. War: Commandos, Airstrikes and Allies on the Ground,” *New York Times*, December 29, 2001, p. 1. (Article by a well-respected military correspondent suggesting that the Afghanistan model is the emerging American way of war.)

7. Anderson, Edward G., and Michael Linick. “Ensuring Future Victories Through Land Power Dominance: The U.S. Army Modernization Strategy,” in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 2nd ed. Newport: Naval War College Press, 1997, pp. 513–530. (A discussion of the Army’s plans to meet future requirements.)

8. Buckley, Edward T., and Henry G. Franke. “Army After Next Technology: Forging Possibilities into Reality,” *Military Review*, March-April 1998, pp. 2–8. (Discusses technological and doctrinal integration challenges and opportunities facing AAN planners.)

9. Caldera, Louis, and Eric K. Shinseki. “Army Vision—Soldiers On Point for the Nation . . . Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War,” *Military Review*, September–October 2000, pp. 3–5. (Provides an overview General Shinseki’s Vision for the Army.)

10. Congressional Budget Office. *Options for Reconfiguring Service Roles and Missions*. Washington, D.C.: Congress of the United States, March 1994, pp. 11–16. (The CBO reviews potential redundancy between USMC units and Army light divisions.)

11. Congressional Budget Office. *Structuring the Active and Reserve Army for the 21st Century*. Washington, D.C.: Congress of the United States, December 1997. (CBO examines the advantages and disadvantages of four force structure alternatives, which focus on an increased reliance upon host nation support and the Army National Guard.)

12. Dunn, Brian J. "A Total Army for Total War: The Guard Divisions' Role," *Army*, January 1999, pp. 10–12. (Contends that reserves capable of fighting a "larger-than-MTW" threat be maintained into the future.)

13. Fautua, David T. "Transforming the Reserve Components," *Military Review*, September–October 2000, pp. 57–67. (Article examines three important aspects of the ongoing transformation of the reserve components)

14. Killebrew, Robert B. "The Army After Next," in Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 2nd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1997, Chapter 40, pp. 590–598. (The author addresses key assumptions underlying U.S. Army strategic concepts.)

15. Metz, Steven, et al. *The Future of American Landpower: Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century Army*. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1996. (An examination of the Army's future strategic challenges.)

16. MacGregor, D. A. *Breaking the Phalanx*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997. (Offers new organizational design for twenty-first-century land forces.)

17. Scales, Robert, and Paul Van Riper. "Preparing for War in the 21st Century," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1997, pp. 14–20. (Cautions against over-reliance on single capabilities, and contends that next war will be decided on land.)

18. Website, "U.S. Army Objective Task Force," address: http://www.objectiveforce .army.mil. (Contains up to date briefings, information, and links to Army transformation.)

19. Website, "U.S Army," address: http//www.army.mil. (Contains hundreds of links from breaking Army news stories to strategic level concerns to individual soldier issues.)

20. Millet, Allan R. *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps*. New York: The Free Press, 1991. (An excellent account of the evolution of the Marine Corps from its origins to Desert Storm.)

21. Bartlett, Merril L., ed. *Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare*. Annapolis: Naval Justice Press, 1983. (A comprehensive treatment of amphibious thinking from the ancient world to the present.)

22. Krulak, Victor H. *First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984. (An account of the U.S. Marine Corps since World War II by a legendary Marine.)

23. Marine Corps University. *Naval Expeditionary Forces and Power Projection: Into the 21st Century*. Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Association, 1992. (Essays reflecting the origins of a post–Cold War Marine Strategic Concept.)

PC-6 MARITIME PLANNING CHALLENGES

A. Focus. As long as the nation remains committed to sustaining its position as a global power it must remain engaged throughout the world, in part through the presence and capabilities of the U.S. Navy. The challenges of the 21st century will require the Navy to be innovative and possess advanced technologies to fully integrate sea, land, air, space, and cyberspace capabilities to maximize joint operational effectiveness. In 2002, the CNO announced the Navy would address these challenges through Sea Power 21 (SP21). According to the CNO, SP21 is a vision for the U.S. Navy to provide "credible, persistent combat power to the far corners of the earth without having to ask permission." It is also a strategy with clear implications for future naval force structure and employment. SP21 poses challenges for current operators and future planners. Among these challenges are decisions related to force mix. For example, the Navy must decide whether it will build limited numbers of large, very capable, but very expensive ships, greater numbers of small, less capable, but far less expensive ships, or some mix of the two. It is also clear that the CNO's vision and operational transformation concept must be accepted and supported both internally by the Navy and externally by domestic and international partners, sponsors, and resource providers.

B. Objectives

- Examine and critically assess current and future maritime operational concepts and force planning initiatives that support future National Military Strategies.

- Assess the practicality, affordability, and capability of these forces to meet the challenges of 21st century war, including the Global War On Terror.

- Using the three NSDM frameworks examine the international and domestic implications of Sea Power 21 and how U.S. naval leadership should move ahead to acquire the necessary naval force structure to support the National Security Strategy.

C. Guidance

Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), has said the current dynamic security environment requires the Navy to expand its strategic focus to encompass both evolving regional challenges and transnational threats. The combination of traditional and emerging dangers means increased risk to the United States. To counter this risk, the Navy has determined it must expand its striking power, achieve information dominance, and develop transformational ways of fulfilling the enduring mission of sea control, power projection, strategic deterrence, strategic sealift, and forward presence. At the heart of the Sea Power 21 vision are three fundamental pillars called Sea Strike, the projection of offensive power; Sea Shield, the projection of defensive power; and Sea Basing, the enhancement of operational independence and support to the joint force. These concepts rest on the foundation of the Navy-Marine Corps team, leveraging U.S. asymmetric advantages to strengthen joint combat effectiveness. Do you agree that these three concepts will fully integrate naval forces into the joint team across the full expanse of the unified battlefield to meet the challenges of the 21st century? What key lessons' learned should U.S. naval forces bring away from our recent combat experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan? How do the Navy's Global Concept of Operations and the Fleet Response Plan

support implementation of Sea Power 21? Does this new operational construct provide the necessary blueprint to decide what force structure the Navy must invest in, and what it should no longer buy? Is SP21 truly a vision/strategy? Is it the right vision for the Navy?

D. Required Readings

1. "Naval Power 21," October 2002. (Signed by the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Provides brief Naval Vision and the components that necessary to achieve that vision.)

2. "Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations," Excerpt, January 2004. (An excerpt from the source document signed by the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps that provides an explanation of how the Navy and Marine Corps will enable the joint force. Full version available at: http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/Concepts/NOC.pdf).

E. Supplemental Readings

1. Clark, Vern. "Sea Power 21," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, October 2002. pp. 32–41. (Admiral Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, states the naval missions and capabilities that are critical to meeting future threats that challenge the United States in the 21st century.)

2. Clark, Vern. "Statement of Admiral Vern Clark, USN, Before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee for Defense," 2 April 2003. (CNO outlines current capabilities, Navy transformation efforts and examines the near and far term plans for U.S. naval forces.)

3. Mullen, Mike. "Global Concept of Operations," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, April 2003, pp. 66–69. (The Navy's Global Concept of Operations meets the new National Military Strategy's requirements and implements "Sea Power 21" by more effectively distributing the naval assets currently available.)

4. England, Gordon, Vern Clark, and James L. Jones. "Naval Transformation Roadmap Power and Access . . . From the Sea," Department of the Navy, pp. 1–45. (The Transformation Roadmap describes how naval forces will achieve the nine transformational warfighting capabilities, organized by a family of concepts that optimize and maximize advantages that are uniquely naval.)

5. A comprehensive index of Navy websites, articles, and related issues can be accessed at:

   http://www.navy.mil http://www.ncts.navy.mil/nol

   http://www.usni.org/magazines.html http://www.insidedefense.com

PC-7 RESERVE FORCES PLANNING CHALLENGES

A. Focus. The Reserve Component (RC) of the Armed Forces has always played an important role during periods of crisis and war, dating from the local militias of the American Revolution. Since Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, however, the Reserve Forces and the National Guard have been an indispensable element in not only armed interventions, but normal peacetime operations as well. Today's increased reliance on the Reserve Components is a product of a number of factors: the Abrams Doctrine (inextricably linking Reserve and Active Force elements), evolving Total Force policies, the effects of force downsizing, and increasing mission demands. In fact, due to the requirements of *Operations Enduring Freedom, Noble Eagle, and Iraqi Freedom*, there are more RC Forces mobilized to active duty than at any time since World War II. This session examines the RC's contribution to the nation's Total Force equation. In particular it considers the current administration's plans to review the balance of capabilities within and between the Active and Reserve Components and whether changes are needed in how the Reserve Component is used. In this session we will also review the rationale behind the Abrams Doctrine and whether that doctrine is still valid in the post–Cold War security environment.

B. Objectives

- Examine and critically assess current and future roles, missions and manning of the Reserve Component in force planning initiatives that support future National Military Strategies.

- Assess the practicality, affordability, and capability of the Reserve Component to meet the challenges of 21st century war, including the Global War On Terror.

- Evaluate the validity of the Abrams Doctrine to act as a "check-and-balance" in an administration's decision to go to war.

C. Guidance

1. In "Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve," the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs asserts that the Department of Defense is undergoing a transformation to a more responsive, lethal, and agile force based on capabilities rather than threats. As the transformation has progressed, it has become evident that the balance of capabilities in the Active and Reserve components is not the best for the future. There is a need for rebalancing to improve the responsiveness of the force and to help ease stress on units and individuals with skills in high demand. The Global War on Terrorism, which began after September 11, 2001 and has included Operations NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM, has accelerated the need for change. What changes should the civilian employment sector expect in order to support a "continuum of service" in which personnel alternate between active and reserve service during the course of military and civilian careers? What criteria should be used for assigning missions to the RC? Should current Federal Law be changed to make Reserve personnel less or more accessible via involuntary mobilization? What is the proper role of the Reserve Component in Homeland Defense?

2. Khalil and Rehberg review the rationale behind the creation of the Abrams Doctrine as well as the current administration's plans to negate its effects by transformation and rebalancing of the Total Force. They conclude that elimination of the Abrams Doctrine does not appear to be warranted or justified, although it may need to be updated to address vital concerns of OSD. Is the Abrams Doctrine consistent with America's history? Is a policy that was adopted to preclude repeating mistakes made during the Vietnam conflict still valid in the current security environment? Is the Abrams Doctrine an impediment to the GWOT? Will the rebalancing of the RC, as organizations that are rarely used or used only in a limited fashion, result in a neglected and demoralized force of decreased effectiveness?

D. Required Readings

1. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. "Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve," Washington, D.C., January 2004. Read only pages 1–35. http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/annualreports/RebalancingForcesFinalFinalD1.pdf (Report provides a comprehensive review of the Services' rebalancing initiatives—both ongoing as well as those planned for fiscal year 2005 and beyond.)

2. Khalil, Gary, and Carl Rehberg, "W(h)ither the Abrams Doctrine: Good or Bad Policy," Reserve Officers Association *The Officer*, December 2003 pp. 21–28 and p. 55. (The authors examine the Abrams Doctrine and its evolution and analyze potential changes in the role, mix and employment of Active Component and Reserve Component Forces.)

E. Supplemental Readings

1. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. "A Guide for Effective Peacetime Employment of Reserve Component Units and Individuals." Washington, D.C., November 2001, http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/annualreports/peacetimeemployment guideNOV12001.pdf. (Provides general DoD policy regarding use of the RC.)

2. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. "Reserve Component Categories of the Reserve Components of the Armed Forces," Washington, D.C. November 2001. http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/documents/annualreports/RC101Handbook-updated5Nov01 .pdf. (Defines the structure and relationship of the various Reserve components, reserve categories and their mobilization responsibilities.)

3. Owens, Dallas D. Jr., *AC/RC Integration: Today's Success and Transformational Challenge*, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, October 2001. (Owens analyzes current integration programs and initiatives and evaluates potential threats to AC/RC integration.)

4. Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study," Washington, D.C., July 1999. (Report from ASD for Strategy and Threat Reduction highlighting Homeland Defense, Smaller Scale Contingencies, and Major Theater Wars.)

5. Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Reserve Forces Policy Board, Annual Report 2002," Washington, D.C., June 2003. http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/rfpb/2002FYreport.pdf. (Annual Report of the RFPB, the principal independent advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Component issues.)

6. Wray, Robert Jr., "Integrate Your Reserves: A How-to Primer," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, December 2003, pp. 60–63. (The author makes recommendations on how to derive advantages in skill, manpower, and flexibility through adroit teaming with Reservists.)

7. Myers, Richard B. "The Total Force for Today and Tomorrow," Reserve Officers Association *The Officer*, December 2003 pp. 29–31. (CJCS reviews Reserve Component contributions to the Total Force.)

8. Hart, Gary. "A Well-Regulated Militia," *The American Prospect*, Vol. 14, No. 10, November 2003, pp. 52–54.

9. A comprehensive index of Reserve Component websites, articles, and related issues can be accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/.

PC-8 STRATEGIC MOBILITY PLANNING CHALLENGES

A. Focus. A key strength of the U.S. military is the ability to project and sustain significant military power. This is supported by a robust, responsive and flexible strategic mobility system comprised of airlift, sealift, and pre-positioned forces. This session will look at the current planning challenges for the design of future strategic mobility forces. A key transformation goal of the QDR is "Projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access and area-denial environments and defeating anti-access and area-denial threats." Lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Global War on Terrorism, on-going reconstruction and stability operations in Iraq, and a review of overseas basing posture all must be considered for their implications for future strategic mobility.

B. Objectives

- Assess the capabilities and limitations of the strategic mobility triad.
- Assess operational challenges to projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access and area-denial environments and their implications for strategic mobility.
- Evaluate operational concepts, organizational innovations, and the level and mix for future strategic mobility forces.
- Evaluate metrics for the strategic mobility system. What do we need to be able to measure? How well do existing measures encourage appropriate behavior and needed change?

C. Guidance

1. David Kassing provides a framework for thinking through the design of a strategic mobility system. He describes the capabilities and limitations of each element of the mobility triad, fundamental tradeoffs and key choices. In particular, he emphasizes a total system perspective: "Viewing mobility as an integrated, end-to-end system calls attention to the complex analytical problem of balancing capability in a complex system." He also stresses the need for an honest assessment of the vulnerabilities of the system to anti-access strategies. What do you see as the vulnerabilities of our strategic mobility system today?

2. Gen. John W. Handy, USAF, CDR USTRANSCOM, calls for a follow-on study to the Mobility Requirements Study-05 to determine mobility capabilities needed to support the defense strategy in the future. He suggests that lessons learned during Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the Global War on Terrorism, among others, should be taken into account. What questions would you want addressed in this study?

3. The Mobility Requirements Study 2005 (MRS-05) is DoD's most recent major-mobility requirements study. It assumed two, nearly simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTWs). Given the recent changes to the national security and defense strategies, what issues would you want a new study to address? What assumptions would you suggest for a new study? What are the current threats to strategic mobility forces? What risks should be addressed?

4. Recent conflict has demonstrated the U.S. military's ability to project power on a global scale. Potential adversaries may have concluded that to oppose the U.S. they must use selected strengths against our perceived weaknesses. These vulnerabilities include the global distances U.S. forces must travel to engage anyone and the U.S. forces' near-absolute reliance on unimpeded access to and use of ports, airfields, bases, and littoral waters in the theater of conflict. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Joint Forces Command co-sponsored wargame, Unified Course 04, attempted to define future joint concepts required to combat an adversary's anti-access strategies. The wargame scenarios gave the warfighters tools such as the Collaborative Information Environment (CIE), sea-basing, global strike capabilities and space-based operations. What is your view of these systems or concepts to combat anti-access strategies? Do you have a better approach?

5. The Defense Science Board (DSB) concluded that the *Sea Power 21* Sea Basing concept represents a critical future national military capability. The Sea Base replaces or augments fixed, in-theater airports and seaports. It is an expeditionary capability that provides a maneuverable facility at sea from which tactical operations are conducted, controlled, sustained, and supplied. The study identifies capabilities and technology advances that require research and development. It states that the development of a Sea Basing capability use a spiral development process which incorporates existing current capabilities with experimentation, evaluation, and development of emerging technology and capabilities. The study emphasizes Joint participation in the development and operation of the Sea Base capability. What do you think of their proposals? What challenges does this potentially create for the individual services?

6. The Secretary of Defense has directed TRANSCOM to assume the role of Distribution Process Owner in addition to its core deployment and mobility missions. What is your view of this initiative?

D. Required Readings

1. Kassing, David. "Strategic Mobility: Overview of Current Issues and Future Requirements," prepared for the Office of Naval Research sponsored research and education symposium on Joint Logistics in the 21st Century, held at the Naval War College, March 6–7, 1997. (The author provides an overview of strategic mobility with emphasis on the key questions that must be addressed to improve overall system performance.)

2. Goodman Glenn W. Jr., "For the record, Gen. John W. Handy, U.S. Air Force, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command and Military Airlift Command," *Armed Forces Journal*, October 2003, p. 28.

3. Fedyszyn, Thomas, Marshall Hoyler, and Raymond Sullivan, ed. "Excerpts from DoD's 'Mobility Requirements Study—2005,'" Newport RI: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2003. Extracted from the U.S. Department of Defense, "Mobility Requirements Study—2005," Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff J4, 2000.

4. Cupp, Jon. "Warfighters Sail Clear, Steady Course Toward Anti-Access Strategies with UC04," *United States Joint Forces Command Newslink*, January 7, 2004, http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2004/pa010704.htm

5. Department of Defense. *Final Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Sea Basing,* Washington, D.C., October 20, 2003. (The Defense Science Board conducted a study into the CNO's Sea Power 21 fundamental concept of sea basing. The DSB identified sea basing as a critical capability and discussed twelve issues in the development of this capability.)

6. "Partnerships key to supply management efficiencies," USTRANSCOM, Release Number: 031027-1, October 27, 2003. (Explains implications of move to include distribution in USTRANSCOM missions.)

E. Supplementary Readings.

1. Hancher, Douglas H., David P. Smith, and David T. Buckwalter. "Strategic Mobility," Newport, RI: Naval War College faculty paper, February 2003.

2. Hickins, Kenneth E. "Strategic Mobility: The U.S. Military's Weakest Link," *Army Logistician,* November/December 2002 Vol. 34 Issue 6; pp. 34–38.

3. U.S. Transportation Command. *Strategic Guidance FY 2002*. Scott Air Force Base, IL, 2002. http://www.transcom.mil/j5/fy02sp.pdf [15 January 2004].

4. Clark, Vern. "Sea Power 21," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings,* October 2002, pp. 32–41. (Admiral Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, states the Naval missions and capabilities that are critical to meeting future threats that challenge the United States in the 21st century.)

5. Orme, Nate. "Army Catamaran 'Hulls' Equipment Double-Time," CENTCOMNEWS. 06 September 2003. http://www.centcom.mil/CentcomNews/stories/ 09_03/11.htm [14 January 2004]. (This CENTCOM News article discusses operational capabilities, crew training and craft maintenance of the Army's experimental TSV based on experiences gained while deployed to the Arabian Gulf of the U.S. Army's experimental.)

6. Allard, Kenneth. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995. pp. 11, 15, 44–54, 76–87. (This article discusses the logistics lessons learned during Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE in Somalia.)

7. "The Military Option—Operation Desert Shield," Conduct of the Persian Gulf War Final Report to Congress, April 1992, pp. 37–60. (This report provides an assessment of strategic mobility during the preparations and execution of the Gulf War.)

8. Harper, Gilbert S. "Logistics in Grenada: Supporting No-Plan Wars," Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College *Parameters,* Vol. XX, No. 2, June 1990, pp 50–63. (The author provides a short historical account of the movement of forces, support equipment and logistics for the U.S. Armed Forces during military operations in Grenada. These events occurred prior to the establishment of the U.S. Transportation Command.)

Websites:

The following websites provide useful information about strategic mobility

U.S. Transportation Command	http://www.transcom.mil
U.S. Central Command	http://www.centcom.mil

PC-9 DIPLOMACY AND SOFT POWER

A. Focus. Diplomacy is a crucial tool in the execution of a nation's national security strategy. It is essential that those tasked with national defense responsibilities understand the role of diplomacy in national security; a failure to achieve synergistic cooperation between DoD, DoS and other agencies can hamper even the most straightforward diplomatic task. This Planning Challenge session will help prepare you to decide which challenges and opportunities can potentially be addressed with diplomatic and "soft power" tools. We will explore the function and operation of the State Department. In addition, we will examine issues for which diplomacy could be an effective tool, while keeping alert for potential obstacles to the successful employment of diplomacy and soft power.

B. Objectives

- Understand the basic purpose and operation of the State Department.
- Explore the diplomatic tools available, and the difference between active tools (diplomacy) and passive tools (soft power).
- Examine the range of issues, nations, and threats that could be taken into consideration in developing a diplomatic approach to national security.
- Grasp the importance of integrating all the above concepts to best execute the National Security Strategy.

C. Guidance

1. The contributions of diplomats to national security are often understated. Even strategically vital diplomatic victories (such as the Bush administration's successful effort in obtaining Pakistan's support in the struggle against al Qaeda and the Taliban) are often quietly achieved. Aside from high-stakes confrontations such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, diplomacy does not capture the public eye. Violent conflicts, in contrast, usually draw considerable attention, and for understandable reasons. As a result, comparing diplomatic and military contributions to national security can be difficult. On consequence of this disparity is that national security professionals can be too quick to dismiss the State Department's role in national security.

2. Similarly, diplomacy is not as resource-driven an enterprise as is military operations. Successful diplomacy revolves around policy positions and relationships, in addition to resources (foreign aid, military assistance, coercive threats, etc.). For example, tripling the budget of the State Department would not triple the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy.

3. All diplomatic relationships involve opportunities and potential challenges. Both peacetime and crisis environments can offer opportunities to improve relations. Similarly, serious dangers can be camouflaged by what appear to be issue-free relationships. Often it is the unexpected crisis that poses the greatest danger, since this is the type of crisis that is most likely to catch a government unprepared. Some of the quietest (and least costly) diplomatic successes are those that make unlikely conflicts even less likely.

D. Required Readings

1. Bin Laden, Osama. "Text of Fatwa Urging Jihad Against Americans." *Al-Quds al-'Arabi*, 23 February 1998. (One of bin Laden's more prominent declarations of hostile intent toward Americans, and one in which the role of soft power in his strategy clearly plays a major role.)

2. General Accounting Office. "U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges," September 2003. [excerpts] (Presents the difficulties that face U.S. public diplomacy, particularly in the Middle East.)

3. Nye, Joseph. "Wielding Soft Power." Ch. 4, *Soft Power: Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004. (Offers a conceptual grounding in soft power and its applications.)

4. "Palestine Textbooks Under Fire," *al-Jazeera*, 13 November 2003. (Serves as an example of al-Jazeera's reporting and the "Arab perspective," and illuminates one of the typical challenges to political reform.)

5. Pei, Minxin. "The Paradoxes of American Nationalism," *Foreign Policy*, May/June 2003. (Explores how nationalism is often a matter of perspective, and how it can have ramifications for U.S. diplomacy.)

6. Stack, Megan K. "For Arabs, It's Not Yet Must-See TV." *New York Times*, March 26, 2004, p. 4. (Offers a perspective on the U.S.-operated Arab News Channel Al Hurra.)

E. Supplementary Readings

1. Finn, Helena K. "The Case for Cultural Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, Nov/Dec 2003. (Argues that cultural diplomacy will play an important role in the future.)

2. Nye, Joseph. *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*. Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2003 (Elaborates on Nye's views on soft power and American primacy.)

3. Peterson, Peter G. "Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, Sept/Oct 2002. (Offers advice on how to reform U.S. public diplomacy. Summarizes the Council on Foreign Relation's 2002 report.)

4. Powell, Colin. "A Strategy of Partnerships," *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 2004. (Lays out the administration's diplomatic achievements and its plans for the future.)

5. Snow, Donald M., and Eugene Brown. *United States Foreign Policy: Politics Beyond the Water's Edge*, 2nd ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2000. (Overly critical of the State Department, but a useful overview of the U.S. national security apparatus.)

ANNEX E
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING EXERCISE

NSDM-3 NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING EXERCISE I: INTRODUCTION AND PREPARATION - STRATEGY ASSESSMENT & STRATEGIC CHOICE

A. Focus. The National Security Decision Making Exercise is the culminating event of your trimester with the National Security Decision Making Department. This session builds upon the concepts and issues examined in the three sub courses you are taking this trimester as well as the analysis completed in the Planning Challenges module. Its intent is to generate a creative and wide-ranging strategic conversation among the members of your seminar on the subject of future U.S. strategy and force structure in the context of the security environment that you believe the U.S. will likely encounter in the early twenty-first century. However, that conversation must lead to decisions by your seminar on the future, the investment decisions needed to complement your assessment of the required future force structure, and a transition plan to implement those decisions.

The NSDM-3 session offers the seminar the first of five days dedicated to the process of building seminar consensus on a National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS) and a supporting military force structure. This session and the NSDM-4 session are scheduled several weeks before the PC Challenge module and the dedicated "exercise week" to allow the seminar time to complete an assessment of the security environment and begin building the seminar's NSS and NMS. While there is no required deliverables for these sessions, it is important for the seminar to reach a general consensus on a NSS and a NMS prior to beginning the Planning Challenges module. The PC module discussions are designed to support building a force structure to support the unique NSS and NMS developed by your seminar. Those seminars that complete the assessment of the security environment and come to an agreement on a seminar NSS and NMS prior to the PC module are well positioned to continue the process of building a corresponding force structure during the dedicated exercise week. As such, it is strongly recommended that seminars strive to complete the following objectives during NSDM-3:

1. Assess the security environment the U.S. will likely encounter in the first quarter of the twenty-first century
2. Determine the seminar's grand strategy and build a National Security Strategy to advance and, when necessary, defend our nation's interests and objectives

While no two seminars will end the day at exactly the same place, experience indicates those seminars ending the day with the two above objectives near completion are better positioned to build a corresponding NMS during NSDM-4 and a matching force structure during the dedicated exercise week. Seminars are encouraged to consult their faculty teaching teams during the exercise to ensure interim exercise goals are being met.

While no two seminar presentations will be alike, each seminar must address a minimum number of key, fundamental issues necessary to understand and execute a national security or military strategy. These issues will be provided in the initial guidance memo provided on or about 24 September 2004.

B. Objectives of the NSDM Exercise

- Assess the security environment that the U.S. will likely encounter in the first quarter of the twenty-first century.
    - Identify the strategic and operational challenges that the nation's armed forces will face in that environment;
    - Describe how you have addressed uncertainty in your planning; and,
    - Assess the risk inherent in your seminar's choices.
- Formulate a new National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) that will advance and, when necessary, defend our nation's interests and objectives.
- Develop appropriate operational concepts and a new force structure capable of addressing the operational challenges that you identify within the context of the fiscal guidance provided to you. Each seminar must address specific issues as provided in NSDM supplemental POM guidance. These issues will be current and of interest to Department of Defense leadership.
- Create a transformation strategy to implement your decisions.
    - Using the PMP concepts of IPS, DPS, and NSS identify the most likely centers of resistance to your transformation strategy and identify potential allies;
    - Develop specific implementation steps to overcome resistance to your transformation strategy;
    - Assess which aspects of your transformation strategy are achievable and which ones are not; and,
    - Adjust the transformation strategy accordingly.
- Approach the tasks outlined above as rational decision makers.
    - Identify alternatives.
    - Specify criteria you will use to choose among those alternatives, after first assessing candidate criteria with respect to validity, reliability, and practicality.
    - As you consider implementation issues, explicitly identify internal and external stakeholders, their interests, and their likely positions.
- Produce briefing materials that portray your seminar's decisions.
- Brief these decisions clearly and concisely to a panel of faculty members.

- Defend your views before that panel.

C. Guidance

1. This is your chance to "skate to where you think the puck is going to be." Your points-of-main-effort for today are to assess the security environment that the U.S. will likely encounter in the first quarter of the twenty-first century and to craft your seminar's National Security Strategy.

2. Your decisions should reflect a coherent vision of the security environment that the U.S. will most likely encounter in the first quarter of the twenty-first century and the risks, threats, vulnerabilities, opportunities, driving forces, pre-determined elements, and critical uncertainties likely to confront the United States in that environment. As you work this problem, it is important to remember that resources are not means until strategy provides some understanding of how they will be organized and employed.

3. Your seminar's decisions should be in consonance with the planning considerations assigned to it in a Chair, National Security Decision Making Department memorandum entitled "National Security Decision Making Exercise Guidance" of 24 September 2004. This document will provide a schedule to guide your seminar through the NSDMEX and provide general guidance all seminars must consider as they develop their unique NSS's.

4. This is an exercise in clear thinking. As such, we expect that you will draw on the concepts and techniques from SSF, PMP, and DMI in thinking through the various issues we ask you to address. We expect you to use the PC module to assist in building a force structure to support your chosen NSS and NMS. For example, as you describe your seminar's choices and recommendations, we expect you to be able to address the explicit alternatives you considered, and the criteria you used to assess those alternatives. While not all seminar ideas, concepts and decisions can realistically be presented in a 40-minute Power Point presentation, the seminar should be ready to defend their decisions if asked to do so. In briefing your implementation plan, we want you to identify major stakeholders inside and outside of DoD and to describe their interests and likely positions. Your ability to do so along with the logic, realism, persuasiveness, creativity, compliance with fiscal guidance, innovative use of all elements of national power, and overall professionalism of the briefings will determine the quality of this strategic conversation.

D. Required Readings

1. U.S. Naval War College. Chair, National Security Decision Making Department memorandum of 24 September 2004 (Subject: National Security Decision Making Exercise Guidance.) (To be distributed to your mailboxes on or about 24 September 2004.) (Provides basic guidance for the Exercise.)

NSDM-4 NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING EXERCISE II: NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

A. Focus. This session builds on NSDM-3 in which the seminar assessed the global security environment and developed a National Security Strategy. This session requires the seminar to continue to build a National Military Strategy capable of supporting their chosen NSS. It is imperative for the seminar to reach general consensus on a NSS and NMS by the end of this session as the Planning Challenges module will build on the NSS and NMS developed by your seminar in NSDM 3 & 4.

A. Objectives

- Review the assessment of the global security environment and the seminar's NMS developed in NSDM 3.
- Develop a NMS to support the goals and objectives of the NSS.
- Begin to build a Power Point presentation to document the NSS and NMS.
- Be prepared to use the Planning Challenge sessions to determine the right force structure to support your unique NSS and NMS.

B. Guidance

1. Continue seminar discussion in order to reach consensus on a National Military Strategy. If time permits, prepare for the Planning Challenge sessions by building initial force structure concepts to include specific military capabilities your seminar requires to effectively support your NSS and NMS. The seminar should make every effort to agree on a general National Military Strategy by the end of this session.

C. Required Readings.

Review initial Guidance Memorandum of 24 September 2004 to ensure all required issues are addressed as well as any issues provided in POM supplemental guidance.

NSDM-5 NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING EXERCISE III: OSD GUEST SPEAKER

A. Focus. A senior official from the Office of the Secretary of Defense will discuss major resource and program issues the OSD Staff is currently addressing for the Secretary and provide an up to date assessment of the current fiscal environment.

B. Objectives

- Assess the briefing in light of the frameworks and analytical decision-making techniques you have studied this trimester.
- For each of the issues addressed, ask yourself:

How well has OSD defined the problem?

Does the OSD staff appear to have considered a wide range of alternatives?

What criteria does OSD appear to have used in evaluating alternatives?

- As you listen to the discussion of the major issues, think about the reconciliation challenges the Secretary faces in the context of the U.S. political economy.

With respect to each issue, ask yourself:

- Who are the internal and external stakeholders?
- What are their interests?
- What were their likely positions earlier in the resource allocation process, and how might they have changed?

C. Guidance.

1. Because you and your seminar have by now developed your own NSS and NMS, contrast the approaches you envision that your seminar will use with what you hear from the OSD representative.

2. This is an opportunity to use the SSF, PMP, and DMI frameworks as the basis for assessment of ongoing resource allocation and transformation issues in the Pentagon. How will your seminar approach these and other issues like them in the context of your assessment of the future geostrategic environment and the NSS and NMS your seminar develops?

D. Required Readings. None

NSDM-6 NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING EXERCISE IV: PREPARATION

A. Focus. This session provides time for your seminar to review its assessment of the security environment and NSS and NMS developed during NSDM-3 and NSDM-4 and begin the process of creating a supporting force structure.

B. Objectives

- Review your seminar's assessment of the security environment, its National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy developed in NSDM-3 and NSDM-4.

- Develop appropriate operational concepts and a new force structure capable of addressing the operational challenges that you identify within the context of the fiscal guidance provided to you.

- Create a transformation strategy to implement your decisions. This transformation strategy need only address those core capabilities (air, maritime or land) designed into your unique force structure that will significantly change when you transition from the force structure of today to the force structure in 20-25 years.

  - Identify the most likely major centers of resistance to your chosen transformation strategy and identify potential allies;

  - Develop and be prepared to discuss specific implementation steps to overcome resistance to your transformation strategy;

- Approach the tasks outlined above as rational decision makers.

  - Identify alternatives based on assessed risk associated with building and transitioning to your NSS, NMS and force structure.

  - Specify criteria you will use to choose among those alternatives, after first assessing candidate criteria with respect to validity, reliability, and practicality.

  - As you consider implementation issues, explicitly identify internal and external stakeholders, their interests, and their likely positions. Be prepared to discuss if asked to do so.

- Produce briefing materials that portray your seminar's decisions.

- Brief these decisions clearly and concisely to a panel of faculty members.

- Defend your views before that panel.

C. Guidance

1. While this exercise is not intended to be an arithmetic drill, each seminar must meet certain specified resource constraints or be able to provide convincing justification for any proposed increase or decrease. Your seminar's decisions should be in consonance with the planning considerations and fiscal guidance assigned to it in a set of two Chair, National Security Decision Making Department memoranda entitled "National Security Decision Making Exercise Guidance." These memoranda will be distributed to you in your mailboxes on or about 24 September 2004 and 20 October 2004. These documents will provide a schedule to guide your seminar through the NSDMEX and will outline the fiscal guidance, planning considerations and any supplemental guidance that your seminar should address in the development of its strategies and force structure.

2. As you work this problem, it is once again important to remember that resources are not means until strategy provides some understanding of how they will be organized and employed. Accordingly, it is important that your seminar address any new operational concepts appropriate to its strategies and the organizational adaptation needed to implement them.

3. This is an exercise in clear thinking. As such, the faculty expects that you will draw on the concepts and techniques from SSF, PMP, DMI and the PC module in thinking through the various issues we ask you to address. We also expect you to give evidence of having done so in your briefing. For example, as you describe your seminar's choices and recommendations, we expect you to explicitly identify the alternatives you considered, and the criteria you used to assess those alternatives. In briefing your implementation plan, we want you to identify stakeholders inside and outside of DoD and to describe their interests and likely positions. Your ability to do so along with the logic, realism, persuasiveness, creativity, compliance with fiscal guidance, innovative use of all elements of national power, and overall professionalism of the briefings will determine the quality of this strategic conversation.

4. The faculty expects your seminar to deliver a professional brief. Each seminar is required to write a 2-page executive summary of their seminar strategy to turn in to the faculty team during NSDM-8. Specific guidance as to the format will be provided by your faculty teaching team.

D. Required Readings.

1. U.S. Naval War College. Chair, National Security Decision Making Department memorandum of 24 September 2004 (Subject: National Security Decision Making Exercise Guidance.) (To be distributed to your mailboxes on or about 24 September 2003.) (Provides basic guidance for the Exercise.)

2. U.S. Naval War College. Chair, National Security Decision Making Department memorandum of 20 October 2004 (Subject: Additional National Security Decision Making Exercise Guidance) (To be distributed to mailboxes on or about 24 October 2004. Provides general planning and programming guidance as well as any supplemental program guidance from the Chair and NWC Base Force and notional programming options for use as the seminar desires.)

NSDM-7 NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING EXERCISE V: PREPARATION

A. Focus. This session provides time for your seminar to review its NSS and NMS and to continue developing a supporting force structure.

B. Objectives

- Review your seminar's National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS).
- Continue to build a supporting force structure that allows your seminar to reach the goals of the NSS and execute the NMS.
- Continue to develop your transformation strategy (as required).
- Continue to assess the risk inherent in your seminar's choices.
- Continue to develop briefing materials that portray your seminar's decisions.

C. Guidance

1. Continue using guidance provided in NSDM-5.
2. Continue preparing a 2-page executive summary of their seminar strategy to turn in to the faculty team during NSDM-8. Specific guidance as to the format will be provided by your faculty teaching team.

D. Required Readings. None

NSDM-8 NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING EXERCISE VI: PREPARATION

A. Focus. Seminars complete their briefings for presentation to an NSDM faculty panel.

B. Objective

- Review your decisions. Continue to develop seminar presentation.
- Practice the delivery of your seminar's briefing.

C. Guidance

1. Prepare and practice your briefing. Make four paper copies (not color) and one floppy/ZIP/CD disk of your briefing materials for the faculty panel with which your seminar will have a strategic conversation during session NSDM-8. Also prepare and submit a 2-page executive summary of your seminar strategy as described by the faculty teaching team.

2. The faculty strongly recommends a "murder board" to help the seminar review its decisions and give the briefer(s) an opportunity to practice their delivery. The faculty encourages you to invite your SSF, PMP and DMI instructors to participate in the "murder board."

3. All members of the seminar should be prepared to answer the faculty panel's questions in their areas of expertise.

D. Required Readings. None

NSDM-9 NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING EXERCISE VII: SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS TO NSDM FACULTY AND STUDENTS

A. Focus. Present your seminar's briefing IAW the schedule provided by the faculty.

B. Objectives

- Convey your seminar's decisions to a panel of three NSDM faculty members.
- Defend your views before that panel.
- Assess the professional quality, completeness, relevance, and feasibility of a set of three other briefs.

C. Guidance

1. Plan for your remarks not to exceed 40 minutes and prepare for 15 minutes of Q&A. Anticipate intense questioning during and after your briefing. The briefer need not attempt to answer every question presented by the faculty; any member of the seminar may reply to a question in an area of their expertise.

2. To gain additional insight, you are required to attend the briefings of three other seminars. The faculty will provide the briefing schedule to you.

3. At the completion of these briefs, the NSDM faculty members will provide brief feedback on the presentations that group observed. The faculty will then meet in caucus to select one of the presentations from the group to present the following day to the NSDM Executive Panel. Normally the NSDM class is divided into 17 seminars. As such, to execute NSDM-8, the 17 seminars are divided into five groups of 3 or 4. During the course of the day, five seminars (one from each group) are selected to present to the NSDMEX Executive Panel during NSDM-9 the next day. Your NSDM faculty members will provide you with the details of how to this process will take place.

D. Required Readings. None

NSDM-10 NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING EXERCISE VIII: PRESENTATIONS TO NSDMEX EXECUTIVE PANEL

A. Focus. Normally, 5 seminars are selected by faculty panels during NSDM-8. These five seminars next brief the NSDMEX Faculty Panel to select two seminar finalist. The NSDMEX Executive Panel is composed of the three Sub-course directors, the PC Module director and the NSDMEX director. The five selected seminars should present the same brief used during NSDM-8. The NSDMEX Executive Panel will select two seminars to present to the Defense Panel from Washington D.C. during NSDM-10

B. Objectives

- Selected seminars brief NSDMEX Executive Panel on a schedule provided by the faculty

C. Guidance

1. The NSDMEX Executive Panel, after observing the seminar presentations, will select two seminars to present briefings to a panel of senior current and former Department of Defense and Department of State officials. The two seminars selected will receive the Naval War College's James Forrestal Award for Excellence in Force Planning and will be given the opportunity to waive one of the sub-course final exams (your faculty member will explain the incentive option).

D. Required Readings. None

NSDM-11 NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING EXERCISE IX: PRESENTATION TO SENIOR WASHINGTON OFFICIALS

A. Focus. This is the culminating session of the strategic conversation that began in your seminars at the beginning of the trimester. A key element in the national security decision-making process is the presentation of joint and service views to higher levels of authority in the form of an oral briefing. This session gives two seminars the opportunity to present their briefings to a panel of senior current and former DoD and DoS officials. After the presentations, with time permitting, the panel members will provide their views about national security, strategies, resources, and the level and mix of future forces and afford you the opportunity to raise your key concerns with them.

B. Objectives

- Gain additional insights from the panel and your classmates' presentations.
- Interact with panel members to explore their insights and seek further information during the question and answer period.

C. Guidance

1. All seminars will attend the presentations, normally in Spruance Hall, and should formulate questions to ask panel members about issues raised during the briefings. Note: Only the panel may ask questions during the seminar briefings. In the second half of the session, you will have the opportunity to explore future strategic and force choice issues that have emerged from the strategic conversation among the members of your seminar with the panel members.

2. This panel discussion completes the National Security Decision Making Exercise. In your judgment, how well did the seminars address future strategy and force structure? Were their recommendations realistic, considering both the future global environment and the likely constraints upon defense spending?

3. In the NSDM course we have described the complex processes by which resource allocation decisions are made and implemented. Frameworks have been developed for strategy and force planning, complex decision-making under constraint, and managing large organizations. During this final session, what visions of the future have emerged? Which ends-strategy-force mismatches are of greatest concern to you? Why? What major controversies are still unresolved?

D. Required Readings None.

ANNEX F—NSDM MASTER SCHEDULE
CNW/NCC AY 2004–2005
AUGUST 2004

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
2	3	4	5	7
9	10	11	12	13
16	17	18	19	20
CONVOCATION **1300-1330 Spruance Auditorium** NSDM-1 ODD/EVEN "Course Overview" **1345-1515 Seminar Rooms** NSDM-2 ODD "Introductory Seminar" **1530-1700 Seminar Rooms** NSDM-2 EVEN	**0800-1000 Seminar Rooms** DMI-1 EVEN—"Intro to Decision Making and Implementation (DMI)– A Basic Framework and Professional Context" **0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** SSF-1 ODD—"Intro to Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF)" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-1 EVEN **1015-1215 Seminar Rooms** DMI-1 ODD	**0800-1000 Seminar Rooms** PMP-1 EVEN—"Intro to Policy Making and Process (PMP)" **0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** SSF-2 ODD—"Contending Analytical Perspectives" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-2 EVEN **1015-1215 Seminar Rooms** PMP-1 ODD	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** DMI-2 ODD—"Leading Large, Complex Organizations—Is It Different?" PMP-2 EVEN—"Introductory Case Study: Lebanon Revisited" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** PMP-2 ODD DMI-2 EVEN *DMI Ungraded Reflection Papers Due*	STUDENT PREPARATION
23	24	25	26	27
0830-1000 Seminar Rooms SSF-3 ODD—"National Interests and Strategic Uncertainties" DMI-3 EVEN—"Introductory Case Study: *The General*" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** DMI-3 ODD SSF-3 EVEN **1800-2000 Spruance Auditorium** DMI-4 ODD/EVEN Personality Type: The MBTI (Lecture)	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** SSF-4 ODD—"Domestic Political Economy and National Security" PMP-3 EVEN "The International Political System—Part I" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-4 EVEN PMP-3 ODD	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** DMI-5 ODD—"Assessment" PMP-4 EVEN—"The International Political System—Part II" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** DMI-5 EVEN PMP-4 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** SSF-5 ODD—"Neo-Isolationism and Primacy" PMP-5 EVEN—"Case: International Political System—Landmines" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-5 EVEN PMP-5 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	STUDENT PREPARATION
30	31			
0800-0830 Spruance Auditorium "SSF Paper Preparation"—PROF Tim Castle **0845-1015 Seminar Rooms** SSF-6 ODD—"Cooperative Security and Selective Engagement" DMI-6 EVEN—"Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT)" **1030-1200 Seminar Rooms** SSF-6 EVEN DMI-6 ODD **1330-1500 Spruance Auditorium** PMP-7 ODD/EVEN (Lecture) "Domestic Political System"	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** DMI-7 ODD—"Issue Definition and Alternatives" PMP-6 EVEN—"Congress, the Constitution, and the Federal Budget" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** PMP-6 ODD DMI-7 EVEN			

SEPTEMBER 2004

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
		1	2	3
		0830-1000 Seminar Rooms SSF-7 ODD—"National Security Strategy and Alternatives" PMP-8 EVEN—"Interest Groups, Public Opinion and the News Media" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-7 EVEN PMP-8 ODD *****SSF Paper Topic Due***** 1330-1630 Electives	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** SSF-8 ODD—"Forms of Diplomacy" DMI-8 EVEN—"Criteria" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-8 EVEN DMI-8 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	STUDENT PREPARATION
6	7	8	9	10
HOLIDAY	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** SSF-9 ODD—"Alliances, Coalitions, and Alignments" DMI-9 EVEN—"Uncertainty and Risk Management" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-9 EVEN DMI-9 ODD	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** SSF-10 ODD—"International Community and Institutions" PMP-9 EVEN—"Case Study: Haiti" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-10 EVEN PMP-9 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	**0800-1100 Seminar Rooms** PMP-10 ODD/EVEN **or on-line** PMP Midterm Exam 1330-1630 Electives	STUDENT PREPARATION
13	14	15	16	17
0830-1000 Seminar Rooms SSF-11 ODD—"International Political Economy and National Security" DMI-10 EVEN—"Decide and Set Future Direction" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-11 EVEN DMI-10 ODD **1330-1500 Spruance Auditorium** Lecture—S. Kappes, ADDO, CIA	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** SSF-12 ODD—"Rethinking Security in a Globalized World" DMI-11 EVEN—"Strategy as a Guide" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-12 EVEN DMI-11 ODD	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** DMI-12 ODD—"Formulating Strategy - Culminating Case" PMP-11 EVEN—"Analytical Perspectives" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** DMI-12 EVEN PMP-11 ODD *DMI Midterm Exam Distributed* 1330-1630 Electives	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** SSF-13 ODD—"Assessing the Security Environment" PMP-12 EVEN—"The President, NSC and the Rational Perspective" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-13 EVEN PMP-12 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	STUDENT PREPARATION SACEUR (tentative) DMI Midterm Turned In
	NCC IPV 14–18 September			
20	21	22	23	24
0830-1000 Seminar Rooms SSF-14 ODD—"Asia and the Pacific" DMI-13 EVEN—"Principles of Reconciliation and Negotiation" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-14 EVEN DMI-13 ODD **1330-1500 Spruance Auditorium** PMP-13 ODD/EVEN "Defense Resource Allocation Lecture"	**0800-1000 Seminar Rooms** DMI-14 ODD—"Negotiation Exercise" **0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** PMP-14 EVEN—"The Interagency Community" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** PMP-14 ODD **1015-1215 Seminar Rooms** DMI-14 EVEN	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** SSF-15 ODD—"Greater Near East, Part I" DMI-15 EVEN—"Implementation Strategies: Structural" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-15 EVEN DMI-15 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** SSF-16 ODD—"Greater Near East, Part II" PMP-15 EVEN—"Joint Strategic Planning System" (JSPS) **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-16 EVEN PMP-15 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	STUDENT PREPARATION
27	28	29	30	
0830-1600 Seminar Rooms NSDM-3 ODD/EVEN NSDMEX I: Introduction and Preparation:	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** SSF-17 ODD—"Greater Europe" PMP-16 EVEN—"The Organizational Behavior Perspective" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-17 EVEN PMP-16 ODD	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** SSF-18 ODD—"The Americas and Africa" DMI-16 EVEN—"Implementation Strategies: Policy" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-18 EVEN DMI-16 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** DMI-17 ODD—"Implementation Strategies: Technology" PMP-17 EVEN—"The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution" (PPBE) **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** DMI-17 EVEN PMP-17 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	

OCTOBER 2004

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
				1
				STUDENT PREPARATION
4	5	6	7	8
0830-1000 Seminar Rooms SSF-19 ODD—"The Future of War" DMI-18 EVEN—"Implementation Strategies: Human Capital" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-19 EVEN DMI-18 ODD	**0830-1000 Spruance Auditorium** An Address—President NDU **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** DMI-19 ODD—"Assuring Performance" PMP-18 EVEN—"Governmental-Politics Perspective" **1330-1500 Seminar Rooms** DMI-19 EVEN PMP-18 ODD	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** SSF-20 ODD—"Approaches to Force Planning" PMP-19 EVEN—"Case Study: Kosovo" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-20 EVEN PMP-19 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** SSF-21 ODD—"Operational Challenges and Concepts" DMI-20 EVEN—"Measuring Performance" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-21 EVEN DMI-20 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	STUDENT PREPARATION
NCC IPV 4–8 October				
11	12	13	14	15
HOLIDAY	**830-1200 Seminar Rooms** NSDM-4 ODD/EVEN "NSDMEX II: National Military Strategy Development"	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** DMI-21 ODD—"Integrating Control and Measurement" PMP-20 EVEN—"Cognitive Perspective" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** DMI-21 EVEN PMP-20 ODD 1330-1630 Electives	**0830-1000 Seminar Rooms** SSF-22 ODD—"Baseline Strategy and Forces and Alternatives" PMP-21 EVEN—"Case Study: The 1973 Arab-Israeli War" **1015-1145 Seminar Rooms** SSF-22 EVEN PMP-21 ODD *****SSF PAPER DUE***** 1330-1630 Electives	STUDENT PREPARATION
18	19	20	21	22
STUDENT PREPARATION	**0800-1000 Seminar Rooms** DMI-22 ODD—"Synthesis Case" PMP-22 EVEN—"Current Policy Analysis" **1015-1215 Seminar Rooms** DMI-22 EVEN PMP-22 ODD **1330-1500 Spruance Auditorium** NSDM-5 ODD/EVEN "NSDMEX IV: PA & E (Lecture)"	**0800-1200 Seminar Rooms or On-line** PMP-23 ODD/EVEN PMP Final Examination 1330-1630 Electives	**0830-0930 Spruance Auditorium** PC-1 ODD/EVEN—"Integration (Transformation Panel)" **0945-1045 Spruance Auditorium** PC-2 ODD/EVEN—"Homeland Defense Planning Challenges" **1100-1200 Seminar Rooms** PC-1&2 ODD/EVEN Seminar Sessions 1330-1630 Electives	STUDENT PREPARATION
25	26	27	28	29
0800-0900 Auditorium PC-3 ODD/EVEN—"Space and Nuclear Planning Challenges" **0915-1015 Spruance Auditorium** PC-4 ODD/EVEN—"Air Planning Challenges" **1030-1200 Seminar Rooms** PC-3 & 4 ODD/EVEN Seminar Sessions	**0830-0930 Spruance Auditorium** PC-5 ODD/EVEN—"Land Planning Challenges" **0945-1045 Spruance Auditorium** PC-6 ODD/EVEN—"Maritime Planning Challenges" **1330-1500 Seminar Rooms** PC-5 & 6 ODD/EVEN Seminar Sessions	**0830-0930 Spruance Auditorium** PC-7 ODD/EVEN—"Reserve Forces Planning Challenges" **1000-1100 Seminar Rooms** PC-7 ODD/EVEN Seminar Sessions 1330-1630 Electives	**0800-0900 Spruance Auditorium** PC-8 ODD/EVEN—"Strategic Mobility Planning Challenges" **0915-1015 Spruance Auditorium** PC-9 ODD/EVEN—"Diplomacy and Soft Power" **1030-1200 Seminar Rooms** PC-8 & 9 ODD/EVEN Seminar Sessions 1330-1630 Electives	STUDENT PREPARATION

NOVEMBER 2004

MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
1	2	3	4	5
0830-1630 Seminar Rooms NSDM-6 ODD/EVEN "NSDMEX V: Preparation"	**0830-1630 Seminar Rooms** NSDM-7 ODD/EVEN "NSDMEX VI: Preparation"	**0830-1630 Seminar Rooms** NSDM-8 ODD/EVEN "NSDMEX VII: Preparation"	**0830-1330 Designated Rooms** NSDM- 9 ODD/EVEN "NSDMEX VIII: Seminar Presentations to Faculty and Students"	**0830-1330 Designated Rooms** NSDM-10 ODD/EVEN "NSDMEX IX: Selected Seminar Presentations to NSDM Committee"
8	9	10	11	12
0830-1200 Spruance Auditorium NSDM-11 ODD/EVEN NSDMEX X: Presentations to the Defense Resources Board and Panel Discussion" **1330-1500 Seminar Rooms** SSF-23 ODD "Review and Reflection" DMI-23 EVEN "Review and Reflection" **1515-1645 Seminar Rooms** SSF-23 EVEN DMI-23 ODD	**0830-1130 Seminar Rooms** SSF-24 ODD/EVEN **or on-line** SSF Final Examination *****Take-home DMI Final Exam***** **Distributed**	*****DMI Final Exam Turned In*****	Holiday	ADMINISTRATIVE DAY
NCC IPV 8–19 November				
15	16	17	18	19
INTERSESSIONAL CONFERENCE	INTERSESSIONAL CONFERENCE	GRADUATION		
NCC IPV 8–19 November				
21	22	23	24	25
28	29	30		