CASE STUDIES IN POLICY MAKING AND PROCESS

8th Edition

Naval War College

National Security Decision Making

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Case Studies in

Policy Making & Process

(8th Edition)

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

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Send requests for publication and reproduction information to: National Security Decision Making Department, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI, 02841-1207, or phone: (401) 841-3540.

First edition published 1994
Eighth edition published 2004

Library of Congress Control Number: 2004107347

ISBN (pbk.): 1-884733-33-6

Printed in the United States of America

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Preface

Founded in 1884, the United States Naval War College is the oldest continuously operating educational institution of its type in the world. Each year more than five hundred American and international students come to its campus overlooking Narragansett Bay in Newport, Rhode Island. These men and women are amongst the most talented members of their countries, services, and professions. Each of the U.S. armed forces and many government agencies are represented at the college, both on the faculty and within the student body. Of the international community, more than fifty nations send midcareer and senior naval officers. Many of these students have traditionally gone on to fill the highest positions of leadership in their respective countries, armed services, and organizations.

Successful U.S. students earn a Master of Arts Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies upon completing a year of study at the Naval War College (NWC). The yearlong program is focused on Strategy and Policy, Joint Military Operations, and National Security Decision Making. Graduates leave the college better prepared to deal with changing geopolitical realities, advanced technologies, new leadership concepts, and evolving national policy.

In support of the National Security Decision Making (NSDM) Department curriculum, the selected cases in this 8th edition of *Case Studies in Policy Making and Process* (PMP) have been significantly updated to ensure relevant course material is available to the students. Each case study is an accurate portrayal of a particular event. The cast of characters, their personalities, and interpersonal relationships have been fictionalized in some instances, time has been compressed, and a few issues have been condensed or enhanced for educational usefulness of the case study in a program that involves an extensive graduate level reading load. All of the cases were written by Naval War College faculty, past and present, and over half of them are new case studies never before published.

I would like to thank Peggy Jones and the entire NSDM Department staff for their tireless technical support and advice. A special thanks goes to the contributing authors, who have spent long hours of research and interviews to ensure accurate and relevant case studies are available to our students. The Naval War College support staff has also provided an enormous amount of assistance. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the professional work provided by JIL Information staff of the Desktop Publishing section. Without the individual efforts of Jo-Ann Parks, Susan Meyer, Matthew Cotnoir, and Erin Poe involving the formatting, editing, and proofing of this edition, it could not have been completed. This 8th edition of *Case Studies in Policy Making and Process* is also available online, and you can access it by visiting the NSDM web page at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/nsdm/pubs.htm.

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May 2004

Policy Making and Process: A Guide to Case Analysis

RICHARD J. NORTON

Scholars specializing in international relations and policy specialists in the government face together the challenging task of improving the knowledge base required for more effective foreign policy. This objective will be furthered by a better understanding of the gap between the theory and practice of foreign policy.[1]

INTRODUCTION

Few decisions can be more difficult for a U.S. president than to commit military forces to potential combat situations. The stakes in such decisions are always high. Loss of U.S. and other lives, the expenditure of vast amounts of resources, and damage to national prestige are among the possible negative outcomes of such decisions. Other decisions made at this level, such as the selection of a particular policy, commitment to procurement of certain military capabilities and weapons systems, and the signing of treaties, involve stakes that are almost as great as those involving the use of force.

There is a widespread tendency to believe that decisions of this nature are derived from a coolly analytical process, in which the costs of particular courses of actions are weighed against anticipated gains to national security. Indeed, many of the formal decision-making mechanisms in the federal government were designed to facilitate and support this sort of cost-benefits driven decision making.

But scholars who have studied national security decision making have learned that such calculated decisions are more the ideal than the real. Some analysts believe decisions predominately are reached to protect the interest of the great established government bureaucracies, such as the departments of Defense, State, and Treasury. Others see the decision-making process dominated by powerful individuals such as Henry Kissinger, Zbignew Brezinski, James Baker, Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell, and Carl Rove—all of whom have enjoyed the ear of one or more presidents. Still other scholars argue national security decisions cannot be understood without understanding the personal beliefs, values, norms, and biases of the senior decision maker. It has even been argued that some decisions are forced on the U.S. government as the result of irresistible inputs generated either domestically or internationally.

Students at the Naval War College will be involved as participants in the national security environment and as part of the decision-making process. Thus, an understanding of these

forces and the various ways national security decisions are made is an essential part of our students' education. The Department of National Security Decision Making (NSDM) and the Policy Making and Process (PMP) course seek to provide our students with an understanding of the organizational, political, and behavioral influences on such decisions as well as knowledge of the formal processes through which national security decisions are made.

THE CASE STUDIES

The PMP course uses the case study as the principal vehicle to study national security decision making. The case studies in this volume are either in current use at Newport, or have been part of the PMP curriculum in the past. All have been authored by members of the NSDM faculty. While a fictional narrative may sometimes be used, the facts in each of the cases are accurately reported. Each case is based on extensive research of primary and secondary sources and numerous interviews with participants. In some cases, those interviewed have provided information under conditions of anonymity and their wishes have been respected. The cases in this book represent only a small number of the case studies compiled by various members of the NSDM Department for more than a decade.

THE INPUT-OUTPUT MODEL

The primary analytical tool used in the PMP course is the Input-Output Model (I/O Model), depicted in figure 1. The origins of the I/O Model can be traced to the work of David Easton.[2] However, the NSDM faculty have constantly and consistently modified the I/O model over the years. While it is true the model is U.S.-centric and oriented to analyzing

Figure 1: The Input/Output Model



decisions made at the highest levels, it can, with only minor modifications, be used for any decision-making process in any organization.

The I/O model is divided into three major components: the international political system (IPS), the domestic political system (DPS), and the national security system (NSS). Each of these systems provides inputs to, and receives inputs from, the other systems. Although the line diagram used to denote these systems might imply impermeability, actors can often belong to more than one system. For example, the chief executive officer of a large U.S. company could be an actor in both the domestic and international political systems.

The international political system is primarily composed of actors outside the domestic political and economic arena, such as states, nations, intergovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, and nongovernmental actors with cross-border activities or membership. The last category is extremely diverse, encompassing everything from armed resistance groups to religious organizations to multinational corporations. The state is given primacy of place in this system because, although others act within and exercise influence upon the IPS, states remain this system's most powerful actors. The inputs to the decision-making process from the IPS cover a vast spectrum of discrete actions, but generally fall within the broad categories listed. The term "international rules" refers to international laws, customs, and international agreements that are taken into account when reaching a national security decision. Examples could include restrictions on violating another state's territorial integrity, the need to follow specific treaty provisions, and prohibitions on a variety of military actions. International trends, such as conflicting norms, globalization, and emerging technology also play a critical role.

The domestic political system is no less complex than the IPS, especially in a participatory democracy where public opinion and core societal values may form significant inputs to members of the national security system.[3] Interest groups form another rich source of inputs as does the legislative and, to a lesser degree, the judicial branches of government. The news media is represented as both a domestic actor as well as an international one, since most countries have a relatively identifiable and distinct national press and video media. Some of the key inputs to the decision maker from the DPS include resources (e.g., financial and political support), missions and requirements, as well as restraints on the activities of organizations belonging to the national security system. Other inputs include information and intelligence from sources as disparate as lobbyists to congressional staff members returning from a fact-finding mission.

For the PMP course, the national security system lies at the heart of the decision-making process. It is here where various models of decision making are active. Broadly speaking, membership in the NSS is composed of the individuals and organizations that work for the decision maker. For example, in the case of the Haitian intervention, the NSS would consist of the entire executive branch of the U.S. government. However, this is not to imply that every member of the NSS participates in the decision-making process. Nor do members and organizations that are involved always play an equal role.

The following are among the central tasks of the NSS.

- Obtaining resources from the IPS and DPS.
- Once obtained, allocating those resources.
- Planning and deciding U.S. national policies.
- Organizing and directing agents to achieve those policies.
- Motivating, evaluating, modifying and changing both agents and policies as implementation and feedback is processed.[4]

The outputs of the NSS are decisions which, in turn, are translated into actions. Sometimes the decision and the subsequent action are to "do nothing." These outputs then directly and indirectly influence all three systems of the model. Thus the model incorporates a feedback loop, and can be used as a tool to analyze a series of decisions, as well as a one-decision "snapshot."

Before discussing how the decision-making process can be analyzed, it is necessary to touch briefly on the role of situational factors and informational uncertainty in the model. These aspects of the decision-making process affect every portion of the model. Failure to take them into account increases dramatically the possibility of flawed analysis.

Situational factors are elements that contribute to the unique nature of each decision. At the level of the IPS such factors could include the polarity, or distribution of power within the IPS, whether or not a particular actor possessed weapons of mass destruction, a global dependency on oil, geographical or climatic conditions and so on. At the domestic level, an impending presidential election, the state of the economy, time elapsed since the last major conflict, and the degree to which populations in the United States possess a shared, cross-border identity, are all examples of situational factors. Within the NSS, situational factors might include the availability and competence of certain military units, the age of the participants in the decision-making process, and the amount of time available to the decision makers to select a course of action.

Informational uncertainty also occurs at every point of the model. Decision makers rarely, if ever, have all the information they want. Even when inputs to the decision-making process are clearly perceived, as would be the case for a documented movement of foreign troops to a contested international border, the rationale behind these movements may be unclear. Are the troops there as merely a show of force, or are they moving to preinvasion jump-off points? On the domestic level, outcomes of votes taken in Congress are often laced with uncertainty as is the predicted duration and strength of public support for a given course of action. Equally unpredictable may be the manner in which the domestic media handle a given story. Nor does uncertainty only impact inputs. Outputs are also affected. Among the most powerful uncertainties is often the inability to fully answer the question, "will this decision solve or improve the problem?"[5]

It is also important to identify what national interests are involved in the issue being analyzed. Since the end of the Cold War, the term "national interest" has been applied to many issues that previously would not have been considered in such a light. The PMP course does not argue that one definition of national interest is superior. The I/O model can be successfully utilized whatever definition of national interest is used.

THE PERSPECTIVES

The I/O model depicts four different ways of looking at the interactions in the NSS. These four perspectives (rational actor, organizational behavior, governmental politics, and cognitive) are listed above the NSS "box." Each of these perspectives is discussed in considerable detail during the PMP course and is applied to each case.

Very briefly, the rational actor perspective assumes that decisions are based on the desire to promote a clearly identified national interest, and that all the costs and benefits of the various options are weighed in order to make a choice. The organizational behavior perspective maintains that power government organizations exert tremendous influence on the decision-making process and that these influences are often translated into decisions. Rather than a deliberate advancement of national interests, decisions are often made to protect the interests of these organizations. The governmental politics perspective offers a different twist on this idea. Rather than presenting the idea that organizations are having the most influence on the decision process, the governmental politics model sees that role as being filled by the decision maker's closest and most powerful advisors. The fourth perspective, which the PMP course has labeled the cognitive perspective, argues that the decision maker's personal beliefs, values, experiences, and emotions are much more influential in reaching a decision than the other perspectives would suggest.

The PMP course does not suggest that one of these perspectives is the "right" perspective. All depict and provide a means of analyzing forces that may be active in a decision domain. In fact, the forces examined through these perspectives are often active at the same time, perhaps working to propel the decision maker toward a given decision; perhaps pulling the decision maker in different directions.

APPLYING THE I/O MODEL

The I/O Model can be used to map the components of each of the major systems, to identify the national interests involved in the case and to link specific actors to discrete inputs, and to identify the impact those inputs had on the decision-making process. It is also possible to identify linkages between various actors and the role of situational factors, uncertainty, and feedback in the decision-making process. Once this is completed, it is possible to apply the rational actor, governmental politics, organizational, and cognitive perspectives to gain a deeper appreciation of the forces which impacted, shaped, and drove the decision-making process.

THE VALUE OF PMP

If all PMP was able to do was provide a deeper understanding of past national security decisions, it would be valuable to participants in the national security decision-making environment. However, PMP and the I/O model perform a much greater task than simply historical analysis. A greater understanding of past decision making can generate valuable lessons learned that can be applied to current and future decisions. Using the tools, techniques, and concepts of PMP, participants in the decision-making environment can more readily identify the forces acting on the decision-making process and counter or exploit those forces in order to best further the national interest. Furthermore, PMP may also provide the practitioner with the means of more accurately determining the probability that a given option will be the one chosen. This is not to claim that PMP is some sort of crystal ball, merely that those who have the benefit of this course will be more proficient in the decision-making environment than those who do not.

Notes

1. Alexander George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 135.
2. David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965).
3. William C. Adams, "Opinion and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Service Journal*, 6, no.5 (May 1984).
4. Allan Ricketts and Richard J. Norton, *National Security, Volume 1: Case Studies in Policy Making and Implementation* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1994), 5.
5. Ibid., 7.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War

DAVID T. BUCKWALTER

The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, known as the Yom Kippur War in Israel and the Ramadan War in Arab countries, stands as perhaps the most-examined example of strategic surprise in history, with the number and breadth of studies exceeding even the other "classic" examples, Pearl Harbor and the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Particularly striking is the well-established fact that Israeli decision makers had no lack of indicators that an attack was imminent, yet their collective judgment was that war would not come—almost right up to the moment of attack. One cannot imagine that in a case of potential national survival, with individual leaders with a well-deserved reputation for intellectual acumen, that anything but the highest quality of decision making would be observed. Nevertheless, the surprise was complete enough to bring Israel as close to extinction as it has experienced in its modern history. Thus, this case is an excellent vehicle to explore the effects of human factors in national security decision making. This case study, prepared by Professor David Buckwalter, a faculty member of the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College, is being used as part of the school's curriculum.

PROLOGUE TO WAR

The seeds of the 1973 war were sown with Israel's stunning six-day victory in 1967. The Arab forces suffered a humiliating defeat, which was felt most severely by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel-Nasser. Nasser tendered his resignation immediately after the 1967 defeat, but a demonstration of popular support within Egypt and much of the Arab world caused him to withdraw this resignation.[1]

It was clear in the wake of the 1967 war that the Arabs could not soon regain their territory by directly attacking Israel. Nasser's strategy evolved to one of increasing military pressure along the Suez Canal with the aim of reclaiming the Egyptian land by making continued occupation too costly for Israel. His "War of Attrition" from March 1969 to August 1970 consisted mainly of artillery and commando raids designed to impose this unacceptable cost on Israel.[2]

The fundamental weakness of the "attrition" strategy was Israel's ability to escalate the conflict when costs grew onerous and make the Egyptian costs too great to bear. One example was in January 1970, when Israel began deep air raids against strategic Egyptian targets. Following this escalation, Egypt sought and obtained increased assistance from the Soviet Union in the form of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and additional Soviet fighter aircraft (with Soviet pilots to fly them). There was a direct Soviet-Israeli air battle on 30 July 1970, resulting in five Soviet aircraft downed with no Israeli losses. Shortly after, Egypt and Israel

agreed to a cease-fire, and the "War of Attrition" ended in August 1970. The war cost Israel over 700 dead and 2,700 wounded, but the Arab losses were three to five times greater.[3]

In September 1970, President Nasser died of a heart attack and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat. Sadat exhibited greater flexibility than Nasser in pursuing diplomatic solutions, but he retained the option of improving the status quo by force. He accepted U.S.-mediated negotiations, but proclaimed 1971 the "year of decision" if diplomacy failed to dislodge the Israelis from the Sinai. When 1971 passed with no Egyptian action, Sadat's proclamation was seen as a mere bluff. Later in July 1972, when Sadat expelled over twenty thousand Soviet advisers, Egypt seemed even less able to impose a military solution. Few realized that the expulsion of the Soviets, by providing more freedom of action for Sadat, was a precursor to war. Despite the expulsion, Sadat was able to obtain agreement for increased Soviet arms deliveries in late 1972—arms that helped make war more feasible.[4]

For Sadat, the status quo of "no war—no peace" was intolerable. Facing a crumbling economy, deprived of Suez Canal revenues, and still shouldering the humiliation of 1967, Sadat felt he had to do something. In October 1972, Sadat called a fateful meeting of Egyptian military leaders. At this meeting, Sadat stated his desires for a limited war with Israel as soon as Soviet weapons deliveries provided sufficient strength. The Minister of War, General Sadeq, argued vehemently against limited war, believing Egypt was ill prepared to challenge the Israelis. Two days later, General Sadeq was replaced by General Ahmed Ismail, who supported Sadat's plan for limited war. Sadat had decided to change the status quo by force.[5]

From the Israeli perspective, "no war—no peace" was a favorable outcome. The 1967 war gave Israel reasonably defensible borders and some strategic depth for the first time in the young state's history. It would be a long time (if ever) before the defeated Arabs could hope to match Israel's prowess in air combat and mobile armored warfare. The apparent cooling of Egyptian-Soviet relations was also a favorable development; Israel would be free to conduct strategic operations without the likelihood of direct Soviet confrontation. Moreover, the pursuit of détente by the superpowers favored continuation of this favorable status quo.[6] The environment seemed to provide Israel with a greater range of choices for a national security strategy.

The national security strategy chosen by Israel was "total deterrence" (threatening massive retaliation for any attack). Operationally the strategy relied on three essential elements, in addition to superior combat forces:

- Prepared defensive strong points along the hostile borders, which would enable Israel's small standing ground force (supported by a qualitatively superior, largely regular air force) to blunt any initial assault
- Rapid mobilization of well-trained reserve ground forces to execute crushing counterattacks (Israel's ground forces more than tripled to over 350,000 upon full mobilization)
- Sufficient strategic warning (minimum twenty-four to forty-eight hours) to both properly deploy regular forces into the border defenses and mobilize the reserves.[7]

In October 1973, all three elements of the Israeli strategy failed to some extent—the most critical failure being lack of strategic warning. The Agranat Commission that investigated the Israeli "intelligence failure" after the war found that the Israeli surprise was due in large measure to their "concept" of a future Arab-Israeli conflict. This "concept" held: 1) Egypt would not attack prior to solving their "air superiority problem" (inability to strike deep into Israel or protect Egypt and her forces from air attack), and 2) Syria would not attack without Egypt.[8] The "concept" was not merely the product of Israeli imagination, it was precisely the *Egyptian* assessment, known through an excellent intelligence source, prior to Sadat's replacement of General Sadeq in late 1972.[9]

The "concept" served Israel well right up to October 1973. In the previous three years there were at least three times the Egyptians were prepared to go to war: December 1971 and 1972, and May 1973. In the May 1973 instance, Israeli decision makers did not heed the advice of the director of military intelligence that war was not imminent. They responded with a partial mobilization that cost over $11 million.[10] Moreover, an October 1973 mobilization would have political as well as economic costs, with an Israeli election approaching in late October.

By October 1973 the "concept" had been "proven." It was a given that Egypt would not go to war while still inferior in the air. Therefore, although the Israelis believed Syria was preparing for some sort of military action, by the tenets of the "concept," Syria would not attack. Ironically, the "concept's" elements did apply in October 1973. The Arabs had solved the "air superiority problem" with Soviet SAMs and SCUDs. In the 1967 war, the Israel Air Force was decisive in the lightning victory, nearly destroying the Arab air forces in the opening salvo and providing effective air support for the subsequent Israeli armored thrusts. By 1973, the SAM umbrella provided air cover for the ground troops, and the SCUDs could threaten deep strikes. Air was important in the 1973 war, but certainly not the decisive factor Israel believed it to be. The second part of the "concept," Egyptian-Syrian cooperation, also was present in October 1973. Syrian President Hafez Assad consolidated his power in early 1971 and proved more amenable to conventional military action than his predecessor, who had favored guerrilla action. Coordination between Egyptian and Syrian military staffs began in early 1973, and on 6 October, Israel faced a fully coordinated Egyptian-Syrian attack.

NO LACK OF INFORMATION—THE RUN-UP TO WAR

> It is October 3d today and it is four in the afternoon. I believe that they will reveal our intention any moment from now and this is because our movement henceforth cannot leave any doubts in their minds as to our intentions. Even if they know tonight, even if they decide to mobilize all their reserves and even if they think of launching a pre-emptive attack, they have lost the chance to catch us up.[11]
>
> —Anwar el-Sadat, 3 October 1973

Sadat overestimated his enemy's acuity by some sixty hours (the Israelis were not fully convinced war was coming until 0430, 6 October), but the Israeli failure to see war on the horizon was not due to lack of information. Even allowing for clarity of hindsight, the indicators during the run-up to war were striking.

Most accounts of the run-up to war begin with a 13 September air battle over the Mediterranean in which Syrian fighters attacked an Israeli reconnaissance flight, to their peril as it turned out, losing twelve planes with only a single Israeli loss. There is no evidence that this engagement was part of a coordinated plan, but it did provide a convenient explanation for subsequent Arab deployments. Israeli Military Intelligence (AMAN) expected some sort of retaliation for the incident, and in this light, Syrian deployments could be seen as either preparation for a limited retaliatory strike or defense against any Israeli reprisals. Subsequent Egyptian deployments were seen as normal for an announced exercise ("Tahrir 41," scheduled to begin on 1 October), but also might be defensive for fear of being caught up in Israeli-Syrian conflict.[12] The expected Syrian strengthening opposite Golan was observed over the next week, and Israel did take the precaution of adding some forces on the Golan heights.

On 25 September, King Hussein of Jordan requested an urgent meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. He flew his personal helicopter to Israel and delivered the message that the Syrian deployments were actually the precursor to war and that he expected, if war were to come, Egypt would cooperate with Syria.[13] Meir asked for an assessment of this information from the director of AMAN, Eli Zeira, who argued that Hussein was acting on Sadat's behalf in an effort to bluff Israel into concessions on returning the canal. Hussein's warning did result in further increases of Israeli forces on the Golan but did not dissuade Meir from departing on a planned trip to Europe the next day.[14]

On 27 September, Egypt mobilized a large number of reserves, announcing that they would serve until 7 October. This was the twenty-third time they had mobilized reserves in 1973. On 30 September, they mobilized another large group, and to maintain their deception plan, announced demobilization of the 27 September call-up (although only a small number were actually released).[15] Mobilizations, troop movements, and even credible human intelligence (HUMINT) warnings of war (as in the May 1973 Israeli mobilization) had become a common occurrence. The "cry wolf" factor certainly operated on the Israeli decision makers. Meir later said: "No one in this country realizes how many times during the past year we received information from the same source that war would break out on this or that day, without war breaking out. I will not say this was good enough. I do say it was fatal."[16]

While Egypt had orchestrated a well-constructed deception plan, there is still argument whether the next critical element in the path to war was part of it or just plain bad luck for Israel. On 28 September, Palestinian terrorists from a previously unknown organization based in Syria took over a Moscow-to-Vienna train carrying emigrating Soviet Jews. They demanded closure of a transit center for Soviet Jews at Schonau castle (which had processed over sixty thousand émigrés in the previous two years). The Austrian chancellor, himself a Jew, quickly acceded to their demands to save the hostages.[17] All Arab leaders quickly praised Austria for the action.

Many thoughtful analysts of the war doubt that this incident was part of the deception plan, but the effect was dramatic.[18] The Schonau incident, as it came to be called, caused Meir to delay her return to Israel until after she could make a personal (and unsuccessful) plea to the Austrian chancellor to reopen Schonau (she did not return until 3 October).

Moreover, Schonau was the lead story on all Israeli newspapers right up to the day before the war, accompanied by public demonstrations, petitions, and meetings, and it provided another possible explanation for the Arabs' threatening preparations (Syria and Egypt could be reacting in fear of an Israeli attack over Schonau).[19] Schonau was also the front-page Middle East story in the *New York Times* from 29 September through 4 October.

U.S. intelligence agencies were not oblivious to the Arab buildup—as early as 24 September the central intelligence agancy (CIA) passed a warning to Israel noting discrepancies in Egyptian preparations from previous exercises. Israeli intelligence was not alarmed. On 30 September and again on 4 October, Henry Kissinger asked for specific assessments of the region, and both the State Department Intelligence and Research Bureau (INR) and the CIA, apparently relying on assessments they had received from Israel, termed the possibilities of war "dubious" to "remote."[20] Kissinger later told reporters: "We asked our own intelligence, as well as Israeli intelligence, on three separate occasions. . . . There was the unanimous view that hostilities were unlikely to the point of there being no chance of it happening . . . obviously, the people most concerned, with the reputation of the best intelligence service in the area, were also surprised, and they have the principal problem of answering the question which you put to me."[21]

Israeli intelligence did indeed have an excellent international reputation. The Israeli intelligence apparatus consists of four separate organizations. The Mossad operates in foreign nations much as the U.S. CIA; the Shin Beth is concerned with internal security like the FBI; and a small research department in the Foreign Office deals with political intelligence akin to INR. Unlike the United States, only AMAN (military intelligence) had responsibility for national estimates. Additionally, in Meir's government, decisions were often made in a smaller forum known as "Golda's Kitchen Cabinet," composed of Meir, Deputy Premier Yigal Allon, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, and Minister without Portfolio Israel Galili. For any national security issues, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff David Elazar and Director of AMAN Eli Zeira were usually included. Thus, AMAN not only had responsibility for intelligence estimates, but a rather central de facto role in the most crucial policy decisions.[22] The Agranat Commission later recommended that the intelligence structure should be revised to provide more diverse advocacy in national estimates and distance intelligence somewhat from the policy formulation function, but the central position of the director of AMAN prior to the war meant he played a critical role in the Israeli surprise.[23]

Late in the evening of 30 September, AMAN director Zeira received word from Mossad that a reliable HUMINT source warned the Egyptian exercise would end in a real canal crossing (ironically, this was the same day that Egypt passed the "go" code, "BADR" to their Syrian allies). Zeira waited until the next morning before passing the information to his superiors Elazar and Dayan and said that his experts considered the report "baseless."[24] In addition, at an IDF general staff meeting that day, Zeira voiced the opinion: "the Syrians are deterred by the IDF's ability to defeat the army in one day." But the Arab buildup continued relentlessly.

Reports received on 2 October included Syrian movement of bridging equipment, fighter aircraft, and SAM batteries. In the south, Egyptian bridging equipment was also observed advancing, and crossing spots were being prepared in the Egyptian Third Army sector.[25] An article was also published that day by the Cairo-based Middle East News Agency that the Second and Third Armies were on full alert (the article was one of the very few breaches in Arab security and deception plan, another was the premature cancellation of flights and dispersal of Egypt Air commercial aircraft on 5 October).[26] It was only at this late date (2 October) that the precise hour for the attack was agreed between Egypt and Syria, and the next day, the Arabs directly informed the Soviets that war was imminent.

The combination of indicators led Defense Minister Dayan to recommend a "Kitchen Cabinet" meeting on the morning of 3 October, shortly after Meir's return from Europe. At the meeting Zeira's deputy (Zeira was ill) related that the probability of war was still "low" because, "there has been no change in the Arab's assessment of the balance of forces in Sinai such that they could go to war." At a full Israeli cabinet meeting later that day, Meir did not even discuss the Arab buildup. Rather, the "hot topic" remained the Schonau incident.[27]

Not everyone in AMAN was as wedded to "the concept" as those at the top. On 1 October, a young intelligence officer in IDF Southern Command, LT Siman-Tov, produced a document that argued the buildup opposite the canal was preparation for actual war. The lieutenant revised and strengthened his argument with a follow-up document on 3 October. Both of the reports were suppressed by the senior Southern Command intelligence officer because, as that officer later recounted, "they stood in contradiction to Headquarters' evaluation that an exercise was taking place in Egypt."[28] AMAN director Zeira only learned of Siman-Tov's reports during the Agranat Commission testimony months after the war. Upon learning of the reports and Siman-Tov's subsequent removal from his post at Southern Command, Zeira invited the lieutenant for an office visit and promoted him to captain.[29]

4 October provided some of the most dramatic warning indicators of the run-up to war. A special air reconnaissance mission in the Sinai revealed an unprecedented buildup of Egyptian forces. Fully five divisions and massive numbers of artillery were now positioned on the west bank of the canal.[30] In the late afternoon, it was learned Soviets were preparing to evacuate dependents (but not advisers). Late that evening, AMAN detected Soviet airlift heading for the region, presumably to execute the evacuation.[31] At 0200 the next morning, Mossad's best HUMINT source gave his case officer the code word for imminent war ("radish") and requested an urgent meeting. The chief of Mossad himself elected to fly to Europe to meet with the source personally, and notified Zeira of the development.[32] By the morning of 5 October, AMAN also reported that Soviet naval vessels were departing Arab ports.[33]

In the face of these indicators, IDF Chief of Staff Elazar, with Minister of Defense Dayan's concurrence, increased the alert status of the regular armed forces and instructed logistics centers to prepare for mobilization of reserves. At a subsequent 1100 meeting with Meir, Dayan, Elazar, and Zeira, discussion turned to what was seen as the most ominous of the indicators—the evacuation of Soviet dependents. Zeira outlined three possible explanations for the evacuation: 1) Soviets knew war was coming; 2) Soviets feared an Israeli attack; and

3) there had been a serious rift in Soviet-Arab relations. He admitted that only the first explanation squared with all the indicators, but he did not change his opinion that there was a low probability of war.[34] Zeira did mention that he anticipated additional information to be forthcoming shortly, although he did not mention the Mossad HUMINT source by name. He was explicitly asked if "all sources were open and being used," and he told his superiors that this was the case. It was learned later that at least one highly valued signals intelligence (SIGINT) source was not activated on Zeira's specific orders. It is presumed that he feared compromise of the source, but the fact that he essentially lied to his superiors indicates how strongly he still believed in the low probability of war.[35] At the end of the meeting, Meir decided to convene a full cabinet meeting, but many ministers had already departed for the Yom Kippur holiday.

The "rump cabinet" met around noon to consider the situation. After brief discussion, it was agreed that authority to mobilize reserves would be delegated to Dayan and Elazar, but that steps already taken by Elazar would be sufficient for the present. The final AMAN report prepared before the war was ready shortly after the cabinet dispersed. Thirty-nine paragraphs of alarming indicators were recounted in the report, but the AMAN Egyptian desk officer appended his own final paragraph. The paragraph read:

> Though the actual taking up of emergency positions on the canal appears to contain indicators testifying to an offensive initiative, according to our best evaluation no change has occurred in the Egyptian assessment of the balance of power between their forces and the IDF. Therefore, the probability that the Egyptians intend to resume hostilities is "low."[36]

At about 0400 on 6 October, AMAN director Zeira received a phone call confirming the nature of the information from the Mossad HUMINT source (the information was actually received by the chief of Mossad the previous evening and another Mossad officer allegedly phoned the information to Israel—the twelve-hour delay in getting to the decision makers remains unexplained).[37] Zeira telephoned Elazar with the information that the Arab attack would come at 1800 that very day. Elazar in turn called Dayan, who already had the same information (it is unknown how Dayan got word, but possibilities include the earlier Mossad phone call and the U.S. CIA). By 0600 when Elazar and Dayan arrived at IDF headquarters, SIGINT sources had already reported Syrian officers phoning relatives in Lebanon telling them not to return to Syria anytime soon. There was no doubt at this point that war was imminent.[38]

Elazar and Dayan disagreed on how to respond. Elazar favored a preemptive air strike and full mobilization to be ready for a rapid counterattack. Dayan opposed the preemptive air strike for political reasons and thought a full-scale mobilization was unnecessary since in-place forces should be able to hold their lines, making counterattack unnecessary. At a subsequent 0900 meeting with Meir, the preemptive strike was conclusively ruled out and only a partial mobilization was authorized. Mobilization actually began at 1000, and a full mobilization was authorized later that day.[39] In addition, movement into the prepared defensive strong points in the Sinai was not rapid enough to occupy them all by the actual 1400 start of the war (some believe because the warning specified an 1800 H-hour).[40]

Israel's reactions, even after all doubts concerning the attack had been removed, have evoked a number of competing explanations. It is clearly the case that Israel was mindful of the political necessity to not appear to be the instigator of the conflict. Meir spoke with the U.S. ambassador to Israel the morning of the attack and was told diplomatically that: "If Israel refrained from a preemptive strike, allowing the Arabs to provide irrefutable proof that they were the aggressors, *then* America would feel morally obliged to help. . . . " (this statement was also the "moral lever" that Meir used later to argue for increased military resupply from the U.S.). [41] Some scholars argue that Israel feared even full mobilization might be perceived as Israeli aggression or trigger an Arab attack even where none was actually planned.[42] Others have argued that the Israeli "concept" and mindset continued to affect their thinking even after any doubts about Arab intentions were resolved. These scholars argue that complacency and overconfidence in their own capabilities versus the Arabs caused less than optimal response by the Israelis.[43] No matter which explanation is closer to the truth, it is clear that Israel paid dearly for both her surprise and limited initial reactions in the ensuing war.

THE WAR

The first forty-eight hours of the Arab attack sent Israel reeling. On the Syrian front, three infantry and two armored divisions stormed into the Golan Heights, defended by a single Israeli armored division. Although Syrian losses were extremely heavy, by the afternoon of 8 October, the Syrians had achieved a major breakthrough and had nearly overrun a divisional headquarters. Syrian tanks stood on the hills overlooking the Sea of Galilee and pre-1967 Israel. The situation was so desperate that arriving Israeli tanks were committed to battle in "ad hoc" platoons, formed whenever three tanks could be assembled.

In the south, the Egyptians sent two field armies (five infantry and two armored divisions) across the entire length of the Suez Canal and through the Israeli front-line strong points. The crossing must be considered one of the best-orchestrated obstacle crossings in history. The Egyptians achieved major bridgeheads east of the canal (Second Army in the northern half, Third Army in the south). The Egyptians estimated the possibility of up to ten thousand killed in this operation—the cost was a mere two hundred killed.[44] By 7 October, the defending Israeli regular division had lost two-thirds of its 270 tanks, most to infantry antitank missiles.

On 8 October 1973, the first two reserve armored divisions arrived in the Sinai and were committed to a major counterattack of the Egyptian positions. One of the divisions was badly mauled by the entrenched Egyptian infantry. The other spent the day maneuvering due to confusing reports on the progress of the battle. By the end of the day, the Israeli army suffered what noted military historian Trevor Dupuy called: "the worst defeat in their history."[45]

The low point of the war for Israel came on the evening of 8 October. Israeli Minister of Defense Dayan told Prime Minister Golda Meir, "the Third Temple [the state of Israel] is going under."[46] Some speculate that if ever Israel considered seriously using nuclear weapons, it was on the night of 8 October 1973, and at least one author has claimed that a decision to

ready the weapons was actually made.[47] It is known that on 9 October Meir was concerned enough to propose the drastic step of traveling personally to Washington to speak face-to-face with President Nixon but discarded the idea upon receiving reassurances of U.S. resupply.[48] Several days later on 12 October, Golda Meir transmitted a personal letter to Nixon. That letter reportedly hinted Israel might soon be forced to use "all available means to ensure national survival" if U.S. military resupply was not immediately forthcoming. This subtle nuclear threat was less credible by 12 October, when the gravest danger to Israel had already passed, but U.S. arms began flowing the next day. Years later, Henry Kissinger indicated to a trusted colleague that an implicit nuclear threat was involved over the arms resupply issue.[49]

The tide began to turn by 9 October. In the south, the Israelis eschewed further counterattacks as the Egyptians elected to reinforce their positions. The Israeli reserves arriving on the Syrian front stabilized the situation and restored the prewar lines by the evening of 10 October. A major Israeli counterattack was prepared for 11 October. The counterattack in the north was aimed at threatening the Syrian capital of Damascus. The intent was to knock Syria out of the war so Israel could concentrate on the Sinai. The attack succeeded in pushing the Syrians some ten miles past the prewar lines, but it stalled approximately twenty miles from Damascus. At this point, the Syrian defensive lines held, aided by the arrival of troops from Iraq and Jordan. By 14 October, the northern front stabilized, with both sides facing force ratios more suitable for defense than offense.[50]

The counterattack in the north did not knock Syria out of the war, but it did affect the southern front to Israel's advantage. On 11 October, Syria urgently requested Egyptian action to relieve Israeli pressure in the north. Egypt had achieved success thus far by remaining under their SAM umbrella and fighting a defensive war. Not all Egyptian commanders were convinced that switching to the offense was the best course of action; notably, Minister of War Ismail was opposed. However, the Syrian plea strengthened the position of other key Egyptian leaders who had argued that Egypt should exploit her gains. Thus, on 14 October, the Egyptians launched the equivalent of a two-armored-division thrust along a broad front against the now-prepared and reinforced Israelis. The Egyptians were repulsed with extremely heavy losses. This was the last major Egyptian operation, but the offensive did disrupt plans for a major Israeli operation scheduled for 14 October.

The Israeli offensive in the south began on the afternoon of 15 October as a two-division thrust toward the Suez Canal. The attack was directed near the junction of the Egyptian Second and Third Armies just north of Great Bitter Lake. Lead elements of the Israeli force, maneuvering through lightly defended terrain, reached the east bank of the canal late on 15 October and began crossing in the early morning of the 16th. The Israelis had secured a bridgehead, but for the operation to succeed they would also have to clear two main east-west roads to allow movement of bridging equipment and supplies. These roads were held in force by elements of the Egyptian Second Army. In a pitched battle over the next three days, the Israeli forces secured a twenty-km-wide corridor to the canal, with heavy losses on both sides. By 18 October, an Israeli pontoon bridge was spanning the canal and a two-division force was crossing into "Africa."

Beginning on 16 October, the first Israeli operations west of the canal consisted of small raids against vulnerable SAM sites, supply depots, etc. These continued until 19 October when the main force was in position to break out and accomplish its main objective. The purpose of the Israeli operation was to cut off the Egyptian Third Army by sweeping south to the Gulf of Suez. By 22 October, elements of the Israeli force were within artillery and tank range of the main Suez-Cairo road, threatening communications with the Third Army.

Initially the Egyptians believed the offensive was an attempt to roll up the right flank of the Second Army. The Egyptians did not appreciate the true purpose of the Israeli thrust until late on 18 October, when satellite photography confirmed the size of the Israeli force west of the canal (the photography was provided by Soviet President Alexei Kosygin, who had traveled secretly to Cairo on 16 October).[51] When the intentions of the Israelis became clear, Sadat became much more receptive to Soviet suggestions to press for a cease-fire. On 20 October, Henry Kissinger flew to Moscow to hammer out the terms of a UN-mediated halt to the fighting. The result was UN Security Council Resolution 338 (UNSCR 338), adopted in the early-morning hours of 22 October. The resolution called for a cease-fire beginning at 1852, 22 October.

Henry Kissinger stopped by Tel Aviv on his way back to Washington at Israel's request to discuss the negotiations (Kissinger had not communicated with the Israelis prior to agreement on the draft UNSCR). The "cease-fire in-place" portion of UNSCR 338 was criticized by Israeli officials, who complained it would not allow them to "finish the job" in the Sinai. Kissinger responded by asking how long it would take to complete encirclement of the Egyptian army. Upon hearing "two or three days," Kissinger is reported to have responded: "Well, in Vietnam the cease-fire didn't go into effect at the exact time that was agreed on."[52]

Although both Egypt and Israel accepted the terms of UNSCR 338, fighting continued unabated past the designated cease-fire time. Both sides claimed that the other had violated the cease-fire, and both sides were probably correct. With many Egyptian units encircled behind the Israeli line of advance on the west bank of the canal, some continued fighting was inevitable. It is clear that Israel went beyond consolidating gains and used the continued fighting to complete their encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army. Israeli forces reached the Gulf of Suez by midnight, 23 October.

By 24 October the final positions of the opposing forces were essentially established, but fighting continued on the west bank of the canal. The Soviets, who had guaranteed Sadat the cease-fire would hold and that the Third Army would be saved, responded to the continued fighting by placing up to seven airborne divisions on alert and marshalling airlift to transport them to the Middle East. At 2125, 24 October, President Nixon received an urgent note from Brezhnev suggesting joint U.S.-Soviet military action to enforce the cease-fire. The note threatened unilateral Soviet action if the U.S. were unwilling to participate.[53]

Nixon and Kissinger saw deployment of U.S. troops so soon after Vietnam, possibly to fight alongside Soviets against Israelis, as impossible. Similarly, unilateral Soviet action was unacceptable. Early on 25 October, Nixon cabled Brezhnev voicing his strong opposition to

superpower military involvement, especially unilateral Soviet action. Nixon also placed U.S. military forces worldwide on an increased state of alert (DEFCON THREE), and an urgent warning was sent to Israel to cease fighting. By the afternoon of 25 October tension was relieved, with the Soviets dropping their insistence on superpower participation in cease-fire enforcement. Fighting along the Suez front subsided to minor skirmishes, but the war had produced the most serious superpower confrontation since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.[54]

It took until 18 January 1974 to reach a disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt. The agreement created a UN buffer zone approximately ten miles east of the Suez Canal with limitations on Egyptian and Israeli forces in areas adjacent to the buffer zone. Disengagement negotiations with Syria were more difficult. An agreement was finally reached on 31 May 1974, including a UN buffer zone approximating the prewar border with force limitations in the adjacent areas.

WINNERS, LOSERS, AND LESSONS

Both sides claimed victory, and both sides had a reasonable case. Israel, after being nearly overwhelmed, staged a remarkable comeback, conquering new territory in the north and isolating an entire field army in the south. By the "numbers," Israel won the war. Israel suffered over 11,000 total casualties (2,800 killed) and lost over 800 tanks (400 of which were later repaired) and over 100 aircraft. The Arabs combined suffered over 28,000 casualties (8,500 killed), losing over 1,850 tanks and 450 aircraft.[55] While the Arabs lost more men and equipment, the impact on Israel with a smaller population was arguably more severe.

Despite the losses, Arab claims of victory are not far-fetched. In the north, the Syrians and their allies had fought the Israelis to a standstill. In the south, Israel had isolated the Egyptian Third Army, but it is not clear that the Israelis could have protected their forces on the west bank of the canal from a determined Egyptian assault and still maintain sufficient strength along the rest of the front. In the final settlements, Syria essentially maintained the status quo ante, and Egypt regained the Suez Canal. Unquestionably the best argument for an Arab victory is the changed political situation. The Arabs had accomplished their goal of upsetting the status quo, and the 1973 war was a direct antecedent of the 1979 Camp David Accords. Trevor Dupuy sums up the issue well:

> Thus, if war is the employment of military force in support of political objectives, there can be no doubt that in strategic and political terms the Arab States—and particularly Egypt—won the war, even though the military outcome was a stalemate permitting both sides to claim military victory.[56]

The 1973 war has been extensively studied for both its military and political lessons, but it is equally revealing as a study in human decision making. The disastrous 14 October Egyptian offensive, which was resisted by Minister of War Ismail, is one example. The Syrian call for help, coupled with the euphoria over initial Egyptian successes felt by many in the senior Egyptian staff, prompted this poor decision. Parallels to the revision of objectives in Korea after Inchon are discernible, as is an appreciation for the discipline it must have taken to hold to

the original objectives in Desert Storm. The case also graphically points out the human tendency to "fight the last war." Israeli reliance on mobile armored warfare, supported by air, was key to the 1967 victory, but also the precursor to the 8 October defeat. The most striking lesson, however, is the aspect of lack of appreciation for the opponent's point of view.

The Israelis were genuinely surprised in October 1973, mostly because they viewed Egypt's resort to war as an irrational act. By their calculations, there was no chance for Egyptian victory, thus no rational reason to resort to force. From Sadat's perspective, continuation of the status quo was intolerable, and even a military defeat (so long as it could be limited) was preferable to surrender without a fight. The parallels to U.S. evaluations of Saddam Hussein's calculations are evident. The technology of war may change, but the calculations (and miscalculations) of national leaders remain a constant element of international conflict.

Figure 1: Southeastern and Eastern Mediterranean
Source: USMA Military History Atlas, http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/MapsHome.htm



Figure 2: Israel-Syria Area: Golan Heights Campaign
Source: USMA Military History Atlas, http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/MapsHome.htm





Figure 3: Suez Canal Area: Campaign in Sinai
Source: USMA Military History Atlas, http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/MapsHome.htm

Figure 4: Suez Canal Area: Campaign in Sinai: Operation Gazelle
Source: USMA Military History Atlas, http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/MapsHome.htm



1973

13 Sep—Air battle with Syria; 23 Sep—Syria deploys in defensive positions/calls up reserves; 24 Sep—Israel begins strengthening Golan; 25 Sep—King Hussein warns Meir of Syrian intention to attack; Egyptian deployments noted; 29 Sep—Meir to Europe (previously planned trip); 27 Sep—Egypt mobilizes reserves (twenty-third time in 1973); 28 Sep—Terrorists attack train in Austria; Schonau transit facility closed

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thur	Fri	Sat
Sep 30 Mossad HUMINT says war coming Egypt to Syria: "go" CIA/INR report calms Kissinger	**Oct 1** LT Siman-Tov warns war coming Egyptian exercise "Tahrir 41" begins Syria deploys more	**2** Bridging equipment moves, both fronts Syria calls reserves 1400 time of attack agreed Meir to Vienna	**3** Soviets informed Meir returns from Austria Siman-Tov's 2nd Rpt Kitchen Cabinet briefed "low"	**4** Sinai recon reveals artillery/ammo Soviet evacuation Soviet navy leaves Mossad source requests meet	**5** Israel cabinet meets: Alert IDF, but no mobilization and prob. still "low" Mossad Chief warned by source	**6** 0400—War at 1800 0930—Mobilize/not preempt 1400—War begins *Yom Kippur*
7 Egypt establishes bridgehead Syria threatens southern flank	**8** Israel's "worst defeat" in Sinai Syria near-break-through "3rd Temple" falling	**9** Meir proposes visit to United States Sinai stabilizes Tide reverses in Golan	**10** Israel regains ground lost in Golan	**11** Counterattack into Syria Syria requests Egyptian attack	**12** Israel would accept cease-fire in place Meir letter to Nixon	**13** U.S. airlift begins Syria offensive begins to stall
14 Egyptian attack defeated Syria lines harden	**15** Israeli thrust toward canal begins	**16** First Israeli forces to west of canal Kosygin travels to Egypt	**17** Battle for corridor to canal	**18** Bridge over canal secured Sadat agrees to cease-fire	**19** Israeli breakout west of canal aimed at Suez	**20** Kissinger to USSR
21 Kissinger in USSR	**22** UNSCR 338 calls for cease-fire Kissinger visits Israel	**23** Fighting continues; Israel closes toward Suez	**24** USSR threatens unilateral action United States to DEFCON III	**25** Cease-fire observed by both sides	**26**	**27**

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Panama—The Enduring Crisis 1985–1989

RONALD E. RATCLIFF

On 20 December 1989, the United States launched its largest military operation since the Vietnam War against Panama. Operation Just Cause employed over twenty-six thousand servicepeople, including the largest parachute drop since World War II, to depose and capture Panama's military dictator, Manuel Antonio Noriega, and to restore a democratic government to the country.[1] In his address to the American people the next day, President George Bush stated the reasons for the invasion were: "to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal treaty."[2] While the operation was generally a success, a greater question arises. Why did the United States find it necessary to employ overwhelming military force to remove the leader of a sovereign country that was ostensibly one of America's strongest allies in Central America? This case study, prepared by Professor Ron Ratcliff, a faculty member of the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College, is being used as part of the school's curriculum.

1968–1984: NORIEGA, THE NECESSARY EVIL

Noriega was the product of a military junta led by General Omar Torrijos that overthrew the Panamanian government in 1968. He was instrumental in helping Torrijos survive his own coup in 1969. His loyalty was rewarded, and he eventually rose to command of the Panamanian military forces in 1983. Shortly after assuming command, he illegally influenced the 1984 national elections in a move to strengthen the military's influence over the Panamanian government. He engineered the election of President Nicolas Barletta, the military's candidate and one who was considered personally loyal and subservient to Noriega. Some observers believe that the United States turned a blind eye to Noriega's election fraud because it put in place a government that was considered sympathetic to American interests.[3] While Panama had an elected government, real power rested in the hands of the military, and Noriega was the man in charge.

Noriega was long known to the U.S. government as an unsavory character whose excesses included drug trafficking, money laundering, and murder. However, the United States ignored his transgressions in order to secure national interests considered more vital than policing his corrupt practices in Panama. American foreign policy was focused instead on two strategic threats emanating from the region: Communist-inspired insurgencies against U.S.-backed governments in Central America and drug trafficking that was causing serious domestic concern. During the 1980s, Nicaragua and Communist encroachment dominated U.S. regional focus. Although secondary to those interests, the United States recognized it also had critical security interests in Panama. These interests included: access to U.S. bases and facilities in Panama, implementation of the Panama Canal treaties, support

for the Contras (anti-Communist military forces) operating in Nicaragua and El Salvador, and continued operation of intelligence-gathering facilities targeted against Cuba and other Latin American countries.[4] Noriega was considered an essential asset in securing those interests. He was used by several U.S. agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and later by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), to further American interests.[5]

1985–1987: YEARS OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY

Serious problems with Noriega began for the United States in 1985 when a well-respected political opponent of Noriega, Dr. Hugh Spadafora, was brutally tortured and murdered by the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF). Spadafora had made credible and extensive accusations that had drawn significant international attention to Noriega's involvement in drug trafficking and other illegal activity. Spadafora was well known and highly regarded by most Panamanians. When his death was discovered, Panamanian outrage was immediate and extensive. With the public's outcry too loud to ignore, Panama's President Barletta called for Noriega to step aside as the PDF commander while the crime was investigated. Noriega responded by forcing Barletta to resign, repressing all attempts to investigate or report the crime, and installing a more reliable puppet as president.

The murder of a popular anti-Noriega figure and the ousting of an elected president elicited significant press coverage of Noriega for the first time in America. The U.S. media portrayed Noriega as a corrupt dictator who was sending drugs into America, protecting drug cartel leaders, supporting terrorists, laundering illicit drug profits, and brutally suppressing democracy in his homeland. These accusations led to congressional hearings where the administration, and the DEA in particular, were forced to defend its continued, albeit reluctant, support of Noriega, citing greater American security interests in the region.[6]

Senator Jesse Helms, an archconservative who had resisted the return of the canal to Panama, was especially critical of the administration's support of Noriega. He felt strongly that Noriega was too corrupt to be entrusted with the Panama Canal.[7] As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Helms tried to build support for a harder look at Noriega, but his stance against relinquishing control of the canal left him with little or no support for his position against Noriega. The administration's point man on Central America, Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams, was also able to blunt much of the criticism by emphasizing the benefits of continued American support of Noriega. Senator Helms found little public interest in Panama, and, lacking congressional support for his anti-Noriega position, U.S. criticism of Noriega quickly died away.[8]

The press, however, did begin to take greater interest in Noriega and his involvement in drug trafficking in 1986. The *New York Times* ran an investigative series detailing his extensive connections to drug traffickers and to the CIA. These accusations struck a resonant note in an America starting to come to grips with its serious and growing drug problems. The *New York Times* revelations precipitated further coverage by other news agencies, which began to raise American public sentiment against Noriega.[9] Those concerns were further

heightened in mid-1987 when Noriega's second in command, Colonel Diaz Herrera, went public with numerous charges of corruption against Noriega. Herrara was motivated by Noriega's refusal to step down in 1986 and pass the reins of the PDF on to him as previously agreed. His charges led to large public demonstrations as Panamanians took to the streets to vent their anger against Noriega and his reign of PDF brutality and corruption. As calls for Noriega's removal continued into the spring of 1987, he struck out against his opposition by brutally crushing demonstrations using special riot police and declaring a state of emergency that precluded further public demonstrations.[10]

As the Panamanian situation grew worse, command of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) changed in June 1987. SOUTHCOM, whose headquarters was inside Panama, was responsible for all military matters that affected Panama. General Frederick F. Woerner, Jr., the incoming commander, had extensive experience in Latin America, was fluent in Spanish, knew Noriega, and understood the issues that afflicted Panama. In his remarks upon assuming command of SOUTHCOM, he made it clear that Noriega needed to return governance of Panama back to civilian control. Noriega was incensed by General Woerner's remarks and responded by stepping up the harassment of U.S. servicemen and women in Panama. It did not take Woerner long to realize that Noriega would never step aside of his own will and that force likely would be necessary. He directed his staff to begin planning for a U.S. military intervention.[11]

The U.S. Congress also had become energized about Panama by mid-1987 as their Iran-Contra hearings revealed details of illicit U.S. activity in Panama. It learned that members of the National Security Council (Admiral Poindexter and Lieutenant Colonel North) had used Noriega to circumvent congressional restrictions on aid to Nicaraguan Contras imposed in 1983. Noriega had been used to help the administration purchase and deliver arms to the Contras using drug profits from various schemes, including transport and sale of cocaine from Panama into the United States.[12] These revelations, and continued negative press about Noriega himself, forced a review of U.S. policy in Panama and led the Senate to pass overwhelmingly a resolution calling on Noriega and his senior advisors to step down immediately. Noriega angrily reacted by accusing the United States of interfering in Panama's internal affairs and instigated mob attacks on U.S. installations and the U.S. embassy itself. Noriega stepped up his brutal crackdown on domestic demonstrations and suspended the free press.[13] The United States responded by suspending all military aid to Panama and curtailing all contact between the U.S. military and the PDF. Significantly, the CIA cut its ties with Noriega, severing a relationship that had lasted over twenty years.[14]

By this time, the Reagan administration had reached the conclusion that Noriega had to be removed. There was, however, no consensus about how to achieve that goal. President Ronald Reagan was known for his reluctance to resolve policy disputes among his senior advisors, and the means and manner of Noriega's removal were no exception. The State Department, led by Elliot Abrams, and the NSC staff wanted Noriega out immediately and were prepared to use strong diplomatic pressure to force Noriega into a corner while supporting a coup from within the ranks of the PDF to depose him.[15] The Department of Defense and the

CIA did not support a rapid overthrow of Noriega. They did not see a capable replacement that could keep the PDF in check and hold the country together while a democratic leader could be elected. They also feared that Noriega would react violently to any hard push to remove him, which endangered approximately fifty thousand Americans living in Panama.[16] In the DoD's and CIA's view, while Noriega had his drawbacks, there were no real alternatives to him. They felt any U.S. action should wait for the Panamanians to take serious steps to oust Noriega.

In 1987, the American media was not forcing the administration's hand on Noriega either. It was focused on the Iran-Contra hearings and the roles that senior administration officials had played in that situation.

Absent any clear consensus among his senior advisors, President Reagan was persuaded to attempt to cajole Noriega to step down. Those efforts proved unsuccessful due to a lack of a clear and strong message to Noriega that he had to go. During late 1987 and early 1988, no fewer than three senior emissaries were sent, but each communicated a slightly different spin on when, or even if, he had to leave. As a result, Noriega gained the impression that there was no consensus within the administration that he had to leave.[17] Absent forceful U.S. intervention, Noriega saw no compelling reason to abandon his lucrative situation.

1988: RUNNING OUT OF OPTIONS

In February 1988, the Reagan administration's predicament with Noriega grew even worse, when the U.S. Justice Department indicted Noriega in Florida for drug trafficking and money laundering. Those indictments linked him directly with the drug cartels that were smuggling cocaine into the United States. They were also a distinct source of embarrassment to the U.S. government and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which considered Noriega to be one of its best assets in its war on drugs. Noriega had always complied with DEA requests, and nurtured an appearance that he was a strong advocate of America's war on drugs, but it was clear that he had used that cooperation to his personal advantage.[18]

To the even greater embarrassment of the administration, however, was the total lack of coordination between the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and the administration on the issuance of the indictments. The Justice Department has a culture of operating independently and staying clear of political considerations in the pursuit of bringing criminals to justice. As a result, neither President Reagan nor Secretary of State George Shultz were advised in advance that the leader of a sovereign nation was to be indicted on charges of drug trafficking.[19] The Florida indictments, coupled with the administration's failed attempts to get Noriega to step aside voluntarily, made it clear that more forceful action was now required to remove Noriega. Matters were only made worse when polls revealed Reagan's declining approval figures, showing in July 1988 that less than 30 percent approved of his handling of the Panama situation.[20] Something needed to be done, but once again, the administration was split on how to accomplish that goal.

The Department of State became the earliest proponent of using military force to remove Noriega from power in Panama. Elliot Abrams, the assistant secretary of state for

inter-American affairs, largely shaped that policy. Abrams was a personal favorite of Secretary of State George Shultz, but his abrasive and arrogant manner caused him to be disliked by most other senior presidential advisors. Shultz, however, was content to let Abrams set State Department policy toward Panama and Central America, since his attention was focused on more pressing problems in the Soviet Union and the Middle East.[21]

Abrams's attention to Panama came late. His initial focus in Central America had been squarely on Nicaragua and its Communist-inspired Sandinista government that had taken power in 1979. Many felt that Abrams had been obsessed with the overthrow of the Sandinista government. When illegal U.S. operations there were exposed and stopped as a result of the Iran-Contra scandal, his personal role came under severe criticism. His reputation and credibility with the Congress were badly damaged by his lack of veracity during testimony before them about the administration's support of the Contras.[22] Critics charged that his focus on Panama and Noriega was an attempt to rebuild his standing with the Congress and others.[23] As Noriega demonstrated obstinate resiliency in staying in power, Abrams became convinced that U.S. military power was the best, perhaps the only, instrument to push the troublesome Noriega aside. He convinced Secretary Shultz that military intervention was the best course of action.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Admiral William Crowe, solidly opposed Abrams and Shultz in the use of military force in Panama. His reasons were compelling. Military action staged from U.S. bases inside Panama to remove the ruling regime would jeopardize the U.S. basing rights in other countries where the United States had sensitive issues with the host.

Fifty thousand Americans lived in Panama, and all would be at risk to Noriega if the United States started military action.

Use of military force against Panama would reinforce the perception of "Yanqui" abuse of power at a time when Communist ideologues were making strong inroads into the region.[24]

Among the stronger reasons for Crowe's reluctance was the fact that Noriega permitted the U.S. military to use its bases in Panama to spy on neighboring countries, and to train other regional military forces, all in direct violation of the Canal treaties. Another leader might not be so passive in permitting such operations.[25]

When the State Department and Abrams proposed any form of military action, Crowe and the JCS countered with details of the costs, risks, and obstacles inherent in such action. One telling example was the questionable defense estimate that evacuation of noncombatants from Panama preparatory to U.S. military action would cost over $100 million and take at least seven months to complete. Crowe's position was further strengthened by the elevation of the chairman's role under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act. He was now the principal military adviser to the president and no longer had to build a consensus for his personal opinions from among the other service chiefs or the secretary of defense. Crowe held strong reservations about getting involved militarily in Panama and regularly clashed with Abrams. He purportedly considered Abrams "a dangerous man pursuing

perilous policy . . . an ideologue out of control."[26] Abrams, for his part, considered Crowe's reluctance to use military force as "ill-guided, post-Vietnam military caution."[27]

Throughout 1988 the Reagan administration remained split over employing a military option to resolve the Panamanian problem. State, led by Elliot Abrams, argued for at least a limited use of force to capture Noriega and bring him to justice in the United States. Defense, however, pointed out practical problems of such an operation and raised the issue that the PDF might respond by taking American hostages to recover Noriega.[28] The CIA was also reluctant to support any military operation against Noriega, having just endured the fallout of its dealings in the Iran-Contra scandal. Its new director had little interest in or knowledge of Panama and wasn't interested in getting involved in any potentially controversial action that would bring further discredit or attention to the agency.[29] President Reagan's national security advisor, Frank Carlucci, who had replaced the disgraced Admiral Poindexter, also opposed State's desire to use military force in Panama. The Tower Commission investigation of the Iran-Contra affair had just reported its findings and had severely chastised the National Security Council for violating normal national security decision making processes. As a result, Carlucci was not willing to support another military adventure in Central America.[30] When General Colin Powell replaced Carlucci, who moved across the Potomac to become the secretary of defense, the Pentagon was effectively in a position to block any presidential support for military action throughout 1988. Any desire by Washington to take strong action against Noriega was mitigated by the presidential elections of 1988. The Republican administration needed to put a lid on Panama so that it did not become an issue that could be used by the Democrats against Vice President Bush. Although the military option was ruled out, President Reagan recognized that he had to take some action against Noriega. As a consequence, economic sanctions were authorized against Panama.

Panama was highly susceptible to U.S. economic pressure. Its economy was closely tied to the U.S. economy, and it used the American dollar as its currency. Unable to win support for military action, the State Department argued for invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in order to economically isolate Panama. By blocking the transfer of funds into and out of the country, the United States could deny Noriega the money he needed to pay his military and civil servants, the last vestiges of his support. Without that support, the theory went, Noriega would be forced to leave by the Panamanians themselves.

The administration was sharply divided over the use of stringent economic sanctions. Secretary of the Treasury James Baker was adamantly opposed to employing economic sanctions in Panama. He described the use of the IEEPA as "using an atomic bomb to kill a fly." Baker was further influenced by his concerns for the numerous American banks and businesses that operated in Panama and would bear the brunt of the sanctions. Even Secretary of State Shultz personally doubted the effectiveness of economic sanctions, characterizing them as difficult to enforce and rarely effective. Those Panamanians who opposed Noriega were also reluctant to embrace economic sanctions, noting Noriega and his

associates got most of their money illegally and weren't dependent on the local economy.[31] Secretary of Defense Carlucci argued that IEEPA would only serve to stiffen Noriega's resolve to remain in power. He was joined by General Powell and White House Chief of Staff Howard Baker, both of whom argued for less drastic measures.[32]

Despite the many reservations voiced, President Reagan forged ahead with sanctions, but permitted a modified plan to be implemented. Sanctions were initially delayed as the bureaucracy struggled with the many practical problems of implementing a complete economic sanction of Panama. First, there was the issue of how to pay several thousand American and Panamanian employees of the Panama Canal. To stop paying them would risk shutting down the canal. Further, there were numerous American government offices and facilities (the embassy and SOUTHCOM, to name two) that had to pay utility bills or be shut down. And finally, as Baker had feared, numerous American businesses and banks lobbied hard for exceptions to avoid the huge expected losses that would be felt by the banks if full-blown economic sanctions were put in place. In the end, the sanctions were delayed for over two months and not fully employed as the bureaucracy waded through numerous requests for exceptions. The net result was that the sanctions had much less effect than they might have had.[33]

As the last days of the Reagan administration drew to a close, it was determined that the United States needed to wait for a Panamanian solution such as a popular uprising like the one that had forced Marcos from power in the Philippines or a coup d'état. Some held out hope that the 1989 Panamanian elections would force Noriega from power.[34]

1989: BAD GETS WORSE

In 1989, after George Bush's election as president, CINCSOUTH was summoned to Washington to testify before the House Appropriations Committee regarding the defense budget. General Woerner had grown increasingly frustrated as he was forced to sit back and avoid confrontation with Noriega at all costs. The PDF had grown increasingly brazen as it illegally detained U.S. servicemen, physically assaulted others, stopped mail deliveries, and stole U.S. material, including diplomatic dispatches. During nine months in 1988, over one thousand incidents of harassment by Panamanian forces against Americans were documented.[35] The decision to go slowly with Noriega had exacted a heavy toll on the morale of U.S. troops in Panama. While adhering to the administration's desires, General Woerner became the target of their frustrations, and SOUTHCOM became known as "WIMPCOM."[36]

During his testimony before the House, and in a subsequent visit to Washington, Woerner publicly aired his concerns and frustrations regarding the lack of a clear and comprehensive U.S. policy in Panama. Woerner had never served in Washington, and his candor showed his political naiveté. His criticisms were widely reported and provoked a strong response by President Bush, who admonished Admiral Crowe for Woerner's remarks.[37] Despite his firsthand knowledge of how bad the situation was in Panama, his remarks won him little support in Washington and numbered his days in Panama.

As matters continued to deteriorate in Panama, the Bush administration, like its predecessor, continued to look for a nonmilitary way to depose Noriega. The last viable option was to use the May 1989 Panamanian presidential elections. The United States funneled ten million dollars to the opposition party in an effort to install a democratic government that would throw Noriega out of his position as PDF commander.[38] Despite significant U.S. assistance to opposition parties and the presence of distinguished election observers (including several from the United States), those hopes disappeared when Noriega seized ballot boxes and manipulated the returns to give victory to his candidate. The press immediately reported the widespread fraud to the waiting world. Noriega attempted to prevent former president Jimmy Carter, the leading U.S. election observer, from conducting a press conference to raise his objections to the handling of the election. Outraged Panamanians took to the streets, but they were brutally repressed by the PDF and Noriega's paramilitary Dignity Battalions. When the opposition candidates dared lead demonstrations in protest, they were beaten and arrested in front of the international media.[39]

These last acts removed all hope in the Bush administration's mind that it could find a peaceful solution to the Noriega problem. President Bush recalled the American ambassador to Panama, reduced embassy staff, ordered an evacuation of American dependents, and placed the remainder inside secure American compounds. Further, he announced that the United States would enforce its rights under its treaties with Panama, including the free and unfettered movement of U.S. troops through Panamanian territory, and sent a brigade-sized force to augment U.S. troops in Panama.[40]

The Organization of American States (OAS) was drawn into the conflict as it watched events in Panama and Noriega's handling of the presidential elections. It had conflicting interests at stake—its desire to let Panama handle its own internal affairs, juxtaposed with its duty to support free elections and the democratic process that Noriega had just trampled. Yet any intervention in Panama risked intervention in the future elections of other countries in the region. OAS was not prepared to censure Noriega, but it sent a delegation to Panama to try to mediate a peaceful transfer of power from Noriega.

Between June and September 1989, Noriega received various OAS delegations, but as time passed it became clear that he had no intention of stepping down.[41] The reasons for Noriega's refusal to step aside, which escaped OAS and U.S. government officials at the time, were quite simple. He could not relinquish power without signing his own death warrant. His intimate knowledge of drug cartel operations, coupled with a long list of enemies made through a lifetime of crime, made him far too dangerous to be left alive.[42]

The United States and Panama embarked on a war of words and nerves between the May 1989 elections and October 1989. On 3 October 1989, that tension was wound even tighter by a coup attempt led by a small group of officers in Noriega's inner circle. Despite U.S. hopes that a coup d'état would occur, the United States was caught woefully off guard and poorly prepared to help the plotters. The plotting officers' request for U.S. support, which was minimal, came at a most inopportune time for the United States. General Maxwell Thurman had just taken command of SOUTHCOM three days earlier. He immediately

feared that the coup was a Noriega hoax designed to embarrass him and humiliate the United States.[43] Not only was Thurman brand-new, so too was the CJCS. On the same day he assumed his duties, General Colin Powell was advised of the coup that was to take place the next day.

Information about the coup and its leaders was sketchy at best. The CIA and DIA had little reliable intelligence about the plotters or their likelihood of success. The situation was made even more confusing when the plotters delayed their coup by one day. As a result, despite the plotters' capture of Noriega, the United States failed to provide the minimal assistance required by the plotters to prevent Noriega's faithful soldiers from rescuing him. As the coup attempt unfolded, American support was largely paralyzed. Conflicting information flowed to the administration from SOUTHCOM and other intelligence sources regarding the status of the coup. General Thurman was unable to provide any clarity to the situation because he had largely purged the experienced and knowledgeable staff officers who had served under General Woerner.[44]

Thus, during the most critical hours of the coup, American soldiers in Panama waited for guidance from Washington about what assistance they were to render to the coup. Yet, Washington was paralyzed by insufficient and, oftentimes, conflicting information from the scene, which was necessary to form a decision.[45] As a result, Noriega narrowly survived the coup and exacted immediate vengeance on the plotting officers, who were tortured and executed for their efforts.

Congressional and media criticism of the administration and the military was swift in coming. Numerous government leaks from both the State and Defense Departments revealed the magnitude of the U.S. failure to help the Panamanians get rid of Noriega. Congressional and media criticism was so extensive and detailed that the administration ordered its agency heads to stop all leaks and implicit criticism immediately.[46] The Senate Intelligence Committee criticized the administration for "talking loudly and carrying a small stick." The national security advisor, who was the target of much of the criticism, responded by accusing the Congress of withholding the president's stick.[47] Senator Jesse Helms, who had sounded the alarm about Noriega a couple of years before, revealed embarrassing details to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. failure to support the coup d'état and described the administration as a bunch of "Keystone Cops."[48]

While the administration scrambled to deflect attention away from its failings, it recognized that the criticism was richly deserved. It took immediate steps to determine how and why it had performed so poorly and to prepare for the next opportunity to get rid of Noriega, once and for all. President Bush irritably declared, "Amateur hour is over."[49]

DECEMBER 1989: END GAME

For his part, Noriega was not content to let America's embarrassment go unnoticed and continued his provocations against American personnel in Panama. To add insult to injury, on 15 December 1989, the Panamanian National Assembly appointed Noriega "Maximum Leader" and head of the Panamanian government. It further declared that a state of war

existed between Panama and the United States.[50] The next day, PDF soldiers fired on an American vehicle and killed a Marine Corps lieutenant. A U.S. Navy lieutenant and his wife observed the shooting and were arrested. The lieutenant was severely beaten and his wife was physically abused and threatened.[51]

On Sunday, 17 December, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, briefed the president and his closest advisors on the situation in Panama and the continuing risk to American lives, as evidenced by the death of the U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant. President Bush was particularly disturbed by the treatment of the Navy lieutenant and his wife.[52] After a review of the events, General Powell made his recommendation. The time had come to use military force to remove Noriega from power, and a large-scale operation was needed to do it.

President Bush inquired about the need for large forces. Powell responded that overwhelming force was necessary to reduce the risk to those involved. A smaller operation only reduced the chances of success without reducing the risk to U.S. forces involved. Secretary of State James Baker, the former secretary of the Treasury Department in the Reagan administration, who had opposed economic sanctions, voiced State's support for the operation. He argued military force was needed to destroy the PDF so that a truly democratic civilian government could be installed. Discussion continued for approximately two hours. Finally President Bush observed, "This guy is not going to lay off. It will only get worse." He turned to General Powell and said, "Okay, let's go."[53]

PANAMA CRISIS TIME LINE

1977	President Carter negotiates return of control of the Panama Canal to Panama, to occur in the year 2000.
1979	Carter administration officials block federal indictments against Noriega for drug trafficking and arms smuggling.
Aug 1983	Noriega assumes command of the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF).
May 1984	Noriega and the PDF intervene in presidential elections and rig results to produce a victory for Noriega's candidate.
Sep 1985	Dr. Hugo Spadafora, a popular critic of Noriega, is brutally tortured and murdered after making serious and credible allegations about Noriega's illicit activities.
Jun 1987	Noriega announces he will remain head of the PDF for an additional five years. The next day, his planned successor goes public with details about Noriega's crimes.
Jun 1987	The U.S. Senate approves a nonbinding resolution calling for Noriega to step down. Noriega supporters attack the U.S. embassy with rocks and cause extensive damage. Panamanians stage a general strike that causes to Noriega to shut down the media. The U.S. responds by suspending military aid to Panama and cutting contacts. Noriega is removed from the CIA payroll.
	General Woerner assumes command of SOUTHCOM and criticizes Noriega publicly.
Aug–Dec 1987	The U.S. tries to negotiate a deal with Noriega to step down and permit free elections of new government.
Feb 1988	Federal grand juries in Miami and Tampa, Florida, indict Noriega for racketeering, drug trafficking, and money laundering.
	President of Panama fires Noriega, but he responds by ousting the president and replacing him with a more reliable politician.
Mar 1988	PDF officers stage unsuccessful coup d'etat against Noriega. Plotters brutally tortured and executed.
	Noriega creates Dignity Battalions to augment PDF forces.
	The Reagan administration considers military action, but the DoD and others oppose it. Economic sanctions are considered while the administration attempts to get Noriega to step down voluntarily.
Apr–June 1988	Economic sanctions implemented against Panama.
Nov 1988	George Bush wins U.S. presidential elections.
May 1989	Presidential elections held in Panama. Noriega steals election with widespread fraud. Dignity Battalions assault opposition candidates and crowds in front of world media.
30 Sep 1989	General Max Thurman replaces General Woerner as CINCSOUTH.
2 Oct 1989	General Colin Powell replaces Admiral Crowe as CJCS.
3 Oct 1989	Noriega survives coup d'etat and executes plotters.

EPILOGUE

The invasion of Panama received much domestic and international criticism. One day after the invasion, the Organization of American States (OAS) voted overwhelmingly to censure the United States, stating that it "deeply deplored" the U.S. invasion. It marked the first time in the forty-two-year history of the OAS that it formally rebuked the United States.[54] The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China introduced a resolution before the UN Security Council two days later condemning the United States. It was vetoed by the United States, but a similar resolution was passed a week later by the UN General Assembly by a wide margin. While there was criticism in the American press, the media was generally supportive.[55]

Inside Panama, there was widespread support for the American invasion. Two weeks after the United States invaded Panama, a CBS opinion poll showed over ninety percent of the country supported the invasion.[56] Subsequent polling data gathered between 1991 and 1994 showed a decrease in support for the invasion to between 67 and 55 percent, but nearly three-quarters of those polled still supported Noriega's ouster.[57]

Notes

1. Margaret E. Scranton, *The Noriega Years* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 202.
2. "Transcript of the President's Speech," *New York Times*, 22 December 1989.
3. Frederick Kempe, *Divorcing the Dictator* (New York: Putnam & Sons, 1990), 125.
4. Scranton, *Noriega Years,* 3.
5. Kempe, *Divorcing*, 28.
6. Ibid., 92–94.
7. Ibid., 175–176.
8. Kevin Buckley, *Panama—The Whole Story* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 51.
9. Ibid., 56.
10. Scranton, *Noriega Years,* 108–109.
11. Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause* (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 11–12.
12. R. M. Koster and Guillermo Sanchez, *In the Time of the Tyrants* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990), 24.
13. Scranton, *Noriega Years,* 113.
14. Eytan Gilboa, "The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of Force in the Post Cold War Era," *Political Science Quarterly* 110, no. 4: 539.
15. Scranton, *Noriega Years,* 116.
16. Ibid., 117.
17. Gilboa, "Panama Invasion," 544.
18. Scranton, *Noriega Years,* 46.
19. George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1993), 1052.
20. Gallup Poll, July 1988.
21. Kempe, *Divorcing*, 294.
22. William R. Farrell and Andrew E. Gibson, *The Panama Dilemma* (Newport: NWC Press, 2000), 67. More than 125 House Democrats had called for his resignation after his admission that he had misled the Congress.
23. Kempe, *Divorcing*, 294–295.
24. Kempe, *Divorcing*, 297.
25. Ibid., 301.
26. Ibid., 294.
27. Ibid., 299.
28. Gilboa, "Panama Invasion," 545.
29. Kempe, *Divorcing*, 297.
30. Ibid., 296.
31. Ibid., 307.
32. Scranton, *Noriega Years,* 136.

33. Ibid., 307–308.
34. Ibid., 543.
35. Ibid., 334.
36. Scranton, *Noriega Years,* 39.
37. Donnelly, *Operation Just Cause*, 42.
38. Scranton, *Noriega Years,* 157.
39. Ibid., 161–163.
40. Ibid., 165.
41. Buckley, *Panama,* 185–187.
42. Gilboa, "Panama Invasion," 554.
43. Kempe, *Divorcing*, 381.
44. Ibid., 380.
45. Ibid., 386.
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Flight of the Phoenix: The V-22 Story

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The V-22 Story provides substantive insight into the tools used by the legislature to initiative, control, influence, and oversee spending by the executive branch. More than a simple story of the development and procurement of an important technology, this story delves deeper into the partisan, bureaucratic, and organizational politics that are an inescapable complement to any acquisition project. A thorough reading and understanding of this case study will provide the student the foundation to discuss the forms of interaction between the legislative and executive branches, as well as provide insight into the delicate balance senior leaders must maintain between partisan politics and military necessity. This case study, prepared by Dr. Clemson Turregano, LTC, USA, a faculty member of the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College, is being used as part of the school's curriculum.

> The phoenix is a bird from ancient Greek, Egyptian and Arabian mythology that lived in Arabia and was sacred to or a servant of the sun god of ancient Egypt. The phoenix is described as a heron in Egypt, but is usually depicted as a peacock or eagle like bird with red and gold plumage. Only one phoenix could exist at one time and every 500 or 1000 years when it felt its end coming the phoenix would build a nest to be used as a funeral pyre. The old phoenix is then consumed in flames and burned to ashes. A new phoenix would then rise from the funeral pyre.[1]

Although nicknamed the Osprey, the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft might be more appropriately termed the phoenix. Like the bird of myth, this program has seen many different lives and constant threats of death.[2] This case study reviews the life of the program from its inception in the early 1980s, through its cancellation by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in 1990, to its resurrection by the House Armed Services Committee in 1992.

The V-22 is a multimission, multiservice twin turbine, vertical-lift, tilt-rotor aircraft. The program has been the mainstay for the Marine Corps acquisition program for the past decade. Originally proposed by the Marines as a replacement for the aging CH-46 fleet (which is now in its 36th year of service life), other services found promise in the aircraft.[3] Special Operations Forces saw great potential in an aircraft that can take off vertically like a helicopter, then fly like an aircraft at twice the speed of modern rotary wing aircraft. If successful, the navy would also like to have V-22s to replace its own aging CH-46 fleet for the vertical replenishment and possibly combat search and rescue (CSAR) missions.

The Osprey, like the mythical phoenix, has died many times, but through the various complexities of the political and budget system, has always been reborn.

A LONG JOURNEY NEEDED

In 1946, Marine Corps General Alexander A. Vandergraft first reviewed the results of the nuclear explosive testing on Bikini Island in the Pacific. His conclusions led to new concepts designed to incorporate the speed, mobility, and flexibility necessary for success in modern warfare. As a result, the Marine Corps adopted the concept of '*vertical envelopment.*' Instead of assaulting a beachhead frontally in concentrated, slow-moving waves of landing craft, Marines could leapfrog it with carrier-based helicopters.[4]

The late 1940s and early 1950s saw the development and operation of an early generation of vertical lift aircraft. In the mid 1950s, the services developed second-generation follow-on aircraft. In 1958, DoD directed the navy to conduct a study on the feasibility of a vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft to satisfy the medium-lift requirements of all the services. The navy's study indicated that a compound helicopter could satisfy the needs of all the services, thus creating the first attempt at a joint development program. The attempt quickly stumbled, however, when the army and air force declined to join. The army wanted their own aircraft and the air force desired an aircraft with a longer range. The navy and Marine Corps pressed on in what would become a familiar story. The program proved too expensive for the Marine Corps alone, and efforts shifted back to the original program structure.[5]

Three major designs were tested in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but none proved viable enough for operational use.[6] This forced the Marine Corps to go back to a heavy-lift design and to go it alone. As a result, this project evolved from a VTOL aircraft to a more conventional helicopter design, eventually leading to the development of the CH-53A heavy lift helicopter. The lesson learned, which would come back to haunt the Marine Corps, is that joint programs rarely stay joint.[7]

Another product of the early attempts at VTOL aircraft was the CH-46 medium helicopter. Born from the Boeing 107, the CH-46 represented a significant achievement as the first turbine-powered helicopter for the Marine Corps, possessing excellent lift and speed capabilities.

However, the Marines always believed the CH-46 was an interim program. They published three different statements between 1968 and 1981 reflecting the need for a replacement to the CH-46. By 1981, the service life of the CH-46 had reached fourteen years, and the Marines desired something better, faster, and more capable.[8] However, they were not the only service desiring a multipurpose, multirole rotorcraft. The Marines wanted a replacement aircraft for their medium assault/aero medical evacuation missions; the navy wanted an aircraft for their CSAR missions; and the air force for CSAR plus their long-range special operations missions. Once again, the ingredients for a joint program appeared to be developing.

The marines reviewed several programs in various stages of research: a lift fan, compound helicopters, improved conventional helicopters, and the XV-15. NASA and the army were developing the XV-15, an experimental tilt-rotor concept. The army was interested in the new technology since an interservice agreement prevented them from buying jet

aircraft and forced them to depend on helicopters entirely for assault, medivac, and troop transport missions. NASA was interested in developing the technology because it felt that a commercial VTOL aircraft was the answer to congestion of civilian airports.[9]

The versatility of the XV-15 tilt-rotor impressed then secretary of the navy, John F. Lehman. Lehman had seen the aircraft fly in the 1981 Paris Air Show and later arranged to test fly the demonstrator. While Lehman's enthusiasm reflected the promise of the new technology, his former boss, Sen. John Tower (R-TX), approached him about purchasing the new tilt-rotor. Bell Helicopter of Ft. Worth was a primary developer/contractor for the XV-15, and was a major employer in Tower's state. Lehman decided to support development of this new technology, a deciding factor in United States Navy/United States Marine Corps (USN/USMC) participation in the XV-15, the second joint service attempt at a VTOL aircraft.

The secretary of the navy was not the only observer at the Paris Air Show who was impressed with the potential of tilt-wing technology. The air show made the tilt-rotor demonstrator an international celebrity. Two markets demonstrated serious interest: the Europeans and the Japanese. After the Paris Air Show, the Europeans quickly formed a powerful coalition, European Future for Advanced Rotor Technology (EUROFAR). Members of EUROFAR included British Aerospace, CASA from Spain, Aerospatiale from France, Augusta from Italy, and MBB from Germany. A seventeen-member national research organization, Eureka, dedicated toward advancing European technology, provides a large portion of the financing. Pacific-based industries, such as Ishida, made great strides through the 1980s to develop and build a tilt-wing aircraft, the TW68. The 1981 Paris Air Show generated the international involvement that shadowed the development and approval of the V-22 program throughout the next decade.

THE JOINT FUNDING PROCESS

In March 1981, then army brigadier general Ellis D. Parker was the deputy director of requirements for the army. An ardent supporter of the XV-15, he aggressively sought a joint partnership to develop the concept. He knew that acceptance of the XV-15 into a joint funding proposal offered tremendous potential in cost sharing, which significantly broadened the risk for development amongst the services. After arranging for several individual briefs and demonstrations, General Parker gained the support of his counterparts for the tilt-rotor concept within each of the other services.

In December 1981, Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci officially established the JVX program. This army-led joint program was a joint-service, multimission program to integrate avionics and composite technologies with a tilt-rotor design in order to achieve significant improvements over helicopter technologies.[10] Deputy Secretary Carlucci assigned the army as the lead agent, with the Marine Corps assisting. In 1982, he was "most pleased to note that the services have agreed to a joint development strategy for the joint services advanced vertical lift aircraft."

In June 1982, the service secretaries made the JVX a top priority and designated the individual service funding levels. The 1983 plan called for production of 1,086 of the

tri-service VTOLs, with a total procurement cost of $25 billion. The services would share the funding, with the navy assuming a 50 percent contribution. The initial requirement called for the craft to support all the services and be capable of carrying 24 troops. There were many other possible missions mentioned for the revolutionary new VTOL, such as electronic warfare, amphibious assault, and special operations.[11] This was going to be one of the first truly "joint" programs.[12]

By late 1982, however, the tide of joint success began to turn. In December, the Marine Corps became the lead agent due to the army's inability to decide on a specific mission statement for the JVX. The army had many problems with the V-22, including lack of a specific mission statement, budget, operational, and political problems with the program.

Regarding the budget, the army was paying for 46 percent of the research and development costs, but was buying only 26 percent of the aircraft. Second, the Special Electronic Mission Aircraft (SEMA) role that the army had planned for their variant did not command the support from senior army officers relative to other competing programs.[13] Third, the JVX program could be perceived as an army threat to other air force fixed-wing missions. Finally, the large size and cost of the JVX would make it a direct competitor of other army helicopter programs.

Increasingly frustrated at the lack of a defined mission for the Osprey, the army announced it was dropping out of the research and development (R&D) program to fund a higher-priority helicopter aviation program: the Light Helicopter Experimental (LHX).[14] Dr. Richard D. Delauer, Undersecretary of Defense for Research, Testing and Evaluation, disagreed, and fought to reverse the army's decision and preserve the joint funding.

Delauer won, but the victory was short-lived. The army remained in the program, but its role was reevaluated and reinstated at a much lower level with a commensurately lower level of funding. The army and the air force shares of the budget were consolidated into the navy's budget to simplify the funding structure. Despite the restructuring, the army still lacked a solid mission for the Osprey.

Despite these difficulties, DoD awarded the team of Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing/Vertol the JVX contract in April 1983. The aircraft that Bell-Boeing developed from the XV-15 was designated the V-22 Osprey.

The following year, Brigadier General Parker was promoted and assigned as the commanding general of the Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama. Now, at the other end of the budget food chain, General Parker had a hard time promoting the program for the army. He began to feel that the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter could do the same job for significantly less money. By 1987, he no longer believed the V-22 was best for the army and recommended dropping out of the program he initiated. Secretary Ambrose backed him, and the army left the V-22 program.

In spite of the army's withdrawal, the program progressed and the first V-22 prototype hovered into the sky on 1 March 1989. The phoenix had just begun to fly, but its first life was to be very short.

Major reasons for canceling the V-22

- Peace dividend. The DoD topline in terms of the president's recommended numbers for FY 1990 though 1994 fell by $167 billion.
- Overall force size: The DoD drawdown involved cutting force size from 1.6 million to 1.1 million personnel.
- Navy funding shortfalls: V-22 procurement required $3.7 billion more than the navy wanted to spend on this mission.
- Limited assets versus requirements: DoD would have to make some very painful tradeoffs to sustain a V-22 buy. In canceling the V-22, the OSD was trying to preserve sufficient funds so that the money would be available to fund a reasonable amphibious shipbuilding program and a reasonable helicopter lift program for the Marines.
- USMC mission: With the fall of the Soviet Union, the assumed USMC primary mission was limited to amphibious assault. DoD felt USMC could do this mission with less costly alternatives.

Source: COEA Analysis, p. 3

CUTTING THE PROGRAM

The changes in Europe and the Soviet Union spelled turmoil and dramatic reductions for the defense budget. In 1989, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney dropped the Osprey program from the 1990 budget. The V-22 was just one of the programs sacrificed on the altar of the post–Cold War defense reductions. Other programs to receive the axe were the A-12 attack plane and the F-14D Tomcat upgrade. Regarding the V-22 cut, Secretary Cheney went on to remark during the House Armed Services Committee hearings that his decision "might have been different had the army been interested in the plane."

The demise of the joint funding, the end of the Cold War, and a new administration's priorities for funding left a critical wound in the Osprey program—no Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) support. Without this, the program was dead.

THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE V-22

Or was it? Like the phoenix, the Osprey had a nest in which it might lay eggs to be reborn. In this case, that nest was in the office of Representative Curt Weldon, a Republican from the 7th District of Pennsylvania. With the future of over two thousand hometown jobs in Boeing's helicopter division in Philadelphia riding on the outcome of the V-22 program, Curt Weldon emerged to lead the crusade. In 1990, this junior representative was faced with a difficult task as a minority member of the House Armed Service Committee (HASC). At least as a HASC member he had an effective forum in which to operate.[15]

His first task was to confront the OSD, an office firmly against the V-22 program. When submitting the budget to Congress in April 1989, Defense Secretary Cheney told the HASC that he "could not justify spending the amount of money . . . proposed . . . when we were just getting ready to move into procurement on the V-22 to perform a very narrow mission that I think can be performed . . . by using [CH-53E] helicopters instead of the V-22."[16]

Fueling then secretary Cheney's position was an earlier report from the analysts in the Pentagon's office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), led by Dr. David Chu, stating the Osprey's mission could be accomplished cheaper with a mix of conventional helicopters. These 1989 cost tables compared a fleet of 602 V-22 aircraft to a mix of 478 CH-60 and 225 CH-53s. The PA&E report concluded that OSD could save billions by employing a mix of standard helicopters. With the soaring budget deficit during the late 1980s, this seemingly unnecessary expenditure rang loud bells in the ears of the budget cutters.

The PA&E study set the foundation for the campaign for the V-22. This campaign would include three important battles the program had to win to survive—the political battle, the budget battle, and the battle of conflicting studies. Although each of these conflicts occurred simultaneously, we will look at each individually in order to enhance the understanding of each fight. Only by winning these three battles could the V-22 emerge victorious and continue its path to production.

The Political Battle. This battle was between Secretary Cheney and the House, led by Representative Weldon, over the future of the V-22. What follows is a description of how Mr. Weldon initiated, coordinated, and cajoled support for the V-22. Weldon would have to be convincing, because everyone was against the program. The administration, the secretary of defense, the chairman of his own committee, Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), and the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), were all opponents to the V-22.[17] However, Representative Weldon knew the Marines needed the program in order to advance their operational concept, and replace the aging CH-46. In addition, he needed the program in order to keep jobs in his district.

Addressing the needs of his constituents in the name of national defense and responding to the Marines' requirements, Representative Weldon dedicated himself to saving the V-22. First, he put together an unheard-of coalition. This coalition included representatives from Texas, Pennsylvania, and all the states involved in the production of the aircraft. He contacted labor unions and manufacturers, asking for their support. Labor is usually not strong on defense issues; however, they understood the importance of this program.[18] With their endorsement and the support of the committee, he worked to create momentum to reenergize the program.

The effects of constituent politics were much clearer outside the doors of the HASC hearings as Mr. Weldon set out to secure the essential funding, regardless of Secretary Cheney's decision. The role of the HASC was critical in this fight because the HASC, like the Senate Armed Services Committee, is an authorization committee. In order to save the V-22, money first had to be authorized for this need, and only then could money be appropriated through the Subcommittee on Defense from the House Appropriations Committee.

In an effort to win the political backing he needed, Representative Weldon joined the forces battling for the F-14D project, which was also marked for extinction. Weldon teamed with New York and California representatives in a powerful coalition, eventually winning $1 billion for the F-14 and $351 million for R&D and early procurement of the Osprey.

Obtaining these funds was a huge victory for Mr. Weldon. He had won a critical battle despite the efforts of Secretary Cheney. Representative Weldon was overheard to say at the time, "The leadership pulled out all the stops, especially on the Republican side. Cheney personally called probably every member of the Committee, except for people like myself, to try and get us to go along with his budget."[19]

The following year was no different, as Secretary Cheney cut the Osprey from DoD's FY 1991 budget. Representative Weldon's role was also the same. First, he sought the full unequivocal support of the Bell-Boeing presidents. Despite the possibility that they could endanger their positions with respect to other military contracts under fire (like the B-2, for which Boeing was a primary contractor), they agreed. Next, he approached the Marine Corps, which was extremely wary of openly challenging the known desires of the secretary. However, the Marine Corps agreed to continue to support the need for the V-22 ". . . *verrry* carefully."

Representative Weldon places the Marine Corps' desire in context. Federal law bans the Offices of Legislative Liaison from "lobbying" Congress. Instead, their role is to provide information to members of Congress.[20] As seen in the army's 2002–2003 fight for the Crusader artillery system, the service can oppose the wishes of DoD by providing opinions and information contrary to that provided by the OSD. However, the services do this at very high cost.[21] In the case of the V-22, the Marine Corps provided information to Mr. Weldon in a very compelling manner.

The dedication of the Marines to this program reveals the potency of one of Washington's least understood and most underrated lobbying forces. Unlike the other armed services, which have multiple subcommunities and numerous competing programs, the Marines focused like a laser on the Osprey as its number-one weapons program.[22] Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute states,

> While the other services are larger and more divided in terms of their goals, the Marine Corps makes an attribute of its small size by combining it with great passion and focus. The Marine Corps is also expert at tasking its veteran alumni almost as a grassroots political organization that is very effective in lobbying for the Corps' interests. In my mind, the Marine Corps is almost the institutional equivalent of Israel: It's small, impassioned, and it never takes its survival for granted.[23]

Although DoD was providing information that funding the V-22 would harm other programs, Mr. Weldon shared the Corps' belief that the program was paramount.

Unlike the military services, nothing prohibits manufacturers from ardent support and lobbying in favor of their programs. The conglomerate of Bell-Boeing was also conducting a "save-the-Osprey" campaign. Bell-Boeing used a two-pronged approach. First, with the assistance of Representative Weldon, they instituted the "guest pilot program," which allowed several influential military, congressional, and civilian leaders the opportunity to fly the V-22.[24] Secondly, Bell-Boeing showcased its broad V-22 aircraft production base. This industrial network included Lockheed of Georgia, Lucas Western Inc. of California, Moog

Inc. of New York, Grabill Aerospace Co. of Ohio, SCI Technology of Alabama, and Allison of Indiana. These tactics began to work and drew attention from well-known names. Donald Trump, for instance, who was heavily involved in the aviation shuttle business, was very attracted to the possibilities of tilt-rotor technology.[25] He saw the potential of tilt-rotor technology easing the congested air corridors along the East Coast.

With the secure backing of the industry and the military, Representative Weldon made a novel change in strategy by promoting the Osprey's commercial aviation applications. Just as NASA had set out to do with the XV-15, Weldon revitalized the tilt-rotor as the solution to commercial aviation congestion. To accomplish this, Representative Weldon formed a tilt-rotor coalition, an extensive list of powerful House and Senate members dedicated to the promotion of the benefits of the V-22. Weldon's view was, "You can't sell a B-2 bomber to Trans World Airlines, and you can't sell a nuclear powered submarine to Carnival Cruise lines, but the V-22, everybody is chomping at the bit to get."[26] Another recent study by NASA/FAA, titled Civil Tilt-rotor Missions and Applications, Phase II, supported Mr. Weldon's views:

> For half of the 4-6 billion dollar cost of a single new airport, an entire network of 12 urban vertiports, including the cost of 165, 40 seat tiltrotor aircraft, could be installed in the congested corridor between Boston and Washington D.C., serving 12 million passengers per year. . . . Commercial tiltrotors can extend the useful life of existing airports and preserve service to small airports.[27]

The threat of foreign competitors encroaching on U.S. tilt-rotor technology also fueled Mr. Weldon's strategy. This threat began ten years earlier with the XV-15. In 1991, a lobbyist reinforced this threat just before a meeting of the HASC budget approval meeting. The lobbyist placed in front of each member, a Korean toy V-22 model and a letter that warned that, "our fiercest economic competitors have already duplicated the model, and they are avidly pursuing the development of their own tiltrotor aircraft . . .our technological leadership can quickly erode."[28]

This threat provided even more ammunition for advocates of tilt-rotor development. In addition to enhancing the combat capability of the Marine Corps, providing jobs in home districts, and solving critical problems of civil aviation congestion, it now represented a battle to maintain U.S. competitive edge. One Marine Corps officer put it very bluntly: "It's [V-22] going to make it because of wanting to keep the technological base here in America."[29]

The sum of the political support for the V-22 offset Secretary Cheney's funding-based argument to cancel the program. The phoenix had survived the political battle.

The Battle of the Studies. The PA&E analysis supporting a mix of helicopters instead of the V-22 was but one salvo in what might be called the battle of the studies. Since the initial study substantiated OSD's position, Representative Weldon, with the support of other committee members, urged further study:

> . . . The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide with the fiscal year 1991 budget request an independent cost and operational analysis (COEA) of all reasonable V-22 alternatives including but not limited to, the CH-53E, BV-360, EH-101, CH-46E, CH-60 aircraft or any combination thereof.[30]

The desire for "further study" by another think tank is not unheard of on Capitol Hill. The Department of Defense contracts with think tanks and analytical centers to provide in-depth research and support that is difficult to attain inside the Pentagon. Capitol Hill uses a similar practice to insure that the studies the Pentagon contracts are accurate.[31] Admiral William Crowe Jr., former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, argues that this is a common tactic when the political stakes are too high or the votes are too close for a decision. In this case, the HASC directed the Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA) to study the V-22.

Not surprisingly, the IDA conclusions contrasted with the OSD study. IDA approached the issue from a slightly different angle. Rather than assume the procurement of 602 V-22 aircraft (the number the Marine Corps proposed to buy), it took the same $24 billion that the comparable mix of CH-60/CH-53 would have cost and assumed the purchase of 356 V-22s. The result was the IDA supported the V-22 over any conventional mix of helicopters. The V-22 was favored across the entire range of program life costs, mission effectiveness, maintenance requirements, survivability, risk development and Joint Services Operational Requirements (JSOR). In summary, the IDA study concluded that:

> The V-22's speed, range, and survivability advantages could enable even the 356 aircraft fleet to be more effective—sometimes significantly more and other times only slightly more than all proposed helicopters in each of the four Marine missions examined.[32]

The V-22 emerged as a star. The favorable results of the IDA study had the single greatest positive impact toward keeping the program alive. In addition to the IDA study, sixteen other major studies strongly supported the V-22 option.[33]

The IDA results were DoD's primary concern. In a letter sent to the SASC chairman, Senator Sam Nunn, Secretary Cheney disputed its conclusions.[34] He explained to Congress that:

> In the current era of declining budgets, we must give up certain capabilities. Marine Corps medium lift requirements can be met in substantial part by alternate means that are much less costly. Procuring the V-22 would force painful tradeoffs. One example is the amphibious warfare mission. To pay for even the slowest V-22 profile examined by the IDA . . . would require us to give up virtually all the amphibious shipping we have planned to build over the next several years.[35]

The OSD worked valiantly to discount the claims of the IDA study. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation Dr. David Chu, testifying before the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee during July 1990, supported Secretary Cheney's views:

> The V-22 program . . . even the scaled down version in the IDA study . . . remains unaffordable in today's budgetary climate, which is likely to become even more stringent.

> While the V-22 has many positive attributes that no other existing helicopter can match, it is still a tactical transport that would cost about 42 million per copy in today's dollars.[36]

Dr. Chu criticized the study's assumptions and recommendations but acknowledged, despite his concerns about maintenance and sortie rates, that the V-22's performance was clearly superior to any of the helicopter options. During testimony to the HASC he stated,

> The bottom line here, sir, with great reluctance by the Department [of Defense], is, we cannot afford to spend the kind of money that starting this [V-22] production line and buying these aircraft in reasonable numbers would require. [What this] would compel the Department to confront are a series of very painful tradeoffs to find the several billion dollars necessary to sustain that buy, not only in the period of 1991-1997, but in the years beyond. [We question] whether we have enough money to buy both the ships that the Marines need and the aircraft, if we go for an elegant aircraft solution [the V-22].[37]

Senator Dan Inouye (D-HI), Chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, commented that he had been a member of the subcommittee for about twenty years and this was the first time that he could remember that the OSD had attacked an IDA study. After more robust questioning, particularly by Senator Arlen Spector (D-PA), Dr. Chu told the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee that, "The driving factor underlying the V-22 cancellation decision was the comparative up-front investment cost of the V-22 versus an alternative force of helicopters . . . judged capable of performing [various missions] reasonably well."[38]

The entire debate between Dr. Simmons (representing IDA) and Dr. Chu (of PA&E) offers a rare glimpse of two senior analysts placing opposing views on record. This hearing also underscores the importance of the services supporting DoD leaders and members of Congress with high-quality rational analysis. Capturing the essence of the V-22 debate, this dialogue demonstrates the spirited nature congressional inquiry can take when major defense programs have strong interest group support and affect member's districts.[39] Once again, the phoenix escaped destruction.

The Battle of the Budget. The battle over the studies and the battles over politics were minor, compared to the battle over the budget. The V-22 emerged victorious from these two battles. Despite Secretary Cheney's refusal to include the Osprey in the 1991 budget (for a third year in a row), Congress approved $165 million for early procurement and $238 million for R&D. The phoenix had risen and was set to fly.

But a third, more vicious, battle was just heating up. This battle, begun in earnest in 1990, would be hard fought until the change of administration in 1992. The V-22's victory in the political and analytical struggles kept the program alive, but at the cost of stretching out the entire program. This increased the cost significantly. The extended time line also forced the Marine Corps into an untenable corner because they still desperately needed a replacement for their aging CH-46s.

OSD countered the congressional victory of FY 1991 with a procedural move by the then DoD Comptroller Sean O'Keefe.[40] O'Keefe attempted to employ the 1974 Budget Impoundment Control Act to withhold the $165 million appropriated for early procurement, pending congressional authorization to reprogram the money into V-22 R&D. Although the General Accounting Office (GAO) comptroller general subsequently determined this action to be a "deferral" in violation of the 1974 act, the Congress did approve the reprogramming of the $165 million into R&D in the FY 1992 authorization bill, as part of a larger restructuring of the program. Thus, despite the hard-won congressional decision to fund V-22 production, DoD had successfully blocked the directive with its delaying tactic and eventual diversion of the production money into R&D.

In FY 1992, DOD's proposed budget again excluded the Osprey. Nonetheless, Congress added an additional $625 million in FY 1992, to the $165 million held up in FY 1991, to be dedicated towards the production of three Engineering and Manufacturing Design (EMD) aircraft. Congress also added $15 million for the Special Operations Forces (SOF) variant for the air force. Included in the package was a directive for the secretary of defense not to take any action that would delay the obligation of these funds. Congress further specified that OSD was to provide, within sixty days of enactment, the total funding plan and schedule to complete the Phase II development program. This is a congressional technique used to force agencies into compliance.

Secretary Cheney did not provide such a plan. The sixty-day deadline expired. Instead, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) chairman, Donald Yockey, countered the congressional directive by ordering the secretary of the navy to provide additional information on the Osprey. The letter to then secretary Garrett requested answers to questions regarding the contractor's performance, the engine and transmissions upgrade program, additional requirements to fund an aircraft that meets the JSOR, and estimated costs of additional requirements.

There were several views on Undersecretary Yockey's move. Some in Congress believed it to be just another attempt to find something wrong—another study to find an excuse to cancel the program. Others believed it to be a positive move towards a smaller V-22 acquisition program. Still others believed it could be an effort to make a clean break from the old program and start a new effort to define costs. In any case, the funding Congress ordered not to be delayed had been blocked and was not authorized for expenditure.[41]

Meanwhile, fueled by the upcoming presidential elections, the battle between DoD and Congress continued to heat up. Having fought OSD both politically and analytically, Congress adopted new tactics. Exercising their right to oversee the DoD, Congress used budget complexity, the Government Accounting Office, the media, and its coalition partners to pressure Secretary Cheney to approve the V-22.

Political pressure continued to mount. The presidential primaries were taking place, and the Democratic front-runner, Governor Bill Clinton, had expressed great interest in maintaining the V-22 program. In April 1992, Joe Coors, Jr., chairman and CEO of the Coors

Brewing Company (a very influential republican ideological and financial supporter), made a personal attempt to lobby Cheney on behalf of the Osprey through the Republican National Committee. Cheney refused the approach, stating that, "I regret to report that the passage of time has only strengthened my conviction that the original decision was correct."[42]

Congress began with an innovative attack using the budget. In June 1992, the HASC FY 1993 budget resolution recommended that the Osprey replace the VH-3D presidential helicopters. The HASC, in perhaps a political move, moved to deny the $27.9 million requested to upgrade the executive helicopters. Like many requests, this one was not enacted; however, it served to reinforce the intent of Congress.

More important, Secretary Cheney's program opposition gained some added negative attention when the GAO concluded that DoD had been illegally withholding money by refusing to spend $790 million earmarked for the V-22 program in FY 1991 and FY 1992. The GAO report stated that according to the 1974 budget act, DoD would have until 4 August 1992 to spend the money appropriated, unless Congress ratified the rescission, which was unlikely. Rep. Pete Geren (D-TX), representing Fort Worth, said of the GAO report, "It finally puts an independent party on record as concurring with Congress that the Secretary [of Defense] has been breaking the law. This is a very significant finding that Cheney is wrong and the V-22 supporters are right."

Another action the HASC took in June was to insert a provision in the FY 1993 Defense Authorization Bill aimed at putting further pressure on DoD to spend the Osprey money. Under the inserted language, funding for the DoD Comptroller's was to be cut by 5 percent each month the V-22 funds went unspent.

Finally, the V-22 was an important political issue in 1992. Forty senators (including twenty-three Republicans) turned up the heat when they sent a strongly worded letter to the president requesting the administration's support of the project. Many saw the Osprey as a growing "political hot potato" which could act to distance Cheney from the president. Additionally, Curt Weldon said that Governor Bill Clinton, the Democratic presidential nominee, would support the Osprey in his strategy, which subsequently did come to pass. H. Ross Perot, the third-party candidate and seen as a pragmatist, was also reported to be a tilt-rotor supporter. His support of the V-22 could pull votes away from the Bush campaign.

The combination of political and budgetary pressure may have been too much, for on 2 July 1992, Secretary Cheney reversed his decision and announced DoD will devote $1.5 billion toward continued program development. It would seem that the Phoenix-like program had received a new lease on life. However, Cheney qualified his support, saying DoD would continue to study the ability of a conventional helicopter to perform the V-22 role. Congress was not satisfied with this qualified support, and through the summer and early fall there were further negotiations between DoD officials and congressional staffers. The result of these negotiations was a decision to proceed with development of four EMD aircraft, placed on contract in 1992. That decision did allow the "hot potato" to cool off, and the Bush administration to focus on other election issues.

SUPPORT FROM A NEW ADMINISTRATION

In January 1993, Bill Clinton was sworn in as the president and he, in turn, swore in former representative Les Aspin as his secretary of defense. Aspin, although not an original supporter of the V-22, vowed to continue the administration's promise to support the program. The first indication of the new administration's support of the program was the February 1993 budget cut. When Secretary Aspin asked the services to find $10.8 billion in additional cuts, the navy proposed that the V-22 remain in the defense program, and noted that the V-22's mission was even more important in the new littoral strategy. The Osprey escaped any serious cuts in the February 1993 exercise, and the program remained targeted at 612 aircraft (507 USMC (MV-22), 50 USN (HV-22), and 55 USAF (CV-22)), with an estimated cost of $40–45 billion (in then-year dollars) and low-rate initial production in 1997.[43]

That October, Secretary Aspin's "Bottom-Up Review" again spared the V-22. However, the navy restructured the program's procurement profile to fund R&D for Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) version of the aircraft (now known as the CV-22; the marine version is known as the MV-22), resulting in eight fewer aircraft than expected by the end of the decade (eighteen instead of twenty-six). Additionally, because the cost/benefit analyses that have been conducted on the V-22 are judged to have not adequately reflected changes in the type of warfare that naval forces expect to conduct in the future, another Cost & Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) was directed in December 1993 to shore up the analytical bases for the program. Again, the program was stretched out and the costs increased. This called for a review of costs and feasibility.

In December 1994, the Defense Resources Board deliberations of program affordability resulted in a Program Decision Memorandum that approved the integrated MV-22/CV-22 program with the Department of the Navy as the lead service. The navy would pay for the completion of the CV-22 development and procurement of the MV-22. The air force would pay for the procurement of the basic V-22 airframe and equipment common to the MV-22. SOCOM would pay for CV-22-unique equipment, integration, and procurement. In early 1995, the navy finally approved the program that would lead to operational fielding of the V-22 in 2001.[44] It looked like the path was clear to production of the V-22.

From 1994 through 2001, funding for the V-22 Osprey Program was stable. Although the House and Senate committees fought in the margins, each accepted that the program was viable and feasible. In addition, OSD supported the program, so there was little need for fighting for funds. The CV/MV-22 was approved for further testing and operational evaluation (OPEVAL). The 02-07 Future-Years Defense Program scheduled procurement of 360 V-22s for the Marine Corps; the same number recommended by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (and remarkably close to the Institute for Defense Analysis's recommendation), 50 Special Operations CV-22s for the air force, and 48 Combat Search and Rescue V-22s for the navy.

During this time, Boeing attempted to lobby the navy for a rebuild of the CH-46. A senior Boeing executive approached Admiral Jay Johnson, then the chief of naval operations,

stating that Boeing could do a complete factory rebuild on the CH-46. They could make the old helicopters brand new again. The CNO's reply was that the helicopter was old when he entered service, and it was now time to move on.[45] Any discussion of the CH-46 was dead—the service was moving on to new technology.

The need for the MV-22 became even more acute as the Marines initiated Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM). STOM is an implementing concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea, the basis of the Marine Corps Operational Concept. STOM also initiated the Combat Developments Process to provide the tools for the concept.[46] According to the doctrine, STOM is not aimed at seizing the beach, but at thrusting combat units ashore in fighting formations. The goal is to capture the decisive place on the battlefield, in sufficient strength to ensure mission accomplishment. The emerging technologies supported by this concept include the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), the MV-22, GPS, and developing C2 systems.[47]

According to STOM, the MV-22 and CH-53E offer mobility, which enables the vertical assault force to attack from over the horizon and strike rapidly at deep objectives, reembark, and strike other objectives before the enemy can react. This concept is the operationalization of GEN Vandergrift's vision. The MV-22 now had the employment concept it needed for employment. Everything was falling into place.

THE PHOENIX FALLS TO EARTH

In 2000, the phoenix was once again in dire straits. The MV-22 suffered a series of setbacks that halted the program. The first problem was two crashes, one in April in Arizona and another in North Carolina in December, that cost the lives of twenty-three marines. The second problem was an anonymous letter mailed to the media by someone claiming to be a mechanic in the Osprey program. This letter claimed that the V-22's maintenance records had been falsified for over two years. The accidents grounded the aircraft, but the anonymous letter caused extreme damage to the program as well.[48]

The April 2000 mishap occurred during operational evaluation testing in Arizona. The accident board determined the cause of the mishap was a high rate of descent that produced a phenomenon known as "vortex ring state" or VRS. In short, this occurs when the blades no longer provide lift for the aircraft. Although all rotary-wing aircraft may suffer from this mishap, helicopters (depending on the conditions) have the ability to fly through the condition. However, on a V-22, VRS may occur on one prop rotor and not the other. This creates unequal lift and may flip the airplane over.[49]

Another fatal accident occurred in December 2000 during a night training evolution in North Carolina. The cause of this mishap was alleged to have been hydraulic failure caused by a flight systems software error.[50] The combination of these two accidents left grave doubts about the program, the media in a frenzy, the program grounded, and the technology under attack.

Once again, the phoenix faced certain death.

The Marines immediately grounded the fleet, and initiated investigations into what happened. They also requested a delay to move the aircraft into full-scale production. In addition, they mounted a media blitz to both support the program and to limit the damage of the events on the credibility of the Marine Corps. This public-affairs blitz included discussions with the media, press conferences, and the commandant, General James Jones, appearing on the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer.[51]

Although there were calls to dismantle the program, then secretary of defense William Cohen postponed any decision until the completion of several investigations. In the wake of the December 2000 crash, he appointed a four-person panel to make recommendations to the new administration on the V-22 program.[52] The purpose of the panel was to review the V-22 program, recommend any changes, then report the results to the secretary of defense. The secretary's charter listed five factors they might review to affect the safety and combat effectiveness of the aircraft:

- Training
- Engineering and Design
- Production and Quality Control
- Suitability to Satisfy Operational Requirements
- Performance and Safety in Flight.[53]

On 19 April 2001, the Blue Ribbon Panel reported its findings and recommendations. They recommended that the programs should continue, but in a restructured format. "The panel found no evidence of an inherent safety flaw in the V-22 tilt-rotor concept. [We] recommend that the program be continued, but restructured. The panel [finds] that the V-22 aircraft lacks the maturity needed for full-rate production or operational use. . . ."[54]

The panel hearing was not enough for the legislature. Senator John Warner (R-VA), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, also held hearings on the V-22. The contentious issues, as in 1990, included cost and effectiveness but now, with eight hundred hours of flying the aircraft available for evaluation and analysis, there was much more discussion of risk. This question of risk involves not only risk to the personnel flying in the aircraft and the program, but political and budgetary risk as well.

Even as the V-22 served its penance on the ground, waiting whether or not it would ever fly again, the Marine Corps suffered a heavy blow to its integrity as a service and the credibility of the program. An anonymous letter, sent by a supposed MV-22 ground crew member, accused the MV-22 squadron commander of falsifying maintenance records. Based upon the publicly reported transcript of his comments, the MV-22 squadron commander wanted his marines to shade the aircraft availability reports. More specifically, he wanted to get the V-22 past the Defense Acquisition Board's milestone decision to approve full production, despite the warnings in the Pentagon and GAO reports.

When his actions came to the attention of the Marine Corps, he was immediately relieved and the investigations into misdeeds began. To remove concerns that the Marine Corps has been seduced by the V-22 program, the Marine Corps commandant shifted the investigation about the misleading readiness figures, and the possibility of improper command influence, to the Department of Defense inspector general.[55] On 15 September 2001, three marines were found guilty of misconduct and two were reprimanded in conjunction with the falsified statements.[56]

The combination of crashes and a crisis in confidence in the Marine Corps seemed certain to doom the Osprey.

THE FUTURE OF THE OSPREY?

Following extensive testing, and the reports of many investigations, the MV-22 resumed flight testing on 29 May 2002. The phoenix lives. The question is, how many lives might this mythical bird have?

To be fair to the program, the V-22's developmental track record of casualties and mishaps in its first five years is not very different from other rotary-wing and some fixed-wing aircraft that introduced new technology. For example, according to Naval Safety Center data for Class A mishaps (loss of life or greater than $1 million of damage), the CH-53D heavy-lift helicopter had nine Class A mishaps in its first five years, the H-3 Sea King helicopter had 28, the UH-1 Huey helicopter had 43, and the F-14 variable geometry wing interceptor had 27.8. Because naval aviation safety has improved dramatically in recent decades and our tolerance of casualties has diminished, the Osprey may be victim to an unrealistically high standard.

In spite of the setbacks, the V-22 program maintained the steady support of Congress and the Pentagon. In terms of budget, the V-22 has largely met its cost goals and projections; at $40 billion for the overall program, production model Ospreys will cost $83 million each, including research and development costs. The important cost for decision makers is the relevant or production model cost of each V-22 from here on: approximately $44 million per aircraft. The sunk costs of the V-22 program, by reducing its relevant costs remaining, are making a replacement helicopter program increasingly unattractive, unless that helicopter comes off the shelf, like the $8 million UH-60 Black Hawk. In addition, lawmakers concur that the continued cost of a V-22 testing and acquisition program will be far less than initiating dual programs by SOCOM and the Marine Corps for replacements to the MH-53 and the CH-46.

The lack of a replacement and testing issues aside, what keeps this bird alive? In short, its survival is due to the Marine Corps' rock-solid commitment to the program. That dedication reveals the potency of one of Washington's least understood and most underrated lobbying forces. Unlike the other armed services, which have multiple subcommunities and numerous competing programs, the Marine Corps has focused like a laser on the Osprey as its number-one weapons program.[57] Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute states,

> While the other services are larger and more divided in terms of their goals, the Marine Corps makes an attribute of its small size by combining it with great passion and focus. The Marine Corps is also expert at tasking its veteran alumni almost as a grassroots political Organization that is very effective in lobbying for the Corps' interests. In my mind, the Marine Corps is almost the institutional equivalent of Israel: It's small, impassioned, and it never takes its survival for granted.[58]

In addition to the lack of an obvious helicopter alternative that meets the Marines' requirements, there is another downside to canceling the V-22. President Bush campaigned on a promise to strengthen the U.S. military, in part by skipping a generation of technology. Presumably, the V-22 is exactly the kind of next-generational technology he believes is important for the new security environment. The secretary of defense, however, is not so sure. Looking again for areas to downsize in order to reinforce his transformation efforts, Donald Rumsfeld is taking a hard look at the V-22 program.

Congress continued its overview of the program. On 7 February 2001, Senator Russell Feingold introduced a bill that would rescind all FY 2001 procurement funding except for what is required to maintain the production base. This bill also requires the secretary of the navy to report on steps taken to ameliorate concerns expressed by the DoD's director of Operational Test and Evaluation. This report is in addition to the one on V-22 maintenance the DoD inspector general must to submit to Congress. In addition, Senator Feingold wrote a letter to Secretary Rumsfeld, urging him to delay further procurement of the V-22 until all investigations and testing are complete.[59]

Although Feingold's measures never passed, they play a critical role in explaining the current mood of Congress towards the V-22. In FY 2001 and 2002 budget battles, the Congress has matched the administration's requirements for research and development of the V-22. In addition to cutting funding for procurement, the committees each tacked on a version of oversight. In 2002, the authorization committee conferees required DoD to provide a report thirty days before any resumption of V-22 testing. The report would also notify Congress of any waivers required by the V-22, as well as software deficiencies, corrective actions, actions to implement the recommendations of the Dailey report and an assessment of the NASA report on tilt-rotor.[60] This bill was never passed; however, it demonstrates that enemies still exist to the V-22. These opponents will work diligently to insure that the aircraft never reaches production.

This leads to the question of whether the V-22 Osprey's mythical relationship to the phoenix will continue. Who will save the phoenix next time?

It may be Paul Wolfowitz, the current deputy secretary of defense. A memo from his office indicated he would like to accelerate efforts to field the V-22, assuming the aircraft was airworthy. In addition, the memo asks how quickly a bare-bones version of the MV-22 might be ready for production. To bring the issue full circle, Wolfowitz, in a separate memo, asks the secretary of the army to consider MV-22 capabilities for the army's Objective Force.[61]

Osprey production is currently set for eleven aircraft a year.[62] It remains the Marines' number-one procurement program. The CH-46, now entering its thirty-sixth year of

service, remains the Marines' workhorse, under tight flight and operational restrictions. Given recent developments surrounding homeland defense and the Global War on Terrorism, there is renewed interest in the MV-22's capability. Perhaps it will be a joint program again. Most likely, it will continue to fly.

The Osprey, like the mythical phoenix, may be developing a legend of its own—a true legend of program survival.

Notes

The author would like to thank the National Security Decision Making Department for its unlimited support of this case study. The author also acknowledges the contributions of the USMC Aviation Plans and Policy, as well as the Washington Textron office for its support and information. Many thanks to those who patiently reviewed the many different versions of this case study.

1. Online at: http://www.phoenix125.com/LEGEND.HTM (accessed on 8 January 2003).
2. The views, comments, and opinions in this case study are the author's alone, and do not represent the beliefs, attitudes, or stated position of the U.S. Naval War College, the U.S. Navy, or the Department of Defense.
3. "V-22 Osprey Fact Sheet," Summer 2002, USMC Aviation Plans and Policy Department, HQ USMC 2002.
4. J. Robert Moskin, *The U.S. Marine Corps Story*, 3rd ed. (New York: Little, Brown and Co, 1992), 431.
5. Department of the Navy, *V-22 Resource Book*, USMC Aviation Plans and Policy, 2002.
6. This subsequent undertaking involved an early variant of a tilt-rotor aircraft called the XV-3. The testing of the XV-3 demonstrated the feasibility of tilt-rotor technology. The three major contenders in the XV-3 program were the Vought-Hiller-Ryan XC-142A tilt wing; the Curtis X-19A four-engine tilt-rotor; and the Bell X-22A four-engine ducted-fan tilt-rotor. The XC-142 won, but proved too big and heavy for the navy, and it withdrew in 1961.
7. The CH-53, originally purchased by the air force and navy, taught another important joint procurement lesson. If the weapons platform turns out to be viable, other services will desire to purchase it as well.
8. Department of the Navy, "COEA Summary/Analysis," USMC Aviation Plans and Policy, March 2001.
9. Online at: http://www.simlabs.arc.nasa.gov/library/tiltrotor/ctr20th.html#History (accessed on 21 January 2003).
10. "COEA Summary," 2.
11. Online at: http://avia.russian.ee/vertigo/bvertol_osprey-r.htm. (accessed on 21 January 2003).
12. Original discussion between MG Parker and LCDR John W. Dziminowicz, U.S. Naval War College, Department of National Security and Decision Making, 1991. First published in *Still Hovering After All These Years,* U.S. Naval War College Case Study, 1991.
13. The primary mission that the army initially had in mind was the SEMA role to replace the OV-1, a twin-engine turboprop airplane. Designers, however, began to raise questions about antenna interference caused by the tilt-rotors. The intelligence community also felt the interior was too large for its needs. The alternative missions that the army was exploring were also considered, after closer review by General Parker, to be those of other services. Parker noted: "To buy into this program for something that was another service's mission, and for which we already had capability, was not a very high priority for us in times of shrinking defense budgets."
14. The LHX combat helicopter program was initiated in 1983 to replace the army's rapidly aging fleet of UH-1, OH-58A Kiowa Scout, and AH-1 Cobra light-attack helicopters. At the time, the JVX program was too heavy and did not fit the

army requirements for a one-man, light, multiuse helicopter. Online at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/lhx.htm (accessed on 13 February 2003).

15. For a more insightful look at Mr. Weldon's view of the process, contact the author for a transcript of his comments given at the Naval War College in 1995.
16. Bert Cooper, Jr., "86103: V-22 Osprey Tilt Rotor Aircraft," *CRS Issue Brief*, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, U.S. Library of Congress, updated 6 December 1996, 4.
17. Those familiar with Congress understand the challenges facing Representative Weldon. In the House, the Majority party holds all the cards—if a committee chair does not want to entertain legislation, he or she can use numerous political, procedural, and parliamentary means to halt the legislation.
18. Labor groups, such as the AFL-CIO and unions, such as the United Auto Workers (UAW), often oppose large defense contracts because they compete with programs that interest groups support. When Representative Weldon convinced the labor groups that this was in their best interest, it represented a huge victory for both the representative and the V-22.
19. Discussions with Professor James Miskel, U.S. Naval War College, February 2003.
20. Research conducted by the author, July 1991, first printed in "Inside the Offsite: An Organizational Study of the U.S. Army," doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan Press, 1995.
21. The cost is not in financial capital, but in political capital. The services are subordinate to the secretary of defense. When they publicly oppose the secretary's position, they challenge the leadership of DoD and the loyalty of his subordinates. This can result in friction and have significant repercussions on the service. A recent case involving the army and the Crusader weapons system is a case in point. The army wanted it, Secretary Rumsfeld did not. Some argue that the army's opposition resulted in the secretary naming a successor to the army CSA over sixteen months prior to his end of time in the position. This weakened the bargaining position of the army in any fight, both at the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill.
22. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Louis Jacobson, and James Kitfield, "High Stakes at the Pentagon Poker Table," *National Journal*, (7 December 2002): 3582.
23. Ibid.
24. This program still exists. Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), a pilot in World War II, recently test flew the V-22.
25. Dziminowicz, *Still Hovering*, 5.
26. Ibid., 6.
27. D. Berry, ed., *Civil Tiltrotor Missions and Applications, Phase II: The Commercial Passenger Market: Summary/Final Report*, NASA/FAA Contract #NAS2.12392, February 1991. For more information on civilian tilt-rotor applications, see *Congressional Record*, 19 April 1989:S4507-S4509. Also see congressional hearings on the importance of U.S. production of a tilt-rotor aircraft for civilian purposes: 17 July 1990, by the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology's Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation, and Materials. In 1992 Congress directed the secretary of transportation to establish a civil tilt-rotor advisory committee.
28. Dziminowicz, *Still Hovering*, 8.
29. Ibid.
30. "COEA Analysis," March 2001.
31. For more on the uses of analysis by Congress, see ADM (Ret.) William J. Crowe, Jr., "Congress and Defense" extracted from *The Line of Fire*, reprinted by the Naval War College, 1993, by permission of Simon and Schuster, 227–241.
32. Cooper, "86103: V-22," 5.
33. Ibid., 1–6.
34. Secretary Cheney questioned three assumptions made in the IDA report: the ability of the Osprey to operate at 200 knots with external cargo; the relatively high number of sorties required to support amphibious operations; and the acceptability of a smaller V-22 procurement program of 356 aircraft. See "COEA Analysis," 5–7.
35. Cooper, "86103: V-22," 5.

36. Statement of Dr. David S. Chu, assistant secretary of defense for program analysis and evaluation, given before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, Washington DC, 19 July 1990. Quoted from COL Charles H. Murray, USAF, ed., *Executive Decision Making*, 3rd printing, 1 Feb 2002. For more insight on Dr. Chu's position, see "Chu Defense Decision to Terminate V-22 Program Despite Favorable IDA Study," *Inside the Navy* (23 July 1990): 1, 11.
37. Cooper, "86103: V-22," 5.
38. Ibid., 6. The author would like to thank LTC Ray Sullivan and LTC Alan Neff, National Security Decision Making Department, U.S. Naval War College, for their assistance with this portion of the narrative.
39. Quoted from Murray, *Executive Decision Making*.
40. This same Sean O'Keefe is now the chief administrator of NASA. See http://www.nasa.gov (accessed on 19 Febraury 2003).
41. Adapted from Murray, *Executive Decision Making*.
42. Dziminowicz, 5.
43. Adapted from Murray, *Executive Decision Making*.
44. The Engineering and Manufacturing Development Program would maintain an initial operating capability (IOC) of 2001 for the MV-22 and a 20005 IOC for the CV-22. While the V-22 alternative was still the most costly alternative that could meet both the USMC and SOCOM requirements, separate programs from both SOCOM and USMC to replace the CH-46 would be much higher. COEA Summary/Analysis, 1 March, 7.
45. See author for source, February 2003.
46. The author would like to thank LTC Norm Hitchcock, USMC, for his contribution to this report.
47. "Ship to Objective Maneuver," *Marine Corps Concept Paper*, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia, 1997.
48. Christopher Bolckom, *V-22 Osprey Tiltrotor Aircraft*, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, updated 5 November 2001, CRS-5.
49. The members are distinguished members of the aeronautical community: Professor Eugene E. Covert, former head of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Aeronautics and Astronautics Department; GEN John R. Dailey, USMC, (Ret.), formerly deputy commandant for aviation, currently director of the National Air and Space Museum; GEN James B. Davis, USAF, (Ret.), former commander of U.S. Pacific Air Forces; and retired Lockheed chairman Norman R. Augustine. "Report of the Panel to Review the V-22 Program," Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 2001.
50. Ibid., 19–21.
51. *The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer*, transcript 22 January 2001, online at: www.pbs.org (accessed on 12 February 2003).
52. Covert, Dailey, Davis, and Augustine, "Report of the Panel," 11–18.
53. Ibid., 2.
54. Ibid., frontispiece.
55. Viewed dispassionately, much of the confusion about availability and readiness reporting arose because there are three separate maintenance-reporting methodologies within the squadron, each with different reliability problems. The manual system is based primarily on the mechanics' subjective evaluation of whether an aircraft is down (unavailable), mission capable (can fly at least one of its missions) or fully mission capable (can fly any of its missions). The second and third reporting techniques are often confusing, and may be used for different purposes.
56. Charles V. Pena, "V-22: Osprey or Albatross," Foreign Policy Briefing Paper, CATO Institute, Washington, D.C., 8 January 2003, 4. See also DoD news briefing with LTG Fred McCorkle, deputy commandant for Marine Corps Aviation, 19 January 2000.
57. Freedberg Jr., Jacobson, and Kitfield, "High Stakes," 3582.
58. Ibid.
59. Christopher Bolckom, *V-22 Osprey Tiltrotor Aircraft*, CRS Issue Brief for

Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, updated 5 November 2001.

60. Ibid., 15.

61. "DoD Eyes Fielding the CV-22 Sooner and Possible Army Tiltrotor Uses," *Inside the Navy*, 30 September 2002.

62. See the *FY2004 Budget Proposal*, Office of Management and Budget, February 2003, Aircraft Programs, 23.

Somalia II

RICHARD J. NORTON

Presidents always inherit some number of ongoing security and foreign policy issues from their predecessors. The U.S.-led humanitarian intervention was such an issue handed to President Clinton by former president George Bush. In dealing with Somalia, the Clinton administration eventually changed the mission assigned to U.S. forces. The results were dramatic and cast a long shadow over the remainder of the decade. This case study examines how this decision was reached. The case, in addition to examining one of the most far-reaching foreign policy decisions of the 1990s, illuminates many of the structural challenges any new administration faces when taking office. This case study, prepared by Dr. Rick Norton, a faculty member of the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College, is being used as part of the school's curriculum.

CDR Jim Sherman, USN, stared at the piles of documents and notes on his desk and sighed. It was going to be a long night. Still, he told himself, there were no real grounds for complaint. He had been given four days to put this brief together—that was almost a luxurious amount of time. Especially with his current boss.

BGEN Hamlin was known in the Department of Defense (DoD) for being a "go-getter" and a "forward thinker." He got that reputation by keeping his staff hopping, reacting to ideas that flew from the general's mind in a steady stream. Three days ago the general had caught Jim coming out of the men's room and delivered a classic "on the fly" tasking.

"Oh, Jim! I was hoping to see you." The general had beamed. "I've been thinking about Afghanistan. With the Taliban defeated and Al Qaeda coming apart, it seems clear that we may wind up in some post-war, nation-building program. To me, it sounds like Somalia and mission creep all over again. I need you to first put a briefing together on what happened in Somalia. Tell me who was involved, tell me why the mission grew. Then we'll compare the two situations. I'd hate to see us make the same mistake."

At first Jim found the going easy. There was a lot of material on Somalia. The intervention had happened far enough in the past that more than a few books had been written about the operation, but yet recent enough that most of the participants were alive and ready to talk about things. Jim was also lucky in being able to track down some fairly knowledgeable personal sources of information. The first person he sought out was Dr. Marti Van Buren, who had once been in his company at Annapolis. Marti had left the navy as soon as her obligated service was up, got a Ph.D., and plunged into the world of D.C. think tanks. She was currently a senior researcher at the Brookings Institution. They spent a half day walking about the mall discussing Somalia.

"The first thing to remember is that Bill Clinton inherited Somalia from George Bush. I know you're not looking at the Bush decision to get us involved in the first place, but there are a few vital points to bear in mind.[1] Both President Bush and United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali believed that the end of the Cold War offered a golden opportunity for the UN to live up to the promise of its charter and take a much more proactive role in peace operations.[2] In order to make this work, the United States was going to have to shoulder major leadership responsibilities in such matters. Somalia, a failed state, caught in the grip of warlords and famine, seemed tailor-made for action. In December 1992, under cover of UN Security Council Resolution 794, Bush sent in the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). UNITAF had UN blessing but was a U.S.–led operation all the way.[3] It was a classic George Bush operation—a highly polished and efficient effort.

"In accordance with the Powell doctrine, overwhelming force was landed on the beaches of Mogadishu. Within days relief supplies were flowing to distant refugee camps and the local warlords hunkered down and got out of the way. Matching the show of military muscle was a polished diplomatic effort. The United States military commanders, most notably Marine Corps generals Robert Johnson and Anthony Zinni, were extremely sensitive to local conditions and in executing their stated mission. Accordingly, senior U.S. leaders on scene actively resisted doing anything that might diminish their claim to neutrality.[4] Together with Ambassador-at-Large Robert Oakley, who was serving as a U.S. special envoy to Somalia, senior U.S. leaders made contact with the various warlords and faction leaders. A 'Joint Military Committee' [JMC] formed an essential part of the U.S. diplomatic effort.[5] The committee consisted of senior U.S. and UN officials as well as the leader of each of the various clans and factions. Although the daily JMC meeting frequently took up a lot of time and often discussed rather trivial matters, it was an important avenue of communication. The JMC also provided a way to defuse several potentially troublesome situations, some of which concerned occasions when UN forces had to fire on armed clansmen.[6] Back in Washington, a senior Policy Coordination Committee [PCC] met often to discuss events in Somalia, and Somalia was frequently discussed at the National Security Council [NSC] Principals Committee meetings."[7]

Jim looked puzzled for a moment, then brightened. "Oh yeah, PCC was the Bush term for an interagency working group." He realized Marti had stopped speaking. "Sorry. Go on."

Marti continued. "By January, there was no doubt that the Somalia intervention was a success. Wherever UNITAF forces went, there was order. Food distribution was ongoing.[8] Famine had been averted and planting crops had begun. Private markets reappeared and ships began calling at the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo. Somali refugees began to return from neighboring states."[9]

"Marti, this is old news. I'm interested in mission-creep," Jim complained.

"Keep your shirt on. We're getting to that. Enter the Clintons. The fact that the Somalia intervention was being well conducted did not stop the Clinton team from criticizing aspects of the operation, even after Candidate Clinton became President-elect Clinton.[10]

While generally approving the Bush decision to intervene, the incoming national security team argued that a greater role should have been played by the UN. Their preferred solution would be to turn the operation over to the UN and then get the maximum number of U.S. troops out of the country. This was precisely what UN Resolution 794 had called for from the beginning, but Clinton spokesmen made it clear that they felt the transition was taking too long.[11]

"So, the Clinton team's plan for Somalia was to turn it over to the UN and get out as quickly as possible, leaving only a small 'footprint' of U.S. troops behind. UNITAF would become UN Operations in Somalia II (UNISOM II). Originally, it was hoped that the turnover could take place shortly after the inauguration, but getting the UN forces identified and prepared took longer than anticipated and UNISOM II was not actually stood up until March 1993. But even then the United States maintained nearly eighteen thousand troops in country assigned to the U.S. Joint Task Force in Somalia.

"There were several reasons for the delay. There were the usual difficulties in logistics. But there were also concerns that were continually raised by the secretary-general. From the beginning, Boutros Boutros-Ghali saw UN action in Somalia as a nation-building exercise. As the former Egyptian deputy foreign minister for the upper reaches of the Nile, Boutros-Ghali believed he had exceptional insight into what was required. He had long argued that the warlords would have to be disarmed and that UN troops would have to carry out this mission.[12] This was a very sensitive topic. The UN had facilitated such efforts before, notably in South America. But those disarmament campaigns had been carried out with a limited number of actors who had agreed to the program. In Somalia, none of the clans were willing to voluntarily give up their weapons. The Bush team, fearing a radical change in the scope and nature of the mission, had flatly refused to get involved in disarming any Somalis except those that posed a direct threat to relief columns or UN troops.[13] This arrangement had worked reasonably well. The warlords got to keep their guns, but only if they kept them out of the way of the Americans."

Marti glanced at a group of tourists heading for the Smithsonian, then continued. "With Boutros Boutros-Ghali's prodding them along, the Security Council approved UNISOM II. Its mandate was authorized under Chapter VII of the *UN Charter*, making it, in Boutros-Ghali's words, "the UN's first peace enforcement mission."[14] As you should know, UN forces that carry out operations under Chapter VII are permitted to use force to accomplish the mission; thus the blue helmets in Somalia would be equipped and ready to fight. UNISOM II's assigned missions specifically included disarming the clans; punishing anyone who violated the required cease-fire; conducting a massive de-mining campaign; and facilitating the return and resettlement of Somali refugees. All of these conditions, and much more, were spelled out in UN Security Council Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993.[15] As a member of the Security Council, Madeleine Albright, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, voted for the resolution.

"The level and nature of U.S. participation in the operation was also a matter of political negotiation and importance. The secretary-general wanted the United States deeply

committed to this effort. However, the Clinton team was reluctant to place U.S. combat forces under UN leadership, even though the administration's first *National Security Strategy* would admit to such a possibility.[16] At its height UNISOM II fielded 29,284 troops from twenty-nine countries, but only a small section of U.S. logistics personnel were assigned to UNISOM II.[17] However, 17,700 U.S. personnel assigned to the U.S. Joint Task Force in Somalia remained in country. Although not under UN command, this force operated in conjunction with UNISOM II personnel and contained a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) that was supposed to respond to any emergency situation that might arise.[18]

"It was also decided that the second in command of UNISOM II forces should be from the United States. The secretary-general wanted this arrangement because he thought it would 'lock in' U.S. support and participation. It would also provide him with a valuable channel of communication into the heart of the Clinton White House."[19]

Marti shook her head. "The Clinton team didn't see it quite the same way. They believed that the second in command would be able to keep the UN reined in. He could also facilitate the hoped-for drawdown of U.S. forces. His presence would also alleviate some United States concerns about the UN chain of command and the possibility that U.S. troops would be under foreign commanders. Basically both Boutros Boutros-Ghali and President Clinton believed they would have a man on the inside.[20]

"National Security Advisor Tony Lake hand-picked retired admiral Jonathan Howe, USN, to serve as deputy UN commander.[21] Renowned for a keen intellect, Howe had distinguished himself as Ronald Reagan's deputy national security advisor; however, he had no significant experience working with the UN, with Africa, or with Somalia.[22] Howe was also often described as imperial and autocratic. After the UN took over in March, one of the first things Howe did was suspend the JMC.[23] Another thing was to initiate attempts to disarm the rival clans.

"On 27 March 1993 a document known as the *reconciliation agreement* was signed at a UN-sponsored meeting in Addis Abba, Ethiopia. Fifteen of the main Somali factions were present, as were Somali clan elders, and leaders of Somali community and women's organizations.[24] All present agreed to a two-year transition plan that would result in the establishment of a new central Somali government. Key to the plan was agreement that substantial disarmament would have to take place within the next ninety days.[25]

"This proved to be easier said than done. It seemed as though every armed Somali resisted being disarmed. The clans claimed they required weapons to protect their power, and many individual Somalis felt they needed weapons to protect themselves.[26] As the resistance to UN-led disarmament grew, some of the local UN military commanders began receiving specific instructions from their home governments, forbidding them to conduct offensive or disarming operations against the Somalis.[27] Yet Boutros-Ghali and Howe insisted that this needed to be done. The United States QRF provided an answer to the problem. Not only were the Americans allowed to perform the missions, but they were among the very best troops available to the UN commander. Accordingly, the QRF shouldered an

ever-increasing share of the "disarming burden."[28] The forces of Mohammed Farah Aidid were among the first clans targeted. While there were logical reasons for this, it was also true that Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Aidid had a long-standing history of enmity dating back to Boutros-Ghali's days with the Egyptian Foreign Ministry. In fact, they hated each other.

"Aidid protested that the disarmament of his forces placed him at an unfair disadvantage and made it clear he would not accept unilateral disarmament. Soon after, several Italian soldiers attached to UNISOM II were killed when they inadvertently approached a hidden heavy arms cache belonging to Aidid.[29] In an effort to avoid further such confrontations, the Italians began direct negotiations with Aidid's forces.[30]

"As U.S. forces became more and more active, allied contingents became more and more annoyed. The Americans were perceived as being unwilling to listen to other military opinions, as well as arrogant and condescending to their allies. The French and Italians were especially aggrieved.[31]

"On 5 June 1993, twenty-four Pakistani troops were killed in an attack by Aidid's troops.[32] The Pakistanis had one of the largest military contingents in the country, as well as most of the armor at the UN's disposal. The attack was conducted in response to the searching of one of Aidid's heavy weapons storage sites.[33] The attack was an incontrovertible signal that Aidid did not see the UN force as neutral and was serious about resisting being disarmed. Later that month an independent investigation of the situation, led by Professor Tom Farer of the American University in Washington, D.C., concluded that only Aidid's forces had the motive, means and opportunity to carry out the attack.[34]

"The United States and the UN reacted swiftly. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 837 calling for all necessary measures to be taken against those responsible for the attack.[35] The resolution also reaffirmed the need to disarm the factions and to "neutralize" radio stations urging resistance to UNISOM forces.[36] Once again the United States voted for the resolution. This was met with support from Tony Lake.[37] In fact, the U.S. Department of State provided most of the resolution's wording. No one in the administration disagreed with the resolution, including President Clinton, who was briefed on the issue.[38] In an unprecedented move, the UN placed a price on Aidid's head, offering $25,000 to anyone who brought him in. Although the offer originated in Admiral Howe's office, the decision to authorize this move was the secretary-general's.[39]

"Initial moves against Aidid were quickly carried out by the QRF. They appeared to work so well that the president publicly spoke about Somalia. On 17 June 1993, he declared that operations against Aidid had been successful. In an address to the press the president stated that the United States had "crippled the forces in Mogadishu of warlord Aidid."[40] The words sounded good, and the president may well have believed them, but they were wrong.

"Aidid's forces were far from broken. Howe requested additional U.S. troops be made available, including the highly lethal and secretive Delta Force. The request caused considerable debate among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although the NSC staff was strongly in favor of the idea.[41]

"On 8 August 1993, four U.S. servicemen were killed when their vehicle was destroyed by a remotely activated mine. The attack took place in an area controlled by Aidid's forces. The Joint Staff now recommended sending in a Special Operations Task Force that would include members of Delta Force. General Powell endorsed the request and recommended approval to Secretary Aspin. Powell also called Lake, who agreed that Delta should go in, just as the NSC staff had wanted.[42] Although no meeting was held, the geographically scattered principals discussed the issue through a series of phone calls and decided that the task force should be sent. The president, who was on vacation on Martha's Vineyard, was informed of the discussion by an NSC staffer who was in his entourage. The president allowed the decision to stand.[43]

"The presence of Delta operators and U.S. Rangers, collectively identified as "Task Force Ranger," complicated matters for the forces already in Somalia. For one thing, Task Force Ranger was not under local command, but reported directly to General Hoar, the commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).[44] Local commanders frequently had no idea what Task Force Ranger was up to. Another problem was that the Task Force Ranger had different cultures and attitudes than the rest of the peacekeeping forces. Finally, the first two operations that Task Force Ranger carried out were embarrassing failures. In each case the target house was incorrectly identified. Rather than attacking Aidid strongholds, Task Force Ranger hit a UN villa and the home of a friendly former chief of the Mogadishu police.[45]

"Failure to bring Aidid to task began to sour the Clinton foreign policy team's attitude toward the effort. Accordingly, the Clinton administration began pursuing a different avenue in regard to Somalia.[46] They began to press for an UN-led diplomatic solution. The military option did not seem to be working, or more precisely didn't seem to offer a way out, and it had begun to look as though twenty thousand U.S. troops might be required to deploy to Bosnia as part of a comprehensive peace package. UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and eventually the president himself began putting pressure on Boutros Boutros-Ghali to find a political solution.[47] The secretary-general assured the U.S. leaders that he was working hard for just such a solution. To observers in Washington, this appeared to be typical bureaucratic inertia. In reality it was a deliberate effort by the secretary-general to give Task Force Ranger more time to kill or capture Aidid.[48] Thus a strange, almost schizophrenic, series of actions ensued, with military forces trying to bring Aidid to justice, while at the same time he was being approached with an eye to negotiation. Tony Lake and others publicly explained that this was a deliberate effort to apply "pressure all across the spectrum."[49] And, even at this late date, Aidid was seeking some method that would allow him to rejoin the nation-building effort and avoid punishment for actions that he claimed were taken in self-defense.[50]

"Task Force Ranger raids continued through August and September, netting the occasional Aidid lieutenant, but getting no closer to the man himself.[51] Then came the 3 October raid in which eighteen members of Task Force Ranger were killed and one taken prisoner. The Quick Reaction Force also had an additional two soldiers killed, and two

Malaysian soldiers also lost their lives in the ensuing battle.[52] When the dust settled, all you heard were cries of outrage at mission creep."

Jim reviewed his notes on their way to the Metro stop. "Marti, tell me when it became inevitable. When was U.S. policy doomed to failure in Somalia?"

She stopped. "Tough question. Some will say when George Bush said 'go.' I think that's wrong. The Bush experience with Somalia has to be rated a success. Others would point to the moment when the UN took over and initiated disarmament, but I have reservations about that too. Just because the UN was running the show didn't mean the United States had lost all ability to act. Most would say it was when we began going after Aidid—when the price was put on his head. That's pretty defensible, although the fact that Aidid was trying to work something out at the end indicates to me that, even then, we didn't have to wind up with eighteen dead Rangers and a policy failure. So I'd say the point you're asking about happened pretty late in the game. But I do know this. The president could have turned it all off with a single phone call. All he had to do was order the secretary of defense to have our forces stand down from offensive actions. That never happened."

The next day, Jim had lunch with Charlie Fairbanks. Charlie worked for the *Washington Post*, covering Capitol Hill. Each had a child in the same preschool, and they had initially met through their wives. Charlie had agreed to keep the conversation off the record, in return for the understanding that he might write something comparing Somalia to Afghanistan if he thought there was any merit in doing so. He promised to keep any mention of Jim, or military efforts along the same lines, out of his story. After providing Charlie a copy of his unclassified notes, Jim asked why the press had stopped covering Somalia after Clinton took over the White House.

"I know people, even people who were on the ground in Mogadishu, think we did stop reporting on Somalia.[53] But the truth is, if you go back and take just three major papers—the *Los Angeles Times*, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, you will find that there is usually one story about Somalia per day. The coverage gets even deeper when you include other U.S papers and the international press.[54] I'll be the first to admit that there was less total coverage than during the Bush invasion and the famine, but the notion that the world press failed to document changes of mission and events in Somalia just isn't so."

"But you can't say U.S. public opinion was energized after January," Jim interrupted.

Charlie agreed. "That's so. You can lead a reader to an article, but you can't make him think. Still, look at it from the point of view of John Q. Public. Somalia is a success story. We moved in, stopped the famine, and cowed the warlords. Publicly, the UN said everything was going okay. Publicly, the president and his foreign-policy wonks say everything was going okay. The common denominator between "feed the starving of Somalia" and "build the nation of Somalia" is that "warlords are bad." And we are easily able to handle them—that's what DoD was saying. Besides, there is no large Somali-American contingent in the United States. Somali supermodel Imam and other celebrity spokespeople who had helped

publicize the famine apparently lost interest after we went in, and there was absolutely no U.S. economic interest in Somalia."

Charlie then held up his hands and ticked points off on his fingers. "One, there were less than twenty thousand U.S. soldiers in Somalia and hardly any were getting hurt. Unless you happened to be related to one of them, it was nothing to fret about—not like the World Trade Center. Two, no one was feeling the Somalia story in their pocketbook. Three, there were no more pictures of starving babies. Food was flowing, crops were growing. Four, we were going after the bad warlords who were standing in the way of peace and prosperity. These guys were why we went in the first place and were seen as no match for the heroes of Desert Storm. Five, the Clinton team was shooting itself in the foot almost every time it turned around and that was a lot more fun to watch. We had everything from Nanny-gate to the $200 dollar haircut to the Vince Foster suicide.[55] Result? Somalia was a ho-hum issue. Until they killed eighteen of us at one time and dragged U.S. bodies through the streets of Mogadishu. That got the public's attention."

Jim had to agree. Charlie was abrasive and arrogant, but usually made sense. "What about Congress? Why didn't they do anything?"

Charlie cracked his knuckles. "Who said they didn't? But don't forget that the congressional herd is motivated by the same basic influences as their constituents. If the folks back home don't care about Somalia, your average congressman isn't going to either. But there were some who did. For example, about the time that the UN was putting a price on Aidid, Robert Byrd (D-WV), Sam Nunn (D-GA), and others were starting to make critical noises about Somalia looking like an open-ended commitment.[56] Still, it's not all that surprising that about that same time, Clinton started pushing for a diplomatic solution to the Aidid problem.

"But I digress. Congress was also looking at Bosnia. Byrd and others were saying in so many words, "You get one big peace operation, Mr. President. You want twenty thousand troops in Bosnia, you get twenty thousand troops out of Somalia." But all in all, Congress was pretty quiet until after Mogadishu. Then they unloaded on the White House and Aspin.

The two friends parted company, Jim feeling a little disappointed that Charlie couldn't provide more information. It was as if the U.S. public and its congressional representatives had simply not bothered to read or understand what was happening in Somalia after January 1994.

A day later Jim spent a couple of hours with Schuyler Colfax. Colfax had been on the Clinton NSC staff through both terms. Jim and he had worked on a classified project during an earlier tour in Washington. Now retired, the formerly reserved Colfax proved exceptionally forthcoming. Jim had once again explained his tasking and asked Colfax how the Clinton administration had allowed itself to be surprised by what was happening on the ground in Somalia.

Colfax exploded with a snort. "Surprised!? Listen, Jim, in the wake of Mogadishu everyone from the president on down ran around yelling, 'Oh, why didn't I know?' and 'If we only

had known.' Let me tell you, they did the same thing with Rwanda, and it wasn't any more true then." At this point, forcing himself to calm down, the former staffer started over.

"To understand Somalia, you have to understand the Clinton administration during the first year in office. In fact, you have to start before that. During the campaign, the Clinton team was spectacularly effective. Their instincts were sure, their tactics powerful, and their cohesion enviable. A measure of how good they were is seen in the kinds of obstacles they dealt with on the way to the White House. They were also young and mostly lacked real D.C. experience. Those who had once held real jobs in government had been away from them for a long time. Above all, they were so focused on getting into office that they didn't prepare what to do when they actually got there.[57]

"So, rather than hitting the ground running as most observers expected, they hit the ground fumbling. In part this was because there was a huge, multifaceted agenda the president, the first lady, and the Clinton team wanted to get at. These included such massive challenges as providing universal national health care. And there were still the familiar, less exciting, but still critical tasks, like filling presidential appointments.[58] The administration's lack of experience showed as members of the team began moving in a lot of different directions at once. It was like a three-ring circus without a ringmaster. Since we're on the subject of Somalia, did you know that it was not discussed even once during a Principals Committee meeting until after the October firefight? Other concerns always seemed more important.

"And don't forget what a turnover of presidents is like in the White House and NSC. Everything gets taken away. There is no pass-down material. We were looking at empty desks, empty computer disks, and empty filing cabinets. In retrospect we should have called in experts and gone to the interagency process for background information and continuity."

"I take it that wasn't done?" said Jim.

Colfax shook his head. "No. The experts were all Republicans or had been on the Republicans' teams. How would that look? Take Somalia again. Robert Oakley was the most knowledgeable guy around, but he had been Bush's guy. So no one talked to him until after the October firefight.[59] And the Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) were pretty much all swept away. The Clinton leadership wanted a clean sweep. It's not an uncommon attitude among the newly elected. So the Somalia IWG went away, and a lot of knowledge went with it."

"If Oakley was too political to consult, why not talk to General Johnston or Zinni?" Jim asked. "Everything I've seen indicates they knew the situation better than anyone except maybe Oakley."

"Ah, well, that brings up another first-year problem—the relation of President Clinton to the U.S. military. Remember, the president was terribly vulnerable where his military experience was concerned. He had no military service of any kind, and his record of avoiding the draft did not win him any friends in the Pentagon.[60] Another problem, one that cut deeply inside the Clinton security team, concerned gays in the military. Candidate Clinton had

vowed to rescind the Executive Order that denied openly gay Americans the ability to serve in the armed forces. This decision infuriated the various service chiefs and General Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[61] Powell felt so strongly about the matter that he arranged a meeting with the president-elect where he spelled out how strongly he and the other Joint Chiefs would fight lifting the ban. The result was a compromise, the policy of 'don't ask, don't tell.' This didn't reduce the Joint Chiefs' fears of being used for a variety of new missions, social experiments and so on. It also did not alleviate the administration's view that military leadership was reactionary and antagonistic from a political point of view."[62] Colfax paused.

"And then it got worse. In a chance meeting between Dee Dee Meyers, the White House press secretary, and Air Force General Barry McCaffrey, Meyers icily told the general, "I don't talk to the military."[63] It was a deliberate snub.

"That was Meyers?"

"Indeed it was, although it took a long time before her name came out. From the military's point of view, this was seen as confirmation of their worst nightmares. A senior Clinton official, who by the way was decades younger than the general, who lacked the slightest military experience and who was female, had apparently dismissed and "dissed" all of them, their values and their contribution. Word of the insult flew like wildfire among the flag community. Attitudes hardened. It was clear that the administration had little feel for the military community or culture. The president even had to be taught how to salute properly.[64] And there were those in the administration who were convinced that the military was not above trying to intentionally embarrass the president.[65] These may seem like small things; they really were small things, but their cumulative effect was to strain potentially vital relationships."

"Couldn't General Powell have smoothed things over?"

"To answer that, I'll have to talk about a few personalities. Let's start with the president. To his credit, he's brilliant, and that's not a term I toss around lightly. He's also got an incredibly forceful personality. Pundits talk about how well he works from a podium—well, multiply that by ten when he's in a more personal situation. He's also quick to anger and has an explosive temper. While president, he hated getting bad news and was prone to flare up at anyone who brought him some. Like most people in the heat of the moment he sometimes forgot if he had been told about a situation earlier or if he had said something that eventually turned out wrong. You know, like when you forget you told your teenager he or she can borrow the car and then yell at them for taking it when you needed to go golfing. To President Clinton's credit, most people say that once he blew up at someone, there were no lingering hard feelings. It might simply have been a form of venting. But the rage and the tirades were hard on his staff, and anyone who has worked for someone like that will tell you it doesn't make delivering unpleasant information a sought-after job.[66]

"And you can't forget that President Clinton was focused strongly on domestic issues. Fixing problems at home was what he viewed as his electoral mandate. Inside the borders was where he wanted to work. His foreign policy team would carry the load outside those borders.

"On paper that team seemed strong enough. Warren Christopher, the secretary of state, had served as deputy secretary of state under Jimmy Carter and had negotiated the return of the Iranian hostages. Madeleine Albright, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, was widely regarded in the field of international relations. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake had a reputation for toughness and for principled, ethical behavior. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin came from decades of experience in Congress and was regarded as an expert on military matters. General Powell rounded out this powerful group. Of course, only Powell had any recent experience in the executive branch of government.

"While Christopher seemed to prefer a traditional approach to statecraft, Albright and Lake believed in aggressive multilateralism. The Clinton policy of engagement and enlargement owed much to their ideas. Where Colin Powell had a rather narrowly defined conception of when military force should be used, Lake, Aspin, and Albright believed the U.S. military should be used for a much wider variety of missions, including humanitarian assistance.[67] Lake and Christopher were also highly competitive when it came to driving foreign policy. Lake was very interested in issues dealing with Africa, where Christopher was oriented more toward Europe and Asia. This at times led to some sparks between them. But that was nothing compared to the friction between Les Aspin and Colin Powell.

"Powell's actions during the episode over gays in the military did not sit well with Les Aspin, Clinton's new secretary of defense. Aspin complained that Powell had overstepped the boundaries of his job and had actually been insubordinate. Powell privately thought Aspin was not a good secretary of defense.[68] Although the two men tried to give an appearance of collegiality, there was a significant underlying personality conflict.[69]

"General Powell was, to put it bluntly, too powerful a political figure. He was beloved by the American people. When it came down to any matter that involved the military, Powell had more credibility than his bosses. The Clinton team was also leery of the power and influence that he and other senior military leaders would be able to exert on Capitol Hill.[70] From the beginning, political advisors to the president marked Powell as a potential challenger in the 1996 election and began collecting material that could be used to counter a Powell campaign.[71]

"To make matters worse, Aspin was encountering friction from more sources than Colin Powell. The new secretary had widely been regarded as a defense expert when he was a congressman on Capitol Hill. But his professorial style, sloppy suits, and meandering meetings did not sit well with the culture of DoD.[72] Also, Aspin believed the Powell Doctrine was flawed. Rather than using a sledgehammer to crack a walnut, Aspin argued a nutcracker should suffice. This did not go down well with military leaders who had come to view the Powell doctrine as the best guidelines for the employment of U.S. military muscle.[73] Had Aspin been more autocratic, more authoritarian; had he chopped off a few heads, he might have brought the Defense Department to heel. But he did not work that way.[74]

"At first, despite all the differences of personality and the friction, there was no disagreement over what to do about Somalia. That the UN should 'run Somalia' was a strong point

of agreement between Tony Lake, Madeleine Albright, and Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Each saw Somalia as the first great success story of the adminis,tration's foreign policy and the new role of the UN.[75] It is doubtful whether Bill Clinton saw the matter in exactly the same light, but it does appear clear that he wanted Somalia to be settled. Having the UN take over the operation would do just that—especially if remaining U.S. troops could then be drawn down to a minimum level, or, better yet, withdrawn entirely."

"How informed were these key players about events in Somalia?"

Colfax smiled. "Very informed. Oh, sure, after 3 October everyone was running around denying knowledge, but that isn't borne out by the facts. U.S. military leaders were filing reports up the chain of command every day.[76] A status on Somalia was provided to Tony Lake on a daily basis. Reports were also flowing to Christopher, and a mountain of data was going to the UN Security Council and thus to Ambassador Albright, who voted on each of the resolutions.[77] So, for example, it's clear that everyone knew the hunt for Aidid was being stepped up.

"In fact, when Admiral Howe and others began to request additional troops, there was widespread agreement in Washington that this was a good idea. Madeleine Albright and Warren Christopher were both in favor of the increase, as was the Central Intelligence Agency. The State Department, which had played a key role in the early days of the crisis, had largely been pushed aside by DoD.[78] However, State registered no objections. Interestingly, the three most powerful individuals opposed to the idea were Secretary of Defense Aspin, Chairman Powell, and Marine General Joseph Hoar, who ran CENTCOM. There were several reasons for their reluctance. Hoar and Powell wanted to avoid 'mission creep.'[79] Sending in additional forces would clearly allow for an increased scope of operations. Also, there would be no hiding the fact that U.S. military forces would be chasing Aidid. Hoar was concerned that the introduction of such forces would further erode whatever neutrality remained to the U.S. force. Finally, Powell and Aspin were astute enough to see that Congress was becoming increasingly critical of what seemed now to be an open-ended mission. And the army was less than thrilled about this new dimension to the Somalia operation.

"The troika of Powell, Aspin, and Hoar might have been strong enough to carry the issue, but shortly after Howe requested reinforcements Aidid's forces deliberately attacked an American vehicle, killing the four occupants.[80] After that, Task Force Ranger was going in."

"What about the local guys requesting additional tanks? Didn't Aspin say no?" Jim asked.

Colfax let out a long sigh. "I wondered when you would ask about the request for armor. The short answer is that there was such a request and that Aspin said no to it. But it's just not that simple. The initial request was not just for four M-1 Abrams tanks. Artillery and four highly advanced Cobra helicopters were also included."[81]

"I didn't know that. What happened?"

"General Hoar disapproved the artillery request. He and the CENTCOM staff felt it had no utility in the environment of Mogadishu. In this environment it would be an aggressive,

not a defensive, weapon, and its use would inevitably cause casualties among noncombatants.[82] He did positively endorse the request for the helicopters and the tanks.

"Somewhere going up the line the helicopters fell off the table. It turned out there were only fifty of these particular helicopters in existence at the time and they were all in Korea, in the words of a friend on the Army staff, "where the real war could break out."

"My friend also reminded me that there is no such thing as a request for only four tanks or four helicopters. A great big bunch of logistics and material support comes along with them. The Army didn't like this idea at all. Remember, they wanted to get out of Somalia. There was also an argument made that if the QRF got these additional capabilities they would just be assigned more challenging and difficult missions. The new platforms would facilitate mission creep.[83]

"But the request for tanks did land on Aspin's desk. General Powell had favorably endorsed it but didn't say anything when the secretary said no."

"That seems odd. Any idea why not?"

"Probably because he was on the eve of retiring. His relief was taking over. Some say the chairman had already checked out.[84] I don't know that was the case, but it's clear that he had a great deal else going on.

"As far as Aspin's decision, I'll simply point out a few facts. He was trying to get the United States out of Somalia and was very worried about mission creep. There was already armor assigned to UNISOM forces. These were Pakistani tanks.[85] They weren't as advanced as the Abrams, but were certainly up to whatever the Somalis could throw at them. And the Abrams required a big support contingent. The final point I'll make in this regard is that Aspin said no ten days before 3 October.[86] Even if he had said yes, it is highly unlikely any armor would have been in Mogadishu in time for the battle. After the firefight, Aspin was besieged with questions about the tanks. He never really gave a coherent answer as to his reasoning."[87]

"That's fascinating." Jim looked pensive. Then he asked a final question. "Okay, I understand about the tanks, now. That was Aspin's call. But how much information about Somalia as a rule actually got to the president? Did he make the big decisions, or was it someone else?"

"It's clear a lot of information did get to President Clinton. What's not so clear is how that information was packaged. The answer to your question also depends on what you mean by "decide." In the navy you have a concept known as 'command by negation,' right? As I understand it, you tell your boss what you are doing and what you are going to do and as long as you aren't told no, you can do it? If not stopping something is a decision, then yes, the president did make the decisions."

Now it was time to put the research together. Jim sighed. The situation involving mission creep in Somalia was a lot more complicated and messy than he had assumed it was. He didn't know how applicable the events of 1994 would be to those of 2002. He didn't even know if he could explain the events of 1994 by themselves. But he knew he would have to try.

Notes

1. President Bush's decision to intervene in Somalia is the subject of another case study in this volume. See Valerie J. Lofland, "Somalia: U.S.Intervention and Operation Restore Hope."
2. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1990).
3. United Nations, *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992–1996* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 30–40.
4. General Anthony Zinni, USMC (ret.), interview with author, telephone, Newport, RI, 22 September 1999.
5. Ambassador Richard Oakley, interview with author, telephone, Newport, RI, 6 December 2001.
6. Oakley interview.
7. Oakley interview; Major Charles Ikins, USMC, interview with author, Newport; former member Somalia IWG, 9 February 2000.
8. United Nations, *United Nations and Somalia*, 36.
9. Ibid.
10. Oakley interview.
11. United Nations, *United Nations and Somalia*, 40.
12. Ibid.
13. Zinni interview.
14. United Nations, *United Nations and Somalia*, 44.
15. Ibid.
16. William Jefferson Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1994), 13–14.
17. The following countries participated in UNISOM II: Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States, and Zimbabwe. Only 3,017 U.S. personnel were assigned. United Nations, *United Nations and Somalia*, 328.
18. Ibid.
19. Oakley interview.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.; Dr. Thomas Farer, former legal advisor to deputy commander, UNISOM II, interview with author, telephone, Newport, RI, 2 January 2002.
23. Oakley interview.
24. United Nations, *United Nations and Somalia*, 46.
25. Ibid., 44.
26. Vance J. Nannini, *Decisions in Operations Other Than War: The United States Intervention in Somalia* (Leavenworth: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1994), 114–118.
27. Interview with Colonel Lawrence Casper, United States Army (ret.), former Commander, U.S. Army 10th Aviation Brigade, 10th Mountain Division and Commander U.S. Quick Reaction Force, Somalia, 17 December 2001. Key among these states was Italy, which, due to its past colonial history, had unusually deep ties with Somali clan leaders. See also: U.S. Department of Defense, *Somalia After Action Review: Briefing for Secretary of Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1994), especially slides 11–16.
28. Casper interview.
29. Farer interview.
30. James C. Dixon, *United Nations Operations in Somalia II: United Nations Unity of Effort and United States Unity of Command* (Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), 92.
31. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, *Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Humanitarian Intervention* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 144.
32. Although the attack on the Pakistani forces resulted in the largest number of casualties, forces from Morocco and Italy had also been killed by Somali factions. United Nations, *United Nations and Somalia*, 52.

Note: There are multiple spellings of the name "Aidid." This case study uses that adopted by the United Nations.

33. Ibid., 50.
34. Ibid., 51. A detailed reading of Professor Farer's report reveals numerous parallels between the strategy and tactics used against the Pakistani forces and those used against U.S. forces later in October. A copy of Professor Farer's report was provided to each member of the Security Council, including Ambassador Albright.
35. Ibid., 50.
36. Ibid.
37. Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 320.
38. Drew, *On the Edge*, 320.
39. Farer interview.
40. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 29, no. 23 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 14 June 1993), 1098–1101.
41. Drew, *On the Edge*, 320.
42. Ibid., 321.
43. Ibid., 322.
44. See Department of Defense, *Somalia After Action Review*, 24. Also James C. Dixon, *United Nations Operation in Somalia II*, Chapter Five.
45. Drew, *On the Edge*, 323.
46. Farer interview.
47. Drew, *On the Edge*, 323.
48. Farer interview.
49. Drew, *On the Edge*, 323.
50. Farer interview.
51. United Nations, *United Nations and Somali*a, 55.
52. Casper interview, 75–76, 89.
53. Ibid., 255.
54. Lexus-Nexus search for keyword "Somalia," from 1 January 1994 to 4 October 1994.
55. George Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human: A Political Education* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1999), 143–145, 118–120.
56. Drew, *On the Edge*, 225.
57. Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human*, 119–120.
58. Ibid., 117.
59. Oakley interview.
60. Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human*, 69–70.
61. Ibid., 123–129.
62. Drew, *On the Edge*, 48; Oakley interview.
63. Oakley interview; Drew, *On the Edge*, 44.
64. Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human*, 132–133.
65. Drew, *On the Edge*, 87.
66. Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human*, 71, 74, 90, 96–98, 176, 217, 286–288.
67. Drew, *On the Edge*, 139–146.
68. Ibid., 356.
69. Oakley interview.
70. Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human*,123.
71. Ibid., 195–197.
72. Drew, *On the Edge*, 356–358.
73. Oakley Interview.
74. Drew, *On the Edge*, 356–358.
75. Oakley interview.
76. Casper interview.
77. Oakley interview.
78. John G. Sommer, *Humanitarian Aid in Somalia: The Role of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance: 1990–1994* (Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 1994), 5.
79. Drew, *On the Edge*, 320–323.
80. United Nations, *United Nations and Somalia*, 424.
81. Casper interview.
82. Ibid.
83. Oakley interview.
84. Drew, *On the Edge*, 221–223.
85. United Nations, *United Nations and Somalia*, 328.
86. Farer interview.
87. Drew, *On The Edge*, 320–323.

Rwanda

RICHARD J. NORTON

What happens when national leaders are faced with an emerging humanitarian crisis that does not directly involve the traditional security interests of the United States? In April 1994 Rwanda exploded in a fury of genocide that the world had not witnessed since World War II. For a variety of reasons, not least because the United States was a signatory to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, the Clinton administration could not ignore the issue. As the following case study reveals there were significant international and domestic forces that impacted the decision-making process as well as significant turmoil inside the national security system. This case also illustrates the importance of feedback from earlier national-security decisions. This case study, prepared by Dr. Rick Norton, a faculty member of the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College, is being used as part of the schools curriculum.

The renewal of the Rwandan Civil War in April 1994, and the genocide that accompanied it, presented the Clinton administration with one of the most perplexing and difficult decision-making situations a U.S. president can be asked to deal with. Should the armed forces of the United States be committed to combat operations when U.S. values, but not U.S. interests, are at stake?[1]

The Clinton administration never answered this question directly, although a decision to deploy military forces to the region was reached in late July of 1994, after the civil war and genocide in Rwanda had ended. The administration's actions in regard to Rwanda continue to be hotly debated within the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and academic and political communities. Given the continuing possibility of genocidal violence, not only in the Great Lakes region of Africa, but also in other parts of the globe, a study of the events leading to the president's decision could be of unusual utility.

In order to understand the decision-making process involving Rwanda, it is first necessary to provide a brief historical background of the events leading up to and following April 1994.[2] Rwanda is a small state. Roughly half the size of Maryland, it was a German colonial possession from 1899 until 1916. The Belgians then became Rwanda's colonial rulers and remained in power until 1962.[3]

Two ethnic groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis, dominate the Rwandan population. The Hutus compose the numerically larger group. European colonists fostered a sense of superiority among the Tutsis, and in time the Tutsis became the comprador class of Rwanda.[4] Devices such as the establishment of a national identity card system in 1933 solidified racial identities, despite a tradition of intermarriage, common language, diet, and cultural heritage.[5] In time assimilation and elevation became "next to impossible."[6]

In the late 1950s, as independence and national elections drew closer, the Belgians realized a rise in Hutu power was inevitable, and as a result the Tutsis were essentially abandoned.[7] In 1959 rebellion broke out. The Belgians made no move to help their former allies and the result was a bloodbath. (While casualty estimates would vary from ten thousand to one hundred thousand, the savagery of the action would serve as an eerie precursor to the mayhem of 1994.)

In contrast to Rwanda, the Tutsis in Burundi remained in power following independence. In Burundi the population distribution was more equal and the Tutsis dominated the military. Ironically, the behaviors of the Hutu elite in Rwanda and the Tutsi elite in Burundi have been very similar.[8]

From 1959 on, Tutsis fled Rwanda. Two great waves of refugees entered Uganda. The first entered in 1959, the second in 1962.[9] The total numbers of refugees crossing the Ugandan border may have reached as high as two hundred thousand.

Life in Uganda under the Obote and Amin regimes was not easy. The suffering the Rwandan Tutsi Diaspora experienced increased their prevalent determination to return to Rwanda. As the second generation of Tutsi expatriates came of age, enlisting in the revolutionary army of Yoweri Museveni provided them an accelerated opportunity to do just that.[10]

Museveni's army was, in comparison with other forces in the region, highly disciplined and professional. In the successful effort to overthrow Obote in 1986, its Rwandan soldiers gained both combat and leadership experience.[11] When the war was over the Tutsi fighters would leave Museveni's service and form the core combat cadres of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).[12]

While Tutsi refugees were settling in Uganda, the one-party state in Rwanda was becoming increasingly corrupt and ruled by patronage. Tutsi guerrilla raids brought fierce reprisals and pogroms were common. (Two massive purges occurred in 1963 and 1967.) In 1973 all Tutsis were purged from Rwandan universities as part of an overarching program to drive them from all educational institutions.[13]

Also in 1973 Rwandan military Chief of Staff Juvenal Habyarimana staged a coup under the pretext of restoring social order. Although presenting the appearance of positive social change, Habyarimana simply replaced a corrupt set of Hutu rulers with a new set of corrupt Hutu rulers. These were predominately his friends from the north of Rwanda, traditionally the most chauvinistic of all Hutu nationalists.[14] The new elite was known as the Akazu.[15]

Once in power, Habyarimana and his cronies set about draining the country's resources while continuing to blatantly discriminate against the Tutsis. The Tutsis also served as convenient scapegoats. When Hutu complaints were raised, the regime blamed the Tutsis.

But scapegoating had its limits. Eventually crops collapsed. Migration and social upheaval spread. Western donors who had been generous with aid, only to have it siphoned off in a variety of ways, began to demand more stringent accounting.[16] With funding drying up the Akazu found it increasingly difficult to buy the loyalty of the army and the civil service.

Suggestions that Rwanda should democratize horrified the elites, as this would mean the end of their system of clients and patronage.[17]

By 1990 the RPF staged a significant offensive. As many as seven thousand RPF troops may have attacked into Rwanda.[18] The Habyarimana regime reacted by denouncing Tutsis as fifth columnists and blaming them for any and all government setbacks. Fear and hatred of Tutsis were actively fomented by the Rwandan government in order to direct the people's anger and frustration away from the government. These efforts produced what was to become the most virulent anti-Tutsi propaganda in the history of Rwanda. A civilian militia was formed and attacks on Tutsis escalated, although this violence did not reach the level of genocide.[19]

However, the violence was not one-sided. Tutsi armed groups were also targeting some elements of the civilian population. Selective killings had, for all purposes, "become part of the common coinage of politics."[20]

The Rwandan government's initial response to RPF success was to dramatically expand the size of its army. Between 1990 and 1992 the Army of Rwanda grew from a force of five thousand to one of thirty thousand. In addition, the Coalition for la Defense de la Republic (CDR) was formed. The CDR, a violent Hutu extremist party, was opposed to any dialogue with the RPF.[21]

However, the twin elements of RPF military success and growing international pressure for a peaceful resolution eventually forced Habyarimana to embrace compromise. On 26 October, with the aid of Belgium, a cease-fire was brokered between the Rwandan government and the RPF. Known as the Gbadolite agreement, it was short-lived.[22]

In 1991 further political concessions were forced from Habyarimana when he was forced to agree to the principle of multipart politics.[23] Several new political parties sprang into existence, including the Mouvement Democratique Republicain (MDR), a true Hutu challenger to the president.[24] Other parties, some socialist, some moderate, also emerged. Government and right-wing controlled radio stations and newspapers began an increasingly virulent hate campaign aimed against Tutsis.

On 12 July 1992 significant political progress was at last apparently achieved with the signing of the Arusha Accords. An associated cease-fire went into effect on 31 July. A buffer zone, in Rwanda, between the RPF and Rwandan army front lines was established.[25] The Organization of African Unity (OAU) agreed to provide a "Neutral Military Observer Group" to monitor the zone. The accords also called for a Joint Political Commission to help implement the cease-fire and a pledge to reach a final peace agreement within twelve months. A transitional government would take over at this time until new elections could be held.[26]

The cease-fire held more or less until 8 February 1993, when a new outbreak of fighting occurred. The RPF rapidly seized several objectives in the buffer zone, alleging they were responding to human rights violations committed by the Rwandan government. The RPF closed on Kigali airport but were prevented from seizing it when French troops intervened. The French government, seeing Rwanda as part of Francophone Africa and being partial to

the Habyarimana government, deployed forces to Kigali. Having prevented the RPF capture of Kigali, the French continued to maintain a sizable military mission and detachment of officers in Rwanda.[27]

By this stage of the conflict six hundred thousand Rwandans had become displaced persons, prompting calls for help to be made to the UN. In response to requests from the governments of Rwanda and Uganda, the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) was authorized to deploy along the countries' mutual 150-kilometer-long border.[28] The mission was tasked with reporting and verifying any cross-border provision of assistance to the RPF from Uganda. The efficacy of this force was doubtful at best. Consisting of only fifty-five personnel, UNOMUR was not armed.[29] Lacking significant surveillance and transportation assets, the UNOMUR forces never possessed the ability to adequately monitor the border.[30] Whether acting from a sense of obligation, or a desire to ensure the RPF fighters did not return, Uganda continued to provide arms and supplies to the RPF in Rwanda.[31]

On 24 September 1993, Kofi Annan presented an expanded peacekeeping proposal to the Security Council. The UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda, or UNAMIR, as the new peace operation would be called, not only would absorb UNOMUR, but also would bring in 2,458 additional military personnel in four phased increments.[32] On 5 October, the Security Council approved Annan's proposal, but instructed the secretary-general to "seek economies." The UN requested a Canadian general to command the operation.[33] The first troops landed in Rwanda in October. By December, 1,260 troops were on the ground.[34] UNAMIR's mandate was to assist with the delivery of food supplies to the displaced and expatriated. Monitoring of the Ugandan border and the demilitarized zone (DMZ) would continue.[35] Cease-fire violations would be investigated and the activities of the gendarmerie and civilian police monitored. Other UNAMIR activities would include mine awareness training and assisting with resettlement initiatives and in the disengagement, disarming, and demobilization efforts that would follow the end of the war.[36]

As UNAMIR was getting established, a military coup took over the government of Burundi. This set a refugee flow of more than 375,000 Hutu moving into Rwanda. As a result, UNAMIR extended its monitoring patrols into the south. By November, UNAMIR was already investigating reports of mass killings. The secretary-general realized that UNAMIR was going to require more troops and more time if it was going to carry out the assigned mandate. He asked for a six-month extension of the mandate and more peacekeepers.[37] On 6 January 1994, the Security Council passed United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 893, approving the request.

Although UNAMIR has been criticized in the wake of the genocide, the blue helmets were not inactive. Nor were they reluctant to gather and report intelligence. As early as 11 January, UNAMIR was reporting plots by the Interhamwe and the CDR to kill large numbers of Tutsis.[38] Guidance was requested from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). This communication has become known as the genocide telegram.

DPKO responded the same day. UNAMIR was to warn President Habyarimana that he should investigate the charges and prevent any killings. UNAMIR was informed that while it could "assist" in arms recovery operations, it was forbidden from "entering into a course of action which might lead to the use of force and to unanticipated repercussions."[39]

The next day the UN special representative saw Habyarimana. The ambassadors from the United States, France, and Belgium were also briefed by both the special representative and the UNAMIR force commander. The ambassadors were asked to request their governments to encourage the Habyarimana administration to grant the UNAMIR/UN request to prevent killings and confiscate arms. In New York, the UN special advisor briefed the Security Council.[40]

The situation in Kigali continued to grow increasingly tense. On 3 February, UNAMIR was authorized to engage in a deeper level of participation on arms recovery operations on a case-by-case basis. By the end of the month the UNAMIR commander had brought an additional two hundred troops to the capitol from the northern DMZ.[41]

Violence continued to escalate. Boutros Boutros-Ghali continued to pressure Habyarimana to get the transitional government in operation. The special representative continued to meet with the president on a regular basis.

Between 5 and 7 March additional peace talks were held in Dar es Salaam. During the talks both sides agreed to continue the cease-fire. On 14 March, the Belgian minister of foreign affairs warned Boutros Boutros-Ghali in writing of a predicted explosion of violence if the political deadlock continued. The truce had been renewed on 9 March, and the Arusha talks continued on 15 March. It was expected that the talks would be complete by the first week in April.[42] The agreement called for the removal of all foreign forces, except those that would be deployed to Rwanda.[43]

Other actions forced upon the Rwandan president by the accords included political power sharing with the RPF, a reduction of presidential powers, and the integration of the RPF into the Rwandan Army. Under heavy international pressure Habyarimana signed what he thought was only a political agreement. It was actually also his death warrant.

By late March, UNAMIR had reached its peak manning level of 2,539 troops as a result of Security Council Resolution 893.[44] There was also an additional component of sixty UN police personnel. Violence continued in Kigali. Despite UN protests, government forces mined the roads out of the capitol. The special representative reported that weapons were being distributed to Hutu civilians. All this information was then reported to the Security Council.[45] On 5 April 1994, the Security Council extended the duration of UNAMIR. The mission would now run until 29 July. The vote for extension was unanimous.

On 6 April 1994, Rwandan president Habyarimana, Burundi president Cyprien Ntaryamira, and Rwandan army chief of staff Deogratias Nsabimana were returning to Kigali from the latest round of the Arusha Accords. Their aircraft, a gift from the French, was on final approach to the landing field when it was struck by two surface-to-air missiles.

All aboard were killed. Members of Habyarimana's presidential guard most likely launched the missiles.[46] More recent reports have suggested that the RPF may have been responsible, but most scholars have discounted this idea.[47]

In the wake of the shootdown, Rwandan authorities acted with speed and well-planned precision. State radio immediately blamed the RPF for the destruction of the presidential jet. Militia and army units moved out of their barracks with lists of enemies and maps of their houses. Roadblocks were set up and manned by Interhamwe gunmen in some cases in less than half an hour.[48]

Thus began one hundred days of genocidal fury and renewed civil war. In those one hundred days an estimated one million people were hacked, shot, strangled, clubbed, and burned to death. As might be expected the majority of this number was composed of noncombatants.[49]

Within a few hours after the shootdown the RPF battalion in Kigali was fully engaged in combat. Within twenty-four hours the civil war had been renewed. The RPF, far more professional and disciplined than its Rwandan army opponents, sought contact with enemy forces and strove to maintain it.

Among the hundreds of deaths in the first twenty-four hours, several were of extreme consequence. The leaders of three opposition parties were killed. The moderate prime minister, Ms. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, and ten Belgian UN peacekeepers that were serving as her bodyguards were also assassinated.[50] Sensing a potential need for rapid UN action, General Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR, had tried to create a "quick reaction force" from the soldiers he had been assigned. It was envisioned that this force would be able to respond to a variety of situations. Unfortunately, due to a combination of training and equipment problems, the quick reaction force was not ready.[51] The Rwandan army, their allies, and the Interhamwe essentially decapitated moderate Hutu opposition and dealt what would come to be seen as a deathblow to UNAMIR in the first twenty-four hours of the genocide.[52]

News of the violence traveled rapidly. On 7 April, President Clinton condemned the murder of Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana. He also called for a return to the cease-fire.[53]

Any United States military operation mounted in Rwanda or neighboring countries would fall under the overall command of the United States European Command (EUCOM). EUCOM had already been paying attention to Rwanda and had even created a Rwanda Working Group prior to the shootdown.[54] EUCOM immediately asked the Joint Staff if Rwanda contingency plans should be made. The answer was an emphatic no for anything other than a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO). EUCOM was to simply monitor the situation.[55] There would be no U.S. involvement. EUCOM followed orders, but expanded the Rwanda Working Group. It was a busy period for EUCOM. Five joint task forces (JTFs) were already in operation in the theater.[56] Accordingly the apparent decision not to mount an operation in Rwanda was not unwelcome.

In the wake of the violence in Rwanda, UNAMIR was unable to conduct operations in accordance with the mandate. Instead the blue helmets concentrated on establishing safe havens for Rwandan noncombatants. Civilians flocked to the protection offered by the UN peacekeepers. Rwandan army, Interhamwe, and RPF fighters did test UN resolve to defend these areas.[57]

The secretary-general has stated that he kept the Security Council appraised of all Rwanda developments he was aware of.[58] On 9 April, the assistant secretary-general for peacekeeping operations provided an additional briefing on Rwanda to the Security Council.[59] The OAU also reported itself ready to fully cooperate with any efforts the UN might initiate.

International response was initially rapid. U.S. personnel (225 total) evacuated themselves from Rwanda via road convoy on 10 April. The ambassador and a number of embassy personnel remained on station. For a period of time the fighting effectively trapped the ambassador in his residence. On 11 April French and Belgian troops landed in Kigali to assist in the evacuation of their nationals.[60]

UNAMIR was also struggling to respond to the situation. UNAMIR troops deployed from the RPF-Rwandan DMZ to the capitol. The next day the Belgian minister for foreign affairs reported that the Belgians were leaving UNAMIR. On the 13th, Belgium recommended suspending UNAMIR. The secretary-general said UNAMIR would remain.[61] The national governments, with the exception of Ghana, made it clear to their UNAMIR contingents that self-protection was of the highest priority.[62] General Dallaire, commanding UNAMIR, sought to reverse the defensive orientation of the national contingents, obtain reinforcements, stop the genocide, and bring the parties back to the negotiating table. It is doubtful whether the latter could have been accomplished under any conditions. Once back on the offensive, the RPF was not inclined to negotiations. Its leaders correctly sensed that they possessed a markedly superior fighting force than the Rwandan army and that victory could be theirs.[63]

The U.S. response was in some ways surprisingly rapid. By 7 April representatives from the United States had clearly stated their opposition to shifting the authority for UNAMIR's mission from Chapter VI to Chapter VII of the UN charter. This would have enabled the UNAMIR commander to take bolder and potentially more dangerous actions, including acts of combat to carry out the assignment. However, conducting Chapter VII operations would expose the blue helmets to potentially much higher personal risk and opened the possibility of full-blown combat with both RPF and Rwandan army forces. During the same week National Security Advisor (NSA) Anthony Lake became the first western political figure to demand a stop to the killing and to place the blame squarely on Hutu leaders.[64]

President Clinton spoke with reporters in Minneapolis on 8 April. He stated that he had been involved in lengthy conversation about the Rwandan situation with Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry, and National Security Advisor Lake. The subject of utmost concern was the safety of U.S. citizens in Rwanda.[65] Three days later, on 11 April,

the president was able to report that 275 U.S. Marines had been flown to Bujumbura to assist with the evacuation of U.S. citizens from Rwanda. However, the Marines had not been required to cross into Rwandan territory. Ambassador Rawson was singled out for his efforts.[66] The Marines then returned to their ships in the Indian Ocean.

Within a short period of time, the Defense Department had established a Rwandan Task Force.[67] The task force collected and forwarded intelligence on the situation in Rwanda. Among the data collected was a daily estimate of those killed.[68] Under National Security Council (NSC) auspices, a Rwanda Interagency Working Group (IWG) was also established. In a short period of time, daily IWG conferences were being held. Some of these were conducted by video teleconference (VTC), but most were in the Situation Room in the White House.[69] Participants in the videoconferences included representatives from State, the NSC, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Defense, the CIA, and the Office of the U.S. ambassador to the UN.[70] The meetings held in person tended to involve only members whose agencies were located in Washington.[71] According to one participant, it was clear that there was no desire to become involved on the ground in Africa.[72] And while these meetings were supposed to focus on policy, on at least one question the issue of potential impacts on the 1994 elections was specifically raised.[73]

Although the IWG was drawn from a disparate group of agencies, the membership had, according to one participant, one thing in common. None were experts on, or even essentially well versed in, the politics of the Great Lakes region of Africa. None understood the historical and political context involving the French and the former colonial powers.[74] This lack of knowledge was shared by the major cabinet level actors as well, specifically Secretary Warren Christopher, National Security Advisor Tony Lake, and Secretary of Defense William Perry.[75] As the IWG worked out their internal procedures, events continued to move at the UN.

Interestingly, although Belgium had been the first state to favor a withdrawal from Rwanda, Belgian foreign minister Willy Claes initially pressed for armed intervention by UN forces. He rapidly gave up this idea in the face of French and U.S. opposition.[76] Nor did he have unanimous support in Belgium.

On 11 April, the UNAMIR troops that had been guarding a school where two thousand refugees were being sheltered were redeployed to Kigali airport. The refugees remained behind. Almost all were killed shortly thereafter. At this point, the UN had no doubts that widespread killing was going on in Rwanda and that there was a strong ethnic component to some of the shooting.[77]

Still, Dallaire's thought that UNAMIR could provide some stability clearly had merit. With only the UNAMIR troops in the capitol, he was providing security for thousands of displaced persons.[78] Had he received the five battalions and armored personnel carriers he requested, much more would have been possible.

At the Security Council, the subject of debate was whether UNAMIR should be continued. Now that initial concerns about the safety of their own citizens had been answered, the

question was what to do with UNAMIR. Belgium, having abandoned any idea of intervention, pressed hard to withdraw the UN force.[79]

The Belgian argument was easy to follow. Events in Rwanda were developing rapidly and unpredictably. Although the Rwandan army and the RPF had seemingly embraced a "hands off" policy toward UN safe havens, this had lasted slightly less than a week. On 18 April, displaced persons and UNAMIR forces within UNAMIR havens came under mortar attack. The next day Uganda requested that UNAMIR be retained and reinforced.[80] On 21 April, Bangladesh threatened to withdraw its forces and the Security Council unanimously voted to make the withdrawal of UNAMIR from Rwanda a reality.[81] However, as events unfolded UNAMIR was never completely removed from Rwanda, and 450 UN soldiers remained in Kigali throughout the crisis in order to secure the airport.[82] Despite their small numbers these troops also managed to provide sanctuary for as many as twenty thousand displaced persons.[83] Yet they could not cover all the people that UNAMIR had originally sheltered, and when UNAMIR forces left, death inevitably followed.[84]

In the years following the Rwanda crisis, the question, "Did the UN and the United States know genocide was being conducted in Rwanda?" was frequently asked. Obviously the answer is yes, although *when* that fact became known is a tougher question to answer. It was clear, almost at once, that widespread killing was going on, that civilians were being targeted, and that the civil war was once again raging. Independent confirmation of these conditions came from evacuated civilians, UNAMIR soldiers, and NGOs, such as the Red Cross, that reported "tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of dead" by 21 April.[85] On 23 April, the killing campaign intensified, reaching into the countryside and rural areas that had previously been unaffected.

Part of the reason the United States was slow to recognize, and even slower to admit, that genocide was ongoing in Rwanda can be traced back to the U.S. experience in Somalia. A common perception among senior U.S. decision makers was that involvement in the Somalian civil war had led to the debacle of Mogadishu. This was especially true in the case of Warren Christopher.[86]

Michael Barnett, a member of the United States mission to the UN in 1994, has stated:

> By mid to late April, people in the Security Council knew it was genocide, but refused to call it such because, ultimately, one understood that if you used the term genocide, then you might be forced to act. And when someone suggested that maybe they should call a genocide a genocide, they were quietly reminded that perhaps they should not use such language.[87]

Although other participants differ as to why the term genocide was not used, all agree that a decision was made to not call the widespread killing genocide.[88] The very fact this discussion was held indicates that there was general knowledge of mass killings going on inside Rwanda.

On 29 April, Boutros Boutros-Ghali went before the Security Council to ask for consideration of sending reinforcements to Rwanda.[89] Such a force, if approved, would have to be "well equipped, very mobile and able to protect itself." The secretary-general admitted that he was not sure if even such a force would be able to bring about an end to the massacres.[90] On that very day, the outgoing security council president, Colin Keating of New Zealand, took matters into his own hands and forced the council to approve a resolution. The council had been debating the issue for several days. Some members, such as China, were opposed to any recommendation of strong action. Other members, such as the United States, did not want the term genocide used. Keating informed the council that unless they could reach agreement he would declare the meeting an open session.[91] This would have made the wording and positions of the opposing states public. The council rapidly passed a resolution recommending strong action, but refrained from the use of the word genocide.[92]

On 30 April President Clinton made a radio address. He spoke to the leaders of both the RPF and the Rwandan army, urging them to stop the killing. The word genocide was not used, nor was there any intimation of U.S. or UN action.[93]

As the Rwanda IWG continued to attempt to craft policy options, it became apparent that no organization or senior decision maker wanted lead responsibility.[94] Rwanda was a very hot potato. Of all the organizations represented at the table, the Defense Department was the most reluctant to do anything that might lead to U.S. involvement.[95] But DoD's reluctance was in many ways indicative of the inability of decision makers to craft a policy that DoD could understand and support.[96]

Officials continued to use the word "chaos" to describe the killings in Rwanda. Some VTC participants saw Rwanda as a failed state, one that had failed from an excess of tribalism. Others thought the strife was of a permanent nature.[97]

Yet, over the course of the crisis, the option of committing U.S. forces either unilaterally or in conjunction with the OAU, or the UN, was continually raised. Later, when the French were launching Operation Tourquoise, there was even discussion of the United States militarily joining that effort.[98] The memory of the perceived failure of U.S. policy in Somalia hung heavy over these discussions, as indeed it did over most U.S. foreign policy deliberations.[99] Defense Department representatives were also affected by distant memories of Vietnam.[100]

Discussions among U.S. actors were not confined to the IWG level. Rwanda was a standard topic of discussion at informal luncheons of Defense Secretary Perry, Secretary of State Christopher, and NSA Tony Lake. These gatherings were referred to as PCL or "pickle" meetings.[101] However, there were no NSC Principals meetings being held to discuss Rwanda during the first two months of the crisis.[102]

Whether at the IWG or at the "pickle" level, one component of the crisis stood out clearly. There was no major U.S. public support for involvement in Rwanda. The Congressional Black Caucus had not called for intervention. This fact was not lost on the president who specifically asked if the Congressional Black Caucus was showing a strong interest in the

issue.[103] The *New York Times* twice ran editorials cautioning against providing more than logistic support and financial aid to Rwanda relief. The point was also made that the United States has no vital interests at stake in Rwanda. Both the *Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times* took similar positions.

On 3 May, President Clinton appeared on the Cable Network News (CNN) program "Global Forum with President Clinton." In the course of the show the president was asked what to do about Rwanda. He replied that he, like everyone, was shocked at the "slaughter," but hoped that the recognition of military and political dimensions would lead to avoiding the problems of Somalia. There was no discussion of intervention.[104]

Despite the president's appearance on the CNN news show, Rwanda was by no means the "hot" story of 1994 as far as the U.S. press was concerned.[105] Events in Haiti and Bosnia dominated U.S. stories about the international scene as potential health care and crime bills did the domestic.[106] In part, this lack of coverage was due to a paucity of press assets in Central Africa and the difficulty in getting news crews and reporters into the country. However, reports, primarily in print media, did reach major news markets. In the United States, the *New York Times* gave the most play to stories about Rwanda, but the *Times'* coverage was not extensive, especially compared to Canadian papers. In part, the press's difficulty in getting at the Rwanda story was that neither the Rwandan army nor the RPF wanted the scrutiny of the world press on their activities.

Congressional attention eventually touched on Rwanda. Secretary of State Albright testified on 5 May to the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. She briefly discussed Rwanda and also took the opportunity to brief the committee on Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), which had but recently been signed into force. As Secretary Albright put it, PDD 25 was seen as a way to "make multilateral peace operations more selective and more effective.[107]

In reality PDD 25 was designed to make U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations a far more difficult mission into which to enter. The PDD established criteria concerning command and control, funding, and the selection of which peacekeeping operations to support. Critics claimed that the president had effectively shut the United States out of the peacekeeping business. Many within government traced the origin of the PDD back to the battle of Mogadishu and the failure of the Clinton administration's Somalia policy. It was, in the words of one ambassador, "emblematic of the times."[108] But the PDD would also make it easier for government organizations opposed to intervention of any sort to advance their position.[109]

In discussing Rwanda, Ambassador Albright stated that the OAU had volunteered to contribute forces, but that funding for those forces would have to be provided. The UN did not have the money that was needed and was starting a voluntary fund for Rwanda. The UN secretary-general hoped the United States would pay a portion of that funding. The ambassador referred to the dilemma as a "chicken and egg situation."[110] When asked for specifics regarding the killings in Rwanda, Ambassador Albright answered that it was "hard" to get

information out of Rwanda, but that while the exact numbers were unknown it seemed that the victims were mostly Tutsi and some moderate Hutus. The four hundred troops in Kigali were said to be "trying to help with negotiations, protect the UN negotiators there, and trying to provide some protection to Rwandans who sought protection under the UN force."[111] The prospect of putting more forces into Rwanda was complicated by the fact that the RPF did not want additional peacekeepers in the country. The ambassador also voiced doubt as to whether or not the Rwandan peace operation had "started out properly."[112]

These were public statements. Ambassador Albright has since stated that she did not agree with the orders she was receiving from Washington in regard to Rwanda. She claims to have "screamed about the instructions," feeling they were "wrong."[113] However, as an ambassador, she had to "follow" those instructions.[114] Her account has been substantiated by one IWG participant.[115]

Other voices were also heard in Congress on the subject of Rwanda. Kofi Annan, then the under-secretary-general of the UN, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa on 2 May 1994. Annan focused on the extent of the crisis. He noted that the situation was so bad that Médicins Sans Frontières and the Red Cross had either suspended operations in Rwanda all together, or confined themselves to Kigali. He noted that Rwanda was "the most violent and virulent of all African challenges" and that the UN was "doing everything within its power to respond to the devastation which is occurring." He set the casualty figures at one hundred thousand dead, and two million displaced, within fourteen days. Senator Simon (D-IL) asked what the United States could or should do. Annan replied that the United States had the required lift capability, military hardware, and speed of action that was desperately needed. Furthermore, he added, even if the United States was unwilling to commit ground forces, it could "lead the international community in mobilizing resources.[116] When Simon asked about the capability of the OAU to be of greater support in helping answer the Rwanda problem Annan replied, "At least they tried."[117]

Although it took some time, pictures and video of the devastation and genocide that was sweeping Rwanda began to appear internationally.[118] In the United States, many congressional representatives reported themselves horrified at the images. However, while there was support for increased aid for NGOs and UN agencies in Rwanda, there were no calls to send U.S. troops.[119]

On 4 May George Moose, an assistant secretary of state, was before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. By now congressional representatives were using the terms "genocide" and "holocaust" to describe the killings in Rwanda. Furthermore Representative Johnston (D-FL) made it clear that the genocide was being carried out by Interhamwe and elements of the Rwandan army. He further noted that the killings had been carefully planned and deliberately executed. Moose explained the killings had begun in Kigali, then spread to the countryside. The victims were moderate Hutu opposition leaders and Tutsis of every type. Casualties were estimated at one hundred thousand dead and more than three hundred thousand refugees.[120] After running down a long list of actions the United States was taking to address the situation, Moose noted, "In the end only the Rwandans can bring peace to

their country. No outside effort can succeed without commitment to peace by the combatants themselves. The influence of the international community on internal conflicts of this type is limited."[121]

The committee was hard on Moose. One of the more telling points they raised was that although UNAMIR had been removed out of concern for the soldiers' safety, the four hundred troops in Kigali had been safe since the second day of the fighting. Moose admitted that this was so.[122] He also made it clear that U.S. and UN missions that were being dispatched to the region were not actually scheduled to enter Rwanda. Moose downplayed the chance of French or Belgian capabilities to "influence the current situation" due to "historical baggage."[123]

However, despite the committee's willingness to put Moose on the spot, only Alcee Hastings (D-FL) was willing to call for U.S. armed intervention.[124] Others, such as Representative Dan Burton (R-IN), were willing to support a multilateral intervention, as long as U.S. troops were not part of the operation.[125]

Other congressional personalities tried a more direct approach. Personally contacting General Dallaire, senators Paul Simon (D-IL) and Jim Jeffords (R-VT) were told "If I can get five thousand to eight thousand troops here quickly we can stop the whole thing." Accordingly the senators both wrote President Clinton urging rapid action.[126]

In New York, the UN Security Council continued to wrestle with the problem of Rwanda. On 1 May, Tanzania formally protested the decision to draw down UNAMIR. This act, it was argued, "demonstrated that the tragedy in Rwanda was of no concern to the international community, and stood in sharp contrast to the peacekeeping efforts of the organization elsewhere."[127] Unnamed Clinton administration officials stated that they were considering helping organize and fund an African intervention in Rwanda, but that the idea of any direct U.S. intervention had been rejected.[128] Ambassador Madeleine Albright reinforced this the next day during an interview on CNN.[129]

On 3 May, Kofi Annan blamed the lack of support for direct action in Rwanda on two major factors. One was fear of placing national forces at risk.[130] This fear was fueled by past events in Rwanda and current events in Bosnia. The other factor was the lack of a feeling of "kinship" by the populations of western states for the people of Rwanda.

On 4 May, Boutros Boutros-Ghali referred to the killing in Rwanda as genocide.[131] So too did David Breyer, director of the nongovernmental organization Oxfam. He reported that as many as five hundred thousand Rwandans might have been killed.[132]

On 13 May, the Security Council was prepared to vote on restoring UNAMIR strength in Rwanda. Ambassador Albright delayed the vote for four days.[133] On 17 May, the Council passed Resolution 918 authorizing UNAMIR II, an expanded UNAMIR. UNAMIR II would consist of 5,500 personnel. Its mandate was to provide protection to displaced persons, refugees, and civilians at risk while supporting relief efforts.[134]

Although UNAMIR II boasted an authorized strength of 5,500, the required soldiers could not be found. Ghana immediately volunteered to send in the first of four phased installments, but made it clear their troops would need Armored Personnel Carriers (APC). The UN requested the United States provide the vehicles on 19 May.[135] Two weeks later the United States publicly agreed to provide the APCs.[136]

Meanwhile the RPF was collecting an impressive string of military successes against the Rwandan Army. They were still not keen on a UN intervention and possible interruption of their campaign.[137] Despite the arms embargo, both forces were being resupplied throughout the campaign, but the greater war-fighting skill and discipline of the RPF was credited as the most important elements of their victories. However, RPF professionalism only extended so far behind the battle lines. They were "less than precise" when it came to the Geneva protocols invoking the noncombatant status of hospitals and so on.[138]

As the RPF steadily advanced, UNAMIR II continued to be plagued by trouble. The transfer of the APCs came to be seen as an essential component to a successful deployment. The United States had the vehicles and had publicly agreed to transfer them. However, in reality U.S. actions would cast serious doubts on Washington's commitment to that agreement.

At the best of times, the bureaucratic processes of the UN are cumbersome. Things happen slowly. Paperwork is extensive. When faced with a crisis, this process can be speeded up, but only with the intervention and oversight of an interested, powerful party.[139] In the past the United States has played such a role. This time the United States did not.[140] Disagreements over the terms of the APC contract were frequent and often focused on such details as taillights and painting the vehicles white.[141] U.S. officials kept asking for clarifying details, slowing down the process.[142] At least one contemporary editorial accused the White House or the NSC as being responsible for the delay in turning over the APCs.[143] The end result of this slow and cumbersome process was that the APCs would never be transferred from U.S. custody until after an RPF victory was certain.[144] UNAMIR II would never become an effective force.

But the killing continued. By mid-May the International Red Cross estimated that five hundred thousand people had been killed in Rwanda. The RPF held half of Rwanda and were tightening their hold on the environs of Kigali. Hutu refugees were "streaming" from the capitol to areas still dominated by the Rwandan army.[145] On 21 May the RPF gained control of the Kigali airport and refused to turn it over to UNAMIR.[146] Yet, within the zone controlled by the RPF, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Program (WFP) and the ICRC were active. These agencies were even able to provide what amounted to systemic humanitarian assistance.[147] This fact would appear to strengthen the argument that the RPF's aversion to an increased UNAMIR presence was fear of being forced to give up their offensive short of total victory, rather than a general reluctance to deal with the UN and other actors.

In late May the secretary-general began an increasingly anguished cry for support in stopping what he was publicly calling genocide in Rwanda. While recognizing a "general

fatigue on the part of the international community regarding peacekeeping," the growth of peacekeeping missions, and the difficulties with past operations such as Somalia, Boutros Boutros-Ghali still labeled Rwanda "a failure of the entire international community."[148]

During the same time period, President Clinton addressed the topic of U.S. intervention while giving the keynote commencement speech at the United States Naval Academy. The president's remarks made it clear that it was unlikely sufficient national interests were at stake in Rwanda to warrant U.S. intervention.[149] The next day the president signed Executive Order 12918, embargoing arms sales and transfers to Rwanda.[150] President Clinton repeated this point about no U.S. military intervention to the French press on 7 June.[151] The United States was willing to help, but would not commit troops. The president pointed out that the United States already had forces committed to Korea, to Europe, and to the blockade of Haiti. Developments in Bosnia and Haiti could place additional demands on the armed forces of the United States. The United States would provide financial assistance and armored support. The president thought that only a modest force, fielded by several African states, offered the best hope of success.[152]

On 8 June the Security Council passed Resolution 925, endorsing the immediate deployment of two battalions to Rwanda and also extending the UNAMIR mandate.[153] Troops for the battalions were not forthcoming. The EUCOM APCs had yet to be delivered and it was increasingly becoming apparent that no major deployment of UN forces was likely. On 20 June the Security Council voted to extend UNOMUR until 21 September.[154] The day before, 19 June, the secretary-general told the Security Council that the French had informed him of "their willingness to undertake with Council authorization, a French-commanded multinational operation to assure the security and protection of displaced persons and civilians at risk in Rwanda. The U.S.-led United Task Force in Somalia (UNI) was cited as a precedent.[155]

On 20 June the French directly addressed their fellow members of the Security Council. France and Senegal were prepared to deploy troops into Rwanda. They were ready to move "without delay" and wanted Chapter VII authorization.[156] They also insisted that the mandate empower them to use "all means necessary" to carry out their mission.[157]

As the Security Council debated the French offer, the RPF continued to make headway against the Rwandan army. As the RPF advanced the numbers of Hutu refugees continued to grow. UNAMIR's troop strength in Rwanda had grown from 444 to 503. The Rwandan noncombatant casualty list continued to grow. Any doubts about the existence of genocide had long been dealt with at the IWG. The mood was one of "increasing urgency" and the French offer was appealing.[158] But the problem of a lack of knowledge continued to affect the decision-making process. In the words of one participant, "State assumed the French would stabilize the situation and separate the warring parties. It never occurred to them that the genocidaires would use this as an opportunity to rest, reconsolidate, and then escape across the border. It never occurred to them that the French would allow this, even though many of the genocidaires were their former clients."[159]

On 22 June 1994, France's offer was accepted by the Security Council. Resolution 929 authorized the French to intervene in Rwanda under UN auspices. The operation was to conclude on 21 August.[160] This was only the sixth time that a UN operation had been approved under Chapter VII of the charter. The first elements of what would be known as "Operation Tourquoise" deployed into Uganda that very day. By early July more than two thousand troops were on the ground.[161] On 27 June, President Clinton addressed the members of the White House Conference on Africa.[162] U.S. financial, material, and "statistical" support was being provided for the efforts in Rwanda, including more than $100 million in humanitarian relief. To date, the author has been unable to discover just what the president meant by "statistical" relief.[163] The president also expressed support for the French intervention and affirmed that the United States was committed to bringing genocidaires to justice.

The ever-growing numbers of Rwandan cross-border refugees resulted in a shift in the relative interest of the various agencies attempting to come to grips with the problem in Washington. From the beginning of the crisis, USAID, true to its charter, had been anxious to do whatever was possible to alleviate the suffering in Rwanda and in neighboring refugee camps. In fact, it was acknowledged by some participants that USAID was probably the most "out in front" of all in the U.S. foreign policy community.[164] But USAID had not been able to significantly advance its position with other members of the IWG. Tony Lake was sympathetic, but the president was not.[165]

As the numbers of Rwandan refugees crossing into Tanzania and Zaire increased, two major developments ensued. The first was that the State Department's Bureau for Population, Refugee, and Migration (PRM) became progressively more involved in the situation.[166] As the refugees flooded across international borders and pooled in increasingly huge and unhealthy camps, NGOs rapidly found themselves overwhelmed.

The second major effect was that "the CNN effect," which had previously been muted, now became more pronounced.[167] Reporters who had previously found it difficult to enter Rwanda had no such problems in entering the camps.[168] The conditions, death, and suffering were the stuff of powerful news stories, and media coverage increased dramatically.[169] This resulted in a further increase in the urgency felt by members of the IWG and a growing sense that some U.S. response was going to be required.[170] Despite State's increased involvement, at the IWG meetings there was an increasing sense that the State Department, and Warren Christopher, were deferring more and more to the NSC and Tony Lake. Christopher was not an "Africa hand" and was having other diplomatic difficulties. Tony Lake, in contrast, was very interested in Africa.[171] Defense Department representatives were still extremely reluctant to support any initiatives that might require the use of military forces in the Great Lakes region. There was a general agreement that there were still no U.S. national interests at stake.[172] The military also had concerns with any deployment's effect on readiness and budget, as well as potential combat risks to U.S. personnel.[173]

In Rwanda, the RPF continued its string of victories. RPF troops were closing in on Rwandan Army strongholds in both the southwest and north-central portion of Rwanda. Refugee flows in excess of two million people were in motion away from the fighting.[174]

Fear of the RPF, fear of being caught up in the general conflict, and the urgings of Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines all incited Hutus to flee.[175] Ostensibly in reaction to these developments the French felt compelled to establish a safe humanitarian zone in the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle in southwestern Rwanda. French-led forces deployed into the zone on 9 July.[176] Five days later the RPF had taken full control of Kigali and captured Butare, Rwanda's second-largest city.[177] Neither the leaders of the RPF or the Rwandan government were interested in discussing a cease-fire agreement. In the United States, an RPF victory was being increasingly seen as the most likely way to stop the genocide.[178]

By 14 July, approximately 1.5 million Rwandans, mostly Hutu, had crossed the border into Zaire. This number included "virtually all the forces of the former Rwandan Governmental Army." Zaire's ability to deal with such a flow was nonexistent and the Security Council called on the international community to mobilize all available resources to provide urgently needed humanitarian assistance. As many as 850,000 refugees settled in the vicinity of Goma.[179] Another 350,000 stayed in camps in the South Kivu region. U.S.-based humanitarian NGOs also began to marshal their forces to deal with the situation.

Among the more active of these groups was the Capitol Hill Hunger Consortium. In addition to serving as a lobbying group for humanitarian programs, the Consortium also provided consulting services to several NGOs and UN agencies.[180] Eugene Dewey directed the Consortium. Mr. Dewey was a former senior official in both the UN and the State Department and he was well connected on Capitol Hill. On 14 July, he phoned contacts on the NSC staff, stressing the need for United States leadership. He did not stop with entreaties. Mr. Dewey also drafted an action plan, which he provided to his contacts on the NSC and certain influential congressmen, such as Tony Hall (D-OH).[181] Dewey claims that his proposals were actually presented to the NSC.[182] In the wake of this lobbying effort there were increased numbers of letters from the Congressional Black Caucus to the president requesting increased aid to Rwanda. Black Caucus chairman Donald Payne (D-NJ) penned the strongest of these letters. Sources within the NSC have confirmed that the Dewey proposal was among several plans made available to NSA Lake and other key figures. However, it was just one of several action plans under consideration.[183]

On 15 July President Clinton dispatched USAID's Brian Atwood to Goma in order to assess the severity of the humanitarian crisis. While there, Atwood met with General Dellaire and Charles Petrie, deputy director, United Nations Mission Rwanda Emergency Office. At the meeting Petrie "begged" for additional UNAMIR forces. According to Petrie, "It was fascinating to see how much support, compassion and willingness to give help there was at the time."[184] Shortly after Atwood returned, he personally briefed the president.[185] For what appears to be the first time in the crisis, the possibility that the United States was likely to send military forces into the African Great Lakes region became public knowledge. In EUCOM the initial indicator, at the action officer level, that something more than "monitoring" was needed came in the form of a White House press release.[186]

On 18 July the RPF reached the Zairean frontier and declared a unilateral cease-fire. With the exception of the French "humanitarian zone," the entire country of Rwanda was

under RPF control.[187] The RPF formed a "government of national unity.[188] Representatives of all parties named in the Arusha Peace Accords were represented with the exception of the more extreme, Hutu-dominated parties.

On the next day, cholera appeared in the refugee camps of Goma. This was rapidly followed by an outbreak of dysentery.[189] The UNHCR urgently appealed for assistance as stockpiled relief supplies for half a million people had run out.[190] The very nature of the disease placed additional burdens upon the U.S. decision-making apparatus. Cholera is extremely virulent and dangerous. It had broken out in the camps as a result of contaminated water supplies and a lack of sanitation facilities. Water purification equipment and associated hygienic items were needed immediately. Only the United States had the unquestioned ability to lift the required materials into the theater in a timely fashion.[191] On 21 July, Brian Atwood personally briefed the president on the situation.[192]

The end of the civil war dramatically changed the relative influence among the members of the IWG. Defense Department representatives had lost one of their most compelling arguments against the deployment of U.S. forces into the region. With the shooting at an end, U.S. personnel would be at little or no risk from combat. The Somalia analogy no longer seemed as applicable.[193]

Given the new situation on the ground, however, "clear objectives and endpoints" could be identified.[194] This would satisfy at least one condition laid down by PDD 25, although the issue of national interest remained problematic. Furthermore, the diminished risk to U.S. forces also meant there was less political risk in mounting an operation.[195]

On 22 July, President Clinton announced a major increase in U.S. aid and directed the Department of Defense to commit troops to the relief effort.196 He noted that prior to making this decision he had met with Brian Atwood to get Atwood's report on the situation in the refugee camps. The threat of cholera was said to have been an important element in the decision. Interestingly, NSA Lake, Deputy Secretary of Defense Deutch, USAID Director Atwood, and General Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were charged with conducting the operation.197 The decision was unilateral, but consistent with calls for international action made by the UN.

Once the decision was made, U.S. response was rapid. Initial airdrops of food from Special Operations C-130 aircraft were being conducted within twelve hours.[198] Led by General John Nix, of European Command, U.S. troops were on the ground and conducting operations within forty-eight hours.[199] In less than twenty-four hours, following the arrival of U.S. forces, purified water was being provided to the refugees.[200]

From late July until early October more than thirty-five hundred U.S. personnel participated in Operation Support Hope. In addition to water purification, U.S. forces were involved with aid distribution projects, establishing and maintaining airfield operations, and providing logistic support to UN forces.[201] The total cost of the operation was evaluated to be $123.9 million.[202] And while Rwanda would continue to attract U.S. observation and concern for years, the immediate crisis was over.

Notes

1. Dr. Anthony Lake, former assistant to the president for national security affairs, interview by author, 18 October 1999.
2. There are numerous publications dealing with the history of Rwanda. For a very good condensed overview, see Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, *Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons Learned from Rwanda* (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 1996), 59–70; also see Howard Adelmand and Astri Suhrke, eds., *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999) for a comprehensive report of the events from April 1994 to November 1997.
3. James F. Miskel and Richard J. Norton, eds., "Going to Goma, the Rwanda Deployment," *National Security, vol. 2, Case Studies in US Contingency Operations* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1996), 223.
4. Fergal Keane, *Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey* (New York: Viking, 1995), 16.
5. Ibid., 17.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 18–19.
8. Keane, *Season of Blood*, 19.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 19–20.
11. Indeed, many of the army's senior leaders were Tutsi.
12. Keane, *Season of Blood*, 19–20.
13. Ibid., 21.
14. Ibid.
15. Akazu translates to "Little Hut."
16. Keane, *Season of Blood*, 23.
17. Ibid.
18. United Nations Department of Information, *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 12.
19. Keane, *Season of Blood*, 23.
20. Glynne Evans, *Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes* (Trowbridge, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997), 23.
21. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 12.
22. Ibid., 14.
23. Keane, *Season of Blood*, 22.
24. Ibid., 22–24.
25. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 15.
26. Ibid.
27. Keane, *Season of Blood*, 26. Negotiations between the RPF and the government of Rwanda continued. As part of the Arusha accords, Tutsi representatives in Kigali were supported by a battalion of fully armed RPF soldiers.
28. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 24.
29. Ibid.
30. Keane, *Season of Blood*, 36.
31. Ibid.
32. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 27.
33. Romeo Dallaire and Bruce Pullin, "Rwanda: From Peace Agreement to Genocide," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (Spring 1995): 7.
34. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 27–28.
35. Ibid., 24.
36. Dallaire and Pullin, "From Peace Agreement to Genocide," 8.
37. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 29–30.
38. Ibid., 31.
39. Ibid., 32.
40. Ibid.
41. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 33.
42. Ibid., 37.
43. Ibid.
44. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 36.
45. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 35. The specific national contributions to UNAMIR were: Austria, 15 soldiers; Bangladesh, 942 soldiers; Belgium, 440 soldiers; Botswana, 9 soldiers; Brazil, 13 soldiers; Canada, 2 soldiers; Congo, 26 soldiers; Egypt, 10 soldiers; Fiji, 1 soldier;

Ghana, 843 soldiers; Hungary, 4 soldiers; Malawi, 5 soldiers; Netherlands, 9 soldiers; Nigeria, 15 soldiers; Poland, 5 soldiers; Romania, 5 soldiers; The Russian Federation, 1 soldier; Senegal, 35 soldiers; Slovakia, 5 soldiers; Togo, 15 soldiers; Tunisia, 61 soldiers; Uruguay, 25 soldiers; and Zimbabwe, 29 soldiers.

46. Keane, *Season of Blood*, 27; Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia Press, 1995), 221
47. Professor Howard Adelmand, University of Toronto, discussion with author, 15 November 2000.
48. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, 221–24.
49. Keane, *Season of Blood*, 29.
50. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, 230–231.
51. Assemble Nationale, Mission d'information commune, *Enquete sur la tragedie rwandaise 1990–1994* (Brussels: Assemble Nationale, 1998), 138–39.
52. The Interahamwe were lightly armed and largely ill disciplined militia units established by the Rwandan government. At the commencement of the genocide they were called to service and carried out a great deal of the killing.
53. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 30, no. 14, 737.
54. CDR Douglas Hancher, former EUCOM J-5 action officer and EUCOM Crisis Action Team watch stander, 1994–1996, interview by author, 6 July 2000.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid. Most of the five involved Bosnia-related operations.
57. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 38.
58. Ibid., 39.
59. John A. Berry and Carol Pott Berry, *Genocide in Rwanda: A Collective Memory* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1999), xxii.
60. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 40.
61. Scott R. Feil, *Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1998), 3.
62. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, 270–71.
63. Lake, interview, Assemble Nationale, *Enquete sur la tragedie rwandaise*, 532.
64. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 30, no. 15, 752.
65. Ibid., 771–72.
66. Yael S. Aronoff, "An Apology Is Not Enough: What will happen in the next case of genocide?" *Washington Post*, 9 April 1998, A25.
67. Ibid.
68. Mr. Richard McCall, former USAID chief of staff and USAID representative to the Rwanda IWG, interview by author, 11 July 2000.
69. Miskel and Norton, "Going to Goma, the Rwanda Deployment," 227.
70. McCall, interview.
71. *Frontline*, PBS, "The Triumph of Evil," Transcript #1710, 26 January 1999, 15. The member was identified as Tony Marley, U.S. State Department Military Advisor, 1992–1995; McCall, interview.
72. Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 624.
73. McCall, interview.
74. Ibid.
75. Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 605.
76. Ibid., 623.
77. Feil, *Preventing Genocide*, 8.
78. *Frontline*, transcript, 16. This statement was confirmed by Karel Korvanda of the Czech Republic on the same show.
79. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 41.
80. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 43–44.
81. Feil, *Preventing Genocide*, 30.
82. Dallaire and Pullin, "From Peace Agreement to Genocide," 9.
83. Feil, *Preventing Genocide*, 16.
84. Feil, *Preventing Genocide*, 15.
85. McCall, interview.

86. *Frontline*, transcript, 17.
87. Lake, interview; Ambassador Richard Bogosian, Special Assistant to the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative and former ambassador to Somalia, interview by author, 6 June 2000; Mr. George Taft, Attorney, U.S. Department of State, Office of Legal Affairs/ Africa, interview by author, 5 April 2000.
88. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 45.
89. Ibid.
90. Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 639.
91. Ibid.
92. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 30, no. 18, 984.
93. McCall, interview.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 30, no. 18, 984.
97. McCall, interview.
98. Bogosian, interview.
99. McCall, interview.
100. Miskel and Norton, "Going to Goma, the Rwanda Deployment," 227.
101. Aronoff, "An Apology Is Not Enough," A25; McCall, interview.
102. Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 624–625.
103. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 30, no. 18, 974.
104. Adelmand and Suhrke, *Path of a Genocide*, 211.
105. A review of stories in major newspapers for the period January through August reveals that Bosnia and Haiti stories outnumbered stories on Rwanda by nearly two to one. When only U.S. papers are examined the ratio is even higher.
106. Testimony, Ambassador Albright, 5 May 1994, "Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations for 1995, Part 4: Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 547–622.
107. Bogosian, interview.
108. Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 625.
109. Albright testimony.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. *This Week*, ABC News: 10 July 2000, transcript, 4–5.
113. Ibid.
114. McCall, interview.
115. "Briefing of the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," Federal News Service, 2 May 1994, transcript, 3.
116. Ibid.
117. Adelmand and Suhrke, *Path of a Genocide*, 218.
118. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 30, no. 18, 978.
119. "The Crisis in Rwanda: Hearing Before the Subcommittee In Africa Of The Committee On Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, May 4, 1994" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 1.
120. Ibid., 4.
121. Ibid., 12.
122. Ibid.
123. "Crisis in Rwanda," 44.
124. Ibid., 50–54.
125. Testimony of Senator Paul Simon, *Congressional Record*, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., Cong. Rec. 140, no. 8, S10941, 8 August 1994.
126. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 46.
127. Paul Lewis, "U.S. Examines Way To Assist Rwanda Without Troops," *New York Times*, 1 May 1994, 1.
128. Ralph Begleiter, "Albright Says U.S. Action Possible in Haiti," CNN, 2 May 1994, Transcript #600-3.
129. "Many countries 'reluctant' to send peacekeepers," the *Vancouver Sun*, 3 May 1994, A4.
130. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 51.
131. "Aid group on Rwanda: It's 'genocide' on a horrific scale; Kigali battered by heavy

shelling as fighting surges," *The Gazette* (Montreal), 4 May 1994, A10.

132. *Frontline*, transcript, 4.
133. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 29.
134. *Frontline*, transcript, 8–9.
135. Ibid.
136. Paul Lewis, "UN Chief Seeks an African Peace Force for Rwanda," *New York Times*, 2 May 2000, A3.
137. Keane, 123–124.
138. Bogosian, interview; Dr. Ronald Senykoff, Country (Rwanda) Program Officer, Office of Food for Peace, U.S. Agency for International Development, interview by author, 5 July 2000.
139. Aronoff, "An Apology Is Not Enough," A25.
140. Ibid; Keane, *Season of Blood*, 124; Prunier, *Rwanda Crisis: History of Genocide*, 275.
141. McCall, interview. McCall pointed out that such questions were not unique, but rather common when dealing with the U.S. military. "It's been my experience that when you work with the military you have to be very precise about what it is you want or they will keep coming back to you with questions."
142. "Shameful Dawdling on Rwanda," *New York Times*, 15 June 1994, A24.
143. CDR Douglas Hancher, interview by author, 6 July 2000. There were other aspects of the APC transfer that escaped the attention of the press. The requirement for transfer essentially required the APCs to be delivered "as is." No spare parts, support packages, or training were to be provided with the vehicles. Perhaps not surprisingly, less than half the APCs were reported to remain functional within three months of delivery and none within two years.
144. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 48.
145. Ibid., 120.
146. Ibid., 49.
147. Ibid., 50.
148. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 30, no. 20, 1161.
149. Ibid., no. 21, 1171.
150. Ibid., no. 23, 1252.
151. Ibid.
152. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 52.
153. Ibid., 53.
154. Ibid.
155. Ibid.
156. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 54.
157. McCall, interview.
158. Ibid.
159. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 54. Ten council members voted for the action, none voted against. Brazil, China, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Nigeria abstained.
160. Ibid., 54.
161. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 30, no. 26, 1365.
162. To date, the author has been unable to discover just what the president meant by "statistical" relief.
163. McCall, interview
164. Ibid.; Lake, interview. McCall stated that the decision to not intervene more directly was made by the president. Lake has only said that he wanted to "do something."
165. McCall, interview.
166. Ibid.; Adelmand and Suhrke, *Path of a Genocide*, 221–227.
167. Hancher, interview.
168. Minear and Guillot, *Soldiers to the Rescue*, 15, 111; Hancher, interview. In EUCOM, it was only half-jokingly said that the appearance of CNN reporter Christiane Amanpour usually presaged an impending operation. Informally referred to as "the Death Angel" Amanpour always seemed to be where the most compelling stories were to be found.
169. McCall, interview.
170. Lake, interview
171. Ibid.
172. Ibid.; Bogosian, interview.
173. Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 170.
174. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 55.
175. Initially Operation Tourquoise was carried out by French and Senegalese troops. Forces from Chad, Congo, Guinea-Bissau,

Mauritania, and Niger later joined them. Minear and Guillot, *Soldiers to the Rescue*, 96.

176. Ibid., 56.
177. Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 670.
178. Ibid.
179. Miskel and Norton, "Going to Goma, the Rwanda Deployment," 226.
180. Ibid.
181. Ibid., 228.
182. Ibid.
183. Berry and Berry, eds., *Genocide in Rwanda: A Collective Memory*, 151.
184. McCall, interview. Although there was a sense that a U.S. deployment of troops was inevitable the Atwood meting "clinched" the decision. As a result of this meeting, the president would increasingly look upon Atwood as a personal "asset."
185. Hancher, interview.
186. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 57.
187. Ibid., 121.
188. Ibid., 74.
189. Ibid., 120.
190. McCall, interview; Admiral David Jeremiah, former vice-chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, interview by author, 9 November 1999.
191. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 30, no. 29, 1533.
192. Ibid., 229.
193. Jeremiah, interview.
194. Ibid.
195. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 30, no. 29, 1533.
196. Ibid., 1535.
197. Hancher, interview.
198. McCall, interview.
199. Minear and Guillot, *Soldiers to the Rescue*, 112.
200. Ibid.
201. Ibid.
202. Ibid.

Haiti

RICHARD J. NORTON

"Operation Uphold Democracy," the invasion of Haiti, was another "New World Order" mission. Unlike Somalia, it began in perceived failure and ended in success. Also unlike Somalia, the president went against, rather than with, public opinion in his decision to commit U.S. forces to combat. At the last minute, combat was averted when Haitian leader Raoul Cedras agreed to allow his country to be peacefully occupied. This case study, prepared by Dr. Rick Norton, a faculty member of the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College, is being used as part of the school's curriculum.

In 1991 the impoverished Caribbean nation of Haiti held free elections for the first time in decades. Many Haitians had not voted more than once in their lifetimes. This time they swept a fiery orator, Jean Bertrand Aristide, into office. Aristide, a Catholic priest, was a champion of the poor and leader of the populist *Lavalas* movement.[1] In a country where the elites, who numbered less than 1 percent of the population, controlled more than 44 percent of the national wealth, support of the powerful for Aristide's brand of government was less than enthusiastic.[2] Nor was it certain that the newly elected president would even complete his term of office. In its two hundred years of independence, Haiti has had forty-one heads of state. Of these twenty-nine were either assassinated or forcibly removed from office; nine declared themselves heads of state for life, and seven served for more than ten years.[3] In the nineteenth century, only one Haitian leader left the presidential office alive.[4] In the two centuries of its existence, Haiti has experienced twenty-one constitutions.

On 30 September 1991, a military junta, led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, deposed the president in a quick, successful coup. Cedras, the coup's titular leader, was a military aristocrat who had initially risen to power during the Duvalier regime.[5]

The United States and the Organization of American States (OAS) refused to formally recognize the Cedras regime. That the OAS did so was not surprising. Democracy had swept South America during the latter half of the 1980s. By 1991, only Haiti and Cuba had nondemocratic governments. Furthermore, on 5 June 1991, the OAS passed *Resolution 1080*, which called for an emergency meeting any time there was an overthrow of a democratic state in the region.[6] On 4 October, an OAS delegation met with Cedras in an effort to convince him to relinquish power. The attempt failed and by November the OAS had embargoed all shipments of weapons and oil to Haiti.

President Bush embarked on essentially a two track policy toward Haiti. One track was designed to make General Cedras and his cronies step down. The other track was to manage the tide of boat people that were coming to the United States. To accomplish the first track's objectives the United States initiated diplomatic overtures and supported similar moves by the OAS. An embargo on certain essential materials bound for Haiti was initiated. It was hoped that such actions would be enough to convince the Cedras junta to leave.

In handling the other track, the administration was aided by the Alien Migration Interdiction Operation (AMIO). AMIO was a treaty, signed during the Reagan years, between Haiti and the United States. It gave the United States the right to return Haitian refugees to Haiti without recourse to a legal screening process. However, this generated considerable domestic unrest and several court challenges. On three separate occasions the Bush administration was forced by court injunctions to suspend direct repatriation of Haitian refugees until they could win the domestic legal challenges to the policy. As an interim measure, Haitian refugees began to be quartered at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo, Cuba.

An additional problem for the Bush policy on Haiti was presidential candidate Bill Clinton. After emerging as the democratic candidate the former governor of Arkansas attacked the president on a wide variety of topics, including repatriation. Not only did candidate Clinton condemn the president's policy, but he also took pride in being ". . . the first person running for president . . . to speak out against the Bush administration's handling of the Haitian situation."[7]

Candidate Clinton's domestically oriented campaign produced highly successful results. In November 1992 he reiterated his opposition to the forcible repatriation policy and promised to overturn it when he was president.[8] This promise was not lost on the Haitian population.[9] Throughout October and November boat building boomed along the Haitian coast. Some of the wood used in the construction came from houses that people had torn down in their eagerness to escape. Nervous Coast Guard officials began predicting refugee flows as large as two hundred thousand people.[10]

By mid-January 1993 President-elect Clinton, faced with overwhelming evidence of impending massive Haitian refugee flows, was faced with a dilemma. If he kept his words, waves of boat people would put to sea. He then announced that he would temporarily continue the Bush policy of forcible reparation. At the same time he reiterated his support of UN diplomatic efforts to find a way to restore democracy to Haiti."[11] The response did not go over well with the Haitian or the human rights communities.

Clinton's words also failed to resonate with the detainees at Guantanamo. Although the detainees had praised the U.S. military officers in charge of the camp, there was a riot on 14 March. The reason for the outburst was said to be irritation with the pace "with which U.S. officials are deciding their fate."[12] The riots also brought a visit from the Reverend Jesse Jackson, who compared the living conditions at the camp to those of a prison.[13]

On 15 March there was a rally in Manhattan protesting the government's Haiti policy. Forty-one people were arrested. Among the marchers was actress Susan Sarandon. Among

the arrested was the Reverend Jesse Jackson. Reverend Jackson's arrest was photographed and was printed in the *New York Times* for two consecutive days.[14] Sarandon later made a controversial plea for the Haitian detainees during the nationally televised Academy Awards.

Haiti was far from being the only item on the president's agenda. It was even far from being the most important item on the agenda. Deprived of even the traditional "honeymoon period," the Clinton administration found itself embroiled with Congress from the outset. In part this was because the president had chosen much of his staff at the last minute and according to one noted Washington columnist had seemed to prefer inexperience.[15]

The president allowed foreign affairs and national security issues to be looked after by key cabinet members and advisors. When it came to Haiti, National Security Advisor (NSA) Tony Lake, Assistant National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, and Lawrence Pezzullo, a foreign service officer who had been named special envoy to Haiti, were among the most important of the inner circle.[16] These men formed the core of the "Haiti hawks." Lake and Berger controlled and dominated the National Security Council staff and managed the NSC schedule and agenda. As a result, even if the president's attention were elsewhere, there would always be a spot on the NSC calendar for Haiti.[17]

The most encouraging aspect of the spring of 1993 in regards to Haiti came from traditional diplomatic efforts. Things seemed to be on the verge of a breakthrough. A series of visits to Port-au-Prince had been made by UN envoy Dante Capote, and Lawrence Pezzullo, special envoy and special advisor to the president in Haiti. Pezzullo had carried the message that the United States was "determined to restore democracy quickly."[18] This determination was echoed by U.S. Air Force General Raymond O'Mara, who was addressing a regional Caribbean security meeting in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad later that week. The general warned Caribbean military leaders to prepare themselves for action in Haiti if the situation worsened.[19]

Details of the plan began to emerge both in the hallways of power and in the press. Cedras would step down. Within six months Aristide would return. A new prime minister, acceptable to both sides, would have to be found. A UN mission of as many as five hundred persons would oversee the reconstruction of the Haitian judiciary and the creation of an independent police force. The mission would work with the 140 UN human rights observers already in Haiti.[20]

There seemed to be three key components to the rapid progress of the talks. One was that the United States seemed to be taking a dedicated interest in the problem. Another was that President Aristide seemed to be softening his long held position that General Cedras had to be exiled or punished. This was important as the junta considered it nonnegotiable. The third was that the United States and the United Nations (UN) were holding out the prospect of a massive infusion of aid to Haiti. President Clinton pledged $1 billion as a start.[21]

Despite the optimism, there were also counterindications suggesting that agreement might not be as close as some would wish. Representatives of the Haitian business sector had

told Pezzullo it would take U.S. military forces to reinstate Aristide. Cedras and his cronies had a monopoly on weapons and on violence. No one, including a restored Aristide, could "make" them behave. As prospects for peace grew stronger, so did the unease of the Haitian elite. They saw the return of Aristide as a return to class struggle, the possibility of being held accountable for the violence of the Cedras regime and, worst of all, and erosion of their wealth position and power.[22]

Other warning signs that all was not well with the negotiations included Cedras' insistence that the coup participants be given amnesty or pardon. In addition these guarantees had to extend to businessmen and politicians who had supported Cedras. While the Cedras camp focused on these issues, Aristide's support base began showing signs of friction. Longtime allies and supporters began "bickering" over what the new government of Haiti should look like.[23]

Domestically, right-wing Democrats were demanding action and resolution. Chief among these was Senator Bob Graham (D-FL). Concerned about an increase in the size of the Haitian refugee flow, as would-be boat people tried to beat the approaching hurricane season, Graham called for a 31 May deadline.[24]

As the negotiations continued, "After Action Reports," of U.S. interventions in Grenada, Panama, and Somalia were being widely circulated in the Pentagon. Secretary Aspin worried that failure to get the Defense Department actively involved in the Haitian interagency planning process could have a significant negative impact on his department.[25] He accordingly directed the Department of Defense to commence interagency planning. The secretary had correctly diagnosed reluctance on the part of the Defense Department and the military to participate in any operations having to do with Haiti. The opposition consisted of two major elements. The first was a reluctance to get into another "nation-building exercise." The army had gone through that in Panama and Grenada and was involved in just such an operation in Somalia. The second reason for the resistance was that based on an analysis of Haiti's conditions, senior defense leaders firmly believed that the U.S. military could not solve Haiti's problems.[26] Frequently reference was made to the thirty-five-yearlong occupation of Haiti by U.S. military forces.

Nevertheless, in support of the United Nations–sponsored negotiations with Haiti, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was directed to plan a "nation assistance" operation to help restore democracy to Haiti.[27]

The negotiations that had led to such high hopes collapsed when General Cedras and the junta broke off talks.[28] This began a three-month period of varying diplomatic initiatives.

The Cedras regime's refusal to find a solution drew fire from both the UN and the United States. The secretary-general placed the blame squarely on the junta.[29] Inside the United States the Aristide cause was helped and promoted by a talented lobbying team. The team was led by Michael Barnes, a former congressman with a savvy understanding of Washington, D.C. Barnes had also been a key Clinton fund-raiser as well as a former

partner in Sandy Berger's old law firm. The White House denied that Barnes had any special connectivity.[30] Mr. Randall Robinson of the lobby group "TransAfrica" helped Barnes in this effort. Robinson had been a member of the same public relations firm as Barnes and was also well acquainted with Tony Lake.[31]

After torturous negotiations it was agreed that talks between Aristide and Cedras would be conducted under UN auspices on Governors Island, just off Manhattan, on 27 June. Although the talks lasted several days, Aristide and Cedras did not actually meet. Dante Caputo served as intermediary between the two groups. The two sides reached agreement on 3 July. The terms of the agreement were relatively simple. There would be a meeting of all Haitian political parties. A prime minister would be nominated by Aristide and confirmed. At this point the UN, OAS, and United States would suspend, but not end the embargo and start a program to modernize the armed forces and create a new police force. Aristide would then issue an amnesty for all the officers who acted against him in the coup and Cedras would resign and take early retirement. Aristide would return.[32]

Unbeknownst to the participants, the U.S. operatives had most carefully monitored both delegations. And what the United States knew was that neither side had any intention of honoring the agreement.[33]

Still, just because the signatories were contemplating cheating did not mean that they could not be maneuvered into compliance. Or that as the months moved along that the contending parties might not come to see real value in following the course of action laid out in the agreement. At least these assumptions are what the administration began to base its policies on.

Although it was known that the Cedras regime was planning to break from the agreement, Pezzullo and others believed that once the trainers were in place, Haitian resistance would be futile. Construction personnel would also be sent in to assist the Haitians in starting civic action projects. Further, President Clinton, proposed a five-year, $1 billion international development program for Haiti.[34]

On 18 August, after weeks of debate and strife among Aristide supporters and opponents, the Haitian senate, with Aristide's approval, officially named Robert Malval as prime minister. Malval declared that he would only serve as an interim leader and would be replaced no later than 15 December 1993. Interim prime minister or not, Malval's acceptance as prime minister indicated to most that the agreement was on track.

One of Malval's first official acts was to appeal for an early end to the international economic embargo of Haiti. The confirmation of Malval as prime minister and the appeal to lift the embargo were enough to convince the OAS and the UN to recommend lifting the sanctions. Madeleine Albright, U.S. ambassador to the UN agreed with the idea. Haiti was starting to be touted as a rare example of sanctions being powerful enough by themselves to be successful. Some analysts attributed this to Haiti's unusual degree of vulnerability.[35]

Although Malval was now in place, political violence continued to escalate in Haiti. Beatings, kidnappings, and shootings were common. Political opponents frequently assaulted pro-Aristide demonstrators as Haitian military personnel watched, making no move to intervene. Most of the assailants were known to be "attaches," civilian auxiliaries of the Haitian police force.[36]

On 16 September, Coretta Scott King wrote a hard-hitting editorial. The widow of the country's most famous civil rights leader claimed that the UN sanctions had been lifted prematurely. She recommended delaying any further payments or shipments to the island until the return of Aristide as the Governors Island agreement required.[37]

On 27 September, the UN Security Council voted to send more than 1,200 police and military personnel to Haiti. Five hundred sixty-seven would be UN police monitors and the rest would be U.S. and UN military trainers. Most of the U.S. troops would be navy construction battalion personnel, known as "Seabees." Most of the police monitors were expected to be in Haiti by 30 October.[38]

As September wore on, the United Nations threatened to reinstall sanctions. On the last day of September 1993, the USS *Harlan County* (LST 1195) set sail from Charleston, South Carolina, having embarked the initial group of U.S. monitors. The ship stopped in Puerto Rico en route to Haiti.

Secretary of Defense Aspin had argued against landing the monitors, fearing that once a presence in Haiti was established, it would be difficult to terminate. Should the animosity between the Cedras and Aristide camps turn violent, U.S. forces could be "caught in a civil war."[39]

Tony Lake, Sandy Berger, and Warren Christopher felt that the United States needed to get the monitors into Haiti. They made the case that reversing U.S. policy was "not an option." The interventionists carried the argument, without it ever reaching the level of the president.

There was also opposition from Capitol Hill. In a display of bipartisan concern, Senator Bob Dole (R-KS) and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) warned against sending U.S. forces into the country.[40]

Then, half a world away, events unfolded that would directly impact the administration's handling of Haiti. On 3 October, in Mogadishu, Somalia, a force of U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force soldiers attempting to capture warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid found themselves in an intense firefight. The eventual casualty report would list eighteen soldiers killed, seventy-four wounded and one captured. The Cable News Network (CNN) was on the scene and every television station in the United States showed the CNN video of a dead ranger being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Public and congressional reaction was immediate and negative.

Mogadishu would have a profound impact on the Clinton national security team and on every decision potentially involving military intervention made after 3 October 1993, and

most strongly on what to do with the *Harlan County*. As George Stephanopoulos said, "So soon after Somalia, no one had the stomach for another fight."[41]

Tony Lake admitted that the fight in Somalia had an impact, but denied that it had made him, or other members of the administration "less interventionist. Rather it had the effect of imposing a more critical cost-benefit analysis into the decision-making process."[42]

The Haitian government had agreed to allow *Harlan County* to berth at a pier in Port-au-Prince. As *Harlan County* approached it quickly became apparent that the pier was blocked by another vessel. Furthermore, a large and angry crowd stood upon the pier, waving clubs and pistols. Mob spokesman claimed that they would turn Port-au-Prince into another Mogadishu.[43] The *Harlan County* stopped in the Port-au-Prince Harbor, reported the situation, and waited for guidance.

In the White House a battle quickly developed between advisors in favor of forcing a landing and those that recommended the ship withdraw. On the one side were Ambassador Albright and NSA Lake. Albright claimed that U.S. prestige was at stake and would be harmed if *Harlan County* withdrew.[44] On the other side, Secretary Aspin argued that the troops embarked in *Harlan County* were not equipped for serious combat operations.[45]

Deliberations over what to do consumed the next day. The specter of the dead rangers in Mogadishu hung over the deliberations.[46] Lake, Albright, and Berger argued for intervention. Aspin was still opposed. Chief of Communications David Gergen recommended that it was time to "cut our losses."[47] In the end, Secretary Aspin's position prevailed. There would be no forcible landings. *Harlan County* withdrew. Larry Pezzullo was outraged. He had pushed hardest of all for a display of will, insisting that what the cameras were capturing was "theater, not threat." In the end Secretary Aspin prevailed.

The *Harlan County* incident, as it came to be known in some circles, marked a major development in the U.S. involvement with Haiti. For several days there was an intense debate about what to do next. Lake, Berger, and Albright favored a rapid return to Haiti, followed by a forced entry if necessary. The president began asking close advisors whether the United States should "go in and take them?"[48] The answer, in part, was that the military continued to oppose invasion and there was no public support for such an action.[49]

In the wake of the *Harlan County* debacle, several new and disturbing facts and allegations came to the attention of the White House, the Congress, and the American people. For example, it was discovered that the mob which had demonstrated on the pier in Port-au-Prince was not a spontaneous expression of public determination. It had been organized by the "Front Pour L'Avancement et le Progress Haitien," (FRAPH). FRAPH was definitely a right-wing organization, with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ties, but leaders in Washington were unsure whether to view it as a political party or merely a creature of the Cedras regime.[50]

There were also allegations made concerning President Aristide. A CIA personality profile of Aristide that had been provided to the White House was leaked to the press. The report claimed that Aristide had been treated for a mental disorder and was suffering from

manic depression. Equally disturbing was the translation of a speech in which Aristide seemed to be voicing support for the use of violence against political opponents.[51] In Congress, Jesse Helms referred to Aristide as a "psychopath" and even though the president dismissed the report, he too referred to Aristide as "flaky."[52]

It was later revealed that the information reported in the personality profiles was false.[53] The issue of supporting violence was more problematic. Aristide's supporters claimed he had been poorly translated.

On 14 October, the United States and the UN reimposed sanctions on Haiti.

President Clinton ordered the United States Navy to take up blockading duties. Prior to this decision, the Coast Guard had performed this duty. Within days of the order six naval warships were on station off Haiti. Several Canadian and one British ship would also participate in the blockade.[54]

It was clear to all that the planned 30 October return of President Aristide to Haiti was not going to happen. Cedras and the junta remained firm in their defiance. For his part, Aristide returned to his old position of no amnesty for junta leaders. At this point, a discovery involving the junta leadership was made. It was reported and confirmed that both Cedras and Francois had at one point been paid by the CIA to be informers and agents.

The failure of the Cedras regime to conform to the Governors Island agreement convinced many people who had been unaware that there had never been any intention of conforming, that the junta was not to be trusted under any circumstances. Although some individuals and agencies, such as the Department of Defense, remained opposed to military intervention, others, such as members in the human rights directorate of the State Department, reevaluated their positions.

While the UN debated whether or not to impose an even tighter embargo on Haiti, reports began to emerge that the sanctions were taking their toll. Among the hardest hit were Haiti's poor. Many were out of work. Other than private volunteer organizations (PVO) and religious societies, there was nowhere to turn to for relief. Death rates among children rose. Broadening the sanctions would clearly deepen the impact, but this course of action was seen as the only alternative to combat.[55]

As this was occurring, Secretary Christopher was becoming increasingly marginalized where Haiti was concerned. As his power waned, the power of the Haiti hawks increased.

On 27 January 1994, the United States further tightened the economic screws on Haiti. In a series of moves designed to impact the Haitian elites, the United States revoked visas and froze additional Haitian financial assets.[56] At a meeting of the "friends" it was also decided to press the UN for a total trade embargo.[57]

Proponents for greater economic pressure being applied to Haiti received a boost when the Commerce Department reported that both imports to and exports from Haiti rose in 1993. It was also reported that the Haiti–Dominican Republic border was a sieve. Although

the total amount of trade was small, only $370 million, it was seen as sufficient to help the junta maintain their grip on the country.[58] Further indication of the failure of the embargo came when observers in Port-au-Prince reported the price of black-market gas had dropped from $9 a gallon to $6 a gallon.[59]

While the international diplomatic battles raged, domestic events were unfolding that would intrude into the Haiti calculus. Lawton Chiles, governor of Florida, had been impacted by the refugee flows as no other state leader had. Legal immigrants, bona fide refugees, and illegal immigrants tended to stay in Florida, and placed heavy burdens on the state's social systems and budgets. Efforts to get the federal government to pick up the additional costs had not been successful. The governor turned to other methods and sued the federal government.[60] If the suit was successful, Chiles anticipated recouping significant amounts of money. The governors of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, New York, and California were closely watching this pending legal action. Chiles was also a power in the Democratic Party and his state was going to be crucial in the upcoming congressional November elections.[61]

However, President Aristide managed to keep in the public eye. On 19 March, he launched his most telling and harshest criticism of the Clinton administration to date. During an opening meeting of the Congressional Black Caucus, Aristide compared the treatment of Haitian refugees with Cuban refugees. Aristide maintained that the U.S. policy toward Haiti was racist. Several members of the Caucus immediately agreed.[62] Few statements could have aggrieved or angered the Clinton administration as much.

In a nearly full page advertisement in the *New York Times*, more than eighty-five religious leaders, actors, politicians, and other well-known personages signed an open letter to the president, claiming that the repatriation policy was driven by "considerations of race."[63] The ad included a form that one could use to make a donation to TransAfrica.

Aristide's supporters now focused on Special Envoy Pezzullo as being part of the problem.[64] Special-interest groups began to demand his removal. Following a series of increasingly confrontational meetings, the Congressional Black Caucus called for his removal.[65] Although arguably filling no more than forty congressional seats, the impact of the caucus was significant. They represented large numbers of Democrats. The caucus members were highly articulate and dedicated. Their support was seen as essential to many of the president's social programs. Furthermore, this was a unified position among caucus members. "We are hoping that the White House understands on this issue that the Congressional Black Caucus speaks with one voice," said caucus Chairman Kweisi Mfume (D-MD). [66] The White House was listening and the White House did understand.

Proof of this came on 26 March 1994, when the administration announced that it was implementing a new plan that would be much more in tune with that favored by Aristide.[67] The new plan also included the potential for increased sanctions.

On 7 April, President Aristide formally served notice on President Clinton that, as the recognized leader of Haiti, he was canceling the current AMIO Accord. In keeping with the terms of the Accord, the cancellation would become effective in six months. Although the

State Department would not comment on the cancellation, the repatriation policy remained in effect.[68]

Randall Robinson, the director of TransAfrica, was so adamantly opposed to the policy that he embarked on a highly publicized hunger strike on 12 April 1994. He made it clear that the strike would last until he died or Haitian refugees were given a hearing. In a powerful op-ed article, he accused the Clinton administration of lacking deep convictions, Pezzullo of accommodating the Haitian military while holding Aristide in contempt, and failing to include FRAPH among the State Department's annual listing of human rights abusers.[69] The initial response of the White House was to announce a policy review.

As Robinson began his hunger strike, additional congressional members began to call for a military solution to the Haitian dilemma. David Obey (D-WI), chairman of the powerful House Appropriations Committee, publicly endorsed such an option. Although Obey stated that he would prefer an international military force be used, he would support a unilateral U.S. invasion. Not surprisingly, many representatives, especially Republican representatives, found the idea unacceptable. Others, notably Charles Rangel (D-NY), supported a "show of force," but not the "use of force."[70]

As Randall Robinson continued to fast, supporters of Aristide continued to attack Special Envoy Pezzullo. On 27 April, he tended his resignation. The special envoy had become increasingly ignored by the administration.[71]

Robinson's fast entered its seventeenth day and President Clinton admitted that his Haiti policy to that point had failed. He was personally troubled by the continuing violence. The president gave additional moral validity to the Robinson hunger strike when he stated that Mr. Robinson should "stay out there."[72]

The number of voices clamoring for military invasion increased. Columnists Mary McGrory of the *Washington Post*, Richard Cohen, also of the *Post*, and Cathy Booth of *Time* all came out in favor of military action.[73]

On 21 April six representatives were arrested after chaining themselves to the White House fence in protest of the president's Haiti policy. All were Democrats. The protest was well covered by the press and photographs of Joseph Kennedy (D-MA), Ron Dellums (D-CA), and the other four were on the front page the next day.[74]

By the end of April, the refugee issue was still receiving heavy play in the papers, Randall Robinson was gradually starving to death, and California and Arizona had followed Florida's lead and filed lawsuits against the federal government. The governor of New York announced that New York was going to pursue similar action while the attorneys-general in Texas and New Jersey were deliberating whether or not to join the Florida litigation.[75] More than $3 billion were at stake.

On 4 May, the twenty-third day of his hunger strike, Randall Robinson was hospitalized. Robinson's strike and physical condition had been closely monitored by the White House,

and perhaps most closely of all by Tony Lake. When asked if the hunger strike had an impact, Lake answered, "Of course. I was worried Randall might die."[76]

Behind the scenes, military contingency planning for the use of force in Haiti was activated. Admiral Paul David Miller, commander in chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) directed General Hugh Shelton to develop a plan to forcibly remove Cedras from power. The forcible entry option would be known as Operations Plan 2370 (OPLAN 2370). The U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps would provide the combat power the plan required. Simultaneously, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) began developing its own plan for assisting democratic forces and training a Haitian police force.[77]

On 6 May, the UN Security Council voted for more sanctions. Private flights in and out of the country were banned. Police and military officers, prominent civilian supporters of the Cedras regime, and their families were prohibited from leaving Haiti. A worldwide freeze on these individuals' assets was also recommended.[78]

On 7 May, President Clinton once again changed U.S. policy toward Haitian refugees. Forcible repatriation would no longer be practiced. Haitians would now be given interviews either at sea, or in third-party countries. Those determined to be ineligible for asylum would be returned to Haiti.[79] This change of policy was enough to cause Randall Robinson to end his hunger strike. The decision came after a presidential discussion with General Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During this discussion the president said he had come to believe that the only way to resolve the situation was through intervention. The general countered by laying out the opposing viewpoints and invasion plans were put on hold.[80]

The Clinton administration also announced the appointment of Larry Pezzullo's replacement. William Gray, former congressman (D-PA) and president of the United Negro College Fund, was named U.S. special envoy to Haiti. Gray immediately announced that his goal was to "end the suffering of the Haitian peoples at the hands of their military leaders."[81]

During the second week in May, large-scale military maneuvers were conducted in the Caribbean. Many observers believed these were precursor operations to a Haitian invasion. The Clinton administration dismissed such speculation as incorrect. The sense that the nation was edging closer to conflict also energized Congress. Led by Bob Dole (R-KS), a proposal to require congressional authorization for any use of military force involving Haiti was introduced.[82]

As Congress debated and the junta continued to defy the UN, one of the fears of the Clinton administration began to be realized. As news of the revised refugee policy reached Haiti the numbers of Haitians putting to sea steadily increased. In an effort to cope with the rising demand, the U.S. government chartered the Ukrainian flagged liner *Gruziya* to serve as floating staging area and site of immigration hearings.[83]

As rumors of a possible invasion continued to abound, congressional members slowly coalesced into groups supporting and opposing the use of military force. On 22 May, Senator

Bob Graham (D-FL) returned from a two-day trip to Haiti and announced that he now supported invasion.[84] Bob Dole continued to lead the opposition.

The shifts and reversals that had marked the Clinton policy on Haiti were also having an impact on public opinion. In May, a *Washington Post—ABC News* survey showed that only 40 percent of the U.S. public approved of the president's handling of foreign policy as opposed to 53 percent of those polled who did not.[85]

Yet another voice was added to those calling for invasion, when, on 1 June 1994, President Aristide claimed that economic sanctions would not restore him to office and called for "action." In his speech, he made it clear that he was talking about military action. "The action could be a surgical move to remove the thugs within hours," Aristide said of the kind of intervention he would support.[86]

On 10 June, President Clinton further increased sanctions on Haiti. U.S. commercial flights to Haiti were banned and most financial actions between the two countries were canceled. Concurrently, the State Department announced that it was pulling all embassy dependents out of Haiti and recommended that U.S. citizens in Haiti leave at the earliest opportunity. Other nations were expected to cancel their commercial flights as well.[87] In Haiti the Cedras government declared a "state of emergency." Junta-appointed President Emil Jonassaint stated there was a threat of invasion and occupation. In response to this announcement, Clinton administration officials noted that thirty Caribbean and Latin American nations had expressed support for a U.S. intervention if all else failed.[88]

While the international community may have been coming to grips with the possibility of an invasion, the U.S. public was not. On 23 June, an *Associated Press* poll found only 28 percent of the populace approved an invasion.[89] This was not lost on the administration. Years later Tony Lake admitted that public opinion was never on the side of the administration.[90]

By 28 June, the oceangoing exodus the administration had been waiting for materialized. In an explosive surge of interdiction, Coast Guard vessels gathered in more than thirteen hundred Haitians in one day. It quickly became apparent that, despite the precaution of moving additional vessels into the area, the flow would overwhelm the preparations to meet it.[91] Within a day, President Clinton decided to reopen the refugee center at Guantanamo Bay. The combination of increased regime repression in Haiti, the disproportionate impact of sanctions on the poor and the reversal of the U.S. forcible repatriation policy were believed to explain the dimensions of the flow.

The refugee flow continued to build. The CIA estimated that as of early July, one thousand Haitians were leaving by boat every day and that the number would soon rise to four thousand each day. Boat building in Haiti was at such a fever pitch that houses again were being torn down to provide raw construction materials. In Haiti, it was believed that as many as one third of the refugees intercepted at sea were being allowed into the United States.[92]

In the midst of changing policies and mounting congressional debate, the United States sent four amphibious ships carrying the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to the waters

off Haiti to conduct exercises and to be available if a noncombatant evacuation operation of embassy personnel had to be carried out. Although Special Envoy Gray assured the press that no invasion was "imminent," speculation ran rampant.[93] The MEU had only just returned to its home base of Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, from duty in the vicinity of Somalia.

The next increase in the pressure being applied to the junta came when Special Envoy Grey announced that General Cedras and the members of the coup had six months to leave, or face possible military action. The threat may have gained credibility when Panama declared that it would no longer serve as a third-party host to Haitian refugees. Efforts by the United States to reach a compromise solution failed.[94] UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali announced that only two thousand to three thousand of the nine thousand to twelve thousand strong peacekeeping force had been identified. Potential contributors were said to be reluctant to commit until they knew if the United States intended to oust Cedras by force.[95]

At this point in the confrontation, the Cedras regime took action that could not have been more beneficial to the Clinton administration than if it had been planned for that purpose. On 10 July 1994, all OAS and UN human rights observers were ordered to depart Haiti within forty-eight hours. The observer force, numbering one hundred individuals, was declared to be "undesirable aliens." To external observers it seemed that the junta was removing potential witnesses to what many feared would be a wave of orchestrated violence and terror.[96]

In Guantanamo, more than sixteen thousand Haitians awaited screening and transportation to a safe haven not in the United States. Some, tiring of the conditions or disappointed at being denied entry into the United States opted to return to Haiti.[97] The ever-increasing number of Haitians at Guantanamo was exerting an inexorable pressure on the administration to find some solution to the confrontation.

President Aristide amplified his earlier remarks on 15 July. Explaining that Haiti's constitution did not "allow" him to call for an invasion, he still called for "swift and definitive action against the leaders of the coup.

The U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division was ordered on 28 July 1994, to begin planning for a permissive entry into Haiti.[98] This plan would be known as OPLAN 2380 and was an entirely separate operation from OPLAN 2370. There was almost no overlap in the forces assigned to each plan.

On 31 July, the UN Security Council authorized the United States to "use all means necessary" to restore President Aristide to power in Haiti. The vote was 12 to 0 in favor of the resolution, with China and Brazil abstaining. A UN observer force would accompany any invasion force.[99] The stage was now set for an invasion. All the component pieces were in place.

On 2 August, the Dominican Republic agreed to allow an international force to patrol the Dominican-Haitian border. The force's purpose was to report cross-border smuggling to the Dominican authorities, which would then intervene.[100] The force, initially numbering only

eighty individuals from the United States, Argentina, and Canada could be said to be more symbolic than utile, yet still presented an image of an internationally isolated Haiti.

Several Latin American countries, led by Venezuela, expressed concerns with the prospect of yet another U.S. military intervention into the Caribbean and Latin America. In the U.S. on 3 August, the Senate unanimously declared the UN authorization to use force did not justify the use of U.S. troops. However, the measure was nonbinding and when Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) offered an amendment blocking the use of force in Haiti unless U.S. lives were endangered, the amendment was defeated 63 to 31. Even some opponents of the use of force in Haiti felt the amendment, if passed, would set a dangerous precedent.[101] The president reiterated that he already had constitutional authority to use military force as needed.[102]

Inside White House decision-making circles, Secretary of Defense William Perry argued against Deputy Secretary of State Talbott's desire to impose a deadline by which the junta leaders had to leave or face invasion. Perry, echoing the sense of his department wished to explore alternatives that could buy off the Haitian leadership. Talbott found this idea "repugnant" and favored an early invasion. Perry's counter was that it was preferable to spend money than lives.[103] Through the duration of the Haiti confrontation the Defense Department had been adverse to any application of military force and Strobe Talbott had consistently been in favor of intervention.[104]

As Guantanamo filled with Haitians and Lawton Chiles continued to sue the federal government and fall elections drew closer, Fidel Castro allowed an outpouring of Cuban refugees to brave the Windward Passage and head by sea to Florida. As the old operating rules remained in effect, the Cubans were initially granted political asylum. The expatriate Cuban community welcomed them to Florida. Not surprisingly, the flow evoked memories of the Mariel Boat Lift.[105] As the Cuban refugee flow swelled in size to more than two thousand individuals a week, the comparisons between the treatment they received vice that meted out to the Haitians came under harsher criticism.

For the president, recollections of the Mariel Boat Lift were not pleasant ones. While Clinton was governor, Cubans being held in Fort Chaffee, Arkansas rioted. There were several deaths and the riots were a major issue in the next gubernatorial campaign, which Clinton lost. He now made it clear that such events were not going to happen again.[106]

The refugees continued to flow and Guantanamo continued to fill. By 24 August, the navy was planning to remove civilian dependents of base personnel back to the United States. It was announced that the base would be used to accommodate up to forty thousand refugees.[107]

While the United States grappled with Cuban and Haitian refugees, the Cedras regime once again was thrust into an unflattering limelight. On 28 August 1994, Father Jean-Marie Vincent, Catholic priest and longtime friend of President Aristide was killed. More precisely, Father Vincent was gunned down just a few feet from the door of his order, the Congregation of Montfortin Fathers. It was "the first political killing of a priest in memory. . ." in Haiti. Vincent was credited with having saved Aristide's life in the past.[108] When President Clinton learned of the killing he was "outraged."[109]

As August gave way to September, four Caribbean states pledged to provide forces for any upcoming invasion of Haiti.[110] UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali also announced that he was "giving up" any attempt to try and persuade the leaders of the junta to step down. The UN had sent a high-level mission to Haiti during the last week in August, but the Haitian military leaders had snubbed the diplomats and refused to talk with them.[111]

Newspapers ran story after story speculating as to when U.S. forces would be used. The Pentagon announced that an invasion would cost $427 million dollars in addition to the $200 million already spent on interdiction operations as well as building and running the refugee facilities on Guantanamo.[112]

Unlike most preparations for operations involving the potential for combat, much of the invasion preparations took place in an overt fashion. The press coverage was extensive. This was clearly done in an effort to impress the junta to abdicate. U.S. military overflights of Haiti were increased and the international contingent of the invasion force trained openly in Puerto Rico.[113] Some administration officials explained that due to conflicting signals in the past and a possible perception of President Clinton being indecisive, General Cedras and the other coup leaders might not understand how resolute the U.S. position was.[114]

But opposition leaders were also making statements. Bob Dole continued to argue against any invasion arguing no U.S. interests were at stake. On 6 September, political cartoonist Gary Trudeau announced that the Clinton presidential icon was going to be a "waffle."

What did not get reported was an NSC meeting on the Haiti situation in the White House on 7 September 1994. Tony Lake chaired the meeting. General Shalikashvili briefed the state of the Haitian Army, and the U.S. plans to deal with them. As soon as the briefing was over the president thanked him for the briefing and said, "It's a good plan; let's go."[115]

Although it would take an additional eighteen days during which U.S. forces moved to position, the press indulged in a frenzy of speculation, and U.S. public opinion never moved to a point favorable to the president; the decision had been made.

Just prior to the invasion the president gave former president Carter, retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, and former senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) permission to fly to Haiti in order to make one last effort to convince Cedras to step down. Former president Carter argued that, as he had known Cedras personally, he would be successful. He had convinced Powell and Nunn to add their arguments to his. Although there was concern that the three men could be taken hostage, they were allowed to go. The mission's initial efforts were not successful, and negotiations were in progress when planes loaded with U.S. paratroopers lifted off and headed for Haiti.[116]

That fact, relayed to Cedras by a Haitian intelligence asset in the United States, was enough to convince him that the time had come to quit. The Carter mission gave him a face-saving way out and he took it. As the paratroopers' aircraft moved steadily to the jump points, Carter reported Cedras' "surrender" to the president. In a remarkable display of military discipline and precision the invasion was halted. Aircraft were turned around in

mid-air and headed home. OPLAN 2380 was activated. In less than twelve hours, U.S. troops walked ashore. Five years later, Cedras was living comfortably in exile, the Haitian population was preparing for its second consecutive free presidential election and U.S. soldiers still walked the streets of Port-au-Prince.

Notes

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5. Many feel that Francois was the true leader of the coup.
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9. Perusse, *Haitian Democracy*, 39.
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20. Ibid.
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23. Howard W. French, "Talks Are Set on the Details of Haiti Pact, *New York Times,* 1 April 1993, A3.
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25. Margaret Hays and Gary Wheatley, eds., *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), 13.
26. Ibid.
27. Ricketts and Huber, "Coming to America," 345.
28. Michael Tarr, "Diplomatic Efforts Fail In Haiti; U.N. Envoy Could Not Get Military to Let Aristide Return," *Houston Chronicle,* 17 April 1993, A21.
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30. Norton and Ahart, "Haiti: Uphold Democracy," 212.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 213.
34. "Clinton, Aristide Meet; U.S. to Send Military Trainers, *Los Angeles Times,* 23 July 1993, A11.
35. Lippman, Thomas W., "Dramatic Success of Sanctions Linked to Haiti's Circumstances; Economic Pressure Has Yielded Few Clear Victories in Recent Uses," *Washington Post,* 29 August 1993, A23.
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42. Interview between Anthony Lake, former assistant to the president for national security affairs, and the author, via telephone, Newport, RI, 18 October 1999.
43. "Envoys Chased from Port in Challenge to U.N. Mission," *Minneapolis Star Tribune,* 12 October 1993, 1A.
44. Walker, "US Tussles Over Haiti," 3.
45. Drew, *On the Edge*, 334.
46. Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human*, 217.
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48. Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human*, 219.
49. Ibid.
50. Although not conclusively proven, there are significant indicators that FRAPH was a tool of the junta and that Washington deliberately ignored this and chose to treat it as a political party. (Confidential interviews.)
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52. Ibid., Stephanopoulos, *All Too Human*, 219. "Clinton Says Aristide Is Fit to Govern; President Says Evidence Belies CIA Suggestions of Haitian's Instability," *Minneapolis Star Tribune,* 24 October 1993, 4A.
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62. "U.S. Haitian Policies Are Racist, Says Aristide," *Seattle Times,* 19 March 1994, A2.
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65. During the harshest of these meetings, Mr. Pezzullo was surprised that a briefing requested by Representative Joseph Kennedy (D-MA) was actually an interrogation of several members of the CBC. During this encounter, Mr. Pezzullo was accused of being racist, a charge he found as puzzling as it was hurtful. After the meeting was over, Michael Barnes personally apologized for

the treatment Pezzullo had received. Pezzullo interview, 22 October 1999.

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116. This is not to downplay the very real contribution former president Carter, et. al. made to preserve the lives of both U.S. and Haitian citizens. While reports of inbound paratroopers apparently drove Cedras' decision, the presence of Carter made this process easier and contributed to the success of the 'peacekeeping' mission.

Antipersonnel Landmines: A U.S. Policy-Making Minefield

GEORGE E. TEAGUE

On 17 September 1997, President Clinton stated that the United States would not sign the Ottawa Treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. He then announced a new U.S. policy that represented a multifaceted approach to landmine control. This was a surprising moment for the president, considering his own personal inclinations as well as the fact that the United States had been the leading country in banning landmines since the 1980s. The case study examines the complex influences upon the president that resulted in his refusing to sign a treaty. It also examines the increasing power and influence of nongovernmental organizations in the post–Cold War era and how they can impact policy inputs from both the domestic political system and the national security system. This case study, prepared by Colonel George Teague, USA, while he was a faculty member in the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College, is being used as part of the school's curriculum.

Commander Jimmy Lemkis just couldn't believe it. Despite all the stories he had heard throughout his twenty-one years of service, and especially during this past year at the Naval War College, he still was not prepared for what was happening to him. Reporting for duty at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) only a few hours earlier, he was now sitting in the office of his new boss, Air Force colonel John Rockets. He had gone there expecting to get the typical welcome aboard speech and an overview of his new duties. Instead, he was met with a brief, but friendly, introduction and then quickly given the particulars of his first tasking.

"Sorry I can't give you more time to get your feet on the ground, Jimmy, but we've got to move on this fast and everyone else is already tied up with multiple missions. As I am sure you are aware, OSD has been going like gangbusters ever since President Bush took office. With all the attention paid to high-profile issues like the attacks on Iraqi air defense sites, the EP-3 aircraft incident with China, and especially our ongoing war on terrorism, a lot of other important work has been left somewhat unattended. However, the administration is continuing to review and modify many of the policies that were put in place during the Clinton years. One such policy currently under review involves antipersonnel landmines [APLs], and Secretary Rumsfeld needs some information from us pretty quickly before he weighs in with a formal Department of Defense [DoD] position."

Colonel Rockets paused for a moment to take a quick sip of coffee and then continued, "Basically, what the boss needs from us is a clear understanding of how the current U.S. policy on APLs came about. He also needs a summary of how we have done to date on implementing the policy and what's changed since it was first announced. Finally, he wants to

know 'who's got a dog in this fight' . . . that is, what interested parties may try to influence the current review, why, and how." He reached across the desk to hand Jimmy a thin folder, stating, "I jotted down a few names and phone numbers of folks you may want to talk with to help you get started. In case you are wondering, you got this mission for three reasons. First, since you just got here you don't have any other assignments yet and can give this your complete attention. Second, as a navy construction expert, or Seabee, you are the closest thing I've got to a subject matter expert on landmines. Third, and most important, your Policy Making and Process [PMP] instructor up at the Naval War College was a classmate of mine when I was there in 1999, and he told me that you were one of his star pupils, so I know you've got the requisite skills to handle this mission. I'll need an initial brief tomorrow. Great to have you on-board," he said as he shook Jimmy's hand and ended the meeting.

Back in his office, Jimmy began looking over the rather sparse list of names he had gotten from Colonel Rockets. One grabbed his attention right away—an army colonel named Jack Warden from the Office of the Secretary of the Army. The notes beside Colonel Warden's name indicated that he had done some sort of review of the landmine policy back in 1999. Jimmy smiled as he dialed the colonel's number, thinking that this call might save him a lot of legwork. A female voice answered the phone, "Colonel Long speaking. May I help you?"

"Yes, Ma'am. This is Commander Lemkis from OSD. May I speak with Colonel Warden, please?" asked Jimmy.

"I'm sorry. He is no longer assigned here. May I help you with something?" replied Colonel Long.

Jimmy was immediately disappointed, but took the time to explain why he was calling in the hope that perhaps Colonel Long or someone she knew might have worked with Colonel Warden on his review. "Do you, by any chance, know anything about the landmine policy briefing that he prepared for Secretary Caldera in 1999?" he asked.[1]

"You're in luck, Commander," she replied. "I remember the project. I even helped him a little bit with it. If you will leave your number, I'll try to locate a copy of it for you and I will call you back."

As he waited for her call, Jimmy dialed another number from the list, this one for the Office of Mine Action Initiatives and Partnerships at the State Department. He explained what he was working on to a secretary, who then forwarded his call to Ms. Laura Beccam. After a brief discussion, Ms. Beccam agreed to meet with him later that afternoon. As soon as he hung up, the phone rang, and he was pleased to hear Colonel Long's voice on the line.

"Commander Lemkis? Patty Long here. Although I hate to admit it, I cannot find a copy of Jack's briefing. Now that I think about it, I'm not sure he ever produced a final version. However, I did locate his working file, and it is full of notes and articles that I think you will find very useful. You are welcome to come look at it and even make copies of stuff, but I'm afraid I cannot let the file leave the office. Would you like to come by sometime today?"

"Yes," Jimmy said quickly. "Can I come over now?"

"No problem. I'll keep the file on my desk. If I get called out before you get here I'll leave it with the secretary up front and let her know you are coming."

After getting directions, Jimmy thanked her and headed for the door feeling much better about this project than he had when he left Colonel Rockets' office.

Colonel Warden's file was a gold mine of information about U.S. policy on APLs, at least up to the point where his work apparently ended in 1999. Jimmy had news articles, interviews, e-mail messages, handwritten notes, and other documents spread all over a table near Colonel Long's office at OSA. In addition to the workspace, Patty had given him a code for the copy machine and even offered to discuss the issue with him once he had reviewed the material. He quickly organized the paperwork into several distinct piles and then began to sketch out a timeline of events and a synopsis of current U.S. antipersonnel landmine policy.

Although elements of the policy were announced at various times in 1996 and 1997, the key decision seemed to be President Clinton's 17 September 1997 declaration of antipersonnel landmine policy.[2] In announcing his decision, the president stated that the United States would not sign the *Ottawa Treaty* banning APLs due to our nation's "unique responsibilities for preserving security and defending peace." He further added that "there is a line I simply cannot cross, the safety and security of our men and women in uniform." He then reviewed his APL policy, a multifaceted approach to the problem. This included a commitment to renew efforts to negotiate a global ban on landmines through the United Nations (UN) Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, an approach he originally announced in January of that same year. He also directed the Defense Department to develop alternative technologies to replace APLs outside Korea by 2003 and within Korea by 2006, and he committed to significantly increasing funding for all aspects of U.S. demining programs. In addition, he made permanent a moratorium on the export of APLs by the United States and capped the U.S. inventory of self-destructing landmines at existing levels. Finally, he appointed General David Jones, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as special advisor to the president and the secretary of defense for issues related to this policy.[3]

Just one month later, Secretary of State Albright and Secretary of Defense Cohen further clarified the policy by introducing the president's initiative called *Demining 2010*, a program intended to eliminate, by 2010, the threat to civilians posed by landmines already on the ground. The first step in this program involved appointing Assistant Secretary of State Karl F. Inderfurth to serve as the special representative of the president and of the secretary of state for global humanitarian demining. "Looks like the major focus of this policy is going to be on the demining component," Jimmy thought to himself. "I wonder why . . . visibility? . . . likelihood of success? . . . powerful forces at work who favor this approach? . . . doing what no one else can do as well? Hmmm."

Next, Jimmy decided to prepare a brief summary of the historical facts he had derived from the folder. Since before World War II, the rules of war and international law have defined mine warfare as a *defensive strategy*. Minefields were normally placed between countries or occupied territory, and APLs were invented to inhibit breaching of these barriers. These rules generally held through the Korean War, after which both North Korea and the UN Command used APLs to help establish the Demilitarized Zone. To this day, the U.S. defense treaty with South Korea rests in part on our policy of maintaining defensive mine warfare to protect U.S. forces. Then in Vietnam the Viet Cong started to use mines as psychological weapons, often building crude "homemade" mines from tin cans and scrap metal. In that same time frame, the United States introduced a technological breakthrough—*smart* mines capable of self-deactivation and self-destruction.

These remotely delivered smart mines were called by their acronym—FASCAM—which stands for the "Family of Scatterable Mines," and they contained both anti-armor and antipersonnel mines. Developed for both the Army and Air Force, FASCAM was widely viewed as an important force enabler to the military. Except for the dumb mines retained for use in Korea and for training, the United States currently only uses FASCAM. However, the rest of the world's major arms producers—particularly China, Russia, and Italy—continue to focus on producing *dumb* mines. Though labeled "dumb," these mines are actually sophisticated weapons that are noted for their ease of construction, cheap cost, and lack of metal parts to foil detection. These types of mines were used extensively in the wars in the 1980s and 1990s and now constitute the problem.[4]

Patty interrupted his thoughts to offer him a cup of coffee, adding, "I've got a few moments if you would like to discuss any of this."

"Sure," said Jimmy, "and thanks for the coffee. I hope the army's coffee is better than the stuff we make over at OSD."

"I wouldn't count on it. If you don't mind my saying so, I think this issue is potentially more explosive than you may think. DoD feels itself under attack from all sides on this issue. Although in the big scheme of things APL policy may appear to be a small-potato policy, it is anything but that! It has direct connections to debates about international law, traditional diplomacy versus new processes of arms control, rules of war and sovereignty, and what role other states, nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], and the public should play in driving United States security policy. It is a confusing issue unless you have the timeline down."

"I have the key dates broken out here," said Jimmy. (See Chronology at end of case study.)

Patty took a long look at the timeline and said, "Wow, I'm impressed! You've gotten this together pretty quickly. Did you know our policy efforts were supported by several NGOs, and in particular the International Committee of the Red Cross, during the Cold War period? In the last several years, however, the situation has changed somewhat, and new forces have emerged to attempt to force a change in our APL policy. Let's talk about some of those forces.

"In the early 1990s the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation [VVAF] initiated an international effort to ban landmines and managed to enlist the support of several other NGOs. They hired an outspoken activist, Ms. Jody Williams, to serve as the coordinator of what became known as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines [ICBL].[5] Ms. Williams championed the ICBL cause and led it from its infancy into 'super-NGO' status. She eventually brought together over thirteen hundred groups and organizations from ninety countries to create a force to pressure governments into changing their landmine policies. She calls this concept for world change the use of 'civil society.'[6] For their efforts, she and the VVAF were co-recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize, an event that generated a great deal of favorable publicity for the cause and undoubtedly enhanced the ICBL's credibility.

"I can understand how the ICBL might be effective in pressuring individual countries into changing their landmine policies," Jimmy said, "but how did they manage to generate an international treaty?"

"Actually, they did not generate the treaty, although they were certainly instrumental in promoting it and pressuring countries to join," replied Patty. "The international treaty was largely the result of efforts by Canada's foreign minister, Mr. Lloyd Axworthy, who created the 'Ottawa Process'—a fast-track negotiation of a convention banning landmines.

"At the conclusion of the First Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons [CCW] in Geneva in May 1996, many delegates were disappointed at the failure to achieve consensus on an outright ban of APLs. Mr. Axworthy decided to radically change the process of negotiating a landmine treaty and announced Canada's sponsorship of a new and different kind of conference in Ottawa in October of that same year. At the end of the Ottawa Conference, Mr. Axworthy then challenged the world's countries to come back by the end of 1997 with their respective government's approval for a treaty to ban landmines. The Ottawa Process surprised many governments, not only because of the speed with which it operated, but also because Canada chose neither to follow the lead of its superpower neighbor to the south nor to rely upon an existing diplomatic forum. Instead, Canada formed its own process and rapidly changed the face of international diplomacy. The result was the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction*, more commonly called the *Ottawa Treaty* or the *Landmine Ban Treaty*.[7] For his active support and leadership in this process, the VVAF recognized Mr. Axworthy with the Senator Patrick J. Leahy Humanitarian Award in December 2000."[8]

"Would that be Senator Leahy, the Democrat from Vermont?" asked Jimmy. "I think I saw an interview in Colonel Warden's folder with one of his congressional staffers. Yeah, here it is. He must have been a pretty active supporter of the cause to get an award named after him."

"Senator Leahy has been impacting this process for years by continually introducing congressional legislation to limit U.S. production, export, and use of APLs," Patty replied. "He seemed to get pretty close with President Clinton on this issue . . . the details are probably in that interview.

"What about DoD—do you have any insight as to their role or inputs into the process?" asked Jimmy.

"Not a lot of specifics," replied Patty. "I know there were many factions within DoD with strong emotions and what I think were parochial mindsets on the policy during that time frame. The Joint Staff apparently didn't want to run afoul of their civilian leaders at OSD so they wouldn't touch it. They wanted the Army to carry the ball. The folks over in OSD actually wanted to see the APL ban go into effect early in Mr. Clinton's first term, so they weren't very happy with us because the Army took a go-slow approach.[9] Since Secretary Rumsfeld took charge, I haven't heard as much about the issue, perhaps because everyone has been tied up with all the other stuff going on around here. I did hear that one of the reviews he commissioned has recommended abandoning the 2003 and 2006 deadlines to replace all APLs with alternative technologies. As you might imagine, this is already causing a lot of anxiety among NGOs like the ICBL and Human Rights Watch, both of which had hoped to convince President Bush to go one step further than Clinton and actually sign the *Ottawa Treaty*.[10] Further exacerbating the issue, word has gotten around that the Army has zeroed the funding in the 2003–2007 spending plan that was targeted for the development of a dumb APL alternative, and the word also indicates that we are going to propose that the United States abandon its efforts to develop alternatives for FASCAM mixed-mine systems.[11] You should try to hit some of the NGO Web sites to get their latest views on these issues.

"Well, I've got to get back to work," Patty concluded. "Hope I've been of some help. One last piece of advice: there are lots of competing and complementary pressures exerting themselves on this policy. Don't draw any conclusions until you've looked at the full range of participants and issues."

Jimmy thanked her for all her help, then made copies of several documents, and headed back to his office to begin organizing his thoughts and making notes. He selected copies of some e-mail messages and some interview notes from his Warden file and began to carefully read through them.

The first e-mail message that Jimmy read was from Jody Williams herself. Although Colonel Warden's message indicated that he had asked her about the ICBL's position on banning landmine use along the Arab-Israeli borders, her response did not answer that question directly. Instead, her reply explained that with the Cold War over, small countries could gain influence if they worked together to act on a policy. She went on to say that governments would come to see that they do not need landmines to secure their borders and that their civil populations would help to bring about this change. She also spoke of how the NGOs gained credibility with the public and with international organizations and states because they were initially the only ones with the data on the destruction APLs were causing. Ms. Williams added that NGOs were adept at using information to raise domestic awareness of the problem in countries all over the world. She ended by saying that her concept of "civil society" works to form new partnerships with governments, and that these open partnerships were not the old diplomacy of the nation-states.[12]

The next message contained notices from Canada's Foreign Ministry. One noted how Canada was being praised by the UN and other countries for leading the Ottawa Process and for influencing the U.S. policy of 17 September 1997. Another showed Mr. Axworthy at the DMZ in Korea stating that the treaty might save forty thousand casualties worldwide per year and that South Korea should eventually renounce APLs.

"Interesting," Jimmy thought as he turned his attention to a lengthy set of notes from an interview conducted with a Mrs. Anne Sears from the National Security Council.

Colonel Warden had begun the interview by asking Mrs. Sears if she could clarify the current U.S. policy on APLs. Her response read as follows:

> Without Senator Leahy there might not have been any action. The landmine moratorium he pushed through Congress in 1993 was due to expire in 1996. When he promised to renew it with even greater restrictions, the administration launched a formal review of its landmine policy. The outcome was published in February 1996 in the first National Security Strategy in which we laid out our commitment for APL control. The strategy clearly stated that long-lasting "dumb" APLs were the problem, *not* the U.S. "smart" FASCAM mines. So our 1996 policy was to stop the use of "dumb" APLs except in Korea and for training, to destroy United States stockpiles of these mines, to retain our "smart" APLs until we can find alternative technologies, and to have DoD conduct demining programs. We would also seek to use the Conference on Disarmament process to control other nations' use of dumb landmines. This was a positive statement of global leadership by the president. Our allies totally supported this policy.[13]

When asked why the president announced new policy on 17 September 1997, Mrs. Sears had said, "The NGOs came together like never before on this issue and really carried the day. We believe that even the Canadian government was surprised at how fast and how far the Ottawa Process went. Mr. Axworthy personally believed in this cause when he announced the goal of a total landmine ban in October 1996 and took the unusual step of challenging the world community to come back to Ottawa in December of 1997 to sign the treaty. By 4 December 1997, there were 122 countries that had signed the actual treaty.[14] With only forty countries needed to ratify the treaty, it went into effect on 1 March 1999, and by now most of the remaining countries have also ratified it.

"Our position was that we needed to keep our smart mines—especially our mixed-mine FASCAM systems—in order to protect our troops. Those countries attending the Ottawa Conference did not accept our position; they wanted to completely ban the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of all APLs. We bargained aggressively in the Ottawa Process but to no avail, so we did not sign the treaty. The treaty advocates just wanted everything to happen almost immediately. They didn't fully realize that government policy takes time to develop, as do the alternative technologies needed to replace our smart APLs. Our deliberate efforts through the Conference on Disarmament may achieve success and thus we can have a greater impact on everyone. Several countries involved in the proliferation of dumb APLs didn't attend Ottawa, but they do attend the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.[15]

"The president knew he would have to publicly address his decision not to sign the *Ottawa Treaty* and was, therefore, pressured to pull the various aspects of United States landmine policy and practice together into a coherent and defensible alternative to the treaty. He received numerous inputs in coming to his decision, but the option that he chose was one that maintained United States leadership on this issue, protected our forces, and acknowledged values held by the American public. The key new elements of his 17 September 1997 policy were the commitment to develop alternatives to APL use outside of Korea by 2003 and within Korea by 2006, and the appointment of General Jones, former CJCS and an APL ban supporter, as the president's landmine advisor. He also directed a significant increase in funding for demining operations, to include research and development, expanded training, and increased assistance for mine victims. And the last step was to renew our efforts to negotiate a global APL ban at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva."

After reading the interview and taking more notes, Jimmy took Patty's advice and visited several Web sites for nongovernmental organizations, international and national special interest groups, media coverage, and governmental agencies' reports. A quick scan showed him that there were a lot of confusing facts and opinion on this policy. He noted that several of the sites included phone numbers for points of contact, so he decided to try to arrange some interviews. Although unsuccessful in getting through to the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs, he did manage to get appointments with the Human Rights Watch and the VVAF. He also tried to contact Will Davids, a reporter from the *Army Times* who had written an article on this issue that Jimmy had found in the file. Davids wasn't in, so Jimmy left a message and then headed to the State Department for his appointment at the Office of Mine Action Initiatives and Partnerships.

On arrival at the State Department, Jimmy entered and found his way to the office of Ms. Laura Beccam. He was somewhat surprised to note that she was located in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. He made a mental note to ask about reorganization, then checked in with the secretary. She informed him that Ms. Beccam would be back in a few minutes and that he was welcome to wait in her office. As he did so, he picked up an unusual comic book and began leafing through the pages.

"Hi. I'm Laura Beccam, and you must be Commander Lemkis," a tall woman of about Jimmy's age stated as she entered the room. "Well, I see the Superman and Wonder Woman comic book caught your eye. We created the first one of these for use in Bosnia, and the first lady, Hillary Clinton, introduced it in 1996. The Spanish version you're looking at is for Central America, and it was unveiled in 1998 at the UN by Kofi Annan and General Wilhelm. Our State Department coordinated with *DC Comics*, a division of Warner Brothers Entertainment, to create and publish them for the United Nations Children's Fund [UNICEF].[16] The comic books are part of our efforts to educate the public about the dangers of landmines and to

match government and private partnerships to bring support to our APL policy. The project has been a huge success."

"What a great idea," said Jimmy. "I really appreciate your meeting with me on such short notice, Ms. Beccam. As I said on the phone, I'm preparing a report on APL policy and would like to discuss the State Department's views."

"Well," she began, "as you know, our APL policy is currently under review and we are prevented from talking about specifics of the review. However, I can give you some background information and fill you in on the role State played in shaping that policy, and I can discuss some of the things that we have done since.[17] Basically, the landmine problem began during the 1970s as the superpowers fought proxy wars in places such as Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, and Vietnam. Since the Cold War many of these locations and others, including Bosnia, Kosovo, and Chechnya, have been embroiled in internal conflict and civil war. Cheap, effective, and easily obtained, APLs quickly became the weapons of choice in these conflicts, leading to their extensive and largely uncontrolled use. As a result, an estimated 70 to 110 million such mines were scattered in sixty-eight countries around the globe, causing death and serious injury to thousands of innocent civilians each year. Consider these statistics: in Cambodia one of every 236 civilians is a victim, and in Angola over 70,000 people are amputees—both are the highest proportions in the world. Our initial estimate was that 55,000 casualties were occurring yearly due to landmines. United States policy had to respond to these facts.[18]

"The State Department was the early leader among nations in advocating the control of landmines. In the late 1970s we helped craft the Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions that were eventually signed by the United States in 1982. These Protocols codified customary humanitarian law about who is a combatant and the protection of noncombatants, and they outlawed the use of indiscriminate and excessive force in war."

"I'm confused," said Jimmy. "Isn't that called international law?"

"Lots of professionals get this confused." Ms. Beccam continued. "American and European views about landmines are tied by their history and culture to customary law, and the Protocols codified them into international law. In other countries customary law does not carry the same weight, and some of those same countries did not sign the Protocols.[19] Further compounding matters, international laws such as the Protocols often clash with the law of sovereignty when dealing with conflicts internal to a state. As a result, internal conflicts in places like Afghanistan and Nicaragua provided an open market for nonsignatory countries to sell mines, and as I have already mentioned, the warring factions eagerly purchased and used them, usually in very irresponsible ways.

"During this time frame the UN and several NGOs became very involved in efforts to limit the production, export and use of APLs and to minimize their impact on noncombatants. The State Department welcomed the NGO community involvement as well as the support of politicians and popular personalities. As I am sure you recall, arms control was a major priority in the 1980s due to Cold War tensions, and the State Department's tool of choice

for these negotiations was the international Convention on Conventional Weapons [CCW]. At the 1980 CCW, the International Committee of the Red Cross pushed hard for a landmine ban. At this conference the delegates did negotiate Protocols to the Geneva Convention that included limitations on APLs, but the Protocols did not go far enough for many concerned parties. They did not call for an outright ban, did not cover internal wars, and lacked an important element of any arms control mechanism—strong verification and enforcement standards. Worse for us, despite active U.S. involvement in developing the Protocols, our Senate did not ratify them until 1995! More recently, at the First Review Conference of the CCW in 1996, U.S. delegates helped amend the Protocols to address some of the landmine control, verification, and enforcement issues. Not all of the parties to the CCW ratified the amended Protocols; even our own Senate did not do so until 1999.[20] Needless to say, these delays in U.S. ratification don't do much for our credibility when we try to influence other states during these types of negotiations.

"At the conclusion of the 1996 Review Conference, many delegations were frustrated by the lack of progress toward establishment of an outright ban on APLs. This is where Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy stepped in and announced his country's sponsorship of a conference in Ottawa dedicated to establishing a worldwide ban on APLs."

"I've already got a pretty good handle on the Ottawa Process," Jimmy stated. "But what can you tell me about the role of NGOs and Senator Leahy in shaping the current policy?"

"As I mentioned earlier, the International Red Cross was very involved in the process of establishing the landmine Protocols, and they were also supporters of the Ottawa Process. For its part, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines served a worthy cause in promoting the Ottawa Process, but I think the State Department's diplomatic efforts are more important. I don't want to minimize the NGOs' impact; after all, they were instrumental in getting over 140 countries to sign the *Ottawa Treaty*, and this has undoubtedly had a limiting effect on landmine use. However, the major producers of dumb APLs never joined the process, so although it may be popular and get good press, the treaty is less likely to have the same effects as efforts to negotiate APL reform at the CD and the CCW."

"Could you please explain the difference between the CD and the CCW?" Jimmy asked.

"Sure," replied Laura. "The actual name of the CCW is the *Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects*. Easy to understand why most folks use the shorter name or just the CCW acronym. Basically this is an international forum in Geneva for negotiating the rules of war. The Protocols to the CCW currently represent the strictest international agreement on APLs to which the United States is a party. The Conference on Disarmament, on the other hand, is an international forum for negotiating arms control issues. Simply put, agreements reached at the CCW dictate what you can and cannot do when engaged in armed conflict, whereas agreements reached at the CD dictate the types and amounts of weapons participants can produce, manufacture, stockpile, and distribute. Got it?"

"Yeah, thanks," said Jimmy. "Now I get it."

"President Clinton's decision to pursue landmine reform at the CD seemed like a logical choice at the time because it was an established forum with previous success in negotiating international controls on chemical weapons. Further, while the world's top APL-producing nations never joined the ICBL or signed the *Ottawa Treaty*, they were all party to the CD. Unfortunately, despite our repeated and concerted attempts to add APL reform to the CD agenda, these efforts have been blocked by states who were party to the *Ottawa Treaty* because they feel the issue properly belongs to that process."[21]

"Wow!" exclaimed Jimmy. "You'd think that anyone supporting a landmine ban would welcome the opportunity to address the issue at a forum that includes most of the major states who are *not* party to the *Ottawa Treaty*. Do you think they view the CD effort as redundant and unnecessary, or is this perhaps an attempt to undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts out of anger or spite for not signing the treaty?"

"I'm not sure," Laura replied. "All I know is that nothing is happening at the CD on landmine reform or anything else for that matter. However, on the good news side of things, our delegation just got back from another Review Conference for the CCW and we made good progress there. The conference resulted in an amendment to the Protocols extending their application to internal conflicts as well as international ones, and significant progress was made in negotiating controls over other unexploded ordinance such as cluster bomblets, collectively referred to as explosive remnants of war, or ERW. Our work at the CCW is one aspect of APL policy that never seems to get proper attention. We also continue to attend *Ottawa Treaty* meetings as observers to keep track of things. I think it is fair to say that U.S. leadership in humanitarian demining has deflected a lot of the criticism initially directed our way when we did not sign the *Ottawa Treaty*. In fact, some of our good NGO friends have even been overheard saying that Ottawa means nothing and that we should continue to focus on demining."

"Even so, don't NGOs like the Human Rights Watch [HRW] and the ICBL tend to overlook our contributions in demining and still beat us up on the Internet and in the press every chance they get for not signing the treaty?" asked Jimmy.

"You must remember, Jimmy, we at the State Department do state-to-state diplomacy, not popular campaigns. Those entities we deal with the most—other countries around the world and IGOs like the UN—recognize and appreciate the impact of our tremendous contributions in demining. Did you know that we have increased spending levels from $7 million in 1997 to almost $40 million in 2000 and 2001, for a total of almost $142 million?[22] Our worldwide demining and mine awareness education efforts are already bearing fruit, too. Remember I said our initial estimate was that as many as 55,000 landmine casualties were occurring yearly? Later estimates suggested a much lower, but nonetheless significant, average of about 26,000 a year through the late 1990s. For the year 2000, however, the estimated number of casualties is less than 10,000 total for both landmines and ERW! This significant reduction is believed to be the combined result of fewer mines on the ground and

better awareness among citizens of affected countries. Also, early estimates on the number of mines scattered around the globe ranged from 70 to 110 million; the estimates have since been reduced in part due to more accurate surveys, but also due to superhuman efforts being made to remove and destroy deployed mines. This data, as well as a lot of other useful landmine-related information, is regularly made available to many audiences through our series of landmine publications called *Hidden Killers*.[23]

"As for Senator Leahy's influence, although the state that he represents—Vermont—is fairly small, it is also traditionally independent, and he has managed to be a pretty effective champion of landmine reform for years. I think it is safe to say that he is the recognized leader in Congress on this issue. President Clinton personally commended him for his dedication and moral leadership of the country on this issue, and in 1998 the VVAF even established an annual humanitarian service award named in his honor. In May of 1998 National Security Advisor Sandy Berger wrote a letter to Senator Leahy on behalf of President Clinton to let him know that if suitable alternatives are not found, the United States will sign the *Ottawa Treaty* by 2006.[24] This commitment was well received by the senator as well as by NGOs and many states party to the *Ottawa Treaty*, although some considered this 'kicking the can,' since President Clinton obviously would not be in office to honor the commitment.

"You know, Senator Leahy really had more of an issue with DoD's policy than with State's, and most of his actions seemed to focus on changing DoD behavior. In pushing his *Landmine Moratorium Act* in 1993 he really caused a DoD policy crisis.[25] Interestingly, the Leahy amendment to the *Defense Authorization Act* in FY 93 requiring demining operations actually helped the State Department by promoting the type of diplomacy we favor. We negotiate with countries to perform demining missions, and then you guys over at DoD, along with some NGOs and contractors, execute them. With the continued help of the Congress, DoD, and the NGOs, we here at the State Department can further the foreign policy objectives of America through our humanitarian demining programs."

Jimmy sensed that his time with Ms. Beccam was growing short, so he quickly stated, "I know you are very busy and I don't want to take up too much more of your time. I was wondering, though, if you could fill me in on any significant changes in landmine policy or related issues, to include any organizational changes, since the APL policy was announced?"

Laura smiled and said, "No problem. There have been some organizational changes made under the new administration involving the offices charged with landmine policy, but I think the moves simply reflect a 'better business practices' approach to the organization rather than a shift away from commitment to the Clinton initiatives. The Office of Global Humanitarian Demining, established as part of the *Demining 2010* initiative, has been renamed the Office of Mine Action Initiatives and Partnerships, and as you can see, we are now located within the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Given the political and military components of the demining mission, I think this is a pretty good fit. My boss, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Lincoln Bloomfield, Jr., was just given the additional responsibility of serving as the special representative of the president and the secretary of state for mine action on 30 November 2001.[26] In case you think that giving this job to an assistant

secretary with other duties is somehow a downgrade of the position, I should point out that the first person to hold the special representative position, Karl Inderfurth, continued to perform his primary duties as assistant secretary for South Asia.

"As far as implementation issues, the only one impacting us at State seems to be the stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament. While we have not publicly stated so, our efforts there have simply not panned out. Several other issues have been dominating the agenda, to include: nuclear arms control, the *ABM Treaty*, and 'weaponization' of space, so I do not expect much to happen at the CD with respect to landmine controls. Given the progress we made at the last review conference of the CCW, we will likely focus our efforts there, although I doubt that this will lead to a stated policy change.

"Other elements of the policy seem to be facing some serious challenges from your side of the house. The early word on DoD's position going into the policy review is that someone there is pushing for abandonment of the Clinton policy commitments to eliminate the use of both dumb and smart APLs by the 2003 and 2006 deadlines. Further, I'm told that the army has already cut back on some of its funding for alternative technology research and development, and that the Pentagon is looking at further cuts. Needless to say, such changes would nearly eliminate half of the 1997 APL policy and any chances of signing the *Ottawa Treaty* by 2006, effectively breaking the commitment that President Clinton made in his letter to Senator Leahy. I've seen a number of NGO 'Action Alerts' on the Internet calling on U.S. policy makers and private citizens alike to weigh in and convince President Bush to adhere to the current policy. These actions have produced some support among retired senior military officers and in Congress. On 19 May 2001 six retired army lieutenant generals, including two who commanded at the division-level or higher in Korea, joined ranks with a retired vice admiral and a retired rear admiral in sending a letter to President Bush urging him to sign the *Ottawa Treaty*.[27] Similarly, a largely partisan group of 124 members of Congress sent the president a letter expressing concerns over DoD's proposed changes to the policy and encouraging the president to honor the current policy and work toward elimination of APLs.[28] Although only two of the letter's signatories were Republicans, the current balance of power in Congress does not allow the president to take matters such as this too lightly. Remember, the Republican majority in the House is small, Democrats are in the majority in the Senate, and 2002 is an election year."

Jimmy thanked her, left, and found a space in the lobby to type his notes. He called to confirm his NGO appointments and found out that the Human Rights Watch representatives would meet him over at the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. It was a short cab ride over to their headquarters, where he was shown in.

Jimmy couldn't help being impressed as introductions were made and he discovered that he had the senior leadership of both groups in the room. While it was very convenient for him, he wondered why they would choose to meet with him this way. He came right to the point: "I would like your views on the current U.S. landmine policy."

The room erupted with remarks from several of the veterans, including: "We don't have policy! The State Department cooked the books when its second edition of *Hidden Killers* cut the size of the landmine problem in half to show progress! DoD has been outright stonewalling, and now they're trying to get Bush to blow off Clinton's commitments to eliminate APLs! Relying on the CD process just kicks the problem down the road. We should have signed the *Ottawa Treaty*."[29]

After these initial outbursts, Bob Mueller, chairman of the VVAF, took the lead. "In the 1980s several of us were in Cambodia building prosthetics for landmine victims when the idea just suddenly came to me—what the world needed was a total landmine ban. Six NGOs came together and shaped the idea of the international campaign. Once formed, the ICBL grew to over one thousand NGOs, and we knew we had a new mechanism for affecting policy. It was a cooperative security approach, influencing countries to declare a total ban on landmines. Canada certainly helped us, but our disappointment is with the United States."[30]

A VVAF member broke in. "Bob is being too modest. He struck paydirt when he was able to get key retired generals to sign a letter endorsing the ban. Generals Schwarzkopf and Galvin signed up. Even General Powell agreed with us, but wouldn't sign. We heard General Shalikashvili actually had to call and ask generals to stop supporting our ideas, as they were counter to the administration's."[31]

"Interesting," thought Jimmy. "I wonder if this is an indication of how Secretary Powell will vote on the current policy review, now that he's at State instead of DoD."

Bob broke in, "Let me go on. We were close to getting all of the Joint Chiefs to agree on the ban until General Luck over in Korea said he had to have landmines and the tide turned. From what we could tell, landmines were not even highlighted in most of the current war plans. We heard when Walt Slocombe, then undersecretary of defense for policy, found that out he hastily had them put that into the war plans so that his technology funding wouldn't be hurt."

One of the HRW representatives broke in, "I would like to commend Senator Leahy. The Clinton administration liked to say that its interagency working groups worked this policy, but I think that without Senator Leahy there would be no U.S. policy. We feel he talked President Clinton into the policy and his office actually wrote the landmine speech the president gave to the UN in 1994."[32]

"What about the Nobel Peace Prize; how did winning it affect your efforts?" asked Jimmy.

This produced a chill in the room. Bob Mueller addressed the question. "You know, the Nobel Prize probably hurt us as much as it helped us. We received tremendous recognition, and thus it helped to power the ICBL's support of the treaty. We are proud of the fact that with some help from the Ottawa Process, we had a significant impact on the international arms industry, reducing production and use of APLs in several countries, and in some cases eliminating it altogether."

"Yeah, and now the generals over in the Pentagon are worried about us using our success to go after another class of their weapons, like blinding lasers and submunitions."

"Don't confuse the commander. Let's stick to his subject," said one member, who continued with, "Here's what you need to know about Jody Williams. We here at the VVAF hired her to be the coordinator for the ICBL. She did a good job, but she is no longer affiliated with us. In fact we were not only paying her, but we were housing and heavily financing the ICBL, which was not even a legal entity at the time. Determining who would speak for the ICBL was too difficult for some; that is why after the Nobel Prize was awarded Jody Williams left. We are no longer housing the ICBL; it has moved to Paris and, with its Peace Prize funding, has established itself as an international legal organization to allow it to continue its work. For others in the campaign the movement just lost its glamour and they went on to new issues."

Bob Mueller spoke up once again, stating, "There really is no reason for the United States not to sign the *Ottawa Treaty*. President Clinton directed DoD in May 1998 to find alternatives for their mixed-mine systems as well as all their APLs. He also decided at that time to commit the United States to signing the treaty by 2006 if alternatives cannot be developed. The truth is, suitable alternatives already exist. Our military advisor, retired army lieutenant general Robert Gard, Jr., wrote an excellent monograph that discusses seven viable alternatives to mixed antitank and antipersonnel mine systems that the DoD already has access to.[33] We know that the Clinton policy is under review by the Bush administration and that some in DoD want out of the commitments to replace APLs. We have already initiated a lobbying campaign to pressure President Bush, Congress, the State Department, and especially DoD not only to honor President Clinton's commitments, but also to sign and ratify the *Ottawa Treaty* as soon as possible. Maybe you can put in a good word as well."

Jimmy checked his watch and realized he needed to get moving if he hoped to catch the *Army Times* reporter before the end of the day. He thanked everyone for their candid discussion and excused himself, saying, "I really appreciate the information you have given me. I promise to include your concerns in my report."

He next placed a call to Will Davids of the *Army Times*. "Mr. Davids, this is Commander Jimmy Lemkis from the Defense Department. I'm working on a landmine policy report for the secretary and would like to include some media insights. I read a couple of interesting articles you wrote a few years ago about landmines and was hoping you might be willing share your thoughts about the U.S. landmine policy. Can you take a few minutes to talk to me about this over the phone?"

"Sure, Commander. Just make sure I get your phone number before we are done so I can let you return the favor sometime. What would you like to know?"

"I'd like to pick your brain about this whole landmine issue, especially anything you can tell me about goings-on within DoD during the decision-making process for the current policy. And please, call me Jimmy."

"OK, Jimmy. First of all, everyone has been defining this issue in their own terms in order to promote their own policies and programs. There has been a real dogfight going on about this for years within DoD. The army and air force both have a stake in this with their FASCAM systems. The policy issue was beginning to heat up just as General Shelton first came on board as CJCS, so the vice-chairman, air force general Ralston, was a big player while Shelton got his feet on the ground. Ralston was personally for the ban. I've spoken with a lot of Pentagon insiders about this, and some say Ralston's support was politically motivated because a lot of this was happening as he was being nominated to be the next chairman. Others accused him of not playing joint and of supporting the ban on APLs in order to gain more technology funding for the air force to pursue alternative technologies. And finally, some implied it was just the traditional army–air force rivalry. This really plays itself out in the high-stakes game of South Korea's defense. The air force strategy for the "Halt Phase" has them doing the major destruction of any North Korean attack, while Army force-planners see their ground forces at the DMZ doing the bulk of the killing.[34] In any case, it was clear that money and influence were potentially up for grabs on this one at the time the policy was established, and I suspect that this is still true to some extent."

"Okay," said Jimmy. "What about the media?"

"Well, naturally the Ottawa Process got a pretty good amount of press, but much of it was outside the United States. Naturally, when the ICBL won the Nobel Peace Prize they got tons of coverage, about the most attention they got at any one time. Some of the best media coverage involved Princess Diana. She was a champion of the ban with worldwide popularity and constant access to the media. Who can forget her widely televised and very brave act of walking along the minefields in Africa and talking with child victims of landmines? Her death on 31 August 1997 sparked an emotional upsurge in the demand for a solution in the Ottawa community. She is now generally viewed as a martyr for the cause. Queen Noor of Jordan, a human rights celebrity in her own right, took over Princess Di's role, and with the subsequent death of her husband, King Hussein, she has also become something of a 'martyr.'"[35]

"Have you seen very much current coverage?"

"Not a lot," Davids replied. "Periodically I see or read about another horrific landmine tragedy, usually involving children. But frankly, there really isn't a lot of public interest in the issue right now. Even when one of our marines lost his foot to a landmine in Afghanistan, an event that got wide coverage on television and in newspapers across the country, the focus was more on the inherent dangers associated with the war on terrorism than on the fact that his injuries were caused by the type of APLs that the Ottawa Process seeks to ban.

"I do recall a pretty good *Los Angeles Times* article that discussed the administration's policy review and reservations about the APL phase-out plan. I thought they did a pretty fair job of remaining objective and giving adequate coverage to both sides of the issue. The article included an interesting quote by Colin Powell taken from a CNN interview broadcast earlier in the week; I jotted it down for future reference. Speaking about United States

objections to some international treaties, Secretary Powell stated, 'Just because they are multilateral doesn't mean they are good.'"[36]

"More recently," Davids continued, "the *New York Times* printed an interesting piece on India's establishment of minefields along the border with Pakistan. The article highlighted the plight of the many civilians displaced from their farms and homes, and it described a number of mine-related accidents involving civilians, soldiers, cattle, and dogs.[37] While not directly related to U.S. policy, it serves to remind the world of the many problems associated with APLs. It is also worth noting that India, like the United States, is one of only fifty-one countries that have not yet signed the *Ottawa Treaty*. Others include China, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, and Syria. Did you ever think you would find the United States on the same side of an issue as those countries?"

With that as a closing comment, Jimmy thanked the reporter for his input and headed back to his office to begin compiling his report for the secretary. It looked as though he was in for a long night. "Thank goodness I hand-carried my PMP notes with me," he mumbled in the backseat of his cab. "I'm definitely gonna need them tonight!"

LANDMINE POLICY CHRONOLOGY

1982	United States signs Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), which limits landmine use through broad language and a weak enforcement mechanism. It does not call for a total ban.
1991–1992	Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and 5 NGOs form the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. Ms. Jody Williams hired as coordinator.
1992	Leahy amendment for one-year moratorium on APL exports signed into law by President Bush.
1993	Leahy moratorium amendment extended for three years; passes Senate 100–0.
April 1994	State Department's first edition report on landmines, *Hidden Killers*, sparks worldwide interest.
Sept 1994	UN General Assembly adopts President Clinton's resolution to strive for complete APL elimination.
1995	Formal negotiations begin to amend the 1980 CCW governing use of APLs.
Jan 1996	United States and fifty-one states sign Protocols amending CCW to strengthen rules governing APL use, but Protocol does not call for an outright APL ban.
Oct 1996	Canada's Foreign Minister, Mr. Axworthy, initiates the Ottawa Process.
Dec 1996	UN votes 156–0 for United States initiative to negotiate a ban on all APLs "as soon as possible."
Sep 1997	President Clinton announces United States will *not* sign *Ottawa Treaty* and outlines a new U.S. APL policy. States that were party to the *Ottawa Treaty* block the United States' efforts to add landmines to the agenda at the Conference on Disarmament.
Dec 1997	*Ottawa Treaty* signed by 122 countries.
May 1998	President Clinton states that the United States will sign the *Ottawa Treaty* by 2006 if alternative technologies can be found.
Mar 1999	The *Ottawa Treaty* enters into force.
Sep 1999	Conference on Disarmament ends with no progress on landmines or other issues.
May 2001	Eight retired U.S. general/flag officers write letter to President Bush urging him to sign the *Ottawa Treaty*.
Aug 2001	Bush administration signals reservations about U.S. APL policy and initiates a review
Nov 2001	Army cancels funding of program to develop alternatives for "dumb" APLs; Pentagon proposes cancellation of program to develop alternatives for FASCAM mixed-mine systems.
Dec 2001	124 members of Congress write letter to President Bush urging him to support APL ban.

Notes

1. Colonels Jack Warden and Patty Long are fictitious characters from a 1999 case study titled "The Landmines," written by Colonel Edward W. Sullivan of the Naval War College Faculty and published in *Case Studies in Policy Making & Implementation*, 5th edition, Naval War College Press. E-mail messages and interview transcripts from Colonel Warden's working file, as well as dialogue with other characters in this case study, unless otherwise noted and cited, represent paraphrased material from interviews Colonel Sullivan conducted in July 1998.
2. President Clinton, 17 September 1997, transcript of remarks given upon announcing landmine policy, White House, Washington, D.C., Office of the Press Secretary, daily press releases, 17 September 1997. Several Presidential Decision Directives cover the actual policy; the most critical one for DOD and arms control is PDD 64.
3. U.S. State Department, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Program," issued 20 May 1998, available from http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0798/ijpe/pj38lmfx.htm (accessed 3 January 2002).
4. Mark Hizney, *Background Paper on APL Control Measure* (Alexandria, Virginia: Defense Special Weapons Agency, report prepared under contract DSWA001-96-G-0061), May 1998, 1.
5. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Temptative Statutes to Register ICBL in France," available from http://www.icbl.com (accessed: 27 May 1998).
6. Ms. Jodie Williams, speech presented at St. George's School, Middletown, Rhode Island, 23 October 1998, author's notes.
7. Stuart Maslen and Peter Herby, "An International Ban on Anti-personnel Mines; History and Negotiation of the '*Ottawa Treaty*,'" *International Review of the Red Cross*, no. 325, 31 December 1998, 693–713.
8. Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, "Lloyd Axworthy Receives Senator Patrick J. Leahy Humanitarian Award," 1 December 2000, available at http://vvaf.org/media/pr_120100.shtml (accessed 10 January 2002).
9. Unless otherwise indicated and cited, information regarding the internal DOD perspectives represents paraphrased material based on interviews with officers in the Pentagon while conducting research for this case study during July 1998.
10. Human Rights Watch Press Release, "U.S.: Pentagon Mine Policy Rollback," 21 November 2001, available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/11/usmines1121.htm (accessed 2 January 2002).
11. Human Rights Watch Press Release, "U.S.: Pentagon Mine Policy Rollback" (Washington, D.C., 21 November 2001), available on http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/11/usmines1121.htm (accessed 2 January 2002).
12, Ms. Jodie Williams, speech presented at St. George's School, Middletown, Rhode Island, 23 October 1998, author's notes.
13. U.S. Department of State, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Government Humanitarian Demining Program," *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* (Washington, D.C.: U.S.IA, July 1998; issued by DoS 20 May 1998), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0798/ijpe/pj38lmfx.htm (accessed 3 January 2002).
14. Anthony Depalma, "As U.S. Looks On, 122 Nations Agree to Landmine Ban," *New York Times*, 4 December 1997, 1–2.
15. Canadian Press, "Russia Sees Continuing Need for Land-Mines," *Ottawa Citizen,* 30 May 1998, as published in the *Early Bird,* 2 June 1999, 8. Interestingly enough, even with the animosity between the ICBL and the U.S. government, Ms. Williams and a representative of the Canadian government went to Russia to attempt to have that government renounce the use of landmines and join the international community's traditonal venues for their control.
16. DC Comics, "The Hidden Killers," New York, 1998. This comic book has been translated into languages for use in Central America and Bosnia. Copies of the English and Spanish versions are in the author's possession.
17. Unless otherwise indicated and cited, the dialogue with Ms. Beccam represents paraphrasing of material obtained in

interviews and correspondence with State Department personnel by the author in January 2002 and by Colonel Sullivan in July 1998 during research for the original version of this case study.

18. U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis* (Washington D.C., September 1998), available at http://www.state.gov/global/arms/rpt-9809 (accessed 26 October 1998).
19. Kofi Annan, "At Last, a Court to Deter Despots and Defend Victims," *International Herald Tribune,* 28 July 1998, as published in the *Early Bird,* 28 July 1998, 11. Mr. Annan makes the point through relating a quote from the famous Roman lawyer and scholar Cicero, who declared that "in the midst of war, law stands mute." Another secretary general of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, makes much the same argument in his September 1994 article in *Foreign Affairs.* An effective treatment of many of the legal aspects is covered in chapter 6 of the book *The Technology of Killing: A Military and Political History of Antipersonnel Weapons,* ISBN 1 85649 357.
20. Ambassador Michael J. Matheson, *International Law and Antipersonnel Land Mines,* available at http://137.52 (accessed 24 March 1999). On 24 May 1999 the Senate finally ratified the Amended Protocols, and President Clinton took this opportunity to again recognize Senator Leahy and others. White House, Washington D.C., Office of the Press Secretary. An executive summary and the text of the CCW can be found at http://acq.osd.mil/treaties.
21. Conference on Disarmament, *Disarmament Diplomacy*, no. 59, July–August 2001, available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd59/59cd.htm (accessed 3 January 2002).
22. U.S. Department of State, "Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) Funds for Humanitarian Demining Programs," Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Fact Sheet, 2 January 2002, available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2002/index.cfm?docid=7010 (accessed 10 January 2002).
23. U.S. Department of State, *Hidden Killers 2001—The World's Landmine Problem* (Washington, D.C., undated), available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/2001/index.cfm?docid=6961 (accessed 10 January 2002).
24. U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, "Facts: Anti-Landmine Chronology," available on Senator Leahy's Web site at http://leahy.senate.gov/text/issues/landmines/facts.html (accessed 3 January 2002).
25. Mr. Tim Reiser, congressional staffer for Senator Leahy, interviewed by Colonel Ed Sullivan, Middletown, Rhode Island, July 1998, author's notes. Mr. Reiser offers that Senator Leahy was a critical influence in shaping Mr. Clinton's perspective on landmines, and that he also has had a continuing impact on DOD, where he feels they have been slow to respond to the landmine crisis. Similarly he also feels Senator Leahy impacted Mr. Berger's policy direction on the issue. Evidence of this is the exchange of letters between the two that shows the senator's influence in having President Clinton publicly state that the United States is in favor now of signing the *Ottawa Treaty*.
26. U.S. Department of State Press Release, "New U.S. Landmines Official Appointed" (M2 Communications, 10 December 2001), available at http://www.banminesusa.org/news/977.htm (accessed 3 January 2002).
27. Ban Mines U.S.A, "Action Alert! Make the Military Argument!" available at http://www.banminesusa.org/urg_act/990_generalsltr.html (accessed 2 January 2002).
28. Ban Mines U.S.A, "Defense Department Asks President Bush to Abandon Efforts to Ban Landmines; 124 Members of Congress Send Letter to the President Urging Him to Give Up the Weapon!" available at http://www.banminesusa.org/news/975_letter.htm (accessed 2 January 2002).
29. Unless otherwise indicated and cited, information regarding the NGOs represents paraphrased material based on interviews conducted by Colonel Sullivan during research for his case study during July 1998.
30. Mr. Robert Mueller, interviewed by Colonel Sullivan, VVAF Headquarters, Washington D.C., July 1998, Colonel Sullivan's notes.
31. Unless otherwise indicated and cited, information regarding the NGOs represents paraphrased material based on interviews

conducted by Colonel Sullivan during research for his case study during July 1998.

32. Mr. Steve Goose, interviewed by Colonel Sullivan, Human Rights Watch Headquarters, Washington D.C., July 1998, Colonel Sullivan's notes.

33. Lieutenant General Robert G. Gard, Jr., (USA, ret.), *Alternatives to Antipersonnel Landmines* (VVAF Publications, Spring 1999), available at http://vvaf.org/gard.shtml (accessed 10 January 2002).

34. Unless otherwise indicated and cited, information regarding the internal DOD perspectives represents paraphrased material based on interviews by Colonel Sullivan with officers in the Pentagon while conducting research for this case study during July 1998.

35. G. E. Willis, "Defense vs. Offense Landmines," *Army Times,* 15 June 1998, 12. Underestimating the impact of Princess Di for the ICBL would miss one of the critical cognitive and emotional impacts to this case. The information on Queen Noor comes from a series of e-mails Colonel Sullivan had with her press secretary's office September 1998.

36. Norman Kempster, "U.S. Cools Toward Land Mine Phase-Out Plan," *Los Angeles Times*, 3 August 2001, available at http://www.banminesusa.org/news/988_administration.html (accessed 2 January 2002).

37. Somini Sengupta, "India's Land Mines, A Bitter Harvest for Farmers," *New York Times*, 4 January 2002, as published in the *Early Bird*, 4 January 2002.

Showdown Over Iraq

CHARLES P. NEIMEYER

Throughout most of the 1990s, U.S. policy makers have struggled with what to do with Saddam Hussein and Iraq. Repeatedly, Saddam had been able to focus international attention on his goal of getting UN sanctions lifted against his country. These sanctions—imposed by the UN and ostensibly still in force—place a stranglehold on Iraq's ability to sell oil on the world market. As recently as December 1999, in response to continued sanctions, Saddam embargoed the little oil he was legally allowed to sell and spiked the price per barrel of oil by over a dollar. Time and again Saddam would heighten world and regional tension by threatening to flaunt UN sanctions. As a result, many policy makers in the United States have felt themselves on a yo-yo string regarding Middle Eastern international relations and they have had little control over how and when Saddam would again choose to upset the stability of this critical and strategic region. This case study, prepared by Dr. Charlie Neimeyer, who was a faculty member of the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College from 1997–2002, is being used as part of the school's curriculum.

To Colonel Steve Martindale, U.S. Marine Corps, working the political-military desk at the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, Saddam's frequent threats in the Middle East were becoming "old hat." This was Steve's third and final year on the job. He was looking forward to returning to the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) as a regimental commander. He clearly recalled his first "crisis" initiated by Saddam in March 1998 that eventually turned into a nonevent. Back then and perhaps taking a page from North Korea, Saddam had developed a sinister new strategy in dealing with the United States. Then, instead of threatening stability in the Middle East with conventional forces, Saddam had decided to continue to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

During March 1998, the immediate provocation was Saddam's decision to deport six Americans who had been part of a UN arms-inspection team. The inspectors, according to their chief, Richard Butler, an Australian diplomat, seemed to be closing in on Saddam's hidden cache of ingredients and equipment to build WMD. Moreover, the Americans on the team were not allowed to fly home but were forced to leave the country in a humiliating ten-hour trek across the desert to neighboring Jordan. As a result the rest of the UN inspection team also withdrew from Iraq. For America, the situation in Iraq was intolerable.

Saddam's expulsion of the UN inspectors in March 1998 had been a very real threat to world stability. In many ways, the situation was similar to the 1994 Operation Vigilant Warrior—when the United States returned over thirty-five thousand troops to the Gulf to once again deter Saddam. However, in March 1998, the president chose to forgo a military

solution to his problems and ultimately went with a diplomatic solution proffered by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. However, just eight months later, over basically the same issues, the president chose to use military force and bombed Iraq in Operation Desert Fox. But as Colonel Martindale pondered this thought his phone suddenly rang. It was the CINC, General Tony Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps.

"Steve, I want you to analyze the decision-making processes that went into how and why we acted the way we did concerning the nearly annual crises precipitated by Saddam for the past several years. We need to know more about how and why we decide on the courses of action that the president eventually decides to take. Both the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and I agree that Saddam has the potential to heighten tensions again anywhere and at any time of his choosing. I will need your work as soon as possible." The general abruptly hung up. Steve and the whole CENTCOM military policy staff were always leaping from one crisis to the next. Why should this task be any different, he thought.

Steve immediately recognized that he would have to consider all the events that had taken place between the United States and Iraq since 1998 in order to give General Zinni an adequate answer. Obviously, there are a number of decisions and inputs that he would have to consider. Luckily for Steve, Captain Barbara Burns, U.S. Navy, and a former Naval War College seminar mate, was over at the State Department. She was a renowned Middle East expert and knew all the nuances of the Iraqi situation. He decided to phone her: "Barb, I need your help with information on our seemingly perpetual crises with Iraq. I am concerned about how the national security decision-making process actually works in the decisions we have made since the March 1998 crisis over Saddam's ejection of UN weapons inspectors. Any help here?"

"Here is what I know," stated Barb. "In March 1998, Saddam had tried to turn up the pressure on the United States and the precarious international coalition that was still in the business of keeping up UN economic sanctions on Iraq since the end of the Gulf War. As the crisis unfolded beginning in November 1997, the scenario seemed all too familiar. Everyone thought Saddam would follow his usual pattern of huffing and puffing and threatening dire consequences if the UN sanctions were not lifted. In a similarly practiced fashion, the United States would respond by sending navy carriers, marines, army ground troops, and perhaps a few air force fighter wings to demonstrate our resolve. After much rhetoric on both sides, Saddam would find the UN coalition sound, the resolve of the United States strong, and back down at the last minute rather than risk the possibility of further military humiliation. And Americans at home could finally return to their regularly scheduled programs. Except that is not the way things went this time. As Hosni Mubarak of Egypt was fond of telling my boss, Madeleine Albright, this is not 1991!

"The whole calculus of Middle Eastern politics had changed since the end of Operation Desert Storm. Israel then had a very aggressive government led by Benjamin Netanyahu. The mid-east peace process started by the assassinated former leader of Israel, Yitzak Rabin, and Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, was on the verge of collapse and the United States seemed powerless to do anything about it. Saddam sensed that the United States was

not only failing there but losing its influence with the moderate Arab states in the Gulf as well. I don't need to tell you how tough it was to get the Gulf Cooperative Council [GCC] to let our forces back into the region when Saddam last threatened war during Operation Vigilant Warrior in 1994.

"Moreover, Saddam's WMD threat was real. Richard Butler had hard evidence that Saddam possessed a number of mobile missile launchers with chemical or biological warheads. This spooked everybody in the gulf. Early on in the crisis, Israel signaled that this time—unlike 1991—they would not receive an attack without some sort of retaliation. Can you imagine what would happen if Saddam attacked Tel Aviv with a WMD warhead? Moreover, in my opinion, Saddam's threat caused our traditional GCC allies to waver. The Saudis could not allow themselves to be seen as a lackey of the Great Satan (the United States) and have—at least for the past couple of years—kept the United States at arm's length. Further, the height of the crisis could not have come at a worse time. It was Ramadan, and the Saudis would be very hesitant to admit additional nonbelievers into the holy kingdom. Other GCC allies seemed to pile on. Oman announced—in the midst of negotiating a ten-year agreement for access to prepositioned equipment—that they might limit U.S. military presence in their country. Qatar announced that the United States could stage strikes from their country and then promptly rescinded the offer. When the United States launched a limited Tomahawk attack against Iraq in September 1996 in support of the Kurds, nearly the entire GCC roundly condemned us for this action. In an especially embarrassing moment for the United States, the GCC also boycotted a regional economic summit called by Secretary Albright. Even a staunch ally like Turkey was considering the ramifications of allowing the United States basing rights to stage strikes from their territory. For a while, it seemed our only allies in the crisis were the British and the Kuwaitis. On the bright side, Saddam's reacquisition of a limited WMD capability may have helped produce the first thaws in United States–Iranian relations in nearly twenty years.

"We were not only having problems in the Middle East. France, Russia, and China openly criticized the activities of Richard Butler in the UN Security Council. While no one on the Security Council wanted to see Saddam with a viable WMD program, they tended to splinter on the tactics used to keep him from achieving his objectives. Early on in the crisis, Russia, led by its pro-Iraq foreign minister, Yevgeny Primakov, clearly stated that they opposed using force under almost any circumstances against Iraq. The Russians quickly moved to establish a leadership role in the crisis. During November 1997, during the initial flare-up in the crisis, we appeared as if we surrendered all diplomatic initiative to the Russians and Primakov. One problem was that Iraq has long been Russia's traditional ally in the Persian Gulf. Moreover, the Russians had substantial investments there and were desperately trying to get their own economy in order. Even the French had a substantial stake in seeing Iraq spared from bombing. Their major oil company, *Total*, had recently joined in a multibillion-dollar investment with Malaysia and Russia in an Iranian oil venture, much to the ire of our government. They were worried that if war erupted again in the Gulf, it would affect their access and investment. In other respects in this crisis, we were dependent on the French (and the Russians) for information and support and had to endure their opposition

in the UN, which one pundit likened to the diplomatic equivalent of being 'nibbled to death by ducks.'

"In fact, businessmen all over the globe have already invested in Iraq in anticipation of the day when sanctions are lifted. To give you an idea about how far business is taking precedence these days, it was recently revealed that the Czech Republic in conjunction with Bulgaria was in the process of selling radar units to Iraq that could allegedly detect stealth aircraft. Yes, that is the same Czech Republic that was simultaneously asking to be considered for NATO enlargement!

"Finally, we need to mention the role the UN played in all this and especially that of Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general (who at the time of the crisis had just assumed his office). To be honest there are few public officials easier to blame than a UN secretary-general. Just ask Boutros Boutros-Ghali. He was essentially marginalized by Saddam during the 1991 crisis and became an easy target for peacekeeping missions that failed after some catastrophic decisions had been made by sovereign states over which he had little or no control. Annan's ascension to office was seen as a great improvement, especially by the United States. Secretary Albright was instrumental in gathering support for Annan's election and seeing to it that Boutros-Ghali did not gain another term. Stephen Schlesinger of the World Policy Institute noted that Annan's executive leadership style was that of an accommodator whereas Boutros-Ghali was a man who kept everybody on edge. The real question was whether Annan would hang tough against Saddam. He had already signaled his willingness to allow Iraq to sell more oil for food in earlier pronouncements. Thus, during the last weekend leading up to the end of the crisis, it seemed that he was the last best hope for a diplomatic solution to the crisis since the president and his national security team all had signaled that anything less than full compliance with the UN sanctions would not be acceptable. We were hoping that Annan's visit was the fig leaf Saddam needed to back down and save face."

"Thanks, Barb, you have given me a lot to work with."

Steve now headed up Constitution Avenue to the Rayburn Congressional Office Building to meet with an old contact, Colonel Buck Buckingham, U.S. Air Force. Colonel Buckingham had been assigned to the Air Staff's Legislative Liaison office for the past several years, so Steve figured he would have a lot of inside scoop.

"Steve, I have a lot of things for you to consider," stated Buck. "For starters, the American public is not all that well educated on the nuances of our policy toward weapons of mass destruction. To them, it sounds like a very boring college course, and to tell you the truth, we did not do a very good job of educating them on this matter. To make matters worse, the opinion polls were initially nearly split over whether we should use force to make Saddam comply with the UN sanctions at 49 percent for using force to 41 percent for using less forceful options. However, before you say the public just doesn't care, we saw the polls substantially change if Iraq shoots at an American surveillance plane—65 percent favor retaliation; if Saddam hits a United States aircraft, a whopping 82 percent would want to strike back. But only 18 percent of Americans favored limited air strikes against Saddam. More—

36 percent—preferred all-out air and military action to remove Saddam from power, but 39 percent still thought diplomacy remained our best option for solving the crisis."

"What role did you see the media playing in all this?" asked Steve.

Buck laughed. "The media was all over this thing. For months they were dragging out stock footage from the Gulf War and especially focused on the casualties caused by our bombing campaign. Other commentators were again making references to Saddam as a Hitler figure and that any accord with him would be tantamount to a Munich-like settlement on our part. In response to the American threat of bombing, Saddam announced at a major rally in downtown Baghdad that Iraqi women and children had volunteered to be human shields for high-value targets. This obviously meant Saddam was going to use the media to his greatest advantage and play up to the well-known American aversion to collateral damage.

"In fact, the media, at times, seemed to be the principal battleground and conduit of information for both sides. Remember the now infamous Town Hall meeting at Ohio State University? The intention of the administration was to show Saddam that America was willing to debate the crisis but was generally united over the requirement for him to comply with the UN sanctions. Well, it really backfired and was a public relations disaster of the first order. Instead of communicating our resolve, there were celebrations in Baghdad that evening over the supposed wisdom of the American people who publicly and loudly objected to the president's policy. They played and replayed on Iraqi television Madeleine Albright's icy confrontation with obnoxious students. It went so bad, that in a column the next day, conservative George Will referred to the president as a political salesman intent on selling an idea to America instead of creating and leading United States foreign policy. Meanwhile the president was being buffeted with his own domestic scandals involving sexual impropriety in the White House. The most curious thing was that his job approval rating and rating on how he was handling the Iraq crisis both stood at a solid 60 percent—despite the disastrous town meeting. One possible reason for the president's continued popularity is that the United States' economy seemed to boom along no matter what was happening in the world.

"It was also interesting to note that national security officials from past flare-ups with Iraq were solidly in favor of an attack if talks with Iraq failed. Former secretary of state James Baker—one of the principal architects of victory during Desert Storm—was on record as saying that the only thing Saddam understands is force. Former CIA director Robert Gates called for a powerful air and missile campaign against the elite Iraqi Republican Guard if talks did not work. Richard Haass, who was a top National Security Council [NSC] advisor on the region during the Gulf War thought that Clinton's rather mild responses to past flare-ups had been ineffective and that only a massive strike would suffice. Former Clinton CIA director R. James Woolsey publicly referred to Saddam as a 'professional killer.'

"You know, I think that their opinions may have had some weight with the president's advisors partly because these people had been so successful against Saddam in the past. They almost all roundly condemned any campaign of gradualism. Former president

George Bush, however, was a notable exception—perhaps remembering his own time as president—and stated that he thought the president's policy was about right.

"On the other hand, we were worried, especially after the reaction we got from the Arab world following our 1996 Tomahawk attack in support of the Kurds, that any military option would be seen by Arab-Americans as heavy-handed or bullying. Thus, national security advisor Sandy Berger met with James Zogby, president of the Arab-American Institute. Mr. Zogby came away saying that he felt the government was not rushing into anything in the crisis.

"Here on the Hill there seemed to be little initial criticism coming from anyone. Congress seemed to rally around the president. Republican Senator Robert Smith of New Hampshire, a frequent critic of Clinton's foreign policy, told the president that he did not envy the position Clinton was in but that he would have the support of Congress when he needed it. Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts—normally one who is not a military hawk—called for a strong military attack in response to Saddam's 'horrific objective' of stockpiling of WMD. However, like the former Bush administration officials, Kerry also urged a more aggressive campaign than the administration was at least considering in the media.

"Republican Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and even liberal pundit and former close Clinton advisor George Stephanopoulos wanted Saddam 'taken out.' Lott emphatically stated that 'we cannot let stand what [Iraq] is doing.' The administration team of Berger, Cohen, and chairman of the JCS, General Hugh Shelton, privately met with seventy-five senators to allay fears that the limited air campaign would not achieve the objective of substantially taking down Saddam's WMD capability. Some openly groused that the air campaign amounted to mere 'pinprick' attacks. Yet, in a rather perverse twist of timing, House Republicans voted to withhold payment of an $819 million debt to the UN. So while UN Representative Bill Richardson was trying to drum up international support at the UN, the Congress was back at home pulling the rug out from under him.

"The real problem for the administration was to convince Congress to not be overly optimistic about what air strikes could accomplish in Iraq and to reassure squeamish congressmen that no United States ground troops would be used in any potential attack. To be honest, I don't think we were ever totally able to accomplish this objective. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen was directly asked by several congressmen whether air strikes could accomplish the mission without ground troops. The secretary responded that he thought that we could. However, more than a few congressmen left the meeting privately voicing that they thought Mr. Cohen was being overly optimistic. It was interesting to note that Congressman John Murtha of Pennsylvania and a ranking Democrat on the House Appropriations subcommittee that controls military spending did not believe the secretary of defense. 'You got to put people on the ground if you really want to solve the problem.' Others were concerned that our Saudi allies were not as helpful as they had been in the past and wondered why. But for once, Congress did not seem caught up in its usual hawk vs. dove debate about whether or not force was an appropriate tool of American foreign policy.

"Meanwhile the congressionally mandated National Defense Panel [NDP] was arguing that the United States military was woefully unprepared for chemical or biological warfare. Moreover, others in Congress such as Republican representative Christopher Shays of Connecticut were highly critical of the Defense Department's handling of illnesses related to United States military personnel participation in the Gulf War. Evidence was being compiled that demonstrated governmental bungling in determining whether or not United States troops had been exposed to chemical munitions during the war and Shays recommended that the Defense Department be stripped of its oversight authority on this issue due to a lack of public trust.

"Thanks Buck."

Steve now had to hustle across the river before rush hour and get in to see his old friend on the Joint Staff, Colonel Jim Dana, U.S. Army. Jim got right down to business.

"Steve, you have to remember that this crisis occurred over a period of months. It was not like we here at DoD, State, or even you guys at the NSC needed to react all that rapidly. Most of us at the Pentagon were very wary about White House expectations of what an air strike could accomplish. Moreover, we certainly are not the same force we were in 1991. To make matters worse, we were not sure of basing rights almost right up to the moment where we could have gotten the 'go' order. Thus we had to heavily rely on only two carriers in the Gulf for the bulk of our strike requirements and even that stretched our assets to the limits. Deploying—at one point—three carriers to the Gulf caused the navy tremendous organizational stress. What we needed to give the president were options as to what we could or could not do with the force we had—and this is essentially what we did. Our problem was we were never absolutely sure we were going to be able to get at all of Saddam's WMD stockpile. While the highly touted Tomahawk missile was available, it was not very effective at getting at deep underground WMD stockpiles. There were other discussions going on at the time inside the Beltway that the United States military was more suited to fighting Cold War–era major regional contingencies and not the asymmetric warfare that Saddam seemed to be favoring. It should be obvious to all that Saddam will never again attempt to conventionally confront the United States. He has found new ways now.

"In this crisis, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen really stepped up to the plate. You may remember during a crucial Principals Committee meeting at the NSC, he brought along his now famous five-pound bag of Domino sugar and his photo of a dead Iraqi woman and child that he termed 'Madonna and child, Saddam style.' With all the major policy players in the room including Secretary of State Albright, he brought the entire audience to total silence by informing everyone that this one bag of sugar represented the amount of biotoxin necessary to kill most of Washington. With the permission of the president, the secretary took his show on the road and did the same thing on a Sunday morning news show with television reporters Sam Donaldson and Cokie Roberts. The bag of sugar was so effective and made the reporters so uncomfortable that Ms. Roberts begged him to take it away. Secretary Cohen was also very effective on the air arguing that we could accomplish our objective of forcing Saddam to comply with UN sanctions without using ground troops.

"The real wild card in this whole process was the newly appointed chairman of the JCS, General Hugh Shelton. It was widely known that he was not the president's first choice for chairman. Moreover, General Shelton was concerned that the White House was starting to see air power as a panacea for all its problems with Iraq. He had just finished reading a book titled *Dereliction of Duty* about how the military failed to stand up to its civilian leadership in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations during the Vietnam conflict. One wonders if he saw any analogies to his situation with Iraq. There were complaints that civilians were casually picking targets and telling the military how to do their jobs. Some White House mavens even went so far as to compare the situation in Iraq with the Cuban Missile Crisis. We in the Pentagon wanted clear objectives and missions. However, the president's NSC staff wanted to target known and suspected weapons facilities, air defenses, command bunkers, and Saddam's presidential palaces suspected of hiding WMD material. The target package seemed to change on almost an hourly basis. That is not to say we were blameless here. One senior general anonymously leaked to the media that he thought the White House was turning military options into purely political ones. To make matters worse, most of our military defense team in the region was new like the chairman. Air Force General Michael Ryan, chief of staff of the service most likely to see a large portion of the action, was brand new to his job. Even your boss, Marine General Tony Zinni, commander in chief, U.S. Central Command [CINCCENT], was new at the time. Secretary Cohen had only been in his job since February 1997.

"We here at the Pentagon also suspected that Madeleine Albright and Secretary Cohen were not totally clear on what they wanted the air strikes to accomplish. While Secretary Cohen was quoted as stating we would hold out 'no carrots' for Saddam to grab once we decided to bomb, Secretary Albright quickly countered that we would perhaps hold out a 'little carrot.'

"Nonetheless, Secretary Cohen strongly pressed ahead with military options for the president despite the disgruntled rumblings from some of the Joint Chiefs. Our options included a variety of air strike packages—which would not be as extensive as Desert Storm—but certainly not pinpricks either, or further economic measures. However, at no time was the option of employing ground troops ever seriously considered being sent to the president. We all felt the president was already very much against it. In an eerie analogy with the Cuban Missile Crisis, Secretary Cohen downplayed the ability of the Iraqis to shoot down high-altitude U-2 reconnaissance flights. The secretary's political savvy, his demonstrated expertise with WMD, and his masterful performances in front of the media seemed to be paying off.

"This is not to say we were not without our moments of uncertainty. We were very concerned about Kofi Annan's last-minute mission to Baghdad. However, Secretary Albright ensured that there were no glitches in our plan to confront Saddam by briefing Mr. Annan on what we would or would not accept as a response to his last-minute visit. She called them 'red lines' and they were extremely effective in making Kofi Annan a de facto member of

Clinton's policy team. The UN Security Council, with France, Russia, and China in opposition, was certainly not going to give him any written instructions.

"Fortunately, Mr. Annan came back with an agreement that everyone could live with and the president ordered us to stand down. The inspectors would be given free access to all suspected WMD sites. No one here at the Pentagon, CENTCOM, or probably anywhere else in the world thinks this thing is over by a long shot. Most suspect that problems will continue with Iraq for as long as Saddam is around."

"So why did we decide to bomb Iraq just eight months later in Operation Desert Fox?" asked Steve.

"That is a good question," responded Jim. "Let me tell you why I think things changed. First, you have to remember that Saddam cagily never personally signed the Annan agreement in March 1998. Moreover, things were happening in the American domestic political scene that might have given Saddam the idea that the time was right to get rid of the sanctions once and for all. Recall that by December 1998, we were on the very precipice of a historic impeachment vote by the U.S. House of Representatives. In the middle of all this, the United States and Great Britain launched three waves of missiles and bombs at military targets throughout Iraq in response to Saddam Hussein's decision to—once again—remove UN weapons inspectors from Iraq. Also recall that much of the December crisis seemed to hinge on a report about the state of the UN mission in Iraq from its chief weapons inspector, Richard Butler—a diplomat from Australia. In the past, when the United States used force against Saddam's frequent violations of UN sanctions, we paid a heavy price with countries like France, Russia, and the GCC. These states argued that America inappropriately violated the sovereignty of Iraq. Moreover, many of our moderate Arab partners in the region felt threatened by the United States' propensity to use military force seemingly at will. These complaints must have had some effect on the president's decision—just one month before Desert Fox—to call off a planned raid against Iraq. The problem was that the president had repeatedly stated that he wanted complete Iraqi compliance with international agreements or he would use force to get them to comply. This position seemed to tie his hands regarding his options of response. Now, not to respond might look weak or that we were tacitly agreeing to the lifting of sanctions. To make matters worse, we could not look to Kofi Annan getting any sort of agreement out of Baghdad since his own man—Richard Butler—was claiming that Iraq was not allowing his inspectors adequate access to suspected weapons sites.

"As usual, much about international politics is about timing. By December 1998, the political atmosphere inside the Beltway in Washington had become superheated. The Monica Lewinsky scandal and the resulting impeachment trial were nearing their climax in the U.S. House of Representatives just a few days after the president initiated Desert Fox. As the decision was made to unleash the most intense air bombardment the United States had conducted in the region since Desert Storm, the president and his advisors had to consider three basic questions. Would the United States public consider the attack justified? Was there sufficient international support for a U.S.–led strike? And finally, was there support

for a strike from nations in the Arab world? To further complicate matters, an American movie called *Wag the Dog* had been released just prior to all the trouble with Iraq. The film was about a fictional American president who manufactured an international crisis in order to deflect attention from a domestic political scandal. President Clinton's situation in December 1998 was too eerily similar in many details for Washington's political pundit class to leave alone. If Clinton bombed Iraq, critics would say he did it simply to disrupt Congress' impeachment drive. If he did not bomb, he was certain to be denounced as weak and indecisive in the face of Saddam Hussein's continued provocations, just as Clinton had been criticized [one month earlier] when he canceled strikes at the eleventh hour."[1]

"Further, as you may recall from other previous flaps with Iraq, Saddam had a track record of backing down at the last minute in the face of U.S. threats of military force. However, this time, in December of 1998, Saddam stated that he was going to remove the UN inspectors for good. With a crisis brewing with Milosevic over Kosovo, it was not a good time for the United States to be appearing to cave to international bullies. Internationally, the United States was also in a slightly better position than it was in March 1998. Just a month before Desert Fox, in a joint statement signed by eight Arab nations, including Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, they actually criticized Saddam Hussein for his behavior toward the UN mission—something they did not do in March 1998. The president 'left it to British Prime Minister Tony Blair to make the first formal announcement of the Iraq strike.'[2] However, there were many in the United States—especially the Sunday morning pundits—who were highly suspicious of the president's timing concerning the strikes. And don't forget the domestic and international political criticism the president took in August 1998 over our cruise missile response to Osama Bin Laden's terrorist attacks against our embassies in Africa.

"During the December crisis, there was none of the usual war-drum beating by the president or his advisors. I clearly remember back in February, Secretary Cohen's now-famous sack of Domino sugar, which he said represented the amount of anthrax it would take for Saddam to kill all of Washington, D.C. This time there were none of the Sunday morning talk show theatrics. Having failed at taking the offensive against Iraq over this issue, I believe the administration purposely avoided tough rhetoric to avoid the trigger-happy label that had come with past strikes. Instead, our diplomats worked to get 'quiet assents from Paris to Riyadh for strikes.'[3] That may have been one reason why we agreed to the Annan compromise with Saddam in March 1998. This time, Saddam's flouting of the Annan deal left even the Russians and the French—who opposed military force in February and November 1998—with little choice but to condemn Saddam's December action.

"While France, Russia, and China loudly complained about the 'American' attack on Iraq, it was the Russians, in particular, who seemed to be especially furious at Saddam's latest move, since they believed they had been, up to this point, very close to getting UN sanctions lifted. Nonetheless, following the attack, the Russian government recalled its ambassador to Washington and reportedly canceled plans to approve the START II nuclear

arms reduction treaty, a move that was seen at the time as likely to derail plans by Clinton to seek Senate approval of arms control agreements.[4]

"As to why the United States may have acted without consulting its allies, national security advisor, Sandy Berger said that not garnering overt allied support was a 'conscious decision' made by the administration. Berger noted that putting together a military coalition was 'too time consuming a process. You have to fit in the extra plane so that it interfaces with the rest of the operation. It takes weeks to do that.'[5] It has been long axiomatic that working with allies is very difficult. The only thing worse is not having them at all.

"You know Steve, you might want to visit a contact of mine at the National Security Council. His name is Captain Douglas Yastremsky, U.S. Navy. He was well aware of everything that was going on at that time. I will set up an appointment for you."

"Thanks, Jim. I appreciate that."

Steve arrived at the Old Executive Office Building (OEOB) just across the street from the West Wing of the White House. Doug was prepared when he arrived.

"Here is what I have on what was happening during those momentous times at the end of 1998. I don't have to tell you that things were really jumping around here then. With the impeachment trial and the bitter partisan politics in Washington those days, I was very surprised the president could even concentrate on national security affairs at all. To make matters worse, the Butler report was due at that about the same time the House was voting to impeach a president for only the second time in our history. Remember too that the 1998 November elections went decidedly against the Republicans—especially in the politically fractious House. Further, the president's political archenemy, Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House, had suddenly resigned his seat and would be out of power by 1 January 1999. After the New Year, the Republican majority in the House would fall to just five members being temporarily leaderless and confounded by the president's continued high popularity rating despite the scandal could have been part of the reason why the Republicans were so adamant about pressing ahead with the impeachment process and why they were so critical when the president decided to bomb Iraq.

"Many lawmakers, including a few Democrats, decried the president's decision to bomb Iraq while in the process of being impeached. Representative Gerald Solomon (R-NY) stated that he wondered why, after so many times where the president did not act militarily against Iraq, he had chosen to do so now. Many Republicans openly questioned the timing of the air strikes but because ground troops were not used and the bombing attacks lasted only four days, there was little they could do about it for the time being. In fact, the Republicans seemed so intent on the impeachment process that they seemed to have time for little else. Nicknamed 'The Hammer' for his uncompromising ideological rigidity in the House, Majority Whip Tom Delay (R-TX) pointedly asked Defense Secretary Cohen during testimony about whether 'there was any national security reason why the House cannot proceed with impeachment.' Seemingly exasperated, Cohen eventually told Delay an impeachment debate in the midst of an attack would 'hurt the morale of the troops.'[6]

"Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, who in the past had strongly favored any sort of punitive measures against Saddam, refused to support the president's action. This was a rather historic move on his part. Traditionally, Congress had long held to the rule that political bickering on foreign policy ended at the water's edge. Now, Lott broke with that tradition by openly criticizing a presidential national security decision while an operation was still in progress. This had not occurred since Vietnam. While he quickly backed off his initial statement to the press, Lott and several other powerful Republicans including the highly respected John McCain (R-AZ) later changed tactics and criticized the president for not being *more* aggressive against Saddam. Many other members questioned our strategy. They asked what our objectives were. However, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) an old veteran of partisan politics on the Hill, laconically noted that 'most Americans will support the decisions of our defense leaders . . . Saddam must go.'[7] Nonetheless, Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, 'promised almost immediately after the bombs started dropping, to launch politics' current answer for everything: an investigation.'[8]

"Americans can be funny at times. You would think that after all the talk about 'wagging the dog' and the impeachment trial, that the president would be in trouble with the American electorate. Former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter, from the United States, appeared on the talk shows and bluntly stated that there was no choice but to interpret the president's actions as 'wag the dog.' Ritter added that he had evidence that the United States prodded the UN inspection teams to return to Iraq in November 1998 to provoke a crisis to justify the attack.[9] The talk shows featured the usual media pundits and national security experts like the Council of Foreign Relations' Leslie Gelb, who openly questioned whether the United States has any sort of capability short of invading Iraq with ground troops that would actually find or destroy the places where Saddam keeps his weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, the public rallied around the president. His personal job-approval rating hit an all-time high of 73 percent. This was up nearly eight points *before* he bombed Iraq and was *after* the House voted to impeach him. In fact, in a Gallup poll, 78 percent of all Americans approved of the air strikes with only 18 percent opposed. Seventy-nine percent of all Republicans approved of the strikes along with 74 percent of Independent voters, as well as 71 percent of all Democrats. For a president to consistently receive 60 percent–plus approval ratings throughout the impeachment crisis was simply astounding to many experts on the Washington political scene.

"While member after member from the Republican side of the House got up and spoke about the suspiciousness of the president's timing, it seemed to gain little traction with Americans at large. Secretary Cohen was able to stop a lot of this talk in its tracks by making a very convincing case for why the actions of Saddam Hussein required military intervention at that time and not in previous instances. Speaking in a rare closed session of Congress, Cohen flatly stated that he would never have agreed to the operation if he thought politics were involved in the decision. That seemed to end debate for most over whether the president had politically timed the air strikes. Cohen ended his testimony by appealing for national unity and got a standing ovation from both sides of the aisle. Senators John Warner (R-VA) and Chuck Hagel (R-NE) and even Speaker of the House–designate, Bob Livingston

(R-LA) all now voiced their support of the president's action. Despite the defense secretary's emotional appeal, the House voted only a twenty-four hour delay in the impeachment proceedings.

"It was a tumultuous time but DoD seemed to have a plan in place. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], General Hugh Shelton angrily denounced those who saw politics behind the president's decision. In testimony, he stated that plans to bomb Iraq had been ready since the near bombing in November 1998. As for the media, they remained focused on the historic impeachment proceedings and it seemed nothing could dissuade them from doing so.

"DoD's plan was to strike quickly and hard at Saddam and take advantage of the media's preoccupation with U.S. domestic politics. General Shelton pointed out to the president at a NSC meeting that we only had a small window of opportunity between when the Butler report was released and the start of Ramadan. Moreover, as luck would have it, the window coincided to a time when we had two carriers in the Gulf (one was relieving the other in accordance with their normal rotational schedule). We were also in the process of exchanging B-52 bombers before Christmas so that we actually had double the normal number of bombers we keep on station in the region. Things just seemed to line up right for us. In addition, by attacking quickly and without the usual diplomatic work-up that usually took place before each crisis with Iraq, Shelton stated that he hoped to be able to catch Iraqi antiaircraft missile launchers and other mobile forces (traditionally the hardest to hit) before they can be dispersed.

"Throughout the December crisis, I was very impressed with the role played by NSA Sandy Berger. As you well know, he has known the president for over twenty years and was initially offered the job as NSA when Clinton first came to office. He declined because he felt he lacked the necessary national security experience and instead took the deputy's job at the NSC. But after Tony Lake moved on, Berger was the president's first choice to replace his former boss. He is also one of the few close advisors who has served the president from day one—Madeleine Albright being the other. From what I heard from General Ralston, who attended all the NSC Deputy Committee meetings, Berger really talked this issue through and got unanimity from the committee about the justification for the December strike. He also recognized that people would accuse Clinton of trying to use his powers as commander in chief to influence the upcoming impeachment vote. The only fly in the ointment was Secretary Cohen's concern about how difficult it was for air strikes to actually accomplish the job of degrading Saddam's WMD arsenal.

"Also recall that within White House circles, Sandy Berger had built up, over the years, a tremendous reputation as the 'go-to' person for national security issues. He was very approachable on issues and was very mission oriented. Moreover, he was closer to the president than even Madeleine Albright, who many think 'is better at formulating policies than selling them to Mr. Clinton or William Cohen who spent the president's first term in the Senate as a member of the opposition party.'[10]

"During a number of video-teleconference meetings with the president and the NSC during the days leading up to the air strike decision, no one voiced opposition to making the attack. Many felt pressure from the military advice coming from CJCS Shelton, who consistently argued that the window for an attack was very narrow and must be commenced before Ramadan and after the receipt of the Butler report. During one of the conferences while the president was in Israel, Mr. Clinton asked if—owing to the domestic political turmoil going on at that time—he should take the risk and order air strikes. Not only were Berger and the NSC deputies unanimously in favor of the attack, but the NSA and others in the meeting noted that word might leak that the president had defied his national security team advice for political reasons. At this point the president, according to my sources, dejectedly replied that 'there is no basis on which I can make a decision other than national security factors. I'm going to be criticized and accused of playing politics whatever I do.'[11]

"On the day that the president made his decision to bomb Baghdad, it was evident to all of us on the White House staff that he was in a state of agitation and turmoil. On the morning of the bombing, the president immediately went into a NSC Principals meeting already underway. They were discussing the implementation of a presidential 'go' decision and the president wanted to make sure everyone was still on board. While all the major players were present the vice president was conspicuously absent. Again, as in the days leading up to the crisis, no one offered any options other than the advice to proceed as planned—all was in readiness according to Shelton and Cohen. Clinton left the room and took the unusual step of visiting the West Wing staff and informed them to 'continue the people's work' despite the bad news coming from Capitol Hill and what they might soon hear in the media.[12]

"Speaking to the nation at 6:01 PM from the Oval Office, the bags under the president's eyes were more pronounced than usual. Announcing that air strikes were presently underway in Baghdad (CNN broke the story to the nation on the national news at around 5:30 PM), he looked physically and emotionally exhausted. Due to the time of the speech, the president had to cancel a meeting with Congressman Chris Shays (R-CT), whom he had hoped he could convince to vote against impeachment. The White House staff was leery of the president giving his speech from the Oval Office, as it was the 'scene of the crime' in reference to the Lewinsky scandal. Nevertheless, the president felt that Americans expect their president to announce major national security decisions from this location no matter what else was going on at the time. Later that evening, protesters with megaphones showed up to express their outrage over the bombings.

"Just a few days later, the president ordered a halt to Desert Fox. It was unclear whether the attacks had degraded Saddam's military capability. We were sure that he was no nearer to being out of power than at any other time since 1991. In reflecting on Operation Desert Fox, some reporters at *Newsweek* concluded that since the end of the Cold War, the 'United States has been, as both Clinton and Madeleine Albright like to say, the indispensable nation. . . . For Americans, such indispensability can be troubling; they get dragged into disputes that hardly threaten American national security merely because nobody else can do

the job. For the rest of the world, the dangers are even more striking; for it is held hostage to internal American politics.'"[13]

Steve now had plenty of information to analyze several presidential decisions regarding Iraq during 1998. It was a sure thing that Saddam would no longer allow UN inspectors back in after the December strikes until either he had rebuilt his WMD capability and his capacity to hide it or got the UN to lift the onerous trade sanctions that were strangling his ability to rebuild his war machine. Steve headed back to his office at the Pentagon to write up his findings.

SHOWDOWN OVER IRAQ CHRONOLOGY

1981–1988 Iran-Iraq war

1990 Saddam invades Kuwait

1991 Iraqi forces are ejected for Kuwait by international coalition. UN resolutions are passed that require Saddam to allow UN inspection teams to inspect sites throughout Iraq for WMD.

1992 In August, the United Nations establishes a no-fly zone along the 32nd parallel after Iraq launches renewed attacks against Shiite Muslims. The United States and its allies begin patrolling the no-fly zone, operations that continue today. In December, the U.S. planes intercept and shoot down an Iraqi MiG-25 that violates the no-fly zone.

1993 U.S. intelligence uncovers an assassination plot against former President George Bush and responds with a Tomahawk missile attack against Iraq.

1994 Saddam again threatens Kuwait with Republican guards and violation of UN no-fly zone. The United States responds with Operation Vigilant Warrior and deploys over 35,000 troops to the Gulf. Saddam backs down.

1995 Saddam's son-in-law temporarily defects to Jordan and reveals that Iraq has an ongoing WMD program.

1996 June terrorist attack against United States forces in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Nineteen U.S. deaths occur.

1997 United States launches September Tomahawk missile attack in response to Saddam's continued repression of Kurds in northern Iraq. U.S. action is roundly condemned by GCC.

1997 November—U.S. members of the UN WMD inspection team kicked out of Iraq by Saddam. Entire UN inspection team leaves in protest. Saddam's violation of UN resolutions regarding inspections seen as prelude to renewed conflict in the Persian Gulf. Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov takes lead in negotiating a peaceful settlement. France and Russia openly oppose the United States in the UN Security Council.

1998 January—Saddam temporarily backs down and readmits UN inspectors but places a number of key sites (presidential palaces) off-limits. France and Russia continue to oppose U.S. use of force in getting Iraq to comply with UN sanctions.

1998 February—United States demands admittance to palaces. Iraq refuses. War again looms.

1999 February—Kofi Annan, secretary-general of the UN, makes a last-ditch attempt at peace by traveling to Baghdad to convince Saddam to back down. In exchange for a deal to sell more food for oil, Saddam relents at the last minute and war is again avoided.

October—Iraq cuts off all work by UN monitors. The United States and Great Britain warn of possible military strikes to force compliance. A renewed military buildup in the Gulf begins.

November—The UN Security Council condemns Iraq for violating agreements assigned after the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. On 11 November, the UN withdraws most of its staff from Iraq. On 14 November, with B-52 bombers in the air and within twenty minutes of attack, Saddam Hussein agrees to allow UN monitors back in. The bombers are recalled before an attack occurs. Weapons inspectors return to Iraq a few days later.

December—On 8 December, Chief UN Weapons Inspector Richard Butler reports that Iraq is still impeding inspections. UN teams begin departing Iraq. On 15 December, a formal UN report accuses Iraq of a repeated pattern of obstructing weapons inspections by not allowing access to records and inspection sites, and by moving equipment records and equipment from one site to another. On 16 December, the United States and Great Britain begin a massive air campaign against key military targets in Iraq. UN inspectors have yet to return to Iraq.

Notes

1. Robert A. Rankin, *Denver Post*, 17 December 1998.
2. Ibid.
3. Michael Hirsch, John Contreras, and Christopher Dickey, *Newsweek*, 16 November 1998.
4. Miles Pomper, Chuck McCutcheon, and Pat Towell, *Congressional Quarterly*, 22 December 1998.
5. Stephen Fidler, *Financial Times*, London, 18 December 1998.
6. John F. Harris, *Washington Post*, 17 December 1998.
7. Richard S. Dunham and Stan Crock, *International Outlook*, 28 December 1998.
8. James Kitfield, *National Journal*, 19 December 1998.
9. Timothy Maier and Sean Paige, *Insight on the News*, 11 January 1999.
10. R. W. Apple, *New York Times*, 25 August 1999.
11. Evan Thomas and Debra Rosenberg, *Newsweek*, 4 January 1999.
12. Roger Simon, *Chicago Tribune*, 17 December 1998.
13. Michael Elliot, Joseph Contreras, and John Barry, *Newsweek*, 28 December 1998.

Kosovo

ANDREW L. STIGLER

In March of 1999, NATO initiated air operations against Yugoslav forces in Kosovo to convince Slobodan Milosevic to discontinue the Serbian military's attacks on ethnic Albanians. After deciding to use air power, the United States and NATO found that events did not play out as they had expected, and the United States considered escalating to a ground war. This case study examines two policy decisions related to the operation: the initial decision to apply military force, and the issue of whether NATO should escalate to a ground campaign. Both decisions involved complicated assessments of what stakes were involved, what measures were appropriate, and whether those measures were likely to succeed. This case study, prepared by Dr. Andy Stigler, a faculty member of the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College, is being used as part of the school's curriculum.

Commander Neil McCauley had hardly arrived at his office when the phone rang. It was General Fogarty's aide, informing McCauley that the general was asking for him and could McCauley stop by at his earliest convenience. McCauley promptly left his Pentagon cube and headed for E-ring. He had recently been assigned to the Joint Staff, and was still getting the swing of things. This was his first time in with his new boss.

On arrival, the general's executive assistant (EA) sent him in. They exchanged a few brisk pleasantries, and then the general got to the point. "Commander, we've been called on by the secretary to assist with some research on coercive strategies. I hear it's got something to do with NSC preparations for a possible approach to North Korea.

"To be specific," the general continued, "I need you to take a look at two of the key decisions involved in Operation Allied Force. Specifically, examine the initial decision to use force, and subsequently how the Clinton administration approached the question of whether or not to escalate to a ground operation. This second part is likely to be tougher to pin down. I'm told that you should look at the case broadly, as whatever you come up with may be used in planning for other scenarios as well.

"Pay close attention to how the political heavyweights affected the process. I want to know who took what side. We need to try to understand their perspectives and influence even if we only have access to incomplete information. I've arranged three people for you to interview who should be able to help you out, two at DoD and one at State. Good luck." The general handed McCauley a folder with contact info and background material.

McCauley left and returned to his office. The first name on the general's list was Richard Meyers, a former foreign service officer with the Political-Military Affairs Bureau of the

Clinton State Department. Meyers was now working as the assistant deputy to the Chief of Staff at State. McCauley had assumed that it would be fruitless to try to get ahold of him in short order, and was surprised when Meyers told McCauley he could open up some time toward the end of that afternoon. At 1730, McCauley found himself being ushered into Meyers' slightly cramped but well-appointed office at Foggy Bottom. Meyers wasted no time.

"Everyone had known long before March 1999 that Kosovo was a potential flashpoint. As a province of Yugoslavia, it had been granted semiautonomous status for much of the Cold War. But as in so many other parts of Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War seriously unsettled things. In 1989, Kosovo 'teetered on the edge of secession and open revolt.'[1] There were op-eds appearing as early as 1993 warning of the possibility of instability spreading to Kosovo.[2] It was hard to be proactive, though, when there were so many other matters in the Balkans that needed our attention.

"The main Kosovar resistance organization, the Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA], emerged in 1996 when it conducted a series of bombings in the province.[3] Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic decided to crack down on the KLA in early 1998, and things started to heat up. At that time, the CIA predicted a major crackdown was in the offing. On February 28, 1998, two dozen ethnic Albanians were killed in Central Kosovo.[4] A U.S. reaction of some kind was needed.

"Secretary Albright was in the lead on this one. She made a number of strong statements, remarking at one time that 'History is watching us. In this very room our predecessors delayed as Bosnia burned, and history will not be kind to us if we do the same.'[5] Some people have called this 'Albright's War.' There's a fair amount of substance to the argument that she was a major factor in the policy decision, but it's worth exploring why for a minute. It's often believed that those of us in State didn't have much say in determining when the United States will employ military force, at least compared to individuals with Defense Department responsibilities. There were, however, some unusual elements to the Kosovo situation that may have given Albright additional influence.

"First off, State was in the unusual situation of *promoting* the use of military force. If the diplomats believe that concrete military threats are necessary in a situation, that means they don't expect diplomacy alone to work—a position that does not bode well for purely diplomatic options. It's similar to having the DoD tell you that military force will not get you what you want—politicians pay attention when those in charge of a particular national security tool say that their tool alone cannot do the job.

"Second, there were reasons to believe that Milosevic would have little interest in continuing his actions against the Kosovars in the face of a unified NATO. The KLA was a major nuisance to Belgrade, but not a real threat. Remember, Richard Holbrook's book had just come out in 1998,[6] arguing that it was NATO airstrikes that convinced Milosevic to sign the Dayton Accords back in November of 1995. Dayton, in turn, had led to a fairly stable political arrangement between Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. General Clark was of a

similar mind, later writing that 'the NATO limited strikes [had] worked so well in Bosnia in August 1995.'[7] You mentioned you're talking to LTC Vincent Hanna?"

"He's next on my list, yes," McCauley said.

"I'll let him cover the choice of military strategy," Meyers continued. "We've probably got different perspectives, but you should certainly get his cut on it. Suffice it to say that there were reasons to hope that air power would work. And, ultimately, very little reason to believe it would make the situation worse. But Milosevic responded in ways that made no sense, and only worsened his situation. He should have recognized that escalating against the Kosovar Albanians would not serve him well in the long run, because it would force NATO to insist that the situation be reversed.[8] Even if air power was not guaranteed to get us everything, there was little reason to believe that it would lead to such a deterioration of the situation.

"It's also worth considering Clinton's relationship to the military. His effort to allow gays to serve openly, one that he had pursued early in his first administration, started the relationship off on a pretty bad foot. His lack of a military record, and the fact that he was replacing a president who had both fought in World War II and won the 1991 Gulf War, didn't help either. As a reporter put it toward the close of his presidency, Clinton's own foreign policy advisors conceded that he was "a president unwilling to exercise full authority over military commanders."[9]

"In early 1998, there was little indication that the highest reaches of U.S. government (aside from the State Department) were inclined to seriously contemplate that use of force in Kosovo. As long as things were fairly quiet, Kosovo was off the 'to-do' list. Albright's own memoirs offer an example of the resistance that the State Department met in its early suggestions that Clinton take a hard-line approach. As National Security Advisor Samuel 'Sandy' Berger put it in April 1998, 'It's irresponsible to keep making threatening statements outside of some coherent plan. The way you people at the State Department talk about bombing, you sound like lunatics.'[10]

"American special envoy Richard Holbrook had been sent to the region in May 1998 to try to convince the Serbs to back off and to foster discussions between the Kosovars and Serbs. Progress was limited; it proved extremely difficult to even get an agreement between the KLA and other Albanian leaders as to who would be on their negotiating team. Holbrooke, like Albright, thought that military action could be necessary to resolve the situation. It seemed that diplomacy was not likely to save the day.

"The situation in Kosovo continued to deteriorate, though not dramatically. Regardless, the Europeans felt that they had been too slow to involve NATO in previous Balkan crises, and were resolved to get some sort of military threat on the table sooner rather than later. In June 1998, they undertook an air exercise and a series of preparations for military action. Many people, including the chairman of the NATO Military Committee, General Klaus Naumann, felt that Milosevic came to the conclusion that NATO was only bluffing.[11] And numerous Western officials thought that Milosevic was right on that score.

"Then, in July 1998, the KLA made the mistake of launching an offensive, a limited operation that Albright called 'a disaster.'[12] The Serbs went after the Kosovars again—hard. By late August, about one hundred thousand Kosovars had been forced to flee their homes, and many of Kosovo's villages had been turned into ghost towns. On September 23, the UN passed Resolution 1199, stipulating the Serb government should end its brutal treatment of the Kosovars, let them return to their homes, and enter into meaningful dialogue to try to end the crisis. The resolution had no teeth, but this was because no one had tried to give it any—it was assumed that the Russians wouldn't let a resolution authorizing force to go forward.

"There was a massacre at Gornji Obrinje on September 29, 1998. This was a particularly nasty event, involving the murder of twenty-one women, children, and elderly citizens, including a seven-month pregnant woman whose belly was slit open. The international media did an effective job of publicizing the massacre. Berger found this event particularly appalling, and called it a breach of the 'atrocities threshold.'[13] He was now leaning more in favor of a forceful response.

"Why didn't we take action then and there?" Neil asked.

Meyers smiled. "It's worth keeping in mind how difficult it is to determine when it's appropriate to use force in these situations. These things unfold gradually, and you can't really say 'Five more atrocities and I'm going to do something.' That takes matters out of your hands, and commits you to action at a time you cannot control. Politicians aren't keen to make such commitments. And there are disadvantages to publicizing your 'atrocity threshold' even if you have one, since that just gives the bad guys an incentive to do everything just short of the line you've drawn in the sand. As a result, any decision to act is going to look arbitrary in retrospect. This is one of the things that makes military action in defense of human rights both hard to justify and hard to get rolling.

"On October 8, Albright and Holbrooke met with Alliance representatives and generally agreed that the threat of force would be necessary. Now the European members of the Contact Group, members such as France and Germany who had been leery of pressing the Russians on the issue, were willing to put serious diplomatic heat on Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov.[14]

"But even this attempt to convince the Russians to support a UN Security Council resolution failed. As a result, the enlarged circle of Europeans who supported action understood that such action would have to be taken outside of the UN. Clinton became willing to make more concrete threats, and sent special envoy Richard Holbrooke back to talk to Milosevic. Holbrooke had met with Milosevic a number of times in previous years, and the two men had established a working relationship. Holbrooke could make no headway, however, at one point reporting to Albright that "This guy is not taking us seriously."[15] Only when NATO publicly issued activation orders for airstrikes (which would be executed only after ninety-six hours had passed) did Milosevic come around and agree to let two thousand European monitors in to guarantee Yugoslavia's compliance with UN resolutions regarding Kosovo. It seemed as if a serious but not imminent risk of military action had gotten

Milosevic to change his position. But any appearance that NATO had decided that the situation merited the use of force is deceptive; Holbrooke convinced his fellow NATO members to approve the activation orders [ACTORD] only by assuring them that such a move would get Milosevic to change his mind.

"The monitoring agreement was flawed, however. It wasn't clear exactly what the European monitors were supposed to verify. Did Kosovo need to be perfectly quiet, or just something close? If atrocities occurred, would the monitors investigate? Additionally, there was no NATO force on the ground to make it clear what the repercussions would be if the Serbs violated the agreement. The fragile truce that Holbrooke had brokered gradually deteriorated, and by December 24 the Serbs were sufficiently emboldened to launch a major new offensive. As William Walker, the American diplomat in charge of the monitoring mission put it, 'If the two sides are unwilling to live up to their agreements, 2,000, 3,000 or 4,000 unarmed verifiers cannot frustrate their attempts to go after each other.'[16]

"Worse was to come. On January 15, Serb soldiers attacked the Kosovar village of Racak, slaughtering at least forty-five people. U.S. Ambassador William Walker called the scene an 'unspeakable atrocity' and 'a crime against humanity.'[17] This was enough to put some momentum behind the effort to make a serious threat of American force. Though some of the NSC principals—most notably Secretary of Defense William Cohen and CJCS Hugh Shelton—still wanted to avoid escalation, it was clear that the current arrangement in Kosovo was gradually falling apart. The timing of the Yugoslav attack was especially poor—Racak was discovered just hours after a meeting of the NSC principals, a meeting in which Defense Department officials had expressed optimism that the situation in Kosovo would improve.

"Albright and her chief aides at the State Department spent the next few days developing a strategy for delivering a final ultimatum to Milosevic and, if this was not successful, executing NATO's standing orders to commence a phased air campaign. With Berger's change of heart and the lack of a viable policy alternative from those who were still opposed to the use of force, the way had been cleared for generating a serious threat to use military force. On January 19, Albright convinced the rest of the NSC that it was time to commit the United States to a serious NATO air campaign if Milosevic did not amend his ways.

"Then another piece fell partway into place. On a trip to Moscow, Albright took in a production of *La Traviata* with Foreign Minister Ivanov. During an intermission, Albright brought up Kosovo. She pointed out that the United States and Russia would be unable to cooperate on a 'whole range of issues' if the situation in Kosovo were not resolved. 'We can't let this happen,' Albright said. Ivanov listened to Albright's arguments, and then replied that 'Russia will never agree to air strikes against the Serbs.' All the same, Ivanov said, Russia 'share[s] your desire for a political settlement, and perhaps the threat of force is needed to achieve that. I do not see why we cannot try to work together.'[18]

"This admittedly vague Russian endorsement of NATO's position was used to convince the Serbs to agree to peace talks that were held the next month. Negotiations were opened on February 6 at Rombouillet in France, and after a number of obstacles were surmounted, the

Kosovar Albanians signed the proposed settlement. This settlement allowed for a three-year interim period, during which hostilities would be ended and Kosovo would be allowed considerable latitude for self-government. After the Kosovar delegation signed, the Serbs declined to give their approval. There's much more that could be said about Rambouillet, but that's most of what you need to know. It was essentially the outcome that had been expected.

"There is one other element that bears mentioning, since it touches on the other focus of your investigation—the role played by NATO's ground threat. Some individuals, most notably the Balkan expert Tim Judah, have suggested that the Serbian delegation was not prepared to negotiate at Rambouillet. Judah reports that the Serbs adamantly opposed *any* foreign forces in Kosovo, and that NATO's demands in Kosovo 'could certainly have been whittled down significantly' if the Serbs had adopted a more flexible diplomatic approach.[19]

"To my mind, this could be important, because it gives us some insight into what led to Milosevic's decision to give in. Some people say that the offer the Serbs accepted on June 10 was substantially different from the one they had been offered at Rambouillet, and that this was a major reason for the Serbs' decision to concede. If so, this would undercut the role played by both the air campaign and the ground threat, since it would mean that NATO altered its demands to a limited extent. But even if the final treaty that ended the conflict was significantly different from what was negotiated at Rambouillet, it's hard to say that the Serbs were fighting the war for those changes.[20] If they had been, why didn't they try harder to achieve their aims at the negotiating table?

"It was becoming clear to everyone involved that diplomacy was all but exhausted. At a foreign policy meeting on March 19, President Clinton summed up his perspective.

> Look, let's remember the purpose of using force to stop Milosevic-style thuggery once and for all. There's no guarantee it will succeed, but the alternatives are worse. If we don't respond now, we'll have to respond later, perhaps in Macedonia, maybe in Bosnia. Milosevic has picked this fight. We can't allow him to win. . . . In dealing with aggressors in the Balkans, hesitation is a license to kill.[21]

"Richard Holbrook led a group to Belgrade in a final effort to get Milosevic to change his mind, but this failed on March 23. NATO commenced bombing on the following day."

McCauley then arranged a telephone interview with COL Vincent Hanna (USMC). Neil placed the call late that evening, in order to catch Hanna at a reasonable hour. Hanna had been a NATO military aide in Brussels during the war, and was now the G-5 (responsible for developing and updating plans) for III MEF in Okinawa. "I can certainly give you my personal perspective on the United States' negotiating strategy and the threat of air strikes," Hanna said after McCauley had introduced himself. "Ultimately, it was a strategy that relied on coercive diplomacy. This is not always a bad thing in and of itself. But there are serious risks involved in coercive strategies such as these. Such strategies depend on defeating the

enemy's willingness to resist, and it is very difficult to gauge in advance what the enemy's tolerance for pain will be. From my perspective, any number of actors involved in the planning of NATO's strategy could have made more of an effort to recognize its potential shortcomings.

"It's important to consider how the political environment shaped the strategic thinking. Almost everyone involved recognized that it would be impossible to get NATO to agree on the use of ground forces in advance; introducing that topic at the outset could have scared the more reluctant allies, with the effect of taking all military options off the table entirely. Clark clearly perceived this danger.

"And keep in mind, the less-than-warm relationship between Clinton and the military could have had two effects. It could have made the Clinton administration less likely to confront the Joint Chiefs, since Clinton knew he had little leverage to change their minds. But it could also mean that the Chiefs had less influence on policy decisions, since the administration knows the military doesn't completely trust the president's leadership. Bad relations between branches of government can cut in one of two ways—you can become either less likely to disagree with the other agency, or more likely to ignore it.

"GEN Clark recognized that the air campaign could lead to a debacle. It's worth considering his words on the situation:

> In Clausewitz's *On War*, there is a crucial passage in which Clausewitz writes that 'No one in his right mind would, or ought to, begin a war if he didn't know how to finish it.' . . . But in practice, this proved to be an unreasonable standard. In dealing with complex military-diplomatic situations, the assertion of power itself changed the options. And trying to think through the problem to its conclusions in military terms always drove one to 'worst-case' analysis. Had we done this in Bosnia, we could well have talked ourselves out of participating in any agreement. No doubt, I thought, someone could easily imagine the situation in Kosovo turning into a military quagmire like Vietnam—all one had to do was assume the worst at every step along the way. While it was well to see the risks, some of the risks would have to be discounted by common sense. Others would have to be faced if they become more likely.[22]

"Clark had a point. If you focus on worst-case planning, you can talk yourself out of anything except the use of decisive force. Limited uses of force have their virtues, and are even necessary in some situations. The effort to find Osama bin Laden is such an example of limited force; it is limited because the political environment in which the operation is taking place (the border region shared by Afghanistan and Pakistan) is not amenable to an all-out U.S. military operation.

"Basically, people were optimistic that air power alone could do the job. A number of high-level U.S. officials believed that there was a less than 25 percent chance that Milosevic would be able to withstand a short bombing campaign.[23] It's been publicly revealed that President Clinton, Berger, and Albright were optimistic about the effect of a brief but sustained bombing campaign.[24] Albright believed that Milosevic would cave, and that threats

of action were necessary because Milosevic 'only understands the language of force.'[25] When you think of the military power at the command of NATO, it wasn't hard to see why Clinton thought that the Serbs would change their mind.

"There were a number of bad signs, however. Diplomats who dealt with Milosevic near the end of negotiations described him as having a 'bunker mentality.' Apparently his advisors had told him that it would be possible to finish off the KLA once and for all if the Yugoslav army put forth a maximum effort, and that this could be done in several days.[26] In this scenario, the start of bombing was a signal to the Serbs to ramp up their military operations, instead of warning them to scale back as the Allies had hoped.

"Ultimately, however, after seventy-eight days of bombing and the threat of escalating to a ground war, Milosevic capitulated. The Russians decided that things were getting unpleasant, and in early June they told Milosevic that they could no longer support him. You may have reservations about NATO's strategy, but it was ultimately successful at very low cost, even if it wasn't pretty to watch."

The next morning, McCauley went to talk to LTC (ret.) Mark Gable. Gable had served in Political-Military Affairs at State at the time, and was now retired and living in Alexandria. General Fogarty had said that Gable was considered a bit of an expert on the ground threat, and could offer McCauley both sides of the issue.

"General Fogarty tells me you've gotten the background on how the war played out," Gable said. McCauley nodded, and Gable continued. "I've always been interested in the role of the ground threat myself, since it raises an important issue—had Clinton decided to move up to a ground war?

"From the start, Clinton thought that the U.S. public wouldn't tolerate a ground war in Europe, at least not over these stakes. Cohen summed it up in testimony to Congress during the air campaign. As he explained:

> At the time [during diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis], you may recall there was a great disconnect up here on Capitol Hill. If I had come to you at that time and requested authorization to put a ground force in—U.S., unilaterally, acting alone—I can imagine the nature of the questions I would have received. You'd say 'Well, No. 1, where are our allies? And No. 2, who's going to appropriate the money? No. 3, how long do you intend to be there? How many? How long? How much? And what's the exit strategy?' . . . And that would have been the extent of the debate and probably would have received an overwhelming rejection from the committee.[27]

"As the air campaign unfolded, it wasn't hard to see why both NATO and administration officials were reluctant to issue open threats.

"By most accounts, the idea of a ground war received considerably more resistance from the senior commanders than had the initial decision to start the air campaign. It's one thing for the Department of Defense to acquiesce to a limited use of air power; a ground war in Europe, however, is another matter entirely. Clark was in favor of generating a sincere ground threat, and he believed that is was one of the reasons we won the war.[28] Certainly many well-informed analysts of national security affairs felt that NATO had waded in pretty far after dropping bombs for over two months, and if it took a ground campaign to win the war, then that was the way it would have to go. The future of NATO was on the line, and alliances like NATO don't grow on trees."

"What was Secretary Cohen's position?" Neil asked.

"Cohen apparently thought an invasion was a bad idea," Gable replied. "After the war, he gave an interview in which he discussed why he was not eager to mount a ground campaign.

> It became clear to me that [a ground war] was going to be a very hard sell, if not impossible [sic], to persuade the American people that we were going to put up 150,000 or 200,000 American troops to go in on the ground. . . . The chiefs were split [as well]. There was strong opposition within the ranks as such. If you look at the terrain, you can understand why. I have seen it, and I think it would have been a very difficult campaign. There were bridges [which] could have been dropped, with Milosevic's forces up in the hills just zeroing down on our forces. There could have been substantial casualties. And if we had started to suffer substantial casualties, I am convinced it would have turned into quite a contentious issue up on the Hill. . . . It was never a close call in getting a consensus to put land forces in. There may have been one or two countries that said they'd be supportive. But out of 19 total, I doubt very much whether we could have gotten consensus. I'm convinced we could not have. . . . I think it's easy to sit on the sidelines and say, if only we had led, they would have followed. But none of those people were part of these conversations. We found strong opposition. . . . It would have been very difficult to get the support of countries that were under enormous domestic pressure to not even participate in any way in Kosovo. . . . Those who said if we had only led . . . fail to appreciate the intensity of the opposition within those countries.[29]

"By the end of the war, was President Clinton ready to send U.S. troops into Kosovo to finish the job? Right after the bombing ended, he gave an interview to Jim Lehrer during which he said that he believed that Milosevic surrendered in part because the Serbs believed a NATO ground operation was inevitable.[30] During the war, however, the president felt he could go no further than making statements such as 'we have not and will not take any option off the table.'[31] If this was a signal to Milosevic that he should expect ground forces to be used, it was a pretty vague one.

"If Clinton was willing to escalate to a ground war, why didn't he openly make that threat? A serious and unmistakable statement from Clinton that the United States was prepared to use ground troops might well be what was needed to get Milosevic to reconsider whether further resistance was in his interests. When you think of the human, political, and

economic costs that a ground war would entail, it's hard to believe that Clinton wouldn't throw out an unmistakable threat in an attempt to avoid those costs.

"It's worth considering how difficult it is to figure out what politicians actually planned to do at the time. Keep in mind the fact that everyone had expected this to be a short conflict. When it went on far longer than expected, the Clinton administration came under intense criticism for getting the United States and NATO embroiled in a war that it had no sure way to win cheaply. Then the air campaign turned into a win—contrary to the expectations of many—at the same time that there were *some* signs that the president was trying to warm up the invasion threat.

"There was a clear political motive for administration officials to suggest, after the fact, that they were ready to invade if necessary. If the United States was prepared to invade, then the win in Kosovo would seem like less a matter of luck and more the result of the administration's determination to do whatever was necessary to see the struggle through to the end. These motives would be shared by any president in a similar position. Secretary Cohen's statement, on the other hand, sounds a bit more credible, since it cuts against those incentives.

"The alliance had frequently indicated that this June 15 was the deadline to start preparations in order to execute the operation before the onset of winter. At the time Milosevic gave in, not only were the resources in the theater woefully inadequate for such an operation, there was no indication that additional troops and equipment were in the pipeline.[32] If NATO and the U.S. Congress were reluctant to support a ground operation before the deadline, they would be even less likely to be in favor if the most opportune time for an invasion had passed. An experienced politician like Clinton would be sure to recognize this.

"Clark was strongly in favor of an invasion; he had even taken some political heat at an early stage for candidly mentioning it to some senators. The service chiefs were apparently against the idea, however. When Clark briefed Shelton on ground options on May 19, he sensed 'ambivalence' from the CJCS. Shelton, however, also saw a need 'to force a [political] decision.'[33] But as late in the game as June 2, Clark was pointedly not invited to a discussion of the ground option at the White House, apparently because of expectations that he would lobby aggressively for a ground campaign.[34]

"Congress was not keen to engage in a ground war. In April, it had voted 249 to 180 to prohibit funding for ground forces unless Clinton put it up to a vote at some future juncture.[35] Polls from the same month showed that a majority of the American public would not support a ground operation if casualties were significant.[36] These were serious considerations for a president that had no military record, and who did not enjoy the warmest of relations with the Pentagon.

"There were risks, of course. A genuine threat to go in on the ground might cost us a significant amount of international support. Many of our NATO allies—Greece, Italy, and Germany in particular—were struggling to maintain support for the air campaign. In Greece, the bombing was opposed by 97 percent of the population;[37] it was hard to imagine that Athens would sign off on an escalation to a ground campaign.

"At the same time," Gable said, "Berger said that they were going to win the war at all costs. And when you think about it, plinking away with air power over the course of a long winter while refugees are dying of exposure is not the sort of image that any president would want on the Newshour—or in the history books, for that matter. And if you're Milosevic and you're not sure what's in the cards, don't you want to assume the worst? If the Russians support a UN resolution that authorizes force, then you're really up the Danube without a paddle. It's hard to say either way."

McCauley thanked him and left. He wasn't a fan of having to interpret such an ambivalent situation for his superiors, but that was his job. He returned to his office, and got ready to run off a memo summarizing what he'd picked up on the two decisions.

Notes

1. Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), 26.
2. John J. Mearsheimer, "Shrink Bosnia to Save It," *New York Times*, 31 March 1993, 23.
3. BBC, "Kosovo Liberation Army Emerges from the Shadows," http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/kosovo2/62067.stm.
4. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000), 27.
5. Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 24, 25.
6. Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 125.
7. Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), 177.
8. Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 171. In a conversation with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, GEN Clark stated that he expected Milosevic to act against the Kosovar civilian population.
9. Jane Perlez, "For 8 Years, a Strained Relationship with the Military," *New York Times*, 12 December 2000, A17.
10. Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary* (New York: Miramax Books, 2003), 383.
11. Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 31–33.
12. Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 386.
13. Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 43.
14. Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 389.
15. Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 47.
16. Mike O'Connor, "Attack by Serbs Shatters a Cease-Fire in Kosovo," *New York Times* (25 December 1998), A1.
17. Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 64.
18. Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 396–397. Albright later called the other Contact Group foreign ministers on her hotel line, knowing that it was tapped. "If I [Albright] were misrepresenting Moscow's position, I expected to find out in short order," 397. Albright heard nothing to contradict her understanding of Yeltsin's position.
19. Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2000), 210, 213–214.
20. See also Stephen T. Hosmer, *Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001).
21. Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 406.
22. Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 167.
23. Thomas W. Lippman, "Albright Misjudged Milosevic on Kosovo," *Washington Post*, 7 April 1999, A1.
24. Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 298n85.
25. Linda D. Kozaryn, "Albright Says Kosovo Matters to United States," *Armed Forces Information Service*, 25 February 1999, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb1999/n02081999_9902084.html.
26. Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 94.
27. Cohen statement, *U.S. Policy Regarding Kosovo*, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 106th Cong., 1st sess. (15 April 1999).
28. Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 405.

29. Interview with U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, *Frontline,* 22 February 2000.
30. Interview with Jim Lehrer, *NewsHour with Jim Lehrer*, 11 June 1999.
31. Quoted in Katherine Q. Seelye, "Clinton Resists Renewed Calls for Ground Troops in Kosovo," *New York Times,* 19 May 1999, A10.
32. Interview with LTC Clemson Turregano. LTC Turregano was the Commander, 1–35 Armor, 1st Armored Division.
33. Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 309, 310.
34. Ben Macintyre, "White House Snubs Hawkish General," *Times* (London), 3 June 1999. See also Steven Lee Myers, "U.S. Military Chiefs Firm: No Ground Force for Kosovo," *New York Times*, 3 June 1999, 16.
35. Charles Babington and Juliet Eilperin, "Clinton Signals Raids May Last 3 More Months: House Votes to Require Assent for Ground Troops," *Washington Post*, 29 April 1999, A1.
36. Jane Perlez, "Clinton's Quandary: No Approach to End War Is Fast or Certain of Success," *New York Times*, 29 April 1999, A16.
37. Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 161.

Colombia: Mission Impossible?

DAVID T. BUCKWALTER

On 13 July 2000, President Clinton signed Public Law 106-246. This law, actually the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001, contained a large emergency supplemental that was virtually certain to pass in an election year. A portion of the emergency supplemental became known as "Plan Colombia." With that law, the United States entered a new dimension of its involvement in South American foreign policy. This case examines the troubled history of the Andean region and the myriad of international, domestic, and executive branch complex influences that led to President Clinton's signing of "Plan Colombia." Sensitive issues surrounding this policy, such as, should the U.S. become more directly involved in the Colombian counterinsurgency operations, or is Vietnam an appropriate analogy to use in Colombia, are examined. Feedback of this policy upon the newly elected Bush administration is also reviewed. This case study, prepared by Professor David Buckwalter, a faculty member of the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College, is being used as part of the school's curriculum.

> They [the Colombian paramilitaries] are like a plague of locusts and they are just one of the four fronts we are fighting on with limited resources. [in response to interviewer's question:] Yes, it is mission impossible.
>
> —Colombian President Andrés Pastrana[1]

> The powerful talisman of "fighting drugs" has led sensible policymakers to endorse a futile and bloody war they would otherwise never countenance.
>
> —William M. LeGrande and Kenneth E. Sharpe[2]

INTRODUCTION

Colombia is the fourth-largest country in South America, covering an area of 440,000 square miles, or about the size of Texas, New Mexico, and Arkansas combined. With a population of 42.8 million, it is Latin America's third most populous country after Brazil and Mexico. It is also Latin America's oldest democracy, governed by elected civilian officials for all but six years of military rule since its independence from Spain in 1810.[3] Colombia has historically had one of the most stable economies in Latin America, experiencing sustained economic growth from 1932 to 1997. During the 1980s the country averaged 3.5 percent annual increases in gross domestic product (GDP), and Colombia was the only major Latin American nation that did not have to restructure its foreign debt during what was then known as the "Latin American debt crisis."[4]

Colombia is also the source of virtually all of the world's cocaine and increasing percentages of the world's heroin. It is easily the most violent country in Latin America. With thirty thousand annual murders (the United States had under thirteen thousand in 1999), Colombia has the world's highest murder rate and is the scene of half of the world's kidnappings.[5] The country has suffered through the hemisphere's longest running leftist guerrilla

insurgency, one that is also probably the wealthiest in history thanks in part to drug profits estimated to range from $400 million to over $1 billion annually.[6] Opposing the guerrillas are illegal paramilitary groups estimated to be responsible for roughly 70 percent of extrajudicial killings in the country, and a Colombian military assessed to be able to control at most 60 percent of the countryside.[7] If all of this were not enough of a burden, the country entered its worst economic recession in over fifty years in 1998 and is only recently recovering with unemployment rates still at historic 20 percent highs.[8]

For President Bush, who promised in his campaign to: "look south, not just as an afterthought but as a fundamental commitment of my presidency," what he sees in Colombia can only be the source of deep concern.[9]

BACKGROUND

Colombia's political divisions can be traced back to the nation's formation. Followers of Colombia's "founding fathers," Simon Bolivar, the first elected president, and Francisco Santander, first vice president, evolved into rival political parties, the Conservative and Liberal parties, respectively. Throughout most of the country's history, these parties contended for power, sometimes violently, most notably during the period 1948–1957, known as *La Violencia* [the violence], when as many as three hundred thousand Colombians perished in a bloody civil war.[10] A political power-sharing arrangement known as "the National Front" restored order in 1957, but the legacy of *La Violencia* is alive in Colombia today in the form of armed resistance groups and illegal paramilitary forces that grew out of the numerous militias that participated in the earlier carnage.

The largest armed resistance group in Colombia today is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, known by their Spanish acronym, the FARC. The FARC's leader, Manuel *Tirofijo* ["Sureshot"] Marulanda, has been described as "the world's oldest living guerrilla." Now in his early seventies, Marulanda claims to have formed a small militia with fourteen cousins and brothers in 1949. In 1964 Marulanda emerged as the leader of a coalition of small peasant guerrilla groups that adopted their current name in 1966 and have been continuously under arms ever since. Marulanda did join government-sponsored peace talks in 1984 and later endorsed FARC participation in a left-wing political party *Unión Patriótica* (UP) in the late 1980s. When up to thity-five hundred UP candidates were murdered by right-wing paramilitaries during violence in the 1989–90 electoral season, mistrust of government peace overtures was instilled in the FARC leadership.[11] While the FARC espouses a Marxist political agenda, many observers claim they are merely organized criminals. In recent years, income from kidnappings, extortion, and drugs has made the FARC possibly the richest guerrilla force in history, enabling purchase of large quantities of arms on the world market. From modest beginnings with as few as three hundred fifty fighters, the FARC now claims as many as seventeen thousand combatants, with a purported goal to double that number. They operate virtually throughout the country, but mostly in rural areas beyond reliable government control. Their largest concentrations are in the southern departments [states] where most of Colombia's coca is grown and processed.

The other major guerrilla group is the National Liberation Army, known by their Spanish acronym, the ELN. Formed in 1964 in the north-central department of Santander by radicalized students and catholic priests, the group follows a Cuban model of guerrilla warfare. This group was nearly eliminated in the late 1960s by the Colombian government, but reemerged in the 1980s under the leadership of Father Manuel Pérez. Although Pérez died from natural causes in 1998, the group remains a potent force. From approximately eight hundred fighters in the mid-1980s, the ELN may have grown to as many as five thousand combatants by 2000.[12] Current strength estimates number thirty-five hundred, the decline attributed to attrition caused by the illegal paramilitaries.[13] With their proximity to Colombia's oil fields, a good portion of the ELN's income is derived from extortion of the major oil companies, and their "signature" terror tactic is blowing up oil pipelines. More than 2.6 million barrels of crude oil have been spilled as a result of these attacks, more than eleven times what was lost in the Exxon Valdez disaster. The attacks represent a serious economic loss for both the companies and the regional governments, who derive the vast majority of their budgets from oil royalties, and are producing what some call an "ecological disaster."[14]

One of the big reasons for FARC/ELN strength and persistence is the drug trade. As cocaine became the U.S. "drug of choice" in the late 1970s, Colombia virtually "cornered the market" for processing and transshipment of the world's cocaine supply. With effective coca eradication programs in Peru and Boliva in the mid-to-late-1990s, coca cultivation also moved to Colombia. The FARC seized the opportunity to "tax" the cocaine producers, and according to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, is now directly involved in production and trafficking. It is estimated that at least two thirds of the FARC "fronts" [small localized bands of guerrillas] and one third of the ELN fronts derive income from the drug trade.[15] Ironically, this symbiotic relationship between guerrilla and trafficker may have been enhanced by effective U.S.-Colombian government action in the war on drugs. With the killing of notorious drug kingpin Pablo Escobar in December 1993, and subsequent dismantling of the Cali and Medellín cartels, the Colombian drug industry adapted by decentralizing into hundreds of smaller, loosely connected "mini-cartels." This made effective targeting and law enforcement more difficult, while facilitating interaction with the rebel resistance groups and Colombia's other illegal army, the paramilitaries.[16]

The lineage of the illegal "self-defense" forces (as they refer to themselves) or paramilitaries/"paras" (as most U.S. sources name them) can be traced to *La Violencia*, but their current form and functions have been influenced more by recent government counterinsurgency and narco-trafficking. From 1964 to 1987, armed civil defense forces were permitted under Colombian law as an adjunct to the army's antiguerrilla campaign. Although they were outlawed in 1987, they were openly tolerated until the mid-1990s. They continue to receive support and tolerance from Colombia's military, according to both the U.S. State Department and numerous human rights groups. Although President Pastrana calls them "a bigger problem than the FARC," the human rights groups view such pronouncements with suspicion, since the paramilitaries seem to directly support the government battle with the guerrillas.[17] But both narcotics and legitimate businessmen are also contributors to the paras. The rise of the drug cartels was accompanied by purchase of large tracts of land by

the drug kingpins. Along with cattlemen, large farmers, and major industries, the drug cartels began forming private armies to protect their holdings. These "paras" now number up to eight thousand and are attempting to obtain political recognition as a legitimate organization called the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC. The AUC's leader, Carlos Castaño, has admitted "taxing" the drug industry for income and has said: "the guerrillas are military objects whether they be civilian or uniformed. I know this violates international humanitarian law, but the guerrillas violate humanitarian law all the time."[18] The "signature tactic" of the paras is the "village massacre," where forces occupy a village and suspected relatives or supporters of the guerrillas are publicly slaughtered.[19]

The final player in the Colombian carnage is, of course, the military itself. The government security establishment is composed of an army (146,000), a national police force (120,000), an air force (10,000), and a navy (5,000). Despite universal conscription, Colombian law exempts anyone with a high-school education from serving in a combat unit, so the burden of the counterinsurgency campaign has fallen on the lower strata of Colombian society. This provision, the need to defend fixed installations, and the sheer size of the country leave few soldiers to prosecute the counterinsurgency. In 1996–98, the Colombian army suffered highly publicized and embarrassing defeats by the FARC, although more recent campaigns have been successful. The army has long been accused of human rights abuses, but in recent years these claims have decreased dramatically. Traditionally, the Colombian National Police (CNP) were responsible for combating the drug trade, but the army is now assuming a larger, cooperative role in this task as well.[20] Most observers believe that the Colombian security establishment will need substantial assistance, reform, and training if it is to attain control over the countryside and effectively counter the rebels, traffickers, and paramilitaries.

The war in Colombia can also be seen as a problem for the entire Andean region, and Colombia's eastern neighbor is perhaps most problematic. Venezuela, a founding member of OPEC, boasts the largest petroleum reserves outside the Middle East.[21] Hugo Chávez, a former army officer and unsuccessful coup leader, was elected president of Venezuela in December 1998 and again for a six-year term in July 2000.[22] He led the effort within OPEC to reduce production to increase oil prices. Venezuela's reduction in production led to relinquishing its status as the largest U.S. petroleum supplier, slipping to its current fourth place behind Canada, Saudi Arabia, and Mexico.[23] Chávez has also "gutted congressional power, dismantled the judiciary, increased the military's role and reduced the power of provincial and local officials."[24] Recently he has used the national guard to break up strikes at the national oil company, and demonstrations and strikes have become nearly daily occurrences.[25]

Chávez' stated desire is to form a new "axis of power" with other nations in the region to counter U.S. influence, but he has not been warmly received by his neighbors.[26] He has met with leftist rebels from both the FARC and ELN, and the ELN maintains an office in Caracas.[27] Additionally, his expressions of sympathy for antigovernment forces in Bolivia and Ecuador have cooled relations with those nations.[28] Chávez has publicly advocated an end to Cuba's isolation and has hosted a state visit for Castro.[29] He has negotiated an oil-for-

medical-services deal with Cuba, helping to ease the U.S. trade embargo, and he was the first international head of state to break the international isolation of Saddam Hussein when he visited the Iraqi leader in August 2000.[30] Leaders in the region still seem to want to preserve at least cordial relations with Venezuela. Colombian President Pastrana, for instance, told an interviewer: "Chávez has always been straight with me. Every time he has met with FARC or ELN representatives . . . he had asked me beforehand for my opinion."[31]

Panama's situation is also of concern. The lightly armed Panamanian national police, a legacy of U.S. Operation Just Cause, are no match for heavily armed guerrillas or narco-traffickers. The Panamanian government exercises virtually no control of its southern province of Darién, and the region has become an operating area for the FARC and base for drug shipments. Both U.S. and Panamanian officials agree that defending the canal from a determined FARC attack would be problematic, but view that necessity as unlikely, since the current situation is favorable for the guerrillas. If the Colombian government were successful in putting extreme pressure on the FARC within Colombia, there is no assurance that the current calculus regarding the canal would remain benign.[32]

Ecuador is in a similar situation to Panama, and every bit as vulnerable to spillover. Ecuador has the lowest per-capita income of any of Colombia's contiguous neighbors and is in closest proximity to the primary coca growing area in southern Colombia. There have been five Ecuadorian presidents in the past six years, the current president having been installed following a bloodless coup in January 2000. The military is only marginally in control of the country's northern regions, and FARC, narco-traffickers, and Colombian paramilitaries routinely cross the border. The United States is rehabilitating an air base in Manta on Ecuador's northwestern coast as a forward operating area for AWACS surveillance aircraft that were displaced from Howard AFB, Panama, in 1999. That location could be threatened if the conflict in Colombia moves south. As one mayor of a northern village puts it: "If Colombia is going to be another Vietnam . . . Ecuador is going to become the Cambodia of this war."[33]

Colombia's other neighbors are also potential concerns. The coca eradication successes in Peru and Bolivia are by no means irreversible, and both countries have other internal concerns of their own. Peru is just recovering from the political scandal that resulted in former president Fujimori's fleeing in disgrace to his native Japan last November and the arrest of ex-intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos in Venezuela in June.[34] Bolivia's President Banzer, architect of Bolivia's coca eradication success, resigned in August due to poor health, with his vice president to fill the remainder of his term until elections in 2002.[35] Brazil is not yet directly threatened by the Colombian war, but the geography of the 1,020-mile border with Colombia makes control of that area problematic. In September 2000, the Brazilian government began a three-year program termed Operation Cobra, increasing military presence and surveillance in the region to avoid spillover effects.[36]

Beyond the state and regional dimensions of the Colombian conundrum, there are hemispheric and global aspects as well. In 1997 at a Summit of the Americas, President Clinton joined the other Western Hemisphere heads of state in calling for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) to be established by 2005. President Bush has consistently

voiced his strong support of this initiative, which would create the largest free-trade area in the world, encompassing thirty-four countries and 800 million people.[37] If Colombia, with her strategic location as the "gateway" to South America, were to degenerate into a "failed state," the FTAA may turn out to be an "impossible dream."

Colombia's internal terrain and access to both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans makes the country the ideal production and shipment location for cocaine. The United States is still by far the world's largest user of cocaine, consuming over 270 metric tons in 1999 (and accounting for $37 billion of the estimated $63.7 billion this country spent on illicit drugs).[38] But Europe is developing a taste for the drug at an alarming rate. European cocaine seizures have more than quadrupled in the past decade, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) estimates that nearly half of Colombia's cocaine is now destined for destinations other than the United States.[39] Thus, Colombia is a serious concern at state, regional, hemispheric, and global levels.

THE ROAD TO *PLAN COLOMBIA**

The U.S. "war" on drugs, originally proclaimed by President Reagan twenty years ago, is looking increasingly like a shooting war in Colombia. A key milestone in the war occurred on 13 July 2000, when President Clinton signed Public Law 106-246. The law, actually the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001, contained a large emergency supplemental that was virtually certain to pass in an election year. A portion of the emergency supplemental became known as "Plan Colombia," and provided $1.3 billion funding for counternarcotics operations, mostly in Colombia, for FY 2000 and 2001. Depending on the account one chooses to accept, the law was either: 1) the response to a reasoned plea from a respected foreign leader; 2) the skillful manipulation of process by administration policy entrepreneurs; 3) a policy "forced" on a reluctant president by an activist Congress; or 4) an administration initiative to close one last vulnerability in preparation for a presidential election. The truth of the matter is that it was probably all of the above.

U.S. counternarcotics strategy has always had a "supply reduction" component. During the first five years of the Clinton administration, overall funding for national drug control rose slightly from roughly $12 billion for FY 1993 to $15 billion in FY 1997, but the interdiction and international portions of the budget experienced a slight decline ($2.5 billion to just over $2 billion).[40] When the rate of twelve- to seventeen-year-old drug use nearly doubled from 5 to 10 percent during the same period, the administration came under attack from a number of critics, who argued the president was overemphasizing domestic law enforcement versus a more balanced program.[41] Among the most vocal critics was Speaker Dennis Hastert, who had chaired an informal group of Republicans termed the "anti-drug task force." A 25 March 1998 "Issue Brief" published by the House Republican Conference alleged: "The Administration's response and inattention to this growing national crisis, and

* Because the term *Plan Colombia* is used in most publications to refer to both the Colombian plan *and* the U.S. support of the Colombian plan, to avoid confusion, this text will use the italicized phrase to indicate the Colombian plan, and the plain text phrase to refer to the U.S. response.

the resulting explosion of drug use across the nation, is frightening."[42] The administration could argue that total illicit drug use by 13.6 million Americans in 1998 was far below the 1979 peak of 25.4 million, but the apparent deterioration in teenage use figures was an unquestionable liability.[43] One congressional staffer later claimed: "Congress compelled the president to submit a meaningful supplemental aid package."[44]

During the mid-to-late 1990s, the political situation in Colombia also took a disturbing turn. Liberal Party candidate Ernesto Samper was elected president in 1994, and in early 1996 allegations surfaced that the Cali drug cartel had contributed $6 million to his campaign (among his accusers was Andrés Pastrana, the unsuccessful Conservative Party presidential candidate, who reportedly gave the U.S. Embassy tape recordings of Samper talking with the wife of a drug dealer). Samper was formally charged in February 1996, and President Clinton decertified Colombia as cooperating with counternarcotics efforts. This decertification, which was repeated in 1997, barred Colombia from receiving U.S. foreign aid (but not counternarcotics assistance, so total U.S. funds to Colombia actually *increased* from approximately $50 million to $150 million from FY 1996–98).[45] The Colombian Congress absolved Samper in June 1996, but the State Department revoked his visa to travel to the United States in July 1996.[46] While U.S. engagement with Colombia continued, it would take a change in Colombian administrations before any new dramatic initiatives were politically possible.

In 1998, Conservative Party candidate Andrés Pastrana, running on a "peace platform," won the Colombian presidency. In July 1998, before his inauguration, Pastrana met with FARC and ELN officials and also traveled to Washington to meet with President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright. On 7 August 1998, Pastrana took office; just two days before, the Colombian Army had suffered its worst defeat at the hands of the FARC, losing 150 soldiers to the rebels. The country was also well into its first recession in over fifty years; a recession that would blossom into a 4.3 contraction of GDP for 1999.[47] On 6 November 1998, Pastrana agreed to withdraw government forces for ninety days from an area roughly the size of Switzerland in southern Colombia (termed the *despeje* or demilitarized zone). This created an area in which FARC guerrillas were ostensibly free to assemble while peace talks were being held. Peace talks did not begin until 7 January 1999, and continue to the present with numerous suspensions and resumptions, but little real progress. The deadline for reoccupying the *despeje* had been extended several times and expired in November 2001.[48]

For Pastrana, who had tied the reputation of his administration to the peace negotiations, every suspension of negotiations was a threat to his political credibility (for instance, in August 2000 after negotiation setbacks and FARC attacks, Pastrana's popularity slipped to 23 percent; it rebounded to 52 percent in February 2001 when talks were resumed).[49] Additionally, Pastrana grew increasingly at odds with his military, who had never favored the creation of the *despeje* in the first place. Things came to a head in May 1999, when Defense Minister Rodrigo Lloreda and two dozen top officers tendered their resignations. Pastrana accepted the departure of the defense minister but convinced the officers to

remain, promising to increase military pressure on the guerrillas. When the FARC launched a multifront attack with four thousand rebels from the *despeje* in July 1999, the situation in Colombia seemed to be spiraling out of control.[50]

Figure 1: U.S. Public Opinion, Noneconomic Problems
Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/indicators/indmip.asp



These events spurred an administration policy review by a National Security Council "ExCom" for Colombia. It was at this point that Clinton drug czar, retired general Barry McCaffrey, took the initiative, proposing an additional $1 billion of funding for Colombia. Not all administration officials were happy with such a grandiose effort, but McCaffrey's proposal hit at a good time.[51] The economy was booming and budget surplus projections were growing. Congressional Republicans had been criticizing the administration for being "soft on drugs," and a presidential election was looming just over a year away. The public was not overly concerned with drugs, per se, but crime was still running as the number-one noneconomic problem, and the connection between drugs and crime was an easy one to make. Not all administration officials were opposed to increased aid to Colombia. Rand Beers, the assistant secretary of state, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), had long argued for increased funding for the Andean region.

In mid-August 1999, Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering and Beers traveled to Colombia to caution Pastrana that he risked weakening U.S. support if he made any more concessions to the guerrillas. Conversely, if a comprehensive plan could be crafted, the United States might be willing to provide considerably more financial support.[52] For President Pastrana, it was an offer he couldn't refuse. According to one source, the actual plan was authored by Pastrana's Chief of Staff Jamie Ruiz, and was completed in a week in English. Ruiz was educated in Kansas and has an American wife, so the use of English is at least plausible, but the fact that the plan was first available in English led both U.S. and Colombian media to speculate that Pastrana's *Plan Colombia* (see appendix 1) was really a U.S. plan forced on a reluctant supplicant.[53] In all, the plan called for spending $7.5 billion over six

years. Four billion dollars were to be provided by Colombia, with the other $3.5 billion to come from the international community.

The comprehensive breadth of *Plan Colombia* allowed different constituents to view the plan in the way they most preferred. For Colombians, the emphasis on peace and security was attractive, the counternarcotics strategy resonated within the United States, and the peace and social development aspects found a favorable hearing in Europe.[54] While European and international sources were asked to contribute to the plan, actual funding was slow in coming, with Spain ultimately pledging $100 million, Norway $70 million, and Japan $20 million. The European Union (EU) pledged $332 million in 2000 (including the Spanish contribution).[55] In April 2001, the EU pledged an additional $304 million. All of the international contributions are earmarked for peace initiatives and social development programs.[56]

Pastrana announced his plan in a speech at the United Nations on 23 September 1999. The plan drew eager endorsement from the Clinton administration, State Department spokesman James Rubin saying:

> We applaud the GOC's strategy as an ambitious, but realistic package of mutually reinforcing policies to revive Colombia's drug-ravaged economy, reinforce the democratic pillars of society, advance its peace process, and eliminate "sanctuaries" for narcotics producers and their agents. The U.S. Government will carefully review Colombia's request for international assistance and, in consultation with the Congress, develop proposals on how the U.S. can best assist the GOC.[57]

The U.S. quickly became an enthusiastic partner in Pastrana's *Plan Colombia*. The plan may not have been actually written by the United States, but the initial direction of the plan was heavily influenced by U.S. policy and politics.

The implementation strategy for the first two years of the plan, *Plan Colombia: Interagency Action Plan*, was a joint U.S.-Colombian effort in which members of the departments of State, Justice, Defense, Commerce, ONDCP, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) participated.[58] This document "operationalizes" the initial steps in Plan Colombia and sets the key initial strategy of a "push to the south." The southern strategy consists of CNP, supported by specially trained units of the Colombian Army (COLAR), conducting intensive coca eradication efforts in the southern departments of Putamayo and Caqueta. These eradication efforts are primarily conducted through aerial fumigation with the chemical glyphosate, marketed in the United States as "Roundup." The major U.S. contributions to the plan are the training of three specialized counternarcotics (CN) battalions, provision of helicopters for mobility of these battalions and the CNP (sixteen Blackhawks and fifty-seven Hueys), and direct, contracted support to the aerial fumigation program.[59] While all of Pastrana's reform and social development initiatives were funded to some extent by P.L. 106-246, over 70 percent of the money was devoted to the COLAR and CNP counternarcotics efforts.[60] All of the U.S. Plan Colombia efforts, however, are carefully

crafted to reflect CN and avoid the appearance of direct counterinsurgency (CI), even though the southern departments are the areas of heaviest FARC concentration.

Colombia may be one of the few places in the world where the U.S. State Department does the "fighting" and the Defense Department does the "talking." U.S. military trainers are specifically prohibited from engaging in combat or situations where combat is imminent. State Department contractors, on the other hand, pilot the sprayers and covering helicopters that do the coca fumigation and occasionally come under fire from narcotraffickers and/or guerrillas. DynCorp has been supporting these missions since 1994, and has recently signed a five-year, $200 million contract with the State Department for the fumigation effort. In addition, Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI) has a $6 million contract with SOUTHCOM to provide military advice and training to the Colombians.[61] This "contracting out" of war has raised concern in some circles, but it also reduces risk to the policy. As U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Anne Patterson has said: "I'm under no illusion what it would mean to have an American shot down here."[62]

Thus, the counternarcotics thrust of the plan answers a political need in the United States, but also must have been attractive to the COLAR, which was at odds with Pastrana's peace overtures. The COLAR is more interested in the CI problem, and while the U.S. assistance is specifically prohibited from use for direct CI support, the southern push strategy into Putamayo and Caqueta establishes COLAR presence directly adjacent the FARC *despeje* (see map at figure 2). The stated relationship between CN and CI operations is that success in the drug war will reduce funds available to the insurgents. Some observers have pointed out that the guerrillas are likely to have built up a sufficient "war chest," and thus disruption of drug income would have minimal immediate effect on the insurgency. But increased army control of the southern departments would presumably have a desirable counterinsurgency effect.[63] The southern push strategy has thus been termed as "CI disguised as CN."[64] Even the Clinton administration proponents could seem unclear. Testifying in 1999 before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Rand Beers stated: "We have no intention of becoming involved in Colombia's counterinsurgency, but we do recognize that given the extensive links between Colombia's guerrilla groups and the narcotics trade, that

Figure 2: Republic of Colombia
Source: CIA World Factbook: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/co.html#Govt

counternarcotics forces will come into contact with the guerrillas and must be provided with the means to defend themselves."[65] At this point, chairman Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) threw up his hands and complained: "We are left with the appearance of a policy of drift and dissembling."[66] The CN versus CI issue was one of the central arguments of the Plan Colombia debate and continues as one of the most serious questions for U.S. policy in Colombia.

THE DEBATE

President Clinton formally presented his proposal for Colombia to Congress on 11 January 2000.[67] Because Plan Colombia was cast in counternarcotics terms, it engaged the larger constituency of all those interested in U.S. drug policy. From legalization advocates, to increased treatment supporters, to those arguing for drug testing/treatment for inmates and parolees, many saw Plan Colombia as an unwise diversion of funds and opposed the plan. They could point to the fact that with two million persons in jail, the U.S. has the highest per-capita prison population in the world (excepting Russia), so law enforcement does not seem to solve the problem. Moreover, many argued that the relatively small cost of producing drugs compared with the tremendous profits they generate dooms supply-reduction efforts to failure.[68]

Objections more specific to the actual plan also arose. Environmental groups such as the World Wildlife Fund cited the "potentially grave environmental impact" of aerial fumigation and compared it to the Agent Orange debacle of Vietnam. Even the United Nations Drug Control Program attacked the spraying as "inhumane" and "ineffective" (aerial eradication efforts in Colombia have been conducted from 1994 onward, and in that time, coca production *increased* dramatically, mostly due to displacement from Peru and Bolivia).[69] Other countries in the region voiced concerns over "spillover" effects, and many observers asked publicly if the United States had the will to remain engaged for the extended period that was likely necessary.[70] The most strident and compelling objectors to Plan Colombia, however, raised the "human rights" flag and the specter of Vietnam.

The Vietnam analogy was inescapable, but Clinton administration officials denied the applicability. Former SOUTHCOM commander General Charles Wilhelm told senators:

> The lieutenants and captains, like me, who struggled and suffered through Vietnam, have become today's generals. I know that we will speak with one voice in opposing any measures that would . . . risk a repeat . . . of the Vietnam experience. . . . I willingly place a 36-year professional military reputation on the line when I tell you categorically Colombia is not another Vietnam.[71]

The Vietnam analogy was compelling enough that the State Department felt it necessary to distribute a fact sheet entitled: "Why Colombia Is Not the 'Next Vietnam.'" The paper made seven points including: U.S. troops would only train, not fight; that Colombia had a freely elected government; and that the FARC enjoyed support from fewer than 5 percent of the Colombian population.[72] If not Vietnam, then perhaps El Salvador or Guatemala? A recent RAND report pointed out that in those two successful counterinsurgencies the guerrillas were at stalemate or defeated when they made peace, but that neither condition applies to the

FARC/ELN, and argued that the United States should blend its CN focus with a more active CI role.[73] Another critic suggested that even Desert Storm was an appropriate analogy:

> Colombia's petroleum production today rivals Kuwait's on the eve of the Gulf War. The United States imports more oil from Colombia and its neighbors Venezuela and Ecuador than from all Persian Gulf countries combined. . . . Stan Goff, a former U.S. Special Forces intelligence sergeant, retired in 1996 from the unit that trains Colombian anti-narcotics battalions [said] Plan Colombia's purpose is "defending the operations of Occidental, British Petroleum and Texas Petroleum and securing control of future Colombian fields.[74]

None of the references to past wars, nor the arguments for alternative drug policies, diverted the political juggernaut of the Colombia supplemental, but one interest did alter the plan as enacted.

Human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International (AI), and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), teamed with Colombian human rights groups to stridently oppose the "militaristic approach" of Plan Colombia.[75] They found sympathetic allies in Congress especially Rep. Janice Schakowsky (D-IL), Rep. David Obey (D-WI) and Senators Wellstone (D-MN) and Leahy (D-VT).[76] Partially as a result of rights groups' lobbying, a cap was put on U.S. military personnel at five hundred and American civilian contractors at three hundred in support of Plan Colombia (currently the military limit is not a problem, but the number of contractors will closely approach three hundred with final delivery of all helicopters). In addition, Senator Leahy managed to get six specific human rights certifications written into the law as conditions for release of the aid, and added language requiring:

> The Secretary of State shall consult with internationally recognized human rights organizations regarding the Government of Colombia's progress in meeting the conditions contained in paragraph (1), prior to issuing the certification required under paragraph (1).[77]

As part of the required consultation following passage of P.L.106-246, HRW, AI, and WOLA produced a detailed report documenting Colombian failure to meet the designated human rights conditions. This forced President Clinton to waive the conditions in the interest of national security (as allowed by the law) on 22 August 2000. In the August waiver justification, the president noted that an additional waiver would be required prior to obligation of FY 2001 funds.[78] The three rights groups prepared a similar detailed report for the anticipated January 2001 certification, but shortly before leaving office, Clinton administration lawyers determined no further certification was required.[79] The rights lobby remains an active and engaged force in Colombia policy, but as President Clinton left office, Plan Colombia was on track and the "push to the south" was beginning with an intensive aerial fumigation effort.

ENTER PRESIDENT BUSH

The new president, who had supported Plan Colombia during the campaign, did indeed seem to "look south" in the early days of his presidency. His first trip outside the United

States was a visit to Mexico on 16 February 2001, and by the end of February, official delegations from Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Brazil, and El Salvador were traveling to Washington to meet the president or his new Secretary of State Colin Powell.[80] In April 2001, the president attended the Summit of the Americas in Quebec, Canada, where he voiced support for both Plan Colombia and the FTAA proposal.

The president also talked of an "Andean Regional Initiative (ARI)" that answered some of the criticism that Plan Colombia was too focused on Colombia and too militaristic. The ARI proposal was for $882 million in FY 2002 funding, roughly 45 percent going to Colombia and the rest to neighboring nations of Panama, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, and Venezuela (even at this level of aid, Colombia remained the third highest recipient of U.S. aid behind Israel and Egypt.) The requested funds were also nearly evenly divided between economic/social development and counternarcotics/security.[81] At an on-the-record State Department briefing of the plan, career civil servants who had also served in the previous administration characterized the policy as a continuation of a balanced strategy begun in 2000. The speakers frankly admitted that Plan Colombia had been weighted toward the military because policy makers had seen the opportunity to obtain the "big ticket" items (helicopters), and that the current, more balanced approach had been their intention all along.[82] There was also a slight change in tone concerning overall drug strategy.

In his senate confirmation hearing on 11 January 2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said, "I am one who believes that the drug problem is probably overwhelmingly a demand problem."[83] In later congressional testimony, Secretary Powell echoed these sentiments, noting, "obviously the ultimate solution is demand reduction."[84] The president himself, during the announcement of his nomination of John Walters[†] as the new drug czar on 10 May 2001, spoke for active supply reduction but noted: "However, the most effective way to reduce the supply of drugs in America is to reduce the demand for drugs in America."[85] The president's requested $19.2 billion for his drug control budget for FY 2002 is an overall increase over the previous year of $1.1 billion, with the largest single increase being an additional $1.6 billion for drug treatment.[86] But this new tone did not signal retrenchment from Plan Colombia.

The third of the CN battalions was declared ready by May 2001, and helicopter deliveries continued on schedule (with an estimated completion date of December 2001 for the Blackhawks and May 2002 for the Hueys). The aerial fumigation program in Putamayo department proceeded apace, with some seventy-five thousand acres sprayed from December to February. There was no significant FARC reaction to the intensified government presence, some said because the illegal paramilitaries had moved into the region in advance of the government forces, acting as a virtual, if not coordinated, vanguard.[87] One police helicopter was shot down on 22 February 2001, and a State Department–contracted helicopter flown by a DynCorp American civilian came under fire during the successful rescue, but no

[†] Walters was deputy director of ONDCP under the first drug czar, Bill Bennett (during the elder Bush's administration). Walters is still awaiting Senate confirmation, and Edward H. Jurith, former chief counsel for ONDCP, continues to serve as acting director.

Americans were injured.[88] Residents in northern Ecuador complained that the push south did have some spillover effects, with an estimated 2,100 Colombians fleeing into Ecuador and an increased presence of both FARC and paramilitary fighters.[89] There were also reports that the coca growers were simply moving their operations into neighboring Nariño department, but all in all, the first stages of Plan Colombia seemed to be proceeding smoothly.[90]

On 20 April 2001, the war on drugs claimed two innocent victims in neighboring Peru. American missionary Veronica Bowers and her seven-month old daughter were killed when a Peruvian Air Force plane, operating with a U.S. CIA aircraft, shot down their small private aircraft, mistaking it for a drug smuggler. The shootdown occurred on a routine "Joint Air Bridge Denial" mission, a program that had been in place since 1995 in both Peru and Colombia with no previous civilian casualties. Interception and shoot-down programs in both countries were immediately suspended, and an investigation was completed in August 2001. While the investigation found shared U.S./Peruvian responsibility for the mishap and recommended some corrective actions, the air bridge denial program remains suspended.[91]

There were also increasing complaints and protests of the aerial eradication program during the spring of 2001. Residents of areas being sprayed complained of health problems and destruction of legal cash crops. A Colombian nongovernmental organization (NGO), the Organization of Indian Peoples of the Colombian Amazon, gained a Colombian court-ordered halt to the spraying on 27 July 2001. The suspension was reviewed just days later and overturned, and spraying resumed on 31 July 2001.[92] The same day, however, six Colombian department governors and several Colombian legislators were in Washington lobbying Congress to halt the fumigation program. After meeting with the Colombians, Representative Schakowsky told reporters, "[the policy is] a very terrible thing we're doing. I don't think we would do it in the United States, and I don't think we should do it in Colombia."[93] However, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Patterson noted, "Fumigation is a key element under Plan Colombia. If there were a halt to aerial fumigation, there would be an immediate, probably devastating, impact of U.S. support for Plan Colombia."[94] The State Department sought to defuse, and possibly delay, some of the controversy by requesting a study in Colombia of the effects of the chemical fumigant by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The Center for Disease Control was also asked to participate in the study at the request of Senator Leahy. EPA officials let it be known they were not happy to be stepping out of their jurisdiction and into this politically charged issue, but until the study is complete, the fumigation program proceeds. Leahy made it clear that, should the study reveal harmful effects, both aerial fumigation and the entirety of Plan Colombia would be called into question.[95]

Meanwhile, on the peace front, not much progress was being made. There was a negotiated prisoner exchange with the FARC in which 359 low-ranking military and police prisoners were released. This did not indicate much of a softening of the FARC; in the same week rebel attacks claimed nineteen lives, and the rebels retained fifty officers in custody.

Some observers even noted that the release of the prisoners merely served to free rebels for fighting who had previously been pulling guard duty.[96]

Talks with the ELN had shown some promise in early 2001, and President Pastrana was negotiating for an ELN safe zone in northern Colombia much like the FARC *despeje*. The proposal for another guerrilla safe haven was extremely unpopular with many factions in Colombia, especially the military. All the candidates for Colombia's presidential election next year were calling for a tougher line against the rebels, and their poll numbers were much better than Pastrana's (Pastrana's term expires in August 2002, and he can not run for reelection by Colombian law). Residents in the proposed new safe area staged numerous protests against the measure, but the issue was made practically moot by the illegal paramilitary forces in the region, whose spring offensive made considerable gains against the ELN. Finally, on 7 August 2001, President Pastrana announced he was suspending peace talks with the ELN, citing doubts about "their commitment to peace." The State Department supported Pastrana's action.[97]

The paramilitaries did not pass the spring unscathed either. Over the past year, the Colombian government, sensitive to human rights groups' influence, had been arresting individual paras in record numbers. On 25 May 2001, in a series of raids on homes and offices of large landowners and cattlemen, the government sought to fight the AUC through their employers. Reportedly the police have hundreds of tape recordings of "respectable" citizens discussing protection contracts with the AUC militias, and the increased pressure led to the resignation of the AUC's self-proclaimed head, Carlos Castaño, in June. Thus far, the AUC has not attacked government targets, but the increased pressure may make active enemies of the eight thousand or so fighters the group claims to have under arms.[98]

On 16 August 2001, President Pastrana signed legislation that represented "the first substantive reform of Colombian security law since 1965." The law had been strongly favored by the Defense Ministry and the Colombian military. One provision of the law allowed the military a freer hand in prosecuting the counterinsurgency, and it drew howls of protests from human rights groups. Senator Leahy warned that further payments of Plan Colombia funds could be threatened, and Senator Wellstone indicated that he would propose an amendment redirecting next year's military aid when Congress reconvenes in September. However, the State Department termed the law "much improved from the original version" and voiced confidence that Pastrana would interpret it to "maximize the safeguarding of human rights."[99] It could also provide the power to step up the guerrilla war in the last year of his presidency if peace talks bear no fruit.

In fact, in August peace looked more and more remote. On 11 August 2001, Colombian authorities arrested three members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as they attempted to depart Bogotá. The men had spent the previous five weeks in the FARC *despeje* and were believed to have been training the Colombians in bomb making using advanced plastic explosives. The fruits of such training could be a fundamental shift in FARC strategy to attack urban targets, and an intercepted radio transmission from a FARC commander reportedly revealed him saying, "We must hit the cities hard."[100] To opponents of

the peace process and the ceding of the zone in the first place, the IRA arrests were further evidence that the peace process was a failure and that it was time to turn up the military heat on the FARC.

Barely a week after the IRA capture, it appeared the Colombian army was doing just that. COLAR sources reported that the army was engaging a 1000-guerrilla strong FARC column that was moving out of the *despeje* to engage northern targets. Over the next week the strength of the rebel column was put at up to two thousand fighters, and the army voiced confidence that they could kill or capture most of them, with their engaged forces of six thousand Colombian troops (but not the Plan Colombia CN battalions, that are prohibited by terms of the agreement from taking part in CI). At the end of the month the fighting was still raging, and it is not clear that the army will be able to capture the entire rebel force.[101] In any case, the army is voicing increased confidence that they can solve the CI problem militarily, which worries many observers and supporters of the peace negotiations. One observer complained, "We're now left with the dust of a vigorous policy that had prospects," and the UN special envoy to Colombia lamented, "there now seems to be a belief in military solutions, which means that people believe they can bring peace by going to war. That is one of the historic errors."[102]

With all the developments in Colombia, Washington was making some news of its own at the end of August. On 21 August, the Pentagon scheduled a friendly roundtable with selected media reporters designed to introduce the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD ISA), Peter Rodman. Rodman noted that responsibility for Latin America had been shifted to ISA from Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), so that we now "treat them as we would any other region of the world." Rodman cited Colombia as one of his top three issues and said that there was a "formal review" going on with respect to Colombia, an issue about which there is "enormous congressional sensitivity." Rodman summed up the statement by saying: "I think there's a consensus that there's an important American interest, but there is not necessarily a consensus about what the right way to serve that interest is."[103]

The next day, Phillip Reeker, the State Department deputy spokesman, responded to questions about Rodman's remarks. Reeker discounted the "formal review" wording, noting that Colombian, and all policies, are under "constant review." He also tried to minimize "consensus" point by stating: "the Bush administration has a clear policy toward Colombia, which is to support democracy, combat narcotics trafficking, and support social and economic development." At this same press briefing, Reeker announced that Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman would lead an interagency delegation to Colombia on 29–31 August.[104] Included in the delegation were representatives from the NSC, ONDCP, USAID, Department of Justice, and Department of Defense. The commander of SOUTHCOM, General Peter Pace, who was just nominated by the president for the vice chairman position, was included in the delegation. Several days later it was announced that Secretary Powell would visit Colombia on 11–12 September, in conjunction with a planned trip to Peru.

Mr. Reeker's remarks notwithstanding, other observers have noted some confusion in the administration policy. Peter Hakim, president of Inter-American Dialogue, a D.C. think tank, said: "I've spoken in the past two weeks with at least six ambassadors [from Latin America] and the common complaint is, 'We don't know who to talk to. There's no one with a broad sense of the issues.'" Part of the problem is that Bush nominees for the key positions of ONDCP (Walters) and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Otto Reich still await senate confirmation. In at least in the Reich case, the confirmation may be a protracted one (human rights groups have already posted objections on their Web sites citing Reich's role in Central America in the Reagan administration).[105]

APPENDIX I

PLAN COLOMBIA SUMMARY[106]

1. *An economic strategy* that generates employment and allows the country to have a viable counterbalancing economic force to narco-trafficking. Key components of the strategy are expansion of international trade, enhanced access to foreign markets, and free-trade agreements to attract domestic and foreign investment.

2. *A fiscal and financial strategy* that includes austerity and adjustment to boost economic activity and recover Colombian prestige in international financial markets.

3. *A peace strategy* that aims at a negotiated peace agreement with guerrillas, which should strengthen the rule of law and the fight against drugs.

4. *A national-defense strategy* to restructure and modernize the armed forces and police, so that they will be able to restore the rule of law and provide security in the country, to combat organized crime and armed groups and protect and promote human rights.

5. *A judicial and human rights strategy* to reaffirm the rule of law and ensure equal and impartial justice to all.

6. *A counternarcotics strategy* in partnership with other countries involved in some or all of the links in the drug chain: production, distribution, sale, consumption, asset laundering, precursor chemicals, and arms dealing.

7. *An alternative development strategy* that will promote agricultural schemes and other profitable economic activities for peasant farmers and their families. Alternative development will also consider economically feasible environmental protection activities.

8. *A social-participation strategy* to develop more accountability in local government, community involvement in anticorruption efforts, and pressure on the guerrillas and other groups to end kidnapping, violence, and internal displacement of individuals and communities.

9. *A human-development strategy* to guarantee adequate education and health, provide opportunities to every young Colombian, and help vulnerable groups in the society.

10. *An international-oriented strategy* to confirm the principles of shared responsibility, integrated action, and balanced treatment of the drug issue. The support of the international community is also vital to the success of the peace process provided it conforms to the terms of international law and is requested by the Colombian government.

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The Steel Trap

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ADDENDUM BY CLEMSON G. TURREGANO

"The Steel Trap" refers to the challenges faced by the Bush administration when it sought to stabilize the steel market through the imposition of trade restrictions on steel. Incurring the wrath of the international community, this policy reinforced the perception that the United States was becoming more isolationist, and, in a sense, seeking to withdraw behind its own borders. The case reveals the awkward policy position assumed by many agencies within the executive branch, with respect to the president's intent. Upon completion of the case, the reader will grasp why organizational culture, bias, and structure create such a strong pull on the decision makers within the organization. In addition, the reader will see the effect of domestic and international politics on the desires of the administration. Now discarded, the steel trade restrictions offer the student of policy a rare peek behind the complexity of policy initiation, into the second and third order effects of executive decisions. This case study, prepared by Commander Larry McCabe, USN and Dr. Clemson Turregano, LTC, USA, faculty members of the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College, is being used as part of the school's curriculum.

Captain Brett Lee, USN, was perplexed as he slowly put down the telephone. He had only recently moved into his large office at the headquarters of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), located at the Washington Navy Yard on the banks of the Anacostia River in Washington, D.C. As the new executive assistant (EA) to the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, the command responsible for engineering, building, and supporting the navy's fleet of ships and combat systems, Brett was excited by the prospect of working directly for a commander responsible for 50,000 employees and one-fifth of the navy's budget.[1] However, he was baffled by the phone conversation he had just had with his boss. The conversation had been short and to the point. The admiral wanted to confirm that Brett had in fact earned an MBA and had served a tour on the staff of the National Security Council. Satisfied with Brett's affirmative response to both, the admiral asked Brett to immediately come to his office because, as the admiral put it, "he needed help."

Flattered the three-star actually needed his help so soon after his arrival, Brett grabbed his pen and notebook and hurried to the admiral's office. Brett knocked and entered. The admiral thanked his EA for the quick response and walked him over to the conference table and introduced him to a civilian already in the office.

The admiral began, "Brett, I want you to meet Cliff Johnston, from the Department of Commerce. Cliff is in a hurry, so I'll be brief. The folks at Commerce are coordinating a Pentagon meeting to discuss the recent decision by President Bush to place steep tariffs on steel imports. The papers and television are full of stories on the issue—many of them

critical of the decision. The secretary of the navy (SECNAV) has asked that I represent him at the OSD meeting. Normally this would fall under the assistant secretary of the navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, but he is on travel the day of the meeting. Since NAVSEA shipbuilding is DoD's largest consumer of steel, SECNAV thought we were a natural fill-in for the Assistant Secretary."[2]

The admiral paused and offered the Commerce Department official the opportunity to continue. Cliff began, "As you might know, the president is taking a public relations beating for imposing the steel tariffs, particularly from our trading partners overseas. The White House is aware of the criticism and wants to stay on top of the issue as it develops. Commerce has been directed to monitor and coordinate the feedback—or fallout—from the tariff decision for two reasons: first, to monitor the impact the tariffs are having on the U.S. economy; and second, to help the West Wing political advisors deflect attacks from those who think the president made a huge mistake."

Cliff continued, "The defense department is actually a very important player in the steel import tariff issue. When influential senators like Carl Levin (D-MI), chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, say to thousands of union steel workers that the tariffs are necessary because 'we go to war with what you make,' the Defense Department is involved whether it wants to be or not.[3] In fact, in August of 2001, President Bush told a Pittsburgh audience of steelworkers that steel is a national security matter.[4] Pro-tariff and anti-tariff special interest groups are both waving the 'national security banner' to support their respective arguments. This is why the secretary of Commerce has asked me to stay in close contact with the Pentagon to ensure the entire administration is on the same sheet of music as we work our way through the fallout from the president's decision. Suffice it to say, during the days prior to the 6 March decision, government agencies with a stake in the decision were not in complete agreement on the issue of steel tariffs."

Cliff continued to explain, "The *pro*-tariff people are claiming the United States needs to protect the domestic steel industry with high tariffs on imported steel so the country will not have to rely on foreign steel imports to build our weapon systems—like aircraft carriers, planes, and tanks. They conjure up the image of an 'OPEC of steel-producing countries' that might cut the supply of steel to the United States during a national security crisis. For those who remember the OPEC oil embargo of the '70s, it is indeed a scary thought.

"On the other side of the coin," continued Cliff, "are the *anti*-tariff groups who claim the 'steel OPEC' argument is nonsense. They claim the domestic steel industry produces more than enough steel to meet the national security requirements of the United States. They make the argument that high tariffs on imported steel will only raise the price of steel for domestic steel-consuming industries—like NAVSEA—and make the production costs skyrocket. They claim the domestic steel industry is bloated and inefficient. It is only a matter of time, they say, before the inevitable industry shakeout occurs that will force the domestic steel industry to downsize, modernize, and improve efficiency. They acknowledge this will be, in the short run, painful in terms of lost jobs. However, the result will be a more competitive, efficient domestic

steel industry. This is what the anti-tariff camp says the country and the defense industry needs—not higher steel prices and bloated, protected steel producers."

Cliff thanked the admiral for his support and apologized for his abrupt departure, but he explained he had a similar meeting with army officials in forty-five minutes. After Cliff left the office, the admiral turned to Brett and continued the conversation.

"Brett," the admiral began, "I'm nervous about the OSD meeting. This is an issue involving politics and economics—neither of which is my strong suit. I'm a great engineer and a pretty good leader and manager, if I do say so myself. But I know when I'm out of my league. I want you to research this issue and brief me on the facts that led the president to make the tariff decision. I need you to focus particularly on the differences in opinion among the various government agencies. The secretary of the navy, besides being a great secretary, is a politician who will be very interested in the internal politics involved."

The admiral continued, "I believe the meeting is scheduled early next week. This gives us three days to get smart on the steel tariff issue. Please put yourself on my calendar first thing Friday morning." The admiral paused, "I'll be at Norfolk Naval Shipyard today and tomorrow. I'll see you Friday morning—and thanks for the help. Good luck."

Brett's first order of business would be to learn as much as he could about the vocabulary of international trade as well as the associated concepts and government policies. Even with an MBA, there were many terms, procedures, and government agencies involved in the steel issue that were unfamiliar to him. His first office call was to a former classmate, Ed Pettus, whom Brett befriended pursuing his MBA during the evening at the George Washington School of Business. Ed was now a senior economist at the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), the federal agency tasked with providing trade expertise and advice to both the legislative and executive branches of government.[5]

Ed was thrilled to see his old "military" friend. Both chuckled and agreed it was truly a new and different world when the U.S. Navy was interested in the work of such a heretofore obscure government agency as the International Trade Commission.

Already feeling the pressure of the admiral's imposed deadline, Brett moved quickly to the point. "Ed, I'm a bit confused as to exactly what all the ruckus is about with respect to the steel tariff decision. If foreign countries were dumping cheap steel on the U.S. market, I don't see a problem with the president's decision. We do need to protect our domestic economy. Aren't there provisions in our trade agreements to combat product 'dumping' by foreign businesses and governments?"

Ed quickly held up his hand in an attempt to interrupt Brett. "Slow down, buddy—not so fast. You're making a common mistake. This particular steel issue is not at all a 'dumping' issue. Dumping occurs when a foreign producer sells a product in the United States at a

price that is below that producer's sales price in the country of origin (the 'home market') or at a price that is lower than the cost of production. Just because a foreign producer sells a product in the United States that is cheaper than similar U.S.-produced products, it does not necessarily mean dumping is occurring. The foreign producer just might be more efficient than the U.S. competition. There are some very specific long-standing dumping complaints by U.S. companies regarding specific foreign steel products, but the current tariff decision by President Bush is separate and distinct from these."[6]

Ed continued, "And for the record, many of the talking heads and pundits have also misused the term 'countervailing subsidy' [CVS] in the current steel tariff debate. Simply put, CVS occurs when a foreign government subsidizes its own industries by providing financial assistance to benefit the production, manufacture, or exportation of goods. This can be in the form of direct cash payments, tax credits, or extremely favorable government loans.[7] For example, the European Union has several CVS cases filed against the United States at the World Trade Organization [WTO] concerning tax breaks given to U.S. companies on profits earned on the sale of U.S. goods in foreign countries. The WTO is the international governing body that oversees all international trade issues and resolves trade disputes between international trading partners. The Europeans claim the tax relief, in effect, reduces the cost of production, allowing U.S. products to be sold much cheaper in foreign markets, providing an unfair advantage to the U.S. companies. The WTO is trying to resolve the dispute, but these things sometimes take years to adjudicate."

Ed paused, then continued, "Neither of these situations apply to the steel tariff decision. The Bush tariff decision involves something we call a 'Section 201 Global Safeguard' investigation performed by my organization, the ITC. This refers to the section of the WTO treaty that permits a member state—in this case, the United States—which believes increased imports of a product—in this case, steel—are a substantial cause of serious injury or threat of serious injury to a U.S. industry—in this case, the steel industry—to take action to protect the domestic industry for a designated period of time.[8] This 'window of protection' created by the tariffs on foreign imports gives the threatened domestic industry some breathing room to transform into a more efficient, competitive operation. In other words, even though foreign steel companies are currently doing nothing illegal or unfair, the United States government can make the claim, and has done so, that large amounts of imported (cheaper) steel are causing serious damage to the domestic steel industry. The tariffs will make the imported steel more expensive than the domestic steel, resulting in, hopefully, higher sales and profits for the domestic steel industry. In fact, the big domestic steel producers have been screaming for tariff protection from imported steel for some time. They claim they need time to reform and restructure the domestic steel industry in order to compete with the cheaper foreign steel.

"At the president's request, my organization, the ITC, investigated the 'serious damage' claim made by the U.S. steel industry. Our conclusion was that the U.S. domestic steel industry *was* being harmed by the abundance of cheaper foreign imported steel. Our recommendation to the president was to place protective tariffs on imported steel for a period of

three years. Keep in mind the ITC can only *recommend* remedies to the president—he does not have to follow our recommendation. The steel industry, however, was screaming loud for protection. For whatever reason—be it sound economics or wise political maneuvering—President Bush finally heard them and imposed the protective tariffs on March 6th."

Ed continued, "The ITC offered several remedy options to the president, but the remedy chosen by President Bush was to raise the tariffs on imported steel by an average of 30 percent for periods of time ranging from 18 months to 3 years, depending on the specific steel product. Imported steel comes in many different shapes and forms, and not all imported steel was affected. Additionally, many countries were exempted from the tariff, including Mexico and Canada due to NAFTA agreements—as were 100 additional developing countries. The countries most affected by the tariffs, and consequently the angriest, were Japan, China, Taiwan, Brazil, South Korea, and the European Union. The Europeans are worried for two reasons—first, they export a great deal of steel to the United States, particularly from Germany. The tariffs will no doubt hurt the German steel industry. Second, they fear the excess cheap steel on the global market will end up in Europe if high tariffs keep it out of the United States."[9]

Brett was now beginning to understand the complexity of the issue. He asked Ed his next question, "What were the arguments of the groups who opposed the tariffs? I assume the opposition came primarily from the international arena. What American would not want to protect our domestic steel industry and associated jobs?"

Ed smiled, "Again, not so fast. The answer is complex, but I will try to keep it short. As you say, the opponents of the tariffs do include our international trading partners. Equally angered by the tariffs are the domestic U.S. consumers of steel, and the two groups have joined together in a classic case of 'strange bedfellows.' The consumers of steel—those U.S. industries that use steel in their manufacturing process, like the automobile and shipbuilding industries and the manufacturers of large appliances—were incensed by the new steel tariffs. They claim the steel tariffs will drive up production costs and force an increase in the sale price of their products. This could lead to an industry slowdown and result in an even greater loss of jobs. Some studies indicate there are seven jobs in steel-consuming industries for every one job in the steel-producing industry. They claim the president might save a few jobs in the steel industry but will actually end up eliminating many more jobs in the steel-*consuming* industries—an unintended consequence."[10]

Ed continued, "Our international trading partners are equally, if not more, enraged with the president's decision. The European Union is leading the global steel community in protest against the president's decision. Simply put, the Europeans believe the United States is wrong with respect to the U.S. steel industry being harmed by imported steel and have said so in a complaint filed with the World Trade Organization. The EU claims the International Trade Commission (my organization) failed to adequately separate and subsequently analyze the multiple and diverse steel products imported by the United States. Additionally, the Europeans claim many of the steel products protected by the recent Bush decision are already protected under previously adjudicated and separate antidumping protective

measures, resulting in many products being protected twice by U.S. trade remedies—a case of trade remedy 'double-dipping.'"[11]

Ed continued, "Personally, I think the Europeans make some reasonable arguments—particularly when it comes to the need to protect the U.S. steel industry. As the Europeans and our U.S. domestic steel-consumer industries point out, it is only the larger—and older—integrated steel mills in the United States that complain about the foreign competition. These integrated mills, which manufacture steel using the older, less efficient smelting of iron ore and coking coal, are in big trouble. Not only are they less efficient, they are also burdened with enormous legacy financial commitments (retirement benefits and medical costs) to large populations of retired steelworkers, a financial commitment many believe the steel industry will fail to meet. This financial 'albatross' is preventing the merger of the large steel companies that is required to transform the industry. As you might guess, the stronger of two merging companies does not want to assume responsibility for extraordinary legacy debt commitments of the weaker company. Consequently, there has not been the required 'weeding out' of inefficient noncompetitive steel mills in the United States. The Europeans are quick to point out the protective tariffs set by the Bush administration will only prolong the inevitable agony associated with the downsizing of the U.S. steel industry."[12]

"The Europeans also take great pleasure in pointing to the smaller, successful steel 'mini-mills' that have recently prospered in the United States. These mills are smaller and melt recycled steel scrap in electric-arc furnaces to produce steel products. They use mostly nonunion labor and have few costly, long-term financial obligations to their employees. Bottom line—they are efficient and can compete quite nicely with the international steel producers. While the mini-mills have not been screaming as loud as the less efficient integrated steel mills for tariff protection, they did not protest much when President Bush placed tariffs on their international competition."[13]

Ed added, "We simply agree to disagree with the Europeans and the rest of the world on the steel tariff issue. The steel tariff decision seems to have touched a raw nerve with many of our heretofore trading allies. For the first time in my career, I am actually worried about the future of global free trade. I just hope those of us at the ITC made the right remedy recommendations to President Bush. From an economic perspective, there is much at stake for the United States and the global economy."

Brett looked a bit dazed after hearing Ed's steel speech, but he did have a much better understanding of the issue. Brett then asked, "Ed, because my boss is going to an interagency meeting on the issue next week, can you give me an idea of the politics involved—particularly where each interested agency stands with respect to the steel tariff issue? This is an important part of my prebrief to the admiral."

Ed replied, "No way, my friend. By law, tradition, and plain common sense, politics is beyond the purview of the ITC. You need to talk to your old friends on the National Security Council. They are closer to the West Wing and can give you a clearer picture of the discord this issue created within the executive branch."

Brett thanked Ed and walked quickly to the metro station to catch the blue line train to the White House. He had previously told his NSC contacts that he would stop by to talk about the steel issue. After clearing security, he settled down with Roberta Boggs, an economist with twelve years' experience working on the Reagan, Bush I, and Bush II NSC staffs.

Roberta began, "It is an understatement to say this has been a divisive issue within the administration. The agencies are lining up and towing the party line now that the president has made the tariff decision—but it was anything but tranquillity in the weeks leading up to the 6 March decision. Moreover, once the steel unions and pro-tariff members of Congress began to link the welfare of the domestic steel industry to national security—particularly after 9/11—the issue was on everyone's front burner."

She continued, "The first thing we did at the NSC was to ask Commerce Department to conduct a 'Section 232' study to determine the actual effects of imports of iron ore and steel on the national security of the United States. These '232' investigations are often done by Commerce Department when one or more government agency or congressional member believes a trade issue might have a detrimental effect on national security. We wanted the facts without the political and emotional spin being applied by people on both sides of the steel tariff issue. Commerce consulted with the Defense Department, the Department of Labor, Department of State, Treasury, and Transportation, as well as the Office of the United States Trade Representative and the International Trade Commission. This issue really does cross all agency boundaries."[14]

Roberta continued while pulling the report out from under a stack of papers on her messy desk, "The results were revealing and perhaps surprising. Long story short: the investigation concluded that iron ore and steel are absolutely important to national security; however, the evidence did not support the theory that iron ore and steel imports were a threat to national security. I read directly from the report: '*Although domestic manufacturers of iron ore and semi-finished steel clearly are enduring substantial economic hardship, there is no evidence that imports of these items fundamentally threaten to impair the capability of U.S. industry to produce the quantities of iron ore and semi-finished steel needed to satisfy national security requirements, a modest proportion of total U.S. consumption*.'[15] In fact, your folks at Defense essentially took the steam out of the 'threat to national security' argument being used by the pro-tariff groups. DoD said the demand for steel for weapons systems is a small portion of the domestic industries' output—less than 0.3 percent of the industry's output by weight.[16] They said even after executing a two–Major Theater War [MTW] operation, the need to replenish the force would create a DoD demand for steel that would remain *small* relative to domestic output.[17] To ice the cake, the report quoted DoD in saying 'the department has also found no evidence that there will be a spike in demand for steel by critical industries resulting from the events of September 11, 2001.'"[18]

Roberta closed the report and continued, "In my view, that takes care of traditional national security concerns—there are none. Other agencies involved in assuring the economic and diplomatic well being of the United States—such as State, Treasury, Labor, and others—took a different view. This is where it gets interesting."

She continued, "Let's talk first about those agencies who voiced concerns with the steel tariffs. The State Department is number one on the list. For obvious reasons, State was not thrilled with the prospect of irritating U.S. allies needed to support our war against terrorism—in fact Secretary Powell voiced these exact concerns with the proposed tariffs.[19] State realized it had a 'hot potato' when Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain—one of our staunchest allies—not only wrote to President Bush, but also called him directly to express great concern that steel tariffs would be bad for the world economy as well as for American consumers forced to pay more for steel products. He was concerned enough—at least for a short while—to place the steel tariff issue ahead of the war on terrorism.[20]

"There were others in the anti-tariff camp with State Department," Roberta continued. "While State opposed the tariffs for diplomatic reasons; most others opposing the tariffs did so for economic reasons. This group included such economic stalwarts as the head of the National Economic Council and White House Economic Advisor Lawrence B. Lindsey, Treasury Secretary Paul H. O'Neill, Chief Economic Advisor to the President R. Glenn Hubbard, as well as the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan. Lawrence Lindsey has long held the view that any government intervention in the markets should be limited. Moreover, Lindsey posed the classic economic argument: if other countries want to subsidize the production of raw materials such as steel and sell it at or below cost, that translates into a subsidy for U.S. consumers and steel users. Raising tariffs in the United States makes U.S. manufacturers less competitive by increasing their prices.[21]

"Treasury Secretary O'Neill was worried the United States might lose the lead as the world's foremost promoter of free trade if the tariffs were imposed. He has been outspoken not only on the negative impact of the steel tariffs, but also about pending tariffs on Canadian soft lumber and the return to generous agricultural farming subsidies under consideration right now in Congress. O'Neill says these policies simply don't square with an administration claiming to support free world trade. He was additionally worried, along with the Department of Labor, that the tariff would actually cause a loss of U.S. jobs in the steel-consuming industries.[22]

"Finally," Roberta continued, "Fed chairman Alan Greenspan testified before the House Financial Service Committee that he too was concerned with the potential job loss of those in the steel-consuming industry if the tariffs were imposed. He was not particularly worried about the domestic steel industry because, he noted, the more efficient U.S. mini-mills were doing reasonably well and the amount of steel actually needed for defense purposes is extraordinarily small.[23]

"While you might think Labor Department would have strong views on the issue—considering the variety of job-loss/job-gain numbers being tossed around—they have actually said very little. The fact is, no one is quite sure how many jobs would be 'saved' or 'lost' after the tariff implementation. However, most agree that there will be a sizable pool of winners and losers as well as shifting jobs and incomes between industries, countries, and regions. I suppose the uncertainty of the impact of the tariffs coupled with the political instinct of the Labor Department is enough to keep Labor quiet for the time being."[24]

Roberta continued, "Also of interest to the steel debate is the position taken by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the international organization created in 1947 to monitor and assist developing world economies with economic advice and development loans. While the IMF is an international government organization, the United States is the largest contributor and has enormous influence on the fund's policies. The director of the IMF, Anne Krueger, an economist from Stanford University, claims by setting steel import tariffs, the United States has violated the World Trade Organization commerce rules and is not in accord with international trading rules that the United States has signed up to. She has been quoted as saying the '[steel tariff] protection will at best delay a necessary restructuring of the U.S. steel industry.'"[25]

Brett quickly finished the notes he was taking, took a deep breath, and said, "I am amazed, considering the abundance of high-powered economic rationale against the tariffs, that the president still made the decision to impose the tariffs. Can you tell me 'who's who' on the pro-tariff side?"

"Absolutely," Roberta replied. "First and foremost, Secretary of Commerce Don Evans has been a big supporter of the Bush decision. While initially skeptical of the tariffs, Secretary Evans has recently been very much pro-tariff—for a variety of economic and political reasons. Secretary Evans is very concerned with the jobs that are being lost in the steel industry and downplays the 'fears of inflation' (rising consumer prices) issue promoted by Treasury Department and other White House economic advisors. For example, Secretary Evans believes the higher steel costs brought on by the tariffs will raise the price of a car by just $30. He also points out that the most popular imported steel product—slab steel ingots used to forge steel products—would escape most of the import tariffs.[26] Secretary Evans and the Commerce Department have been a strong cheerleader in support of the steel tariffs. The Commerce secretary is also a savvy politician who understands the dilemma the president is in with the powerful steel unions and their congressional representatives, who are pushing hard for the protective tariffs.[27]

"Then there is the U.S. Trade Representative, Robert Zoellick, who also strongly supports the steel tariff. Zoellick is the president's point man in foreign trade negotiations. Intuitively, you might think he would oppose tariffs on the grounds that they tend to restrict free world trade. In this case, however, he has been one of the first to point out to President Bush the mistakes made by former president Clinton in not doing more for the ailing steel industry prior to the 2000 election. Some say the inaction cost Al Gore the presidency, as West Virginia, a hard-hit steel-producing state, ended up voting for a nonincumbent Republican for the first time since 1928.[28]

"Speaking of political factors," Roberta continued, "I would be remiss if I failed to discuss the importance of the president's top political advisor, Karl Rove. The word from the West Wing is that he is the 800-pound gorilla with respect to this issue. It is rare for a political advisor to take such a prominent role in foreign policy decisions. Reliable sources tell me Secretary Powell is put off by Rove's influence with the president, not only on the steel tariff decision but also on the Middle East, terrorism, and Latin American issues—the Vieques,

Puerto Rico, issue in particular.[29] Rove is politically astute—his focus group meetings with labor groups, business groups, and congressional leaders on the steel tariff issue helped shape his advice to the president. For example, Rove knows that thirty-one steel companies have filed for bankruptcy protection in the last three years—mostly the older integrated steel mills that smelt iron ore to produce steel. These bankrupt mills are located in swing states critical to the Republican Party in the November '02 midterm elections. These include the industrial Midwest states of West Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan. The Republicans need to win these states to have any hope of winning control of the Senate and retaining control of the House. These states will also be critical to a Bush 2004 presidential campaign.[30]

"Perhaps you should point out—or warn—your admiral of the power wielded by Karl Rove. While this sort of influence is not unprecedented, it is highly unusual for a political advisor to have such influence on such a broad spectrum of issues. The admiral should be aware of this before he walks into next week's meeting."

Roberta added, "Even though Congress will not participate in the Pentagon meeting next week, you should still brief your admiral on how they view the issue. As you might expect, both Republicans and Democrats from the critical Midwest industrial states are very supportive of the steel tariffs. They did not hesitate to make mild, and not so mild, threats to the White House regarding their personal support for the president's legislative agenda if he did not implement the tariffs. After all, there are thousands of voters in all these states who would experience great personal loss without the protective tariffs."

Roberta paused, then continued, "On the other side of the coin are the congressional representatives from the steel-consuming states who have aligned themselves with the 'free traders' who believe in the economic theory of comparative advantage, where each country produces those things in which it is comparatively more efficient. If a particular country is very efficient at making steel, then we should buy our steel from that country and focus U.S. labor and resources on producing those things at which we are most efficient. It makes for good economic theory but lousy political policy. Nevertheless, congressional heavyweights such as Senators John Breaux and Trent Lott joined forces with Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert to oppose the tariff. At the end of the day, I think political considerations coupled with a perception of minimum economic risk led President Bush to impose the tariffs."[31]

Brett finished scribbling wildly and commented, "Despite the interagency and congressional squabbling, it seems that most, if not all, of the president's men have fallen in line and are now supporting the steel tariffs."

Roberta responded, "This is true, but the anti-tariff people might have had a bigger impact than we thought. As we speak, the Commerce Department is working hard to expand the list of developing states that would be exempt from the steel tariff. The list has grown to well over one hundred states. Additionally, thousands of waiver and exemption requests are being reviewed to expand the list of steel products that would be exempt from the steel tariffs. It seems to many of us the steel tariff regime is being 'watered down' to please the many

domestic and international special interest groups who opposed the idea from the beginning. Some say the tariff implementation is starting to look more and more like an expedient political decision versus a decision based on sound economic theory. Both sides make reasonable arguments—you need to make up your own mind."

Brett thanked Roberta for her insights and explanation of the complex interaction between the various Washington agencies during the steel tariff decision-making process. He realized there was much to learn about the many government agencies with which he would likely interact in his new job. As he walked toward the Washington Metro station, his thoughts turned to the difficult task of preparing his boss for the interagency meeting next week at the Pentagon.

Contemplating his immediate future, Brett very much longed for the 'good old days' of leisurely steaming at fifteen knots across the blue South Pacific ocean—when the only "steel" worry he had was whether or not the sides of his sleek destroyer were running with rust—and when his immediate boss and the numerous government agencies were thousands of miles away and had no easy way to reach out and ruin his day.

ADDENDUM

(20 MONTHS LATER)

ON BOARD THE USS *RONALD REAGAN* (CVN-76), SOMEWHERE IN THE PERSIAN GULF: Rear Admiral Brett Lee, USN, Battle Group Commander, stood on the bridge wing, inhaling the intoxicating mix of jet exhaust and salt air, the wind swiping at his collar, feeling the warmth of the Gulf sun on his face. . . .

The Officer of the Deck interrupted his reverie. "Sir, you have a call from assistant secretary of the navy." Regretfully departing his reverie, Lee walked down to the Combat Information Center (CIC).

Brett was soon talking with his old boss, the former commander NAVSEA, now the assistant secretary of the navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASA RD&A). "Brett, the president just announced he is going to lift the steel sanctions. I know you are our expert on this, and I need some insight from you on what it will mean for the Navy—and I need it this afternoon."

Brett had been here before; he replied, "Yes sir, I'll get right on it."

Sitting down at the desk in his admiral's quarters, Brett was surprised to find that the satellite Internet connection was faster on the ship than in his old office at the Pentagon. He called up recent *Washington Post* articles as well as the president's "Statement on Steel," dated 4 December 2003.

The *Post* article covered the fact that in the twenty months after imposing steel tariffs, the steel industry underwent a great transformation. This remarkable change included bankruptcies that led to consolidations. Old plants, not used in years, were springing to life. The Benefit Guaranty Corporation (BGC) had been part of this change by greatly easing the burden on many steel corporations. Basically, the BGC was the government entity that took over failing company pension plans. Also, organized labor had cut payrolls. The mills themselves had introduced innovative manufacturing techniques and slashed staffs—sometimes by 50 percent. In short, U.S. steel was healthier than it had been in a long time.

Brett understood President Bush was accepting significant political risk by ending the steel safeguard measures. Several Rust Belt states might go against him in 2004, including Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio. Even the president's advisors believed this would be one of the 'diciest political calculations of his term.' However, other analysts believed votes potentially lost in the Rust Belt states would be made up in the southern and midwestern manufacturing states that used steel. Brett smiled as he reflected he was now in command of several of those states' products.

The admiral also realized that, internationally, the tariffs had been little more than a disaster. Viewed as another unilateral international agreement designed and implemented by an isolationist administration, the steel tariffs set off international trade wars. European

countries, angered by a perception of U.S. hypocrisy from an administration that, proclaiming itself in favor of free trade, threatened to impose sanctions on citrus, motorcycles, farm machinery, textiles, shoes, and other American products. In late November 2003, the World Trade Organization ruled the Bush steel tariffs illegal, clearing the way for retaliatory European sanctions. Many in Washington argued this pending punishment contributed to the president's decision to cancel the tariffs.

Hoping to assuage voters in key states, Trade Representative Robert Zoellick told reporters that the tariffs had worked as planned. The president reinforced this message with his announcement, "I took action to give the industry a chance to adjust to the surge in foreign imports. . . . These safeguards have now achieved their purpose and as a result of changed economic circumstances it is time to revoke them."

Admiral Lee quickly wrote out a point paper in the proper format and sent it via e-mail to the secretary, with an info copy to the vice CNO. Heading back to the bridge, he heard the distinct sound of the ship's catapults flinging several thousand pounds of U.S. steel into the sky.

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The Challenge of Opportunity: Rebuilding Iraq, 2003

CLEMSON G. TURREGANO, JOHN F. GAROFANO, & GEORGE A. COX

This case study examines the origins of U.S. reconstruction policy on Iraq, a review of the region, and several transitions in personnel and organizational structure. After reading the case, students should be able to discuss how U.S. planning for reconstruction evolved, the international and regional factors that came into play, and how the policy surrounding reconstruction evolved. Students should be able to assess the international, domestic, and bureaucratic factors impinging on policy making during this period. It will also be useful to assess, in hindsight, what transitions in planning and organization have been made since the first months after the war. This case study, prepared by Dr. Clemson Turregano, LTC, USA, and Dr. John Garofano, faculty members of the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College, and Captain George Cox, USN, faculty member of the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College from 2002 to 2003, is being used as part of the school's curriculum.

THE TASKER

It was late April as LTC Jack Rawlins walked to his new office in a Washington, D.C., think tank. Although he had drawn a choice assignment following graduation from the Naval War College in November, and he understood the critical nature of his new position, he regretted being left out of the war in Iraq. Assigned to a prominent Washington think tank, his job was to provide a military perspective and up-to-date military-related information to policy analysis teams working for various agencies, members of congress, senior levels at the Pentagon, and for the think tank itself. Jack had just stepped in the door when he noticed Mac Moise approaching him. As director of studies, Mac was Jack's superior.

"Morning, Jack—Got a minute?"

"Always got a minute for the boss," Jack replied.

Together, they went to Jack's office. Mac got right to the point, "We've got a critical analysis we would like you to head up. The buzz on rebuilding Iraq is huge and we want to be on the leading edge of the curve, out front with analysis and recommendations."

"OK, no problem," Jack replied. "I'll surf the net, download some stuff, look it over, and get something to you by this afternoon."

Mac held up his hand, palm out, in the universal "hold it" sign. "That's a good start, but we want to know what is *really* going on and where things are likely to lead. First of all, what are the U.S. goals and interests? Second, what are the president's options? Think about military, diplomatic, and other instruments of power. Many have mentioned the United Nations and IGOs as our tickets out. Is that realistic? And how long do we stay? Third, who is

making decisions here—is it the same as who conducted the war, or what? Fourth, based on your analysis of the forces at work, what is our policy likely to be? How will we accomplish them? We need to know, for example, what DoD's role is in the ORHA [Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance], and how the other agencies fit in. In the end what we need is a sense of where U.S. policy is headed and why. By answering all of these questions we can make some useful contributions to the policy debate."

"OK, now I see. . ."

"Before you take off, let me give you some background on the home front. We are thinking that rebuilding Iraq may have some overflow into the domestic arena. As you know, the economy is suffering from the recession, and many state and local governments are up in arms over the amount of money they have had to spend on homeland security. Many large cities are going to bust their budget from the severe winter, and the costs involved with keeping the city running with all the snow they have been having. Needless to say, we see the president getting a lot of pressure to focus more on domestic issues.

"At the same time, the president's tax cut proposal is a mixed bag. There was a straight party vote in the House before the Senate cut it in half. This may signal the beginning of the end of the presidential bubble of support he has enjoyed since 9-11. It could also mean a further squeeze on the budget. If that is the case, money spent to rebuild Iraq could be used against him politically, and that helps those who are running against him."

Jack saw he had a tall order to fill.

"Good luck," Mac said. "I'd love to do it myself but more doors would slam in my face than I could count. Some people over there still aren't happy about how I helped save them money by recommending the army cancel the Crusader! Oh, and I need your info at least by mid-May so we can review it and make some decisions on where we want to go with this. That gives you some time to do research and interviews, plus since the issue is so new, we have time for it to develop as well."

After escorting his boss out of the office, Jack began laying out a game plan. He knew he had to go to the Pentagon, to State, and to some other think tanks. Jack decided to start with Dr. Yee Hang in the Near East Bureau at State for some insight on the history and cultural problems facing U.S. policy.

SITUATION ON THE GROUND

It was early May when Jack made his way through security to the fourth floor of the State Department building. Although the halls were empty and every door closed, once shown into the bureau there was a flurry of activity. The receptionist greeted him, stating that Dr. Hang was in an emergency meeting, but Jack could wait in the anteroom. Looking around, he spotted what appeared to be a young intern coming forward with his hand outstretched.

"Colonel Rawlins?" The young intern timidly asked.

"That's me," Jack replied.

"Yes sir, Dr. Hang told me you were coming. He may be a little while, but if you would like to discuss Iraq, I would be more than happy to talk with you."

Jack paused, wondering if he should even bother to talk with what appeared to be a very young, graduate-level intern. "OK—what's your job?"

"First, allow me to introduce myself . . . I'm Mike Cowan . . . here's my card."

Reviewing the card, Jack discovered he was not talking to an intern at all, but the Iraq desk officer. Jack adjusted his tone a little, noting that Mike's office contained more books with Arabic titles than with English titles.

Noticing Jack's searching look, Mike continued, "My favorite is Arabic poetry. I've been studying the language for about ten years now, since my freshman year in college. It came in handy in Damascus, Beirut, and Tel Aviv. Now, I'm . . . what do you guys say . . . flying a desk . . . so my skills aren't what they should be. However, I'm a true Iraqi history buff—how can I help you?"

Jack took out his notebook and got comfortable. "Well, quite simply, what do you see as the future for Iraq?"

Mike chuckled. "Well, I think you will have to ask someone upstairs for that answer. However, from where I sit, to understand the range of futures for Iraq, we really need to look at its past. Throughout its history, Iraq has been pushed and pulled from different sides both inside and outside of the country. The general area known since the eighth century as *al-'Iraq*, meaning something like 'the shore of a great river along its length, as well as the grazing land surrounding it,'[1] was home to Sumerian, Babylonian, and Parthian civilizations before falling to the Assyrians, then to the Persians. It was the site of the major schism within Islam when, in AD 680, the Shia [or Shi'i] leader Husayn [or Hussein] was killed by Sunni [Su'uni] rivals at Karbala.[2] For centuries Sunni Ottoman sultans competed with the Shiite shahs of Persia for this area between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which Europeans called 'Mesopotamia.' Civil wars and Mongol invasions were followed by the clear assertion of Ottoman power in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

"Already, some familiar patterns of control were emerging. Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul were the major power centers with little centralized control beyond. Ottoman control ebbed and flowed depending on their willingness to exert force and their ability to strike bargains with local leaders. And the *mamlak* pashas, the military elites of the empire, who ruled each province, did so only by making alliances with powerful Arab tribal chieftaincies or with Kurdish clans. So the political picture was complex, with some centralization but even more decentralization, and with only nominal subservience to the Ottoman rulers.

"The British occupied Iraq following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Governing under a League of Nations mandate, they established a monarchy in 1921, and the kingdom became independent in 1932 under a constitutional monarchy. The king maintained a close relationship with Britain, one predicated on oil and the place of the Middle East in the British Empire. After the Second World War, Iraq joined the Arab

League, opposed the creation of Israel, and took up the cause of pan-Arabism. Domestically, neither the monarchy nor the parliament ever succeeded in obtaining majority support for stable, civil government. Coups and countercoups, outside influence, and internal repression continued right through the July 1958 coup by the left-wing Baath [Ba'ath] party. The new regime then turned against the West, nationalized oil and other industries, and broke up large landholdings.

"The Baath party members were pretty radical Socialists. They brought in Soviet advisors and armaments, partly to prepare for the 1973 war against Israel [Iraq sent troops to the Syrian front lines]. In 1975, Iraq took on their historical enemies, the Kurds, who were defeated at great cost. Saddam Hussein took over the government in a 1979 coup. A year later he went to war with Iran, which would last eight years and cost maybe a million lives total. With the fall of the Shah a recent memory, the United States wanted friends in the region and extended an open hand to Saddam. When the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988, the international community criticized Iraq's continued repression and weapons programs. Of course, you know the rest. In 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait, setting the stage for the Gulf War. Though Saddam Hussein was defeated he was left in power and for a decade stymied United Nations weapons inspectors while manipulating economic sanctions.[3]

"In short, when you look at Iraq, you need to look at both the internal and the external challenges to see why the Iraqi people are so paranoid about conquerors, dictators, and, some would say, centralized government in general."

Jack replied, "I've read a little about this and see it every day on TV— you have the Shia in the south, the Sunnis kind of in the center, and the Kurds in the north, right?"

Smiling, the young State Department officer nodded his head. "You've got it, but that is just the beginning. Here are some maps that I use to keep all the different ethnicities and religions straight [see figures 1–3]. The Shiites, who live all over the nation but are concentrated more in the south, make up the majority program. They have some organized religious-political leadership at the local and regional level, but also are divided into different camps. The moderate cleric Abdul Majid al-Khoei, who seemed to have been widely respected, was murdered on 10 April. This left two major power groups. In Najaf, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani holds sway, and is sitting on the fence with respect to using religion to increase his power. He is opposed by Mohammed Baquir Al-Hakim, who has spent the last twenty years in Iran and heads the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq [SCIRI]. SCIRI, in turn, has the 'Badr Brigade' of five to ten thousand armed soldiers. Al-Hakim has called on all Shiites to "demand a government that will bring liberty, independence, and justice for all Iraqis under an Islamic regime." Remember when the ORHA had its first meeting in Al Nasiriya? This is the fundamentalist group that boycotted the meeting and marched outside of it."

"Will we accept such a thing?"

"Well, that is a good question, and one you and I both have to anticipate and figure out. On the one hand, it doesn't seem like we went to war to bring about an Islamic theocracy. I'd

Figure 1: Distribution of Ethnoreligious Groups and Major Tribes



Ethnic Group	Estimated Population	Also Found In	Religion	Language
Arabs	16 to 20 million	Throughout North Africa and the Middle East, Iran	65-80 percent Shia, 20-30 percent Sunni, less than 5 percent Christian	Arabic (Iraqi dialect)
Kurds	3.6 to 4.8 million	Turkey, Iran, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan	Mostly Sunni, Shia, and Yazidi minority	Kurdish
Turkomans	300,000 to 800,000	Related to other Turkic peoples in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan	Primarily Sunni	South Azeri Turkish
Others	As many as 1 million	Mostly Christians, Iranians, and other groups found in the Middle East	At least 50 percent Christian; Shias, Sunnis, and members of other religions account for the balance	Mostly Arabic, some Persian and other languages

bet the U.S. public doesn't think so, either. On the other hand, you should think about just how bad that would be. Maybe it would be better than Saddam's Baathists coming back to power or even trying to do so."

"But I saw reports saying that we destroyed the Baath Party."

"We defeated the military arm, but the party pervaded the country at every level of government. There are indications that many of them may be hanging around, convinced the United States will leave before long, so they can make another run for it."

"That's quite a dilemma."

"Whether it will come to pass or not is another question. We shouldn't become hysterical about seeing thousands of people on a religious parade. They've been prevented from practicing their religion for decades, at great cost. This is a small percentage of Shiites. The real issue is how much support the more fundamentalist clerics have. We don't know for sure. Many of them got off to a fast start because they remained secretly organized throughout the Saddam era. But we think we can fight them politically. We hope more people will support the idea of the separation of church and state than will support the idea of a theocracy. In any case, it ain't gonna fly with the Kurds, and probably not with the Sunnis. And as for al-Hakim, many see him as an outsider, from Iran. We believe we can capitalize on the nationalistic side of Iraqis."

"So that's the Shiites . . . "

Figure 2: Sunni Areas in Iraq
Source: The General Libraries, the University of Texas at Austin

"There are also a large number of Shiites, the 'Marsh Arabs,' who once lived in the wetlands south of Baghdad and stretched to the Iranian border. This is the ecologically invaluable area associated with the biblical Garden of Eden. But Saddam tried to exterminate them, and many now live in refugee camps outside of Baghdad, hoping to return home if their environment can be repaired. We and the UN have scientists working on this now. We need to oversee this major resettlement program.

"Then there are the Sunni, who compose only about 20 percent—we really need a census, by the way, because we aren't sure how many there are of any group and each one inflates their numbers in order to try to gain leverage—of

the population but, for reasons going back to tribal and religious connections long ago, they have always held a dominant position in the government. This was especially true under Saddam. A big concern of yours has to be how they will react to what will necessarily be a decrease in their political power. They won't be happy.

"Then in the north, atop or near many of the oil fields, are the Kurds, roughly 17 to 20 percent of the population. The Iraqis tried to arabize Kurdistan during the Hussein regime, killing between 50,000 and 100,000, destroying 4,000 villages, and displacing over 600,000. It was in the *Al Anfal* ["The Spoils"] campaign against the Kurds that Saddam fully integrated the use of chemical weapons into his plans, using them for tactical military purposes as well as simply for wiping out civilians.

"The United States has developed a close relationship with the Kurds since Northern Watch. And in the last ten years Iraqi Kurdistan has become something of a functioning, prosperous, democratic pseudostate, with solid economic growth, stability, and legal guarantees for basic human rights—a real success story and one that probably has influenced some like Undersecretaries Wolfowitz and Armitage, Richard Perle, and others who are optimistic about the prospects for importing western, market-oriented, democratic government to the region.

"The Kurds seem to have accepted the fact that the United States retains its clear war aim of maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity. But the Kurds do have their own interests. During the war they assured us they would not occupy oil-rich Kirkuk. They did anyway, but when we protested, they moved out of the town. At least, they moved out with fighters—we think they may have left organizers and some fighters anyway to try and secure that town for the semiautonomous region that some refer to as Kurdistan.

"Politically, the area is divided between the Kurdistan Democratic Party under Masood Barzani in the northern part, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan under Jalal Talalbani to the south [see figure 3]. These are real, active, organized entities, but so far only within Iraqi Kurdistan. Also, Barzani was formerly a chief proponent of an independent Kurdistan. . . . "

Jack interjected, "But wouldn't that upset the Turks?"

"Bingo," Mike replied. "The Kurds are a nation that is not entirely within Iraqi borders [see figure 4]. The Turkish government does not want them to be independent, because it may threaten not just the security of the Turkish state, but its survival as well. The whole Kurd thing will be something we want to watch very closely as we try to rebuild Iraq. The Kurds have pledged to remain our allies and not upset regional stability by incursions into Turkey, but this is not a guarantee of future behavior. Another problem is that in the middle of the war Kurds began to expel the Arabs Saddam had sent there. So they aren't exactly gaining broad national support among the national majority.

"There are other opposition groups with no particular geographic or ethnic backing. The Iraqi National Congress under Ahmed Chalabi previously included many other political elements, including Arab nationalists and even SCIRI. But now it is basically built on the

Figure 3: Kurdish Areas of Northern Iraq



resources and external support of Chalabi. Educated at MIT and the University of Chicago, he is the favorite of many in the Pentagon, but has a very small base of support within Iraq itself. Other weak groups include the Iraqi National Accord and the Constitutional Monarchy Movement.

"Finally, I should say a few more words about the Baath Party. In Saddam's system of ruling Iraq, just outside the innermost circle—'the people of trust'—were 'the people of expertise.' These were the western-trained technocrats who ran the party, the national and local government offices, and the military. This is, essentially, the middle class, something that most democracies are built on. Unfortunately, this one consisted of some of the worst offenders."

Figure 4: Kurdish Areas in the Middle East and the Soviet Union



"Can we do what we did in Germany?" Jack asked.

"We can denazify them, yes, but then we'll need to figure out who will run the government, the police, the military, etc.[4] Oh—here comes Dr. Hang. I hope that I haven't bored you with this overview.

"Absolutely not—it was just what I needed to provide a foundation for my study. I have your card, so I hope you will not mind my contacting you later with any questions."

"Thanks for seeing me on such short notice," Jack said. "I was wondering if we might talk for a few minutes about the rebuilding and the role of the State Department."

Dr. Hang smiled appreciatively. "Please call me Yee," he said, and offered Jack another cup of coffee. "You have identified a key challenge facing the department. We began the planning process as early as April 2002 with our 'Future of Iraq' project. We met with dozens of Iraqi scholars and international experts and set up multiple interagency working groups. We got some agreement among the opposition groups that we brought in."

Jack then read from a statement by the founder of the Iraqi Forum for Democracy, saying the serious work began only when war was imminent. " . . . [I]t came a little bit too late. It should have been at least twelve months before that so that reports could come out and you could have a public debate outside Iraq and perhaps even inside Iraq. . . . People on the ground still look at the U.S. as a colonizing power." Jack then read from a *Washington Post* article citing a "senior U.S. official" saying, "The planning was ragged, and the execution was worse."[5]

Yee straightened in his chair. "You see, State is not in the habit of running countries. Our strength lies more with diplomatic relations, representing the government, and developing treaties through negotiations. Actually running a country falls far from our level of expertise. Besides, the Pentagon has all the logistics needed to run an operation like this—you have all the trucks and people needed to get an event like this flowing. We would have to contract and hire all the assets we need. Worse yet, we would have to ask DoD for them—and that is more difficult than it is worth. So how far could we proceed in planning? We could get people together and learn about the problem."

"So you don't think this has anything to do with the ongoing feud between the secretary of state and the secretary of defense?" Jack asked.

"I don't know, really. They definitely have a history, and different professional backgrounds as well. I read an article in *Time* that outlined their idiosyncrasies pretty well. Powell is a general who understands how all things are connected, trusts the military, and wants to work through coalitions. Rumsfeld is a corporate CEO, who has a distinct vision for the world, wants to shake up the military, and feels strong enough to go it alone.[6]

"On the other hand, one former diplomat has said recently that Powell understands the military and knows what it can do.[7] Powell himself said that 'The military commander must be in charge for a period of time to stabilize the country . . . there is enough work for everyone to have a role.'[8] He may also be revising his own Powell corollary to the Weinberger doctrine—maybe overwhelming force, or presence, isn't necessary any more. Actually, there are many reasons why General Powell might be more comfortable with the Pentagon running postwar Iraq than with the diplomats who advised him during months of failed efforts to win international backing for the war.

"With all respect to my superiors, however, General Powell had a huge fight on his hands, just in executing the mission of the Department of State. When the second UN resolution did not go through, the relationship between military and diplomatic power shifted—now the environment is one where diplomatic power is supporting the military power—not the other way around. Some of that is a natural progression of events before a war. Unfortunately, all of that was playing out as we decided who was going to run Iraq after the war. If you remember, the press was very interested in postwar issues even before the president stated that we were going to war. I still am not exactly sure how they made the decision to create ORHA, but it came down from the White House in mid-January and the directive said that it was going to fall under DoD. I think one could argue that Secretary

Rumsfeld, having a better relationship with the president, argued convincingly that in the immediate aftermath of the war, having the military follow on in a stability and rebuilding role just made sense. But I don't think we will know the entire truth for some time."

"What I'm hearing from you is that people probably did think about the postwar situation, even if that might not be obvious today."

"Think about it!" Yee exclaimed. "I had a safe full of plans for the postwar situation. But the Pentagon and the CIA drew up their own plans, too. And Garner mapped out his strategies at a resort in Kuwait, where he sat for two months. So there was planning."

"But it all went in different directions. . . ."

"Not necessarily. I don't know what exactly the other plans were, but I know that a common element was to hit the ground running and develop momentum quickly. The reality was that the situation just wasn't safe enough to send in the teams. I'll leave it up to you to decide whether that could have been dealt with or not. Then, there were some things that just didn't happen. For example, there was supposed to be a phone network set up for five thousand cell phones so all the good guys could talk to each other. Where are they? And then you have events like the shooting at U.S. soldiers and our firing back and killing civilians, and all of a sudden Garner's staff isn't out among the population any more because it isn't safe. Now they travel in armed convoys. Imagine dispersing 150,000 troops throughout a hostile state the size of California—New England plus New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York, and Delaware—and you see the problem."[9]

Jack nodded, stating, "But now, the war is over. The question that confronts us is whether that relationship shifts back to the traditional one of the military in support of diplomatic power, or remains the same. This is the critical problem facing us in rebuilding Iraq. We must ask ourselves, as we discuss ORHA—can a military organization rebuild a country? What will State's role be in this rebuilding process?"

"Well, as you know, the president has just recently named L. Paul Bremer to be the special envoy and administrator for Iraq. Although he will report to the secretary of defense, he will effectively be the new boss of the director of ORHA—Jay Garner until last week. State understands that he doesn't have the support and logistics enjoyed by Garner, but we are more interested in the momentum that this gives us. Our real goal is focused on getting an Iraqi Interim Authority. Mr. Bremer, although somewhat aggressive for a State Department operative, will help to oversee all the responsibilities that coalition partners and we shall have in Iraq.[10] You see, the key to us here in State is to create a legitimate Iraqi Interim Authority. The quicker that is created and legitimized, the quicker we can transition from the ORHA. As you know, we got a start to this in Nasirya, and in the town hall meetings that Jay Garner had conducted in Baghdad. What we would like to do is use the people that we know within Iraq to get the country going again. We would like to reestablish the basic necessities, and then transition into our traditional role—running country assistance from an embassy."

Jack spoke up, "Yes, Mike was filling me in on the challenges facing any type of interim authority—you have Chalabi, Barzani, the Shias, the Suunis, the Kurds, all vying for power . . . not to mention the Iranians."

"Don't forget the Baathist diehards who simply want to embarrass us at every turn," Yee added. "The question facing Mr. Bremer and Jay Garner is, whom do you support? The Pentagon has long favored Chalabi and now Secretary Rumsfeld is providing an army for him! The Iraqi people see Chalabi as an outsider. I think we would go so far as to name him a carpetbagger. Why don't we commit resources to undermine the effects of the Iranians? There is no doubt that the Iraqi people are happy we did what we did—just look at what Thomas Friedman of the *New York Times* has been saying for years—that Arab populations want greater democracy. The problem is, now that they have it their view is 'thank you for our freedom, now GO!'

"We need to proceed in three areas quickly and simultaneously. First, the economy. Iraqi oil is its financial engine—we have to get it going in order to fuel the Iraqi economic recovery. This means increasing capacity, which means getting a lot of expertise on the ground in a hurry. As much as possible should be local, but some will be external. Then we have to open up the pumping of oil to the free market so that it doesn't become another corrupt, inefficient government handout that falls into disrepair. This means allowing assets to go to the highest bidder, even if they come, for example, from France. There is, too, the small matter of locating about $1 billion in stolen currency, which we think is in Syria and Jordan.

"The Congress, and the U.S. military, are setting up auditing agencies in Baghdad to monitor how U.S. taxpayers' money is spent and how contracts are awarded. The GAO will do the work for the Congress, the inspector general for the Pentagon. We have spent a couple billion already, and an independent think tank has estimated the total bill at between $100 billion and $500 billion. Meanwhile Democrats have already said that the contract process is unfair.

"At the same time, there are a host of reconstruction issues that need to be handled. Order has to be restored and—something many forget—enforced. This means rehabilitating a police force, and fast. The population has to be disarmed. An army has to be rebuilt. Hopefully we will have more success than in Afghanistan, where we've been able to get an effective battalion or so together since that war ended. A system of open, transparent public administration needs to be set up. A legal system has to be built; most of the trained personnel are complicit in the past. An entire financial system must be set up, one that can both disburse money in a reasonable way and control monetary policy. Needless to say, there isn't much expertise floating around. Elections must be planned. Public works and public utilities companies must be created. An untold number of cases involving expropriated or stolen private property are waiting to be heard. We must get the Iraqi people access to modern communications and some degree of competitive media. Agriculture, fisheries, and other programs have to be set up; before the war, due to Saddam's policies, 60 percent of the population was

fed by the oil-for-food program rather than through self-reliance, which if you think about it is mind boggling.

"That may be the easy part. Finally, we must get a firm grip on who is going to be the Iraqi Interim Authority. During a meeting at Tallil airbase on 15 April, I think they set sound foundations for the creation of such an authority. They agreed on thirteen points released by United States Central Command headquarters in Qatar after a meeting to discuss the future of Iraq. The meeting included Iraqi political and religious leaders as well as U.S. and British officials. Here is a copy of the thirteen points."[11]

- Iraq must be democratic.
- The future government of Iraq should not be based on communal identity.
- A future government should be organized as a democratic federal system, but on the basis of countrywide consultation.
- The rule of law must be paramount.
- That Iraq must be built on respect for diversity, including respect for the role of women.
- The meeting discussed the role of religion in state and society.
- The meeting discussed the principle that Iraqis must choose their leaders, not have them imposed from outside.
- That political violence must be rejected, and that Iraqis must immediately organize themselves for the task of reconstruction at both the local and national levels.
- That Iraqis and the coalition must work together to tackle the immediate issues of restoring security and basic services.
- That the Baath Party must be dissolved and its effects on society must be eliminated.
- That there should be an open dialogue with all national political groups to bring them into the process.
- That the meeting condemns the looting that has taken place and the destruction of documents.

Yee continued, "Iraqi participants in the Nasiriya meeting voted that there should be further meetings on a regular basis with additional participants in order to discuss procedures for developing an Iraqi Interim Authority. The next six months are going to be critical—and I can bet that the president really wants to get us off the front pages in the next six months."

Six months? Jack wondered. "Can they accomplish this?"

"Do we have a choice?"

Jack thanked Yee profusely for his time, made his way out, and caught the Metro to the Pentagon for his next appointment.

THE STRUCTURE

LTC Rawlins entered the building and began looking for the office that held the ORHA-Rear. He found the office in a small alcove, tucked between the Mall area and one of the many coffee shops that now dotted the Pentagon's hallways. Taped on the door was a small, unobtrusive sign—"Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance." That was the only clue that this office was the prime conduit of information for the organization tasked to rebuild a country.

Knocking on the door, LTC Rawlins heard a small buzzer, and the door opened. "I'm Calhoun Garris," he said with an extremely broad South Carolina accent. Welcome to ORHA-Rear. You must be Lieutenant Colonel Rawlins. We can't talk here—too loud and too much going on—let's head down the hall for a cup of joe."

After settling comfortably in the new overstuffed leather couches and chairs, COL Garris leaned forward and abruptly began the conversation. "I know what you want . . . went through NWC back in '99 . . . great place—I really enjoyed the case studies in NSDM—thought it was a wonderful way to teach military officers. Now you want to use me and ORHA-Rear as insight into what's going on in Iraq, right?"

"Yes, sir, that's about it," LTC Rawlins replied.

"Well, as we say in the army, you are SOL—we don't do policy in this office. When they called me down here from J4 to help run this place they said they needed someone to handle admin and paperwork—ship people out, that kind of stuff. The director, recently Jay Garner, executes policy and he doesn't need another policy guy back here getting between him and the SECDEF."

LTC Rawlins was disappointed. "Well, sir, perhaps you can just give me some background on ORHA and how it came about. It is an entirely new beast, after all, and brand new to the Pentagon, not to mention one of the hottest organizations in DoD right now."

COL Garris laughed. "I agree to that—hot we are. Well, it won't hurt to give you some deep background stuff similar to what I gave the press a couple of months ago. Basically, we came into being by a directive that the president signed on 20 January of this year. That decision created an office in DoD to deal with postconflict Iraq. We started out real slow, with only two to three folks, but now we have ninety-six on the books we keep and a lot more coming. Of course, the total military manpower are the ones that we are responsible for—it doesn't count all the teams from USAID [US Agency for International Development] and the folks that CENTCOM has lent us. All told, if you include those folks, we have about two thousand people involved in our setup.[12]

"All these people come from many different agencies. We have army, navy, Marines, State, Treasury, USAID, Justice, and other folks. We also have allies on the team from the UK Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Defense. Also included are liaison units from the United Kingdom and Australia on the team. So, even though the newspapers argue that it is a U.S. initiative, it is definitely an international, interagency team,

with people from all different functions bringing their expertise to the process of rebuilding Iraq."

"But where did all this come from?"

"Well, first, we took some of the plans the interagency had laid out and tried to connect all the dots. Then we staged a rehearsal at Fort McNair over the weekend of 21–22 February. This rehearsal involved over two hundred people from the interagency and helped us address the myriad of issues that we may face as we try to rebuild Iraq. Then we tried to address the issues brought out by the rehearsal—issues involving not only rebuilding Iraq, but also the organizational issues involved with putting ORHA together. For instance, do we have enough money? To whom do we report? Do we have transportation? What is the end state? Of course there was some friction that the interagency had to come to the Pentagon to do all this, but as we went through the rehearsal and the issue answering that followed, it helped bond the team and cement strong relationships.

"I think this was key. If you asked Jay Garner or any member of the team, I think they will tell you that the goal of the team was to put together a solid set of plans that they could take into the country, implement those plans, stay as long as necessary, and get out as fast as we can. The ultimate goal is to turn Iraq over to the Iraqi people, but with a government that expresses the free will of the people of Iraq and also is not likely to threaten its neighbors or anyone else. We want to start turning things over immediately, and every day turn over more and more. We have begun doing this in many small towns and in Baghdad as we have worked with the police to return to the streets, and have restored many public works and utilities."

"So Jay Garner wanted to get in and get out."

"A bit more than that, but you've got the basic idea. He served two tours in Vietnam, in 1967–68 as an infantry adviser in the central highlands and in 1971–72 in the strategic hamlet program, which as you know involved relocating tens of thousands of Vietnamese into areas heavily protected by U.S. forces. Jay thinks the war was a failure because the United States had the 'wrong military objective.' In fact I've heard him say, 'It just took too long. We should have taken the war north instead of waiting in the south. Just like here. If President Bush had been president, we would have won.'"

Heavy stuff, Jack thought. "That might explain why the president hasn't said much about how long we will stay, except to say that we want to turn it over as soon as possible to a responsible government 'of the Iraqi people, for the Iraqi people.' And I've noticed that economic adviser Larry Lindsey, who publicly estimated war costs at $100 billion, and General Shinseki, who said several hundred thousand troops would be required to secure postwar Iraq, have been taken on publicly by some officials. Incidentally, the army estimates that two divisions will remain busy for several months while another is trained to replace them. Is that a realistic assessment of what is needed if. . . ."

Garris smiled. "Have I mentioned that we don't do policy in this office? What I can tell you is that the 'commander in the field' for this particular operation had a very good relationship with the secretary of defense. They have known each other well since the 1990s when Garner served on the missile defense commission chaired by the secretary. They spoke every night by video, and sometimes Mr. Rumsfeld called him directly. I doubt that will be the case with the new director.

"So there we are. To accomplish our mission, we have divided our administrative tasks into groups corresponding to three parts of the country. Here's the outline [see figure 5]. Each one of these looks like a vertical stovepipe, but there are many avenues of communication with other processes and functions within the ORHA and military chain of command. On one side, you have the three pillars—humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and civil affairs. HA is responsible for tasks such as handling refugees, demining, human rights, and

Figure 5: Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance



public health. They are also tasked with UN/NGO coordination, oil-for-food coordination, and sanctions issues.

"The reconstruction coordinator is a very experienced USAID official who will oversee functions such as education, electricity, health, water and sanitation, banking, and economic development, just to name a few of his duties. The Civil Administration coordinator is responsible for justice, information, oil and energy, political transformation, and foreign affairs. So you can see that the three pillars just about cover most of the responsibilities of

any government. Now I'm not over there, but I believe they are going to find trusted agents within those ministries who can operate along our principles in order to restore those ministries as soon as possible. If we can do that, we can move this process even faster. To expedite the process, we have hired a few free Iraqis, who have lived in democratic countries, to help us out. They understand the democratic process and we are going to use them to facilitate what is going on and translate the intent of the process to the people.

"In addition to the three pillars, we also have three area coordinators. This map shows pretty generally the three different regions they are responsible for. Each coordinator will have a staff of about twelve people, and then we will have a larger staff in Baghdad."

LTC Rawlins looked over the sheets. "Wow, sir—that is one heck of an operation. But what I don't understand is who it works for . . . "

"Well, it is quite simple and also quite complex. ORHA works for the commander, Combined Force Land Component Command [CFLCC], who works for the CENTCOM commander [see figure 6]. However, because of the visibility of these issues, Jay has direct coordination authority with the SECDEF through the undersecretary of defense for policy. In short, the way it works is that ORHA gets all its support from the forces overseas, but confirms that its marching orders are in line with the U.S. policy."

Jack looked perplexed. "But doesn't that place Garner and his replacement in a bind between civilian and military superiors?"

Figure 6: OHRA Current Command Structure



"Well, now you want me to start talking out of turn and talk policy, but I will say that is one of the reasons they chose Garner—he is a guy who could juggle those crystal balls without dropping either one. Again, we'll have to see how his replacement stands up to the task."

Jack had one last question. "What about Paul Bremer? What will his relationship be with Garner and his replacement?"

COL Garris eased his way out of the chair, stating in a long, slow drawl, " . . . that sounds like a policy question to me. . . ."

Jack smiled. "Thanks, sir—that's about all I have."

ORHA SHAKE-UP

Jack hopped on the Metro and picked up the latest editions of the *Times* and *Post* to find out what was happening on the just-announced ORHA reorganization. Without warning the White House announced that Jay Garner was being recalled, along with Barbara Bodine, who had been in charge of reconstruction of the Baghdad region. Secretary Powell apparently asked Bodine to leave, though it was not clear why. Some criticized her management experience while others said there were tensions with the counterterrorism community dating to the investigation of the USS *Cole* attack, when she had accused the counterterrorism team of conducting a heavy-handed investigation. It was expected that much of the rest of the senior team would soon follow, including: Margaret Tutweiler, who had been in charge of communications; Tim Carney, a former ambassador who had been overseeing Iraq's Ministry of Industry and Minerals; David Dunford, a senior foreign service specialist on the Middle East; and John Limbert, who had been ambassador to Mauritania. U.S. officials were worrying publicly that the breakdown of civil order was threatening the entire reconstruction effort. "Unless we do something in the near future, it is likely to blow up in our face," one official said.[13] Baghdad was again the scene of billowing smoke and hourly gunfire, according to press reports. Jack read on:

> "There's large parts of the city that are in really bad shape," [one] senior official said. "The city is better than it was three weeks ago, but it has a long way to go." The shortage of visible progress appears to have sparked consternation at the State Department, where officials argued that a civilian with diplomatic skills and foreign policy experience should coordinate reconstruction activities. The Defense Department chafed at that idea and insisted the program remain under military control. Ultimately, the State Department view won out at the White House on the grounds that having a civilian at the helm would inspire other nations to support the costly and complicated chore of transforming Iraq into a stable, democratic nation.[14]

Jack wondered how U.S. policy would change as a result of the shake-up. Some officials seemed to think the U.S. presence would become more assertive in order to impose civil order. Others believed this was not in keeping with the State Department's newly empowered role in the country. In operational terms, headquarters could be moved to a less impressive and less protected location downtown, visibility and everyday contact would be

increased, and a twenty-four-hour operations center would be set up, perhaps a result of Bremer's counterterrorism experience.

POLICIES

LTC Rawlins's next meeting was with Karen Niccum of the NSC staff. Niccum was a long-time policy analyst who had worked on and off in the NSC for three administrations—Reagan, Bush 41, and Bush 43. Her specialty was U.S. foreign policy and she was working on the new version of the national security strategy. However, Jack was here to see her today on topics involving Iraq. Due to security concerns at the White House, she met with him at a coffee house on Pennsylvania Avenue.

"Karen, I want to thank you for meeting with me today—I know how busy you are," Jack said.

"I know what it is like to sit in your chair. I had your desk about three years ago. It's hard getting the inside information, and unless people are willing to sit down with you and talk, you have to depend on the papers—and who knows about what type of accuracy or spin you are going to get from them."

Jack nodded appreciatively and got right to business. "I was wondering if you could give me the view from the NSC regarding rebuilding Iraq."

"Well, our position is quite simple really; the politics, however, are a little complex. To quote Dr. Rice, 'We will help Iraqis build an Iraq that is whole, free, and at peace with itself and its neighbors; an Iraq disarmed of all WMD; that no longer supports or harbors terror; that respects the rights of Iraqi people and the rule of law; and that is on the path to democracy.' In a nutshell, that sums up the national interests."[15]

Jack interrupted, "So we only want an Iraq that is on the path to democracy, not a democratic Iraq?"

Karen nodded. "We want an Iraq formed on basic democratic principles, but our goals are that they are on the path to democracy so we can decrease our presence in the country. We feel that if Iraq is on the path to democracy, receiving humanitarian aid, and supported by an economic recovery, then we can begin extracting ourselves from running the country. This is all a part of the policy that we are developing for the president, in coordination with DoD and the interagency. We see ORHA coordinating the activities of NGOs, international organizations, and other members of the international community, as appropriate."

"Speaking of the NGOs and IGOs, what about the role of the UN?" Jack asked

"I can tell you what they are not going to do, they're not going to be the interim stability organization like the United Nations Mission in Kosovo [UNMIK]. Dr. Rice actually addressed this by saying this isn't East Timor, which is a new state. It is not Afghanistan, which is a failed state. In addition, it isn't Kosovo, which is really just a province of Serbia. Iraq is a liberated state. It has a history of education and some experience with limited self-rule and civil service, which we should be able to leverage through ORHA and other HA agencies to get working

again. But this time it will all be based on democratic principles. Since the coalition forces were the ones who gave life and blood to liberate Iraq, the coalition is going to play the leading role for building the new government. France, Germany, and Russia so want the UN involved that they don't want to lift the UN sanctions!

"Look, we know that UN participation would give the new government instant international legitimacy.[16] But they had their say and they did not support us or the Iraqi people.[17] Therefore we have introduced, on 8 May, a resolution to the Security Council to lift the sanctions and endorse U.S. and British control over Iraq's political development and financial resources for at least twelve months. Oil revenues and other funds would be escrowed to be disbursed as we see fit. The IMF, World Bank, and UN would audit the transactions. There will be a new special coordinator on Iraq, who would work with the authority and the people of Iraq with respect to the restoration and establishment of national and local institutions for representative governance. Essentially we are asking for the rights of 'occupying powers' under international law."[18]

"What about other IGOs?"

"Senator Christopher Dodd [D-CT] sought advice from members of the IGO community. Sandra Mitchell, the vice president for government relations for the International Rescue Committee, responded with concerns she said were widely held, specifically that the military was too tight-lipped and secretive about their plans, and that the IGOs were not included in the planning. Basically, the secrecy involved in the planning created a 'chilling' effect on the ability of NGOs and IGOs to participate in relief efforts. ORHA needs to quickly identify the humanitarian tasks and place these under civilian control that is familiar with this type of operation."[19]

"What about the role of the IIA—the Iraqi Interim Authority?"

"Well, we see the IIA as a 'repository for sovereignty,' but not necessarily as the provisional government. We think there needs to be a process that will move steadily toward elections and give the Iraqi people a voice in what is going on regarding the future of their country. It needs to be broadly representative, and more people are emerging every day to participate as leaders in this process. The one key aspect of the IIA is that for anyone involved, they must be devoted to certain principles about how Iraq will be governed in the future. It will have territorial integrity, it will be unified, it will be broadly representative, there will be respect for human rights, and there will be no weapons of mass destruction in the country. However, we do not see the IIA as an interim government."[20]

"So you aren't ruling out an Islamic theocracy . . . ?"

"Well, right now the official word is that we aren't ruling out anything. However, I think we would look very closely at any form of government they develop to insure that its structure or possible future structure will not violate the principles that I spoke of earlier. To allow that to happen would simply undermine our efforts over there. Already leaders are beginning to emerge."

"What about the INC [Iraqi National Congress] and the support we are giving to them?"

"Secretary Rumsfeld is a huge supporter of Chalabi. We have given him arms and helped him form his organization. He is a smart, democratically oriented leader, but he has been exiled from the country for almost forty years. I am not sure how he is going to be welcomed back into the country or how he is going to be received—that is one that is up in the air. But we are also concerned about the Iranian influence—they have already placed operatives into Iraq to push for an Islamic state. We also believe Syria provides a conduit for terrorists to cross the border and disrupt the reconstruction process. Add to that the desire of some Kurds for an independent Kurdistan, and other groups that need to be accommodated such as the Turkomen and Assyrians, and we really have a unique challenge facing Mr. Bremer."

"What about Mr. Bremer? How did he come into play?"

"The issue with Mr. Bremer has many different layers. The media drives some of this. ORHA had a tough start, from the looting to the problems with electricity in Baghdad to the town meetings that were held. But now we really need someone with diplomatic and negotiation skills in there—that is what State does so well. On the surface, putting Mr. Bremer in place makes perfect sense because he is a civilian, but he is not in the State Department mold. He is more aggressive and much more conservative than the normal State diplomat. But ORHA's chain of command has not changed. The head of the organization still works for CENTCOM. Don't get me wrong—I think Mr. Bremer will play a very important role, even if he adds a little diplomatic decorum to the process . . . but as we speak today I don't think this issue has worked itself out."

"So it's not part of a tug-of-war between two big players?"

"Well, you are aware of the significant challenges we are having between State and Defense. The heads of each department do have remarkable ideological differences. However, they are also team players who are friends. Thus, the challenges, I think, come more from their organizations acting on what they think the heads of the departments want than from the general or the SECDEF himself. That is just what I see. But I know they have to talk with Dr. Rice before anything formal goes to the president. This means she usually plays the role of broker, using their relationship and commonalities to get them to cooperate."

Jack sensed the interview nearing an end and brought up the more sensitive issues. "What about the president? He has an election coming up and has just lost half of his tax cut in Congress. And Congress is concerned about Iraq. Even Democratic moderates in Congress have expressed concern. In a March 18 letter to Bush, Representative Ike Skelton [D-MO], the House Armed Services Committee's top Democrat, said failure to get the United Nations involved in reconstruction will delay the effort and increase U.S. costs. Skelton also expressed dismay that U.S. corporations were going to play a larger role than the IGOs that are dedicated to such causes. President Bush has thirteen Democratic presidential candidates nipping at his heels, looking for maneuver room. With an election coming up, won't he have to show that the Iraq war has been a success, including the reconstruction end? You must look at the polls. . . ."

"Not this administration! Well, sometimes. But they show a mixed bag. Two-thirds of Americans clearly have little stomach for extending the war to neighboring countries such

as Syria—not that we are planning any such thing. The same fraction believes the United States will not be at war again within the year. So that attitude is pretty clear. And we can agree with that general sense. As Ari Fleischer said when the media claimed the administration was threatening war with Syria, 'Iraq is unique . . . every region of the world presents a unique set of challenges . . . and each is dealt with separately.'

"At the same time, 57 percent of Americans would like to see the United States capitalize on victory by pressuring Israelis and Palestinians to a peace agreement. Meanwhile, support for the war in retrospect is right where it was in the middle of it—72 to 77 percent. And nearly six in ten Americans say the United States bears a heavy responsibility for establishing democratic government in Iraq. These are starry-eyed idealists: 82 percent say getting that job done will be difficult. So there is some support for staying in the region and taking care of business, even though it will be a tough job. This probably applies to staying in Iraq. Not that we are planning to stay forever."

As Karen got up to go, Jack pointed out that "A recent poll by Fox—clear supporters of the administration on the war, at least—showed that citizens would vote in the next election based more on 'the economy and taxes' than on the Iraq war. And nearly half [46 percent]," Jack said, raising his voice in mock surprise, "said that 'the country's economic problems' now deserved higher priority than 'the threat of terrorism' [28 percent]. That's gotta hurt. . . ."

"We will have to cover that material another time," Nancy said. "I'll just point out that the day we introduced the most recent UN resolution, Secretary Rumsfeld stated that we would stay as long as necessary to stabilize the country and that it could take more than a year to do so. I've got to run, but here is my card if I can be of any further help."

Jack thanked her, and headed to the Metro. His mind was reeling with information, possibilities, and dangers. He thought of the questions that Mac had posed to him.

EPILOGUE

The night before Jack was to give his briefing, the phone rang. It was Mac Moise. "Removing the director and the 'Central Sector OIC' is big news. The *Post* even printed a senior U.S. official saying that 'By the end of the month you will see a very different organization.'[21] Jack, I want you to refine and zero in on a few of the questions I asked you to answer last week. What are the president's current options? Why did the president make his recent decisions on reconstruction? And what do you think will happen next, over the near and medium term? Of course, if you can explain why you believe what you do, your presentation will be that much more helpful—and convincing."

Jack finished his snack and went to his study to review his briefing. That I/O model would sure come in handy for this. . . .

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Answering the Call: The Emergence of the Department of Homeland Security

CLEMSON G. TURREGANO

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the president did not have one single office dedicated to fighting terror or threats directed against the mainland United States. This case reviews more than just the need for that office. This case reviews the external political challenge faced by the president in creating the first new government organization since the Department of Energy in 1977. Once created, the article reveals the internal challenges faced by Governor Tom Ridge as he sought to meld twenty-two different operating agencies from many different bureaucracies into a seamless and efficient administration dedicated to fighting terror. But the internal fights were just the beginning. The head of the office would have to fight other agencies for budget share and to free resources for his use. Simultaneously, the governor would be forced to reckon with state and local agencies: first responders—the front lines of the war on terror. The reader, recognizing the importance and interrelationships between these different battles, will gain surprising insight into the challenges, rewards, and need for the Department of Homeland Security. This case study, prepared by Dr. Clemson Turregano, LTC, USA, a faculty member of the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College, is being used as part of the school's curriculum.

> Changes bring opportunities. We have an opportunity to do something that happens in this town every 50 or 60 years, and that's create a new department. And in this instance, perhaps, to create a legacy and preserve and protect a way of life that is unique to each and every one of us.
>
> —Governor Tom Ridge[1]

To create a legacy is a difficult business. This case study offers an insight into the status of that creation and where it is going. Forging a new department is no easy task, and this paper demonstrates both the challenges it has endured to become a department, and the challenges that await it in the future.*

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the most significant change in federal government since the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA 47). DHS is also the first high-level government division formed since the Energy Department in 1977.[2] Congress and the president have given the former Pennsylvania governor the responsibility of forging a new organization from a merger of over twenty-two different government agencies and 170,000 government employees.[3] In addition, Governor Ridge will have to contend with competing organizational cultures, personnel structures, computer systems, and management practices that will have to come together in a seamless architecture dedicated to protecting the homeland.[4]

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* The views of this study are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of the Naval War College, Department of the Navy, or the Department of Defense.

In addition to the internal challenges, Governor Ridge must also contend with the political reality of dealing with over eighty-eight congressional committees, all of which had some form of oversight and budgeting relationship with the twenty-two agencies that transferred to the DHS. Within the interagency sphere, Governor Ridge must fight with established departments (like the Department of Defense (DoD) and the intelligence community for budget slice and turf). Last, but not least, DHS must wage an intergovernmental battle with state and local governments to develop and enforce standards that address the threat of terrorism.[5]

Most important, the department must do all of the above while establishing the procedures and necessary capabilities to fight anyone who threatens the homeland.

These are difficult and important tasks. The DHS faces tremendous hurdles if it is going to establish itself as a credible and competent agency. In order to understand some of the challenges facing DHS and some solutions to those challenges, this case study will look at four problems facing the DHS. Leaving the discussion of fighting terrorism for another time, this case study will focus on the domestic challenges: the fight for recognition in Congress, the struggle for internal capability and loyalty, the conflict within the interagency, and the complexity of the intergovernmental arena. Understanding these four challenges, why they are important, and what the DHS is doing to win these fights, provides a broad view of the challenges facing any federal agency.

THE FIGHT FOR A DEPARTMENT

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, President Bush formed the Office of Homeland Security (OHS). Formed to coordinate the homeland security effort, this small executive agency was located just outside the Oval Office. Most members of Congress believed that the OHS was a solid addition to the White House, and enabled the president to make better policy for homeland security. However, Congress did not believe this office was enough to provide the security the country needed. Legislators had two major concerns regarding the new office just outside the president's door.

The first concern was that it was too weak to control the massive and complex tasks of defending the homeland. Over one hundred agencies in Washington had homeland security as a part of their core missions. Congress did not understand how one small office was going to coordinate all of those agencies to construct a credible defense against terror. The second concern was one of constitutional power. Many believed that the OHS could operate outside congressional oversight, leaving Congress little role in homeland defense. According to some members of Congress, a great deal of authority had been placed in Governor Ridge's hands, without any direct congressional oversight or check on his power. To address these concerns, congressmen such as democratic senators Bob Graham of Florida and Joe Lieberman of Connecticut believed a new department, with Congress providing oversight and led by a director approved by Congress, would address these important concerns.

Congress steps in. Fighting to create a stronger office for homeland security was not new to Congress. Senator Lieberman was the chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, which is charged with the organization and reorganization of government. He was

familiar with the Hart-Rudman Commission (see box, next page). Acting on this knowledge, on 21 September 2001, he called for the establishment of an Office for Combating Terrorism, to be located in the White House. Senators Bob Graham (D-FL) and Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) sponsored this bill, S1449. The House followed with a similar measure, HR 3078, introduced by Representative Alcee Hastings (D-FL) on 10 October 2001.[6]

Both of these proposals would create an office designed to consolidate the counterterrorism and homeland defense missions under one roof. These bills sought to address the problems outlined by Senator Bob Graham in remarks made the same month to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs:

> Frankly, I do not believe that the Director of the Office of Homeland Security will have the clout he needs to perform these essential tasks without gaining the power that would be granted him through permanent law. Foremost among the powers he needs is budget authority, which only the Congress can convey. Without the ability to tell an agency director that his budget priorities are misplaced, or to order the elimination of redundant functions from agency budgets, I do not believe that Governor Ridge will be able to implement an effective counterterrorism strategy. I also believe that the director of this office should be confirmed by the Senate. Confirmation would ensure his accountability to both Congress and the American people. This administration has resisted requests from the GAO for documents related to the development of the president's national energy strategy. This Congress cannot afford such resistance when it comes to the battle against terrorism.[7]

These bills were introduced on the part of their sponsors, with the intent to create a more focused strategy towards homeland security.

Congress not only sought a more efficient and focused strategy, but an increased role for itself in the new fight against terror. The OHS was strictly under the president, and as an appointed position did not require confirmation by the Senate. Senator Graham's remarks clearly show this did not sit well with many in Congress. The Constitution states that presidential appointments and public ministers will be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate—this is a critical check on the power of the executive. The confirmation process is a part of the oversight function—many in Congress believed that any official with so much power over the various agencies related to homeland defense should be subject to confirmation.

This type of confirmed, executive appointment is not unprecedented. A good example is the director of the Office of Management and Budget. The OMB director controls budgets; thus the appointment of the OMB director is subject to Senate confirmation. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) does not control budgets, and therefore, the appointment of the APNSA is not subject to the Senate's advice and consent.[8]

Following the introduction of S1449 and HR 3078, President Bush asked Congress to allow him and Governor Ridge six months to ramp up the war on terrorism and establish the OHS without legislative interference. Congress agreed, but continued to provide the president public statements of support and advice. An example of such assistance appeared as an

A Short History of Homeland Security

1941–1979: Office of Civil Defense

1979: Founding of FEMA

1993: WTC bombing

1997: National Defense Panel

1999: Hart-Rudman report: road map for national defense

1999: Embassy bombings in Kenya/Tanzania

2000: USS *Cole* attack

2001: WTC/Pentagon attacks

Oct 2001: Formation of Office of Homeland Security

Apr 2002: Congressional hearings on DHS

Jun 2002: President informs nation he is going to initiate a DHS

Nov 2002: Governor Tom Ridge confirmed as director-elect of DHS

Mar 2003: Official start of DHS

op-ed piece in the *Washington Post,* penned by Senator Graham and Dr. Paul Light, the director of governmental studies at the democratically-leaning think tank, the Brookings Institution (the Republican offset to this think tank is the Heritage Foundation). The op-ed piece set out seven benchmarks by which Congress could determine whether a more formal structure was needed (see box, next page). By April of the next year, Senator Graham and Senator Lieberman determined that many of the marks had not been met.[9]

In April 2002, Senator Lieberman believed Congress had given the president enough time. He convened hearings on the status and possibilities of a Department of Homeland Defense. In testimony before the Governmental Affairs Committee on 11 April 2002, Paul Light stated five reasons to support creation of such a department. Most important was his discussion of accountability. He stated that " . . . creating a cabinet-level department can increase accountability to Congress, the president, and the public by making its budget and personnel clearer to all, its presidential appointees subject to Senate confirmation, its spending subject to integrated oversight by Congress and its Office of Inspector General, and its vision plain to see."* In addition, Light argued that by granting the department cabinet status, it offered a bully pulpit for agency visibility.[10] Senator Graham supported these findings, offering his view that, "I do not believe that Governor Ridge has the clout he needs to perform his essential tasks without gaining the power that would be granted to him through permanent law. Foremost among these is budget authority, which only Congress can convey."[11]

David M. Walker, the comptroller general of the United States and director of the Government Accounting Office (GAO), reinforced the need for congressional oversight with his testimony before the committee on 11 April 2002. The GAO is the audit agency for the federal government, and Walker is basically the chief auditor. Thus, his argument focused more on the effectiveness of the office. Mr. Walker raised the critical point that as far back as

* The other four reasons are: 1. Creating a cabinet-level department can give a particular issue such as homeland security a higher priority inside the federal establishment. 2. Creating a cabinet-level department can also integrate, coordinate, or otherwise rationalize existing policy by bringing lower-level organizations together under a single head. 3. Creating a cabinet-level department can provide a platform for a new or rapidly expanding governmental activity. 4. Creating a cabinet-level department can help forge a strategic vision for governing.

20 September 2001, the GAO had recommended the establishment of a single focal point with responsibility and authority for all critical leadership and coordination functions to combat terrorism.[12] Implied in Mr. Walkers' testimony is the idea that GAO had predicted this need.

Paul Light's Recommendations

1. Governor Ridge needs to be first in line for information.

2. Governor Ridge needs access to the principals.

3. Governor Ridge needs to be a gatekeeper in the budget and personnel process.

4. Governor Ridge needs a permanent staff that owes its loyalty to him, and him alone.

5. Governor Ridge needs a staff within shouting distance.

6. Governor Ridge needs a say in the selection of appointees at the agencies he oversees.

7. Governor Ridge needs to be involved in all management reviews of the homeland defense establishment.

Walker praised the creation of the Office of Homeland Defense, and the selection of Governor Ridge to be its director. However, the OHS simply was not large or strong enough to fully coordinate all the means necessary to secure the nation. He also believed that this " . . . [I]nformal structure and relationship [with] that office to the White House may not represent the most effective approach for instituting a permanent entity with sufficient authority to achieve all of the objectives for securing our borders." Mr. Walker's testimony goes further to state that homeland defense efforts must need to transcend administrations, individuals, and personal relationships to be effective and sustainable.[13] By this, he reinforced the need seen by many senators to have a statute-based, organizational foundation that would transcend administrations.

Mr. Walker stated that there are four important reasons that support a Department of Homeland Security. In his words, having such a department would "help to assure there is reasonable agreement between the executive and the legislative branches regarding the purpose and mission of the agency; provide a specific statutory basis for specific allocation of human and financial resources for the agency; provide an institutional basis for the entity and its leadership that can span changes in administration and key personnel."[14] Finally a department with a "statutory basis would help [enhance] accountability to the Congress and to the American people."[15]

The Senate's desire for stronger coordination and better oversight, reinforced by the testimony of Dr. Walker and Dr. Light, made a compelling case for the new agency. Based in part on their recommendations and the final report of the Hart-Rudman Commission, Congress assertively lobbied the president to create a new agency. Not only would this new department address many of the issues raised during the September and April hearings,

* One example of how senators and representatives help businesses and homeland defense is the Homeland Defense Convention, hosted by prominent Rhode Island politicians, that occurred in Newport, RI, in March 2003. This convention invited any business that would like to participate in homeland security to a series of seminars and workshops dedicated to how they might best benefit from the attention (and funds) going toward homeland security.

the department would provide innovative venues the lawmakers might use to channel money, jobs, and programs back to their districts.*

The president resisted this lobbying, arguing that an independent department was unnecessary. After all, he had run for office arguing against a larger government. Attempting to offset legislative involvement, he argued that Governor Ridge did not have to formally testify before Congress. Governor Ridge would often travel to the hill to discuss OHS matters with members of Congress directly, but this did not satisfy what Congress considered a lack of oversight. When asked if Governor Ridge would ever testify, Ari Fleischer, the president's press secretary, stated that it was the operational agency officials, the department heads and secretaries, who testify before Congress—not the coordinating assistants to the president. In addition, Fleischer argued (echoing the president's intent),

> I think it's unusual for Congress to turn it around and change the way it's worked and worked well for many a decade and now, for the first time, say we seek to have an advisor to the President who does not have operational responsibility come up and testify, even though they've gotten their questions answered in multiple other forums by Governor Ridge.[16]

Despite the strong rhetoric, On 6 June 2002, President Bush abruptly changed course, announcing that he would send a proposal to Congress to create a Department of Homeland Security. Many theories and rumors exist on the timing of the President's announcement. One rumor is that the announcement was to preempt Democrats in Congress from taking over the HLS agenda. Another report states that Ridge's failure in late 2001 to merge two border control agencies initiated top secret meetings led by White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center underneath the east wing of the White House.[17] These meetings may have offered a forum to create the administration's policy and the legislation later introduced in the House.

Although good policy is definitely sound reason to create the department, the polls leading up to the decision may also have played a role. Although his approval ratings were in the high 60s, thus still very high for any administration, the president had declined almost 2 percent a month in the polls since the beginning of the year. In addition, disapproval ratings had gone from 18 percent in January to 24 percent in March to 26 percent in May. More than mere speculation, the polls at the end of May were definitely moving down. "[T]he last Gallup Poll, taken before the president's Thursday night announcement of a new Homeland Security Department, showed his approval rating dropping 7 points in a week, to 70 percent, the lowest since 11 September, with his disapproval rating up 6 points to 23 percent, the highest since the September tragedy."[18] Although this may not be the dominant factor for the announcement, polls are usually a strong factor indicating the need to take action of some sort to reverse a negative trend.

Legislation endorsing a Department of Homeland Security and a National Office for Combating Terrorism had already been introduced in both the House and Senate, but the president's endorsement of the department idea added a sense of urgency to the effort. The president formally submitted his proposal to Congress on 18 June 2002. The bill was

introduced, by House Majority Leader Richard Armey, as HR 5005, on 24 June. It immediately passed, and it almost mirrored the president's proposal. The stated goal was to sign the bill on 11 September, the one-year anniversary of the terrorist attacks.[19]

The Senate, known for long deliberations and careful policy analysis, did not move as quickly as the House. The Senate began debate on this bill by discussing it on 3 September 2002. The substitute bill differed from HR 5005 and the president's proposal in one major detail—the flexibility the new department would have regarding civil service regulations.

The president's proposal, supported by HR 5005, asked for special rules and regulations regarding the hiring and firing of civil service personnel. According to Governor Ridge, these new procedures gave the DHS the flexibility it needed to fight terrorists. "[T]he terrorist threat can literally change overnight. Our response must be equally agile." According to Ridge, "[S]enate Leaders are refusing the President's request that the new Department of Homeland Security have the managerial flexibility to, in his words, get the right people in the right place at the right time with the right pay. Homeland Security is not just about moving people around on an organizational chart. The new department needs the freedom to manage people and move resources where and when they are needed the most." Ridge believed the current system handcuffed the agencies with an antiquated pay system and lack of accountability.[20] His fear was that without the agility provided by the new civil service regulations, the DHS would become another stodgy bureaucracy.

Senator Lieberman disagreed. In a "Dear Colleague" letter distributed throughout the Senate, Mr. Lieberman explained in detail the disagreements between his committee and the president's proposal. The disagreement surrounds the proposal's loosening of civil service laws and guidelines. Senator Lieberman, backed by two government service unions, argued that HR 5005 would remove certain protections and rights that are due government employees.

On the surface, the civil service worker's rights issue is the major disagreement, but the core issue is one of executive versus legislative power. According to Senator Lieberman, "The President claims that he deserves 'flexibility'—and that our legislation denies him flexibility by 'handcuffing' him and the Secretary from exercising their rightful authority. But the President's pleas for flexibility are in fact a request for broad and unchecked authority. Congress has a duty to the American people to make laws. If we left it up to the Administration to rewrite the civil service law, we would be abdicating that responsibility."[21]

The Democrats' opposition to the president was not entirely apolitical. After 9/11, Congress believed that the president was taking advantage of the new security situation. Democrats in particular were finding the White House's assertive and unilateral answer to homeland security troublesome. Wanting a role in the homeland security debate, Democrats in Congress found that fighting for a centralized department was their way to secure that role, as well as a play the constitutional check on the president. A very critical factor in the Democratic congressional opposition was that congressional off-year elections were approaching. This was an important election, determining whether the Republicans could capture both the House and the Senate. One-third of the Senate seats were up for election,

and all of the House seats. Homeland security was a hot topic, and all candidates wanted to look like they were playing an important role in preventing any further terrorist attacks.[22]

The Democrats were in an extremely delicate situation. They had to appear supportive of the president in a time of crisis, yet had to maintain the perception of a loyal opposition. In addition, they had to accomplish this during a time when the president was enjoying remarkable support for his conduct of the war on terror. Even though the president's support may have been slipping somewhat, the Democrats in Congress did not feel that it was slipping enough to run campaigns that were openly critical of the president. Thus, their campaigns had to show the contrast with the president's program would, in fact, help the president fight terror in a better, more efficient, and more effective manner.[23]

Besides the political necessities and the civil service issues, there were four other points of disagreement between the House, Senate and presidential proposals. These differences can be divided into reorganization authority, appropriations flexibility and transition funding, intelligence analysis, and the statutory creation of a White House Office for Combating Terrorism.[24] In describing the challenges of each area, Senator Lieberman returns repeatedly to the constitutionality of the new office, the role of oversight, and the need for congressional involvement.

Representative Pete Stark, a Democrat from California, offers a more poignant perspective. During remarks on the House floor in July 2002, Mr. Stark stated,

> I maintain my suspicions about the creation of this huge, new bureaucracy—nearly 200,000 employees whose actions Congress is currently unable to fully monitor. Its broad new powers do not lessen my concerns or anger about the Bush Administration's blatant abuse of Constitutionally protected civil liberties. Creation of this department makes it more likely—not less—that this practice might be continued to an even greater extent. The conglomeration of typically suspicious law enforcement agencies also doesn't give me much hope that the McCarthy-like hysteria that's often spread by Attorney General Ashcroft won't be amplified in new and very real ways.[25]

The arguments over the proposals continued through the fall, but were suspended because of the congressional elections. The suspension allowed each party to use homeland security as a topical election issue. Following the elections, a compromise, HR 5710, was passed in a lame-duck session late in November. On 20 November 2002, after months of contentious debate, the Senate passed by a vote of 90–9 a revised HR 5005. This bill created the Department of Homeland Security. This bill included provisions that protected the civil service rights of the workers and made significant demands on the new agency regarding the transition period and union rights of workers, and offered protection for many industries producing goods used in homeland security.*

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* Following the Republican victories on Nov. 5, 2003, a handful of Senate Democrats assisted the majority party in approving a bill giving the president the broad authority he sought over employees. The bill stipulated he must notify Congress and employee unions before waiving traditional worker rights in the name of national security. Additional provisions included shielding vaccine makers from potential lawsuits over negative effects the drugs may have on patients. Similar lawsuit protection was given to manufacturers of airport security equipment (www.thomas.gov).

But the real work was just beginning. GAO Comptroller General David M. Walker stated, "It's going to take years in order to get this department fully integrated—you're talking about bringing together 22 different entities, each with a longstanding tradition and its own culture."[26] Senator Fred Thompson (R-TN), a leading advocate for the new department predicted: "This is going to be difficult and it's going to take longer than anyone thinks."

E PLURIBUS UNUM: FROM MANY, ONE

> Tonight, I propose a permanent Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security to unite essential agencies that must work more closely together . . .
>
> —President George W. Bush, 6 June 2002

Governor Ridge's most immediate challenge is to create a department from many different agencies, all of whom have their own cultures, political support, informational technologies, and funding. The president and Congress offered Governor Ridge a starting block with the outline of five departments. Starting from this structure, he must effectively and efficiently merge the new agencies into a capable, loyal, and credible department.

Forging the new organization will be difficult, but Governor Ridge has some advantages that he can leverage to complete the task. First, the DHS is a highly visible political priority. Everyone is paying attention to this new department. Nowhere is this more evident than in the 2003 budget, where the department received $33.5 billion, a near doubling of spending over the past two years.[27] Second, the agencies that will be joining the DHS have long been operating in their areas of expertise. This saves the new department training and other start-up costs, plus gives the department a knowledgeable work force. Third, the DHS' status as an intergovernmental agency reflects its capability to operate on a federal, state, and local level. One might suggest that this gives Governor Ridge additional allies to advance his programs. These additional allies are the state governors, the local officials, and the "first responders." Allies such as these will provide tremendous political support DHS.

Even with these advantages, forging the new department is no easy task. Anyone who argues differently should look to the DHS' chief competitor across the Potomac. In 1947, President Truman announced the plan to integrate the services into the Department of Defense.* Thirty years after instituting this bill, the services still had not come together. Not until the Goldwater-Nichols bill in 1986 did the services take the NSA-mandated merger seriously. This landmark legislation clarified the relationships between the services, the Joint Chiefs, and their political masters. It made the term "joint" mean something in the Pentagon. Even after those reforms and more, resistance to joint procedures and dedication to service cultures remain strong. If it has taken DoD fifty years, can the country afford how long it might take the DHS? The important lesson learned from the DoD experience is the necessity of a common overarching structure for all the agencies to plug into. If DHS can provide a common structure that enables all the agencies to communicate and build from each other, DHS will be a remarkable success.

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* This plan was formalized in the National Security Act of 1947. This act also created the U.S. Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Department of Homeland Security Missions:

- Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States
- Reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism
- Minimize the damage from potential attacks and natural disasters

Building those processes to create the capability to protect the homeland is DHS' most difficult task. Each agency has different personnel policies, missions, information technology, and cultures—all of which must merge into a seamless organization oriented to the missions given by the president. The lack of recent precedent makes this task even harder. Mr. Steven Cooper, chief of information technology for the transition team (now the chief information officer of the DHS), stated this problem very clearly. He argues that there is no manual, no OMB study, and no guidelines for annexation of this scale and magnitude.[28] The challenge is not just internal. The customers of the different agencies need to be reassured as well that the services rendered by other agencies in the past will continue.

According to Michael Scardaville of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington, D.C. think tank, the new department must adopt a multiuse culture for the DHS by building on the example of high-performing agencies that have successfully managed many diverse responsibilities. He also believes the new department ". . . should learn from the best practices of the private sector to effect an efficient transition and promote maximum rationalization of redundant programs and processes."[29] In other words, the new department must concentrate on its core mission of homeland security, but must also respect those agency missions that are not directly related to that core mission.

Maintaining the multiple capabilities of the different agencies is a very important aspect of the new department. A recent study from the Brookings Institution points out that the agencies composing the DHS have multiple missions, many of which overlap and conflict with one another. "Because of this, it will take years, if not decades, to create a common management system to govern the departments, and perhaps just as long to break down the competing cultures those systems currently protect."[30] Governor Ridge needs to move swiftly to identify those functions the agencies must contribute to the homeland defense fight, as well as those functions that must be sustained, yet do not contribute directly to homeland defense. He could reinforce their importance through personal attention and providing an adequate funding share. The accurate and timely identification of these functions will set the foundation for developing the core capabilities needed by the department.

Although reorganization is hard, it will not be the most difficult part of the transition. The most difficult part is not moving around organizational charts—the hard part has two components: technology and people.

Of these two, information technology (IT) may be the hardest. The DHS's IT architecture must accommodate disparate databases and older, legacy applications, attempting to find a standard information protocol to link all the new agencies together. Unfortunately,

"we haven't made much progress in getting that integration done," said Alan Harbitter, chief technology officer of PEC Solutions Inc. of Fairfax, Virginia.[31*] According to Jim Flyzik, senior advisor to Governor Ridge, the department will take on four main IT initiatives immediately, including:

- Consolidating the criminal and terrorist watch lists into one comprehensive list
- Deploying a Homeland Security Department portal
- Setting up secure video and web conferencing
- Enabling secure Internet expansion areas to facilitate information sharing between federal, state, and local authorities.[32]

However, one significant challenge remains—taking all the disparate elements from the merging agencies and forging them into a new culture for the department. The events of 9/11 provide the momentum, but maintaining that momentum when the threat does not seem as immediate may be an issue. As new agencies join the organization, they must leave their old allegiances behind and form new ones. The department must demonstrate early and consistently that this investment is worthwhile. The department leadership must demonstrate not only that the department is capable of accomplishing its mission, but it must also demonstrate that it can take care of personnel. Taking care of personnel in this manner may result in loyalty to the parent organization.

Although the future challenges seem daunting, DHS has already enjoyed some significant successes. The story of the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) is one such success story, offering lessons learned in how DHS might overcome the challenge of creating a loyal and dedicated culture. Founded in November 2001, the president gave the transportation secretary until November 2002 to "create a better-paid, trained, more stable screening workforce from scratch."[33] The secretary of transportation did not hesitate to decide with the leadership that they would make the deadline, which instilled a sense of urgency in the organization. Then, working in an innovative fashion with many in the private sector, they were able to winnow down, through background checks and rigorous testing, the 1.7 million requests for employment to the sixty thousand they needed. Moreover, they were still able to maintain sixty thousand qualified personnel on a waiting list. When the screeners began training, civilian contractor trainers instilled in them a clear and important mission: Don't let what happened on 11 September 2001 happen again. They reinforced this vision statement in the patch worn by all employees of the TSA: It has eleven stripes and nine stars to signify the event that caused the creation of the agency. Although the jury is still out on the effectiveness of this new agency, the lessons of urgency, common vision, outsourcing, and focus will be critical to the success of DHS.[34]

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* According to IT experts, one way DHS can link all their systems would be through Enterprise integration, using common application programming interfaces to integrate systems. This provides data translation and offers rules- and content-based routing for commercial applications already in use, he said. Data standardization with Extensible Markup Language also is a powerful integration tool.

CARVING A NEW PIECE FROM AN OLD PIE: THE INTERAGENCY FIGHT

> Everyone knows that the Pentagon is not in the business of providing an armed force for the United States, but when an event occurs we get the phone call and why do we get the phone call? Well, because the Department of Defense is considered the Department of Defense. They know that they've got troops. They've got people who respond. They're organized and they can be of assistance.
>
> —Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, July 2002

Within the federal government, agencies are constantly at odds over mission, turf, and funding. This competition occurs in what is widely known as the interagency arena, which is known as the horizontal struggle between agencies within the executive branch.[35] A recent report from the GAO outlines the challenges facing the DHS in terms of interagency relations:

> Appropriate roles and responsibilities within and between the levels of government and with the private sector are evolving and need to be clarified. New threats are prompting a reassessment and shifting of long standing roles and responsibilities, but these shifts are being considered on a piecemeal basis without benefit of an overarching framework and criteria to guide the process.[36]

The key to interagency relationships, says the report, "is developing performance goals and measures on which to assess and improve preparedness and develop common criteria that can demonstrate success, promote accountability, and determine areas where additional resources are needed, such as in improving communications and equipment interoperability."[37] This lesson bears repeating—capability breeds credibility, and credibility translates into political power.

The advantages enjoyed by the DHS place it in a unique position in the interagency arena. Every department in the government has a critical mission, but the immediacy of the DHS rivals all departmental missions but one—the Department of Defense (DoD). Although DHS is the newest department, and not yet fully formed, it enjoys tremendous political support from both Congress and the president. This gives the department extensive political capital in its fight with other agencies. How the department uses this capital and fights against other agencies will provide clues into what type of department it is going to become.

DHS faces two significant challenges regarding interagency fights: DoD is one, while the intelligence community is another. The current administration praises and rewards teamwork, wanting all agencies to "be on board" when it comes to fighting terror.

Homeland defense: The prevention, preemption, and deterrence of, and defense against, aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure, as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic emergencies.

Homeland security: A national team effort that begins with local, state, and federal organizations. Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against military attacks emanating from outside the United States.

NORTHCOM: A military organization whose operations within the United States are governed by law, including the Posse Comitatus Act that prohibits direct military involvement in law enforcement activities. Thus, NORTHCOM's missions are limited to military homeland defense and civil support to lead federal agencies.

To this end, both DoD and the intelligence community are treading a thin line when protecting their turf from DHS intrusion.

DoD vs. DHS. The *National Strategy for Homeland Security* addresses the possible friction caused by mission overlap between the DHS and DoD. The strategy defines three circumstances where the DoD would become involved in homeland security. First, in extraordinary circumstances, DoD would conduct military missions such as combat air patrols or maritime defense operations. Second, DoD would be involved in emergencies, such as responding to an attack or to floods, forest fires, or any other type of emergency.* In this case, DHS would ask DoD to provide capabilities that the agencies may not possess. Finally, DoD would take part in limited operations where other agencies may have the lead, for example, security at a special event like the Olympics.[38]

Although national strategy clarifies the missions, the tension over budgets is just beginning. The source of this tension is primarily the discretionary part of the budget, where both departments will compete for funding. A little more than one-third of budget is discretionary. DoD has laid claim to 18 percent of these funds, leaving the rest of the executive branch to fight over the remainder. This is where the real fight will be: determining which agency (DoD or others) will lose budget shares to DHS. This fight bears watching, because both the DoD and DHS are the primary recipient of funds now; however, Congress will have to make a decision in the near future to determine priorities. What comes first, defending here or abroad? How Congress answers that question will reflect the strength of each agency to present its purpose as most important.[39]

DHS and the Intelligence Community. The information and analysis provided by intelligence agencies will be the lifeblood of DHS. The intelligence it processes or receives may determine when a terrorist enters the country, or when an act of terror might occur. Intelligence and the ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate it are vital if the department is going to be a success.

Michèle Flournoy, a senior advisor from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), identified early in July 2002 that the DHS would need an intelligence fusion cell. She stated, "The problem of intelligence sharing and intelligence fusion is not addressed by this reorganization. . . . " She argued that the new department should include a "national intelligence fusion center" to improve intelligence agencies' abilities to share information with each other and with federal, state, and local law-enforcement officials. The new department also should establish an information classification system that could enable law-enforcement officials to contribute to intelligence-analysis projects. Other ideas included the DHS determining a new domestic intelligence classification system and placing protocols on who could receive the information.[40]

According to Republican Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama (member of the Committee on Government Affairs),

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* Federal-level agencies operate under Title X of the U.S. Code. This law restricts them from certain actions (i.e., law enforcement) on the state and local level. Most state agencies operate under Title XXXII of the U.S. Code, and do not share these same restrictions.

> I am proud to see that the new department will include a fusion cell. This entity should be equipped to "connect the dots" of terrorist activities in ways that today's agencies, with their divergent missions and separate databases, are unable to do. It must have a single mission of destroying terrorists and their organizations. To execute this mission, it must have the authority to act. This should include the authority to direct the efforts of our intelligence collection agencies and to direct those who would eliminate the terrorists.[41]

The problem was putting together the authority, structure, and resources to "connect the dots." DHS has inadvertently joined a fight between the CIA and FBI that has been going on since 1947. Various advisory boards, think tanks, and a Joint Congressional Committee chaired by Senator Bob Graham and Republican Representative Porter Goss of Florida, have all looked into the failure of the intelligence community following 9/11. Two of these investigations reached a similar confusion. The Gilmore Commission and the Joint Committee stressed the need for an intelligence fusion cell within DHS. This conclusion began an intense debate over intelligence turf and the roles. CIA wanted only to give DHS intelligence that had been analyzed and filtered, so as not to reveal any national sources. The FBI was concerned over the law-enforcement criteria of the intelligence, and the effect any intelligence sharing might have on future prosecutions. There was even talk of a new, domestic intelligence agency, similar to the British MI-5, that would serve to collect, analyze, and disseminate "domestic" intelligence.

President Bush brought a temporary end to the debate with his announcement in January 2003 to build a new terror intelligence office. According to the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, the FBI, CIA, DHS, and Justice Department will work together to create the new Terrorist Threat Intelligence Center (TTIC). President Bush said the center will "merge and analyze all threat information in a single location [in order to] . . . form the most comprehensive picture" of the terrorist threat.[42] The threat center will perform all of the missions specified by Michèle Flournoy, but there is one glaring difference: the office will report to the CIA Director, not to DHS.[43] Some analysts wonder what this means for the intelligence-collecting activities of the FBI and whether it might diminish the authority of the DHS. Gregory Treverton, from RAND, argues that the new intelligence structure probably reflects the turf battles among the intelligence agencies. The CIA director will not cede any of his authority over intelligence, nor will his access to the president decrease. It may even strengthen his role and visibility.[44] This is very clearly a setback for DHS for two reasons. First, it must continue to depend on the CIA and FBI for its information. Second, the DHS must quickly develop information pipelines into the TTIC for it to have the latest threats, information, and analysis.

With the two "national strategy" documents, the administration has attempted to finesse the tension that will naturally develop between agencies that complement each other on mission, turf, and budget share. What will be interesting to watch is how the other agencies support or isolate the DHS. With the DHS responsible for coordinating their contributions towards HLS, the DHS may have to use some of its valuable political capital to enact policy. This may be the only way that DHS makes some of the other, more senior agencies in

Washington do what DHS needs. Other agencies may resent the DHS premier position with regard to current events. This interagency friction, leading to poor communications, is perhaps the greatest threat to the success of the DHS.

ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL: WINNING ON THE STATE AND LOCAL LEVEL

DHS must not only contend with federal agencies. Another unique feature of the Department of Homeland Security is its overlap between federal, state, and local jurisdictions. This is the result of our system of federalism, also known as the intergovernmental arena, in which state governments share power with the federal government. The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states and to the people all power not specifically delegated to the federal government. This overlapping governance creates over 87,000 different jurisdictions, all with unique challenges and opportunities.[45] Before 9/11, terrorism was essentially a federal responsibility. However, the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centers demonstrated that domestic response is a national issue, involving states, cities, and townships in an unprecedented way."[46]

Governor Tom Ridge addressed this issue in March 2002, stating " . . . the President's assignment to me was to coordinate a national strategy, not a federal one; national strategy meaning we've got to pull in our state and local counterparts as well to help us protect against threats and improve our ability to respond to them."[47]

According to the *National Strategy for Homeland Security*:

> There is a vital need for cooperation between the federal government and state and local governments on a scale never seen in the United States. Cooperation must occur both horizontally (intergovernmental) and vertically (among various levels of government). The creation of the DHS will simplify the process by which governors, mayors and county leaders interact with the federal government.[48]

But where is the line between what is federal, state, or local? According to Representative Jim Turner of Texas, ranking Democrat on the newly formed House Select Committee on Homeland Security, "I think Congress and the decisions that we make, particularly with regard to federal funding, will determine the division of that responsibility."[49] One fact that academicians, administrators, and politicians agree on is that the federal government should not try to replicate what the local governments have already put in place. The federal government has historically given a great deal of latitude to the state and local governments to develop their own ideas about how services are provided. The federal government would be hard-pressed to replace this capacity. The key will be for the federal government and the states to determine only those things that need fixing, and focus on those, not trying to impose or adjust items that do not need mending.[50]

The first action DHS needs to take is to adequately fund the "first responders." However, this is funding with a purpose and would be tied to achievement of federal standards, enforced and monitored by DHS. As one author stated, "The key to a strong network is managing the creative tension between the upper and lower levels of government to address local idiosyncrasies but enforce national standards."[51] Since all man-made and natural disasters

are local events, many state and local governments have established their own form of homeland security task forces and enhanced their emergency management offices. More importantly, " . . . each level of government must coordinate with other levels in minimize redundancy in HLS actions and increase integration of efforts."[52] Similar to creating interagency credibility, the establishment, enforcement, and funding of clear standards will help create credibility on the intergovernmental arena.

Reflecting the need to focus on first responders, the national strategy calls on state governors to establish their own Homeland Security Task Forces (HSTFs), which will serve as the governor's primary coordinating body with the local governments. In addition, the HSTFs would provide a collaborative, cost-effective structure for effectively communicating HLS requirements to all organizations and citizens. HSTFs would also fit neatly into the regional emergency response network inherited from FEMA.[53]

What the federal government can do is set standards to mend holes in the security structure. These standards might include, but not be limited to, setting standards for communications, emergency response, and health plans, disseminating information about terrorism risks, conducting practice exercises, and convening groups to share their practices.[54]

The key to invigorating the national homeland security process is money. Funds promised by the federal government are finally getting to the states following the elongated process involved with the 2003 appropriations bills.* There remains great skepticism on the part of the states that the federal government will make homeland security just another unfunded federal mandate. If this occurs, all the standards in the world will not cement together the intergovernmental process needed to protect the homeland.

WHENCE VICTORY?

The challenges that face the DHS are enormous. It must fight in five places at once and be successful in each. Simultaneously, it must deter terrorists, win a congressional budget share, forge a new organization, wave off attempts by other agencies to steal funds, plus set and maintain tough, clear standards for state and local governments. Given the multidimensional nature of this organizational melee, when can DHS claim victory?

Talking with people inside the department and those from other agencies working to put the department together, every day is a victory. However, when looking closely at all the different fronts on which the department must fight, it is winning minor victories on a daily basis. Most importantly, there has not been a terror attack on the United States since the OHS and now the DHS have been in service. This in itself is a remarkable victory, demonstrating the changes the government has made combined with the selfless dedication of all those involved with HS. But the work on all five areas has just begun.

In terms of congressional oversight, the House has moved to create a special select committee to consolidate congressional oversight over the new DHS. House Republican

* The FY 2003 Appropriations Bill was not signed into law until 20 February 2003 (PL 108-7), http://thomas.loc.gov/home/approp/app03.html (accessed on 10 Mar 2003).

Conference Chairwoman Deborah Price of Ohio said the proposal encountered no resistance and generated little discussion, even by the chairmen of existing committees that could lose turf to a new panel.[55] The Senate is also considering a plan that will mirror what the House has done.* Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Ted Stevens (R-AK) recently spoke with ranking member Robert Byrd (D-WV) to discuss his plan to create a new subcommittee to oversee the new Homeland Security Department.[56] This plan yielded the Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee, which will be chaired by Republican Senator Thad Cochran of Mississippi.[57]

Internally, the agency has made great strides. The department has internalized the president's sense of urgency and is working hard to overcome organizational cultural and information barriers. They have identified their headquarters location, and are building the overarching structure that will be the foundation for integrating the agencies. The TSA and the new border security organizations have also met with success. A new report from the GAO states that the former customs service has met projected goals and has incorporated many recommended changes.[58] Although the report noted some deficiencies, the overall tone of the GAO report was positive.

The agency has also had success in the interagency arena. Mark Holman, former deputy assistant to President Bush for homeland security, recently stated that agencies, notably the CIA and FBI, are now "talking to each other. Information is being shared vertically within departments as well as horizontally across agencies."[59] This is happening not only because of the important mission, but because the public is watching how the department is coming together.[60]

Within the intergovernmental arena, the department is experiencing some challenges. Although Governor Ridge promised first responders money for training, only $1.3 billion of the promised $3.5 billion has come through. The state and local governors are upset, and the administration is blaming Congress.[61] Governor Ridge is addressing this situation, which should be resolved in a supplemental later in the year.

While it is far too early for the DHS to proclaim victory at putting together the newest addition to the U.S. government, it is proceeding in a successful manner. On 1 March 2003, the Department of Homeland Security became a cabinet-level department of the executive branch. Will this department ever be able to proclaim victory on the war on terror or the fight to insure homeland security? As Governor Ridge states,

> We . . . should not expect a V-T day, a victory over terrorism day anytime soon. But that does not mean Americans are powerless against the threat. On the contrary . . . we are more powerful than the terrorists. We can fight them with conventional arms, but with information and expertise, and common sense; with freedom and openness and truth; with

* Despite a lack of opposition to the original measure, House leaders are contesting the vague language of the bill, and the ratio of Republican to Democrat representatives on the committee. See http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0103/011503cd2.htm for more information.

partnerships born from our cooperation. If we do, then like the men and women who fought Nazism and Fascism 60 years ago, our outcome will be equally certain: Victory for America and Safety for Americans.[62]

Notes

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Between Iraq and a Hard Place: Future U.S. Policy with Iran

RICHARD J. NORTON & KEVIN L. LITTLE

The relationship between Iran and the United States has been in a state of tension for more than thirty years, and the discovery of Iran's secret nuclear weapons program has raised those tensions to a higher level. It has not helped that the United States labeled Iran as a member of the "Axis of Evil"; nor have the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq calmed those tensions. This case examines the myriad of influences weighing upon the Bush administration for the future U.S. policy toward Iran.

This case was used as a current policy analysis (CPA). These cases are focused on emerging issues. While every effort is made to utilize primary research sources to build the cases, their nature tends to result in greater reliance on secondary sources. A related phenomenon is the reluctance of many interviewees to be identified by name. This case study, prepared by Dr. Rick Norton and Captain Kevin Little, USN, faculty members of the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College, is being used as part of the school's curriculum.

Captain Milton Takahashi, USN, glared at his blank computer screen and frowned. "This was supposed to be the easy part," he thought. Milt was beginning his second week as a member of the National Security Council Staff. A graduate of the Naval War College, Milt was preparing a major policy paper on Iran. While at Newport, Policy Making and Process (PMP) had been his favorite course and it had been useful during his two following tours, first as commanding officer of the USS *Preble* (DDG-88) and then as a branch head on the joint staff. Following the tour in the Pentagon, Milt had been surprised and delighted when his detailer had offered him the White House job. Now it was time to prove he could produce quality work. During an early job interview, Milt had suggested that future U.S. policy toward Iran would be a hot topic. His boss evidently agreed and told Milt to put together a brief on Iran. Milt had since researched a wide variety of materials and had interviewed several key sources. His desk was now cluttered with stacks of clippings, reports, and notes. All that remained was writing the memo, but the empty computer screen silently screamed "writer's block!" Milt leaned back, took a deep drink of coffee, and frowned. "I should be able to pound this out," he thought, "there's lots of great material." As he waited for inspiration Milt mentally reviewed all he had learned about Iran.

Iran had an incredibly deep history and a geopolitically commanding position. Owning half the shoreline of the Persian Gulf, Iran could potentially close the Gulf of Hormuz and possessed beachfront extending into the Northern Arabian Sea. There were, of course, substantial oil reserves, so necessary to global commerce and industry. These gifts of geology and geography guaranteed Iran's potential importance on the world stage. Furthermore,

long before there was the state of Iran, which came into being in 1935, there was a strong sense of common identity stemming from the days of the Persian Empire. Iranians are Persians, not Arabs, Hindus, or Indians. The Iranian brand of Islam—Shiism—is markedly different from Sunni Islam, and the majority of the world's Shiites live in Iran. However, although it had a long history of limited participatory democracy at lower levels of government, Iran never had a democratically elected national ruler until the 1980s. Prior to that, a succession of kings and shahs ruled Iran. For a brief period in the mid-1950s it seemed as if Iran was going to shift to democracy, but a CIA-led coup saved the shah. He remained in power until 1979 when the Ayatollah Khomeni returned to Iran from exile in France and was propelled to a position of national leadership. Upon assuming power the Ayatollah declared Iran to be an Islamic republic. This was the first time the Iranian clergy had directly assumed the reins of power, traditionally preferring to be the power behind the throne.[1]

Relations between the new Iranian republic and the United States soured almost at once. The Iranian hard-liners saw the United States as the cause of many of Iran's ills and as a political, military, and cultural threat. Milt, to some degree, could understand why the entrenched Iranian hard-liners might feel that way. The United States had engineered a coup to keep the shah in power in the 1950s and had tacitly endorsed his use of extremely repressive tactics against his own people in the 1970s. Following the revolution, the United States not only refused to extradite the shah to Iran to face charges, but also provided him access to medical care in New York. Subsequent U.S. actions, such as freezing of Iranian governmental funds, failure to deliver already-paid-for military hardware, and backing Iraq during its eight-year war with Iran made the Iranians feel more threatened. This feeling intensified in the late 1980s when the United States fought a quasi war with Iran in the Persian Gulf. During this period U.S. warships escorted tankers into Kuwait, and several Iranian ships were attacked. One was sunk, a minelayer was captured, and several oil platforms were shelled. The fight was not altogether one-sided. The Iranians inflicted mine damage on one of the escorted tankers and the U.S. frigate *Samuel B. Roberts* (FFG-58). Most memorable of all during this period was the accidental downing of an Iranian airliner by the U.S. cruiser *Vincennes* (CG-49).[2]

For their part, Americans viewed the Iranians with equal distress and distrust. The fall of the shah took most U.S. political, military, and intelligence analysts by surprise. Ayatollah Khomeni appeared bent on returning Iran to preindustrial norms and was turning a former ally into an enemy. But most important of all from the U.S. point of view, the embassy hostage crisis proved Khomeni's Iran was a rogue nation, operating outside international law and practice. The embassy takeover rapidly became a defining image for most of the U.S. public. Neither the Iranians' nor the Americans' perceptions were entirely true, but both were deeply held.

Within the region the new Iranian theocracy was viewed with suspicion and fear, especially by the Saudis. The Saudis were afraid the Iranians would attempt to export radical Shiism. These fears proved to be well founded as Iranian support was given to Hezbollah,

and Shiite factions in Lebanon. Radical Shiites had also been connected to at least one major terrorist attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca.[3]

In the twenty years following the return of the hostages, there had been no exchange of embassies or even of envoys. In short there was no U.S.-Iranian relationship. Yet every U.S. president in this time period attempted to quietly encourage and support emerging moderate political elements in Iran. This resulted in an odd and delicate political dance between the two states. A major problem was every time U.S.-Iranian contacts became public knowledge, Iranian hard-liners would deny any such connections had been made, crack down on the moderates, and reaffirm Iranian antipathy towards the United States. Despite these setbacks, a discernible movement to moderation was apparent in Iran, especially among young Iranians to whom the rule of the shah was barely a memory. With moderation came the growth of a surprisingly free press and although the *ulama* (the Shiite religious ruling elite) often closed individual media offices, public criticism of the hard-liners was never completely silenced.

Iranian efforts to outlaw international television broadcasts met with equal failure. Since 1996, al Jazeera offered a popular contrast to the dreary state-run media outlets common in the Middle East. Although it was critical of the West and Israel on a daily basis, al Jazeera was also dismissive of unrepresentative and corrupt regional governments. Other media networks followed in al Jazeera's footsteps—Saudi MBC, Lebanese LBC-al Hayat, Hezbollah's al Manar, and Abu Dhabi TV.[4] The impact these alternative viewpoints had on Iranian public opinion and attitudes is uncertain, but some scholars believe the increasing influence of nonstate media is likely to further restrict the mullahs' room to maneuver in the future.

In the waning days of the Clinton administration, leaders desiring improved relations between the United States and Iran detected a small ray of hope. Iranian moderates, including Sayyid Hussein Khomeni, the grandson of the Ayatollah Khomeni, were becoming more prevalent and visible on the Iranian political landscape, and the United States responded by lifting the embargo on certain Iranian luxury goods, such as rugs and caviar.[5] It was hoped this tangible sign of support and political "thawing" would be reciprocated by continued improvement and contacts, which would eventually lead to a return to correct, if not cordial, relations between the two states. Although "thaw" might be too strong a word, there seemed to be at least some warming between the two countries. Yet, within Iran, hard-line conservative religious leaders continued to dominate the *ulama*.

The warming trend continued during the early days of the Bush administration. Trade between the two countries totaled in excess of $200 million annually.[6] On 8 June 2001, Mohammed Khatami, a leading Iranian moderate, was reelected president of Iran, winning just under 77 percent of the vote, and pledged Iran would continue a policy of "détente" with the West. Among Khatami's more encouraging statements was a call for Iranians to phrase their criticisms of the United States in rational terms and to do away with such incendiary rhetoric as "Death to the United States."[7] Although Iranian hard-liners were dismayed at Khatami's positions, many in Iran, especially students, responded positively.

Then came the attacks of 9/11. The United States made some very quiet arrangements regarding the global War on Terror with the Iranians and real progress was made. For example, Iran agreed to assist and return unharmed any U.S. aircrew that might be forced to land in Iran during the war with Afghanistan.[8] But, as had often been the case, the slightest disclosure of such talks brought swift denial from Tehran. Yet, the agreement remained in effect. This was not all that surprising as the Iranians had long backed anti-Taliban Mujahadeen in Afghanistan.[9] Even the Iranian hard-liners did not oppose a "War on Terror," as long as the war was conducted within a "rational framework"; one directed by the UN and not simply under the unilateral command of the United States.[10] The two states continued to edge closer in the usual pattern of fits and starts. All that changed when President Bush delivered his 29 January 2002 State of the Union Address and placed Iran with Iraq and North Korea in an "axis of evil."[11]

Whatever progress was being made with the Iranians suffered a devastating setback. The Iranian government was clearly surprised by the president's categorization. Outrage followed and the Iranian moderates were discredited.[12] The U.S. condemnation simply proved to the hard-liners that Americans were Iran's enemies and never to be trusted. Combined with the U.S. strategy of unilateral preemption, the axis of evil speech caused many Iranians, especially the hard-liners, to begin to fear a U.S. preemptive attack on Iran. Although polls showed as many as two-thirds of Iranians still favored direct talks with the United States, moderates had little choice but to join in the anti-American rhetoric, leading George Tenet, director of the CIA, to state in February 2002 that the reform movement in Iran was losing momentum.[13] In Iran, student protestors who continued pressing for liberalization of Iranian policies were violently suppressed. President Bush may have inadvertently made matters worse for these young Iranians when he "warned" the Iranian leadership not to abuse the human rights of the student protestors.[14] Shirn Ebadi, an Iranian human rights activist and winner of the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize, pointed out in her acceptance speech that the U.S. track record in regard to the human rights of Al Qaeda detainees in Guantanamo made the president's words sound hypocritical.[15]

Despite the setbacks and problems, U.S. diplomats and their Iranian counterparts in March 2003 were once again quietly meeting to discuss issues relating to Iraq and Afghanistan when news of these conversations was leaked in Washington.[16] Iranian hard-line clerics reacted in a predictably outraged manner and the talks came to a crashing halt. In the "hot and cold" cycle of U.S.-Iranian relations, Milt had to conclude the fall of 2003 was a cold spell.

Milt could understand why President Bush had put the Iranians in the axis of evil. From a security point of view there were two major issues of significant concern. The first involved nuclear weapons. From the time of the shah, Iranians had been attempting to build and operate nuclear power plants. The shah had used U.S. experts and firms to help in these efforts; the ayatollahs, on the other hand, had turned to the Russians. When asked why an oil-rich state would need to pursue such an expensive program, the answer had been oil was a finite resource and diversifying energy sources was simply smart policy.[17] Being able to produce nuclear power also marked Iran as a significant economic and scientific power and was

a source of national pride. These explanations failed to satisfy many within the Department of Defense, State Department, and the CIA (which had, as early as the Clinton administration, gone on record as saying that it was possible the Iranians had already developed a nuclear bomb).[18] Civilian watchdog groups, such as the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Federation of American Scientists, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, were also skeptical. They claimed Iran was conducting weapons research and was actively pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons.[19] Iranian research into and production of cruise and ballistic missile technologies deepened these concerns.

Iran's reaction to these concerns was to accuse the United States, Great Britain, and others of paranoia and hysteria.[20] Iranian leaders pointed out Iran was a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and routine inspections by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) had failed to turn up any evidence of a nuclear weapons program. Russian leaders agreed, stating the Iranian nuclear program was peaceful in nature and purpose.[21] For five years, as part of a 1995 secret agreement with the United States, the Russians had agreed not to provide nuclear technology to Iran. But by 2000, the Iranian offer was too tempting for Moscow to ignore. U.S. efforts to get the Russians to abandon the Iranian project were unsuccessful. Threats of economic sanctions against the Russians merely resulted in Russian-Iranian mutual defense consultations and renewed sales of Russian arms to Iran.[22] These sales were not as provocative as might be imagined as, at the same time, the Russians began to sell arms to other former military clients such as India. Rather than risk a rift with Russia, both the Clinton and Bush administrations had to be content with merely expressing grave concerns at the Russians' actions. The departments of State, Defense, and CIA remained convinced the Iranians wanted nuclear weapons and the Russians were aiding them. Presidential Press Spokesman Ari Fleischer made it clear that the United States had not ruled out the use of force as a way of solving the Iranian dilemma.[23] U.S. complaints focused on two sites in central Iran. In December 2002, the EU joined the United States in requesting Iran open these sites for verification and inspection purposes.

In May 2003, it seemed as if there might be a way out of the nuclear puzzle. The Russians invited the United States to join in the effort to build nuclear plants in Iran.[24] Not surprisingly, moderate Iranian leaders welcomed this request, while the hard-liners denounced it. In the end, the United States declined the invitation.

U.S. fears escalated sharply in June 2003 when the Iranians revealed to the president of the IAEA the presence of an enriched uranium facility and heavy water research reactor in central Iran.[25] The IAEA also discovered the Chinese had provided the Iranians with 1,800 kilograms of enriched uranium in the early 1990s and this transaction had not been reported to the IAEA.[26] The Iranians claimed their failure to report had been nothing more than an administrative oversight. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said it was proof of a weapons program and subsequently President Bush stated the United States would not tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran.[27] The Russians suggested Iran sign additional IAEA protocols, but the Iranians refused to do so unless economic sanctions against them were lifted. World

opinion split over the issue with states such as Canada and Britain criticizing Iran while others, such as Malaysia, felt Iran had been open and cooperative with the IAEA.

By October 2003 the question of Iranian nuclear weapons research was reaching a potential decision point. The National Council of Resistance, an Iranian resistance group, declared they were providing information to the United States about Iranian nuclear programs.[28] The Israelis predicted Iran might be less than a year away from obtaining a nuclear device and hinted Israel might be forced to preempt these efforts if nothing more positive developed.[29] The IAEA gave the Iranians until 31 October 2003 to prove it was not working on a bomb. During this debate some voices in the United States began suggesting it was time for a regime change in Iran. In response, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on Iran. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) argued for maintaining sanctions until the Iranians conclusively proved their nuclear programs conformed to the NPT and other appropriate agreements.[30]

Senators might find the topic of Iranian regime change fun to talk about, but the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the military services did not. State put pressure on Pakistan, which held the presidency of the IAEA, to further press Iran for compliance. President Khatami of Iran cautioned such pressure could precipitate the very problem the United States was hoping to avoid.[31] Defense, deeply involved in Afghanistan and Iraq, was quiet about Iran. This was in contrast to the early days of the war in Iraq when DoD spokesmen suggested Iran and Syria might "be next" if they aided or abetted the Iraqi war effort. Military sources were more forthcoming. As one high-ranking officer put it, "Change the Iranian regime? With what?"[32]

While the issue of Iranian nuclear weapons was probably the single largest bone of contention between the countries, the second major issue was related to the Global War on Terror. The Terror War had several facets to it that continued to cause friction between the United States and Iran. One of these involved Iranian support for Hezbollah.[33] Many countries, including the United States, had identified Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Other countries, such as Syria and Iran, believed Hezbollah members were freedom fighters battling for the rights of Lebanese and Palestinians oppressed by the state of Israel. Whatever the definition, there was no denying Hezbollah had carried out a variety of attacks over the years in the Middle East.

Another terror-related issue involved Al Qaeda personnel who had fled into Iran from Afghanistan. Although the Iranians admitted these people were in Iran, they refused to arrest or extradite them to the United States.[34] Among the more prominent members of the organization now living in Iran was Saad bin Laden, Osama's son.[35] Many intelligence analysts believed Al Qaeda was using Iran as a safe haven and planning ground for future operations. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard, an armed organization outside the control of the Iranian president, was believed to be protecting the Al Qaeda members in Iran.

On their part the Iranians were enraged and accused the United States of the deepest hypocrisy in the matter of the People's Mujahadeen (PM), an armed resistance group that had

operated for years against Iran from bases in Iraq. Although the PM had been identified as a terrorist organization by the State Department, the United States negotiated a deal when U.S. forces closed on PM camps during the war in Iraq. The PM stayed in their camps and did not participate in hostilities. In return, they were allowed to keep their weapons and continue "training."[36] Iran desperately wanted the leadership of the PM and offered to exchange high-value Al Qaeda personalities for those of the PM.[37] The United States declined this offer too.

A further complication involved U.S concerns over Iranian efforts to gain an advantage in the predominately Shiite south of Iraq. These efforts manifested themselves in a variety of ways. For example, there was the Badr Brigade.[38] Trained by Iranian Revolutionary Guards and controlled by the Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr Al-Hakim, the ten thousand-strong brigade had been conducting a guerilla war against Iraq for more than twenty years. During the war the United States made it plain that they expected the Badr Brigade to remain on their side of the Iranian border. Al-Hakim, perhaps the leading Iraqi Shiite cleric in exile, kept his fighters in check prior to his assassination in August 2003. He instructed his supporters in southern Iraq to offer no opposition to the Americans. These orders are apparently still being obeyed. While this has resulted in a relatively peaceful occupation, with attendant greater speed of recovery, American diplomats and analysts remain worried. Al-Hakim made it clear that he believed the United States abandoned the Shiites after Gulf War One and was not to be trusted.[39] As a result, many in the occupation force and the State Department are convinced that Al-Hakim merely pushed cooperation as the quickest way to get occupation forces out of Iraq so the Shiites could chart their own political destiny.

Not surprisingly, internal U.S. attitudes and approaches were somewhat consistent with U.S. international efforts. There were congressional leaders, such as Arlen Specter (R-PA) and Joseph Biden (D-DL), who favored engaging the Iranians diplomatically.[40] Others, such as Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) and Senator Brownback (R-KS), called for a regime change in Iran.[41] Other opponents of Iran, such as Barry Rosen, director of External Affairs at Colombia College and a former hostage, were furious when, in December 2001, the departments of State and Justice requested the District Court of Washington, D.C. to dismiss a lawsuit former hostages had brought against the government of Iran. Rosen claimed the Bush team was taking this action solely to build international support for the War on Terror.[42] The administration claimed its actions were dictated by an agreement made by President Carter in 1981. In return for an Iranian promise not to try the hostages as spies and execute them, Carter agreed to unfreeze $7.9 billion in Iranian assets and deny the hostages the right to sue Iran. The hostages sued anyway, citing the 1996 Antiterrorism Act as justification. The House and Senate agreed with Rosen. This left the president in the difficult position of trying to block a claim Congress had found to be legitimate. Eventually the presiding judge decided the presidential agreement took precedence and denied the claim.[43] The case is currently being appealed.

Iran was also a sticky topic for some U.S. businesses. The case of Halliburton was a prime example. In February 2000, Halliburton opened an office in Iran through a subsidiary

company operating out of Dubai, thus avoiding a U.S. law prohibiting U.S. companies to deal with Iran. During the Clinton years, the leadership of Halliburton, including CEO Dick Cheney, repeatedly urged the U.S. government to end sanctions on Iran and allow U.S. firms to compete for lucrative Iranian contracts.[44] Cheney claimed this would help improve relations between the two countries. By 2003, Vice President Cheney was among those who successfully pressured Halliburton stockholders to suspend operations in Iran.

Think tanks also got into the act. While there was general agreement a regime change and greater liberalization in Iran would be in U.S. interests, how to effect those changes was a matter of debate. Generally speaking, more liberal voices, such as Representative Jane Harman (D-CA), favored a policy of proactive engagement while their conservative counterparts, including U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton, did not rule out a greater use of covert, clandestine, or even overt military actions to create the desired conditions on the ground.[45]

All these actions played out on the battlefield of public opinion. In 2000, a poll conducted by the U.S. Foreign Policy Association revealed 72 percent of Americans were in favor of discontinuing sanctions against Iran and 80 percent wanted to upgrade relations between the two countries.[46] By July of 2003, 80 percent of those polled continued to favor diplomatic engagement as the preferred strategy to use with Iran and 62 percent felt the UN should take the lead in such efforts.[47] However, the same poll showed 65 percent favored taking military action against Iran in order to prevent the Iranians from developing nuclear weapons and 50 percent would support such action even if the UN opposed it.[48]

At the same time, polls showed the president's popularity was declining. However, a dwindling majority of Americans continued to support his policies toward Iraq. In the case of the $87.7 billion the president had requested to rebuild Iraq, only a slim majority of the American public supported the administration.[49] These declines in popularity emboldened the democratic presidential candidates in challenging the president. When retired army general Wesley Clark announced his candidacy for president, the attacks intensified. Facing increasing external political attacks on one hand, President Bush also faced increasing apparent strife among his closest advisors.

When President Bush initially came to power both he and most Washington analysts called his inner circle of advisors a "policy dream team." By 2003, significant battle lines or ideological cleavages were visible among the team members and administration efforts to explain these away as healthy disagreements and commendable diverse approaches were sounding less and less believable.[50] Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was increasingly seen as beleaguered and losing influence. The same was true for some of his key assistants, such as Paul Wolfowitz. In contrast, the star of National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice was seen as in the ascendant, as was that of Secretary of State Colin Powell, with whom Rice often consulted. Points of conflict had included U.S. policy toward North Korea, Iraq, the Middle East, NATO and Iran. By 2003, analysts and government insiders said administration battle lines usually pitted Rice and Powell against Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney. It was clear the administration was committed to waging a successful war on terror,

by all means including the use of force. The Bush team was going to fight terror in whatever form it took, whether as a disperse network of nonstate actors such as Al Qaeda or as a more traditional opponent such as Syria or Iran. In contrast to Vice President Cheney and Secretary Rumsfeld, Powell, Rice, and George Tenet of the CIA saw themselves as more "pragmatic," arguing some form of détente with states such as Syria, North Korea, and Iran was possible with the right combination of carrots and sticks. As reports of the in-house rift became more numerous and detailed, the president demanded his advisors stop discussing such matters with the press.[51] This effort failed to halt the leaks.

Other members of the NSC staff claimed infighting among the president's senior advisors had resulted in significant levels of frustration at lower levels and was negatively impacting attempts to create a viable foreign policy.[52] In the case of Iran, in October of 2003, after two years of trying to craft a coherent policy, the presidential directive establishing that policy remained unsigned despite several meetings scheduled by Rice to complete the document.

Although military officers predictably insisted on anonymity, there was no shortage of senior officers on the joint and service staffs who laughed openly at the suggestion that the United States could force a regime change in Iran. The occupation of Iraq, peace operations in Kosovo, and tensions along the Korean peninsula had depleted the U.S. strategic reserve to only three army brigades and the Marine Corps. As of October 2003, the Marine Corps, which had been withdrawn from Iraq, had been ordered to return.[53] This time the Marines would be going to the Tikriti triangle where on the average, one American soldier was being killed every day. A sign that the administration had become very sensitive to these deaths was evidenced by a change in policy that prevented any broadcast or photography of U.S. remains returning from Iraq.[54] Where the press had once been invited to see flag-draped coffins, each symbolic of U.S. heroism and sacrifice, they were now excluded. Bluntly put, military officers argued that unless current taskings changed, there were insufficient U.S. ground forces to impose a military regime change on Iran. There were, however, other military options. If, for example, the existence and location of Iranian nuclear weapons facilities could be proven there were a variety of preemptive options available in the military arsenal.

Mid-rank State Department personnel groaned, rather than laughed, at the notion of taking forcible action against Iran.[55] These diplomats pointed to the severe international strains the war in Iraq had produced and the continuing lack of proof of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Future unilateral, preemptive moves by the United States without ironclad proof would add more stress and possibly fracture such institutions as NATO and the UN. Both State and the military services agreed with the CIA that a nuclear-armed Iran posed an enormous complication in the region and a potential threat to the United States, but argued this issue was not yet ripe to be settled by force.

Milton stretched his back and glanced at a clipping at the top of the stack on his desk. The headline screamed that Iran had declared, ten days before the 31 October deadline, that it would stop enriching uranium and would welcome French, Russian, and German

inspectors to see whatever they wanted. The immediate response from the State Department was to grudgingly complement the EU's success, while cautioning that they would believe Iranian compliance when they saw it. The article went on to say that the Iranian action was a blatant move to drive a wedge between the EU and the United States. Then, at last, inspiration struck. Milt began to type.

APPENDIX

IRAN

A Chronology of Key Events

1907 Introduction of constitution, which limits the royal absolutism of past dynasties that ruled Persia over the previous five centuries.

1921 22 February—Military commander Reza Khan seizes power.

1923 Reza Khan becomes prime minister.

1925 12 December—Parliament, in a constituent assembly, vote to vest the crown of Iran in Reza Shah Pahlavi.

1926 25 April—The coronation takes place and the Pahlavi era begins. Mohammad Reza, the shah's eldest son, is proclaimed Crown Prince.

1935 Formerly known as Persia, Iran is adopted as the country's official name.

Shah installed

1941 The shah's pro-Axis allegiance in World War II leads to the Anglo-Russian occupation of Iran and the deposition of the shah in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

1950 Ali Razmara becomes prime minister and is assassinated less than nine months later. He is succeeded by the nationalist, Mohammad Mossadeq.

1951 April—Parliament votes to nationalize the oil industry. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company is unable to continue operations and as a result Britain boycotts the purchase of Iranian oil. A power struggle between the shah and Mossadeq ensues.

1953 22 August—With the help of western backing, mainly due to oil interests in the country, the shah overthrows Mossadeq in a coup d'etat staged by General Fazlollah Zahedi.

Campaign to modernize

1963 26 January—The shah embarks on a campaign to modernize and westernize the country. He launches the "White Revolution," a program of land reform and social and economic modernization. During the late 1960s the shah became increasingly dependent on the Secret Police (SAVAK) in controlling those opposition movements critical of his reforms.

1978 September—The shah's policies alienate the clergy and his authoritarian rule leads to riots, strikes, and mass demonstrations. Martial law is imposed.

Shah exiled, Khomeini returns

1979 16 January—As the political situation deteriorates, the shah and his family are forced into exile.

1 February—The Islamic fundamentalist, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, returns to Iran following fourteen years of exile in Iraq and France for opposing the regime.

1 April—The Islamic Republic of Iran is proclaimed following a referendum.

4 November—Islamic militants take fifty-two Americans hostage inside the U.S. embassy in Tehran. They demand the extradition of the shah, in the United States at the time for medical treatment, to face trial in Iran.

1980 25 January—Abolhasan Bani-Sadr is elected the first president of the Islamic Republic. His government begins work on a major nationalization program.

27 July—The exiled shah dies of cancer in Egypt.

Iran-Iraq war

1980 22 September—Iraq invades Iran following border skirmishes and a dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. This marks the beginning of a war that will last eight years.

1981 20 January—The American hostages are released, ending 444 days in captivity.

22 June—Bani-Sadr is dismissed; he later flees to France.

After the United States and Soviet Union halted arms supplies, the United States attempted to win the release of hostages in Lebanon by offering secret arms deals; this would later become known as the Iran-Contra affair.

1988 3 July—290 passengers and the crew of an Iran Air Airbus are mistakenly shot down by the USS *Vincennes*.

Ceasefire

1988 20 July—Iran accepts a cease-fire agreement with Iraq following negotiations in Geneva under the aegis of the UN.

1989 14 February—Ayatollah Khomeini issues a religious edict (fatwa) ordering Muslims to kill British author Salman Rushdie for his novel, *The Satanic Verses,* considered blasphemous to Islam.

3 June—Ayatollah Khomeini dies. On 4 June, President Khamene'i is appointed as new supreme leader.

17 August—Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani is sworn in as the new president.

3 November—The United States releases $567 million of frozen Iranian assets.

Major earthquake kills thousands

1990 21 June—A major earthquake strikes Iran, killing approximately forty thousand people.

Iran remains neutral following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, denouncing both Baghdad's conquest of Kuwait and any long-term presence of U.S. forces in the region.

11 September—Iran and Iraq resume diplomatic relations.

United States imposes sanctions

1995 The United States imposes oil and trade sanctions against Iran for alleged sponsorship of "terrorism," seeking to acquire nuclear arms and hostility to the Middle East process. Iran denies the charges.

1997 23 May—Mohammad Khatami wins the presidential election by a landslide with 70 percent of the

vote, which is a clear victory over the conservative ruling elite.

1998 September—Iran deploys thousands of troops on its border with Afghanistan after the Taliban admits killing eight Iranian diplomats and a journalist in Mazar-e Sharif.

Student protests

1999 July—Prodemocracy students at Tehran University hold a demonstration following the closure of the reformist newspaper *Salam*. Clashes with the security forces lead to six days of rioting and the arrest of over one thousand students.

2000 18 February—Liberals and supporters of Khatami win 170 of the 290 seats in the Majlis elections held February, thus gaining control of parliament previously dominated by the conservatives since the 1979 Islamic revolution. Hard-liners win only 44 seats. An additional 65 seats will be decided in run-offs.

23 April—The judiciary, following the adoption of a new press law, bans the publication of sixteen reformist newspapers.

27 May—Inauguration of the Sixth Parliament.

1 August—Senior clerics issue a religious decree, or fatwa, allowing women to lead religious congregations of women worshippers.

2001 April—Iran and Saudi Arabia sign major security accord to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime.

Khatami's second term

2001 8 June—President Khatami re-elected for a second term after winning just under 77 percent of the vote.

8 August—President Mohammad Khatami sworn in for his second term in office.

2002 January—U.S. President George Bush describes Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an "axis of evil." He warns that the proliferation of long-range missiles being developed in these countries is as great a danger to the United States as terrorism. The speech causes outrage in Iran and is condemned by reformists and conservatives alike.

September—Russian technicians begin construction of Iran's first nuclear reactor at Bushehr despite strong objections from United States.

2003 February—Military aircraft crashes in southeast of country, killing all 275 people on board. It is Iran's worst air disaster.

June—Thousands attend student-led protests in Tehran against clerical establishment.

August—Diplomatic crisis with UK over arrest of former Iranian ambassador to Argentina, sought by Buenos Aires on warrant alleging complicity in 1994 Jewish center bombing.

September—UN nuclear watchdog gives Tehran weeks to prove that it is not pursuing atomic weapons program.

October—Iran declares, ten days before the 31 October deadline, that it would stop enriching uranium and would welcome French, Russian, and German inspectors to see whatever they wanted. Shirin Ebadi becomes Iran's first Nobel Peace Prize winner; the lawyer and human rights campaigner became Iran's first female judge in 1975 but was forced to resign after 1979 revolution.

November—Iran says it is suspending its uranium enrichment program and will allow tougher UN inspections of its nuclear facilities. IAEA report says Iran has admitted producing high-grade plutonium for peaceful purposes, but concludes there is no evidence of a nuclear weapons program.

December—Forty thousand people are killed in an earthquake in southeast Iran; the city of Bam is devastated.

2004 February—Conservatives gain control of parliament in controversial elections. Thousands of reformist candidates were disqualified by the hard-line Council of Guardians ahead the polls.

Source: Modified from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/806268.stm.

Notes

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The Next Tanker

ROGER H. DUCEY

This case reviews the United States Air Force's pursuit to acquire a replacement for the KC-135 tanker, a plane that has been in service since the Eisenhower administration. A valuable contributor during the Cold War and Vietnam, the KC-135's importance has been highlighted even more during the Gulf War, humanitarian operations in the mid-nineties, and more recently in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Although it has been modified and modernized over its life, corrosion in critical areas of the plane has made it costly and time consuming to maintain. The Boeing Company, maker of the KC-135, proposed a replacement aircraft in the form of a KC-767 and proposed a way to enable the air force to start the replacement with less up-front money—a lease with an option to purchase at the end of the lease. Three of the four congressional committees approved the deal, and when it reached the fourth, it ran into serious opposition from a key member of Congress. This case study, prepared by Colonel Roger Ducey, USAF, a faculty member in the National Security Decision Making Department and the senior air force advisor to the Naval War College, is being used as part of the school's curriculum.

Lieutenant Colonel Pete Corrao, USAF, a recent graduate from the Naval War College, had just reported to his next assignment at the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Pete had barely finished getting his check-in procedures completed when he was told to see his new boss, Colonel Jim Andrews, USA. Before going to Newport for a year of study, Pete had been a career tanker pilot and had commanded a KC-135 squadron. Colonel Andrews motioned Pete to sit down and got right to the point.

"Pete, I know you're just getting settled, but I need you to get busy right away. You're a career KC-135 tanker pilot, right?"

"Yes, sir." Pete nodded.

"With command experience. Right?"

Pete nodded again. "During Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom."

"Good. You're perfect for the job," Colonel Andrews went on. "As you know, the air force has been attempting to acquire a replacement for its KC-135 tanker. The Boeing Aircraft Company offered to solve the air force's problem by building a tanker version of their 767 commercial jet. A bill was introduced in the FY 2002 Appropriations Act by the appropriations committee and approved by the House and Senate authorizing the air force to pursue the project and then to submit a final report to Congress requesting authorization to expend funds from the two authorization committees and the two appropriations committees. Three congressional committees had approved this proposal, but then Senator McCain

[R-AZ], of the Senate Armed Services Committee raised serious objections that included allegations of Air Force–Boeing impropriety. He thinks that there was an improper relationship between Boeing and the air force from the very beginning of this deal. On the other side, there have been a number of members of Congress supporting this deal especially from the states that Boeing has manufacturing facilities in like Washington and Kansas, and from Illinois, where they have their headquarters.

"In December 2003, McCain's opposition resulted in Secretary Rumsfeld putting the program on hold and ordering an inspector general investigation to determine if the accusations were true. After the initial part of this investigation was complete, the secretary directed three additional reviews be done—by the Pentagon general counsel, the Defense Science Board, and finally the Industrial College of the Armed Forces."

COL Andrews leaned back in his chair. "Look, I'm an army armor guy and I'll never be the expert we need to help the secretary prepare for his testimony as the next fiscal year budget process proceeds. But you are. So, talk to whomever you need to, read whatever you have to, but get smart fast on this tanker lease issue. Then come and brief me. We don't have much time. I can't give you more than a week. Any questions?"

"Not right now, sir. I'll get back to you if something comes up."

Pete returned to his office and reflected on the challenge of his first tasking. He felt a conflict of emotions—sobered at the thought of preparing SecDef for testimony on such a highly visible and politically contentious program, but relieved and actually excited that the issue involved something he had spent most of his time doing. He was the right choice for this job and probably knew more about the tanker issue than his boss already. Pete reached for his PDA. He had kept all his contact numbers from his time in the tanker training branch at Air Mobility Command headquarters, and although the names of the action officers had changed, the numbers were the same. One thing was certain. If he was going to make people understand the KC-135 replacement issue, they would have to understand at least the basic history of air refueling. Air refueling was a critical capability that set this nation apart when it came to global power projection and the Boeing Company had been a big part of this story from the beginning.

Heavier-than-air flight began on 17 December 1903. Pete would not have been surprised to learn the search to keep airplanes in the air longer began the next day. In 1917, a pilot in the Imperial Russian Navy, Alexander P. de Seversky, proposed increasing the range of combat aircraft by refueling them in flight. De Seversky soon emigrated to the United States and became an engineer in the War Department. He received the first patent for air-to-air refueling in 1921.[1] During the 1920s, the U.S. Army undertook air refueling tests at Rockwell Field, San Diego, California, featuring a hose being lowered from a DH-4B biplane to another aircraft in flight. The first flight made with this system occurred on 20 April 1923 and by 27 August 1923, one of the DH-4Bs had established fourteen world records with a flight lasting more than thirty-seven hours.[2] By July 1930, the record was more than 647 hours in the air.[3] Nor was the United States the only country experimenting with

in-flight refueling. In the early 1930s, a British firm named Flight Refueling Limited (FRL) had developed some important fittings that enabled air refueling to be performed routinely by the Royal Air Force.

Surprisingly, World War II brought about a temporary halt to air refueling research. The combination of very-long-range bombers and forward bases enabled Allied aircraft to meet their operational requirements without it. When the war was over and atomic weapons became an integral part of U.S. war plans, this strategy continued with the United States basing nuclear-capable B-29 bombers in key overseas bases. But the B-29s were vulnerable to "political or military restrictions placed upon them by the host nation's government."[4] This vulnerability became very clear in 1947 as the Strategic Air Command's Operation Parkway—an operational "show of force" deployment of B-29s to Europe—ended early when several European nations refused to allow the American bombers to penetrate their airspace.[5] Basing strategic bombers in the United States was the answer to the problem, but this was not a viable solution until the development of the Boeing B-36, which had the range to fly unrefueled to most every potential target in the war plans. There was one problem with the B-36 however, and it was a big one. It lacked the required speed to counter the threat from modern jet fighters that were being designed and tested.[6] The answer was an all-jet bomber that would be fast enough to handle the fighters, but an all-jet bomber would also consume fuel at a much higher rate. The dynamics of the Cold War pushed the air force back toward its previously abandoned air refueling efforts.

But even before the B-36 could be fielded in large numbers, a way to improve the range of the B-29 still needed to be addressed. The air force chief of staff's annual report in 1948 said, "An aircraft of acceptable size could not be built to perform its mission at the desired range unless air-to-air in-flight refueling was employed." On 25 March 1948, air force secretary Stuart Symington told the Senate Armed Services Committee the range of the B-29 could be extended by in-flight refueling. In the wake of Symington's testimony, senior air force officers put considerable pressure on the Boeing Company to demonstrate—in only three days—aerial refueling with the B-29. Boeing delivered.[7] The air refueling program for the United States Air Force was off and running, but the only air refueling equipment at the time readily available in any quantity was the FRL "looped-hose" system developed by the British. Officers from Air Material Command and Boeing engineers flew to England to negotiate with FRL for the installation of air refueling equipment on B-29s. Approximately ninety B-29s were converted to KB-29M tankers and a number of B-29s and B-50s (an improved version of the B-29) were converted into receivers. From 26 February to 2 March 1949, a B-50A named "Lucky Lady II" completed the first nonstop, around the world flight, covering 23,452 miles in ninety-four hours, one minute with four in-flight refuelings by KB-29Ms positioned along the way. Following this demonstration, General Curtis E. LeMay, commander of Strategic Air Command (SAC), commented: "We can now deliver an atomic bomb to any place in the world that requires an atomic bomb."[8]

The original looped-hose system seriously limited the speed and altitude at which air refueling could be conducted, so the search for a better system continued. FRL continued to

try to improve its system, but Boeing was equally busy with its own replacement idea. Boeing's device consisted of a telescoping pipe or "boom" mounted to the lower tail section of the tanker aircraft and controlled by an operator that "flew" the boom to the receiver aircraft. Boeing moved quickly and, on 14 July 1951, the first combat refueling with a boom took place with an RB-45C over Korea.[9] The tanker follow-on to the KB-29M was the KC-97, which was also a derivative of the B-29. It was equipped with the flying boom and became the air force's predominant tanker with 816 being produced by Boeing.

The next air refueling system to be developed was a probe and drogue system where the tanker would unreel a length of hose with a basket on the end of it, which allowed a receiver aircraft to push a probe into it to effect a contact. This proved to be a cost-effective system, providing for a rapid means of converting a large number of fighter aircraft to be in-flight refueling capable. The first operational combat refueling with a probe and drogue system took place on 28 September 1951.[10]

Thus, by the early 1950s, the air force had different refueling systems, which caused interoperability problems within the air force, as well as with the navy, Marines, and NATO allies. In early 1952, Strategic Air Command conducted a series of demonstration flights to evaluate and recommend a single air refueling system. In August 1952 the decision was made to use the probe and drogue system. This did not sit well with GEN LeMay, and he continued to pressure the air force to reverse its decision, arguing that with the Korean War finished, the requirement to refuel fighters had lessened. Thus, the primary mission of tankers was to refuel bombers and the new B-47s and B-52s required much more fuel than could be supplied with a drogue hose, and he demanded that the new jet tanker that the air force needed should come equipped with a boom. It is hard today to realize the power and influence Curtis LeMay wielded when it came to strategic nuclear issues. His reputation as a bomber commander in both theaters in World War II was legendary, and when combined with the threat that the United States felt in the early days of the Cold War, LeMay had almost "carte-blanche" power to acquire weapon systems, build bases, and establish policy. Thanks to LeMay's relentless pressure, the boom became the air force's standard means of delivering fuel.

Faster bombers demanded faster tankers. The air force was slow to realize this, slow to fund such a program, and didn't even formally announce the requirement for a new jet tanker until 5 May 1954. But Boeing was wasting no time. In 1952 the company made the decision to invest $16 million, more than twice the net profits of 1951, to build a prototype airplane that would be able to perform in the role of both a military tanker and a civilian airliner. The new airplane was rolled out on 15 May 1954, two months ahead of schedule, and it flew for the first time on 15 July 1954. According to Boeing's president, William M. Allen, its primary motivation for building the prototype was to provide a tanker for the air force.[11]

In May of 1954, when announcing the requirement for a new jet tanker, the air force also announced there would be competition to select a company to produce the airplane. Boeing, Convair, Douglas, Fairchild, Lockheed, and Martin were selected to compete. Once the air force, and especially the Strategic Air Command, admitted a new jet tanker was needed,

they became very impatient to field one. Although less glamorous than nuclear bombers, SAC's tankers were as essential to the U.S. nuclear strike capability. And no part of the air force, perhaps even the entire U.S. military, was as important as SAC in the early years of the Cold War.

Rumors flew among Boeing's competitors that the air force was leaning toward the Boeing prototype called the 367-80, later redesignated the Model 717. On the prototype's seventh flight it practiced rendezvous and air refueling procedures with a Boeing B-52. The message was clear: while the other competitors were *talking* about building a tanker, Boeing was *flying* one.[12] On 3 August 1954, the air force announced it would procure twenty-nine jet tankers from Boeing as an interim source of jet tankers "pending availability of the aircraft selected as a result of the current competition." Less than two weeks later and prior to the competition deadline, the air force announced the further expenditure of $240 million for eighty-eight additional interim Boeing tankers.[13]

Oddly enough, Boeing did not win the competition. While Air Material Command recommended Boeing should produce the interim, stopgap tanker, they recommended either Douglas or Lockheed build the full production tanker. In February 1955, secretary of the air force Harold E. Talbott announced that Lockheed's proposal had won the design competition. The air force would fund and build one Lockheed prototype immediately but would also purchase another 169 "interim" Boeing tankers in addition to the 117 already ordered. As a result, the winner of the competition was funded to build only one airplane and the loser received enough money to build a sizable fleet. The motivation for the irregular selection process will probably never be known, but may have had much to do with Cold War fears, Le May's power, and Boeing's business acumen. As fielding two different tankers would be a logistics nightmare, Boeing's tanker, now known as the KC-135, became the de facto winner.

The tanker saga of 1954 attracted critical congressional attention from the Surveys and Investigations staff of the House Appropriations Committee, which launched an investigation. The subcommittee requested relevant documents pertaining to the selection process and the air force very begrudgingly complied. In the end, the committee criticized the air force for the way it conducted the selection process, which seemed to favor Boeing. The air force responded to these criticisms by defending its purchase of the Boeing product by asserting that although the Lockheed proposal was the best tanker, the Boeing tanker was cheaper because the company had absorbed the development cost and had eliminated much of the risk by being able to deliver an operable aircraft when the air force needed one. An air force representative remarked that he "wished more contractors had the courage of their convictions to carry on development at their own expense in anticipation of military requirements."[14] The hearings ended with no vindication or additional sales for Lockheed. For Boeing, their multimillion dollar gamble had clearly paid off, and the air force got a fleet of jet tankers sooner and cheaper than it would have with Lockheed.

The first KC-135A first flew in August 1956, and the initial production "Stratotanker" was delivered to Castle Air Force Base in June 1957. The last production model was delivered in

1965. In all, 732 planes were delivered. Ideal for many uses, the aircraft was modified for use in command and control, reconnaissance, transport, and research missions. In addition to supporting SAC's nuclear bombers, KC-135 tankers refueled all types of aircraft during the Vietnam War. KC-135s flew in support of B-52 conventional bombing missions as well as providing support to air force, navy, and marine fighter aircraft. After Vietnam, tanker task forces with permanent party staffs were formed in key locations around the world, and Strategic Air Command tanker crews were deployed for forty-five to sixty days to these detachments to provide refueling support for U.S. and allied aircrews where and when needed.

The air force made several modifications to the KC-135 fleet over the years. A drogue capability was quickly added to the aircraft to refuel probe-equipped navy, marine and allied aircraft. As KC-135s were assigned to Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) units in the 1970s, many were located at international airports around the country. As environmental laws limiting noise were enacted, issues developed with the noise produced by the 1950s vintage engine of the KC-135A. An engine modification program installed newer technology engines to 161 airplanes, called the KC-135E. This modification resulted in improved takeoff performance and 85 percent less noise. Improved engines for the remainder of the KC-135A fleet, designated the KC-135R, dramatically increased takeoff performance, fuel efficiency, and offload capability to the point where two of the new KC-135Rs could do the work of three of the originals. At the same time, a major project was undertaken to re-skin the lower wing surfaces with an improved aluminum alloy, which was less susceptible to fatigue. This program was completed in 1988.[15] The last major modification involved installing a modern "glass cockpit" which provided information to the pilots in such an improved way that it was possible to eliminate the position of navigator on the aircraft. Much like the venerable B-52, the KC-135 fleet remained robust and vital during its lifetime. But age would eventually begin to take a toll, which increased as the Cold War ended.

The Gulf War saw extensive deployments of KC-135s. The combination of nuclear alert commitments accompanied by the deployment of a record number of crews put a strain on the aircraft and crews. Shortly after the war, on 28 September 1991, President Bush directed that alert bombers and tankers stand down from nuclear alert. Many crews had recently returned from Southwest Asia where they had been deployed for months in support of the Gulf War, and the post–Cold War environment raised many questions about the future of the KC-135. Answers were quick in coming.

In 1992, with the Cold War over, the air force conducted its largest reorganization since 1947. Strategic Air Command, Military Airlift Command, and Tactical Air Command were disestablished and merged into Air Combat Command (ACC) and Air Mobility Command (AMC). SAC's bombers and missiles went to ACC, the tankers went to AMC.

Life was different in AMC for the tanker crews. The "new" Air Mobility Command headquarters was the old Military Airlift Command headquarters. The airlift culture, developed in the building over a long period of time, was difficult to change quickly. Airlifters moved cargo and people for a living, and senior AMC leadership looked at the tankers with an eye

toward improving their capability to move cargo and people in addition to providing air refueling. Tankers and crews were sent out into the "mobility system" where they were used to move supplies and people around the world. As the crews discovered, it was the start of a very busy time.

In 1992, Saddam Hussein's forces made moves to the south and north of the "no-fly zones" established at the end of the Gulf War, and the United States and Great Britain responded to the aggression with strikes and increased air patrols. Additional tanker crews were dispatched to Turkey and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, a massive humanitarian relief effort was launched as the United States began airlifting food to Somalia. Tanker crews were deployed to Lajes Field, Portugal, RAF Mildenhall, the United Kingdom, Moron Airbase, Spain, Souda Bay, Crete, and Mombassa, Kenya, to provide an "airbridge" allowing airlifters to launch from the United States and fly directly to Africa without landing. This massive effort would continue into the summer of 1993. Somalia was followed by hurricane relief missions and the preparation for the invasion of Haiti, which turned into another relief mission, and when the Bosnian and Kosovo regions flared into war, tankers were deployed in record numbers to refuel fighters and airlifters supporting Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force through the 1990s. These operations would have been impossible without tankers supplying fuel to attack and airlift aircraft. As the 1990s drew to a close, the KC-135s, now more than thirty years old, began to show signs of age and fatigue.

Some of the warning signs that the fleet was stressed included an increase in the time each aircraft was spending in programmed depot maintenance (PDM); rising operation and support (O&S) costs; and declining mission capable rates of the aircraft. In 1999, 176 tankers, or 32 percent of the entire fleet, were in depot maintenance. Then, a crash of a KC-135E in northwest Germany killed all four crewmembers. Air force officials found problems with corrosion in the aircraft's stabilizer trim actuators. In order to fix this problem, 139 aircraft (24 percent of the total fleet, 40 percent of the aircraft available) were grounded for repair.[16] This grounding was a serious warning that similar groundings could happen in the future and severely limit the ability to deploy the fleet at a critical time affecting U.S. force projection.

Periodically, the air force conducts studies to determine future needs for capabilities and what personnel and equipment will be needed to deliver that capability based on Defense Planning Guidance. Two tanker-related studies had been initiated and were ongoing in the 1999 timeframe: the Tanker Requirements Study-05 (TRS-05) and the KC-135 Economic Service Life Study (ESLS). Due to the shift from Cold War to post–Cold War missions, TRS-05 identified a crew and aircraft shortage to handle predicted tanker requirements in the future.[17] The ESLS made cost and availability forecasts for the KC-135 fleet for the years 2001 to 2040 and projected a real 1 percent annual cost growth to maintain the KC-135 fleet and projected declining aircraft availability in the future. Average days for each aircraft to spend in depot maintenance would go from the present 230 days to 460 days in 2040, a 100 percent increase.[18] The two studies revealed a painful truth. Maintaining the current tanker fleet would be progressively more expensive, while the demand for these aircraft was rising.

As a result of these findings, Air Mobility Command drafted a Future Air Refueling Aircraft Mission Needs Statement (MNS) in October 2000, which was approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in October 2001. As the MNS was approved by the JROC, a team from across the air force met in Washington, D.C., to draft the Operational Requirements Document (ORD), to define needed and desired requirements for the next air-refueling platform.[19]

At the same time, Boeing had not been idle. Building on its tradition of producing exceptionally good, large aircraft, Boeing had begun building a new passenger aircraft in the early 1980s—the 767. After a decade of building these aircraft for commercial carriers, Boeing began to publicly explore the idea of using the 767 as a possible successor for a variety of existing combat support aircraft.[20] Potential customers included many other nations, including Saudi Arabia, France, Turkey, and Singapore, as well as NATO. In 1993, Saudi Arabia began exploring the potential purchase of new or used 767s or other commercial aircraft for use as military tankers. Since then, Australia, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom have studied the use of new, or used, commercial aircraft to replace their older tankers.

In March 2000, Boeing created a business unit to market the 767 tanker worldwide, and in April 2000, Boeing signed a contract with Italy to build four new 767 military tanker and transport aircraft with the first delivery scheduled for 2005. This was followed by a second contract to build four new 767 military tankers for Japan.[21] They also began discussions with the British about a possible new tanker to replace their fleet. Once again, Boeing had created an off-the-shelf tanker technology. In a manner reminiscent of the past, the company decided it was time to turn to one of their best and oldest clients.

In February 2001, Boeing delivered an unsolicited offer to build thirty-six tankers for the U.S. Air Force as a stop-gap measure for bolstering air force tanker capability pending results of the service's analysis of alternatives best suited to replace the remaining aircraft in the tanker fleet.[22] Due to funding constraints by the continued production of the C-17 and C-130J and the development costs of the F/A-22, JSF, and many space systems, combined with the fact that requirements had yet to be established for the tanker of the future, the air force did not take Boeing up on its offer.[23] At a 6 June 2001 hearing before the defense subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, General Michael Ryan, air force chief of staff, mentioned the Boeing offer in his response to a question from Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) on the continued viability of the service's KC-135s. General Ryan stated: "We're looking out in about the next 15 year time frame to begin that replacement."[24] And then came 9-11.

The 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon changed many things for the military services of the United States, and the air force suddenly had new variables to plug into the equations that predicted how long weapon systems would last based on current use rates. Combat air patrols were established over key U.S. cities in Operation Noble Eagle requiring thousands of air refueling missions. Within a few weeks, a large portion of the remaining tanker force deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Access to Afghanistan was difficult for strike aircraft, and missions in Afghanistan were

all but impossible without significant tanker support. Bases were established around the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean in Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Diego Garcia. Navy strike aircraft were stationed on carriers south of Pakistan and the USAF tanker fleet refueled them as well. USAF tankers also supported airlifters from Europe that required air refueling in northern Afghanistan so they could complete their missions. Tanker missions were long in duration, averaging 8.8 hours at the base Pete was stationed. Once on the ground, aircraft were "turned" in minimum time and given to another crew. The flying hours piled up, and the lack of facilities at the deployment bases prevented the normal schedule of aircraft rinses that minimized corrosion in the dusty and salty environment.

The airline industry was severely and adversely affected by the attacks of 11 September. Passengers stopped flying, and orders for new aircraft were canceled or delayed indefinitely. Congressional hearings almost immediately followed the attacks, and on 25 September 2001 Representative Norman Dicks, a fourteen-term Democrat from Washington and a member of the defense subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, was said to be planning "to insert an amendment into a defense appropriations bill to jump-start the Air Force's purchase of hundreds of Boeing 767 tankers and electronic surveillance planes."[25] Soon after this, a meeting with Boeing was organized by the assistant secretary of the air force for acquisition, Ms. Darleen Druyun.

Druyun was a hard-charging, no-nonsense administrator who became a power in the defense acquisition world during the 1990s when defense budgets were shrinking and the Clinton administration was calling for a "reinvention" of how government did business. She was known for testing the limits of Defense procurement practices and had turned around the C-17 program after it was billions of dollars over budget and a year behind schedule. She bullied contractors into lowering prices by reminding them of budget realities and talked vendors into unprecedented partnerships to save money. She regularly met with contractors to tell them what they were doing right and what they were doing wrong. Druyun was credited with saving the air force $20 billion in the process.[26]

At the meeting in September 2001, she asked if there was a way to acquire tankers without a large up-front investment of funds. Leasing was a possible answer and had been used in the past.[27]

In a normal acquisition, the air force would provide money up front to Boeing to fund the development and construction of the aircraft being bought. In the case of a 767 tanker lease, however, Boeing would not be reimbursed immediately but would be paid back gradually with lease payments. The large development and construction costs involved would have to be absorbed by Boeing and carried as debt. Carrying this much debt would negatively affect its credit rating and was not desirable. The discussions also focused on what was the best number of aircraft to initially acquire. Although immediately replacing the entire fleet was not an option for the air force, it did want to acquire an affordable number of aircraft that would efficiently amortize support costs. One hundred planes was determined to be that number.

After the meeting with Druyun, Boeing contacted financial institutions on Wall Street and challenged them to develop a way for Boeing to build 767 tankers for the air force without a large up-front expenditure by either organization.[28] The bank and brokerage firm of Salomon Smith Barney came back with an idea to develop a corporate organization known as a Special Purpose Entity (SPE)[29] for the purpose of building the Boeing tankers for the air force. The one hundred tankers would be built in six groups with Boeing borrowing funds to cover the costs of production of six at a time. The SPE would serve as a nonprofit middleman who would purchase the aircraft from Boeing and then lease them to the air force. The money that the SPE would use to purchase the aircraft would come from issuing bonds on the commercial market. These bonds would be bought by investors, and the money generated by the purchase of the bonds would be used to pay Boeing for the aircraft as they were manufactured. The buyers of the bonds would have their initial payment returned at the end of the term of the bond with a certain amount of interest. The SPE would then lease the aircraft to the air force using lease payments that were calculated to cover, but not exceed, the SPE's costs. Upon conclusion of the six-year lease for each group of 767s, the air force would have the option of returning the 767s to the SPE or purchasing the aircraft from the SPE for an additional sum.[30]

In a 12 October 2001 interview, Air Force Secretary James Roche, a retired navy captain, former member of the secretary of defense's Defense Science Board, and former corporate vice president at Northrop Grumman Corporation, expressed support for leasing the one hundred 767s. Roche explained the air force's rationale for the proposal: "We have a unique business opportunity to get the best pricing possible to address our critical need for a multi-mission aircraft that can carry gas and also do all kinds of other things. . . . This is not a bail-out, but taking advantage of a buyer's market."[31]

The FY 2002 Defense Appropriations Bill, Section 8159, authorized the secretary of the air force to establish a multiyear program for leasing up to one hundred general purpose Boeing 767 aircraft in commercial configuration. Subsequently, the *Congressional Record* clarified the bill's purpose: "to pursue a 767 general purpose commercial *tanker* configuration."[32] The bill authorized the deal, but provided no money. In a most unusual fashion, the tanker lease legislation emerged in what Hill veterans refer to as a "virgin birth," meaning it was inserted into the defense appropriations bill *after* the bill passed the House and Senate, during closed negotiations between conferees. It was then approved on the House and Senate floors as part of a larger compromise defense bill. Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and a longtime supporter of expanding federal leasing, claimed credit for inserting the language.[33]

The year 2002 started with the air force supporting Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle while they continued to refine the capabilities needed in the next tanker. In February, Senator McCain, the chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, along with the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS), parent company of Airbus, with 15 percent of the company owned by the French government, raised the issue of competition in the selection of the next tanker for the U.S. Air Force. Reacting to McCain's

concerns, the air force acquisition office signed out a Request For Information (RFI) on 20 February 2002 to Boeing and EADS/Airbus to begin the air force's market research and to assess market capabilities in the area of commercial tankers.[34] On 6 March 2002, responses to the RFI were received from Boeing and EADS. On 29 March 2002, after reviewing Boeing's and EADS's proposals, the air force notified Congress that it had selected Boeing's 767 over the Airbus A-330. Boeing was selected based on its favorable design, schedule, risk factors, and experience building tanker aircraft. The White House Office of Management and Budget evaluated the air force's RFI process and concluded that it was done in a reasonable and fair manner.[35]

For the rest of 2002 after the ORD was finalized to provide a stabilized position with which to negotiate with Boeing, the air force worked closely with Boeing to compare what they would like to have the next tanker do and what was possible with the 767 airframe. Secretary Roche had declared early on that the air force would not expend the amount of money required to develop a new tanker from scratch—a "developmental aircraft."[36] Developmental aircraft may meet exact requirements, but the costs involved in engineering, testing, and certifying a developmental aircraft are extremely high, and a cheaper off-the-shelf commercial product could be modified to provide the major capabilities required of the next generation tanker. The ORD and the Key Performance Parameters (KPP) were approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and then signed by the chief of staff of the air force on 22 October 2002.

Pete quickly reviewed the capabilities the KC-767 claimed to have. It would move fuel farther from a shorter airfield than the KC-135R. It would offer greater basing options because it would be able to operate out of much shorter runways. The KC-767 would be able to conduct both probe and drogue as well as boom receptacle refuelings on the same mission, which is impossible on the standard KC-135E and R models. The KC-767 would be air refuelable. In a transport mission configuration, the KC-767 would carry more pallets and people.[37] Finally, the mission capable rates (airplanes ready to fly right now) were expected to be at 90 percent compared to an average over the past five years of 78 percent for the KC-135R and 71.9 percent for the KC-135E.[38] Net aircraft availability would increase from approximately 66 percent currently for the KC-135 fleet to 80 percent for the KC-767A. The utilization of commercial practice maintenance inspections would reduce depot time from an average of forty-four days per year for the KC-135, to an anticipated fourteen days per year for the KC-767A.[39]

Pete nodded his head as he read. The U.S. spec 767 sounded like it was going to be a fine machine. Yet, it was important to compare it with the 767 tanker/transport currently being built by Boeing for Italy and the proposed A-330 tanker. Because of the glass cockpit instrumentation, the U.S. version would provide much better situational awareness capability to the crew, much higher thrust, and much higher electrical power output than either alternative. It would also have a fiber optic backbone, which would enable it to be configured for network centric operations. As for the "footprint" created by the two potential aircraft, the 767 was 29 percent larger than a KC-135R but fit in a footprint similar to a C-17. The A-330

was 97 percent larger than a KC-135R, which would mean that fewer of them could be deployed to each airfield overseas where ramp space was often very limited. The final price per aircraft for the U.S. KC-767 was $131 million. The A-330 was slightly less but provided less offload capability. The Italian 767 tanker/transport was priced at approximately $170 million.[40]

The work to procure the KC-767A proceeded smoothly through the end of 2002. Pete was not surprised to learn the FY 2003 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 107-314 of 2 December 2002) stated "the Air Force may not enter into a lease for the acquisition of tanker aircraft under Section 8159 of P.L. 107-117 until authorization and appropriation of funds necessary to enter into the lease in accordance with established procedures for such notifications." The practical effect of this provision was to prevent the lease from being implemented until the four congressional defense committees (House and Senate Armed Services committees and the House and Senate Appropriations committees) signaled approval of the lease. In this way the Senate and the House would ensure they had their usual say in defense matters.

In addition to working closely with the air force to make sure the 767 could meet the requirements of the next generation tanker, Boeing also made sure the company's lobbying arm was active. Boeing is big, powerful, and one of the few survivors of a once rich and diverse aircraft industry. As America's largest exporter and leading aerospace manufacturer, the company packs a lot of political clout. Boeing and its subsidiaries employ more than 153,000 people in forty-seven states and generate more than a billion dollars of wealth a week in the United States.[41] After the merger with McDonnell Douglas and Rockwell in the late 1990s, company emphasis shifted from commercial airliner production to defense related products. Accordingly, Boeing has made an extraordinary effort to make its presence felt in Washington, and it is important to remember that half its sales are defense related.

When it came to finding people to represent company interests in Washington, Boeing chose well. Rudy DeLeon, deputy secretary of defense from 2000 to 2001, was hired to bolster defense connections, and Thomas Pickering, a former U.S. ambassador, was hired to create a global network of ambassadors.[42] E-mail from DeLeon in September 2002 noted: "Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL) and Congressman Norm Dicks (D-WA) spoke directly with President Bush in support of moving ahead on the tanker lease. In both cases, President Bush reportedly expressed his support for moving ahead with the tanker initiative and asked Chief of Staff, Andy Card to be 'on point' for this effort."[43] In June of 2003, more than fifty executives from Boeing entered Room 405 in the Old Executive Office building adjacent to the White House. From the podium where President Bush often hosts visiting groups, Karl Rove, the president's chief political advisor, personally briefed Boeing managers on the administration's agenda and how it overlapped with Boeing's interests.[44]

Why was the White House interested in this deal? A former government official said: "The reason the President and Karl Rove are interested is because they want to win in Washington (a battleground state) in the next election. That is why the President went out there and endorsed the tanker deal two months ago."[45] The Boeing lobbying effort went even further according to a draft review by Taxpayers For Common Sense. According to the group,

Boeing spent $1.2 million lobbying on the tanker deal, including $300,000 to hire the firm Akin, Gump, Strauss Hauer and Feld, whose chief Boeing lobbyist was Bill Paxon, a former Republican Congressman who served as one of the "gang of six" advisers who aided President Bush during his presidential run.[46] Boeing also acknowledged to the *London Financial Times* that two current Defense Policy Board members, who provide policy recommendations to the secretary of defense, retired navy admiral David Jeremiah and retired air force general Ronald Fogelman, were paid consultants who campaigned on the company's behalf in "defense circles" in support of the deal.[47]

Pete poured himself a cup of coffee and shook his head in admiration. When Boeing thought the stakes were high enough, it was okay to spend big bucks to achieve its goals.

On 10 July 2003 the required notification report was sent to the four defense oversight committees. The report discussed the operational requirement for tankers, alternative tanker-force investment options, the estimated costs of leasing and procuring the 767s, the air force's plan for implementing the lease, and basing plans for the 767s. Following the 10 July report, the air force submitted a new start programming notification for the 767 lease mentioned in Section 133 of P.L. 107-314. Most observers felt the 767 deal was moving smoothly on track.

In a 14 August 2003 opinion piece for the *Wall Street Journal*, Richard Perle, a current member of the Defense Policy Board, praised the Pentagon plan to lease tanker aircraft saying, "It takes a special government green-eyeshade mentality to miss the urgency of the tanker requirement." Perle's piece did not mention Boeing or his own firm, Trireme Partners, by name. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had named Perle to the Defense Policy Board in 2001, and later that year, Trireme Partners was set up in Delaware.[48]

Trireme Partners had a significant business relationship with Boeing. Sixteen months before, Boeing had committed to invest $20 million with Trireme, a venture capitalist firm. When questioned about their investment, Boeing admitted they had briefed Mr. Perle on the tanker issue on 14 July 2003, but "had no hand in writing the document [op-ed piece] nor did we assist in placing it."[49]

Predictions of smooth sailing for the 767 seemed all too accurate as, through late August 2003, three of the four congressional defense committees approved the KC-767 new start programming. The Senate Armed Services Committee was the last in line. But as the issue made it to the SASC agenda, Senator McCain challenged the lease.

Claiming the deal unfairly benefited Boeing, McCain requested all relevant documents including e-mail correspondence from Boeing and the Department of Defense. Boeing complied, handing over 8,500 documents including e-mails, but Defense refused, citing the need to protect "pre-decisional" communications on acquisitions. In DoD's opinion, there was no precedent for providing internal departmental communications related to defense acquisition, and by doing so, proprietary data of the companies involved would be compromised.[50] After analyzing the correspondence supplied by Boeing, McCain maintained the air force and Boeing had worked together to build support for acquiring a new tanker, even

though the air force had not listed it as an urgent priority item in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The POM puts money against a service's most important programs. The air force said there was no money for a new tanker with all the other programs, such as the F-22, C-17, JSF, and space systems that needed funding, but the attacks of 11 September 2001 opened a new opportunity.

The air force also believed this opportunity enabled them to comply with direction provided by the secretary of defense. When he first took office, Secretary Rumsfeld challenged each of the services to find new and innovative ways of reducing the procurement time for major weapon systems and to take advantage of commercial practices. Leasing the 767s seemed a textbook example of what the secretary was asking for.

Senator McCain saw it differently. He believed congressional priorities weren't being observed on the tanker lease. McCain maintained there were important reasons to have four separate committees examine and approve major weapon system purchases and then appropriate the money to do it. In this case the authorization was made part of an appropriations bill and wasn't passed by the authorizing committees (SASC or HASC). In a 15 September 2003 *National Review Online* interview, McCain said that "it's a perversion and an obscenity to authorize a multi-billion dollar deal without going through the normal authorization process of hearings in the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee and [instead] put it in a line item in an appropriations bill without so much as a hearing."[51]

Then there was also the question of possible impropriety. Secretary Druyun, who had hosted the first meeting between Boeing and the air force, had been hired by Boeing in December 2002 to work in a part of the company not involved with the tanker program. On 29 August 2002 Ms. Druyun recused herself from decisions on Lockheed Martin Corporation and Raytheon Company programs. Recusal is required if a DoD employee involved in the approval process of contracts being discussed and decided by DoD is contemplating retiring or leaving DoD in order to apply for a position with a company competing for, or possessing, a contract with the Defense Department. The rule was established to prevent conflicts of interest. Clearly Secretary Druyun had acted appropriately with regard to Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. But, Ms. Druyun didn't recuse herself from Boeing programs until 5 November 2002, only two months before Boeing named her head of its Washington missile defense office.[52] Whether she and Boeing had actually done something improper was unclear, but there was enough doubt to provide ammunition to McCain and other lease opponents.

At a 4 September 2002 hearing, in response to Senator McCain's objections, Senator Warner (R-VA) and Senator Levin (D-MI) proposed a compromise lease of twenty-five tankers and the acquisition through the normal procurement process of another seventy-five airplanes. In response to this proposal, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said the plan to lease twenty-five and buy seventy-five would require a total renegotiation of contracts, delay the program by a year, and cost more money up front.[53] The proposed 25/75 plan would require $16 billion in funding over the next five years, compared with the $5.5 billion

needed for the air force's original lease plan. According to a letter written by Wolfowitz, the air force plan would cost $29.2 billion, including training, operation, and maintenance costs. The Senate committee's proposal would cost $27.1 billion, and buying the airplanes outright would cost $24.3 billion. In response, Warner said: "The letter validates my position that, to the extent we buy these aircraft instead of leasing them, would result in significant savings to the taxpayers. In my view, this represents progress."[54] The Senator went on to say that before he scheduled a vote, he would ask the Congressional Budget Office and General Accounting Office to review the Pentagon's figures. At the hearing Senator McCain released nearly one hundred pages of documents that, to him, indicated possible improper collusion between Boeing and the air force. The senator asked the Pentagon's inspector general, Joseph Schmitz, to look into the possibility that Boeing and the air force improperly cooperated to close the deal.[55] Boeing argued that the Senator's documents, taken as a whole, showed no evidence of improper conduct, but eighteen months of negotiations in which both sides—the air force and Boeing—legitimately worked out their differences to meet the needs of the military and the taxpayers.[56]

The debate over the lease raged all through the fall of 2003. Special interest groups, defense officials, and senators and congressmen from both sides of the aisle argued over what should be done.

The A.F.L.-C.I.O. entered the fight, with unions running ads against McCain. Steve Rooney, the president of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge 70, in Wichita, Kansas, wrote in an op-ed piece in the *Wichita Eagle* that "I'm saddened, but not surprised, that many of our elected officials want to outsource our national defense. I think this is a terrible mistake, and a national disgrace. The Machinists union, its members, and a vast majority of Americans don't want to outsource the work and technology to foreign competition."[57]

Marvin Sambur, the air force's top acquisition official, said, "I hope they see that the 25 is not going to be the solution here." He estimated cutting the lease by three-quarters would push up the per-plane cost as much as 40 percent higher, to about $183 million.[58]

Keith Ashdown of Taxpayers for Common Sense maintained lease opponents picked up a valuable ally in Representative Bill Young (R-FL), chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, who told a Florida newspaper buying the planes was a better option than leasing. Young, a supporter of acquiring new tankers, sits in a district bordering Tampa's MacDill Air Force Base, which would get some of the new 767s.[59]

Christopher Hellman of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation said, "The sort of hybrid that Senator Warner has suggested, I suspect when they run the numbers . . . they'll find that the least attractive option financially."

At one point, in early October, House Appropriations Committee supporters of the lease approved legislation offered by Representative George Nethercutt (R-WA) as an amendment to the FY 2004 supplemental appropriations bill that called on the Pentagon to give Congress a report in 30 days on options to replace the KC-135. Language similar to the

House amendment was initially included in the Senate version of the supplemental bill, but Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Ted Stevens agreed to take it out at the request of Senator McCain.[60] But the arguments were not confined to Capitol Hill. The military was also getting in on the act.

For example, the commander of Pacific Air Forces, General William Begert, said in a 6 December 2003 interview with the *Colorado Springs Gazette:* "because of an acquisition holiday in the 1990s and a buying process that takes decades, the United States relies on planes as much as 43 years old, with rust, corrosion and obsolete parts. If replacement of the tanker fleet and production of the latest generation of fighter aircraft . . . isn't hastened, the United States could be vulnerable to such enemies as North Korea, which is speedily acquiring aircraft and surface-to-air missiles."[61]

General John Handy, commander, U.S. Transportation Command, said: "We have a KC-135E/R fleet that is 40-plus years old. I have recommended that we retire our 133 KC-135E model aircraft, whose average age is 43 years. If we received approval today to replace all of our KC-135 fleet, using a typical 15 aircraft-per-year buy, the last tanker would be 100 years old when it was retired. That's the same amount of time as has elapsed since the Wright Brothers' historic flight. The value of the 767 lease [of one hundred aircraft from Boeing] is that it would provide us new aircraft quick and at a reasonable price at a time we really do need them. I wasn't able to send the KC-135Es to Operation *Iraqi Freedom* because of their lack of capability and our fear of exposing them to a corrosive environment. Ultimately, we will have to replace all of our more than 500 KC-135E/Rs, which were bought during the Eisenhower Administration."[62]

An opinion piece in the *Chicago Sun Times* by Congressman William O. Lipinski (D-IL) argued "the Air Force's plan to replace its 46-year old antiquated refueling tanker fleet by leasing 100 aerial tankers from the American-owned, American-based Boeing Company . . . will ensure that our American servicemen and women have the tools that they need to protect our national security safely and effectively. The lease agreement also will strengthen our economic security and provide Americans with jobs."[63] He went on to say, "Some claim that we should buy the tankers from Airbus, Boeing's major competitor, which is primarily a French-owned company with no experience building refueling tankers nor experience working with our Pentagon."[64]

Prompted by the investigation into possible improprieties by Boeing, Airbus redoubled its effort to crack the American market for military business. For several months, Airbus officials had been looking for an American partner for military contracts and were willing to reconfigure Airbus jets as military tankers by installing heavier cargo doors and reinforcing floors and barriers between cockpits and cargo spaces, at an American factory. "Ten years ago, this would have been impossible," said Noel Forgeard, the Airbus chief executive. "Today the situation is completely different." Airbus' parent company, EADS, earmarked $80 million to develop refueling booms and other equipment to transform the A-330 into a military tanker able to meet American requirements. Ralph Crosby, a former twenty-year Northrup Grumman executive, now chairman for EADS in North America, said, "We have

made it clear to Air Force authorities that we intend to compete aggressively for all future tanker buys." Crosby also mentioned that he believed that Airbus needed to win the British tanker order to have a chance at the American tanker order. The company is in competition with Boeing in Britain for a contract worth more than $20 billion.[65]

The announcement coincided with a visit to Washington by one of the two co-chief executives of EADS to lead a meeting of the company's executive committee, which usually meets in Amsterdam. In August, this same executive attended a groundbreaking ceremony for an $11 million EADS helicopter assembly plant in Columbus, Mississippi, home of Senators Trent Lott and Thad Cochran. Asked whether Airbus could suffer because of the bitterness in Washington over the refusal of France and Germany to support the war in Iraq, Mr. Forgeard replied: "Airbus is regarded as a global player, as a great brand."[66] The company was also considering a listing on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ Exchange to raise its American profile.

On 6 November 2003, the Bush administration and senior Republican lawmakers agreed to buy, rather than lease, eighty new tankers. The first twenty aircraft would be leased. In a letter to Senator Warner, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said the final deal "strikes a necessary balance between the critical need for new air-refueling tankers and constraints on our budget." Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told reporters: "Clearly there were significant individual members of the United States Congress who felt that there were better ways to approach this," but described the final deal as "acceptable to all parties. Compromise takes place all the time."[67]

"It's a win-win situation for everyone," said Senator Maria Cantwell, a Washington Democrat, and strong supporter of the plan. "The Air Force has the tankers it wants, taxpayers get to save money, and the state of Washington gets to keep manufacturing a great product."[68]

Keith Ashdown, a spokesman for Taxpayers for Common Sense, which long had criticized the deal, said, "This is the best deal we can get. We were up against the second-largest defense contractor and lots of lawmakers who want to protect jobs for Boeing. A compromise was the only way to go forward. We were worlds apart a few months ago, so this is a big victory."[69]

In a surprising move on 25 November 2003, Boeing fired Ms. Druyun, and their chief financial officer, Michael Sears, as a result of an internal investigation of the tanker lease deal. Though he wasn't accused of any ethical breaches, Boeing's chief executive officer, Philip Condit, resigned a week later, saying he took blame for breaches committed by others. Druyun and Sears were fired for breaking company rules by discussing her hiring while she negotiated the tanker deal and then trying to cover up the discussions.[70] As a result of these firings, Secretary Roche asked the Pentagon inspector general to expand the inquiry of Boeing's 767 tanker deal to include other major contract awards to the company as far back as 2000. At the same time, Marvin Sambur, air force assistant acquisition secretary, made the strongest public case to date that Druyun's possible improper contact had nothing to do with the final contract proposal that Congress reviewed and changed.

"Did she influence the contract?" Sambur said. "She's been gone for a year and three months—there wasn't even a 'contract' when she left. There was a 'price.' The price has gone down significantly," from $150 million per airplane to $131 million per plane, Sambur said.[71]

Following the firings, Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz announced there would be a "pause" for the Pentagon's internal auditor to examine whether the two executives' actions affected Boeing's government contract for the planes. In a letter to the leaders of the House and Senate Armed Services committees, he said the Pentagon "remains committed to the recapitalization of our aerial tanker fleet and is appreciative of the compromise that will allow this arrangement to move forward."[72]

Senate Armed Services chairman John Warner called the pause "a prudent management step." He argued the Pentagon should do nothing about the planes until Congress received the results of the internal review, which should include examining the actions of all Pentagon and air force personnel involved in negotiating the lease contract.

But the existing KC-135s were continuing to age. In December 2003, the air force commissioned a RAND study, which was published in the first week of February 2004. This study, "Investigating Optimal Replacement of Aging Air Force Systems," published under a "Project Air Force" contract, cites a sharp downturn in the KC-135's availability in 2000, because part of the fleet was grounded for inspections following the 1999 fatal crash of a KC-135E model, the oldest model in the fleet. "If one wishes to estimate how KC-135 availability has varied with system age, the key analytical issue is how to handle the 1999 to 2000 availability trough," the report said. "Was it an idiosyncratic episode that should not be considered in estimating the KC-135 availability time trend? Or was it the sort of incident that will become increasingly common as this system ages?"[73] The overall recommendation of the study was that the air force should begin replacing KC-135s before 2010.

In addition to this study, the air force decided to begin another study in April by the service's Fleet Viability Board, created by Secretary Roche in August of 2003, to develop criteria that can help decide whether to repair or retire aircraft. The board is composed of full-time air force technical engineers, cost analysts, and sustainment logisticians. It also includes advisers from sister services, industry, government, and academia to provide recommendations to the air force's top leadership. Another study, by the Defense Science Board, will examine similar issues and will be presented to the secretary of defense by May 2004.[74]

The new chief executive officer for Boeing, Harry Stonecipher, who had retired as Boeing's president a year earlier, set right to work during the pause to reestablish the firm's credibility with Congress and the Department of Defense. He asked former U.S. senator Warren Rudman to conduct a study of ethical issues at Boeing and to examine the practice of hiring former defense officials for positions in the company. The report from this study will be made public. He also visited the office of Senator John McCain on 11 February 2004, to discuss Senator McCain's concerns about the tanker deal. Before the meeting, Mr. Stonecipher said that he would ask Mr. McCain what the company must do "to get out of the penalty box." As he left the meeting, Stonecipher said he was "taking away some action

items—some things that I'm doing, which we agreed on, and some things that need to be done."[75] McCain said he didn't consider the company to be in the "penalty box" despite what the senator called its "incestuous" ties with the air force. "We had a very frank exchange of views," said McCain. "I praised Mr. Stonecipher for a number of the changes that have been made."[76]

As Pete typed the last of his notes, he wondered what the outcome of the tanker issue would be. Would the secretary decide to proceed? Would he decide to start over with a new competition? What impact would Congress have on whatever the air force decided to do? Pete believed he had a good feel for what had transpired up to this point and was ready to get Colonel Andrews up to speed. What would happen after the pause was finished was unclear. But Pete felt fortunate he had spent time in Newport analyzing cases in NSDM using the Input/Output Model. At the time he had found the cases interesting bits of history. Now, he realized PMP had given him tools he might be able to use to influence the decision making process in a beneficial way.

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North Korea's Nuclear Breakout: Lessons for Nonproliferation

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The strategic problem for the policy-making community is North Korea's nuclear breakout. This regime, which is a failing, isolated, and paranoid regime whose government does not inspire confidence and whose economic system is collapsing, is apparently moving aggressively to develop nuclear weapons. This case examines the history of North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the period from 1994 when the Agreed Framework was in effect until its collapse in 2002 and the implications for the policy-making community as it wrestles with nonproliferation policies. It concludes with options for the United States and other members of the international nonproliferation community that seek to persuade North Korea, and other like-minded states, that crossing the nuclear threshold is a dangerous development. This case study, prepared by Dr. Bill Martel, a faculty member of the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College, is being used as part of the school's curriculum.

INTRODUCTION

The consensus is that North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) is moving systematically toward a declared nuclear arsenal, which is known as "nuclear breakout."[1] In a significant development, the DPRK's deputy foreign minister discussed plans in August 2003 to declare its nuclear status and conduct a nuclear test.[2] The problem is that Pyongyang's nuclear breakout could lead to regional nuclear arms races and war. It also could weaken the international consensus on the value of global efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.[3]

The matter of North Korea's nuclear program has been in a state of crisis since October 2002 when DPRK officials apparently admitted that they have a nuclear weapons program. In January 2002, President Bush described North Korea as a member of the "axis of evil" and state sponsor of terrorism, and warned that North Korea might share nuclear weapons or technologies with other regimes or terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda.[4]

The strategic problem for the nonproliferation community is to halt the North's nuclear breakout. But we are dealing with a failing, isolated, and paranoid regime whose government does not inspire confidence and whose economic system is collapsing. This case study examines the history of North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the period from 1994 when the Agreed Framework was in effect until its collapse in 2002, and the implications for future nonproliferation policies. It concludes with options for the United States and other members of the international nonproliferation community that seek to persuade North

Korea, and other like-minded states, that crossing the nuclear threshold is a dangerous development that will undermine efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

BEFORE THE AGREED FRAMEWORK: DPRK'S NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROGRAMS

Since the early 1990s, North Korea's nuclear program has involved two separate activities—the development of facilities for creating fissile material and long-range ballistic missiles.

To begin with the nuclear program, North Korea has had a nuclear weapons program for decades.[5] It started work in the 1960s to develop nuclear reactors, notably with a small research reactor built in Yongbyon by the Soviet Union, to produce a supply of fissile materials. At present, its nuclear program consists of a five-megawatt power reactor, eight-megawatt research reactor, and a fifty-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon. In 1984, the DPRK commenced construction of a two hundred-megawatt reactor at Taechon whose status is unknown.[6] The consensus in the early 1990s was that North Korea could produce roughly fifteen pounds of highly enriched uranium from its five-megawatt reactor, which is sufficient for one Hiroshima-sized bomb per year.

Pyongyang signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1985, but by 1989 reports began to surface that it was building a plutonium-reprocessing facility. DPRK officials repeatedly denied that it was building a reprocessing facility or that it had nuclear weapons, but as early as 1993, officials in the U.S. intelligence community hinted that North Korea might possess one or two nuclear weapons.[7] In late 2002, the CIA asserted that the DPRK could have one or two nuclear weapons, and might have a uranium enrichment facility. In October 2003, the U.S. intelligence community reported that Pyongyang has produced enough plutonium for several bombs.[8] In addition, a facility at Yongbyon was reported by North Korean officials in 2003 to be ready to reprocess plutonium for nuclear bombs.[9] And this debate finally ended when DPRK officials reported in October 2003 that Pyongyang had produced atomic bombs with plutonium to create a small nuclear arsenal.[10]

In addition to its nuclear program, the DPRK has maintained an active research and development program to produce long-range ballistic missiles.[11] It test fired the *Nodong-1* into the Sea of Japan on 29 May 1993, which with a reported range of one thousand kilometers gives the DPRK the ability to cover all of South Korea and much of Japan. In 1998, the DPRK launched the *Taepodong-1* medium-range ballistic missile, which served as a major wake-up call for the U.S. intelligence community, which had underestimated the DPRK's capabilities. This incident coincided with the publication of the Rumsfeld Commission Report in 1998 on the development of missiles, which warned that ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pose a "growing threat to the United States, its deployed forces and its friends and allies."[12]

In response to the 1998 missile test, the Clinton administration agreed in September 1999 to continue the dialogue with Pyongyang while the North agreed to a moratorium on missile testing in exchange for the sale of ballistic missiles, but this failed.[13] Alarmed by

these developments, Japan launched a reconnaissance satellite in March 2003 to monitor activities in the DPRK, and announced in August 2003 that it was developing ballistic missile defenses collaboratively with the United States.[14]

The general consensus is that the DPRK most likely possesses nuclear weapons, but it is unclear whether it could deploy those warheads on short-range and long-range ballistic missiles. The problem, however, is that the Agreed Framework failed to avert the nuclear crisis in North Asia.

EVENTS LEADING TO 1994 FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

The crisis that emerged in the international nonproliferation community in the early 1990s over the DPRK's nuclear weapons program has lasted more than a decade. The evidence would suggest that the DPRK was heading toward "nuclear breakout," and that this development would have serious consequences for nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

The signs of the crisis were evident as early as the summer and early fall of 1992, when North Korea's cooperation with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors was steadily eroding.[15] By early 1993, the IAEA was deadlocked with North Korea over its ability to inspect two suspected nuclear waste storage sites.[16] On 25 February 1993, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution that gave North Korea a deadline of one month to provide access to the two sites where inspection was determined to be "essential and urgent." IAEA Director General Blix was instructed to continue talks with Pyongyang and report back by 25 March 1993. However, on 12 March 1993, the DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT, which predictably generated instant condemnation and diplomatic activity.[17]

The United Nations and the IAEA strongly encouraged North Korea to reverse its decision and to maintain the safeguards inspections.[18] As a result of intense consultations with South Korea and Japan, the United States and North Korea engaged in direct bilateral negotiations on 2 June 1993.[19] The fact that the United States dealt directly with North Korea on the nuclear issue represented a significant change in U.S. policy. As a result of these bilateral negotiations, North Korea agreed to defer its withdrawal from the NPT, while the United States gave security guarantees consistent with those contained in the United Nations Charter and the NPT. North Korea continued periodic discussions with the United States, South Korea, and the IAEA, but there was no substantive progress toward dismantling the DPRK's nuclear program.[20] Overall, there was no significant progress on the key issues that provoked the initial crisis with the IAEA over special inspections of the two suspected nuclear waste disposal sites at Yongbyon. When it ended the safeguards inspections, North Korea rejected a key U.S. precondition for the continuation of bilateral discussions.

The DPRK used the process of negotiation to persuade officials in the Clinton administration that it was willing to dismantle its nuclear facilities, permit safeguards inspections, and remain a signatory to the NPT. However, one suspects that its real strategy was to delay any punitive action by the United States as Pyongyang proceeded with its nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile programs.

During the early 1990s, North Korea continued to resist IAEA requests to conduct routine safeguards inspections. In February 1994 North Korea reportedly offered to open seven main nuclear sites to IAEA safeguards inspections, but this concession appeared to be a tactic for avoiding action by the IAEA Board of Governors, which would refer the nuclear issue to the UN Security Council for action.[21] These developments set the stage for the negotiations that culminated in the October 1994 Agreed Framework.

AGREED FRAMEWORK AND ITS SUBSEQUENT COLLAPSE

As a result of the crisis in 1993 and 1994 over the DPRK's nuclear program, the Clinton administration and the North Korean government of Kim Jong Il signed the Agreed Framework on 21 October 1994. The Framework was an apparent victory for nonproliferation, for two reasons. First, it deescalated a crisis that began on 12 March 1993 with the DPRK's announcement that it would withdraw from the NPT, and ended with the DPRK's declaration that it would refrain from developing nuclear weapons. Second, it created the impression that the DPRK was amenable to denuclearization.

In practical terms, this agreement established mutual sets of responsibilities.[22] The DPRK agreed to freeze the operation and future construction of nuclear reactors, which U.S. officials argued were evidence of a covert nuclear-weapons program. The United States, by contrast, agreed to provide two "proliferation-resistant" nuclear power reactors to North Korea and to supply significant amounts of fuel oil for energy production until those reactors were completed.[23] To supervise the agreement, the Agreed Framework created the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) under which Japan and South Korea agreed to provide financial support.[24]

The Agreed Framework collapsed in 2002, but the signs of its demise began almost immediately after it was signed. After the Republicans gained control of both houses in the fall 1994 mid-term elections, Congress threatened to cut off funding. The debate about the Framework focused on several concerns: delaying the shipment of spent nuclear fuel, special inspections of sites declared North Korea that contained nuclear waste, dismantling the North's nuclear facilities, and whether the North might be able to divert fuel to produce nuclear bombs.[25] The Clinton administration was criticized for its failure to strike a tougher deal with Pyongyang, with Senator John McCain saying that the Agreed Framework was "very badly flawed and unacceptable."[26] In effect, the debate in the 1990s was centered on fears that the Agreed Framework would not be able to contain the North's nuclear program. The process stalled amidst mutual recriminations by the United States and North Korea about the failure that both sides had failed to adhere to the key terms of the agreement.

In early 2001 the Bush administration launched a fundamental review of U.S. policy toward North Korea, signaling that the United States would adopt a more hard-line stance toward the DPRK's nuclear program. President Bush also criticized the policy of engagement, called the "sunshine" policy, pursued by South Korea.[27] This review was preempted by the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against New York City and Washington, which radically transformed attitudes within the administration toward the DPRK. Those terrorist attacks

shifted the consensus within the administration about the relationship with Pyongyang, largely because of fears that the DPRK might provide nuclear weapons or materials to terrorist organizations. This policy shift was symbolized in Bush's 29 January 2002 State of the Union address in which he declared that Pyongyang, with its missile and WMD programs, is a member of the "axis of evil."[28] In a related development, the Bush administration outlined a doctrine of preemption in the September 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States*, which declared that Washington "will, if necessary, act preemptively" to prevent hostile acts by our adversaries."[29] Recently, President Bush reaffirmed the policy of preemption as he headed for Asia in October 2003.[30] Finally, there are indications that the U.S. strategy of preemption, which was implemented against Iraq in March 2003, may have influenced Pyongyang. For example, there are unconfirmed reports that Kim Jong Il went into hiding during the war against Iraq.

The catalyst for the collapse of Agreed Framework was the admission by North Korea's Vice-Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, during an 4–5 October 2002 visit to Pyongyang by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly. Kang admitted that it possessed a clandestine facility for enriching uranium and thus had an active nuclear weapons program.[31] This development was interpreted in Washington and throughout the nonproliferation community as evidence that the DPRK had violated the spirit if not the letter of the Agreed Framework. Even though the North Korean government later denied that it ever made this admission, this declaration by Pyongyang precipitated a diplomatic crisis that affects the future of nonproliferation that continues as of this writing.[32]

After Pyongyang's declaration about nuclear breakout, Washington pressured KEDO to suspend all shipments of fuel oil to North Korea, which became effective on 14 November 2002. Matters continued to deteriorate during the fall of 2002, with North Korea declaring on 12 December 2002 that it would revive the nuclear facilities that were banned by the Agreed Framework.[33] By 31 December 2002, inspectors from the IAEA were expelled from North Korea. On 10 January 2003, the government of North Korea announced that it had withdrawn from the NPT. In the meantime, Bush administration officials discussed, but did not formally declare, the concept of "red lines" on the DPRK's nuclear program. The intent was to signal that there might be thresholds beyond which the United States would not tolerate, which are interpreted as the export of nuclear weapons, materials, or know-how.[34]

REASONS FOR NUCLEAR BREAKOUT

Before we turn to a discussion of why the Agreed Framework failed and its implications for nonproliferation policy, this section discusses the reasons that persuaded the DPRK that nuclear breakout was a good option.[35]

For the government of Kim Jong Il, the first and most important incentive for its nuclear program has been and remains regime survival. With only a few nuclear weapons in its arsenal, the uncertainties of an already catastrophic war would be significantly worse, likely involving millions of casualties and wholesale devastation of the Korean Peninsula. As Richard Armitage wrote, before he became deputy secretary of state, the failure of

diplomacy would leave the United States living with and deterring a "nuclear North Korea armed with delivery systems" or "preemption, with the attendant uncertainties."[36]

The hope for Pyongyang is that nuclear breakout might deter an attack by the United States to preemptively attack the North's nuclear facilities. But this, too, remains highly uncertain because Pyongyang could not fail to notice that the Bush administration has destroyed several regimes—the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001–2002 and the government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in the spring of 2003.[37] Given Washington's declaration that the DPRK is a member of the "axis of evil," which might be a potential source of weapons of mass destruction for terrorist organizations, Pyongyang could conclude that its only strategy for survival depends on possessing nuclear weapons to deter war.

A second incentive for the DPRK is the belief that nuclear weapons will effectively deter Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo. Pyongyang may have drawn the same conclusion as the Indian Army Chief of Staff General Sundarij, who observed that the lesson of the Persian Gulf War was, "Don't fight the United States unless you have nuclear weapons."[38] The North could not match the technological virtuosity displayed by the United States in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. However, nuclear weapons and the prospect of enormous casualties might cause Washington to refrain from a preemptive strike against the DPRK's nuclear facilities. It is widely reported that the Clinton administration confronted the same problem in its 1994 nuclear crisis with North Korea when senior officials considered military options.[39]

There are, however, uncertainties about whether nuclear weapons would deter U.S. nuclear and conventional capabilities. For example, Pyongyang must consider the possibility that its nuclear breakout could backfire if it persuaded South Korea, Japan, or Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons programs.[40] The DPRK may conclude that whether South Korea and Japan would develop nuclear weapons depends on how these states interpret their security alliance with Washington and the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

A third incentive for Pyongyang is that nuclear weapons represent an instrument for increasing its political and military power as a time when the North's strategic position is worsening. For Pyongyang, nuclear weapons and conventional forces might counterbalance the vastly greater economic and military power of the United States, South Korea, and Japan.[41] Without nuclear weapons, Pyongyang would be forced to negotiate from a position of weakness. But the threat to use nuclear weapons—whether on the battlefield or against cities in South Korea or Japan—would increase the DPRK's ability to deter war. In operational terms, the possibility that Pyongyang's ballistic missiles might be armed with nuclear weapons and targeted against South Korea or Japan could weaken their relationship with Washington during a crisis. As an example of the resolve, the South Korean foreign minister, Yoon Young Kwan, demanded in October 2003 that the Bush administration respond to Pyongyang's insistence on security assurances.[42] Thus, there are uncertainties about the relationship with the United States and its ability to deter war in Asia.[43]

Despite these strategic calculations about nuclear weapons, there are significant uncertainties about the DPRK's actual nuclear capabilities. During the 1998 launch of the *Taepodong-1* missile, the third stage exploded, which raises questions about Pyongyang's capabilities.

A fourth incentive is the hope that nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles will generate support for the DRPK's collapsing economy in the form of subsidies based on persuading the North to refrain from developing nuclear weapons. Pyongyang can barely feed its people, much less sustain a basic standard of living or meet its international financial obligations.[44] Its economy is financed by hard currency from foreign military sales, notably for ballistic missiles and missile technology, and China provides virtually all of the DPRK's food and oil.[45] Paradoxically, Pyongyang may believe that nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles will contribute to its security even as it teeters on the edge of economic and social collapse.

The result of the DPRK's nuclear breakout has been its decisions to withdraw from the NPT, alienate its neighbors, endure economic sanctions that have led to economic collapse, establish a consensus about its status as a rogue state, and sustain a decade-long diplomatic crisis. There are two explanations for Pyongyang's behavior. The first is that government officials believe that nuclear breakout represents the best way to ensure the survival of Kim Jong Il's regime, deter the United States from conducting a preemptive strike, and preserve its political and military influence. The second and more worrisome reason is that Pyongyang believes nuclear weapons will protect its security interests more effectively than nonproliferation norms.

WHY THE AGREED FRAMEWORK FAILED

The best explanation for the collapse of the Agreed Framework is that its benefits were not sufficient to persuade the DPRK that it was worthwhile to dismantle its nuclear program. There were prudent reasons for the architects of the Agreed Framework in the Clinton administration to conclude that the DPRK could be convinced that it was rational to abandon its nuclear program. Nevertheless, the strategy that led to the Agreed Framework failed for several reasons.[46]

First, it failed to persuade Pyongyang that the United States would be deterred from preemptively attacking the North's nuclear facilities. Leaders in the DPRK probably concluded that adherence to the Agreed Framework would not necessarily deter Washington and Seoul from preemptive attacks precisely because North Korea could not respond with nuclear weapons. Because Kim Jong Il might have calculated that the strong conventional deterrence effect prevailing along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) might embolden Washington to conduct preemptive strikes without the fear of retaliation. With artillery strikes along the DMZ and in Seoul, some of which might be armed with weapons of mass destruction, the fear is that any war would cause enormous physical devastation and human suffering. In the end, Pyongyang likely concluded that its nuclear program would deter U.S. preemptive attacks against its nuclear program and ensure the survival of the regime.

Without a nuclear option, the DPRK could not deter the United States or prevent it from winning any war—and even with nuclear weapons, the North would lose.[47] This logic was

valid a decade ago when the Clinton administration's Secretary of Defense William Perry considered military options at the height of the 1994 nuclear crisis, but concluded that the risks were too great.[48] If the DPRK believes that nuclear capabilities provide the ultimate deterrent against a U.S. preemptive strike, abiding by the terms of the Agreed Framework would mean dismantling its nuclear program and thereby eliminating Pyongyang's primary instrument for deterring Washington and Seoul.[49]

Second, North Korea's major nuclear facilities, particularly the nuclear reactors at Yongbyon, are highly vulnerable to military attack. Any preemptive attack is further complicated by the fact that the DPRK may have secret underground uranium enrichment and plutonium facilities. Pyongyang may be confident that dispersing and concealing its nuclear weapon program, along with underground alternative reprocessing and weapons fabrication facilities, reduces its vulnerability to preemptive strikes. The DPRK's leadership may have concluded from the two wars against Iraq that even sophisticated intelligence and precision-strike capabilities will not guarantee that the United States will find and destroy hidden and dispersed arsenals of WMD.[50] Judging by its military installations and defensive preparations, Pyongyang clearly worries that the United States might launch a preemptive strike to destroy its nuclear capability.

Since officials in Washington and Seoul would have to risk a major war and millions of casualties to destroy the DPRK's nuclear facilities, North Korean officials might conclude that the United States, South Korea, and Japan are more interested in the status quo than war. With the United States occupying Iraq militarily, it is unlikely to provoke a war at this time that would lead to the destruction of North and South Korea. A related point is the conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula. While Washington and Seoul have the combined military capability to defeat Pyongyang, the conventional balance may not be so stable that the United States could launch preemptive strikes against the DPRK's nuclear facilities without fearing retaliation. The conventional military balance might deter the DPRK from war, but the jury is still out on how the North might respond given uncertainties about the behavior of Kim Jong Il and his advisors.

Third, Pyongyang cannot know whether the U.S. policy of preemption is credible given fears that it might provoke a catastrophic war. Washington has invested considerable political capital in multilateral talks, and has backed down from its earlier insistence that it would not engage in any bilateral talks with Pyongyang. A reasonable conclusion for Pyongyang is that the Bush administration has no appetite for war with a nuclear-armed adversary while it is occupying Iraq.

Fourth, the Agreed Framework weakens the DPRK's security because the elimination of its nuclear weapons places all the risk on the DPRK. Conversely, the risks for the United States are reduced if Pyongyang is nuclear free. In effect, it increased U.S. security and diminished that of the DPRK. Even if Pyongyang concluded that the risk of military preemption is low, the benefits of the Framework still remain low because it undermined Pyongyang's ability to use nuclear weapons to deter Washington from preemption. Such agreements are bound to fail.

Fifth, it failed because the economic benefits of compliance were not worth the loss of nuclear weapons. A critical financial aspect of the Agreed Framework, which is at the heart of South Korea's "sunshine policy" and Clinton administration efforts in the 1990s to engage the DPRK, was to use economic benefits—and later to withhold those benefits—to persuade the North to cooperate. While the DPRK's nuclear program involves significant economic costs for a regime that has endured de facto sanctions since 1950, the Framework's financial incentives were not sufficient to persuade Pyongyang to give up its nuclear program.

A strategy that placed economic incentives ahead of security interests was bound to fail. In the past, others have tried to lure Pyongyang with economic aid to abandon nuclear weapons. For example, in the early 1990s Beijing attempted to persuade the DPRK that trading its nuclear program for improved relations with South Korea, Japan, and the United States might resolve North Korea's economic crisis.[51] The loss of economic benefits did not persuade Pyongyang to stop its nuclear program in the late 1990s or refrain from declaring its intention to withdraw from the NPT on 12 March 1993 or again on 31 December 2002. In the fall of 2002 the United States stopped deliveries of oil when the DPRK admitted that it continued to develop nuclear weapons in violation of the Agreed Framework. And despite its apparent nuclear breakout, Pyongyang still receives massive oil, food, and other subsidies from China.[52]

The Agreed Framework failed in part because the DPRK has shown remarkable resiliency in the face of enormous economic hardships—and because China continues to provide significant supplies of food and oil. For the architects of the Agreed Framework, the strategy rested in part on the hope that the DPRK's deteriorating economic conditions might persuade the North to exchange nuclear weapons for economic benefits. This is particularly true in light of the absence of concern by Pyongyang for the social and economic well-being of its people. What the DPRK is most concerned about is having the resources to sustain the regime, and thus the economic incentives as envisioned by the Clinton administration were not sufficient to destabilize the regime. More importantly, the plan was that the economic assistance and investment most desperately needed by North Korea will lead to political and economic reforms that are likely to destroy the totalitarian regime. However, the leaders in Pyongyang probably concluded that their regime will not survive any significant political or economic reform. Worse still, the international community continues to impose economic sanctions at precisely the moment when Pyongyang suspects that the point of the Agreed Framework is regime change.

Sixth, it failed because the risks of abandoning nuclear weapons were greater than the benefits of regional stability. Since U.S. security commitments and military presence contribute to regional stability by containing the DPRK politically and militarily, Pyongyang's strategy is to marginalize those alliances. Thus, the North's threats to destabilize the region are designed to put pressure on the United States and its allies, which continue to hope that the North will make concessions on nuclear weapons. An important reason for the DPRK's nuclear program is precisely to undermine those alliances. Given that North Korea has infiltrated commandos into South Korea, supported terrorism, and kidnapped Japanese and

Korean citizens, it is unlikely to be influenced by arguments that its nuclear weapons should be abandoned to promote regional stability.

In conclusion, the Agreed Framework failed because it provided less security than nuclear weapons. Put another way, for a regime whose actions suggest that its survival is at risk, only nuclear weapons will provide absolute security. As discussed, it did not provide sufficient insurance against U.S. preemption or persuade Pyongyang that abandoning nuclear weapons and allowing obtrusive inspections would improve its security. Nor were the benefits of economic assistance and regional stability offered sufficiently compelling to dissuade the DPRK from nuclear breakout. By these standards, it failed to meet the North's basic security requirements.

In view of these realities, the central question for nonproliferation is whether agreements like the Agreed Framework can persuade states that giving up nuclear weapons will enhance their security. If leaders in Pyongyang could conclude that it is rational to violate the Agreed Framework by retaining its nuclear program, then we confront fundamental questions about whether and how to preserve global nonproliferation efforts.

NUCLEAR BREAKOUT AND LESSONS FOR NONPROLIFERATION

In my mind there are four key questions about North Korea's nuclear breakout and the failure of the Agreed Framework that the nonproliferation community must address.

The first is whether nuclear breakout is inevitable, and more broadly whether nonproliferation policies can avert breakout. The answer to the first question seems to be "yes," for several reasons. Ultimately, what really matters to the DPRK is ensuring its survival by deterring a U.S. military attack against its nuclear facilities and conventional military forces. The central objective of the DPRK's nuclear program is and always has been to counterbalance the greater military power of the United States and its allies.

Nuclear breakout was inevitable because the Agreed Framework failed to provide the DPRK with what could be called an "existential guarantee." By this, I mean that the only way to dissuade the DPRK from nuclear breakout was to demonstrate that it could deter a U.S. preemptive attack and prevent the collapse of the North in economic, political, and social terms without nuclear weapons. While nonproliferation policies emphasize these "values," the Agreed Framework was not a credible alternative to the existential guarantee provided by a nuclear arsenal.

The North's nuclear breakout occurred because the Agreed Framework, and nonproliferation policies more generally, failed to address the key issue of regime survival. But this is the key factor that influences whether states develop nuclear weapons. Consider, for example, the policy inducements that failed to persuade the DPRK to abandon nuclear weapons. The Agreed Framework offered economic benefits but failed to guarantee Pyongyang's survival. The threat of political and economic isolation and ostracism by the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and other members of the international community was unsuccessful. And military threats, isolation and ostracism, economic sanctions, and the

constant crisis atmosphere failed. Nuclear breakout was inevitable because these policies did not address the one issue that mattered, which was the survival of the regime in Pyongyang.

Second, what policies are likely to prevent, delay, or roll back nuclear breakout? As we review the policies that have worked, only two have generated what could charitably be called even partial "successes." The first is China's ability to slowly and subtly put pressure on the DPRK. If we take the long view, Beijing has successfully nudged Pyongyang on numerous occasions to be more compliant—in part because China's economic assistance keeps the North from total economic collapse.

China has to keep a balance between the DPRK as a buffer state versus coping with the North as a nuclear liability. China has historically opposed international sanctions against another communist regime, but that might change if Beijing's nightmare scenario emerges in North Korea: regime collapse, civil war, and massive flows of refugees in China. The cost of nuclear breakout to China's economic and geopolitical interests is so high that it might be amenable to more coercive strategies down the road. Beijing is walking a fine line because it fears that the United States might react militarily to the North's nuclear breakout and that other states, such as Japan, might develop nuclear weapons.[53] On a positive note, China appears to be more interested than ever in working to resolve the nuclear crisis in North Korea.[54]

The second policy to have worked to some extent is the threat of U.S. military preemption. For Pyongyang, the threat of preemptive strikes against its nuclear facilities appears to dominate its decisions about nuclear breakout. The North has been very careful not to take actions that could convince the Bush administration to preemptively destroy those facilities. For example, a North Korean official recently reassured Washington that the DPRK has "no intention of transferring any means of nuclear deterrence to other countries."[55] While the North generally pursues aggressive diplomatic approaches, its statement demonstrates that Pyongyang has a prudent regard for avoiding actions that could compel the Bush administration to attack the North's nuclear facilities preemptively. Since the Clinton administration actively considered preemptive strikes, and so presumably has the Bush administration, the leaders in Pyongyang understand that its actions could provoke a U.S. military response. One interpretation is that the DPRK fears U.S. military action, and accordingly, has avoided actions that might be judged as escalatory or provocative.

The policies most likely to prevent nuclear breakout must be based on several premises. In view of the North's recalcitrance and hostility, any strategy for successfully denuclearizing the DPRK must be based on a long-term commitment to its survival. Pyongyang cannot be dissuaded from nuclear breakout in the short term. All other policies pursued by the international community must be subordinated to Pyongyang's desire for security guarantees. In the end, the reasonable choice for the Bush administration and the nonproliferation community is between 1) the current regime in Pyongyang that is armed with nuclear weapons, or 2) a denuclearized regime whose existence is guaranteed. Ultimately, the international community must decide which is worse: the regime in Pyongyang or the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Stated in that fashion, the latter choice is obvious.

This strategy is not new, but is consistent with U.S. policies toward numerous totalitarian regimes and rogue states during the Cold War. For example, the United States and Soviet Union were hostile adversaries but each refrained from attacking the other. In addition, this strategy must have broad multilateral support, but it is admittedly difficult to be optimistic about multilateralism in the wake of the 2003 war against Iraq. Nevertheless, the best chance for success, as outlined in recent Bush administration statements, is to coordinate the efforts of China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan in the six-party talks into multilateral security assurances.[56]

Finally, policies that seek to prevent, roll back, or delay nuclear breakout must be carefully calibrated to the DPRK's reasons for wanting nuclear weapons. The problem has been that political and economic incentives can never equal the ability of nuclear weapons to ensure Pyongyang's survival. For decades, states have built nuclear arsenals to defend themselves using the same logic as the leadership in the North. For example, at the heart of the nuclear breakouts in South Asia is the acute sense of insecurity shared by India and Pakistan. Until nonproliferation strategy actively takes into account that the decisive reason for states to possess nuclear weapons is to ensure their survival, nonproliferation norms will not be very persuasive or effective. This is a significant lesson of the 1990s and the failure of the Agreed Framework.

Third, what does North Korea's nuclear breakout mean for the nonproliferation agenda? The unfortunate answer is that the DPRK's nuclear breakout undermines the credibility of efforts and policies that are designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. If Pyongyang's nuclear breakout is unchallenged, states could conclude that all nonproliferation efforts are based on hollow, empty promises. With the ascent of India and Pakistan into the nuclear club, this is not the right time for states to conclude that the nonproliferation norm is a relic of the twentieth century.

Perhaps the more dangerous implication for nonproliferation is that North Korea might provide nuclear technologies to terrorist regimes.[57] Washington worries that the collapse of the failing regime in Pyongyang could put nuclear weapons in the hands of rogue military commanders or terrorists. Since terrorism has been elevated to a strategic threat, the United States will have no choice but to respond—perhaps with military options—if North Korea expands its nuclear arsenal. Since it is not possible to prevent the smuggling out of North Korea of the baseball-sized amounts of plutonium that are necessary for nuclear weapons, any evidence that the DPRK is increasing its supply of fissile material will generate demands for action.[58]

Fourth, assuming that war does not erupt on the Korean Peninsula, what should the United States, its allies, and other regional powers do "the day after" breakout? My view is that this final question has not been sufficiently analyzed, largely because of our legitimate preoccupation with avoiding breakout. One approach is to evaluate these implications in terms of three policy tools that are at Washington's disposal.

The first is the classic tools of conventional military deterrence. Most analyses of the military balance on the peninsula concur with the conclusion that any conflict would involve wide-scale destruction and, importantly, that the United States along with South Korea and Japan would win a war. While the DPRK has significant military capabilities, starting a war would lead to the North's military defeat and the destruction of the regime in Pyongyang. When President Bush said that using force in the case of nuclear proliferation is a last resort, he linked the risks of nuclear breakout with war in a way that sends an unmistakable message to Pyongyang, which has proven adept at interpreting warnings.[59] After the North's nuclear breakout, the United States could bolster its conventional military capabilities in the region to signal its commitment to defeating the North in a war.

We should note, however, that the conventional military balance does not provide good options for Washington in large measure because of nuclear weapons. The United States would win a war but it is possible that the DPRK might use nuclear weapons against Seoul and Tokyo. As a result, the North's nuclear weapons somewhat balance U.S. conventional military advantages, which has significant implications for the credibility of U.S. policy.

The second involves nonproliferation actions that involve a variety of bilateral, multilateral, and coercive measures. After the North's nuclear breakout, the United States and the nonproliferation community could respond with a new program of economic sanctions, but this, unfortunately, has been tried on many occasions and has failed.[60] The DPRK's economy is so weak that additional economic sanctions would be a waste of time. A related approach is a renewed sense of commitment nonproliferation regimes, but these too failed to prevent nuclear breakout. The danger with bolstering nonproliferation regimes is that this step will publicize their failures, and therefore reinforce the conclusion that these are useless artifacts of the Cold War when many states, notably the most dangerous ones, did not have the ability to develop nuclear weapons.

The third is counterproliferation programs, such as missile defense. The United States and Japan are developing ballistic missile defenses as part of a strategy for undermining North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile programs. The intent is to deny the DPRK the ability to threaten the United States or its allies. With the North's nuclear breakout, the United States could deploy missile defenses to the region to signal that it is prepared for war.

What these options for dealing with nuclear breakout share is that they merely react to North Korea's nuclear initiatives.

CONCLUSIONS

For now, the collision course between nonproliferation policy and the DPRK's nuclear breakout has dangerous implications for international security. Despite the DPRK's nuclear breakout, it is essential to preserve the credibility of future nonproliferation policies. This strategy will rest on several steps.

First, the fundamental assumptions behind nonproliferation policy must be revisited because these are not adequate or relevant.[61] There is no more important challenge for nonproliferation than a time when the DPRK is on the threshold of nuclear breakout. The problem is that nonproliferation norms are based on the premise that it is essential to deal with the state's interest in survival, but this position has not been translated into a credible policy. The further premise is that it is desirable for states to remain nonnuclear. The solution is to retune nonproliferation norms to deal with the reality that nuclear weapons protect regimes. The DPRK clearly believes that nuclear weapons are the existential deterrent that protects the regime, and thus are unlikely to give up those forces without security guarantees. In a sense, nonproliferation norms run contrary to the axiom in international politics that there is no higher value for the state than its survival. The problem is that these norms could become meaningless if the DPRK will not abandon nuclear weapons because it sees nuclear weapons as the guarantee of its survival.

Second, the DPRK's nuclear breakout raises the question of whether it is equally rational for states to possess nuclear weapons and for the international community to promote nonproliferation policies. What has crept into the nonproliferation agenda is the presumption that it is not rational for the DPRK to have nuclear weapons. Or even that if it could be rational, that Pyongyang can be persuaded to abandon nuclear weapons for the good of nonproliferation norms.

The reality is that states possess nuclear weapons for what we generally assume are rational reasons. Perhaps the better question is: Is it as rational for rogue states to possess nuclear weapons as it is for the major powers? The dilemma, which nonproliferation has never been able to resolve, is that it may be rational for North Korea to have nuclear weapons if it protects the state from attack, but not rational in terms of its overall effect on international security. The dilemma for nonproliferation is that while it may be rational for the international community to promote nonproliferation, the DPRK case demonstrates that our ability to persuade states to give up nuclear weapons is limited. This is the reality that led to the collision between the Agreed Framework and the subsequent failure to avert the North's nuclear breakout.

The dilemma about nonproliferation may be resolved by strategic realities. On one level, the DPRK's recent claim that it reprocessed fuel rods for plutonium and the Bush administration's position that it will not accept the export of nuclear weapons or know-how, could lead to war.[62] If the DPRK undeniably crosses the threshold to nuclear breakout with undeniable evidence that it is weaponizing, testing, and mating warheads with delivery systems, it could cross the Bush administration's "red line." One of the most problematic issues is the absence of any reliable knowledge about the North, which complicates the ability to make decisions about when the North crosses those red lines—or even whether those red lines exist.

The countervailing event is signs of significant movement in the international community toward a resumption of the six-party talks in early 2004. As the principal intermediary for the United States and North Korea, China is taking an active role with the DPRK and in that capacity has urged Washington to be more flexible. Interestingly, a spokesman for the

Department of State declared the Bush administration's goals are, "a verifiable, complete and irreversible end to North Korea's weapons program while providing whatever multilateral security assurances are necessary for the North Koreans."[63] If there is a new strategy for averting the DPRK's nuclear breakout, it will be based on multilateral security guarantees, which is precisely what Pyongyang has demanded and what nonproliferation norms never provided.

The carrots and sticks—based in large part on the assumptions underlying nonproliferation regimes—offered to the North in the past decade clearly failed to dissuade Pyongyang from pursuing a nuclear option. Indeed, the evidence strongly demonstrates that no amount of incentives showered on Kim Jong Il would have ameliorated (or assuaged) the North's survival instincts. The case of North Korea provides an objective lesson on the limits and constraints of nonproliferation regimes.

However, this does not mean that there is no place for nonproliferation regimes in the future and in other regions. Many states in the world have the intent and capability to go nuclear, but do not confront an existential threat resembling that of North Korea. As such, these states may be more responsive to certain incentives and threats. For instance, a charter member of the "axis of evil," Iran, a country that poses a far smaller regional threat and maintains a far lower level of threat perceptions concerning its survival, may be a case study for further analysis on the constructive role that nonproliferation regimes may play in the future. The bottom line is that the international community needs to objectively assess the strengths and weaknesses of these regimes and seek to maximize their effectiveness while minimizing their structural constraints. The North Korean case suggests that there is a need for a more discriminating approach that moves away from a seemingly universal application of these nonproliferation regimes toward a case-by-case basis that reflects the unique security contexts of each potential breakout state.

Notes

1. See "Nuclear Breakout," *New York Times*, 27 July 2003.
2. Joseph Khan with David E. Sanger, "North Korea Says It May Test an A-Bomb," *New York Times*, 29 August 2003, A9.
3. For background, see James T. Laney and Jason T. Shaplen, "How to Deal With North Korea," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2003): 16–30; Jonathan Pollack, "The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 2003, 11–49; Gary Samore, "The Korean Nuclear Crisis," *Survival* (Spring 2003): 7–24; "Chronology of U.S.–North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy," *Arms Control Association*, June 2003, www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.asp; Victor D. Cha, "Korea's Place in the Axis," *Foreign Affairs* (May–June 2002): 79–92.
4. James Dao, "Threats and Responses: Nuclear Standoff; U.S. Official Says North Korea Could See Bomb Material," *New York Times*, 5 February 2003, A13. "Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage warns senators that North Korea, if allowed to reprocess spent nuclear fuel rods, could see missile material to terrorists or rogue states; predicts North Korea could build 4–6 nuclear weapons within months."
5. For background, see Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., *The Armed Forces of North Korea* (New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), 212–222; Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 249–280;

David Reese, *The Prospects for North Korea's Survival, Adelphi Paper No. 323* (New York: Oxford University Press, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998), 39–58; Leon V. Sigal, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

6. Ibid.
7. See Stephen Engelberg and Michael R. Gordon, "Intelligence Study Says North Korea Has Nuclear Bomb," *New York Times*, 26 December 1993, A1, for reports about a CIA classified assessment supported by almost all intelligence agencies and only disputed by the State Department analysts, which concluded that North Korea "probably has developed one or two nuclear bombs."
8. "North Korea Can Build Nukes Right Now," *Washington Times*, 22 November 2002; Engelberg with Gordon, "Intelligence Study," 1. See Associated Press, "North Korea Escalates Nuclear Standoff," 3 October 2003, for the report that, "North Korea said Friday it had solved "all the technological matters" involved in using plutonium from nuclear fuel rods to build atomic bombs. . . ." See David E. Sanger, "Intelligence Puzzle: North Korean Bombs," *New York Times*, 14 October 2003, A7.
9. Sanger, "Intelligence Puzzle," A7; See Larry A. Niksch, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program," *Congressional Research Service Issue Brief* (30 June 1992): 2.
10. David E. Sanger, "C.I.A. Said to Find Nuclear Advances by North Koreans," *New York Times*, 1 July 2003, A1; James Dao, "U.S. Official Says North Korea Could Sell Bomb Material," *New York Times*, 5 February 2003, A13; James Brooke, "Korean Claim Leaves U.S. Concerned, But Skeptical," *New York Times*, 3 October 2003, A6; David E. Sanger, "U.S. and 2 Allies Agree on a Plan for North Korea," *New York Times*, 8 December 2003, A10.
11. *Executive Summary: The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 15 July 1998). Also see "Chronology of U.S.–North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy," *Arms Control Association*, June 2003, www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.asp. See Joe Bermudez, "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant," *Jane's Defense Weekly,* 10 April 1993, 20–21, for an assessment of North Korea's missile program in the early 1990s.
12. *Executive Summary: The Commission to Assess*, 2.
13. Alex Wagner, "D.P.R.K. Threatens to End Missile Moratorium, Nuclear Cooperation," *Arms Control Today*, March 2001 (accessed at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_03/northkorea.asp).
14. James Brooke, "Japan Launches Spy Satellite Despite North Korean Threats," *New York Times*, 28 March 2003, A10; James Brooke, "Japan Seeks Shield for North Korean Missiles," *New York Times*, 30 August 2003, A3.
15. David E. Sanger, "North Korea Bars Inspectors," *New York Times*, 14 March 1993, E18.
16. See Reuters, "IAEA Tries to Break Deadlock with North Korea," 26 February 1993.
17. While there has been broad speculation concerning the reason for North Korea's renunciation of the NPT, there are several prominent factors, including underestimation of the intrusiveness of IAEA safeguards inspections, fear of the consequences of a loss of face when the full extent of its reprocessing efforts are described in public, efforts to test the strength of the new Clinton and Kim Young San administrations, or simply a decision to proceed with a legal nuclear weapons program outside the jurisdiction of the NPT. For these arguments, see Robert A. Manning and Leonard S. Spector, North Korea's Nuclear Gambit," *Washington Post*, 21 March 1993, C3. For the possibility that the abrupt move was generated by internal conditions as part of a power struggle inside North Korea, see T. R. Reid, "Overtures Made to N. Korea," *Washington Post*, 17 March 1993, A25. North Korea used public statements to justify its withdrawal as "a well justified self-defensive measure against the nuclear war maneuvers of the United States and the unjust act of the International Atomic Energy Agency." See Sam Jameson, "North Korea Quits Treaty to Halt Spread of Nuclear Arms," *Los Angeles Times*, 12 March 1993, A4; David Sanger, "North Korea, Fighting Inspections, Renounces Nuclear Arms

Treaty," *New York Times*, 12 March 1993, A1; R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Denounces N. Korea for Quitting Nuclear Pact," *Washington Post*, 13 March 1993, A1.

18. The most important IAEA and UN actions were the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of 1 April 1993, which found North Korea in noncompliance with its obligations under the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement and referred the matter to the UN Security Council; and the UN Security Council resolution of 11 May 1993, which served as a basis for the United States to initiate bilateral negotiations with North Korea.
19. See R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S., North Korea Set High-Level Meeting On Nuclear Program," *Washington Post*, 25 May 1993.
20. See Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Sees Problems in Nuclear Offer," *New York Times*, 5 December 1993, 1.
21. See Carol J. Williams, "N. Korea Agrees to Inspection of 7 Nuclear Sites," *Los Angeles Times*, 16 February 1994, 1; David E. Sanger, "North Koreans Agree to Survey of Atomic Sites," *New York Times*, 16 February 1994, A1.
22. For a summary, see Reese, *The Prospects for North Korea's Survival*, 50–58.
23. See "Fact Sheets: The U.S.–North Korean Agreed Framework at a Glance," *Arms Control Association*, www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework.asp (accessed 25 August 2003).
24. Pollack, "The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework," 18.
25. Sigal, *Disarming Strangers*, 192–204.
26. See "Fact Sheets: North Korea's Nuclear Facilities," *Arms Control Association*, October 1992. A number of North Korean scientists and research personnel were trained in the Soviet Union as part of a cooperative program that continued until the final days of the Soviet Union. Other personnel reportedly received training in China and Pakistan. See Niksch, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program," 2; Sanger, "Intelligence Puzzle."
27. See Sigal, *Disarming Strangers*, 198. As McCain said, "I believe this agreement will fail. I believe North Korea will renege on this agreement just as they reneged on their freely accepted treaty obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty and just as they did eight times during the past two years of negotiations leading to this deal."
28. See Laney and Shaplen, "How to Deal With North Korea," 20–21. For this visit to North Korea in early October 2002, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, ". . . took with him very narrowly defined briefing papers, hard-line marching orders. . . ." See also Cha, "Korea's Place in the Axis," 79.
29. "The President's State of the Union Address," 29 January 2002, www.whitehouse.gov (accessed 3 October 2003).
30. *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 17 September 2002), 10.
31. David E. Sanger, "Stressing U.S. Right to Attack Foes, Bush Leaves for Asia," *New York Times*, 17 October 2003, A8. As Bush said, "America is following a new strategy. We are not waiting for further attacks. We are striking our enemies before they can strike us again."
32. Samore, "The Korean Nuclear Crisis," 12, who noted that Kang justified the program "as a response to the Bush administration's threats and hostility."
33. Pollack, "The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework," 36.
34. See "Fact Sheets: The U.S.–North Korean Agreed Framework at a Glance"; Pollack, "The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework," 36.
35. Sanger, "Intelligence Puzzle," A7. However, President Bush has "left deliberately ambiguous" what he means by tolerate. On the red line, see James Brooke, "Korean Claim Leaves U.S. Concerned, But Skeptical," *New York Times*, 3 October 2003, A6, which a North Korean official said that the DPRK would not cross that line: "We have no intention of transferring any means of nuclear deterrence to other countries."
36. Since North Korea is proceeding with nuclear breakout, this discussion will not focus on the disincentives, which are examined in William C. Martel, "Is Ukraine a Universal Example of Nonproliferation?" *Defense Analysis*, December 1998.

37. Wagner, "D.P.R.K. Threatens to End Missile Moratorium."
38. See James Risen and Judith Miller, "Officials Say Bush Seeks $600 Million to Hunt Iraq Arms," *New York Times*, 2 October 2003, A1, for reports on the continuing search for weapons of mass destruction.
39. See Scott S. Sagan and Daniel Sneider, "War's Lessons Differ for U.S., North Korea," *Mercury News*, 26 June 2003.
40. See Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 128–131. "President Clinton was within minutes of selecting and authorizing one of these deployment options. . ."
41. Sanger, "Intelligence Puzzle," A7. Seoul and Tokyo may not pursue nuclear programs even if Pyongyang does, but a crisis within the alliance, as was the case with the recent spate of anti-Americanism in South Korea, could change this logic. Alternatively, North Korea could assume that the United States would react negatively to any South Korean nuclear program as it had in the 1970s to the nuclear program started by Park Chung Hee, which was cancelled due to U.S. pressure. See Paul Shin, "U.S. Said to Stop South Korea's Nuke Bomb Plan," *Washington Times*, 29 March 1994, A11. Furthermore, domestic and international pressure could be counted on to discourage Japan from developing nuclear weapons.
42. For a discussion of North Korea's nuclear doctrine, see Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Arsenal: Motivation, Doctrine and Possible Employment," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, *Special Report No. 9*, March 1996.
43. Sanger, "Intelligence Puzzle," A7.
44. Norimitsu Onishi, "Japan Says Its U.S. Alliance Helps Maintain Asian Peace," *New York Times*, 17 October 2003, A8. Japan's defense minister, Shigeru Ishiba, said that, "The U.S. is the only country that promises to defend Japan in a reliable way, by a treaty." Furthermore, a strong relationship with the United States is essential to "countering the North Korea threat," which might be armed with nuclear weapons.
45. Reese, *The Prospects for North Korea's Survival*, 25–38.
46. See Thom Shanker, "U.S. Remains Leader in Global Arms Sales, Report Says," *New York Times*, 25 September 2003, A12, for reports that North Korea has sold surface-to-surface missiles and missile technology to Iran.
47. For an analysis of why the Agreed Framework failed, see Samore, "The Korean Nuclear Crisis," 11–16.
48. See Lonnie Henley, "A War Scenario: Korea Cataclysm," *Washington Post*, 4 May 1997, C1–C4; Michael O'Hanlon, "Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea is Easier Than the Pentagon Thinks," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 135–170; Reese, *The Prospects for North Korea's Survival*, 62–68.
49. See Carter and Perry, *Preventive Defense*, 129: ". . . such an attack [on the reactor site] was very likely to incite the North Koreans to launch a military attack on South Korea. Even though the North Koreans would surely lose this second Korean War, they could cause hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of casualties before being defeated. Therefore, I decided against recommending this option to the president at that time."
50. See Dave McCurdy, "Sanctions Won't Work," *New York Times,* 8 November 1993, A19, for the argument that economic sanctions or military strikes increase the danger of war in Korea. For the contrary view, that military strikes could be effective, see Zalmay M. Khalilzad, "North Korea and the Bomb; A Deadline on Diplomacy," *New York Times*, 8 November 1993, A19.
51. See Sanger, "U.S. and 2 Allies Agree," A1, A10, for the argument that, "North Korea wants to build as many nuclear weapons as possible now, perhaps betting that at least some can be hidden from inspectors." R. Jeffrey Smith, "N. Korea and the Bomb: High-Tech Hide-and-Seek: U.S. Intelligence Key in Detecting Deception," *Washington Post*, 27 April 1993, discusses the problems of finding nuclear weapons.
52. See Associated Press, 11 May 1992.
53. As early as the 1990s, Pyongyang understood the magnitude of its economic crisis,

as exemplified by the North's efforts to gain hard currency to support its economy and oil for its energy requirements. See David E. Sanger, "No More Offers on Inspections, North Korea Says," *New York Times*, 10 December 1993, A8; United Press International, Ruth Youngblood, "North Korea's Nuclear Policy Frightens World," 3 May 1993; see John J. Fialka, "Asian Tinderbox: Korea Face-Off Grows Tense as the Economy of North Deteriorates," *Wall Street Journal*, 3 September 1993.

54. The isolation of the regime has reduced Pyongyang's influence and coincided with the declining ability of other states to influence North Korea. The only exception is China, but its limited influence on North Korea is dwindling.

55. See David E. Sanger, "Bush Lauds China as 'Partner' in Diplomacy," *New York Times*, 10 December 2003.

56. See Brooke, "Korean Claim Leaves U.S. Concerned, But Skeptical," A6, in which a North Korean official said that the DPRK would not cross that line: "We have no intention of transferring any means of nuclear deterrence to other countries."

57. See Sanger, "U.S. and 2 Allies Agree," A1; Reuters, "Bush Sees Progress with N. Korea, Warns Iran," 15 December 2003; Associated Press, "U.S., China Postpone Talks With N. Korea," 15 December 2003.

58. As Gary Milhollin testified in 1991 before a Senate committee, "There is no reason to think that North Korea would shrink from selling nuclear weapon fuel, nuclear weapons design, or even a nuclear weapon itself to countries able to pay the price." See *Hearings before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 25 November 1991.

59. See "An Agreed Framework for Dialog with North Korea," *Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress*, March 6, 2003, 8: "And it is entirely implausible . . . that we could effectively prevent a few baseball-sized lumps of Plutonium-239 from being smuggled our of Yongbyon, and then out of North Korea."

60. Reuters, "Bush Sees Progress with N. Korea, Warns Iran," 15 December 2003.

61. See Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security* (Fall 1997): 90–136; Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work," *International Security* (Summer 1998): 66–77.

62. See "Nuclear Breakout," *New York Times*, 27 July 2003, which noted that, ". . . the nonproliferation treaty is no longer adequate in its present form. . . . It relies on the good faith of governments. It has no clear enforcement mechanisms." As to relevance, see Norman D. Levin, *The Two Koreas in 1998: Dealing With Adversity* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1999), 13.

63. Brooke, "Korean Claim Leaves U.S. Concerned, But Skeptical," A6. As a North Korean official said, the DPRK has ". . . no intention of transferring any means of nuclear deterrence to other countries."

64. Reuters, "Bush Sees Progress with N. Korea."

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